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“OUR FLAG WILL WAVE OVER ALL OF OKINAWA”

SIMON BOLIVAR BUCKNER'S
PACIFIC WAR

CHRISTOPHER L. KOLAKOWSKI

“SUFFICIENT GLORY”

EMMOR B. COPE AND THE
CREATION OF THE GETTYSBURG
NATIONAL MILITARY PARK

MATTHEW T. BOAN



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Front cover: Marine Maj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger (left) and Army Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. pose at a Shinto shrine on Okinawa.
National Archives

In this Winter 2024 issue, we are pleased to offer two excellent articles, a look at two unique artifacts from the Army's collection, a visit to the newly refurbished Rock Island Arsenal Museum, and an engaging crop of book reviews.

The first article, by Christopher Kolakowski, examines the life and World War II Pacific command of Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. During his wartime service, Buckner was the senior officer in Alaska and then commanded the Tenth Army during the Battle of Okinawa. His untimely death on Okinawa made Buckner the highest-ranking officer killed by enemy fire during the war. Kolakowski, through the use of Buckner's papers and other primary and secondary sources, weaves together the story of the formidable and determined commander whose place in history and contributions to the battle have long been overlooked.

The second article, by Center of Military History cartographer Matthew Boan, tells the story of Emmor Cope, Civil War veteran and the first chief engineer and eventual superintendent of Gettysburg National Military Park. Cope, a topographical engineer who served on the staff of Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, created the first maps of the Gettysburg battlefield and then dedicated more than thirty years of his life to its preservation and the memorialization of those who fought and died there.

This issue offers a glimpse at a couple of rare items from the Army's historical collection. Currently on display at the National Museum of the United States Army are two *senninbari*, a type of sash made for Japanese soldiers by loved ones at home. One belonged to a Nisei soldier who fought with the famed 442d Regimental Combat Team in Europe, and the other came from an unknown Imperial Japanese Army soldier in the Pacific Theater. The Museum Feature visits the recently renovated Rock Island Arsenal Museum. Originally opened in 1905, this is the Army's second oldest museum, and it just reopened after a three-year closure. Newly installed exhibits tell the story of the arsenal's contributions to victory through multiple wars and take visitors on a journey from the arsenal's founding up to its contributions to the Army's fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.

I'm happy to report to our readers that, with this issue, *Army History* is back on track in terms of publishing issues on a normal schedule. After the paper shortages and supply chain problems of the previous few years, we've worked very hard to make up time in our production processes so as to return to normal release dates. I thank everyone for their patience during this period. Special kudos go to the small staff here that strived so hard to get us back on track.

As I've done in the past, I'd like to remind potential contributors that, with the approach of the 250th anniversary of the Revolutionary War, we are especially interested in submissions concerning this conflict. Any articles covering land warfare aspects of the war will be considered. We hope to be able to publish a few stellar pieces covering this pivotal period in American history in the coming years.

BRYAN J. HOCKENSMITH
Managing Editor

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THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

HISTORY, HERITAGE, AND THE ARMY PROFESSION

The forty-first chief of staff of the Army (CSA), General Randy A. George, recently opened his tenure by announcing his priorities for the force. Four focus areas will drive the Army's doctrine, training, future force development, and systems acquisition. While all of the focus areas will benefit from the historical perspective that our program brings to the force, the success of the CSA's fourth priority, furthering the Army profession, clearly depends on Army history and historians, museum professionals, and archivists.

As I have written before, the value of historical mindedness to the Army's people occurs in two dimensions. *History*, the process of interrogating the past to establish context and causation and to build critical thinking skills, benefits Army soldiers and civilians at all levels, but it is especially important for leaders who must make decisions in risky, uncertain, volatile environments. The Army's history and museum programs promote this historical awareness in a diverse community of venues, from the classroom to the headquarters to the area of operations. Historical mindedness in all Army professionals fosters a critical appraisal of our past, an ability to avoid easy answers and false conclusions, and a willingness to learn from all aspects of experience. A nuanced understanding of the past leads to better decisions in the present and future.

When we think about the CSA's investment in our profession, however, it is equally important to encourage an awareness of *heritage* and to value it as a tool to help build unit culture and individual resiliency. The term *heritage* has been politically fraught for a long time, evoking images of an uncritical, celebratory view of the past that covers up mistakes and wrongdoing as a means of supporting present agendas. Yet, for a military organization, heritage awareness in our formations, leavened with the historical mindedness of leaders, avoids this trap and fosters in Army soldiers and civilians a deeper understanding of what and why they serve. This awareness can be a powerful motivational factor, producing people who know their standing in a long continuum of service to our nation and who can surmount challenges and accomplish their missions in the knowledge of the accomplishments of their forebears. Heritage awareness should never excise past mistakes

and defeats and should never condone harmful behaviors. With that caution in mind, the Army's historical and museum programs offer powerful tools for leaders at all levels to uncover aspects of their organization's past that are worthy of study and, if applicable, emulation. Programs like the Army Regimental System, unit lineage and honors, organizational heraldry, and Campaign Participation Credit are low-cost, low-impact ways for commanders to demonstrate their personal investment in Army heritage.

We also can see the power of heritage awareness at the nine Army posts that have been redesignated as part of the national efforts of the Naming Commission. The commission's choice of names honors the legacy of both soldiers and civilians who served the United States and supported the Army's missions throughout our nation's history. This endeavor has highlighted aspects of our past that have gone unrecognized for far too long.

I encourage leaders at all levels to examine the historical tools our enterprise provides and to incorporate both history and heritage awareness into their organization's programs to further our chief's objective of reinvigorating the Army profession. Our historians, museum professionals, and archivists are everywhere the Army lives and operates, and are ready and waiting to assist.

The Army's portals to all things history and heritage are web-based:

- U.S. Army Center of Military History:
<https://history.army.mil>
- U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center:
<https://ahec.armywarcollege.edu/>

General George's recent remarks on his priorities at the Association of the United States Army's annual meeting can be found here: https://www.army.mil/article/270691/army_chief_of_staff_outlines_service_priorities_at_ausa.



NEWSNOTES

New Publications from CMH

The Center of Military History (CMH) recently released two new publications. The first of these is *From New Look to Flexible Response: The U.S. Army in National Security, 1953–1963*, by Donald A. Carter. This book examines, year by year, the remarkable transformation of the U.S. Army in the decade that followed the Korean War. Within a national security environment captivated by the power and potential of atomic weapons, and spurred on by the strategic policies of the Eisenhower administration, the Army experimented with developments in its organization, weapons, equipment, and doctrine, as it struggled to define its place on an atomic battlefield. Additionally, the service's leaders slowly embraced concepts of limited warfare and counterinsurgency, which offered new opportunities to expand the Army's relevance. As a result, the Army that emerged in the early 1960s was designed less for atomic combat and more for the flexible role that its chief of staff had championed. *From New Look to Flexible Response* examines the key leaders, critical moments, and important decisions that set the Army on its new course. This book has been issued as CMH Pub 45–6 (cloth) and 45–6–1 (paper).

The second title is *Transition and Withdrawal: The U.S. Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation NEW DAWN, 2009–2011*, by Katelyn K. Tietzen-Wisdom. This publication tells the story following the surge campaign, which, under the improved conditions, saw the transfer of responsibilities from U.S. troops to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The United States and Iraq signed a status of forces agreement, which called for all U.S. forces to depart the country no later than 31 December 2011. The U.S. Army then shifted from combat to stability operations by focusing on advising and assisting the ISF. The U.S. Army departed Iraq by mid-December, leaving behind only a small contingent of personnel housed at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. This monograph, which has been issued as CMH Pub 78–3, covers that three-year period.



The Col. Charles Young Fellowship

This fellowship commemorates the service of Col. Charles Young to the nation and the Army. Born to enslaved parents in 1864, Young graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1889, becoming just the third African American to do so. During his career, he served in the cavalry, led the military science program (a forerunner of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps) at Wilberforce College, was superintendent of a national park, served as military attaché to Haiti and Liberia, and commanded cavalry squadrons in the Philippines and during the 1916 Punitive Expedition in Mexico. He was a torchbearer and trailblazer, becoming the first African-American officer to achieve the ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel in the Regular Army. Through his selfless service, Colonel Young demonstrated that African Americans could lead at any level in the U.S. Army. By doing so, he helped open doors for African Americans in the armed forces and made the Army more representative of the nation it serves. In 2022, the Army bestowed on him an honorary promotion to the rank of brigadier general.

CMH sponsors this fellowship with the objective of increasing diversity in its historian workforce and in the history it produces. Fellows will acquire additional knowledge in the fields of U.S. Army history and general military history, gain firsthand experience in the federal government history community, and obtain a security clearance. Fellows thus will be better prepared for possible future opportunities as civil service employees or contractors with the federal government. Fellows with a PhD will receive \$80,000 in return for working at at the Center of Military History for one year. Fellows who have not yet completed their PhD degree and are in all-but-dissertation (ABD) status will receive \$60,000. The fellowship does not include any paid benefits, other than 11 paid national holidays and 26 days of paid leave. By mutual agreement, the fellowship may be extended for a second year. Fellows will work a standard 40-hour week but are eligible for flexible work schedules that may permit occasional weekdays off in addition to holidays and paid leave. Fellows are eligible for partial telework, but should anticipate spending part of each week at CMH offices in Washington, D.C.

Col. Charles Young Fellows work within the Historical Programs Directorate at CMH, where they participate in activities that further the CMH missions.

They may conduct archival research in support of a major official history book project, research and write short monographs, help CMH historians prepare for and conduct oral histories, research and write information papers intended for senior leaders, assist in guiding battlefield staff rides, answer historical inquiries, research and write historical content for *Army History* magazine and the CMH website, and support the commemorative programs.

Continued on page 54

“Our Flag Will Wave Over All of Okinawa”

Simon Bolivar Buckner’s
Pacific War

By Christopher L. Kolakowski

Marine Maj. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd (left) and General Buckner observe the fighting on Okinawa.

National Archives

On 1 April 1945, the Tenth Army commander, Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr., rose early to observe the initial landings on Okinawa. It was a special day, as it was Easter Sunday, the anniversary of his father’s birth in 1823, and the beginning of Buckner’s first battle command. “The weather was good and the golden sunrise was not for Japan,” he noted that evening in his diary. “The crescendo of the bombardment, culminating in the rocket discharge was a magnificent spectacle. From start to finish the landing was a superb piece of teamwork which we could watch from the 50-yd line in the command room or on the flag deck.”¹

Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. was a major figure of the Pacific War. From 1940 to 1944, he was the senior Army officer in Alaska, charged with protecting the territory from Japanese invasion. He then rose to command Tenth Army during the Battle of Okinawa in the spring of 1945. On 18 June 1945, Buckner became the most senior U.S. officer killed by enemy fire in World War II, when he died from wounds received during a Japanese artillery strike.²

General Buckner’s tenure as Tenth Army commander ran from July 1944 until his death. It covered a key period of the war in the Pacific. From his arrival in Hawai‘i to take up his new post, he

was involved in deciding some of the most important questions of strategy and command in the Pacific theater. Buckner’s input on those matters helped determine the final steps on the path to victory over Japan, along with their timing. He then led Tenth Army in the invasion of Okinawa, the largest sea-air-land engagement in history. General Buckner was a key figure in the battle and the central land commander on the American side. However, his death made it difficult for subsequent historians of the battle to gain a full understanding of his role as commander. It is only in the past few years, as his papers have become widely available, that it has become possible to study his thinking during the battle and thoroughly assess his performance.

General Buckner’s Background

Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. was born on 18 July 1886 in Munfordville, Kentucky. His parents christened him after his father, Simon Bolivar Buckner Sr., and his family referred to him as “Bolivar” to differentiate him from his father.



Confederate Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner Sr.

Library of Congress

The elder Simon Bolivar Buckner was born in Munfordville on 1 April 1823, the son of Aylett and Elizabeth Buckner. Aylett Buckner, a local business owner, was a veteran of the War of 1812. He named his son after Simón Bolívar, the revolutionary Venezuelan commander who had led several colonies in South America to throw off Spanish rule.³ Buckner Sr. graduated from West Point in 1844 and served in the Mexican War, as a West Point instructor, and on the frontier. He resigned from the Army to pursue business interests in Chicago, serving as adjutant general of Illinois for a time. In 1861, he was a senior officer in the Kentucky militia and accepted a general's commission in the Confederate Army. He served primarily in the Western Theater, surrendering in May 1865. Business and newspaper interests occupied Buckner Sr.'s time in the years after the war. From 1887 to 1891, Buckner Sr. served as governor of Kentucky and, in 1896, was running mate to retired Maj. Gen. John M. Palmer on the Gold Democrat third-party presidential ticket.⁴ At the party convention in Indianapolis, the delegates passed a formal resolution naming their vice-presidential candidate's son, Bolivar, "The Child of the Democracy"—an unusual, unique honor. Bolivar's reaction at the time is not recorded, but he later tried to keep

the title quiet. "A good way to see General Buckner flush," noted a reporter in 1943, "or become embarrassed is to remind him of that [distinction] today."⁵

Buckner Sr. supported the War with Spain in 1898 and opposed Democrat William Jennings Bryan in the 1900 presidential election in which President William McKinley won a second term. These stands gained favor among McKinley and his allies in Washington, including then Vice President Theodore Roosevelt, who counted Buckner Sr. as an important partner in Kentucky.

Bolivar went to the Virginia Military Institute for two years, and, in early 1904, his father secured a presidential appointment to West Point from President Theodore Roosevelt. Bolivar reported for his plebe year on 16 June 1904, one month shy of his eighteenth birthday. He became known for athletics but was in the middle of his class academically. Bolivar graduated in 1908, taking an assignment in the 9th Infantry Regiment, which soon posted to the Philippines.⁶ On the third anniversary of his graduation from West Point, he found himself on a transport ship from Cebu to Manila. He had decided what he wanted to do with his life. He wrote to his mother:

The date reminds me that just three years ago Secty. of War [William H.] Taft handed me my diploma from West Point. At that time my idea of the Army was little more than a surmise. One of the thoughts which entered my



Buckner as a West Point cadet in 1908

West Point Library

mind at this time was the fact that as promotion was not according to merit, there was little in the military service to encourage an officer to excel in his profession. Three years, however, have proven to me beyond all doubt that such is not the case. It is true that an officer can not by his own efforts raise his rank, but it is equally true that he can raise his standing. Strict attention to duties will unquestionably raise an officer to a place in his regiment which no amount of rank can give him. In civil life, success is inseparably linked with money, but in military life there is a much higher aim. To render the greatest possible service to his government is the duty of every officer, and this should be his highest ambition. The civilian works chiefly for himself and is considered successful according to what he has done for himself. The incentive which we have in our work is expressed in the motto of our Alma Mater, "Duty, Honor, Country," and it is far more satisfactory to have this before us than to feel that we are working purely from motives of self-interest. It is thus that I have learned to love the Army, and I grow more attached to it every day.⁷

This philosophy guided Buckner's actions for the rest of his life.

Bolivar returned to the United States in time to participate in the Army's support of the fiftieth anniversary commemorations of the Battle of Gettysburg. In January 1914, Simon Bolivar Buckner Sr. died at his home in Kentucky. Bolivar was present for the death and funeral and later transferred to Washington. In Washington, he met Adele Blanc, who had gone to college in Louisville and was the vivacious and intelligent daughter of a New Orleans physician. They married on 30 December 1916 and honeymooned in the Philippines. Children followed in 1918, 1922, and 1926.⁸

When the United States entered World War I on 6 April 1917, Buckner immediately wrote Theodore Roosevelt, offering to serve under him overseas, should Roosevelt recruit another volunteer force similar to the famed Rough Riders in the War with Spain. "You were down on my list," Roosevelt replied, "but the president [Woodrow Wilson] will not send me."⁹ Buckner ended up serving in the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps at Kelly Field, Texas, with the

wartime rank of major. He went through flight training and soloed in a Jenny biplane, but his eyesight was ruled too deficient for full flight status. That ruling kept him in the United States. Buckner drilled aviation recruits and ran Kelly Field's ground school from November 1917 to August 1918. Following this assignment, he served in Washington on the Air Service General Staff. He was in Washington when the Armistice occurred on 11 November 1918.¹⁰

After World War I, Buckner was one of the officers tapped to rebuild West Point, which had been disrupted severely by the strains of war. As a tactical officer, or "tac," he helped implement the reforms of his superintendent, Brig. Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Buckner then studied and taught at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia; Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the Army War College in Washington, D.C. In 1932, he returned to West Point as a lieutenant colonel.¹¹ Buckner served at West Point as assistant commandant for the class of 1933's final year. As understudy to Commandant Robert C. Richardson Jr., Buckner succeeded Richardson as commandant for the classes of 1934, 1935, and 1936. The class of 1936 included some of the most influential officers of the Cold

War and Vietnam periods: Bruce Palmer Jr., William C. Westmoreland, Creighton W. Abrams Jr., John H. Michaelis, Benjamin O. Davis Jr., and William P. Yarborough.¹² After leaving West Point, Buckner, who became a colonel in 1937, commanded in turn the 66th Infantry Regiment (Light Tanks) and the 22d Infantry Regiment, before becoming the 6th Division's chief of staff at Fort Lewis, Washington. From that post, he took command of the Alaska defenses on 9 July 1940. Promotion to brigadier general soon followed.¹³

The Alaska territory was one-fifth the size of the continental United States. However, when Buckner arrived, only one small outpost at Chilkoot Barracks defended it. "A handful of enemy parachutists could capture Alaska overnight," stated newly appointed Governor Ernest H. Gruening in 1940. Over the next year, military installations sprung up all over the territory under Buckner's leadership and influence. The preparations came none too soon; in June 1942, Japanese forces attacked the base at Dutch Harbor and captured the islands of Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians.¹⁴

Over the next year, Buckner coordinated planning and preparations for a counteroffensive with his air and naval counterparts. U.S. forces invaded Attu on 11 May 1943, securing the island in a difficult and bitter battle that ended on the 30th. An invasion of Kiska followed on 15 August, but the Allied forces found that the Japanese defenders had evacuated right under their noses.¹⁵ Despite the anticlimactic ending, the Aleutians Campaign was a significant Allied victory. "The loyal courage, vigorous energy and determined fortitude of our armed forces in Alaska—on land, in the air and on the water—have turned back the tide of Japanese invasion, ejected the enemy from our shores and made a fortress of our last frontier," Buckner announced to his command in October. "But this is only the beginning. We have opened the road to Tokyo; the shortest, most direct and most devastating to our enemies. May we soon travel that road to victory."¹⁶

This optimism proved short-lived, however, as troops were siphoned off for higher-priority battlefronts. Buckner himself followed in June 1944, to serve as the commander of the new Tenth Army at its headquarters in Pearl Harbor, Hawai'i.

Preparing Tenth Army

Buckner, now a lieutenant general, entered a complicated command arrangement in Hawai'i. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz exercised overall command as the commander in chief of Pacific Ocean Areas (POA), a massive zone that covered the Pacific Ocean except for the region between Australia and the Philippines, which fell under General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area. The POA was divided into the North Pacific Area, Central Pacific Area, and South Pacific Area. Nimitz had his headquarters at Pearl Harbor, where he oversaw all areas and directly commanded the Central Pacific Area.


Under Nimitz were deputies for his air, land, and sea forces, who were headquartered on various installations around O'ahu. Air units came under Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon of the Army Air Forces. The fleet was commanded in alternate operations by Admirals Raymond A. Spruance and William F. Halsey, under the names Fifth Fleet and Third Fleet, respectively. Ground forces had divided authority. General Richardson, Buckner's predecessor as commandant of cadets at West Point and now a lieutenant general, administratively controlled all Army units as the commander of U.S. Army Forces Pacific Ocean Areas. However, Richardson's authority over his forces did not include battle command. A parallel organization existed for Marine Corps units under Lt. Gen. Holland M. Smith, the commander of V Amphibious Corps, and Smith already had helped plan and execute several operations in that role.¹⁷

Most of the POA's ground battles so far had been limited in scope to a division or less. Army troops usually had fought alongside Marine units under Holland Smith's overall supervision. As operations in the Central Pacific grew and more U.S. Army personnel arrived to serve under Nimitz, corps were created to provide the needed tactical direction. By mid-1944, it became clear that a field army headquarters was needed to oversee even larger forthcoming battles—especially Operation CAUSEWAY, a planned assault on Formosa and the China coast by Army Maj. Gen. John R. Hodge's XXIV Corps and Marine Maj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger's III Amphibious Corps. In Washington, Army Chief of Staff General George C.



Buckner, shown here as a brigadier general, in Alaska in 1940

*Atwood Resource Center, Anchorage Museum
at Rasmuson*



Lt. Gen. Holland M. Smith

Naval History and Heritage Command

Marshall set up Tenth Army and assigned General Buckner to its command. As Tenth Army commander, Buckner answered to Richardson for administration, training, and supply, and to Nimitz for when and where to fight.

