Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1970


Operational Forces

Several factors influenced the Army's over-all operational situation during fiscal year 1970. The general reduction in the level of fighting in Vietnam, combined with initial troop withdrawals and a presidential directive to reduce oversea forces by 10 percent, led in turn to reductions in Army strength and units. Refinements and adjustments in organization, personnel and skill distribution, and logistical posture improved over-all Army readiness.

The Pacific and the Far East 1

Early in the fiscal year, on July 9, 1969, President Richard M. Nixon ordered the 10 percent reduction in American forces overseas, based on authorized strengths as of June 30, 1969. Certain direct-hire civilians were included. The purposes were to reduce expenditures, favorably influence the balance of payments, and reduce the American presence overseas. Military forces in Vietnam and Korea and others supporting the war were exempted from the reduction. The total number of Army positions deleted in the Pacific area exceeded 2,000.

The initiation of redeployments of U.S. forces from Vietnam served as a basis for major organizational and dispositional changes that occurred in the period. U.S. forces were removed from the Mekong Delta region, and the conduct of the war there passed to the Republic of Vietnam. Redeployment of a major part of U.S. Marine Corps forces in the I Corps Tactical Zone resulted in the transfer of command responsibility for U.S. forces there to Headquarters, XXIV U.S. Army Corps. The headquarters of the 1st Logistical Command was consolidated with Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam. The 10 percent reduction in the Pacific was carried out concurrently, and a major refinement of Army logistical activity was begun to bring logistical forces into line with the structure that is anticipated for the region over the next several years.

Other developments had a bearing on the Vietnam War and on the American presence and U.S. Army deployment in Southeast

1 See chapter 3 for details on the Vietnam War.


Asia. The North Vietnamese in March 1970 drove Royal Lao forces from the Plain of jars in northern Laos and threatened to overrun the Meo heartland. That offensive was conducted by regular North Vietnamese units in flagrant violation of the Geneva Accords concerning the neutrality of Laos. Following the ouster of Prince Sihanouk as Cambodia's head of state, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces moved out of their sanctuaries along the Cambodia-Vietnam border to spread their control over eastern Cambodia. In conjunction with their thrusts into Cambodia, the Communist forces seized two provincial capitals in southern Laos, thus securing a water supply route through Laos to compensate for their loss of the use of the Cambodian seaports of Kampot and Kampong Som (Sihanoukville). The year thus produced the first open confrontation between North Vietnamese and Cambodian forces, and for the first time since 1962 the North Vietnamese attacked Royal Laotian forces without the facade of the Pathet Lao.

In Thailand, U.S. Army authorized troop strength was reduced by about 2,900 in line with the President's 10 percent cutback. Army units continued to provide logistical support for all U.S. forces in the country. Highway construction linking northeastern Thailand with Bangkok and the port of Sattahip neared completion.

The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force in Vietnam, for which the U.S. Army supplied training and support, completed its first full rotation of personnel from the war zone. Responsibility for operating the Thai Overseas Replacement Training Center at Kanchanaburi, Thailand, was taken over by the Royal Thai Army, as the number of U.S. advisers training Thai replacements was reduced to a small detachment. The construction of the camp was completed, and it was turned over to Thailand.

In Korea the Communist threat remained generally unchanged as North Korean pressure on the Republic of Korea in the south continued. Although the attitude of the North Koreans was more hostile than at any time since the armistice agreement was signed in 1953, there was a sharp drop in the number of incidents in the closing quarter of the year, possibly because of effective countermeasures by U.S. and Republic of Korea forces and the fact that the North Koreans have been unable to establish a viable guerrilla base among the South Koreans.

U.S. combat forces remained deployed in Korea and joined indigenous forces in the defense of the Republic of Korea. Eighth U.S. Army elements were deployed along the demilitarized zone; the I Corps (Group) defended the western avenues of approach


into South Korea, with the 2d Infantry Division deployed and the 7th Infantry Division in reserve. Supporting units included the 4th Missile Command and the 38th Artillery Brigade (Air Defense), and the U.S. Military Advisory Group helped the Republic of Korea's Army of over half a million men to develop and maintain its forces.

