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The ARMY HISTORIAN

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The Center and Vietnam History

The first of the Center of Military History's eighteen volumes to be published in the Vietnam series was released late in the fall. *Advice and Support: The Early Years*, by the Center's Dr. Ronald H. Spector, deals with military advice and assistance to the French government in the early postwar years and the advisory program that developed after the Geneva Accords of 1954. The scope of the volume is rather far-ranging — from advisory operations in the field all the way to major political and military decisions which shaped the early Army efforts in Vietnam.

Although the last of the volumes will not be published until 1991, four volumes are far enough along that the Center hopes to have them released within a year. These are John Bergen's *Communications in Southeast Asia*, Richard Hunt's *Pacification in South Vietnam*, a pictorial history of the war by Joel Myerson, and a volume on advice and support in the later years by Jeffrey Clarke.

The Vietnam series poses some interesting problems. Our intention is to be even-handed in writing about that divisive war, an aim which will, no doubt, lead to some interesting reviews as the books start coming out. There is still a great deal of polarity on the war in all segments of our society, and our efforts will in all probability be caught in the crossfire of these differing views.

Vietnam Symposium

Keeping this in mind, we feel that as the volumes begin to appear over the next year it is important that we as official historians begin a dialogue with the larger historical community. To assist in this, the Center will sponsor a by-invitation-only symposium at Airlie House, about an hour west of Washington, in early November 1984. Although some of the symposium papers will be presented by members of the Center, most will be by academics and others involved in Vietnam research.

There will be three panels: "The Evolution of the Commitment," "The Conduct of the War," and "Afterword." The papers, each of which will be original, will be published as chapters in a volume edited by the Chief of Military History. Illustrative of the quality of the participants (leaving out in-house personnel for the moment), the following university professors have accepted active roles in the symposium: George Herring, Walter LeFeber, John Lewis Gaddis, Allan Goodman, Peter Paret, Norman Graebner, Ernest May, and Edward Coffman. Certain high level participants in the war, including Ambassador Robert Komer and General (Ret.) Bruce Palmer, Jr., will serve as commentators on relevant papers. The Chief of Military History will give the opening talk on the challenge of historical research and writing on Vietnam, and the banquet speaker will be Dr. Robert O'Neill, Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The Center of Military History's program is the largest Vietnam research and writing project in the country. We intend to make the series begun with *Advice and Support* worthy of the standards the Center has already set.



Gen. Maxwell Taylor confers with President Diem in Saigon, 1961.

Editor's Journal

"This enterprise," Secretary Marsh wrote of *The Army Historian* in its first issue, "serves a worthy purpose. I wish it well." The publication would, he felt, "help us have a better understanding of history" and "should attract the attention of those thus far uninitiated in the uses of this valuable discipline." We hope we are moving toward fulfillment of the Secretary's expectations.

Service to the Army

The Army Historian is designed to be of service to our principal audience: professional Army historians and the commissioned and noncommissioned officers who can better accomplish their missions with knowledge of military history. What we are about is "historical mindedness." One of our readers observed that the term sounded as if it were translated literally from a Wehrmacht manual. But historical mindedness conveys a meaning not found in such alternatives as "historical consciousness" or "historical awareness." Basically, it means thinking historically. Historians are expected to have it; soldiers need to acquire it. History does not repeat itself exactly, of course, but patterns have emerged the study of which can help prepare soldiers for the impact of combat, the complexity of logistical operations, and the basic human problems of leadership. "Military history," wrote the Swiss general and historian Antoine Jomini, "accompanied by sound criticism, is indeed the true school of war."

The Army Historian retains its three major divisions: "The Commander and Military History," "Practicing the Historian's Craft," and "Professional Reading." To these we have added another section, "Perspective," featuring an important view of the state of the art. In this issue a contribution by Dr. Maurice Matloff, former Chief Historian of the Center of Military History, gives a comprehensive survey of how military history has gotten where it is and where it needs to go.

Readers' Response

We will be inaugurating a commentary and exchange section in our next issue. Readers are encouraged to send their views and inquiries to the address given for subscriptions on page 15. Most of the comments we received on the first issue were positive. There seemed to be general agreement that *The Army Historian* met an Army need and filled a gap in existing publications. One reader, however, thought our targeted audience was too diverse to be served by the same publication. A large part of our mail came from junior officers asking that they be

placed on our distribution list. Our most serious problem with the first issue, in fact, was one of distribution. Important segments of our audience were missed, and many addresses were not current. The list has been put on the mend with the help of computer technology. We were justifiably censured for omitting noncommissioned officers from the people we sought to reach. We recognize this deficiency and are rectifying it. Our readers were also diplomatic. While typographical errors are almost certain to appear in a periodical, only one person called attention to our misspelling Napoleon, and that was Number 1's issue editor.

Future Issues

Copy has been typeset for this issue, thanks to arrangements with the Government Printing Office. In future issues we will work with various typefaces, sizes, and formats. *The Army Historian* is in the process of becoming.

We hope that Roger Nye, who did so much to help make *The Army Historian* a reality, will continue to cast a benevolent eye on our efforts. Meanwhile and nearer the scene, Bruce Hardcastle, a recent addition to the Center's historical staff, will preside as managing editor over the periodical's publication.

We in military history have an important job to do for the Army. We hope our readers will help *The Army Historian* make its contribution.

The ARMY HISTORIAN

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CHIEF'S BULLETIN

Implementing Secretary Marsh's New Directions

Douglas Kinnard

The Center has had a busy fall getting under way those activities connected with the "new directions" program I discussed in the last issue. I should like to highlight three of these.