When Buckner arrived, the Central Pacific Area just had opened Operation FORAGER, the invasion of the Mariana Islands, its largest offensive to date. On 15 June, Holland Smith's joint Army-Marine Corps force landed on Saipan. The Japanese fleet offered battle, and Spruance's Fifth Fleet defeated the Japanese in the Battle of the Philippine Sea on 19 and 20 June. Four days later, during the fighting on Saipan, Holland Smith relieved the 27th Infantry Division's commander, U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith. Holland Smith, who cited failure to follow orders as the official reason for the relief, was notoriously prejudiced against Army troops and made no secret of his feelings. Ralph Smith's relief generated heated controversy in the Pacific and threatened to rupture interservice relations at a critical point in Central Pacific operations.

On 5 July 1944, General Buckner received the orders formally activating Tenth Army. The same day, General Richardson ordered Buckner to preside over a board of inquiry into Ralph Smith's relief. The Buckner Board, as it came to be known, included General Hodge, Brig. Gen. Henry B. Holmes, Brig. Gen. Roy E. Blount, and Lt. Col. Charles A. Selby. The board investigated whether Holland Smith had acted within his authority in relieving Ralph Smith and whether this relief was

justified. Buckner told his diary that this was "a delicate assignment affecting Army-Navy relations," with important effects on future interservice relations in the Pacific and, possibly, his career.¹⁸ The Buckner Board met between 7 and 26 July 1944. It reviewed relevant documents and heard testimony from Ralph Smith and other Army officers involved in the situation. The board ultimately found that Holland Smith was within his authority to relieve Ralph Smith, but "was not fully informed regarding conditions in the zone of the 27th Infantry Division," and consequently Ralph Smith's relief "was not justified by the facts." Holland Smith and his naval colleagues criticized the board for consulting only Army sources. When the Buckner Board's report reached Washington, it circulated among General Marshall's staff before quietly being shelved in November. Public debate about the decision to relieve Ralph Smith continued in the press for the remainder of the war, as well as in postwar publications.¹⁹


Immediately following the Buckner Board's conclusion, General Buckner became involved in events surrounding President Franklin D. Roosevelt's visit to Pearl Harbor between 26 and 29 July. Roosevelt had been nominated for a fourth term and came to Hawai'i to meet with General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz to discuss Pacific War strategy—specifically, the merits of attacking either the Philippines or Formosa. Their discussions tilted the argument in favor of the Philippines, although Admiral Ernest J. King, the chief of naval operations, still favored Formosa as the objective. Yet as the planning continued, reservations grew among Nimitz's staff about the prospect of an operation against Formosa. In mid-September, Nimitz asked his subordinates for their opinions about the operation's feasibility. Harmon and Richardson expressed reservations about the plan, centered upon questions about geography and the relative merits of the islands. Buckner endorsed their views and observed that the Central Pacific did not have sufficient service and support troops to meet CAUSEWAY's requirements. Either the Army would need to reassign troops from Europe, or the invasion would have to wait for several months and would not be feasible much before 1 March 1945. Armed with this information, Nimitz and

Spruance met with King in early October and won agreement to suspend Operation CAUSEWAY in favor of other objectives.

The resulting directive shifted the Central Pacific Area's focus on 3 October. Four days later, Nimitz summoned Buckner to his office for a frank conversation. "Adm. Nimitz," Buckner recorded in his diary, "after sounding out my attitude on the Smith vs Smith controversy and finding that I deplored the whole matter and harbored no inter-service ill feeling, announced that I would command the new joint project."²⁰ This "new joint project" would be Operation ICEBERG, the objective of which was capturing the Ryukyu Islands, specifically the main island of Okinawa. In advance of this campaign, three Marine divisions of Holland Smith's V Amphibious Corps would conduct Operation DETACHMENT, attacking the island of Iwo Jima on 20 January 1945. Following DETACHMENT, Tenth Army would execute Operation ICEBERG on 1 March 1945.²¹

ICEBERG's objective, the Ryukyu Islands, was located around 350 miles from Kyushu, the southernmost of the Japanese home islands—well within range for Japanese land-based planes. Okinawa was the largest and most populated island in the Ryukyu chain. It stretched 60 miles on a roughly north to south axis, varying in width from 2 miles to 18. The terrain was flat in places, especially in the island's middle, but mostly it was rolling and frequently wooded. Most of its 400,000 residents lived in the southern third of the island, which included Okinawa's two largest cities, Naha and Shuri. Existing and potential airfield sites dotted the middle and southern parts of the island. This assault would be the closest attack to the home islands yet attempted. Okinawa was about 350 miles to Japanese bases in Shanghai and 500 miles to Japanese airfields in Formosa. The nearest American bases, by contrast, were 900 miles away in Leyte or 1,200 miles away in the Palaus and the Marianas. Honolulu and Pearl Harbor were 4,100 miles to the east of Okinawa, with San Francisco another 2,100 miles beyond that.²²

ICEBERG contemplated a three-phase conquest of Okinawa and the surrounding areas. First, Buckner's forces would secure southern Okinawa in Phase I, followed by the island's northern third and nearby Ie Shima in Phase II. Phase III (subdivided into



IIIa through III d) envisioned capturing more islands further north using troops from Tenth Army and the V Amphibious Corps. After each phase was complete, the captured territory would become a base for future operations. The goal was to accommodate an air force of 650 planes plus anchorages for shipping needed to support an invasion of the Japanese home islands. All of these objectives were expected to be complete within 120 days.

The forces assigned to Buckner included both U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps troops. The Army contingent consisted of Hodge's XXIV Corps with Maj. Gen. Archibald V. Arnold's 7th Infantry Division and Maj. Gen. James L. Bradley's 96th Infantry Division, plus Maj. Gen.

Andrew D. Bruce's 77th Infantry Division. Maj. Gen. George Griner's 27th Infantry Division was in floating reserve, with Maj. Gen. Paul Mueller's 81st Infantry Division available upon request to Nimitz. Geiger's III Amphibious Corps with Maj. Gen. Pedro del Valle's 1st Marine Division, Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Watson's 2d Marine Division, and Maj. Gen. Lemuel Shepherd's 6th Marine Division provided the marine contingent. Island government and development fell under an Island Command (Iscom), led by Maj. Gen. Fred C. Wallace. ICEBERG also would have its own land-based air force based around the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, known as Tactical Air Force (TAF) under marine Maj. Gen. Francis Mulcahy. Both Iscom

and TAF fell under Tenth Army, giving General Buckner a broader scope of responsibilities than any previous Pacific Army commander.

In support of Tenth Army were the 1,000 ships of Admiral Spruance's Fifth Fleet, which would support and protect Buckner's operations. V. Adm. Richmond K. Turner directed all amphibious operations and the several task forces bringing the ground forces to Okinawa. Buckner would report to Spruance and Turner for the first stages of the battle, later answering directly to Nimitz.

The final tactical plan for Operation ICEBERG called for Tenth Army to land 183,000 troops of Hodge's and Geiger's corps at Hagushi on Okinawa's west coast on 1 April 1945. A week prior to the main assault, Bruce's division would secure the nearby Kerama Islands as a fleet anchorage. The Hagushi landings would be accompanied by Watson's division demonstrating off Minatoga on Okinawa's southeast coast. After landing at Hagushi, Tenth Army would fight its way across Okinawa to cut the island in half, a task expected to take up to fifteen days. After that, XXIV Corps would execute Phase I and capture Okinawa's southern third. On Buckner's orders, III Amphibious Corps and other available units would attack northern Okinawa and the surrounding islands as part of Phase II. The follow-on operations in Phases IIIc and III d (IIIa and IIIb having been dropped during planning) would see three divisions of V Amphibious Corps and one of Tenth Army capture Miyako and Kikai Islands further north. The sequence and timing of the Phase III attacks would be ordered by Admiral Nimitz.

Opposing Buckner on Okinawa was Lt. Gen. Ushijima Mitsuru's *Thirty-Second Army* of two divisions, a brigade, a tank regiment, Okinawan militia, and attached units totaling 120,000 personnel. To provide maximum delay and opportunity to damage U.S. forces, Ushijima chose not to defend on the beaches. He deployed most of his forces in a series of fortified defense rings centered on Shuri, leaving detachments in central and northern Okinawa. American intelligence picked up much of Ushijima's preparations and gave the invading forces a basic understanding of Okinawa's geography. However, their preparations were deficient in two key respects. First, detailed maps



General Ushijima
Japanese Ministry of Defense

covering all of Okinawa were lacking. Second, estimates of Ushijima's strength credited him with between 60,000 and 70,000 personnel—numbers that would be believed until late in the battle.

In January 1945, training and final preparations began for Operations DETACHMENT and ICEBERG. For Buckner, this meant a lot of travel and coordination over long distances, because his forces and supplies were scattered all over the Pacific. Some supplies were in Seattle and San Francisco, while other troops were in Hawai'i. His main combat units also were dispersed, with Watson's division in the Marianas, Geiger's corps on Guadalcanal and nearby islands, and Hodge's corps still fighting on Leyte. The first time Tenth Army came together as a complete formation was off Okinawa.

In late January, Buckner visited Geiger's marines. Buckner and Geiger were old friends and spent time socializing and conferring about plans. The debris left from the 1942–1943 fighting on the island was still visible. Buckner also visited the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions and watched some training. "Training facilities none too good—very little terrain variety," he noted of the veteran 1st Marine Division's area. The newly created 6th Marine Division gave a generally positive impression, except for one regiment: "29th Reg had sloppy qrs & apparently poor discipline but splendid

weapon teamwork in Det & Co attacks. Bn exercise got out of hand. Tanks & men exposed themselves instead of using cover. Individual camouflage good . . . 29th Regt, a new one, seemed behind the others."²³

Buckner met a different reception on Leyte a week later with XXIV Corps. Hodge's troops had been loaned to MacArthur's Southwest Pacific forces for the Leyte landing and had been in action nearly continuously since 20 October 1944. Resisting an agreement with Nimitz that the corps would be available for Tenth Army, MacArthur's staff proved reluctant to part with the troops. "Hodge's corps will get no real rest nor rehabilitation before next campaign and their equipment is badly in need of repair, but they are good fighters," noted Buckner in his diary. "Gen MacArthur, I hear, is very irate over Adm Nimitz' message accurately describing the status of XXIV Corps and requesting that his agreement with Gen MacArthur be lived up to. . . . I urged that we avoid recriminations over the past but bend every effort toward pooling all efforts so as to improve the readiness of the Corps for its coming operation." Buckner won cooperation, and noted in his diary that he returned to Hawai'i with "great confidence in both my corps."²⁴

Buckner also was thinking about command succession. In early February, he wrote Nimitz, "asking that Gen. Geiger take over the Tenth Army should I become a casualty." This letter had to go through Richardson, who blocked further official action or transmission. Nonetheless, Buckner made his opinion known informally to Geiger and others, including Tenth Army Chief of Staff Brig. Gen. Elwyn D. "Eddie" Post.²⁵

In mid-March, Buckner flew to Guam and met up with Admiral Turner aboard the command ship USS *Eldorado*. They conferred about the recent fighting on Iwo Jima as the ship sailed to Leyte. In Leyte Gulf, they observed landing rehearsals, and Buckner ran a command post exercise using the actual D-Day message traffic from the Iwo Jima landing. Buckner also conferred with Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger and his Eighth Army staff, who were in the process of liberating the southern and central Philippines.²⁶

What Buckner saw and heard made a strong impression. "The fighting will be more and more interesting as we press forward into the Mikado's domains," he

wrote to his wife Adele on 26 March. "Two Jima is an example of how heavily a small island can be fortified. The Marines had a tough time there because every inch of the island was defended by solid rock and concrete emplacements. The Marines did a good job in taking it and its capture compensates for the heavy losses. In actual numbers the Marine casualties equal those of Lee at Gettysburg. This will give you some idea of how heavy the fighting was."²⁷ The next morning, the invasion fleet left Leyte Gulf with what Buckner termed "an air of dignified confidence."²⁸


The Battle of Okinawa

On 26 March, Bruce's 77th Infantry Division attacked the Kerama Islands, securing the island group over four days with little loss. On 1 April 1945, Tenth Army landed on Okinawa. The invasion date was code-named L-Day, or "Love Day" using the phonetic alphabet of the time, a somewhat ironic choice that generated much comment.

American forces advanced inland against virtually no opposition. A few hundred yards from the beaches, a 7th Infantry Division private stopped and spoke for many: "I've already lived longer than I thought I would." By nightfall, Tenth Army's troops had pushed most of the way across the island, securing in twenty-four hours what was expected to take days. "The [Japanese] have missed their best opportunity on the ground and in the air," mused Buckner. "When their counter-attack comes we will be holding strong ground."²⁹

On 3 April, Buckner signaled to Geiger, "All restrictions removed on your advance northward." Buckner thus activated Phase II much earlier than planned, which showed considerable initiative and aggressiveness. The marines immediately pushed into northern Okinawa, quickly surrounding and eliminating pockets of resistance.³⁰

As Tenth Army advanced, the Japanese repeatedly sent massed air attacks against Spruance's fleet. Mixing conventional and kamikaze missions, the strikes damaged and sunk many ships, including an ammunition ship. The Japanese navy sent a task force based around the battleship *Yamato* that was sunk halfway to Okinawa on 7 April. "We are constantly under



air attack but our carrier planes and my own operating from captured fields have done a splendid piece of work and shot down several hundred of the attacking planes,” wrote Buckner to Adele on 14 April. “The quality of [Japanese] pilots is deteriorating and those recently encountered show evidence of hasty and inadequate training.”³¹



Generals Buckner (left) and Geiger on Okinawa
National Archives

Administrative concerns soon weighed on General Buckner, as Wallace set up Iscom and started air base and road improvements. One of the biggest challenges was dealing with thousands of Okinawan civilians. “Okinawa civilians, a pathetic lot, [are] coming out of holes carrying children, old people, and few belongings,” noted Buckner on 8 April. His diary observations also remark on the fact that the Okinawans did not necessarily consider themselves Japanese. “They seem docile and often smile and wave as we pass. They seem to dislike the [Japanese]. Many of their villages are destroyed but they accept it stoically. Some say they are glad we are here and give us information about the [Japanese].” Before the battle’s end, over half of Okinawa’s 400,000 residents passed through Iscom’s care.³²

On 6 April, Buckner had received word of a reorganization of the Pacific forces. All Army forces would fall under MacArthur, and Nimitz would command all naval forces. However, Tenth Army would stay under Nimitz until Operation ICEBERG ended. “All members of 10th Army are happy to greet our new theater commander with deep faith in your brilliant leadership and assurances of enthusiastic loyalty in carrying out to the utmost of our ability any task that may be assigned us,” Buckner

wrote MacArthur. “We share with you [a] solemn determination to avenge [the fall of] Bataan in Tokyo.” The next day, MacArthur replied, “I am looking forward with keenest pleasure to association with your magnificent command.”³³

In southern Okinawa, XXIV Corps fought through Ushijima’s outposts and encountered the first defense line before Shuri. The 96th Infantry Division faced *Kakazu Ridge*, and the 7th Infantry Division found a series of ridges topped with Okinawa’s traditional bunkerlike stone tombs. Both divisions attacked repeatedly but failed to make much progress. On 12 April, after three days of fighting, the corps had advanced no more than 500 yards and paused to regroup. A Japanese counterattack was repulsed in savage fighting. “It is going to be really tough,” said General Hodge. “I see no way to get them out except blast them out yard by yard.”³⁴

Buckner remained optimistic. “In the south, we are up against the most formidable defenses yet encountered in the Pacific, well backed up by artillery and Navy mortars,” he wrote to Adele. “Since we have all the airfields that we need to work on for the present, I am not hurrying the attack on the south but am greatly reducing casualties by a gradual



Army troops and a Sherman tank make their way through a Japanese minefield on Okinawa.

National Archives

and systemic destruction of their works. This we are doing successfully and can, I feel confident, break their line in ample time for our purposes.”³⁵


Offshore, Bruce’s 77th Infantry Division attacked Ie Shima on 16 April. The island fell after four days of fighting, yielding an important airfield. On 18 April, the third

day of the invasion, war correspondent Ernie Pyle was killed in the fighting. The division later marked the spot where it had “lost a buddy” with a monument—a fitting tribute from the World War II G.I.³⁶

Meanwhile, General Hodge brought up the 27th Infantry Division as reinforcements and renewed the attack

on 19 April. Land-based artillery joined with naval gunfire to open the offensive in what would be the largest bombardment in the Pacific War. The massed firepower had little effect on the sheltered Japanese, who greeted the Americans with their usual ferocity. Instead, American infantry developed what Buckner called “blowtorch and corkscrew” tactics, using explosives and fire to seal off and destroy Japanese defenses. Ushijima’s defenders held off Hodge’s attackers in five days of back-and-forth fighting, until growing casualties caused Ushijima to order a retreat southward. The attacking divisions also suffered heavy losses; one private in the 96th Infantry Division noted that only eleven of the forty-four men in his platoon were unhurt after this stage of fighting ended.³⁷

The last ten days of April were a transition point in the fighting on Okinawa. Formal Resistance in northern Okinawa ended 20 April, a day before Bruce declared Ie Shima secure. These victories freed up Geiger’s corps and Bruce’s division for employment elsewhere, and Buckner canvassed his staff and colleagues for recommendations about how best to employ these troops. During days of discussions, several officers pushed for one



division to make a landing at Minatoga and envelop the Japanese position at Shuri. Others correctly pointed out that XXIV Corps was exhausted and depleted from the recent fighting and needed reinforcement. Buckner also faced pressure from Nimitz to press the attack. On 23 April, Nimitz told him, "I'm losing a ship and a half a day. So if this line isn't moving in five days, we'll get someone up here to move it so we can all get out from under these damn kamikaze attacks."³⁸

For his part, Buckner considered all possibilities. He felt a need to keep forces available for Phases IIIc and III d, and this made him reluctant to overcommit his army on Okinawa when those operations were not complete. There were questions about Minatoga's beaches and terrain being feasible for a quick landing and breakthrough. Plus, it appeared that Ushijima's strength was nearly exhausted. Buckner also told his staff that a Minatoga operation would be "another Anzio, but worse"—a reference to the landing and siege of the Anzio Beachhead in Italy from January to May 1944, which had been expected to be a quick victory but instead bogged down Allied forces near Cassino and Rome.

Buckner finally ordered Geiger's corps and Bruce's division to reinforce the fighting line opposite Shuri. Once they had deployed, Tenth Army would launch a new series of attacks to capture Shuri. This decision to eschew a Minatoga landing, a point of contention at the time, remains the most controversial aspect of Buckner's conduct of the Battle of Okinawa.³⁹

To Shuri and Beyond

The redeployments were completed by the end of April, and the fresh troops opened the attack against Ushijima's defenses. Buckner visited the 77th Infantry Division and 1st Marine Division to monitor their performance. "It was apparent to me that the 77th Div and the 1st Mardiv entered the line expecting to show their superiority over their predecessors by a rapid breakthrough of the enemy's position," he told his diary. "They were promptly stopped and learned some valuable lessons today. From now on they will be more valuable as all-around fighters."⁴⁰


The pace of fighting increased during the first week of May. Tenth Army faced a Japanese counteroffensive and defeated it on 4–6 May with heavy losses to Ushijima's



General Ushijima (center, pointing) and his staff on Okinawa in April 1945

Japanese Ministry of Defense

troops. Nimitz ordered Phase III d to start on 15 July, a message that was followed by good news from Europe. "Official word came of Germany's complete surrender," noted Buckner. "At noon every gun of our land and ship support batteries fired one round at the enemy. We then tuned into the [Japanese] radio frequency and





Left to right: General Buckner, General Shepherd, and Marine Maj. Gen. William T. Clement view the advance of American troops on Okinawa.

National Archives

announced in Japanese that the volley was in celebration of the victory. Tomorrow we are dropping an extra of our [Japanese-language] newspaper with elaboration of this news.” Ominously, Buckner also noted that “Heavy rain bogged down our tanks and slowed our advance.” This was the first of fifteen inches of rain that drenched Okinawa between 7 May and 31 May, with ten inches falling between 21 and 31 May.⁴¹


On 11 May, Tenth Army launched a general offensive all along its line. In the west, the 6th Marine Division captured Sugar Loaf Hill in a week of intense fighting, then secured the city and port of Naha. To its east, the 1st Marine Division fought into the Wana Draw, threatening Shuri itself. Further east, XXIV Corps’ 77th and 96th Infantry Divisions gained ground, allowing the 7th Infantry Division to slip past the Japanese eastern flank at Yonabaru.