Elsewhere in the Far East-Pacific region, U.S. Army deployment in Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines remained generally stable. On Okinawa, in addition to Headquarters, U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands, and Headquarters, IX Corps, the principal forces were the 2d Logistical Command, the 30th Artillery Brigade (Air Defense) , the 7th Psychological Operations Group, the 1st Special Forces Group, and the 1st Civil Affairs Battalion. In Japan, the U.S. Army headquarters at Camp Zama continued to supply logistical support to U.S. and allied forces in the Far East, including military assistance, depot operations, procurement, and hospital facilities. And in the Philippines and on Taiwan, advisory groups continued to assist host countries to develop and maintain their forces.

By the end of fiscal year 1970, operational forces in the Pacific and Southeast Asia totaled seven divisions, twenty additional combat units of brigade size, five corps or equivalent headquarters, and a multitude of support elements including missile, air defense, engineer, military police, signal, and aviation units.


In Europe the United States continued to maintain an armored-mechanized and nuclear-supported force as a part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's land defenses in central Europe. Major forces consisted of 2 armored divisions, 2 1/3 mechanized infantry divisions, and 2 armored cavalry regiments. Supporting units included artillery units with a nuclear capability.

Organizational changes to streamline the command, control, and logistical organization of Army forces in Europe were completed during the year. A U.S. theater Army support command and two corps support commands were activated; a single inventory control center for the theater was established; and the U.S. Army tactical control echelon under NATO was revised.

A United Kingdom-Belgium-Netherlands-Luxemburg line of communication and port plan was also developed and approved. When implemented it will provide U.S. Army, Europe, with the units and equipment to establish a wartime line of communications through the Low Countries and to replace the line through France,


whose territory was withdrawn from NATO use in 1966. The peacetime line of communications through Bremerhaven, Germany, is not suitable for wartime use.

The Army continued to participate in negotiations with the Spanish government for U.S. base rights in Spain beyond the two-year extension granted in 1969. Under existing arrangements the United States has supplied Spain with small amounts of arms and equipment and with Army advisory training assistance in their use.

Alaska and Latin America

U.S. Army, Alaska, the Army component of the Alaskan Command, continued to be responsible for the ground defense of Alaska. The tactical units were reorganized during fiscal year 1970 to make them more compatible with their missions and the Alaskan environment. The two mechanized infantry brigades were converted to light infantry: the 171st located north of the Alaskan Range at Fort Wainwright near Fairbanks, and the 172d south of the range at Fort Richardson near Anchorage. Each brigade had two maneuver battalions and a battalion of artillery; they were well suited to meet operational conditions in Alaska.

The reduction in tracked vehicles will be offset by the addition of helicopters to improve mobility. The change was prompted by the fact that maintenance of tracked vehicles is difficult under extreme winter conditions and mobility is limited across the muskeg terrain in summer. A modest but adequate mechanized capability remains in two armored cavalry troops, and an antiarmor capability is provided by the Sheridan armored reconnaissance vehicle with the Shillelagh missile.

In the Panama Canal Zone, the U.S. Army, Southern Command, maintained a force consisting of the 193d Infantry Brigade (with two infantry battalions and a mechanized battalion) and a Special Forces Group. The latter was prepared to provide mobile training teams to Latin America on request. In December 1969 the command's aviation was consolidated into the newly activated 206th Aviation Company to provide tactical mobility for the defensive forces. In March 1970 the two 40-mm. self-propelled air defense artillery batteries of the 517th Artillery were inactivated.

The Eleventh Annual Pan American Rifle Matches were held in February 1970 in the Canal Zone under the command's sponsorship. A week of small arms marksmanship and maintenance training was followed by a week of practical exercises in the form of competition between teams of the fourteen participating nations.


Army Readiness

The status of major Army units improved generally in personnel and logistics during fiscal year 1970, while their training status remained essentially unchanged. Support units remained about the same as the previous year; many units reported unsatisfactory readiness status. The orderly reduction of Army manpower during the first half of the fiscal year, through redeployments from Vietnam and subsequent unit inactivations, permitted some improvement in readiness of personnel. But toward the end of the year, reduced draft calls, failures in meeting draft calls, and changes in planned Vietnam redeployment increased the shortage of trained strength and reduced the number of personnel available for assignment to units. The result was an erosion of some of the gains in personnel readiness made earlier in the year.

Unit personnel turnover decreased in most units in the first half of the fiscal year because of higher operating strengths and fewer losses of personnel to short tour assignment. Toward the end of the year, however, turnover again approached the rates of late fiscal year 1969, the result of greater losses of personnel to short tour assignment and increased losses of draftees completing service two years after a peak induction period. Personnel turnover has been the principal limiting factor to any significant improvement in unit training readiness. The net effect of the continuous personnel rotation is to keep units from achieving a fully trained status at any given time and to force them to recycle training at the lower levels to insure basic proficiency in the primary mission.