National Museum

The project on the National Museum of the U.S. Army continues to progress. General E.C. Meyer, recently retired Chief of Staff, has accepted the Presidency of the Board of Directors of the Army Historical Foundation, the proponent body for the museum. General Meyer is in the process of selecting his board. The Board of Advisors' membership now includes the Honorable Stephen Ailes, the Honorable Stanley R. Resor, Generals Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Matthew B. Ridgway, Bruce Palmer, and William C. Westmoreland, Lt. Gen. Orwin C. Talbott, Maj. Gen. Bruce Jacobs, former Sergeant Major of the Army William G. Bainbridge, and Messrs. James Fyock and Joseph Coors.

In early October, Senators Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont and John W. Warner of Virginia sponsored a Joint Resolution of Congress supporting the idea of a national museum for the United States Army. The resolution is now in the Senate Armed Services Committee, of which Senator Warner is a member. A similar resolution introduced in the House by Representative Ike Skelton of Missouri has been referred to the House Armed Services Committee, on which the Congressman sits.

The contract for a site study has been awarded to a Washington-based architectural firm. We would very much like to obtain a site contiguous to Arlington Cemetery and are at the moment optimistic about this possibility. We are, of course, talking about a project which can at best be completed in five years, but will more realistically probably take seven.

Military History Education

We are inaugurating a new series at the Center called *The Army Historian*. The series will consist of several categories of books. One of the first volumes to appear will be a revision by Dr. Robert K. Wright and Dr. James Nanney of the ROTC text, *American Military History*. Another volume covering the relationship of geography and military history will be edited by Michigan State's Professor Harold A. Winters, with contributions from members of the Department of Geography and Computer Science at

the United States Military Academy. Additionally, serving as a kind of university press, the Center will review for possible publication deserving manuscripts forwarded from the field. We also plan to publish out-of-print military classics. An advisory board has been selected to help me on this series. The members of the board are Lt. Col. Bob Doughty, Professor George Herring, Professor Jay Luvaas, Col. Bill Stofft, Professor Mark Stoler, and Dr. David Trask. Dr. Brooks Kleber will be the series' managing editor.

This spring, the Center hopes to initiate a speakers' series featuring well-known academics from other countries. Possibilities include John Erickson, University of Edinburgh ("The Soviet Military's Use of Military History"); David Chandler, Sandhurst ("What Happened to Military History Education in the British Army"); and Brian Bond, Kings College, London ("Military History Education and Professionalism: The British Army Experience"). Normally, a speaker will give one lecture in Washington, and then will be accompanied by me or someone else from the Center to another location for a second lecture.

Streamlining Publications

We recently conducted a study of the life cycle of Center publications with a view toward improved productivity of the large number of current and projected historical projects we have scheduled. The outcome, identified as the Publications Program System, will basically rationalize management of all of our historical projects from project initiation all the way to actual publication. Lt. Col. Adrian Traas is the project officer.

The Publications Program System will help facilitate centralized control of annual and long-range historical programs through the various stages of project directives, guidelines for research and writing, manuscript review processes, editing and graphics support, publication and distribution, and even reprinting of the more popular Center histories. Reviews of projects will monitor productivity and quality, and computer technology will be used to track progress. With these tools we can project peak periods of effort and allocate resources accordingly.

Chief's Activities

On a personal note, I have been doing a great deal of travel to various Army commands and schools and elsewhere. The most extensive trip was to Europe

early last fall. Of particular interest here was the opportunity I had to meet with historians, museum directors, and archivists in Germany, France, and Britain. They were all keenly interested in the "new directions" program we have initiated under Secretary Marsh's direction. We plan to maintain close liaison with these groups and those I hope to

visit in the Pacific in late winter. We also hope to draw on some of these scholars for the speakers' series I mentioned above.

I invite readers who have any thoughts they would like to pass on to me on these initiatives or related matters to write to me here at the Center.

THE COMMANDER AND MILITARY HISTORY

New Historians in the Branch Schools

Henry O. Malone

Recently, the overall Army Historical Program took a major step forward. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Historical Office developed a plan for placing a civilian historian at each of the branch centers. Located within the branch schools, the historians would make valuable contributions in support of TRADOC's emerging Military History Program, assisting in course development and instruction and serving as a focus point of the Command's "history cell."

Establishing the Positions

In December 1982, the TRADOC Commander's Advisory Board on Military History Education, under the chairmanship of Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. John B. Blount, evaluated the branch historian concept and recommended that the school commandants adopt it. It was understood that establishment of the positions would have to be done through realignment of an existing manpower authorization, a cost the Advisory Board felt would be justified by the move's benefits to the Army. A staff historian in each branch school could provide a critically needed service by preparing a documented historical account of the branch's significant contributions in combat, doctrine, and training developments to the Army. The branch historian would also facilitate the revitalization of the military history instructional program in the school, giving it a higher level of historical expertise.

In March 1983 the new TRADOC Commander, General William R. Richardson, reviewed the Advisory Board's recommendation and ordered its implementation. Sixteen school commandants were directed to create civilian Army historian positions in their personal staffs. Each historian was to (1) produce command history, researched and written

according to professional standards of historical practice, that would capture the significant mission-related activities of the commandant and his organization; (2) develop a collection of historical source documentation to serve as the corporate memory of the branch or functional area; (3) develop and teach courses in military history, as required; (4) act as the focal point for infusion of military history into all areas of service school professional development curricula; and (5) serve as the commandant's representative to the historical community.

Recruitment and Selection

It was a big order, but over 250 historians expressed initial interest in the positions as a result of national advertising conducted by Headquarters TRADOC on behalf of the branch schools. Recruitment, coordinated by the TRADOC Historical Office, was based upon standardized position descriptions and ranking factors issued by the Headquarters Staff Civilian Personnel Directorate. Qualification standards for the positions presumed education and training comparable to that expected for appointment to a college or university history faculty, and called for demonstrated ability in historical teaching, research, and writing. Some 150 historians registered with the Historical Office and received position vacancy announcements.