Buckner visited the front nearly every day to check on progress and issue guidance. On 13 May, he visited Col. Edwin T. May’s 383d Infantry Regiment as it attacked Conical Hill, key to the

Japanese eastern defenses. Two companies penetrated almost to the hill’s crest, as supporting attacks made progress. “May’s handling of the Regt. was a beautiful piece of troop leading,” mused Buckner to his diary. “I could watch the Bn & Co movements easily from the OP and even see [Japanese], effect of fire, etc. I was there over four hours.” Conical’s fall opened the way to Yonabaru.⁴²

By 21 May, it was clear that Tenth Army had the upper hand. The 7th Infantry and 6th Marine Divisions were in position to make a pincer movement to surround Ushijima’s defenders, but the weather conspired against further progress. “Heavy rain has stopped our tanks,” recorded Buckner, “and is impeding supply just at a time when rapid progress . . . is most desirable.”⁴³

Ushijima chose to withdraw, leaving an outpost line to cover the retreat. It took American intelligence several days to detect the Japanese movement, but Buckner reacted swiftly once he got the word. “Initiate without delay,” he ordered, “strong and unrelenting pressure to





A flamethrowing Sherman tank fires at the entrance to a cave on southern Okinawa.

National Archives

ascertain probable intentions and keep him off balance.” All units surged forward against desperate Japanese resistance. Shuri fell on 31 May to the 1st Marine Division. “Ushijima missed the boat on his withdrawal from the Shuri Line,” announced Buckner to his staff that day. “It’s all over now but cleaning up pockets of resistance. This doesn’t mean there won’t be stiff fighting.”⁴⁴

By this point, it was clear that Okinawa had far more potential as a base than the U.S. forces previously had understood. Buckner and others had recommended to Nimitz that the island be kept as a U.S. protectorate after the war for that very reason, which also meant that other potential bases in the Ryukyus were not needed. On 8 June, Nimitz canceled all unexecuted phases of ICEBERG and told Buckner to concentrate on finishing the battle on Okinawa. “Directive came directing future activities of Tenth Army over which I have every reason to be jubilant,” noted Buckner in his diary.⁴⁵

The remnants of Ushijima’s army, now reduced to 30,000 troops, dug in along a range of hills 6 miles south of Shuri. Tenth Army probed these defenses before launching an offensive on 9 June. Over eight days of fighting, the Americans methodically eliminated each Japanese strongpoint. Artillery and airstrikes pounded Ushijima’s positions, while American tanks assisted the infantry assaults. In some cases, the Americans poured gasoline into potential Japanese hiding places in caves and bunkers

and set them alight. Ushijima ordered counterattacks, but they all failed.⁴⁶

At the same time, the 6th Marine Division turned its attention to the Japanese naval units defending Oroku Peninsula. The marines attacked into the peninsula, both from the sea and from its base, and soon surrounded its 4,000 defenders among the hills in the peninsula’s center. The marines slowly cleared the hills in ten days.⁴⁷

Buckner sensed victory was near. On 10 June, he appealed to Ushijima to cease resistance but received no reply. “We have passed the speculative phase of the campaign,” he told his staff on 15 June, “and are down to the final kill.” The next day, Buckner closed a letter to his son Claiborne, then starting his second year at West Point, with the line: “I hope that by the time you get this our flag will wave over all of Okinawa.”⁴⁸


“You’re Going Home, General”

Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. awoke on the morning of 18 June 1945 and took his usual breakfast. After looking at some papers, about 0830 he bid farewell to General Post and departed for the front accompanied by several staff officers. He wore his usual uniform and carried his pistol in its shoulder holster while his helmet and jeep displayed the three stars of his rank. He traveled southward toward the front lines near Naha.⁴⁹

In late morning, Buckner arrived at the sector of the 8th Marines, a detached regiment of the 2d Marine Division seeing its first action on Okinawa. That morning, the 8th had attacked south from Mezado against Japanese positions on Ibaru Ridge. The regiment’s 2d Battalion was in the lead, with the 3d Battalion in support and 1st Battalion in reserve.⁵⁰

The 8th’s commander, Col. Clarence R. Wallace, had established an observation post on a hill near Mezado, and General Buckner headed there. Behind the hill, he found some of the regiment’s 1st Battalion and took time to shake hands and interact with the newly arrived marines. “These exchanges meant a great deal to the Marines he encountered, and they gathered around him in small groups,” recalled Capt. J. Fred Haley, commanding Company A. “The presence of the 10th Army commander, a three-star general, on the frontlines gave a tremendous boost to morale.”⁵¹

Buckner then walked up the hill, where he met with Wallace and Maj. William C. Chamberlin of the regimental staff. Almost everyone stayed behind under cover, but the three men stood close to some coral boulders on the crest—easy cover if needed. They watched for some time as Wallace’s marines attacked across the valley into the fire of Japanese machine guns and light artillery. Troops below radioed that the stars on Buckner’s helmet were visible, and he exchanged it for a plain helmet. Shortly



Colonel Wallace

U.S. Marine Corps Military History Division



The last photograph of Buckner (right), taken moments before he was killed

National Archives

afterward, a photographer took a picture of the group.

After about an hour atop the hill, Buckner had seen enough. “Things are going so well here,” he said, “I think I’ll move on to another unit.” Just then, a Japanese 47-mm. shell struck the boulder next to him, knocking the officers down. Wallace and Chamberlin were shaken but unharmed. Buckner was hurt more seriously; a piece of coral had embedded in his chest. He began gasping for air and asked if everyone else was okay.⁵²

Marines quickly carried him to the hill’s back slope and put him on a stretcher. A group gathered as word spread. The 1st Battalion’s surgeon, U.S. Navy Lt. Tom Sullivan, joined and gave Buckner plasma as staff officers radioed for medical evacuation. Buckner kept trying to speak but could not. He reached out his right hand for assistance in standing. Pvt. Harry M. Sarkisian grabbed it with both hands and leaned over the struggling man. “You’re going home, General,” he told Buckner. “You are homeward bound.” Sarkisian repeated these words as General Buckner gasped his last breaths.

“Those present were in a state of shock,” recalled Captain Haley. “It was so totally unexpected, we were stunned.” One of Buckner’s aides recited the Bible’s twenty-third psalm. Sarkisian held Buckner’s hand for a long moment, then released it as Sullivan closed Buckner’s eyes. Soon, an ambulance arrived and carried the body to the rear, where Buckner officially was pronounced dead at a nearby aid station.

The next morning, Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. received a military funeral in a 7th Infantry Division military cemetery on Okinawa. Fittingly, he was laid to rest among representatives of units who had fought in the Aleutians.

On the afternoon of the 18th, Post notified Geiger, Hodge, and Fred Wallace about Buckner’s death. The three met and confirmed that Geiger would succeed Buckner. On 19 June, Geiger announced his promotion to lieutenant general and accession to command of Tenth Army. Geiger was the first (and only) U.S. Marine and the first aviator of any service to command an American field army.⁵³

Despite the sudden change in command, Tenth Army continued its southward advance with renewed aggression. In the 8th Marines, what Captain Haley termed a “slowly rising anger” spurred the regiment to become “an avenging avalanche sweeping



Buckner’s grave on Okinawa

National World War II Museum

all before it, [in] a whirlwind finish, which brought us to the beach at the southern tip of Okinawa.” Over the seventy-two hours after Buckner’s death, more than 7,000 Japanese were killed as the Americans slashed forward against diminishing resistance.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall assigned General Joseph W. Stilwell as the new permanent commander of Tenth Army. On 22 June, Geiger declared Okinawa secure and conducted a ceremonial flag raising. The next morning, Stilwell arrived on Okinawa and assumed command.⁵⁵

On Okinawa’s southeast coast, General Ushijima and his staff sheltered in a seaside cave. Many of his staff cheered Buckner’s death, but Ushijima was more philosophical. He knew the same fate awaited him; surrender was unthinkable for an Imperial Japanese Army general officer. As American troops drew near on the evening of 21 June, Ushijima had a farewell banquet with his staff. In the predawn hours of 22 June, the general, his chief of staff, and several staff officers died by suicide.⁵⁶

Fighting lasted another week as Stilwell directed a systematic advance southward. In the last days of June 1945, Tenth Army killed 8,975 Japanese and captured over 2,900 prisoners. Thousands of dazed civilians were coaxed from caves. On 2 July 1945, major combat operations on Okinawa ended, and Stilwell terminated Operation ICEBERG. It had been ninety-one days since Buckner led his forces ashore at Hagushi.⁵⁷

The invasion of Okinawa was the bloodiest engagement in the Pacific War, and it ranks as the largest sea-air-land battle of all time. In three months, Tenth Army losses had amounted to 7,374 killed, 31,807 wounded, and 239 missing; Navy losses offshore added another 4,907 killed and 4,824 wounded, for a total loss of 49,151. The invasion fleet lost 36 ships to sinking and another 368 to damage over the same period. There were also more than 26,000 nonbattle casualties, mostly accidental and psychological, for a grand total of more than 75,000 American casualties. Japanese losses totaled more than 110,000 military personnel killed and more than 7,000 taken prisoner, plus over 7,000 planes and 16 ships destroyed. Of Okinawa’s population, over 82,000 died in the battle from all causes, including suicide.⁵⁸

For both sides, the obvious next step beyond Okinawa was an invasion of the Japanese home islands of Kyushu and Honshu. The day General Buckner died,



A Japanese prisoner is searched after surrendering at the entrance of a cave

National Archives

U.S. senior leaders met in Washington to discuss prospects for the invasion, code-named Operation DOWNFALL. The bloodletting on Okinawa made a deep impression on the U.S. military and civilian leadership and influenced the decisions to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima on 6 August and Nagasaki on 9 August. Japan signaled its intent to surrender on 15 August 1945. Thus, Okinawa became the last major battle of both the Pacific War and the preatomic era.⁵⁹

General Buckner: An Assessment

General Buckner commanded Tenth Army for eleven months, from 5 July 1944 until his death on 18 June 1945. He led the unit in only one battle, but he had spent much of his tenure preparing it for action and helping determine where it would fight.

Most analyses of General Buckner as Tenth Army's commander focus on his battle command on Okinawa. However, U.S. field army commanders in World War II played many roles. The 1942 Field Service Regulations outlined an army commander's job as follows:

The army commander plans and puts into execution the operations necessary to carry out most suitably and decisively the mission assigned the army. During the planning phase the army commander should keep

the major subordinate commanders advised of the contemplated operations so that these commanders may prepare their plans, make recommendations, execute required troop movements, and reconnaissance, and effect deception and surprise measures. In his planning the army commander must project himself well into the future; his plans must cover considerable periods of operations; and while one operation, which may extend over many days or weeks, is progressing, he must be planning the next. The plans of the army commander must be flexible so that full exploitation of favorable situations can be effected and unfavorable situations, should they occur, can be rectified.⁶⁰

This definition provides a useful framework for evaluating any U.S. army commander in World War II.

Tenth Army was the last U.S. field army to enter battle in World War II. Because it was a new formation, General Buckner needed to coordinate and coalesce his staff, subordinate commanders, and units into an effective team around a shared plan for Operation ICEBERG, the invasion of Okinawa. This task would have been challenging even if all the units had been in Hawai'i with Buckner's headquarters; instead, almost all of Tenth Army's assigned fighting units were thousands of miles from Hawai'i, either in training in the Solomon Islands or in combat in the Philippines. Much the same dispersion applied to Tenth

Army's supporting air and naval forces. The distances, plus the potential of interservice misunderstandings, made planning and preparation fraught with pitfalls. That all these elements came together at the right place and time, under a good plan, to make a successful landing and campaign was a momentous achievement.

Buckner's personal leadership made a significant impact. He refused to allow interservice rivalries to impede Tenth Army's functioning as a cohesive unit, and he used personal visits to build and sustain bonds around a shared concept of operations. "The battle of Okinawa represented joint service cooperation at its finest," opined a marine officer and historian. "This was General Buckner's greatest achievement, and General Geiger continued the sense of teamwork after Buckner's death. Okinawa remains a model of interservice cooperation to succeeding generations of military professionals." Indeed, the battle is notable for the number of times artillery and aircraft of each service supported troops of the other. Buckner and his commanders successfully leveraged Army and Marine strengths to ensure victory. "The Tenth Army, in my opinion, did a magnificent job and made a major contribution toward winning the war," said Brig. Gen. Oliver P. Smith, Buckner's marine deputy chief of staff, in 1946.⁶¹

In addition to the challenges of organizing Tenth Army, Buckner needed to navigate the political waters of the POA. Administratively, Tenth Army fell under Richardson and later MacArthur, but Buckner knew that, operationally, his fate would be determined by Nimitz. General Buckner needed to take care of his Army troops while reassuring his Navy and Marine colleagues that he could work with all services, which he successfully did over a period of months.

Buckner led Tenth Army into Operation ICEBERG, which entailed the seizure of Okinawa and the surrounding islands. The overall plan, its objectives beyond Okinawa, and its estimate of 60,000 defenders on Okinawa affected Buckner's conduct of the battle. Virtually all of the operation's objectives had to be captured with troops on hand—similar to the problems with the proposed Operation CAUSEWAY, the Army had no additional troops to spare for the mission.⁶²

Tenth Army also fought under conditions unique in the Pacific. Buckner was senior ground commander for Operation



Admiral Turner

Naval History and Heritage Command

ICEBERG. Unlike his counterparts in Sixth and Eighth Armies, who could focus on fighting and defer rear-area tasks to higher headquarters or the Philippine government, Buckner, as Tenth Army commander, had to run civil government and base development for Iscom while fighting an active campaign. Additionally, a significant part of his subordinate units were not U.S. Army troops—they were U.S. marines in III Amphibious Corps. Balancing and integrating the two services with their different doctrines, standards, and outlooks was a difficult task, one not always done successfully in previous years—as Buckner had learned first-hand during the investigation of the two Smiths on Saipan. Of the U.S. field armies employed in World War II, only two—Fifth Army in Italy and Tenth Army on Okinawa—contained a significant portion of non-U.S. Army troops. Fifth Army, as the senior American field headquarters in Italy, also had expanded civil government and rear-area responsibilities relative to the American field armies in France. General Buckner thus faced a more complex task than most of his peers.

The nature of Tenth Army's opponents also influenced Buckner's conduct of battle. Ushijima ranked alongside Yamashita Tomoyuki and Homma Masaharu as one of the best Japanese field army commanders the United States faced in the Pacific. Ushijima was a smart soldier who led a large and motivated force in a skillful defense and earned Buckner's respect.

Amidst these circumstances, General Buckner made two critical decisions that shaped the fighting on Okinawa. The first was on 3 April, when he authorized

Geiger to advance his corps into northern Okinawa and commence Phase II. This bold decision, which was made forty-eight hours after U.S. forces landed and before they had encountered the main body of Japanese resistance, demonstrated Buckner's aggressiveness and flexibility. He effectively reversed the plan after landing and sought to capitalize on the momentum generated from lighter-than-expected Japanese resistance. Geiger's victory in northern Okinawa sped up the campaign and made the III Amphibious Corps fully available for commitment against the strong Japanese defenses in the south.

The second, and far more controversial, decision came in late April, after the capture of Ie Shima and northern Okinawa, when both the 77th Infantry Division and Geiger's corps were free for redeployment. Buckner chose to forgo proposals for an enveloping landing behind the Shuri Line at Minatoga, instead sending the three divisions to relieve tired elements of the XXIV Corps in front of Shuri. This decision generated much controversy among the officers involved and in the press; on the day Buckner died, Nimitz was still defending him to reporters. Yet the XXIV Corps was severely battered after three solid weeks of fighting, with many units suffering significant losses in men and equipment. "All three Army divisions, the 7th, 27th, and 96th were all at a low state of combat efficiency due to losses and fatigue," recalled a staff officer. "In order to maintain the pressure on the [Japanese] it was felt that it was better to relieve these divisions as far as possible." Minatoga's terrain was also a factor in the decision. The beaches were treacherous and would make landing supplies difficult, which would be a serious problem in an invasion. The formidable heights inland also aided the defenders. After the battle, it emerged that Ushijima had expected a landing there and had planned an aggressive reception.⁶³

General Post recalled that, at first, "General Buckner wanted very much to make the landings on the southern shore" at Minatoga. "He studied the matter thoroughly, discussed it at length with Admiral Turner, and the commanders involved. It was only after he had weighed all factors that he dismissed the plan as being too hazardous . . . Admiral Turner stood ready to back any decision of General Buckner's which he considered his forces could support. He considered General Buckner's decision correct and sound."⁶⁴

Buckner believed that the Minatoga landing would be "another Anzio, but worse." As mentioned previously, this was a reference to the Italian Campaign, which, in late 1943, had bogged down among German mountain defenses near Cassino, south of Rome. On 22 January 1944, the U.S. VI Corps landed at Anzio in an effort to flank the defenders and force a German retreat. Instead, the Anglo-American force became trapped and fought off several German attempts to drive it into the sea, requiring heavy reinforcements to do so. Meanwhile, the Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army repeatedly failed to break through at Cassino, resulting in a bloody stalemate. Only in late May, four months after the Anzio landing, did the Allies advance past Cassino and link up with VI Corps. "Anzio became the epic stand on a lonely beachhead," wrote the official Army historian of the campaign. "But the dogged courage of the men on that isolated front could not dispel the general disappointment—the amphibious operation had not led to the quick capture of Rome. Furthermore, the expedition had approached disaster, averted only by the grim determination of the troops to hold."⁶⁵

Buckner did not want to divide his combat power between an isolated beachhead and the main front, with neither force being strong enough to win and both taking significant casualties. Plus, his intelligence personnel still underestimated Ushijima's strength by about half and calculated that the Japanese were losing nearly fifteen people for every American killed. It appeared that breaking the Shuri defenses effectively would end the battle, and victory was close. In addition, the requirements of Phase III—estimated at one or more divisions—obligated Buckner to conserve his strength for future operations beyond Okinawa itself.⁶⁶ Based on what he knew and when, as well as considering the requirements of Phase III, Buckner's decision to forgo a landing at Minatoga is reasonable. He did not rule out all amphibious envelopments, as the 6th Marine Division's successful assault on the Oroku Peninsula near Naha bore out.

The focus on the Minatoga decision obscured the fact that Tenth Army essentially had won its battle by the time General Buckner died on 18 June. Buckner had built an army, melded its disparate elements into a fighting force over great distance and time, and successfully led it to the cusp of victory. He made important contributions to the Pacific War's conduct and outcome, and his

performance as Tenth Army commander must be ranked as excellent.

Conclusion

As was customary for all American overseas deaths between 1941 and 1945, General Buckner's next of kin had to decide whether to leave their service member buried in an overseas cemetery or have the U.S. government return his body for interment at a place of the family's choosing. Adele Buckner chose to bring her husband home to the family plot in Frankfort, Kentucky.⁶⁷

On 9 February 1949, Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. was laid to rest for the final time. Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, the former Fifteenth Army commander, escorted the remains to the graveside. In addition to the family, mourners included U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Omar N. Bradley; Generals Courtney H. Hodges, Hodge, Bruce, Shepherd, and Oliver Smith; Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid; and dozens of family friends and lesser-ranking comrades. (The local newspaper called it "Frankfort's greatest assembly of high ranking officers.") Some attendees noted the Buckner plot's proximity to the grave of Daniel Boone and the magnificent view of Frankfort and the Kentucky River below.⁶⁸

The ceremony was "as simple as that of a private," according to a press report. Chaplain C. R. Stinnette, who had conducted the Okinawa service in 1945, presided. The Buckner family laid a lily wreath, which Adele felt was "an exquisite tribute." The salute volleys crashed and echoed off the Kentucky hills; Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. had come home.⁶⁹ The service provided an important sense of closure to Adele. "The strain and fatigue is gradually slipping



General Gerow

U.S. Army

away," she wrote a few days later. Adele never remarried and lived until just after her ninety-fifth birthday in 1988. She lies next to her husband under a stone that notes, "The spirit of adventure never left her."⁷⁰

Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. was the senior American officer killed by enemy action in both World War II and the entirety of the twentieth century. In tribute, many U.S. military installations have named a road, building, or other feature for Buckner. West Point's summer camp became Camp Buckner, and Nakagusuku Bay on the southern coast of Okinawa became known as Buckner Bay to many U.S. service members stationed on the island. The transport ship USNS *Simon B. Buckner* served from 1946 to 1970, including in the Korean and Vietnam

Wars. In 1954, Congress posthumously gave Buckner a fourth star and the rank of general. His gravestone was not updated, however, and to this day shows only the three stars of a lieutenant general. Nevertheless, the inscription fittingly notes that Buckner died "leading his troops to final victory."⁷¹

Christopher L. Kolakowski is the director of the Wisconsin Veterans Museum in Madison, Wisconsin. He received his bachelor's degree in history and mass communications from Emory & Henry College and his master's degree in public history from the State University of New York at Albany. Kolakowski has worked with the National Park Service, the New York State government, the Rensselaer County Historical Society, the Civil War Preservation Trust, Kentucky State Parks, and the U.S. Army. He is the author of *The Civil War at Perryville: Battling for the Bluegrass* (The History Press, 2009); *The Stones River and Tullahoma Campaign: This Army Does Not Retreat* (The History Press, 2011); *Last Stand on Bataan: The Defense of the Philippines, December 1941–May 1942* (McFarland & Company, 2016); *The Virginia Campaigns, March–August 1862* (CMH, 2016), a pamphlet in the U.S. Army Center of Military History's Campaigns of the Civil War series; *Nations in the Balance: The India-Burma Campaigns, December 1943–August 1944* (Casemate, 2023); as well as numerous articles in *Army History*. He is currently working on a book about Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. that is scheduled for release in 2024.