Units operating under standard tables of organization and equipment were used to augment manpower resources available to carry out installation functions. So far as possible, tasks were assigned that were related to the missions of these units and would enhance their readiness. Unit integrity was maintained where possible. As the year closed, a study was under way to develop stationing patterns for active Army units of the baseline force that would make optimum use of their installation support capabilities.

In U.S. Army, Europe, a readiness improvement program, begun in December 1968 had by June 30, 1970, brought 95 percent of reporting units up to their readiness goals for equipment on hand and placed war reserve and prepositioned stocks in a favorable condition. The improvement was achieved by shipment of equipment and supply stocks from the continental United States and redistribution of theater reserve stocks. Over $187 million in


equipment was delivered during the year to achieve the improved readiness posture.

The capability to deploy rapidly and to sustain operational forces anywhere in the world is an essential ingredient of strategic planning. Rapid response is based upon force readiness in combination with airlift, sealift, and prepositioned materiel.

During the past year the rapid response capability was enhanced by the introduction of the first C-5A heavy logistic transport. Army field testing of this aircraft will continue into the coming fiscal year. With respect to prepositioned equipment, although the serviceability of unit sets of equipment continued to be less than desired, improvements were made in Europe in the area of controlled humidity storage facilities.

Of some concern is a continuing decline in the capability of the Military Sea Transportation Service (renamed Military Sealift Command) and the commercial sealift fleet to support the rapid deployment of U.S. forces during the early days of a contingency. The MSTS fleet, consisting of World War II ships, is rapidly shrinking in size, and the commercial fleet is being reduced in total size and in the number of ships suited for the deployment of Army equipment. In light of these conditions, the Army strongly supports a Navy proposal to build and charter ten multipurpose cargo ships. These ships have been specifically designed to transport military equipment; each would be able to carry over 500 vehicles in addition to helicopters and other equipment.

Army Operations Center and System

The Army Operations Center has served as the Army's primary command center during several international and domestic emergencies since its move into new and expanded facilities in the basement of the Pentagon in June 1969. The improved command and control capability afforded by the new facility and equipment assisted the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff in carrying out the Army's mission. The emergency employment of Army resources during Hurricane Camille and the postal strike was controlled from the center, and it has been used by the Army Staff for several special projects.

Evolutionary improvements were made in the operations center system during the year. A new deployment reporting system became operational to evaluate the time-phased force requirements of all operational plans. This system gives the Army a means of adapting automated data processing techniques to its total and partial mobilization requirements. Plans for the next generation


system for the Army Operations Center and for Army emergency relocation sites were developed during the year.

The operations center continued to co-ordinate the Army's contribution to the U.S. Secret Service in its role of protecting the President and Vice President of the United States. This support included explosive ordnance disposal personnel, helicopters, and other assorted equipment and personnel resources. In this connection, the Army received an increased number of requests from other federal agencies and civil authorities for explosive disposal assistance, involving bomb scares, disarming explosive devices, checking and disposing of war souvenirs, and providing help in transportation accidents involving explosives. Over 4,800 requests were acted upon in fiscal year 1970, compared with 3,762 in the previous year.

Civil Disturbance and Emergency Operations

Because of their organization, discipline, equipment, and geographical distribution, federal military forces are available on call to provide prompt assistance in all kinds of emergencies. In the past year Army troops were called upon to assist civil authorities on several occasions of domestic disturbance and to provide aid during a period of major natural disaster.

Requirements for federal forces to help local and state authorities restore law and order during civil disturbances were restudied during the year in the light of an apparent lessening of the threat of large-scale disorders and the increased capabilities of local and state forces resulting from improved planning, training, and equipment. As a result, the number of metropolitan areas considered likely to experience disorders of a magnitude to require federal assistance was substantially reduced, and a corresponding reduction was made in the number of active Army and U.S. Army Reserve units required to be trained and to maintain continuous readiness for civil disturbance operations.