At this writing, the recruitment process has been completed at twelve of the branch schools. Of these, final selections have been made at ten: Air Defense Artillery, Armor, Aviation, Chemical, Infantry, Intelligence, Missile and Munitions, Ordnance, Signal, and Special Warfare. The selection process is still under way at the Field Artillery and Quartermaster Schools. The Chaplain School is expected to take preliminary personnel actions in January 1984, while

the Transportation, Engineer, and Military Police Schools have not yet established branch historian positions on their tables of distribution and allowances.

The ultimate impact of the branch historian initiative on the Army Historical Program can only be estimated at this point. At the very least, the Army

is about to increase its capacity to remember and understand how and why it reached the present, with all the implications this knowledge holds for its future development,

Dr. Malone is Chief Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia.

The Staff Ride Returns to Leavenworth

William Glenn Robertson

Before the turn of the century, Maj. Arthur Wagner, an instructor at the Infantry and Cavalry School, recommended that Leavenworth students visit a Civil War battlefield to study a campaign where it occurred. His proposal received endorsement through the chain of command until it reached Assistant Secretary of War Joseph Doe, who vetoed it "through motives of economy." Wagner revived his idea for a battlefield visit in 1903 while serving as Assistant Commandant of the General Service and Staff College, but again it was not implemented. Staff College students already participated in staff rides, but the rides were conducted near Fort Leavenworth and utilized hypothetical situations. Wagner believed a visit to an actual campaign site should be the capstone of the Leavenworth Staff Ride program.

Early Battlefield Rides

It was not until the academic year following Wagner's death in 1905 that the Staff College included in its curriculum a staff ride to a Civil War battlefield. Led by the Assistant Commandant, Maj. Eben Swift, twelve students left Leavenworth by train for Georgia in July 1906. Their assignment was to study in detail the operations of the Union and Confederate armies between Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Atlanta, Georgia, in 1864. Upon its arrival near the Chickamauga battlefield, the class met a detachment of twenty-five men from the 12th Cavalry Regiment, based at nearby Fort Oglethorpe. The cavalrymen provided horses, wagons, and tents for the party, and escorted the students during their stay in Georgia. Although the Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park had been established in 1890 with the needs of student officers specifically in mind, Swift's class ignored it and spent the next eleven days following the route of the armies to Atlanta. Each student carried a printed order of battle furnished by the college and a set of campaign maps purchased

at his own expense. Swift divided the campaign into segments and designated teams of students to prepare briefings for presentation during the ride. Usually given at the close of each day, these briefings were followed by lively discussion sessions.

For the next four years, the Staff Ride remained in the curriculum of the Staff College. The class of 1907 also studied the Atlanta campaign, but the tour was extended by two days to include visits to the Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge battlefields. In 1908 the Staff Ride moved east, with an itinerary stretching from Manassas to Gettysburg. (The last briefing of that ride was a review of the Gettysburg battle as a whole, delivered by a young first lieutenant named George C. Marshall.) The 1909 class followed the Civil War armies from Manassas to Petersburg. By now the trip was called the Historical Ride. In 1910 the course returned to its roots, with a reprise of the original Chattanooga-to-Atlanta tour. Then, despite the recommendations of both instructors and students, the Staff Ride disappeared from the Staff College curriculum in 1911, probably for reasons of economy.

Reviving the Staff Ride

Modern efforts to revive the Staff Ride at the Command and General Staff College originated in the 1981-82 curriculum guidance issued by then Lt. Gen. William R. Richardson, the College Commandant. The Commandant ordered that the Combat Studies Institute consider instituting a Civil War battlefield tour as an elective course for the spring of 1982. Though unable to conduct the Staff Ride in 1982, the Institute offered the class during the next academic year. In the fall of 1983, Institute instructors selected the Chickamauga campaign as the subject of the 1983 Staff Ride. Chickamauga was chosen for three reasons. First, it was a large and complex campaign, involving veteran troops, a major river



"The Staff Ride" by Don Stivers. Courtesy Fort Leavenworth Museum Association.

crossing, and operations in mountainous terrain. Second, the 5,562-acre Chickamauga battlefield is well preserved with few modern intrusions, marked with nearly a thousand monuments and tablets, and crisscrossed by an excellent trail network. Third, support facilities such as a major airport, restaurants, and lodging are available nearby in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia.

In 1906, the Staff College's Major Swift had written: "Knowledge of detail is of infinitely more value to the officer than the more abstruse subjects and it is harder to obtain. It is therefore recommended that the study of military history should be supplemented by the detailed study of at least one campaign." The revived Staff Ride drew its philosophical inspiration from Swift's remark. Each student on the Chickamauga ride was assigned an army, corps, or division commander to study in depth. The student then prepared an oral briefing for the class on the commander's personality and education, his staff, his unit, and his operations in the campaign. As background, all students read a general work, Glenn Tucker's *Chickamauga; Bloody Battle in the West*. Most student research, however, was concentrated in primary sources, especially those records collected in *The War of the Rebellion*.

Although the students gained many valuable insights from their study of individual commanders, the field trip to the battlefield was the high point of

the exercise for all of them. Since Chickamauga was a two-day battle with most of the action occurring sequentially from north to south on each day, the instructors were able to select walking routes covering salient points of the action in roughly chronological order. The students spent two full days walking the battlefield, each day covering approximately twelve miles in ten hours. Discussions occurred spontaneously, with little prompting from the instructors. On the final day of the trip, the class visited the park museum, then briefly toured the Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge battlefields before departing for Fort Leavenworth.

On the basis of the experience gained in 1983, several improvements are envisioned for the 1984 Staff Ride. Foremost among these is the addition of a bus tour of outlying sites associated with the Chickamauga campaign. Covering approximately 200 miles, this tour will visit the Federal army's river crossing sites, the Federal approach routes, and the concentration points of both armies. Together with minor modifications to the routes of the battlefield walks and an increased use of visual aids, this alteration should make the 1984 Staff Ride an even more successful learning experience than that of the previous year.

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PERSPECTIVE

The Present State and Future Directions of Military History

Maurice Matloff

The following is excerpted from a talk given at the Center of Military History in March 1983. Dr. Matloff was the Center's Chief Historian from 1970 to 1981. The comments briefly presented here will soon appear elsewhere in fuller form.