Notes

1. Diary, Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr., 1 Apr 1945, Diary 1945, vol. 1 [1 Jan–5 Apr 1945], Box 1, Buckner, Simon Bolivar: Papers, ca. 1908–17 and 1941–45, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Museum, and Boyhood Home, Abilene, KS (hereinafter cited as SBB Diary 1945:1).

2. This article is based in part on Christopher L. Kolakowski, ed. *Tenth Army Commander: The WWII Diary of Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., 1944–45* (Oxford: Casemate, 2023).

3. Unless otherwise indicated, all biographical information on the Buckner family and Simon Bolivar Buckner Sr. is taken from Arndt Mathias Stickles, *Simon Bolivar Buckner: Borderland Knight* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940).

4. In the election itself, Buckner Sr.'s party finished behind both Democrat William Jennings Bryan and Republican victor William McKinley.

5. Stickles, *Simon Bolivar Buckner*, 405–9; David G. Wittels, “Simon Bolivar Buckner,” in Walter Millis, ed., *These Are the Generals* (New York: Knopf, 1943), 70–83 (quotation on p. 80).

6. Mil Hist of Simon B. Buckner Jr., U.S. Army, 1956, author's collection (hereinafter cited as Service Summary).

7. Ltr, Simon B. Buckner Jr. to Delia C. Buckner, 14 Feb 1911, author's collection (typescript provided to the author by William C. Buckner).

8. See Ltr, Louisa Frick to Ethel, 7 Oct 1916, Buckner Papers, Filson Historical Society, Louisville, KY. A slightly different version is in Simon B. Buckner Jr., *Tales of the Philippines* (Kansas City, MO: William C. Buckner, 2019), 173–74.

9. Buckner, *Tales of the Philippines*, 174–75.

10. Ibid.; Wittels, “Simon Bolivar Buckner,” 81.

11. Service Summary.

12. Lewis Sorley, *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 22–23. See also *the Register of Graduates and Former Cadets of the United States Military Academy* (West Point, NY: Association of Graduates, United States Military Academy, 2008).

13. Service Summary; see also Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, *Guarding the United States and its Outposts*, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1961), 225–31; Brian

Garfield, *The Thousand Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians* (Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press, 1995), 58–59.

14. Garfield, *Thousand Mile War*, 59–60.

15. Ibid., 128–396.

16. Buckner's message is in Dashiell Hammett and Robert Garland Colodny, eds., *The Battle of the Aleutians: A Graphic History, 1942–1943* (Adak, AK: Intelligence Section, Field Force Headquarters, 1943), copy in the author's collection. This book was produced by Buckner's headquarters in October 1943 as a short overview of what had been accomplished since the bombing of Dutch Harbor.

17. This profile is based on Stephen R. Taaffe, *Marshall and His Generals* (Manhattan: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 295–99.

18. Diary, Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr., 5 Jul 1944, Diary 1944, vol. 2 [5 Jul–31 Dec 1944], Box 1, Buckner, Simon Bolivar: Papers, ca. 1908–17 and 1941–45, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Museum, and Boyhood Home, Abilene, KS (hereinafter cited as SBB Diary 1944:2).

19. For information about the controversy and the Buckner Board, see Harry A. Gailey, “Howlin Mad” vs. the Army: Conflict in Command, Saipan, 1944 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1986); and Philip A. Crowl, *Campaign in the Marianas*, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1960), 191–201.

20. SBB Diary 1944:2, 7 Oct 1944.

21. Delays in preparations meant that DETACHMENT started on 19 February, and ICEBERG on 1 April.

22. This profile of Okinawa and plans for Operation ICEBERG are from the official service histories of the Battle of Okinawa: Roy E. Appleman et al., *Okinawa: The Last Battle*, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1948) and Charles S. Nichols Jr. and Henry I. Shaw Jr., *Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific* (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G–3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1955). See also Joint Staff, “ICEBERG Operation, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas” (study, Joint Forces Staff College, 2 Dec 1944), author's files.

23. SBB Diary 1945:1, 23 and 24 Jan 1945. General Shepherd relieved the 29th Marines' commander, Col. Victor F. Bleasdale, shortly after the landing on Okinawa.

24. SBB Diary 1945:1, 27 and 28 Jan 1945.

25. SBB Diary 1945:1, 8 Feb 1945.

26. SBB Diary 1945:1, 13–26 Mar 1945.

27. Ltr, Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. to Adele Buckner, 13 Mar 1945, Box 1, Buckner, Simon Bolivar: Papers, ca. 1908–17 and 1941–45,

Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Museum, and Boyhood Home, Abilene, KS.

28. SBB Diary 1945:1, 27 Mar 1945 (hereinafter cited as SBB Correspondence, Eisenhower Library).

29. Appleman et al., *Okinawa*, 74; SBB Diary 1945:1, 1 Apr 1945.

30. Appleman et al., *Okinawa*, 138–48.

31. John Toland, *The Rising Sun*, vol. 2 (New York: Random House, 1970), 845–68; Ltr, Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. to Adele Buckner, 14 Apr 1945, SBB Correspondence, Eisenhower Library.

32. Diary, Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr., 8 Apr 1945, Diary 1945, vol. 2 [6 Apr–17 Jun 1945], Box 1, Buckner, Simon Bolivar: Papers, ca. 1908–17 and 1941–45, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Museum, and Boyhood Home, Abilene, KS (hereinafter cited as SBB Diary 1945:2).

33. These messages are in RG-4 Records of Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Pacific (USAFPAC), 1942–1947, MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA (hereinafter MacArthur Library).

34. Appleman et al., *Okinawa*, 103–37.

35. Ltr, Buckner to Adele Buckner, 14 Apr 1945, SBB Correspondence, Eisenhower Library.

36. Appleman et al., *Okinawa*, 149–83.

37. Ibid., 184–248; Interv, Dr. Charles Stearns with Doris Litscher Gasser, 1996, 9, OH 00309, Sauk Prairie Veterans Project, Wisconsin Veterans Museum, Madison, WI.

38. George Feifer, *Tennozan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992), 242–43.

39. Appleman et al., *Okinawa*, 258–64.

40. SBB Diary 1945:2, 3 May 1945.

41. Ibid., 8 May 1945.

42. Ibid., 11–18 May 1945.

43. Unless otherwise cited, this section is based on Appleman et al., *Okinawa*, 360–461.

44. Appleman et al., *Okinawa*, 391, 422.

45. SBB Diary 1945:2, 23 Apr and 8 Jun 1945.

46. Appleman et al., *Okinawa*, 422–54.

47. Ibid.

48. Ltr, Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. to William C. Buckner, 16 Jun 1945, SBB Correspondence, Eisenhower Library.

49. Ltr, Eddie Post to Adele Buckner, n.d., SBB Correspondence, Eisenhower Library.

50. Richard W. Johnston, *Follow Me! The History of the Second Marine Division in World War II* (New York: Random House, 1948), 270–72. See also Appleman et al., *Okinawa*; Nichols and Shaw, *Okinawa*.

51. Unless otherwise cited, this section is based on J. Fred Haley, “The Death of

Gen Simon Bolivar Buckner,” *Marine Corps Gazette* (Nov 1982), 100–106.

52. Johnston, *Follow Me!*, 270–71.

53. Stephen R. Taaffe, *Commanding the Pacific: Marine Corps Generals in World War II* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2021), 172; Roger Willock, *Unaccustomed to Fear: A Biography of the Late General Roy S. Geiger* (Princeton, NJ: printed by the author, 1968), 302. Wallace asserted he should assume command as the senior officer on the island. Geiger, backed by Hodge, cited amphibious doctrine favoring combatant generals in command succession; he also noted Buckner’s preference for Geiger to succeed him. Wallace gave way at that point.

54. Appleman et al., *Okinawa*, 463–65; Haney, “Death of Gen Simon Bolivar Buckner,” 106.

55. Taaffe, *Commanding the Pacific*, 172–73; Willock, *Unaccustomed to Fear*, 302–3. For more on Stilwell’s selection, see Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–1945* (New York: Random House, 2017), 518–20. Stilwell’s background and activities earlier in World War II are discussed in Christopher L. Kolakowski, *Nations in the Balance: The India-Burma Campaigns, December 1943–August 1944* (Oxford: Casemate, 2022). The relevant messages are in the RG-4 Records of Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Pacific (USAFPAC), 1942–1947, MacArthur Library.

56. Accounts of this are in Appleman et al., *Okinawa*, 470–71.

57. *Ibid.*, 471–74.

58. *Ibid.*; see also Nichols and Shaw, *Okinawa*, 260.

59. The best discussion of this process is in George Feifer, *Tennozan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992), 566–84.

60. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100–15, *Field Service Regulations: Larger Units* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1942), 52.

61. Joseph H. Alexander, *The Final Campaign: Marines in the Victory on Okinawa* (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 1996), 30–31, 33–34, 51–52; Ltr, Brig. Gen. Oliver P. Smith to Brig. Gen. Harry Maloney, 30 Jul 1946, Entry 64, Box 4, File “Background Files to the Study ‘Okinawa: The Last Battle,’ 1946–1956,” Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Record Group (RG) 391: Records of the Army Staff, National Archives at College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP).

62. For full details on the ICEBERG plan, see Joint Staff, “ICEBERG Operation.”

63. This and the preceding paragraph are based on Appleman et al., *Okinawa*, 258–64. The quote comes from Memo, Brig. Gen. David Blakelock for Lt. Col. John Stevens, 8 Feb 1946, Entry 64, Box 4, File “Background Files to the Study ‘Okinawa: The Last Battle,’ 1946–1956,” Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, RG 391, NACP.

64. Ltr, Brig. Gen. Elwyn Post to Lt. Col. John Stevens, 10 Jun 1946, Entry 64, Box 4, File “Background Files to the Study ‘Okinawa: The

Last Battle,’ 1946–1956,” Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, RG 391, NACP.

65. There have been many fine histories of the Anzio-Cassino battles. A good overview is found in the U.S. Army’s official histories: Martin Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1969) and Ernest F. Fisher Jr., *Cassino to the Alps*, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1977). The quote comes from Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, 453.

66. The casualty rate is in Appleman et al., *Okinawa*, 473–74, 489.

67. *Kentucky Advocate*, 6 Feb 1949; *Washington Evening Star*, 7 Feb 1949. The next time enemy action would kill such a senior officer would be 11 September 2001, with the death of Lt. Gen. Timothy J. Maude in the Pentagon.

68. *Kentucky Advocate*, 6 Feb 1949; *Washington Evening Star*, 10 Feb 1949.

69. *Ibid.*; Adele Blanc Buckner Correspondence, Filson Historical Society, Louisville, KY.

70. Adele Blanc Buckner Correspondence, Filson Historical Society, Louisville, KY; Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. grave inscription, Frankfort Cemetery, Frankfort, KY.

71. Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. grave inscription.

ARMY HISTORY

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
A *Army History* welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries of between 4,000 and 12,000 words on any topic relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which it was substantially influenced. The Army’s history extends to the present day, and *Army History* seeks accounts of the Army’s actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing that presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with endnotes, which should be embedded,

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MUSEUM FEATURE



The Rock Island Arsenal Museum

We did not, however, object to their building the fort on the island, but we were very sorry, as this was the best island on the Mississippi, and had long been the resort of our young people during the summer. It was our garden which supplied us with strawberries, blackberries, gooseberries, plums, apples, and nuts of different kinds; and its waters supplied us with fine fish, being situated in the rapids of the river.

By S. Patrick Allie

Opened to the public on 4 July 1905, the Rock Island Arsenal Museum in Rock Island, Illinois, is the U.S. Army's second oldest museum. The museum's origins are rooted in a 1903 letter sent by Army Chief of Ordnance Maj. Gen. William Crozier to Col. Stanhope E. Blunt, the Rock Island Arsenal commander. The letter notified Colonel Blunt of the impending arrival of fifteen boxes of ordnance materiel, including weapons and accoutrements from foreign countries, that the chief of ordnance had accumulated over the years to be exhibited "in a Military Museum designed to be established at some future time."¹ The museum opened in 1905 as the Ordnance Museum at Rock Island Arsenal.

In the 120 years since that letter was sent, the Rock Island Arsenal Museum has changed, evolved, and adapted to tell the story of the arsenal and Army manufacturing. Although the museum has been packed up, moved, and renamed multiple times, it always has highlighted the contributions of the local Quad Cities community to the U.S. military.

In 2023, the Rock Island Arsenal Museum went through another change as it reopened to the public after a three-year closure. The new exhibits, driven by the museum's mission, focus on the history of the island, the arsenal and its commands, and the people and products of the arsenal. It explores the installation's role in the history of the Quad Cities region and its 160-year history of providing support to service members as part of the Army Organic Industrial Base. The exhibits incorporate science, technology, engineering, and mathematics-based learning activities, such as a bridge-building interactive display, and focus on the research and development process for new products. The exhibits feature stories of the significant contributions of women and people of

A museum placard depicts a painting of Fort Armstrong with a quotation from *The Life of Blackhawk*, 1834.

color who have worked at the arsenal, reflecting the present-day diversity of the U.S. military.

The museum boasts more than 250 artifacts and hundreds of historic images and maps. Highlights include the first Model 1903 Springfield rifle produced at Rock Island Arsenal, the Model 1860 saber carried by Brig. Gen. John Buford Jr. at the Battle of Gettysburg, equipment reviewed by the 1909 Infantry Equipment Board during the research and development of the Model 1910 Infantry Equipment Set, a 130-year-old taxidermy horse that was used in the arsenal's leather shop for test-fitting harnesses, and products that were 3D printed at the Joint Manufacturing and Technology Center in support of Army's response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Today, the Rock Island Arsenal Museum offers a variety of educational programs, special events, and temporary exhibitions for soldiers and the general public. For more information about the museum, please visit www.arsenalhistoricalsociety.org.

S. Patrick Allie is the director of the Rock Island Arsenal Museum.

1. Ltr, Ofc Ch Ord to Cmd Ofcr, Rock Island Arsenal, 1 Oct 1903, sub: Military Museum—Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island Arsenal Archives, Rock Island, IL.




The Rock Island Arsenal Museum, 2023



Chief of Military History Charles R. Bowery Jr. speaks at the museum's reopening on 29 June 2023.



Visitors use touchable digital and physical interactives.



These products, including .30-caliber Browning machine guns, paracrates, paracaissions, and 75-mm. Pack howitzers, were produced at the arsenal during World War II.



This display explores the reverse engineering of the Puteaux hydro-pneumatic recoil assembly from the French 75-mm. field gun at Rock Island Arsenal and World War I manufacturing.



A young visitor reads about the arsenal's diverse World War II workforce, which included women, people of color, and Italian former prisoners of war.




The XM102 105-mm. howitzer shown here was developed at Rock Island Arsenal for use during the Vietnam War.



Visitors read about the “Big Five” systems, including the M1 Abrams tank, Black Hawk and Apache helicopters, the M2 Bradley, and the Patriot missile system.

Senninbari: The Thousand-Stitch Belt



By Shannon Granville and Sara Bowen

A *senninbari*, literally “thousand-person stitches,” is a belt or sash made for an individual Japanese soldier, intended to be worn under the uniform and around the waist. Traditionally, a female relative of the soldier, such as a mother, sister, or wife, would sew the sash from a long strip of fabric and ask other women in her community to each add a single knotted stitch to it, for a total of 1,000 stitches in the finished design. The sash provided comfort to the wearer, serving as a protective charm, a reminder to have courage during battle, and a memento of loved ones back home.

The National Museum of the United States Army currently has two *senninbari* on permanent display. Both are from the World War II period, yet they come from opposite sides of the conflict. One was the personal possession of S. Sgt. Jimmy Mizote, a Nisei (second-generation Japanese American) soldier who fought in the European Theater as part of the 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442d Regimental Combat Team. The second belonged to an unknown Imperial Japanese Army soldier and dates from around 1939. The donor of the belt acquired it while serving with Company A, 21st Infantry, 24th Infantry Division, on Mindinas, Philippines, in early 1945.

Jimmy Mizote (1918–1976) was born in Portland, Oregon, and joined the U.S. Army in January 1942. In February, not long after Mizote left for training, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which ordered the internment of Japanese Americans living on the West Coast. Forced to leave their Portland home, Mizote’s family spent the next three years incarcerated in the Tule Lake Segregation Center in northern California and at Amache, also known as the Granada War Relocation Center, in Colorado. While living in the camp, Sergeant Mizote’s mother, Kazumi, sewed

Senninbari made for S. Sgt. Jimmy Mizote by his mother Kazumi, ca. 1943.

National Museum of the United States Army

a *senninbari* for her only son. Along with the traditional thousand knots, the belt includes the words “From Mother” embroidered on the reverse side.

The writing on the Japanese soldier’s *senninbari* expresses a very different sentiment. The text painted on the front of the belt, “*uchiteshi-yamamu*,” comes from the *Kojiki*, a collection of epic myths, legends, and histories compiled around the eighth century CE. The *Kojiki* chronicles the purported divine origins of Japan and its imperial line, and, during the war years, specific passages from it were incorporated into imperial propaganda.¹ The passage on this *senninbari* is part of a warrior’s song and literally means “continue to shoot and do not desist,” though a more colloquial translation might read “fight to the bitter end.”² It implies that the soldier who wore the sash was prepared to give up his life to defeat the enemy. The sash’s unknown maker took care to have most of the stitches cluster within the brushstrokes of the painted text, as if to reinforce the message of self-sacrifice.

These handmade *senninbari* showcase a unique connection from a time of total war—a piece of Japanese military culture carried into the fight by soldiers from opposing sides.

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1. For more on the *Kojiki* and its place in wartime Japanese culture, see Gustav Heldt, “Introduction,” in O no Yasumaro, comp., *The Kojiki: An Account of Ancient Matters*, trans. Gustav Heldt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), xiii–xxii.

2. David C. Earhart, “Uchiteshi Yamamu: ‘Keep Up the Fight,’” in *Certain Victory: Images of World War II in the Japanese Media* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2008), 309–31.

From Mother

From Mother

The embroidered "From Mother" is on the side of the sash opposite the thousand knots.

National Museum of the United States Army



In Camp Jerome, Henry Sugimoto, oil on canvas, 25" x 20.5", 1943. Sugimoto, a Japanese American artist from California who was interned during the war years, documented life in the camps in his paintings and sketches. In this painting, a woman holds up a senninbari in front of a Japanese American soldier.

Japanese American National Museum (gift of Madeleine Sugimoto and Naomi Tagawa, 92.97.9)




Sergeant Mizote in Italy

Courtesy of the Sholian family



Amache, also known as the Granada War Relocation Center, where the Mizote family was held

National Archives



Mizote (center) with two of his fellow soldiers

Courtesy of the Sholian family




An "I AM AN AMERICAN" sign on display in a store window in Oakland, California, on 8 December 1941—the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The store's owner was later sent to an internment camp along with many other people of Japanese descent living on the West Coast.

Library of Congress

撃ちてし止まむ

Imperial Japanese Army senninbari, ca. 1939
National Museum of the United States Army



A photograph from the 10 March 1944 issue of the magazine *Shashin shuuhou* (Weekly Photographical Journal), published by the Japanese government, shows the widow of a Japanese service member writing out the phrase “uchiteshi-yamamu.”


Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan



An article from the 8 December 1943 edition of the Japanese-language *Manila Shinbun*, the wartime newspaper printed by the Japanese occupation government in the Philippines. The headline in the black box on the right reads “Bei-ei uchiteshi-yamamu,” or “Fight the Americans and British to the bitter end.”

Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, Hoji Shinbun Digital Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford University

The National Museum of the United States Army, in collaboration with the National Veterans Network and the Army Historical Foundation, is pleased to announce a new traveling exhibit, “I Am An American: The Nisei Soldier Experience.” This eleven-city national traveling exhibit will embark on a five-year journey across the United States in 2026, educating the public about the extraordinary heroism of Japanese American World War II Nisei soldiers. S. Sgt. Jimmy Mizote’s senninbari will be among the artifacts included in the traveling exhibit.