As a precaution against the possibility of civil disturbances growing out of antiwar demonstrations, federal forces were strategically deployed on four occasions in fiscal year 1970. The first grew out of an announced demonstration against the Vietnam War scheduled for October 12, 1969. Various antiwar organizations throughout the United States pledged their support and stated their intentions to disrupt activities at several military installations. To protect installations faced with the greatest potential threat of disorder, small contingents of military forces were deployed to Fort Dix, New Jersey; Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois; Carlisle Barracks,


Pennsylvania; Boston Army Base, Massachusetts; and Fort Hamilton, New York. Disorder occurred only at Fort Dix, and it was quickly contained by local and military police.

Extensive antiwar activities occurred at Washington, D.C., in the period November 13-15, 1969. Estimates of participation ranged up to a quarter of a million people. To protect extensive federal properties and functions within the city, and to make it possible for military forces to respond quickly to requests from civil authorities for assistance, elements were positioned at key locations around Washington. The units were carefully controlled and their mission was strictly defined. As it turned out, they did not have to be used.

At New Haven, Connecticut, in the first three days of May 1970, Yale University students boycotted classes and demonstrated on the eve of the murder trial of several members of the Black Panther group, raising the prospect of violence. The governor of Connecticut requested that federal forces be positioned near the scene, and two brigades were airlifted to military installations in the area. Again their use was not required.

And finally, when antiwar organizations reacted to American military operations against enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia by announcing plans for a mass demonstration in Washington, D.C., on May 9, 1970, federal forces were once again positioned to protect citizens and federal property and functions should the need arise. An important aspect of the operation was the medical and other health-related military support made available to citizens. The occasion demonstrated the principles that guide federal military assistance to civil law enforcement agencies: federal forces respond to requests from civil authorities; they assist civil authorities to maintain law and order; only the minimum amount of force is used consistent with the situation; federal forces protect the rights and property of citizens.

In response to seventy-six requests, riot control materiel—protective masks, CS grenades, protective vests, communications equipment—was loaned to civil law enforcement agencies and the National Guard in eighteen states and the District of Columbia.

The Army has been called upon many times throughout U.S. history to perform various functions connected with labor disputes, and the duties have ranged from peacekeeping to providing essential services. During late March and early April 1970 another occasion arose in connection with a work stoppage by postal employees, and the President of the United States called upon the military services to assist the Post Office Department in maintaining essen-


tial postal services. The postal strike began on March 18 in New York City and spread rapidly to widely scattered cities. The peak of the work stoppage was reached on March 23 and 24. Mail service in thirteen states was disrupted as some 200,000 of the 750,000 postal workers were off the job.

On March 23, President Nixon declared a national emergency and directed the Secretary of Defense to respond to requests of the Postmaster General for help in restoring and maintaining postal services. The Secretary of Defense in turn designated the Secretary of the Army as executive agent. The joint operation was nicknamed Operation Graphic Hand.

Although planning for military augmentation of postal facilities had to consider the possibility of a nationwide postal strike and operational requirements in thirty-five priority cities, Graphic Hand was executed in New York City only, during the period from March 23 to April 4. The multiservice force, named Task Force New York, was under the operational control of Major General Walter M. Higgins, the commander of Fort Hamilton, New York. Over 18,500 military personnel were assigned to seventeen post offices on March 25, the peak day of operation; 12,764 were Army (750 regular Army, 6,839 National Guard, and 5,175 Army Reserve). The balance were Air National Guard and Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Reserve forces.

The military personnel, working under postal supervisors, sorted mail, transported it to substations and other areas, and delivered bulk mail to businesses and charitable organizations. No residential deliveries were made. According to postal officials, service personnel processed 12.8 million pieces of outgoing letter mail leaving New York City; processed 4.4 million pieces of letter mail for delivery in New York City and cased over 3.2 million pieces of mail for city delivery; delivered nearly 2 million pieces to business firms and charitable organizations; delivered 3.2 million pieces to callers; delivered 11,986 registered letters; and loaded or unloaded 96 trailers of mail.

Postal workers began returning to work on March 25, as prospects of an acceptable settlement of their wage and other grievances increased. On March 26 postal authorities canceled requirements for military augmentation of the post offices, demobilization began, and the operation was completed on April 4, 1970.

Earlier on the domestic scene, the Army Operations Center co-ordinated and monitored the military assistance given to civil authorities and the citizenry after Hurricane Camille struck the gulf coast with devastating force in August 1969 and moved across


the southeastern United States to cause flash flooding in Virginia's James River Valley. The military services provided thousands of workers and hundreds of items of equipment and transported thousands of tons of supplies to assist disaster victims in a three-state area. Army units opened hundreds of miles of road, cleared tons of debris, provided communities with food and water, and co-ordinated with the Air Force the evacuation of hospital patients.