In giving my views on the present state and future directions of military history, I shall be speaking in an unofficial capacity and from an unofficial perspective. I shall focus on trends in American military history as I see them in and out of the Federal Government, and I shall approach the subject with an eye to the activities of Army historians.

To understand the present state of the art, we must note first that military history is a form of the general discipline of history, that there are many varieties of military history, and that its scope has broadened, especially since World War II. Probably no part of the general discipline of history has changed more dramatically during this past generation than military history. In this country, most of the military history written down to World War II was operational history centered on campaigns and battles, written primarily by officers for officers. That much of it was vocational, technical, didactic, and narrowly utilitarian helps explain the contemporary academic disdain for the field of military history in general, a disdain reinforced by academic distaste for studying war itself. In recent years, especially since World War II, the substance of military history has broadened far beyond the focus on battles and campaigns as military affairs, broadly considered, have come to occupy more and more of the energies and resources of society. In the American context, military history now deals not only with wars, but with armed forces as institutions in war and peace, with military policy and thought, and with the interrelationships between armed forces and society. The "drum and trumpet" school has been succeeded by the ecological school, a school concerned with putting warfare in its proper political, economic, and social context. So the concept, content, context, and even the tools of military history have expanded to a remarkable degree in a relatively short period of time.

World War II

What part, then, has official history played in this quiet revolution in scholarship, and where does official history stand today? World War II gave a tremendous boost to the research and writing of military history in the United States under official

auspices. Each service developed its own program, and each program grew in response to specific needs. But no central historical office was established in Washington either during or after World War II to provide overall direction to the American military history effort. The resultant published service series, while differing in scope, size, emphasis, and form of publication, complement each other.

The Army developed the largest central military historical office in Washington and the most extensive publication program. To judge the state of Army official history—and indeed of official military history in general—you have to consider the impact of the U.S. Army in World War II series, for all official military history is and will be measured against the standard set in that series. I would suggest that that series, the largest cooperative historical enterprise ever undertaken in the United States, is significant in American historiography for at least four reasons. First, it made official history respectable in the United States, as respectable as it had been in Germany in the nineteenth century. Second, the series gave a boost to contemporary history, itself a recent development in American historiography. Third, the official history pioneered in oral history. Fourth, the Army official program produced historians as well as history. A number of now well-known historians cut their professional eye-teeth in the program, and matured in it.

The World War II volumes are official histories in the sense that they were prepared and published at government expense and dealt with topics considered of value to the Army. But from the beginning, in line with scholarly practice, the Army's central history office has adhered to the principle of authorship responsibility and credit. This partnership between the military and historical professions reflected the almost ideal circumstances and ingredients that existed for telling the World War II military story under official auspices. Spurred by an American Historical Association initiative, the support of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the charter given by General Eisenhower as Chief of Staff, a popular war, well-kept records and full access to them, well-trained young historians, the direction of

outstanding scholars, interested military chiefs, and a strong advisory committee, a lively, productive institute broke new ground in Federal official history programs. The series has gone far toward meeting a goal established for the first time in American history: the official recording of a great military enterprise in comprehensive, narrative, and documented fashion and making the finished products available to the public while most of the participants were still alive to read them. I think it fair to say that the official historical community, led by the Office of the Chief of Military History, provided via the historiography of World War II the catalyst in the field of American military history after the war. Its impact has been to generate a trend, to stimulate interest, and to set a standard.

Broadening Scope

The change in the substance of military history embodied in the Army's World War II series is reflected in the other series and special publications produced and in progress in the Center of Military History. This broadening of scope has occurred in response to the needs of the staffs and schools for timely, current studies on a wide variety of subjects involving the Army's experience in and out of war, the need to produce other series dealing with the limited wars in Korea and Vietnam, and the need to explore recurring topical themes of interest to the Army.

This broadening trend has been accompanied by the development of a number of new institutions, vehicles, and resources under services auspices in recent years. I think it fair to say that the hope held by the founders of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, over a decade ago for establishing the new institution as an aid to the study of military history in the armed services and the civilian academic world is being realized. Its research facilities, as well as the visiting professorships in military history at the War College, West Point, and Leavenworth, are now well established. The fellowship program at the Center has also fulfilled its purposes in providing another bridge to the academic world and in encouraging the study of military history in all its varieties. Other services have followed the Center's lead.

The development of the Department of History at West Point and of the more recently established Combat Studies Institute at Leavenworth, with its special interests in doctrinal historical studies and in teaching, reflect growing Army awareness of the need for meaningful study of its past. Within the Center and other service programs, the development of oral history, art, museum, archival, library, and other support activities has undergirded the broaden-

ing of the field and offers rich possibilities for its further expansion.

Academic Military History

When the state of academic military history in this country before World War II is compared with its position in civilian colleges and universities today, the field appears to have come a long way. Outside the academies and service schools before World War II, only the University of Chicago offered a course in military history. By 1970, at least 110 academic institutions in the United States were offering specialized courses in military history, and the number appears to have doubled in the past decade. Considering the pre-World War II state of academic military history, this growth appears to be quite a remarkable development.

A number of academic institutions have developed significant programs in military history. Duke, Stanford, Michigan, Rice, and Wisconsin have been among the leading centers. More recently, Ohio State, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Texas A&M have been emerging as leading institutions in the field. No school, however, has dominated the substance of military history.

These, I would suggest, are healthy developments. There are other encouraging signs. Recently, for example, students at Yale, where military history is not offered by the faculty, asked for such a course and Dr. (Lt. Col.) Robert Doughty, an associate professor in the U.S. Military Academy's Department of History, was invited to give a course which has proved so popular that Yale wants it renewed. Such an arrangement would have been unthinkable a few years ago. When I was invited to serve as Regents Professor at Berkeley in the spring of 1980, in an institution where the faculty was split on the merits of teaching military history, a number of graduate students were interested in writing dissertations in the field.