Sufficient Glory

Emmor B. Cope and the Creation of the Gettysburg National Military Park

By Matthew T. Boan

The original gate to the
Gettysburg National Military Park
Library of Congress

Every year, nearly one million people from around the world visit the site of the bloodiest battle of the American Civil War in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.¹ The Gettysburg National Military Park (GNMP) has close to 30 miles of roads covering more than 6,000 acres of property. The park features 1,187 acres of regularly mowed grounds with 33 miles of trails, 1,328 monuments, 37 orchards covering 112 acres, 368 cannons and carriages, and breathtaking views from 3 observation towers.² Most of the visitors to the battlefield already know much of the history behind the battle itself, or are there to learn about it, but few of the visitors seem to know the history behind the establishment of the park itself. Much of that history is to the credit of one man, Emmor Bradley Cope, the park's first chief engineer and future superintendent. Cope was familiar with the land, having been present on the Gettysburg battlefield during the fighting on those terrible three days in July 1863.

In the days after the battle, after the smoke and rain cleared, Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren tasked Cope with surveying and creating the first map of the battlefield. Cope dedicated more than thirty-four years of his life to the preservation of the battlefield, transforming it into a place that would educate visitors about what had transpired there and memorialize those who had fought so valiantly.

Early Years

Emmor Cope was born 23 July 1834, the oldest of ten children, to Edge Taylor and Mary Bradley Cope. Emmor's parents were seventh-generation Copes and part of a strong lineage of prominent Quakers who had come to Pennsylvania in 1682 with William Penn.³ In 1830, Edge Cope purchased a two-and-a-half story, five-bay stone frame house and mill property near Brandywine Creek in Copesville, a small community named for his ancestors

who had settled there in 1712. A small milling, manufacturing, and agricultural community, Copesville consisted of only a handful of structures. Situated along the East and West Bradford townships of Chester County, Copesville was roughly 2 miles west of West Chester and a mere mile and a half from the site of the Brandywine battlefield of the Revolutionary War.⁴

During the early days of the community, being able to cross the Brandywine Creek was of necessity for transporting people and goods around the county. The records of a town meeting in nearby Bradford from the 1750s show that a group of local landholders had tasked Abiah Taylor and Nathan Cope, Emmor's great-grandfather, with creating such a bridge:

Wheras the Neighborhood as well as Travelers & Market people from some distance, are under great difficulty & sometimes danger for want of a bridge upon the East Branch of



Cope's Bridge by George Cope (of unknown relationship to Emmor) depicts the E. T. Cope Mill and Cope's Bridge, which is now a nationally registered historic bridge. The original bridge, built of timber in the late eighteenth century, was replaced in 1807 with the stone bridge pictured here.

Courtesy of the Brandywine Museum of Art

Brandywine Creek, on the road leading from Doreen by Joseph Martin's Tavern to Philadelphia, at the Ford Called Taylor's ford in East Bradford, Chester County. Therefore this is proposed as an Essay with Respect to it, to see what Encouragement can be had by way of Subscription where all persons who are Desirous or willing to promote ye Building a Bridge at ye s'd place may subscribe according to their Good pleasure heron. It is Intended to have it made sufficiently strong and planked over for men & horses to pass, and Abiah Taylor & Nathan Cope are appointed to undertake ye work & have ye oversight of the same, and get ye Logs an other Timber Necessary prepared against Next Summer to have it Raised, and all persons that subscribes anything toward s'd bridge, such of them that Chose to pay their subscriptions in work at it, shall be allowed to work out the same at such work as they are capable of, they attending upon ye work when Requisite.⁵


Today, a nationally registered historic bridge known as Cope's Bridge crosses over the east branch of the Brandywine, along the Strasburg Road.⁶

Emmor grew up working with his father and grandfather at the mill. Both Emmor's grandfather, Ezra, and his father, Edge, were highly skilled in mechanics and

had the ingenuity to become inventors. Ezra obtained a patent for a grain cutter called the "Buckeye Mowing Machine" in 1825. Emmor possessed the same skill in manufacturing as his father and grandfather, but he also had a passion for art. By all accounts, he was a talented artist. He was known for a painting of George Washington on horseback that he had painted when he was 12 years old, which hung in his parlor until his death.⁷ His skills in art, mechanics, and manufacturing would serve him well over the course of his life.

Military Service

On 4 June 1861, at the age of 26, Cope made a decision that would set him on a course to leave his mark on the preservation of one of the most iconic historical sites in the United States. On 15 May 1861, Pennsylvania had organized the Reserve Volunteer Corps of the Commonwealth, a volunteer force of thirteen infantry regiments and one regiment each of cavalry and light artillery. The volunteers of the Pennsylvania Reserves would enlist for three years or the remainder of the war, whichever ended sooner.⁸ Going against the pacifist nature of the Quaker religion, Cope enlisted in the Pennsylvania Reserves.⁹ Because of the



This historical road marker commemorates the tenant house, built by blacksmith Joseph Buffington ca. 1821, which was purchased by Emmor Cope in 1883. The home, badly deteriorated, was demolished in 2015.

Historical Marker Database



George A. McCall, shown here as a major general

Library of Congress



A camp of the 30th Regiment Infantry, Pennsylvania Volunteers (1st Pennsylvania Reserves)

Library of Congress

location of his enlistment, West Chester, he was assigned to Company A of the 30th Regiment Infantry, Pennsylvania Volunteers (1st Pennsylvania Reserves), commanded by Col. R. Biddle Roberts.¹⁰ The Pennsylvania Reserve Division was commanded by Brig. Gen. George A. McCall, whom Governor Andrew G. Curtin tasked with organizing the volunteers.¹¹ Originally from Philadelphia, after his retirement from the Regular Army in 1855, McCall had relocated from Philadelphia to an area roughly a mile north of West Chester, which was a desirable retirement location for residents of Philadelphia.¹²

In Pennsylvania at this time, volunteer units had a policy of electing their officers and noncommissioned officers, and so, on 10 June 1861, just a few days after enlisting, Cope was elected to the position of sergeant.¹³ Shortly thereafter, on 11 July 1861, Cope married Isabella L. Parkman, with whom he would have five children.¹⁴ The division spent the rest of 1861 training and performing various security details throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C.¹⁵ During this time, Cope was injured. Although the full details of his injury remain unknown, it seems that sometime in late August to early September he was shot by a fellow soldier. Alfred Rupert, a member of Cope's company, remarked upon the incident in a letter: "the [rifle] ball can't be found," he noted, "but the doctor says it will do [Cope] no harm."¹⁶ After Cope recovered

from his injuries, General McCall detached him from Company A and sent him to the division headquarters for "special duty."¹⁷

In December, Company A was called up to their first experience with battle. On 20 December, the company arrived to aid Federal forces at the Battle of Dranesville in Virginia, but they were too late to be of any real assistance in the main part of the fighting. With the battle over, Cope proceeded to document his experience in Dranesville with a rare drawing of the scene through his eyes.¹⁸

In the spring of 1862, with McCall's Order 74, Cope was attached to Battery C of the 5th Artillery, part of the Army of the Potomac (AoP), for "a couple of months."¹⁹ It is likely that he was sent there to become familiar with the inner workings of the artillery. The AoP comprised five corps plus reserves. Cope was in Maj. Gen. Fitz J. Porter's V Corps, with either the artillery or the Pennsylvania Reserves.²⁰ In March 1862, the AoP began the Peninsula Campaign. Battery C was at the center of the U.S. Army's front at the Battle of Mechanicsville on 26 June 1862.²¹ From there, Porter's corps moved south to engage in the Battle of Gaines' Mill on 27 June, where Battery C was in a position on the left of the U.S. lines overlooking Boatswain's Creek and protecting against a Confederate advance on the left flank.²² Porter's corps continued to move south toward the James River, with the exception of McCall's 3d Division, which fought in

the battle at the Charles City crossroads or Glendale on 30 June 1862.²³ The entire AoP rallied atop Malvern Hill, near the James River, on 1 July 1862, which Porter's entire corps had begun fortifying during the fighting at the Charles City crossroads. Porter initially began positioning his corps defensively, overlooking the River Road on the west side of the hill, to protect from a flanking movement. McCall's 3d Division was so badly crippled from the previous days of fighting that it was placed in reserve.²⁴ After the battle, the AoP continued moving south to Harrison's Landing, where they camped and fortified for a month before boarding ships to return to northern Virginia for other battles.²⁵

Cope also was at Harrison's Landing during the same time that Oliver Norton and Maj. Gen. Daniel A. Butterfield of the V Corps created the current version of the bugle call "Taps." One day in July 1862, Butterfield sent for the brigade bugler because he had made some changes to the last bugle call of the day that he thought would make it sound more musical and appropriate. Together, the two worked, making changes as they went, until the call was just right. That night, Cope and the other soldiers heard "Taps" as their "lights out" call for the first time.²⁶

Even in the thick of fighting, Cope continued to use his artistic and design talents. While at Battery C, Cope created a woodcutting of General McCall that the



General Porter

Library of Congress


general used with his headquarters' envelopes. Soon after, Cope penned a letter to the Honorable Edward McPherson, a well-known political figure in Pennsylvania and the commander of Company K of the 30th Regiment Infantry, Pennsylvania Volunteers (1st Pennsylvania Reserves). Cope's letter informed McPherson of a measuring device he had invented which could prove useful in determining artillery ranges from a fixed location using scaled triangulation. Cope's invention could give a higher degree of accuracy to the U.S. artillery than the standard drop-leaf tangent sights that they currently used. McPherson forwarded Cope's plans to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, but it is unknown what happened to Cope's plans from there.²⁷

Different sources indicate that Cope also was present at the Battle of South Mountain, the Second Battle of Bull Run, and the Battle of Antietam.²⁸ Throughout his time on the battlefields during 1862, Cope had been requesting a transfer to the engineer corps. That request was finally granted on 30 December 1862 when he was transferred to the AoP's Topographical Engineers, where he was to report to the chief of topographical engineers as an extra duty assignment as a mechanic.²⁹ With the reorganization of the AoP under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker in February 1863, Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren was appointed as the chief of topographical engineers.³⁰ With no formal topographical training, Cope likely participated in on-the-job training. He was

so well liked and proved himself so highly skilled as a topographer, in such a relatively short time, that General Warren assigned him to lead a party to survey the Antietam battlefield. This assignment was highly unusual because Cope was still a sergeant, and most topographical work parties of this time period were led by officers. With the increased responsibility of leading survey parties, Cope likely felt it only reasonable to request a promotion, which he began to do the spring of 1863. As the AoP moved into place to thwart the *Army of Northern Virginia's* advance, they met in the now famous Battle of Gettysburg on 1 July 1863.

Little is known about Cope's whereabouts during the fighting at Gettysburg; there are only two notable accounts. In one, a soldier in the 155th Regiment Infantry, Pennsylvania Volunteers (which participated in the fighting on Little Round Top), states that Cope accompanied General Warren to Little Round Top at daybreak on 5 July in order to observe the Confederate movements.³¹

Then, in a Christmas greeting on a postcard to a relative, Thomas D. Cope, sometime later, Cope himself confirmed this account by saying, "I stood on the rock where the statue of General Warren is standing, on July 5 about 8 AM and watched the General ride out towards the Peach Orchard, I had instructions from him viz, if he reached the Emmitsburg Road to send General Wright's division to him. I saw him reach the road and then gave the order to Wright and that was the first we knew the Rebels had left."³² There is a reasonable explanation for the lack of information regarding Cope's specific location during the battle. One of the duties of the topographers during the Civil War was to recon the various positions of both sides in order to accurately depict troop positions on maps at a later point. That means that Cope was likely on horseback riding around the battlefield, collecting troop positions and annotating them in his topographer's sketch pad. Not only was he finding out where the Federal troops were located, he also was stopping in various locations in order to collect troop positions for the opposing forces. Civil War topographers were, in many instances, collecting this reconnaissance while under enemy fire. Cope and his fellow topographers would have had to pause to sketch out troop locations while artillery rounds fell all around them and they could hear the sound of minie balls "zipping" by them. It was not a job for the squeamish.



Gouverneur K. Warren, shown here as a major general

Library of Congress

When not actively riding around the Federal lines, Cope most likely was in his tent either working on the details of the Antietam map or recording information about the day's activities for his future work on the map.

After the smoke had cleared and the majority of the troops had left Gettysburg, Cope began the long process set before him by General Warren. He now had the responsibility of mapping the battlefield at Gettysburg, a task he began on 14 July, an endeavor that would become his greatest achievement and eventually his life's work.³³

The topographical process during the Civil War era was a long and grueling one by today's standards. There were three main phases to the making of a map for Cope: surveying, drawing the topography, and placing the positions of troops on the newly created map of the battlefield. These maps were used as historical records for what transpired at the battle. It probably took Cope a week or so to survey the battlefield accurately on horseback.³⁴ The basic tool of topographical surveys was a small sketch pad that had a series of grid lines on the pages. The topographer would ride across the area he was mapping and would draw the various features, like rivers, roads, and other significant landscape elements, onto the grid-lined pages. The topographer would determine direction with a compass and measure the distance of the various features using a method called pacing.³⁵ Pacing was done either on foot or on horseback, and

Cope chose the latter. To determine the pace of his horse, Cope would have ridden his horse across a predetermined distance—say 100 meters—and counted every time the horse's front left hoof hit the ground. He would have done this three times and then divided the total number of steps by three. This would have given him the baseline pace count for his horse, which then gave him the ability to estimate distances of features quickly and with a high rate of accuracy. While today's Army topographers do not determine distances by their own pace, or by that of their horse, there are some jobs in the Army, such as in the infantry, that require soldiers to determine their individual pace as part of their job training. These soldiers carry a set of beads on their field gear, which they use to count their pace while conducting certain field exercises.

Once the field survey was complete, the topographer would then begin the process of transferring the data collected from the field onto a larger, more complete, version of the map.³⁶ What would become the final map was comparable in size to the 32-by-22-inch map sheets used today, with a grid and set scale. The topographer would draw each feature onto the map with great detail, making sure to convert from the sketch scale to the full-sheet scale. This laborious, multistep process—from riding on horseback carrying a notebook roughly the size of a legal pad and sketching out an area, then taking that sketch and transferring all of that information onto a map large enough to accommodate the scale of the final map, anywhere from 1,000 meters per inch to 200 meters per inch—all had to be done by hand.

During this time, the paper used for maps was what we know now as rag paper. Rag paper was made from old linen or cotton rags that were softened through a boiling process and then added to various fibrous materials such as straw. The mixture was pressed on rollers and dried to create flat sheets of paper. Unlike paper made from wood pulp, which could be brittle and easily damaged, rag paper was durable and flexible.³⁷ This made it easy to transport maps from one location to another without the risk of destroying the map while it was still in the process of being made. A military topographer could not afford to run the risk of having an almost-complete map destroyed because it had been drawn on a type of paper that was not sturdy enough to stand the constant travel across the countryside.

The process of making the maps was so long and tedious that Cope was still working on the last few touches of the Antietam map while surveying Gettysburg. It is possible that while the Battle of Gettysburg was being fought, Cope was working on the Antietam map so that it could be completed in a timely manner. While at Gettysburg, Cope finished the Antietam map and had one of his assistants take it to the War Department in Washington.

During Cope's time at Gettysburg, his father made the roughly 84-mile journey to visit his son. While visiting with his father, Cope expressed his concerns for an incident that apparently had happened when his assistant delivered the Antietam map to the War Department. According to one account, upon delivery of the map, his assistant took sole credit for its creation and was rewarded with a discharge and hired as a civilian topographical assistant. This incident added to Cope's disappointment of not being promoted after many requests. He was still a sergeant but was doing the work of an officer.

Despite the incident with the Antietam map, Cope continued to work on the Gettysburg map with great skill and attention to detail. He produced such a superior product that General Warren commended Cope by writing in the margin of a copy of it: "This is a photograph from a map mainly made by Major (then Sergeant) E. B. Cope of my force (while the chief Engineer of the Army of the Potomac) and under my direction. It is valuable as showing how a good topographer can represent a field after a personal reconnaissance. It was mostly made from horseback sketches based upon the map of Adams County, Pa."³⁸ The Adams County map that Warren references is a land ownership map that was used throughout the county. It details many things like roads, water features, fence rows, and farm ownership. The major item that was not on the Adams County map was the terrain, which Cope surveyed.³⁹ To measure the terrain quickly and accurately, Cope most likely would have used an aneroid barometer to measure the elevation changes.⁴⁰ An aneroid barometer has an altimeter in it which measures the distance above sea level based on the atmospheric pressure being lower the closer it is to sea level.⁴¹ The only drawback of this method was that the topographer needed to be highly aware of the weather, because weather

changes adversely affected the accuracy of the altimeter.⁴²

Cope used the Adams County map as a point of reference for making his. (Using a previously produced map as a baseline for making a more detailed map is a common practice even today.) From 1868 to 1869, topographical engineers made a map of the Battle of Gettysburg, commonly known as the Warren Survey, to include in the *Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. Interestingly enough, General Warren had no involvement in the Warren Survey. The work for the survey was based on Cope's original horseback survey, but there is no evidence that he was directly involved in or contacted about working on the Warren Survey.

On 20 April 1864, Cope received his much-deserved promotion. Not only was he promoted from sergeant to captain, but he was made an aide-de-camp for General Warren.⁴³ As an aide-de-camp, Cope's awareness of troop positions also would have served him well in his topographical work.⁴⁴ Throughout 1864, Cope also was the chief of engineers for Warren's V Corps and spent much of the year leading surveys for the *Atlas to Accompany the Official Records*. With the resignation of Warren's senior aide, Maj. Washington A. Roebling, on 21 January 1865, Warren nominated Cope for the position.⁴⁵ From that nomination, Cope was promoted on 4 February 1865, this time to major and senior aide-de-camp. The next day, the Battle of Hatcher's Run began. The chaos of this battle in the thick woods of the countryside caused Confederate soldiers to stray into the area of the opposing forces. On one such instance, Cope was captured by a group of Confederate soldiers. His captivity did not last long, as the Confederate soldiers soon became aware that they were actually within the perimeter of the Federal forces. The tides then turned, and Cope took the group of Confederate soldiers prisoner. On 1 April 1865, Cope was brevetted to lieutenant colonel for gallantry and meritorious service during the Battle of Five Forks. At the Battle of Five Forks, Cope had the closest call of his military service when he inadvertently rode through the U.S. lines en route to Warren's command, rode right into the Confederate picket lines, and had his horse shot out from under him. To finish his intended mission, he had to borrow a friend's horse. On 20 June 1865, Cope was mustered out of federal service, and he subsequently



Emmor Cope, shown here as either a major or lieutenant colonel

Courtesy of the Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps Historical Society

returned to his childhood home on the Brandywine.⁴⁶

Return to the Mill

Little is known about the details of Emmor Cope's military service, but even less is known about his personal life. While he was away at war, Cope's oldest daughter was born. Cope, his wife Isabella, and their growing family settled along the Brandywine in Copesville, just a few hundred feet from the house Cope grew up in.

By 1868, Edge Cope's mill business had become "ET Cope and Son, Founders and Machinists."⁴⁷ They supplied the surrounding community with churns, mowing machines, water wheels, and turbines, some of which were their own inventions. One of Emmor's passions was inventing, and, in 1875, he received a patent for a more elaborate water turbine. His turbine was a featured item at the Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia in 1876. In 1880, Emmor and his younger brother Ezra took over the family business upon the retirement of their father. In addition to running a business and raising a family, Cope remained in touch with his old commander, Gouvenour Warren. Also, in keeping with family tradition, he entered local politics. Cope requested the general's endorsement in a letter, saying, "I am about to make an application for the office of Collector of Internal Rev, 7th District of Pennsylvania. It is an office that has never been held by a soldier. I must respectfully

ask a few lines from you no matter how brief regarding my military record, for which I shall be extremely obliged."⁴⁸ From 1886 to 1893, Cope sporadically held office as the township auditor.

All the while, Cope remained interested in the art and science of mapmaking. In one of his many letters to Warren, Cope asked for help obtaining copies of the Gettysburg map that he had worked on in 1863. He said, "I once wrote to the Bureau at Washington begging a copy of the map of [the Battle of Gettysburg] I had assisted in making. No notice whatsoever was taken of the request[.] General [Samuel W.] Crawford called at my place several years ago, thinking I had maps, or copies of maps of all battlefields. He was about to write a history of the war[.] I had none."⁴⁹ Warren was able to obtain copies of the map and sent them to Cope, and it was after this that Warren began to request Cope's assistance with various cartographic matters. In one letter, Warren wrote, "I have means to pay your expenses and a per diem of \$5.00. I should like personally to meet you very much; and if you can come there about that time, I will introduce you to those investigating that battle [at Manassas Junction]. I know you can help them in the matter; and that you will but add to the numbers of those who appreciate you."⁵⁰ Warren, who was relentless in attempting to clear his name after losing his command after the Battle of Five Forks, also requested Cope's skills in making a series of maps and sketches to be added to the evidence he was collecting. Warren would need these maps in 1879, when President Rutherford B. Hayes, another Gettysburg veteran, ordered a court of inquiry into the circumstances surrounding Warren's actions in the battle. The inquiry lasted one hundred days, and Cope testified in Warren's defense. Ultimately, the court found that Warren's relief of command had been unjustified.