Civil Affairs and Civic Action

The major civil affairs and civic action commitments and responsibilities in oversea areas remained in Southeast Asia in 1970. Army civil affairs units in Panama, Okinawa, and the Republic of Vietnam participated in a wide variety of advisory and operational activities designed to improve agriculture, education, roads and utilities systems, and facilities, as well as in numerous other activities to encourage host-country counterpart military forces to engage in enterprises to promote the welfare of their people.

As the result of a formal resolution passed by the Congress of Micronesia, the Army joined in a unique civic action program sponsored by the Department of the Interior. A civic action team was deployed to Majuro Atoll in the Marshall Islands to carry out road repair and construction, renovation of school buildings and other public facilities, medical work in outlying areas, and on-the-job training in construction skills for local trainees.

At the close of fiscal year 1970, active Army Special Forces consisted of six groups and one separate company located in Germany, Okinawa, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Canal Zone and in the continental United States at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

In the Republic of Vietnam the 5th Special Forces Group continued its mission of advising the Vietnamese Special Forces and managing the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program under which indigenous forces, commanded by Vietnamese Special Forces, conducted extensive operations against enemy infiltration routes in remote peripheral areas. Other activities, such as psychological operations, engineer construction for camp and community, and military civic actions, continued to contribute to the internal stability of areas where Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps are located.

In Thailand, the 46th Special Forces Company continued its successful work with the Thai Army and other government agencies to assist that country in its internal security operations against Communist-inspired insurgency.


In the Panama Canal Zone the 8th Special Forces Group continued regional training assistance to Central and South American countries. While the value of such assistance to friendly foreign governments is well established, reduction of units in the Canal Zone appears likely.

The 3d Special Forces Group was inactivated in December 1969 at Fort Bragg. Although Special Forces units may well be affected by Army reductions in the post-Vietnam period, they are capable of providing military advisory assistance with minimum forces, and would be used in connection with requests from friendly foreign countries on the basis of justification and availability.

Attention was centered during the year upon providing Special Forces units with a more viable organizational structure; new tables of organization and equipment approved in May 1970 were more closely geared to current missions and will be instituted in fiscal year 1971.

The Special Action Forces, originally formed in 1963 by the attachment of engineer, medical, intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, military police, and signal elements to a nucleus Special Forces Group, were reduced to four during the year. One was oriented toward Asia, one toward Europe, one toward Latin America, and the fourth toward Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Mobile training and technical advisory team activities formed the bulk of their operations during the year. In Latin America, thirteen countries received assistance ranging from radio maintenance work in Panama to water purification training in Venezuela.

Military Assistance

The Army's military assistance responsibility includes funding, training, logistic support, and production. In fiscal year 1970 the Military Assistance Program (MAP) continued the rapid decline that began in 1966. The Department of Defense requested $430 million in new funds, and Congress appropriated $350 million and imposed a similar limit on 1971 new obligational authority. The Army's portion of the appropriation was $208 million. The size of the appropriation reflects the competing demands between domestic programs and the war in Vietnam, along with increasing congressional opposition to military assistance and other oversea commitments. Along this line the Army has supported the national goal of replacing grant aid with military sales. Meanwhile, the 1970 Military Assistance Service Funded program remained at the $2.1 billion level of the previous year. It was anticipated that the Vietnamization program would increase this amount slightly in 1971.


An amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 restricted the number of foreign students who may be trained in the United States in a year to a number no greater than the total of foreign civilians brought to the United States under the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 in the preceding year. The restriction applies only to MAP grant aid, and required a 13 percent reduction in foreign military personnel who would have come to the United States under that program during fiscal year 1970.

The foreign military training program of about $20 million operated in more than seventy countries during the year. The U.S. government received about $2.5 million for foreign military sales training, and these funds supported approximately 10,650 training spaces in the United States and 7,320 overseas, along with orientation tours for 679 senior military personnel, 17 mobile training teams, and 65 field training service personnel.

Army-furnished training to support the Vietnamization program increased substantially in fiscal year 1970, with increases particularly noticeable in artillery, signal, and ordnance training spaces. Civilian university training spaces, both graduate and undergraduate, were increased from thirty-one to sixty-four. The major increase was for the Republic of Vietnam Air Force. About 1,100 pilots entered training in the United States, including English language courses and the special pilot courses at Fort Wolters, Texas, and Fort Stewart, Georgia. About 355 aviation mechanics were trained at Fort Eustis, Virginia. The Vietnamese pilot training program was expected to continue at a somewhat reduced rate in 1971.