Having noted these encouraging signs, I must caution that the academic world still has a long way to go in institutionalizing the study of military history on campuses. Some institutions teach the field; most still do not. When you consider that there are well over two thousand colleges and universities in this country, those offering military history are still in the minority. Like the official world, the academic community in the United States needs continuing education among professional non-practitioners about the nature, scope, and values of the new military history in order to sustain the now stronger but still tender growth. And I would suggest that, in the long run, it is as important in the academic development of this field that due recognition and proper atten-

tion be given to the military factor in general history courses as it is that specialized courses in military history be offered.

Directions for the 1980's

What, then, are the implications of these trends for the future? What directions appear most promising and most likely to meet the needs of the 1980s? Certain areas and currents suggest themselves as fruitful for future investigation and fuller exploitation. If you accept a broad definition of the field of military history and that the preeminent task of practitioners of the new military history is to integrate the field with general history, the opportunities for research are wide open, particularly in areas dealing with war and society themes. In some fields, both official and academic historians can work. Some aspects are particularly suited for academic research, others for official historians. Among the most promising general areas and fields for study I would list:

(1) The impact of war on society. We need to know more about war as a national experience, and particularly about the social context of wars in which the United States has been engaged.

(2) Closely related to the first theme, armies and military institutions as reflections of society. We need to know more about the social origins and attitudes of the officer corps and about a particularly large gap in the literature, the enlisted man. In connection with this societal theme, more studies are needed on the roles of minority groups and women in armies, and not just of the United States.

(3) A third field is biography. The Army's official series on World War II contributed a number of institutional biographies of specific headquarters staffs at home and abroad, but could not do justice to the biographies of individuals. Academic and private writing lend themselves more readily to writing biographical history, as in the recent studies on Generals Marshall, Patton, and MacArthur. Many more are needed. We still know very little about the Chiefs of Staff in the early part of this century when the country began to emerge as a world power. A host of secondary figures whose biographies would also light on phases of American military history awaits this kind of treatment.

(4) Problems of the beginning and end of wars need special attention. We live in a period that is neither war nor peace. Wars are no longer formally declared, and it is no longer the fashion to make formal peace. We know a great deal about origins and causes of wars and about how they were fought. We know very little, and there has been very little good writing about how nations leave wars. This is one

of the themes with which this generation will have to deal.

(5) Not only do we need broad syntheses of recurrent themes in American military history, broadly conceived, we also need good comparative studies. We need comparative studies, for example, of national mobilization and conscription systems, of use of volunteer forces, of civil-military relations, of occupation policies, as well as of strategy, tactics, logistics, training, intelligence, and so forth. From the longer view now possible, the future historian of World War II needs to stand off and examine what was derivative in the U.S. strategic experience and what the U.S. contributed. In such syntheses, the traditional compartmentalization of military, political, and economic factors, which has characterized so much of the writing on World War II and other American wars to date, will have to yield further. The comparative factor is becoming more and more important in military history. As the United States has emerged as a leader of coalitions, we need to know more about the organizational structure, traditions, and experiences abroad of foreign military forces with which our armed forces deal, and about their experience with problems we now face or are likely to face.

(6) In the wake of the Vietnam War, the exploration of certain larger related themes in military history appears more important than ever. What has been the role of dissent in previous American wars, the line between legitimate and obstructive criticism of official policies? What has been the impact on the military of fighting unpopular wars? Has such experience resulted in the military turning to a narrow or broad professionalism after the conflict? What has been the public view of the military after such involvement? A balanced picture of the historic and evolving roles of the military in American society in and out of wars will have to be presented if the military are to receive an understanding hearing from the American public.

(7) Finally, another theme which seems likely to attract more and more attention in future years has to do with studies of technology. There has been a spate of studies in recent years dealing with the military-industrial complex. But the history of technology is just beginning to emerge as an important field in military history and needs more exploration in all its varied aspects. We need more studies of technology in its relationship to science and to the armed forces in and out of wars, the relationship to politics, bureaucratic constituencies, competing service interests, and impact on military organization, on modes of fighting or deterrence.

This list could, of course, be multiplied. These cur-

rents reflect the old adage that each generation rewrites history in terms of its own needs and problems. They reflect, too, that while the official military historical community has led the way in going beyond traditional military history, and academic military historians have been probing new and fruitful fields, the bounds must be extended farther to meet the needs of this generation.

Growing Interest

I would like in conclusion to offer a few observations. It is my impression that interest in military history in and out of the military community is growing and the audience is increasing. As World War II recedes farther in national memory, a wave of nostalgia for this last popular war is being stimulated by a flood of historical novels, television documentaries and dramas, and memoirs and biographies. The disillusionment over the Vietnam War, as we get farther away from that searing and emotional national experience, is spurring a sober reexamination of that conflict and a retrospective review of other less popular and less than total wars in our history.

Current events and preoccupations are stirring public interest in issues of national security. The military factor can no longer be ignored in the national consciousness, and wisdom, precedents, antecedents, and alternatives from the past are and will increasingly be drawn upon by policy makers and military planners faced with complex choices in an uncertain age.

While there are encouraging signs of progress toward the institutionalization of military history in the official and academic worlds, much remains to be done. There is need to reach the growing public audience, the policy makers, and the military planners of this generation with sound, usable history in all its relevant forms. For the official historical community the task, as I see it, is not only to respond to the needs of the various agencies the programs are designed to serve, but also to play a role in defining those historical needs and to maintain the highest professional standards in fulfilling them. As leaders in the public history movement, these official historical offices have a golden opportunity through their service functions to educate both the public and the military audiences at all levels and remain in the movement's vanguard. Opportunities and needs are also developing to reach the new nonacademic and military audience through more popular publications. And, of course, to reach the growing audience and needs in the field, more bridges will have to be built between the official and academic historical communities. I have always regarded the roles of those communities to be compatible. Each can help the other, and there is plenty of room for both.