By 1890, the Cope family business had diminished to the point that Emmor was looking for other ways to support his family. His financial situation was so uncertain that he wrote letters to customers requesting payment for services rendered, an unusual tactic for the time. In small communities such as Cope's, business owners often helped their neighbors by producing and providing products that would help them with their own farms or businesses, without always requiring payment up front. This service to the community caused a strain on his family business. Additionally, two

lawsuits were filed against the business in the spring of 1890, and, as a result, some of the family's assets went into a sheriff's sale, or foreclosure auction. Despite these troubles, the family business continued to operate on a reduced basis.⁵¹

Gettysburg Battlefield

In 1864, David McConaughy, a local lawyer who had a dream of creating a memorial to the men who fought and died in the bloodiest battle of the Civil War, organized the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association (GBMA). The vision of the GBMA was to create beautifully landscaped fields filled with artwork and sculptures honoring those who had served there. The GBMA was plagued with issues right from the beginning. McConaughy had been so focused on finding financial backers for his dream and other commercial investments that he neglected to realize the vision of the GBMA. By 1870, he had been able to place a few wooden informational placards, erect some breastworks, and create a few cannon fields, but the monuments were lacking. To remedy this situation, the Philadelphia chapter of the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) purchased a majority share of the GBMA. By 1880, the GBMA's debt had been wiped out. With the GAR holding the majority of the positions on the GBMA's board of directors, McConaughy was removed from the project and eventually was replaced by a man named John Bachelder.

Bachelder was an artist who was known for his paintings of various battles. As a civilian, he had attached himself to the U.S. Army and was present during the Peninsula Campaign in 1862. During the Battle of Gettysburg, Bachelder was at home in New Hampshire because of failing health, but he arrived at Gettysburg a few days after the fighting ended and remained there to interview soldiers and document the battle. In 1883, the GBMA appointed Bachelder to be the superintendent of tables and legends for the organization. In this capacity, he worked closely with veterans to place monuments in the proper locations for the various units that had fought in the multiday battle. From 1880 to 1894, the GAR hosted week-long events during the summer in which they brought veterans to the battlefield to provide first-hand accounts of their experiences in the battle.



John Bachelder with his wife Elizabeth at Gettysburg in 1888

Courtesy National Park Gettysburg National Military Park, Museum Collection

Meanwhile, the GBMA worked to improve the landscape of the battlefield area and purchased land, such as the wheat field, from private owners. The land surrounding many of the GBMA-owned parcels was still privately owned and was susceptible to being bought by the highest bidder.⁵² In 1888, the Gettysburg Electric Railway threatened to disrupt the field of battle by constructing a railway line that would bisect the battlefield. The *Star and Sentinel*, a local Gettysburg newspaper, explained just how devastating this line would have been: “All along the line in the vicinity of the Devil’s Den, there is heavy blasting and digging and filling, and great havoc is played with the face of the landscape. Huge masses of rock are displaced, great boulders are moved, and the valley is to be filled the width and height of a track from the bridge over Plum Run, in front of Round Top, to the north end of the valley, and a wholly new appearance will be given to that enormous field of carnage.”⁵³ A bill was signed into law in 1895, transferring all GBMA-controlled land and monuments over to the United States War Department.⁵⁴ Finally, this highly publicized controversy over land use and access came to an end in 1896 when the Supreme Court decided that the government had the authority to protect areas of historical significance.

In 1893, Secretary of War Daniel S. Lamont had created a three-person commission to oversee all work to be done at what would

become the GNMP. This commission was made up of Col. John P. Nicholson, Rep. William H. Forney of Alabama (who had fought with the Confederacy), and John Bachelder. The commission quickly realized that in order to carry out the task of building the GNMP, a very important piece was missing—an engineer. Two men were nominated for the position and appeared before the board, and, on 17 July 1893, Emmor Cope reported for duty as the commission’s newly hired chief engineer.⁵⁵

Coming back to Gettysburg, where he once had witnessed first-hand the devastating effects of the battle, had to be an emotional experience for Cope. Before any work could be done, Cope took stock of everything that he had brought with him and purchased any other authorized items he would need to conduct his work. After assembling the necessary tools, he formed a group of three to seven assistants, known as “the Corps.” Their first order of business was to create the backbone of the battlefield survey, from which everything else would be measured and referenced. Cope described this process in his journal:

I caused an iron pin to be driven at the centre of the square of the town of Gettysburg to be used in our work as a datum point of reference, for the town is the centre of gravity of the Battlefield. This point was afterwards connected with a meridian line that I established on high ground of the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association, your Hancock Avenue. The north point



Representative Forney

Library of Congress



John Nicholson

Library of Congress

of this line is near the 126 New York Infantry monument and is marked by a brass point in a granite stone set 30’ in the ground, the south point is similarly marked near the line of the George Benner property, using this meridian line as a base of operations, many miles of back site transit lines have been run on various parts of the field.⁵⁶


Cope was so dedicated to his work at the park that, in October 1893, he moved his family to Gettysburg. Unlike Nicholson, Forney, or Bachelder, Cope would live and work in Gettysburg for almost three decades. (He first lived on Chambersburg Street and then at 516 Baltimore Street.)

By 1895, when the GNMP officially was established, both Forney and Bachelder had passed away. They were replaced by William M. Robbins and Charles A. Richardson, former Confederate and U.S. Army soldiers, respectively. In the years that followed, Nicholson, Cope, Robbins, and Richardson “transformed the muddy ‘cowpaths’ of the GBMA into over twenty miles of semipermanent ‘telfordized’ avenues which to this day provide the base for the macadamized avenues” of the park.⁵⁷ Defense works were resodded, relaid, and rebuilt where necessary. Cast iron and bronze narrative tablets were created to mark the positions of each battery, brigade, division, and corps for the armies as well as the U.S. Regulars. More than 300

condemned cannons were mounted on cast-iron carriages to mark or approximate battery sites. Five steel observation towers were built at key overlook points to assist in instructing military students and other visitors in the strategy and tactics of the battle. More than 25 miles of boundary and battlefield fencing were constructed, as well as 13 miles of gutter paving. In excess of 5 miles of stone walls were restored or rebuilt, and nearly 17,000 trees were planted in denoted parts of the field, including Ziegler's Grove, Pitzer's Woods, Trostle Woods, and Biesecker Woods. More than 800 acres of land were acquired, including Houck's Ridge, the Peach Orchard, and several significant battlefield farms and their structures (such as McPherson, Culp, Weikert, Trostle, Codori, and Frey).

The park's infrastructure, such as the roads and bridges, was designed and overseen by Cope, along with the U.S. Regulars Monument on Hancock Avenue and the battle-line markers for brigade, division, corps, battery, and U.S. Regular units. In addition to overseeing the majority of the items mentioned here, Cope was responsible for recordkeeping, paying workers, and making various maps. All of this work, and more, was accomplished without any example to follow, as there were no other military parks in existence.

In 1922, Nicholson proposed the construction of an entrance gate to the park from Taneytown Road onto Hancock Avenue, and Cope delivered. Based on Cope's design, a beautiful stone entrance gateway was constructed in 1923. The stone for the two large pillars marking the entrance was collected locally from Little Round Top. Each pillar had a bronze eagle, a U.S. seal, and a bronze tablet inscribed with "Gettysburg National Military Park."⁵⁸ In 1960, when the park began to build the old Cyclorama Center and parking lot, this gateway was removed to make room.⁵⁹ The seals and tablets went into park storage for safekeeping, but the eagles, which were loaned to a local antiques dealer, have not been seen since. Only the foundation slabs remained. In 2016, the park rebuilt the gateway wall and pillars upon those original slabs, following Cope's original 1923 design and using some of the original stone from the walls.⁶⁰ Today, the gateway marks a pedestrian pathway leading from the Soldiers' National Cemetery to the cemetery parking, instead of a road, but it is still there for the enjoyment of each visitor



Cope's topographical map of the Gettysburg battlefield at the Gettysburg National Park Commission exhibit (part of the larger War Department exhibition) at the Lewis and Clark Exposition, St. Louis, Missouri, 1904
 Courtesy National Park Service, Gettysburg National Military Park, Museum Collection, GETT 12129

that passes through it, just as Nicholson and Cope had envisioned. The new wall includes the original bronze seals and tablets, as well as recreations of the eagles.

In addition to the work he was doing to build the infrastructure during those first ten years, Cope also created the massive

wooden relief map that is still on display inside the visitors' center. The 9-foot-3-inch-by-12-foot-8-inch 3D depiction of the battlefield was made for display at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, commonly known as the 1904 St. Louis World's Fair.⁶¹ It is a fascinating and admirable piece.



An observation tower, designed and built by Cope, at Gettysburg
 Author's Collection

Cope knew that one of his main tasks would be the creation of navigable roadways that would stand the test of time. When designing the road system, he based his specifications on a process called telfordizing. Invested in creating a lasting memory of what transpired at Gettysburg, Cope was exceedingly specific in his instructions:

The center portion of the roadway feet in width should be piked with a fine course of stone 4 to 5 in size laid on edge, settled down evenly and compactly with rapping hammers[.] This course shall be then covered with a layer of good hard 1 in. stone 4 in. in depth. This last course shall be covered with sufficient clay to form a bond and then thoroughly rolled until the surface is hard smooth and compact so that the wheels of a carriage passing over it will not leave an impression. The whole surface of the piking to be covered with a light coat of stone chips or screenings sufficient to conceal the clay and rolled down hard and smooth.⁶²

Cope was such a stickler for how things should be done that in one instance, when he was called away for other business while the contractors paved the roads, he made them dig up the road the next day and rebuild it to his specifications.⁶³

Cope personally designed every aspect of the five observation towers that extend up from the landscape. These towers were built in two sizes, 60 and 75 feet. Tower One was on Big Round Top and stood 60 feet tall, until it was removed in 1968 because it was underused and had been overrun by turkey vultures. Tower Two is on Warfield Ridge along Confederate Avenue and stands 75 feet tall. Tower Three is on Oak Ridge, and it first stood at 75 feet but was shortened to 23 feet after structural deterioration. Tower Four is on Culp's Hill and stands 60 feet tall. Tower Five was at Ziegler's Grove and stood 75 feet high, but it was removed in 1961 to make room for the old Cyclorama Center.⁶⁴ Looking out across the landscape from any of these towers gives visitors the ability to study the battlefield in a way that soldiers on the ground could not have experienced. Cope designed these towers for that very specific purpose, to educate and to give everyone studying the battle a bird's eye view of the battlefield.

Cope's towers became so appreciated that his design was used to build another



A road crew amidst large pavers in the roadbed at the foot of Big Round Top during an inspection visit by Emmor Cope (center left) in 1897

Courtesy National Park Service, Gettysburg National Military Park, Museum Collection, GETT 41136/T-3118

tower, one that is now but a memory to some. Built in 1906, the tower, known as the Mount Joy Observatory, overlooked Valley Forge State Park where General George Washington and the Continental Army had camped during the Revolutionary War.⁶⁵ The tower stood 88 feet tall atop the highest point of the park, about 13 miles from Cope's childhood home. The tower was condemned in 1979, dismantled, and sold. However, the new owner refurbished the tower and put it back together for people to enjoy. It now overlooks Pine Creek Gorge, the "Grand Canyon of Pennsylvania," near Wellsboro, Pennsylvania.⁶⁶

In 1922, Commissioner Nicholson passed away, at which time the secretary of war appointed Cope to the position of superintendent. Cope, who had been the chief engineer and had run the day-to-day

business at the park, now had to form park policy, participate in long-term planning, and create operational procedures. At first, Cope did not have as much confidence in himself as everyone else seemed to have, but he grew to see that he was more than capable of his new position. In a letter to his sister, he wrote, "I am running the whole business of the National Park now. I was a little doubtful if I could do it at first, but all insisted that I should do it, and I find I can do it better than I expected. I have the Secretary [of] War behind me and am getting along very well so far."⁶⁷ Cope did not miss a beat. He continued to spend every day working in and around the park, making sure that things were running smoothly and being completed according to his plans. In September 1926, that changed when he fell and suffered a hip injury, which kept him



Cope's observation tower at Valley Forge

Courtesy of the Library Company of Philadelphia

from moving around the park. Unable to go into his office on the second floor of the post office, he ran the park from his home until his death in May 1927, just seven weeks before his ninety-third birthday.⁶⁸

Conclusion

Emmor Cope did a wonderful job designing the roads and monuments throughout the GNMP in such a way as to help visitors immerse themselves in the memory of the battle. The experience of walking across the landscape, where so many fell on those three brutal days, cannot be matched. To gain a thorough understanding of the 1863 landscape, one must walk where these soldiers walked, mentally removing the roads and monuments.

Cope was a man of many interests: art, science, meteorology, invention, and philosophy. When working at the family homestead in West Chester, he invented and patented several things such as a water turbine and agricultural implements. He was so interested in meteorology that he spent many years being a cooperative observer for the United States Weather Bureau, without compensation. At his home, he had a miniature weather station, complete with the necessary instruments to record temperature, precipitation, wind velocity, and various other weather occurrences.



Emmor Cope on Little Round Top in 1903

Courtesy National Park Service, Gettysburg National Military Park, Museum Collection, GETT 41135/20P-2097



Cope's gravesite at Gettysburg

Author's Collection

After his workday at the park, he would record the findings from those instruments in his chart book and then mail his findings to the weather bureau daily. His interest in art was so deep that he maintained painting and reading as hobbies. Along with his childhood painting of Washington, Cope had paintings of Abraham Lincoln, General George Meade, his parents, and both pastoral and ocean scenes, all of which he painted himself after spending his day as the park engineer.

Cope was born into a Quaker family, but over the course of his life, he became a Presbyterian, even becoming an elder in the local church. He was a member of the Royal Legion, United War Veterans, Corporal Skelly Post, and the Gettysburg chapter of the GAR. After his enlistment in June 1861, Cope participated in twenty-six battles all the way to the war's end. Enlisting as a private, he became a lieutenant colonel by the war's end and was an aide-de-camp to General Warren. Upon his death, Cope was the last member of Warren's staff



Cope's headstone at Gettysburg

Author's Collection

who had been at the Battle of Gettysburg, and he was the oldest United States Civil Service employee.⁶⁹

Despite his many accomplishments, Cope did not want attention, preferring to remain out of the spotlight. He said, "The knowledge that this work is appreciated is sufficient glory for me."⁷⁰ Unlike the markers that speckle the landscape of the park, Cope's grave marker is subtle and simple. It can be found along the fence at the Evergreen Cemetery in Gettysburg, bearing his name, his wife's name, and a list of his military accomplishments. Yet as local historian Thomas L. Schaefer notes, Cope's grave might equally bear the inscription found on the grave of famed English architect Sir Christopher Wren in St. Paul's Cathedral: *si monumentum requiris circumspice*—"If you seek his monument, look around."⁷¹

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


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BOOK REVIEWS



WAR AND ITS CAUSES

BY JEREMY BLACK

Rowman & Littlefield, 2019
Pp. x, 241. \$34

REVIEW BY CHARLES A. METCALF

William Tecumseh Sherman, the U.S. Army general best known for his march to the sea during the War Between the States (which included the burning of Atlanta), commented as follows in remarks attributed to a graduation address at the Michigan Military Academy on 19 June 1879: “War is at best barbarism. . . . Its glory is all moonshine. It is only these who have neither fired a shot nor heard the shrieks and groans of the wounded who cry aloud for blood, more vengeance, more desolation. *War is hell*” (emphasis added).¹

When we consider General Sherman’s comments, we can easily understand the effects of war. Jeremy Black, a former professor of history at the universities of Durham and Exeter in the United

Kingdom, and currently a Templeton Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, has written an excellent book that offers a rational and detailed historical description of notable events, places, and times (he calls them “wars”) which serve as markers or milestones in military history.

His first chapter asks the defining question, “What Is War?” There is no simple or single answer. Black points out that it is much more than an academic exercise or a visible means of asserting influence and power. He correctly indicates numerous perspectives and points of view: “any definition of war in terms of a public monopoly of the use of force has to face the heavily contested nature of the public sphere” (4). Particularly relevant is his sage observation: “In practice, there is no one trend today, but rather a number of tendencies” that precipitate war (7). Yet he offers his thoughts when he comments, “the framework for analysis [of the causes of war] has changed over time.” However, he also acknowledges that the “risks underplaying the significance of [these] changes [also has changed] through time” (11). To compensate for this broad spectrum of opinions regarding the causes of war, Black relies on a historical perspective—because it appears to be the most useful way of asking and answering a question that has multiple and sometimes conflicting answers.

Black’s viewpoint suggests that “willingness . . . to fight is the key element in causing fighting, at least in the form of enabling it. This willingness is shaped by bellicose drives that encouraged and sustain war. . . . These drives include the role of integrity, honor, and reputation (including revenge) in the shaping of goals” (221). Furthermore, “when considering the causes of war historically (and in the present), it is possible to accumulate reasons for war, but without that accumulation necessarily explaining the drive or establishing priorities” (226). Black’s bottom line says it all: “The most significant fact is the determination to fight on the part of the leadership of at least one of the powers involved” (227).

Black never explicitly tells us war is hell. He intimates it through repeated examples drawn from the passage of time. He lets the facts speak for themselves. Consider: “Military planning, procurement, and preparations in the situation in 1914, let alone military influences in the decision-making process and cultural bellicosity were present for all powers—even the Swiss mobilized; but they were crucially different in character, context, and consequences” (123). Describing World War II and its origins, Black comments, “The causes of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1941, launched by Germany on 22 June, the largest land-scale conflict of World War II, can be firmly found on the German side” (155). Another, more recent illustration: “For example, in South Sudan, since independence in 2012 there has been ethnic conflict between the Murle, Dinka, and Nuer tribes, with many thousands killed, in large part due to competition for land and cattle and raiding for children to use as slaves” (209). War is ugly. War is violent. War is vulgar. Black does not need to tell us that “war is hell” because the examples, facts, and figures that he presents make his case clear. It is there, right in front of us, for us to read and digest. Regrettably, however, he does not balance the equation: Unlike Sherman, he does not consider or address the effects of war.


Sherman was right: War is hell. If we accept and take Sherman’s comment at face value, we should consider Black’s book, *War and Its Causes*, as valid without being questioned. Black started his book with a blank canvas but has left us with an image that is carefully crafted and offers a needed perspective on the causes of war. And, if we substitute reality for perception, we also might have a better idea about the effects of war. No one really wins. Indeed, *war is hell*.

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NOTE

1. Reprinted in the *National Tribune* (Washington, DC), 26 Nov 1914.



MILITARY HISTORY FOR THE MODERN STRATEGIST: AMERICA'S MAJOR WARS SINCE 1861

BY MICHAEL E. O'HANLON

Brookings Institution Press, 2023
Pp. xiv, 399. \$39.95

REVIEW BY WM. SHANE STORY

Every page of *Military History for the Modern Strategist: America's Major Wars Since 1861* reflects skills that Michael O'Hanlon has cultivated throughout his life. As a Peace Corps volunteer in the 1980s, he taught physics in French in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). He then built a career as a defense analyst, making a name for himself with a score of

books and over 4,000 radio and television appearances. He devoted all these energies to explaining how to “solve for X” on any number of thorny policy conundrums, from Kosovo to Iraq and Afghanistan, China and nuclear weapons, and Ukraine. In this succinct review of American military history, O'Hanlon has assembled a primer intended to provide a quick overview of past conflicts and a few observations to help readers analyze current and potential military problems.

O'Hanlon's goal in dissecting America's wars is to explain their “key causes, major campaigns, dynamics, and outcomes” (vii). He has done just that in his first five chapters covering, respectively, the American Civil War, World War I, World War II, the wars in Korea and Vietnam, and America's wars in the Middle East since 1990. These are not histories of the conflicts but rudimentary analyses, each informed by historical context. He focuses on the operational level of war, the realm of the theater commander. He considers how politics and strategy, diplomacy and alliances, and weapons and tactics empower or constrain the commander.

It is difficult to imagine anyone packing more information into just 325 pages of text. Not a word is wasted, but each war's coverage is less than a mile wide and an inch deep. Vietnam is a case in point. O'Hanlon covers American involvement from the mid-1950s to 1975 in just over twenty pages. He hits all the major topics: the Cold War context, the advisory years, South Vietnamese political turmoil, President Johnson and General Westmoreland, escalation and body counts, the Tet Offensive and the Air War, and President Nixon and Vietnamization. His most cited sources—Stanley Karnow, Andrew Krepinevich, and Lewis Sorley—explain his interpretation that Vietnam was a terrible mistake and a complete disaster, but it could have been fought better. Noticeably missing-in-action are the Army's official histories of Vietnam as well as other recent works on the conflict. What results is relatively clear-cut but dated explanations of the war.