In a period of ever-increasing use of the world's airwaves by all nations, the operation of communications and electronic equipment of all kinds and under all conditions, including wartime, is a matter of general concern. During fiscal year 1970, the U.S. Army undertook for the first time to analyze the communications-electronic environment that would result from the deployment, by all participants including potential opposing forces, of an estimated 220,000 emitting components, which is considered to be the situation that will be faced in the 1975 period. The purpose of the analysis was to determine the extent to which U.S. Army communications, operating in a worldwide environment, might cause or be subjected to interference. The results of this investigation will be used on a long-range basis to guide the development of communications-electronics systems.


Because of the expanding use of the world's airwaves for both military and commercial purposes, communications discipline and economy have become increasingly important. Three general themes have been stressed in the U.S. Army's communications management program: efficient and effective use of existing facilities to preclude unnecessary expansion; proper and maximum utilization of government equipment to hold leasing of commercial facilities to a minimum; and provision to the commander of the equipment he needs to accomplish his mission. Among continuing economy and discipline measures, special emphasis was given during the past year to control of voice communications.

In a day of complex, technical, and far-flung communications-electronics systems and equipment, efficient and effective operation at all levels requires active and sustained management. There were a number of management activities during fiscal year 1970 that were more than routine. Communications-electronics management in Army installations in the United States, for example, was addressed in a major study, and one of the important recommendations, approved by the Chief of Staff, was that the installation's communications-electronics officer should be at the principal staff level. As a member of the installation's principal staff, the C-E officer will be in a position to evaluate communications-electronics requirements and provide support expeditiously. This management improvement will be reflected not only at installation level but in more responsive communications Army-wide.

The first communications systems program review was held at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, on October 21-22, 1969. Limited in scope to tactical communications, it produced a concept of a master plan that would address all aspects of management of tactical communications systems on an integrated systems basis. This program includes all communications from the squad radio of the combat zones to complex multichannel tropospheric scatter and ground satellite communications assemblages, which constitute the nerve cells for the Army in the field. The initial master plan was developed as a low-cost, in-house effort. It includes an overview of Army goals, priorities for development and procurement, impact statements for determination of trade-offs required by budgetary and manpower constraints, data elements such as force planning guidance, and concepts and doctrine for employment.

The tactical multichannel communications system provides facilities to connect command and area signal centers. These centers have telephone, message, and data facilities which are tied together by multichannel radio and cable transmission facilities. The signal


centers are located throughout theater Army and field Army down to and including brigade headquarters and firing batteries in the air defense artillery. The equipment used in this system provides voice, record, and data communications circuits required for command, control, and logistic purposes. Multichannel means of communications conserve manpower, equipment, and available radio frequency spectrums by combining several communications channels for transmission over one radio.

Multichannel equipment using a digital technique for transmission is now being introduced in the field. Approximately 25 percent of the active Army requirement for transmission equipment had been fielded through fiscal year 1970. For the most part, the equipment is solid state and represents the latest technological state of the art. It is smaller, lighter, easier to maintain, and more reliable than older equipment, provides greater channel capacity, and is more mobile and responsive than the equipment being replaced.

In other branches of the communications-electronics field, management review and improvement actions were stressed in an Army-wide audio-visual activities program and in an Army avionics master plan, the former embracing photographic and television mediums, the latter the application of electronics to aviation and astronautics. Because of the ever-widening military use of television for training, safety, security, morale, and briefing, new policy and standards in television utilization were issued during the year. Distribution control of motion pictures was also tightened.

The rapid expansion of U.S. forces in Vietnam beginning in 1966 required a comparable buildup of communications units. Between April 1966, when the 1st Signal Brigade was activated in Vietnam, and mid-1968 the brigade grew from an organization of three groups and eight battalions to five groups and twenty-two battalions. Numerous problems grew out of the expansion: skill authorizations and requirements were thrown out of balance; companies were cross-assigned among battalions; and operating units were performing housekeeping in fixed facilities. In general, unit authorization documents were out of line with the actual mission, organization, personnel, and equipment. To rectify the command, control, and organizational problems and provide the mixture of fixed communications facilities and mobile tactical elements required by the combat situation, the 1st Signal Brigade was reorganized effective March 1, 1970. A streamlined and efficient force compatible with the increased tempo of the war was structured at no increase in authorized strength or equipment.