History for the Army

The question of the type of military history needed for the officers of the 1980s will also have a bearing on the future of this field, and will have to be taken into account by the historical community. A slavish adherence to past experience can mislead, can promote rigidity of thought and outmoded practices. A disparity between weapons and ideas, between the theory and practice of war, can lead to fatal results on the field of battle. Doctrine as distilled history must reflect the rapid changes in weaponry, technology, and warfare, as well as in comparative and national military experience, in our shrunken, interdependent world.

Valuable as history's utilitarian role has traditionally been for the military, the question may well be raised whether, given the current trends in technology, warfare, society, and international politics, a broad type of training and education combining utilitarian along with educational values of military history is needed for the military officer of the 1980s. The commander of the 1980s will need to know not only about his tools and his men, but also his society and the world in which he operates, the broader and more uncertain political, social, and economic factors impinging on warfare.

These, then, are some of the recent and prospective general currents affecting military history in this country as I see them. The Army's historical program enjoys a good reputation in this country and abroad, a reputation gained through the pursuit of truth in the exercise of educational and utilitarian values of military history. That reputation needs to be carefully maintained. The products of the Vietnam series will be viewed very carefully on the outside. The danger in writing contemporary official history has not in my experience been the charge of court history or censorship, but rather that historians become the unconscious prisoners of their own assumptions, a product of their experiences, predilections, and times. If the products and services Army historians render are to be of use to the government, the Army, and the public, they must be as accurate, objective, and balanced as possible. That is, in my view, the best answer in the long run to charges of writing court history.

The Future for Army Historians

The confluence of a number of factors are leading to ever greater recognition by the historical profession of Army historians' role and work. Army historians are no longer operating on the margins of their profession. Many talented professionals are eager to join them. As I have indicated, one challenge for the future is to make military history more widely

read while keeping scholarly standards high. Another is to make history in all its varieties more usable throughout the military system. Army historians are in many ways on the frontier of the manufacture and distillation of military history, capturing and recording the Army's experience as it develops. I envisage that the Army historians' role will become more, not less, important in helping policy makers, commanders, and planners. As integral parts of the memory bank of the Army, Army historians supply the blocks on which soldiers and historians of the future will build.

The Army's historical community in both its research-writing and service functions is, as I see it, entering a new and challenging era in fulfilling its important missions for the Army and the nation it serves. The juncture of the growing needs and historical awareness of the Army with the ripening of military historical scholarship in this country offers rich opportunities for this generation of military historians to build on the labors of its pioneering colleagues of the past, and make its own creative contributions to an evolving and broadening field.

PRACTICING THE HISTORIAN'S CRAFT

Professional Development of Public Historians

David F. Trask

Doing history is arguably the most demanding of intellectual disciplines. What other field has comparable scope (nothing less than all past processes) and complexity (an endless number of variables)?

For these reasons, historians find it much more difficult than colleagues in many other fields to establish satisfactory initial competence and to develop themselves further. All that can be expected of formal education in history are the rudiments of professional skill. To move forward the practicing historian, once quit of classroom and seminar, must pursue *above all else* a conscious and unremitting program of professional development *forever after*. There is no end. Perhaps all too few historians accept this responsibility; perhaps that is why many are called but few are chosen. There just aren't too many good historians around, even within the profession. The missing ingredient, sadly, is often a lack of dedication to professional development.

Given the fundamental importance of professional development, it follows that institutions who employ historians should do all they can to support them in projects of professional self-improvement. This principle is fully understood in one of the two main contexts for the practice of history, the groves of academe. Supports for professional development abound in our colleges and universities. Obviously, too few academicians fully exploit their opportunities, but those who would can obtain support in many forms merely by enlisting it.

The situation is much less favorable in the other main arena of historical work, namely "public

history." In this context, which includes historians working with the armed services, an institutional understanding of the absolute necessity to support the professional development of historians is rarely far advanced. Too often the reverse obtains; many barriers to effective support of professional development preclude a level of full achievement.

What is to be done? Let me repeat two familiar injunctions: "Charity begins at home," and "The Lord helps those who help themselves." Public historians must not sit back and expect support to be handed them. They should do everything possible to press for their parent organizations' support of professional development. No one else is likely to take the lead. An obvious strategy is first, to stimulate interest among historians, themselves, in pursuing professional development at every opportunity, and second, to press managers and supervisors whenever possible to support professional development.

Openings to improve professional development vary broadly. There follows a list of various types of support for professional development. When the chance to do something about any of these types of support materializes, seize the day.

1. *Professional reading.* Support for this most basic form of self-improvement may be the easiest to arrange.
2. *Research and writing.* These professional tasks are always vehicles for professional growth.
3. *Teaching.* It is not enough to know. Knowledge is put to its best use when com-

- municated effectively. When you prepare an effective lecture or discussion, you enhance your own comprehension of your material.
4. *Public speaking.* The same generalization given for teaching as a form of professional development applies in this area, with the added benefit that it usually reflects well on your institution.
 5. *Attendance at lectures, seminars, colloquia, and other such gatherings.* Activity of this sort imparts a most useful stimulus.
 6. *Participation in professional associations and councils.* Active membership in such groups provides opportunities to learn from fellow practitioners through collegial exchange of views.
 7. *Released time on the job.* This type of opportunity is rarely available to public historians,

but it exists in some places.

8. *Leaves and sabbaticals.* Sabbaticals are rare but not unknown for public historians. Leaves are more common.
9. *Specialized training.* On occasion, instruction in specialized skills, such as languages, computers, statistics, and related social sciences or humanities, furthers professional competence.

Public historians should ask themselves: "What among these types of opportunities exists where I work?" "What opportunities not now available might be developed?" If the opportunities exist, we should make use of them; if opportunities might be created, we should press managers and supervisors to put them into effect.