And then there is Iraq. O'Hanlon opens his account of the 2003 invasion with a pseudo-disclaimer. “I warned,” he writes, “that war in Iraq would likely be long and hard, but ultimately did not oppose it” (239). Before the invasion, he did indeed warn that stabilizing a post-Saddam Iraq would be difficult and costly. However, he seemed

to accept that toppling Saddam Hussein was necessary, the only caveat being that the aftermath required careful handling.¹ O'Hanlon describes how the fall of the regime led to the occupation, followed by the civil war and counterinsurgency, the Surge, and the withdrawal; how American forces returned in 2014 for the war against the Islamic State; and how Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden in turn strove to minimize and reduce whenever possible the U.S. footprint in Iraq. He notes that the United States has a closer partner in Iraq “than it likely would have otherwise,” but he questions whether history will justify “the huge costs and major mistakes associated with the U.S. led effort in Iraq since 2003” (313).

Military History for the Modern Strategist suffers from an awkward duality between what is explicit and what is implicit. O'Hanlon explains this work “is a primer with a purpose” (viii). Explicitly, he wants contemporary strategists to learn from history to turn historical mindedness into a tool of contemporary policy making. Implicitly, he sidesteps his role in advocating foreign interventions and downplays the significance of their undesirable consequences.

This duality plays out in his last chapter, which offers three lessons. The first is that outcomes in war are not preordained; too much is unpredictable. It is a sound plea for humility when letting loose the dogs of war. Earlier, he noted the “dangerous proclivity of decisionmakers to display naivety [and] overconfidence” when they launch military operations (viii). Left unacknowledged is O'Hanlon's own encouragement of decision makers to solve the problem of Saddam Hussein. There is no mention of the *New York Times* opinion piece he published days after the 2003 invasion of Iraq when he promised “the war will be won, and won decisively.”² A second lesson—one does learn from experience—is that wars are usually harder and bloodier than expected.

O'Hanlon's third lesson is that America's “grand strategy is strong enough to absorb some setbacks” (321). By “grand strategy,” he does not mean a well-considered approach to countering foreign threats or advancing American interests. Instead, he is referring to a set of circumstances: geography, demographics, economic strength, democratic governance, and firm alliances. All these so favor the United States on the world stage that even military defeats

such as in Vietnam and Afghanistan, and stalemate—at best—in Iraq hardly show up as a blip on the radar of the United States' enduring preeminence in global affairs.

Military History for the Modern Strategist feels like an effort to fit disheartening outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan into a longer and more positive history of America's wars over time. The lesson about America's grand strategy being so grand that military setbacks are not all that terrible suggests a "nothing-to-see-here" approach to putting Afghanistan and Iraq in the rearview mirror, as if the legacy of those conflicts should not stain the reputations of their advocates. But their chastening effect does come through: he encourages American policymakers to have confidence in the underlying strength of the nation's position in the world, resolution in the "defense of core interests [but] caution in the use of force . . . and restraint in strategic ambitions" (325).


As a primer, *Military History for the Modern Strategist* is well worth reading for a general audience and equally useful for spurring arguments among veterans, professionals, and experts about these wars and O'Hanlon's lessons. The implication that America's place in the world is so secure that recent setbacks are not significant in the grand scheme of things is painful. Many veterans have questioned whether any good came from the sacrifices of the post-9/11 wars. They wonder, and they doubt. But that was not the book O'Hanlon wrote. It is a starting point to learn about military campaigns; much more is needed if one is to contemplate war. Because O'Hanlon explains why, he deserves the last word: "Military history is fundamentally sobering. For that reason its value is hard to exaggerate" (325).

Dr. Wm. Shane Story, a retired Army Reserve colonel, is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He has a PhD in history from Rice University and deployed to Iraq as a historian with the Coalition Land Forces Component Command in 2003 and with the Multi-National Force—Iraq in 2007–2008.

NOTES

1. Michael O'Hanlon, "The Price of Stability," *New York Times* (22 Oct 2002), A31.

2. Michael O'Hanlon, "And Now, the Good News," *New York Times* (28 Mar 2003), A17



TWENTY YEARS OF SERVICE: THE POLITICS OF MILITARY PENSION POLICY AND THE LONG ROAD TO REFORM

BY BRANDON J. ARCHULETA

University Press of Kansas, 2020
Pp. xvi, 264. \$45

REVIEW BY GREGORY C. MCCARTHY

Brandon Archuleta is an Army officer turned author, and his book is an important addition to the overlooked study of military retirement and its place in the larger fiscal and policy setting. This work examines the adoption of the Blended Retirement System (BRS) as a break from what he deems the 1948–2018 monopoly period of fixed military retirement pay. The narrative involves the response to the Budget Control Act of 2011, which established a commission to examine military retirement, ultimately resulting in the BRS as an option for troops beginning in 2018. In the author's telling, the commission had the notably capable leadership of Alphonso Maldon Jr., ensuring unity that effected this substantial change. This study, supported by anonymous interviews with leaders, is a useful contribution as far as it goes, but the BRS is perhaps not as dramatic as it appears at first blush.

Archuleta offers the study of a subsystem, the personnel policy entities that comprise Department of Defense (DoD) retirement matters. In lamenting the high turnover among DoD personnel experts and legislative overseers, he proposes various reforms to make the policy infrastructure more focused. This lack of focus is a chronic condition across administrations and Congresses, so it is unclear what greater institutional knowledge would result in an environment for reform to his liking. Though he identifies groupthink as a source of policy inelasticity (17), it is just as likely self-interest or yielding to pressure groups. High turnover and possible reorganizations of the DoD's personnel function are not likely to affect the environment for reform when there is minimal appetite for and much opposition to it. He cites strong commission leadership as a necessity to break the status quo, but he also notes that presidential commissions are a dime a dozen and seldom have the desired effect on policy.

The author usefully explains the historical basis for the "famously rigid" and long-standing military pension system, one that most troops take for granted. Beginning in the interwar period, retirement incentives were partly a means of managing the "up or out" promotion system and moving people along. Republican Presidents Calvin Coolidge and Herbert C. Hoover were both concerned about costs. When Coolidge vetoed legislation in favor of greater veterans' benefits, Congress overrode it. Hoover presided over the disastrous 1932 Bonus March, which backfired badly on efforts to address veterans' pay. After World War II, the twenty-year pension became codified.

The author provides jarring evidence that then-Army Chief of Staff General Omar N. Bradley all but lied to Congress in his defense of the original establishment of the twenty years of service standard, feigning confusion and grossly minimizing the number of those eligible for such a pension, thus reassuring his audience that the expenditure would be modest (89). As early as 1948, the author notes that a commission found the new retirement system overly costly and against the public interest.

The author correctly argues that compensation must be viewed with an eye toward recruiting and retention. He rightly sees most interest groups as focused on the concerns of retirees. The twenty-year service standard predates the all-volunteer force (AVF) by nearly a generation, thus

undermining the argument that only the generous retirement will appeal to today's new recruits—most of whom do not reach the milestone. The author senses the danger facing the AVF, which is now beset by grave recruiting challenges, particularly in the Army.

One break in the status quo was the modest Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986, known as REDUX, the brainchild of then–House Armed Services Committee Chair Les Aspin (D-WI). Aspin served a brief, unsuccessful tour as Secretary of Defense before his untimely death in 1995. The author identifies Aspin's death as the end of preserving REDUX, which was undone a dozen years later by Congress. More precisely, Aspin's departure from public office removed the last prominent advocate of the reform.

Several times, Archuleta describes the veteran population as “inactive,” but these groups are inactive in the sense of a volcano. Ferocious defense of benefits defines veterans service organizations (VSOs), the Military Coalition umbrella, and their allies. He correctly notes these groups are quick to charge “breaking faith with our veterans” or denouncing proposed reforms as “on the backs of” servicemembers and insisting other government spending reductions go first. The author quotes then–House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), who conceded to Defense Secretary Robert Gates that she deferred to VSO demands. This tired formula contributes to the \$31 trillion national debt. Regular congressional brinkmanship over annual appropriations complicates any effort at serious legislative reform.

Virtually no entity is concerned with the overall effects of spending, and fiscal responsibility has been something hardly any party, interest group, or politician has embraced with much consistency. Defense budgets may ebb and flow, but retiree costs are more fixed and rising. For example, the overall life expectancy went from 67.2 years in 1948 to 78.7 years in 2018, so retirees' time as pensioners has steadily grown, increasing the cost to the taxpayer without buying more military service for the country.¹ The tiny clawback that was the 2017 adoption of the BRS appears to be the exception regarding pension reform. The BRS breakthrough, such as it was, was more than offset by enhanced benefits elsewhere.² For example, the 2004 concurrent receipt expansion was part of a tremendous growth in personnel costs. The author also does not mention the

concomitant explosion of veterans' disability ratings over the past few decades.³

Like the book, the subject of military pensions belongs in the larger part of the discussion of unsustainable federal spending. Like federal pensions generally, the Military Retirement Fund, which resources military retirees, reshuffled among government trust funds, faces steep unfunded liabilities, more than \$700 billion in fiscal year 2021.⁴ There is no consensus on what “reform” means, much less the political will to enact it. Thus, the painstaking case for rationalizing retirement costs and weighing their effect on national security readiness will have to be made elsewhere. And, in an otherwise sound and informative work, he misidentifies two long-departed members of Congress (64, 89).⁵

This book may be controversial to some readers. It is an emotionally laden, politically charged subject involving service compensation and possible benefit restructuring. This important study opens a conversation most leaders have avoided, but the remorseless math indicates it will only grow in importance in the years ahead.

Dr. Gregory C. McCarthy is a civilian historian for the Department of the Air Force based in Washington, D.C. He is a retired U.S. Marine Corps Reserve colonel with a PhD in American politics from the Catholic University of America.

NOTES


1. National Center for Health Statistics, “Mortality Trends in the United States, 1900–2018,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 25 Aug 2020, <https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data-visualization/mortality-trends/index.htm>.

2. This program grew roughly eightfold in its first decade after inception. See Rpt, Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Actuary, “Valuation of the Military Retirement System,” 30 Sep 2021, <https://media.defense.gov/2023/Mar/20/2003182809/-1/-1/0/fy%202021%20mrf%20valrpt%20final.pdf>.

3. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics News Release, “Employment Situation of Veterans – 2022,” 21 Mar 2023, <https://www.bls.gov/news.release/vet.htm>. Specifically, “41 percent of Gulf War-era II veterans had a service-connected disability, compared with 27 percent of all veterans.”

4. Rpt, DoD Office of the Actuary, “Valuation of The Military Retirement System.”

5. He mistakes Sen. Robert Byrd for Sen. Harry F. Byrd Sr. The former was not in Congress at the time of his quoted dialogue. Also, Wright Patman served in the House, not the Senate.



THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA: FROM CONFEDERATION TO EMPIRE, 1775–1903

BY ROBERT WOOSTER

University Press of Kansas, 2021
Pp. xiii, 479. \$38.70

REVIEW BY BARRY M. STENTIFORD

In *The United States Army and the Making of America: From Confederation to Empire, 1775–1903*, historian Robert Wooster presents a compelling case that the military, specifically the Regular Army, was the central force in creating the continent-spanning American nation in the nineteenth century. Wooster, a Regents Professor of History at Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi, has written several books on the nineteenth-century U.S. Army in the Trans-Mississippi West. In this volume, he reconciles traditional military history with its focus on war and battles with the new military history focusing on the links between the Army as an institution

and society. Drawing on a truly massive assortment of primary and secondary sources (there are one hundred pages of endnotes), the book is an important corrective on the role of the Army in the development of the United States.

The genesis of this work came from comments made by presidential candidate George W. Bush in 2000 that the military should not be involved in nation-building, a sentiment often expressed by military officers. Wooster finds this attitude both ironic and ahistorical, as the Army was key not only to the territorial expansion of the United States but also to the federal government's approach to a host of other issues. The militarization of many of the functions of the United States government—that is, the use of military as the primary means of dealing with issues such as disasters, epidemics, and myriad foreign relations activities—is a common point of criticism. Wooster shows that this pattern began in the first days of the Republic. As small as it was, the Regular Army from its infancy was often the only means the government had for evicting squatters from western lands, dealing with Native American tribes, and creating the physical infrastructure the growing nation required.

After a few years in which the continued existence of the Regular Army was in doubt, it became an accepted permanent fixture of the U.S. government. The primary debate over the century was the size of the Regular Army, one that would be large enough to serve the needs of the nation yet would not be a burden or dangerous. Against this backdrop was populist rhetoric about the militia as the true defender of the nation, but as a practical matter, few in government or the Regular Army believed it. Instead, the government relied on the Regular Army. Aside from servicing the national debt, the military took the lion's share of federal budgets throughout the nineteenth century. It varied from roughly a third to 70 percent of the budget, while often accounting for the bulk of federal employees. These metrics must be put into perspective, as the imperative to keep budgets small and thus taxes as low as possible meant that the size of the Regular Army in peacetime seldom was the size of a single modern division and was at times barely the size of a modern brigade. Although it was small, the United States Army was a "very traditional regular army . . . tasked with the very untraditional duties of managing the

multiracial, multicultural borderlands—a complex assignment it would struggle to fulfill for the next century" (39).

By its very presence, the Army fueled growth as settlers and businesses sprung up around military posts. A constant complaint of congressional representatives from the West was the inequitable spreading of the economic benefits of the military, as armories and foundries, the United States Military Academy, and coastal fortifications were concentrated in the East. Many communities desired military-related infrastructure, but only those on the immediate frontier wanted soldiers. Most Americans had contempt for the enlisted men of the Regular Army, whom they saw as loafers, immigrants, and the sweepings of the lowest elements of Eastern cities. Paired with that was the image of officers with aristocratic pretensions, and the officer corps did little to disabuse their fellow countrymen of it. Indeed, most officers likewise held a low opinion of civilians. Actual war did little to change these perceptions.


Much of the underlying narrative of the book is the increased institutionalization and professionalization of the officer corps. In that, the graduates from the Military Academy at West Point played the decisive role, with the drive from within to depoliticize the officer corps beginning as early as the 1830s. Wooster does not shy away from using the modern yet accurate term of "ethnic cleansing" for the removal of Native American tribes ever further west and onto ever-shrinking reservations, but does emphasize that most officers found such duties distasteful. Equally frustrating were duties related to policing Anglo and Hispanic civilians in places such as San Francisco and Sante Fe after the vast territorial expansion from the Mexican-American War. Also troubling were the missions of the Army in places such as Kansas in the 1850s to prevent violence between pro- and antislavery forces and Reconstruction in the South following the Civil War. Officers yearned for a war against a conventional enemy, usually imagined as against the Spanish or British. However, from 1846 to 1848, the Mexican Army would fill that role to some extent, as did the Confederates between 1861 and 1865.

The Civil War, fought mainly by volunteers rather than regulars, did little to enhance the reputation of the Regular Army. The shortcomings of Army leadership early

in the war brought the reputation of the Regular Army to new lows. The defection of one-quarter of the graduates of West Point to the Confederacy further tarnished the reputation of that institution. The performances of General Ulysses S. Grant, General William T. Sherman, and other leaders of the U.S. Army in the latter years of the war, restored the reputation of West Point. Still, the years after the Civil War saw an increase in the responsibilities of the Regular Army in Reconstruction, Indian wars, labor disputes, and myriad other missions against repeated calls for shrinking the force and closing West Point.

The United States Army and the Making of America will more than hold its place among older works in the field, such as Robert Utley's *Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848–1865* (Macmillan, 1967) and *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866–1891* (Macmillan, 1973). This new volume places Douglas C. McChristian's *Regular Army O!: Soldiers on the Western Frontier, 1865–1891* (University of Oklahoma Press, 2017) in its larger context. While McChristian delved into the details of the post-Civil War Regular Army in the West, Wooster places the Army in its larger context of not just the conquest and policing of the West but also the creation and growth of the American Republic. The book ends with the Army doing what it had been doing since its inception—governing, controlling, and building infrastructure in new territories, a process that started with the Old Northwest in the 1790s and concluded in the first decade of the twentieth century in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. Wooster shows that the Army has long been involved in nation-building.

Dr. Barry M. Stentiford received his PhD from the University of Alabama in 1998 and serves as a Professor of Military History at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. He retired as a colonel from the U.S. Army Reserve. His interests focus on non-regular U.S. military forces.



JOHN P. SLOUGH: THE FORGOTTEN CIVIL WAR GENERAL

BY RICHARD L. MILLER

University of New Mexico Press, 2021
Pp. xv, 288. \$34.95

REVIEW BY ETHAN S. RAFUSE

Because of the small size of the U.S. Army when the American Civil War broke out, Abraham Lincoln and other leaders in the North had to turn to individuals who lacked a West Point education or experience in the antebellum army to fill leadership roles in the Union army. Not surprisingly, given that the war came at a time when the spoils system was central to the functioning of government at all levels, many of the men who wore stars during the Civil War were men of political prominence. For the most part, these political generals have not fared well at the hands of historians, many of whom have agreed with Henry W. Halleck that it seemed “little better than murder” to place troops in the field under the command of “such men.”¹ This is not surprising, as forces under the command of high-profile political generals like Nathaniel Banks and Benjamin Butler did, in fact, suffer their fair share of battlefield setbacks during the war. Moreover, political generals often posed a challenge to the dominance West Point graduates gained over the officer corps in the decades after the War of 1812, which

students of the U.S. Army generally view as one of the most important and salutary developments in American military affairs during the nineteenth century.

Among “such men” who found themselves in important command positions during the war was John P. Slough, whose remarkable life and service to the republic, in and out of uniform, is the subject of Richard L. Miller’s fine biography. Slough’s path to a general’s commission began in Ohio, where, aided by marriage to the niece of a U.S. Supreme Court justice, he began his rise to political prominence. He also started to exhibit flaws in character and temperament that often would prove to be his greatest source of trouble and the greatest obstacle to his ambitions. After being expelled from the Ohio state assembly for physically assaulting a colleague on the statehouse floor, the Douglas Democrat headed west to Kansas, where he participated in the constitutional convention that brought the troubled territory into the Union. Realizing Republican dominance in Kansas limited his prospects in the new state, Slough again headed west. He soon achieved sufficient prominence in Denver to be appointed colonel of the 1st Colorado Infantry. The forces under his command won the March 1862 fight at Glorietta Pass that thwarted Southern hopes of adding New Mexico to the Confederacy. By then, however, Slough had worn out his welcome with the soldiers of the 1st Colorado, who, with the help of members of the Colorado press, decided the more relaxed leadership style of John Chivington was more suited to their interests and tastes.

Two months after Glorietta Pass, Slough was in Virginia, helping defend Harpers Ferry after the Confederate victories at Front Royal and Winchester. Then, in August 1862, he accepted the appointment as military governor of Alexandria, a position he would hold until the end of the war. The task of managing a port city that, while far from the major battlefields of Virginia, was the end of the line for the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, just downriver from Washington and on the front lines of the transition from slavery to freedom in the Old Dominion, brought Slough a host of challenges militarily, politically, socially, and administratively. So, too, did service on the court-martials of Fitz John Porter and William A. Hammond, in which Slough fulfilled Secretary of War Edwin Stanton’s expectations that, despite being a Democrat,


he would be a vote for conviction. After the war, Slough returned to New Mexico as chief justice of the territorial court, where a stormy tenure in office showed that service in the Union army had not dimmed his talent for making enemies. In December 1867, both Slough’s tenure in office and his life ended violently, when one of those enemies chose to resolve their conflict with a Colt revolver.

Slough may not have had a Shiloh, Chancellorsville, March to the Sea, or Sailor’s Creek on his record, but he made important contributions to the Union war effort. Before and after the war, his life was certainly interesting enough—both in its own right and for what it reveals about nineteenth-century America—to justify this commendable study. Readers will appreciate Miller’s well-constructed and well-written narratives of the military operations in New Mexico and Virginia in which Slough played a significant role. They also will appreciate how Miller’s descriptions and analyses of Slough’s struggles and successes away from the battlefield highlight the often rocky, but always fascinating, interaction between politics and the military in wartime as well as the variety of roles army officers played during the Civil War.

Dr. Ethan S. Rafuse earned his PhD at the University of Missouri–Kansas City and, since 2004, has been a member of the faculty at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, where he is a professor of military history.

NOTE

1. Ltr, Henry W. Halleck to William T. Sherman, 29 Apr 1864, in U.S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1891), ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 3, 333.