In September 1968 the Department of the Army initiated a special study—Communications Evaluation in Southeast Asia—to analyze communications activities there during the period 1964-68. The final report was a comprehensive examination of important communications details in Southeast Asia, covering concepts and doctrine, force development, materiel requirements, communications standards, and management. The Army Staff evaluation of the study led to corrective actions, most of which were completed by the close of the fiscal year. Several matters bearing upon joint doctrine for communications in the communications zone and theater area remained to be resolved at year's end.

Project Mallard, the quadripartite research, development, and procurement program intended to provide a secure tactical communications system for American, British, Canadian, and Australian forces in the 1980's, entered the concept formulation phase in the first half of the fiscal year, until in December 1969 the U.S. Senate-House Conference Committee on Defense Appropriations recommended that discontinuation of the project be explored. A hold placed on U.S. contracts was still in effect at year's end, severely restricting U.S. participation in the project.

Civil Defense

The civil defense program is an essential and prudent component of U.S. strategic defensive forces. It is insurance in the event the U.S. deterrent fails or an attack is accidentally launched. Defense Department studies show that in large-scale nuclear attacks, a nationwide fallout shelter system has a greater lifesaving potential per dollar invested than any other single element of strategic defense. Therefore, primary focus in civil defense continued to be the development of a nationwide fallout shelter system for the entire population, whether at home, work, or school. Management of this and supporting emergency systems was accomplished through the dual use of existing capabilities of state and local governments.

Civil defense worked on a day-to-day basis with the governments of each of the states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the Virgin Islands, the Canal Zone, and thousands of local jurisdictions. Many organizations, community leaders, and individuals supported these efforts. There were about 4,500 local jurisdictions, representing more than 89 percent of the nation's population, involved directly with the OCD (Office of Civil Defense) in the nationwide civil defense program.

Fiscal year 1970 was the ninth year of continuous development


of a nationwide fallout shelter system. Although fund restrictions have been increasingly severe since fiscal year 1966, the civil defense capability today would make a major contribution to the protection of the population in the event of a large-scale nuclear attack. Civil defense programs have also provided trained personnel and workable emergency plans which have been used in various peacetime disasters. By the end of the fiscal year, approximately 197.3 million fallout shelter spaces, with a protection factor (PF) of 40 or better, had been located through various surveys. PF expresses the relation between the amounts of radiation that would be received by an unprotected person and a person inside the shelter. Thus, an unprotected person would receive 40 times more radiation than the person inside a shelter with a PF of 40.

Survey and inventory of public shelter space are conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Naval Facilities Engineering Command. The Defense Supply Agency provides logistic support to the OCD public fallout shelter stocking program. By year's end the fallout shelter inventory showed 202,298 facilities with public fallout protected space for 194.8 million people. About 128 million of these spaces were licensed, 108 million marked with shelter signs, and 63.8 million stocked with federal supplies sufficient to sustain occupants for fourteen days or, if shelter areas were filled to their rated capacities, over 103.4 million occupants for eight days. Warehouse stocks of shelter supplies were essentially exhausted during fiscal year 1970. Federally furnished standard survival supplies for additional shelters must await further appropriations.

The Office of Civil Defense, with the assistance of universities, institutes, and professional societies, has qualified 19,843 architects and engineers in the technology of fallout shelter design and analysis. These architects and engineers through the application of appropriate design techniques are able to incorporate additional fallout protection in new buildings at little or no additional cost. The Office of Civil Defense also offers professional advisory services to architects and their clients through the professional advisory service centers established at forty-four universities.

The Direct Mail Shelter Development System (DMSDS) that was functioning in forty-four states at the end of the fiscal year is essentially a systematic procedure for contacting and encouraging architects and owners of proposed buildings to use design techniques that provide fallout protection. By June 30, 1970, 304,550 construction reports had been reviewed; 19,409 of these had been processed and mailed covering projects located in the forty-four


states. Responses indicating co-operative interest were received for 7,300 projects, about 38 percent of the project mailing. Approximately 40 percent of those responding requested technical assistance. Results by the end of the fiscal year indicated that approximately 1,700 building projects valued at a total of more than $4.2 billion would yield 690,000 additional shelter spaces with architect and owner acceptance of DMSDS advice. The cost to the building owner would be approximately $6.50 per shelter space, representing about 0.1 percent of the total valuation of the building projects.