Dr. Trask is the Center of Military History's Chief Historian.

Reflections on a Year at Fort Leavenworth

Raymond Callahan

There comes a moment, after one is irrevocably committed to something new and different, when doubts suddenly arise. For me, that moment came as I drove west on Interstate 70 one hot July morning in 1982, bound for Fort Leavenworth and a year as John F. Morrison Professor of Military History at the Command and General Staff College. We had already been driving for several long days when one of my children suddenly asked, "Why are we doing this, anyway?" Why, indeed?

I had been teaching courses in military history, and writing about it, for some years in the not always supportive atmosphere of a university. But, supportive or not, the university world was a known quantity. What would it be like to teach the same subject to professional soldiers? What would their attitude be to a civilian—an outsider—offering opinions on what was after all something closer to their experience than to his? I had accepted the position because I thought that it would bring an invigorating challenge. But at that moment, with I-70 West unrolling before me, I suddenly began to wonder whether invigorating challenges were all they were made out to be.

A year later, the same ribbon of concrete was in front of me again. This time I was heading east, my year with the Army behind me. The memory of that moment of panic came back and set me to thinking about how it had all worked out. In many ways the strongest impressions were personal, of interesting people met, of friendships made. But as I thought

about the year as a professional experience, two impressions stood out.

First, the study of military history is for soldiers not, or at least not primarily, an intellectual exercise. It has for them an intensely practical aspect. They need precise answers to precise questions. How *exactly* did this army or commander tackle that specific logistical problem, that personnel issue, technological innovation, or tactical conundrum? And what is the relevance of the answer to the structure of the light division or the "deep battle" concept? The historian learns very quickly that a whole new set of questions can be asked of material he has been looking at for years, questions which force him to go back and look at the material again, usually with benefit. Military historians ought to ask that "how *exactly*" question more often than they do. Even if they have to point out that the answer might not have a direct bearing on the concerns of today's Army, their treatment of many issues will gain immensely in clarity and rigor.

A second impression was the hard-working professionalism of the average Staff College student, a contrast to the often unfocused energies of the undergraduates with whom I had worked for so long. The great pressures on the military student's time, however, lends to one not entirely beneficial result in their study of history. The emphasis on breadth, on the comparative dimension in history, second nature to university-based historians, becomes a casualty to the schedule. The national military ex-

perience, quarried for practical lessons, tends to elbow out the longer view. The comparison of our national experience to others' in grappling with similar issues, an approach which often yields very rewarding, and sometimes very disturbing, new perspectives, is often lost. (Many Staff College students saw this quite clearly, but there are only so many hours in the day.) Here perhaps the academic historian has something to contribute: the warning that history can be made so practical that its meaning suffers distortion.

Was that long round trip on I-70 worthwhile? I think so, both personally and professionally. The admonition that the failure to understand history dooms us to repeat the errors of the past is one the Army clearly has heard, and has acted upon. The challenge to historians will be to see that the history the Army studies is, if not always the most comfortable, at least the most enlightening.

Professor Callahan is a member of the Department of History, University of Delaware.

AT THE CENTER

Army Historians and Grenada

Within hours of the opening shots of Operation URGENT FURY on the island of Grenada, Army historians were mobilizing efforts to gather source data and to record first-person interviews with participants at all command levels. Involved in the documentation of the operation are the Center of Military History, the 44th Military History Detachment of Forces Command, the Combat Studies Institute, and the Command and General Staff College. The 44th and Leavenworth teams coordinated interviews of participants from the Ranger battalions and the 82d Airborne Division in Washington State and Georgia. The Institute and Staff College studies will concentrate on training, organization, materiel, and deployment.

Paralleling these efforts, the Center of Military History placed an observer-historian in the Pentagon's Army Operations Center, who was joined by other Center historians to form Task Force Grenada. Besides combat action, the Center's project will cover intelligence and planning for the operation, logistics, public and civil affairs, and reconstruction.

1983 History Writing Awards

The U.S. Army Military History Writing Awards

are made annually for the three best military history essays written by students attending officer advanced courses and the Sergeants Major Academy. Students enrolled during the service schools' 1982-83 academic year provided entries on a wide variety of military history topics for the first annual competition. The essays were forwarded to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, which selected the top five. From these finalists, the Center of Military History picked the following winners of the 1983 competition:

- First Place: Capt. Gerald B. Bacon, Infantry Center and School, "The Battle of Mirbat"
- Second Place: Capt. Allen D. Lewis, Jr., Infantry Center and School, "Artillery Employment and Influence During the Battle of Antietam"
- Third Place: Capt. Dianne Smith, Intelligence Center and School, "The Sixteenth Century Moscovite Army"

In addition to award certificates and letters of congratulations from the Chief of Military History, the winners received checks.

Invitation to Authors

The Army Historian is seeking articles of from 300 to 1500 words for publication in future issues. Articles on Army historical activities, current research, the uses of military history and its position in the Army, past commanders' use of history, military historiography, programs promoting historical mindedness, and professional reading are being considered. Ac-

cepted submissions are edited for clarity and suitability, but every effort is made to preserve the authors' individual styles. Manuscripts should be doublespaced, in two copies, accompanied by a daytime telephone number and a brief description of the writer's current position, and sent to Editor, *The Army Historian*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Pulaski Building, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314.

PROFESSIONAL READING

Ten Important Books

Logistical History

The Army Historian inaugurates here a series of bibliographical essays on various aspects of military history. Each essay will discuss about ten books. The figure ten was chosen as providing manageable yet representative samplings and permitting sufficient room for readers to pursue their own interests. Books were chosen over journal articles for similar reasons and because of availability to military readers. Specialists will probably find favorite books absent and less favored books listed. They and non-specialists should, however, find items of interest.