JULY 22: THE CIVIL WAR BATTLE OF ATLANTA

BY EARL J. HESS

University Press of Kansas, 2023
Pp. xvii, 411. \$44.95

REVIEW BY MARK L. BRADLEY

This book marks the fourth battle study in historian Earl J. Hess's series on the Atlanta Campaign of 1864. The 22 July engagement was the bloodiest of the campaign; Hess calls it "the greatest day of fighting by the Union Army of the Tennessee and one of the great days of battle by the Confederate Army of Tennessee" (xv). Yet, he notes that the Battle of Atlanta was not the decisive victory that the attacking Confederates under Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood so desperately needed.

On 17 July 1864, Confederate President Jefferson F. Davis chose Hood to replace General Joseph E. Johnston as commander of the Army of Tennessee, having grown impatient with Johnston's apparent reluctance to fight Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's larger Union army group. Hood had served as a corps commander under Johnston, and his reputation for aggressiveness helped secure the promotion. He, therefore, understood that Davis expected him to strike the Federals without delay.

Sherman's troops, meanwhile, crossed the Chattahoochee River, the last natural barrier en route to Atlanta from north Georgia. On 20 July, the Confederates launched their first assault under Hood, opening the Battle of

Peach Tree Creek, 2 miles north of the city. Despite an initial surprise, the Union Army of the Cumberland under Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas repulsed the Confederates' attacks. Hess ascribes the failed assaults to "poor management, uneven combat morale among the rank and file, and very stout Union resistance" (36).

On 21 July, the Union Army of the Tennessee under Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson assumed the offensive. McPherson ordered Brig. Gen. Mortimer D. Leggett's division of the XVII Corps to seize Bald Hill, a Confederate-held elevation just a few miles east of Atlanta. Brig. Gen. Manning F. Force's brigade spearheaded the attack, driving off Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Ferguson's Confederate cavalry brigade.

Only after Force's brigade secured Bald Hill did McPherson realize he lacked a cavalry screen for his left flank. On 20 July, Sherman had ordered Brig. Gen. Kenner Garrard to shift his cavalry division from McPherson's left flank to Covington, 35 miles east of Atlanta, where his command tore up the railroad track. Hess notes that "it was incautious" of Sherman "to take away the only cavalry available to McPherson" (48). In response, McPherson reinforced his left flank with Maj. Gen. Grenville M. Dodge's XVI Corps, a precaution that proved vital to the Army of the Tennessee. Yet, Hess agrees with historian Albert Castel that McPherson should have sent Dodge to cover his left flank much sooner. "This was not the first or only laxness displayed by McPherson during the [Atlanta] campaign," Hess writes. These lapses revealed that the general "had risen above his level of skill when it came to battlefield management of such a large command" (298–99).

Hood decided to exploit that weakness after his cavalry reported that McPherson's left flank appeared vulnerable. On the evening of 21 July, Hood briefed his subordinates on his plan to march an entire corps into the rear of McPherson's line. He designated Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee's corps to make the assault. Although among the best in Hood's army, Hardee's troops were exhausted by their exertions over the past two days on little or no sleep, so Hardee requested a change of plan. Hood called a second meeting and authorized Hardee to shorten the march from 15 to 12 miles and to merely strike McPherson's left flank. Hardee's men began their march at dusk, numbering about 18,000 strong; due to straggling, they lost 7,000 along the

way. "Despite the straggling," Hess notes, "Hardee delivered a formidable force of manpower to surprise the Federals" (52).

As the Confederates approached the Union left flank held by the XVI Corps, skirmishers of the 66th Illinois Infantry Regiment glimpsed Maj. Gen. William H. T. Walker at the head of his division and opened fire, killing him. Walker was the highest-ranking Confederate fatality in the Battle of Atlanta. In the meantime, Brig. Gen. States R. Gist's brigade threatened to overwhelm the Federals, but Union division commander Brig. Gen. John W. Fuller seized the colors of his former regiment, the 27th Ohio, and planted the flag where he wanted the unit to reform. His alert action barely enabled Fuller's division to block Gist's assault.

A short distance to the southwest, McPherson rode into Confederate skirmishers of Brig. Gen. James A. Smith's brigade, one of whom shot the general from his saddle as he tried to escape. McPherson died soon afterward. The Army of the Tennessee thus lost its beloved leader. On receiving the news of his friend and subordinate's death, Sherman placed Maj. Gen. John A. Logan in command of the Army of the Tennessee. In the meantime, Logan's former command, the XV Corps, fought desperately to hold onto its position.

At 1515, Hood ordered his former corps led by Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham to support Hardee's assault. Two of Cheatham's brigades broke through the XV Corps line where it crossed the Georgia Railroad, capturing Capt. Francis De Gress's battery as its infantry support fled. It is a tribute to the resilience of the XV Corps soldiers that they recaptured their position after reeling from what Hess calls "the best tactical move ever conducted by the Confederate Army of Tennessee" (298). Even so, Hess finds fault with the Confederate high command, particularly Hood and Cheatham, whom he castigates as hopelessly out of their depth. As for the importance of the Battle of Atlanta, Hess concedes that it fell short of being decisive but maintains that it "did nullify the most dangerous Confederate threat to Sherman's push for Atlanta" (313).


Hess devotes a chapter to postwar commemoration of the battle. The process began with the reburial of the hastily interred dead, the fallen Confederates mostly laid to rest in private cemeteries, while the U.S. Army reburied slain Federals in a national cemetery at nearby Marietta,

Georgia. Hess notes that the monuments to Union General McPherson and Confederate General Walker, which once were located in the countryside, are now engulfed by suburban Atlanta.

The most famous pictorial representation of the engagement is the *Battle of Atlanta*, better known as the Atlanta Cyclorama. Completed in 1886 by a team of artists, the circular canvas measures 400 feet long and 50 feet tall. Since 2019, the fully restored Cyclorama has been on display at the Atlanta History Center. Hess states that the mammoth picture once was interpreted as an icon of Lost Cause mythology but now serves as an accurate rendering of the Union victory.

With *July 22*, Hess has crafted an outstanding battle study. No less noteworthy are the excellent maps by Hal Jespersen. Let us hope that these two men decide to collaborate on a book about the final conflict of the Atlanta Campaign—the Battle of Jonesboro.

Dr. Mark L. Bradley is a historian who recently retired from the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is the coauthor of the forthcoming official history of Army logistical support in Vietnam.



BLOOD AND RUINS: THE LAST IMPERIAL WAR, 1931–1945

BY RICHARD OVERY

Viking Press, 2021
Pp. xi, 990. \$29.82

REVIEW BY GRANT T. HARWARD

Richard Overy has written many insightful books on various aspects of the Second World War over the past five decades. However, now he tackles the entire global conflict in a monumental single-volume history entitled *Blood and Ruins: The Last Imperial War, 1931–1945*. Histories of the Second World War abound, but writing such a chronicle is no easy task, especially one that brings something new to the subject. Since Gerhard Weinberg’s seminal *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II* (Cambridge University Press) appeared in 1994, most such histories have used the same basic outline as that work while incorporating different stories or highlighting contrasting themes. Overy forges an original organization framed by a new perspective, synthesizing the most recent scholarship in a very readable monograph about the global conflict.

Overy favors a “long Second World War” periodization that begins with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and ends with the American dropping of atomic bombs on Japan in 1945. This framing is a major departure from most histories that start in

1939 and finish in 1945. He argues that a true global history should not focus on the defeat of the Axis in Europe and treat the fighting in the Pacific as “an appendix” (xii). Usually, in addition to being separated geographically, other accounts focused on great power rivalry or ideology see the two theaters as distinct. Overy contends imperialism underlaid the war aims of the Axis in Asia, Africa, and Europe, and bound together the campaigns against the Allies on opposite sides of the earth. This lens offers a new explanation for the Second World War as a bloody contest to upturn the global imperial order built by European “nation-empires,” in particular Great Britain and France, that controlled vast swathes of territory in Africa and Asia. Overy argues that the Second World War, following on from the First World War, irrevocably damaged the system and even the very idea of empire—as it was traditionally understood and practiced. Thus, he sets the Second World War as a pivotal turning point in a much broader story of the rise of “new imperialism” after the 1870s; the terrible climax of imperialist expansion in the destruction of the recently conquered empires of Imperial Japan, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany in the 1940s; and finally the collapse of the remaining European empires by the 1960s (854). A new global order of nations sponsored by anti-imperialist superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, coalesced and rejected territorial empire as a basis of rule.

The organization of *Blood and Ruins* is an effective combination of chronological and thematic chapters. The book starts with a narrative arc. After a prologue about the cultural attitudes of the fin de siècle, events of the First World War, and developing crises in the 1920s, Overy has three chronological chapters that cover the Second World War from 1931 to 1940, 1940 to 1943, and 1942 to 1945, respectively. Having established the narrative, he can then dissect the events. There follows seven thematic chapters that examine mobilization, fighting, economies and economic warfare, moral debates about the war, “civilian wars” (civil defense and resistance), the emotional impact of warfare on soldiers and civilians, and crimes and atrocities. The final chapter acts as an epilogue, returning to a narrative format, that traces the end of an empire through the colonial wars fought by European states in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa during the postwar period.

The work is characterized by a comparative approach. Overy focuses on Japan, Italy, Germany, China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. He constantly mixes and matches the actions of the major powers to highlight similarities and differences in varying contexts, resulting in revealing and frequently surprising insights. Additionally, Overy often harks back to the First World War to highlight the differences between the Second World War. The memory and lessons of the Great War had a major impact on the Last Imperial War. The reader will find the shifting comparisons enthralling.


Overy repeatedly asserts that the Second World War was unique and unlikely to be repeated, especially regarding the mass mobilization and mass production necessary to fight an industrial total war. He argues that the First World War convinced states that mass mobilization was necessary and contributed to conditioning societies to accept the burdens of total war in the Second World War. Furthermore, he points out that today's weapons and equipment are far more technologically complex, and far more expensive beyond the capacity to be quickly produced at volume in massive amounts. Workers who manufacture and soldiers who use these modern machines of war must also be far more educated and trained than those of the 1940s. He does not mention that much of the industrial base and workforce no longer exist in the United States or Europe. Only China has the factories and workers to attempt such mass mobilization and mass production in wartime again, which is ironic because of the major powers in the Second World War, only China lacked both, being almost wholly reliant on foreign aid.

Overy's definition of imperialism, direct territorial control of a colony, will be too narrow for many, especially scholars of the American or Soviet empires. The current Russian invasion of Ukraine may also be seen as evidence of a new imperial war—which, according to some, is also prosecuted by a new fascist regime. Yet the global outrage about the war against Ukraine and the condemnation of Russia's motives lends credence to his assertion that the peoples of the world today reject old-fashioned imperialism, justified by racist theories, in a way they did not before the Second World War. Only time will tell if imperial war has been thrown into the dustbin of history.

Regardless, Overy's *Blood and Ruins* is a triumphant work by a talented historian

with a mastery of the history of the Second World War. He tells a familiar story without repeating old tropes and in a way that makes it new. Although dense and lengthy, the style and prose flows and pulls the reader along throughout the book. It is a truly international work with equal attention to Europe and the Pacific that should be on the shelf of anyone interested in the greatest global conflict in history.

Dr. Grant T. Harward is a native of southern California. He completed his bachelor's degree in history at Brigham Young University in 2009, his master's degree in the Second World War in Europe at the University of Edinburgh in 2010, and his PhD in history at Texas A&M University in 2018. He is a former Auschwitz Jewish Center fellow, a former Fulbright scholar to Romania, and a former Mandel Center fellow at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. He was a historian for the U.S. Army Medical Department Center of History and Heritage at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas, from 2018 to 2021. He currently works as a historian for the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Dr. Harward has written numerous articles about the history of U.S. Army medicine and the Romanian Army during World War II. His book, *Romania's Holy War: Soldiers, Motivation, and the Holocaust* (Cornell University Press, 2021), won the 2022 Barbara Jelavich Book Prize from the Association of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies.



PATTON'S WAR: AN AMERICAN GENERAL'S COMBAT LEADERSHIP, VOLUME 2: AUGUST-DECEMBER 1944

BY KEVIN M. HYMEL

University of Missouri Press, 2023
Pp. xi, 467. \$39.95

REVIEW BY ARNOLD BLUMBERG

With Volume 2 of *Patton's War: An American General's Combat Leadership, August-December 1944*, writer and historian Kevin M. Hymel superbly presents the second part of his trilogy of histories about one of the most, if not *the* most, successful United States Army battlefield commanders of World War II: George S. Patton Jr.

For fifteen years, Hymel served as a historian and writer for the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, and he is now a historian and tour guide for Stephen Ambrose Historical Tours, where he leads the "In Patton's Footsteps" tour. He is currently a historian at Arlington National Cemetery, the author of four books, including *Patton's Photographs: War as He Saw It*, and a regular contributor to *WWII History* and *WWII Quarterly*, published by Sovereign Media. His article "Fighting a Two Front War," first published in *WWII History Magazine*, is being made into the Netflix movie *6888*, written and produced by Tyler Perry. Hymel served as a technical adviser to the film.

In the first installment of *Patton's War*, the author leads off with a brief biography of his

subject, warts and all. Patton's antisemitism, racism, and class consciousness are alluded to as well as his determination to become a great warrior. Hymel then covers Patton's exploits as a combat leader from his time as a corps commander in North Africa to his taking the helm of the Seventh Army in the Allied invasion and conquest of Sicily. The general's time in limbo, after the infamous slapping incident, followed by the period of an uncertain military future while stationed in England as the Allies stormed ashore on D-Day and then fought through the Normandy hedgerows, is detailed. Finally, Hymel presents the birth of the Third Army and the resurrection of Patton's military career.

As in Volume 1, in Volume 2 of *Patton's War*, the author maintains a narrative founded on a clear and forceful writing style supported by in-depth research. However, Volume 2 differs from Volume 1 in a number of critical details.

First, the main source for any story of Patton is the warrior's thoughts, derived from his diaries. Hymel discovered that large parts of these diaries were embellished greatly after his death by the general's wife, Beatrice, and several Patton acolytes who added to and helped transcribe them. Generally, the diaries written in General Patton's hand are plain. In contrast, the transcribed versions often make him brilliant, clairvoyant, and an excellent judge of other people's strengths and weaknesses. These characteristics are lacking in the original diaries.

Another major difference between Volume 1 and Volume 2 is the coverage of actual combat seen by the general. The first volume covered his activities from the shores of French Morocco to Normandy, 8 November 1942 to 31 July 1944, a period of only ten weeks of combat for the general. In Volume 2, for the period of August to December 1944, the action was more continuous for Patton and his Third Army. During this time, movement, skirmishes, and major engagements were the norm almost every day. Good examples are the knife-like cutting advances from the Normandy breakout to the detour to capture the French port of Brest and Le Mans between 2 and 9 August 1944 and the delicate maneuver to close the Falaise Pocket from 10 to 19 August. In quick succession, the operations to cross the Meuse and Moselle Rivers, which took place from 20 August to 13 September 1944, all encountered German counterattacks on

the flanks of the advancing units of Lucky Forward. Then came the major counter moves against the Third Army, such as the large armor clash between the 4th Armored Division and the Wehrmacht's hastily formed Panzer Brigades, notably around the French town of Arracourt between 14 and 30 September. The grueling battle to capture the city of Metz, carried on from 8 to 23 November 1944, reveals Patton at his worst as a military tactician. A final example is Patton and his army's slugging match in the Ardennes Forest during Hitler's Ardennes Counter-Offensive between 16 December 1944 and 25 January 1945.

Volume 2 continues the story of Patton, the fighting man, with him becoming head of the newly activated American Third Army, seamlessly taking up the tale where Volume 1 ended. Like Volume 1, Volume 2 relates the general's wartime activities by weaving a clear, fast-paced, and action-packed narrative, employing a combination of Patton's wartime diaries and letters, a myriad of veteran memoirs, interviews and surveys of those who knew and served with and under him during the Second World War, and unprecedented access to material held by Patton's decedents. An honest day-to-day study of Patton's decisions and leadership styles marks the essence of Volume 2, as is the case with Volume 1. The eleven operational maps do a good job of supporting the stirring commentary.

The author's deeply researched second part of his Patton magnum opus, like Volume 1, puts the reader close to its subject's side in the crucible of war. New insights into Patton the man and Patton the warfighter, at the zenith of his generalship, found in Volume 2 significantly add to the already bigger-than-life legend of America's arguably greatest field commander in World War II.

Hymel's second installment of *Patton's War* is an extensive, fresh, must-read for any student of George S. Patton Jr. and, in particular, the United States' participation in World War II in Europe.

Arnold Blumberg is an attorney residing with his wife and family in Baltimore, Maryland. He is a former visiting scholar and fellow by invitation with the History Department and Classics Department, respectively, at Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of *When Washington Burned: A Pictorial History of the War*

of 1812 (Casemate, 2012) and the forthcoming "Custer in Kansas: The U.S. 7th Cavalry and Its Commander in the West, 1866-70." He is a regular contributor to several military journals and magazines.

The fellows also participate in a mentorship program with CMH senior historians and in a professional development program that introduces them to most of the larger government history organizations in the Washington, D.C., area.

The fellowship is open to individuals who are citizens of the United States and who have graduated within the past two years with a doctoral degree in history from an accredited university or who have completed their general exams and are in the dissertation phase of a doctoral degree program in history at an accredited university. Preference is given to those who have focused their education in the field of military history, but historians from any field are encouraged to apply. Fellows must be eligible to obtain a secret security clearance, so they should have no issues such as a history of criminal convictions or illegal substance use that will unreasonably delay processing for a clearance. A security clearance will provide many opportunities

for employment throughout the federal government and industry at the completion of the fellowship.

Applications for the 2024–2025 fellowship must be submitted by 28 February 2024. Applicants possessing a PhD should have graduated from that degree program no earlier than 1 May 2022. The exact start date of the fellowship is negotiable but should begin on 1 August 2024.

A complete application package includes the following items:

1. Letter from the applicant explaining why they are seeking the fellowship (no more than two pages in single-space, 12-point, Times New Roman font). Applicants are invited, but not required, to explain how their background contributes to the diversity of the military history profession or to their approach to study in the field of military history.

2. A curriculum vitae or resume (in 12-point Times New Roman font) listing education completed or in progress, a brief

description of the completed or in-progress dissertation, recent employment history, publications, presentations at academic conferences, and awards or recognitions (highlighting those relevant to the field of history).

3. A transcript covering academic work at the masters (if applicable) and doctoral level.

4. A letter of recommendation from at least one professor at the student's graduate school, and preferably two.

5. A writing sample of 15–25 pages in the form of a published article or a paper submitted for course credit. This can be submitted in Word or PDF format.

Applications must be submitted digitally to: usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.opportunities@army.mil.

Applicants can submit any questions they may have to the same address.



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Jon T. Hoffman


THE COL. CHARLES YOUNG FELLOWSHIP UPDATE

In the previous issue's Footnote, I introduced the newly established Col. Charles Young Fellowship, designed to increase diversity in the historian workforce of the Center of Military History (CMH) and Functional Community 61, and in the history we produce. Because it took many months to gain approval for this entirely new and unique initiative, we had very little time to advertise the grant, accept and evaluate applications, and complete the administrative steps needed to bring the selectees on board before the end of the fiscal year on 30 September. The process was complicated by the bureaucratic demands of the grant system, which required recipients to create accounts in the government contracting system as if they were corporations seeking a contract. That effort literally came down to the proverbial wire, with the last recipient successfully completing the process on 24 September, the day before we otherwise would have lost the funds for failing to obligate them in the system.

Given the compressed timeframe, we did not receive as large a pool of applicants as we would have liked, but we still had a sufficient number of high-quality candidates. We selected three individuals for the inaugural group of Col. Charles Young Fellows. Two of them were just wrapping up their year as graduate research assistants at CMH under our existing contracts with some of the leading military history schools. They made ideal candidates under the circumstances as they already had security clearances, and it was easier to get them through all the necessary bureaucratic wickets in the extremely limited time we had available.

Katherine Hyun-Joo Mooney is in the last stages of her PhD program at Ohio State University. Her major field is African history, and her dissertation is on the formation, implementation, and legacies of the political philosophy of Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, from independence in 1964 until 1980. John M. Lewis is approaching the end of his work on a PhD degree at Texas A&M University. His dissertation is on the Army's pioneer infantry in the American Expeditionary Forces during World War I, with particular emphasis on the segregated African American units that made up nearly half of this branch of the Army. Paul J. McAllister is in the early phase of his dissertation at Ohio State University and is researching and writing on the Army's creation of a segregated medical component to care for African American soldiers during World War I.

We began advertising for the Fiscal Year 2024 Col. Charles Young Fellowships before we even had finished signing up the inaugural class, and the application period will run through the end of February 2024. To help spread the word, in late September, CMH and Functional Community 61 cohosted a booth at the annual conference of the Association for the Study of African American Life and History in Jacksonville, Florida. We also sponsored a panel of Army historians as part of the academic program. We will continue outreach efforts of this sort to boost applications for the fellowship and develop contacts with schools and groups interested in partnering with the Army historical program.



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