The Home Fallout Protection Survey was not conducted in fiscal year 1970 because the Census Bureau was totally involved with the decennial census. The 1970 census was expected to provide information about homes with basements. It is estimated that twenty-two million homes with basements have not been surveyed, and that these could yield significant protection for seventy-seven million occupants.

Community Shelter Planning (CSP) is another important aspect of the shelter program. CSP is designed to develop procedures in local communities for making efficient use of the best available protection against radioactive fallout and to provide information to the public on where to go and what to do in the event of an attack. CSP also identifies in geographic detail the unfilled requirements for fallout shelter. At the end of the fiscal year, CSP projects completed or in process covered 1,767 counties or planning areas with a total population of more than 126.2 million people.

The development of the following civil defense emergency operations systems was continued to help assure the effective use of shelters and the conduct of recovery operations: a nationwide warning system to alert people to impending attack and to direct them to shelters; communications systems to keep people informed and to enable officials to direct emergency operations; nationwide monitoring and reporting systems to collect, evaluate, and disseminate information on radiological fallout resulting from attack; and a damage assessment system to provide guidance for preattack planning and postattack operations.

Emergency operating centers (EOC's) are needed at the seat of government at all levels for effective executive direction and control in any widespread emergency. These EOC's are fallout-protected centers, planned, staffed, and provided with communications and warning facilities for key officials to use in directing emergency operations. By the end of the fiscal year, 1,270 state and local government EOC's were operational. In addition, there were 628


EOC's in planning, 640 under construction, 481 with construction completed, and 591 in the process of being equipped.

To permit broadcasting of information to the public from these EOC's, radio connections were in the process of being installed to protect commercial broadcast stations in the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS). The EBS was established to provide official information to the public in an attack emergency and can be activated only by the President. As part of this system, OCD has a broadcast station protection program to provide selected stations with fallout shelter, emergency power, and the radio links to EOC's. This enables key broadcast stations to remain on the air in a fallout environment. At the end of the fiscal year, 610 broadcast stations were included in the program.

All states and 4,500 local governments participating in the civil defense program submitted annual program papers, one of the requirements for eligibility to receive federal civil defense assistance. Federal assistance includes technical guidance, training and education, and surplus property donations, as well as financial assistance. To provide maximum assistance to U.S. citizens and full participation by civil defense, all restrictions were removed on the use of civil defense personnel, supplies, and equipment in peacetime disasters. The Civil Defense Education Program was modified to put new emphasis on incorporating civil defense into the secondary school curriculum, on developing school self-protection civil defense plans and programs, and on supplying shelter space in school facilities where needed.

Awareness and interest are essential to public support of civil defense emergency preparedness. To this end an information services office was established to provide information to all media concerning the day-to-day activities of the agency. A new liaison services office also serves this end by maintaining contact with business, industry, and organizations of various types.

Other civil defense supporting activities included research to develop an improved technical basis for program direction and guidance; warehousing and distribution of emergency supplies; prepositioning of emergency information to tell the public of actions to take in an emergency; activities and information to gain the participation of industry, national organizations, professional associations, institutions, and agencies; and liaison with other elements of the federal government and with civil defense authorities of friendly countries.

The Army has primary service responsibility for military support of civil defense functions within the continental United States.


All services recognize the need for and support a strong civil defense program and develop survival and recovery programs for the armed forces. The services represent a major source of assistance to civil authorities in civil defense activities because of their organization, specialized equipment, disciplined manpower, and long experience in dealing with emergencies.

The Commanding General, U.S. Continental Army Command, and continental U.S. (CONUS) Army commanders provide planning guidance to the CONUS state adjutants general who, while in preattack state status, prepare military support of civil defense plans for each state. The adjutants general, when called to federal service as state area commanders, exercise operational control over military units made available for transattack and postattack military support of civil defense missions. In Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, similar military support of civil defense planning and operations arrangements are the responsibility of the appropriate unified command commander and the adjutant general.

The Army, with Department of Defense approval, is authorized to establish civil defense reinforcement training units (RTU's) with members drawn from the Individual Ready Reserve. RTU's are authorized to perform preattack planning and training in either civil defense or military support of civil defense. Members earn retirement point credit for such participation.


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Last updated 9 August 2004