Logistics has been briefly defined as "the branch of military science dealing with the moving, quartering, and provisioning of armies," as "the art of planning and carrying out military movement, evacuation and supply," and as "that branch of administration which embraces the management and provision of supply, evacuation and hospitalization, transportation, and service." (In this country, the term is almost always used in the singular.) Short of saying that it includes virtually all military activity other than policy, strategy, and tactics, logistics can probably best be understood as comprising, in its broadest sense, the three big M's of warfare: materiel, movement, and maintenance. It is the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied.

As a basis for decisions of public policy and military action, civilian and military leaders require some background in logistics. Lack of experience can lead to unforeseen problems, losses, and expense. Students of the industrial mobilization and procurement activities of World War I and World War II, for example, are amazed by how frequently lessons of the first were ignored in the second and the same mistakes repeated. How, then, except by actually participating in logistical operations, do policy makers and commanders get the experience? As history illustrates the need, history provides the answer. Logistical experience is gained through reading logistical history.

The historiography of logistics is not extensive. The larger part of military history has tended to place full-blown armies in the field without accounting for how they got there or were supplied. Books on logistical history can be found, however. Most have been written in the past three decades, and some are

very good. The following list of ten counts two-volume sets as one book and emphasizes the U.S. Army's experience:

1. Huston, James A. *The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775-1953*. Army Historical Series. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH), Department of the Army, 1966.
2. Van Creveld, Martin. *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
3. Risch, Erna. *Supplying Washington's Army*. Washington: Center of Military History, Department of the Army, 1981.
4. Goff, Richard D. *Confederate Supply*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1969.
5. Cuff, Robert D. *The War Industries Board; Business-Government Relations During World War I*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
6. Hagood, Johnson. *The Services of Supply; A Memoir of the Great War*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1927.
7. Leighton, Richard M., and Robert W. Coakley. *The War Department; Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943*, and Coakley and Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945*. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington: OCMH, Department of the Army, 1955, 1968.
8. Ruppenthal, Ronald G. *The European Theater of Operations; Logistical Support of the Armies*. 2 vols. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington: OCMH, Department of the Army, 1953, 1959.
9. Smith, R. Elberton. *The War Department; The Army and Economic Mobilization*. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington: OCMH, Department of the Army, 1959.
10. Heiser, Joseph M. *Logistic Support*. Vietnam Studies. Washington: Department of the Army, 1974.

If you read nothing else on logistical history, read Huston. *Sinews of War* traces the logistics of

American armies from the Revolution to Korea, is comprehensive and authoritative, and stands as the state of the art for the field. Van Creveld's *Supplying War* provides a broader, international approach to logistical history from the seventeenth century through the twentieth. It is a controversial work that will not evoke universal approval. The conclusions drawn in his "War of the Accountants" chapter, for example, trumpet the often-heard complaint about timid American planners after the Normandy landings. Van Creveld emphasizes the historical change in the bulk of supply from food and fodder to ammunition and fuel, and the effects this change had upon movement. For that, as well as for the discussion he has sparked about logistics, Van Creveld has made an important contribution to the field.

After Huston and Van Creveld, general works on logistical history are not so comprehensive. Supplemental general readings on the field may be found in George A. Lincoln's *Economics of National Security; Managing America's Resources for Defense* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1954) and Henry E. Eccles' *Logistics in the National Defense* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1959). Lincoln's book was written with a 1950s immediacy that does not always meet more contemporary needs. But his broad strokes on national security development before and after World War II, as well as his treatment of the grander aspects of logistics, national resources and their management, finance, and the international implications of defense economics, lend Lincoln's work continued relevance. His approach is considered especially useful by the "long war" school of mobilization planners. Admiral Eccles' book is a collection of his lectures and research papers on the subject, each discussing theoretically the history, organization, coordination, planning, and programing of logistics.

There are large gaps in the bibliography of books devoted to the logistics of American armies in specific wars. Most are concentrated on World War II. Erna Risch's *Supplying Washington's Army* is a major logistical history on the American side of the Revolution. Readers interested in the other side might consult R. Bowler's *Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America, 1775-1783* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). Goff's *Confederate Supply* examines another failure of logistics, and is, aside from railroad histories, the only major work on Civil War logistics yet available.

Huston's chapters on World War I remain the best overall treatment of Army logistics during that conflict. For more detailed reading on a particularly important aspect of World War I logistics, Cuff's *War Industries Board* is an excellent scholarly examination of the problems central to industrial mobilization. Hagood's *Services of Supply* is the memoir of the title unit's chief of staff in France and is useful on the details of administering the logistics of the American Expeditionary Forces. Only readers with a special interest in American logistical efforts in that war should turn to Benedict Crowell's *American Munitions, 1917-1918* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919). Crowell was an Assistant Secretary of War and Director of Munitions, and his book, actually a government report, makes for deadening reading of facts and figures. More readable and comprehensive, but much more lengthy, is a six-volume work he wrote with Robert F. Wilson on many aspects of American mobilization, transport, and supply: *How America Went to War* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1921).

Selections in logistical history are much easier for World War II, and correspondingly less needs to be said to introduce them. The Leighton and Coakley volumes provide an overall view of the problems of

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Supplying a Normandy beachhead, June 1944.

allocation at the highest levels. Ruppenthal's work is the only systematic treatment of theater logistics available for the war. Pacific Theater logistics are dealt with in Leighton and Coakley and in the campaign studies of the U.S. Army in World War II series. Smith's *Army and Economic Mobilization* rounds off the World War II studies with industrial mobilization and the Army's massive procurement program.

Readers must await the publication of a comprehensive treatment of American logistical efforts during the Korean War. Until the volume on logistics in the Center of Military History's Vietnam series

appears, General Heiser's *Logistic Support* provides an overview of the complex problems involved in supplying forces in Southeast Asia. The monograph is written with a view toward "lessons learned."

If volumes published by the Center of Military History seem disproportionately represented on this list, it is for a very good reason. The Center has done perhaps the most extensive work in this country on logistical history. Although much remains to be written on the field, interested readers will find plenty of works to provide the background they require.

B.D.H.

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