Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1972

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Operational Forces

Against a background of diminishing war in Vietnam, sustained withdrawal of American forces from the combat zone, substantially reduced draft calls, fiscal constraints, and returning peacetime conditions, Army demobilization continued through fiscal year 1972. Actual military strength declined from 1,124,000 to 811,000 during the year, while major units leveled off at 13 divisions, including 5 unmanned brigades, below the Army's postwar goal of 13 fully manned divisions. At year's end there were 6 fully manned divisions in the continental United States and Hawaii, 4Y3 in Europe, and 1 in Korea. Special mission brigades remained in Alaska, Panama, and Berlin.

The waning war in Vietnam, the application of the Nixon Doctrine, detente with China and Russia, and the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control all shaped the outlines of postwar relationships in the Pacific region and set the directions of operational planning for the Army and the other services. In line with the Nixon Doctrine, U.S. Army, Pacific, continued to maintain suitable forward deployments in Thailand, Vietnam, Korea, and Japan while undergoing over-all strength reductions and shifting emphasis to security assistance and adviser efforts that stressed the modernization and strengthening of allied armies.

Redeployment of American forces from Vietnam in accordance with presidential guidance continued at an accelerated rate during the year. Army troop reduction exceeded 166,000 and included the 23d Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), the 3d Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), and the separate 196th Infantry Brigade, comprising the last division- and brigade-size elements in Vietnam. (For full details on Vietnam see Chapter 3.)

A major change in the Army's command and organizational structure in the Pacific occurred on May 15, 1972, in conjunction with the return of Okinawa to Japanese control after twenty-seven years of administration by the United States. Under the complex reorganization that accompanied reversion, Headquarters, IX U.S. Army Corps, was transferred from Okinawa and collocated with Headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan, to form Headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan/IX Corps, at

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Camp Zama, Japan. On Okinawa, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands, and Headquarters, 2d Logistical Command, were inactivated and a U.S. Army Base Command, Okinawa, was established to command and support all Army units there and perform the theater logistic functions for United States and allied forces in the Pacific. Numerous other refinements were made to meet the dictates of operations in Southeast Asia and the gradual transition to peacetime conditions. Five subordinate commands were left within U.S. Army, Japan/ IX Corps, under the reorganization: the U.S. Army Base Command, Okinawa; the U.S. Army Supply and Maintenance Activity, Sagami; the U.S. Army Garrison, Kanto Plain; the U.S. Army Transportation Activity, Japan; the U.S. Army Ammunition Depot Complex, Akizuki; the U.S. Army Medical Activity, Japan; and the U.S. Army Procurement Agency, Japan. Total Army strength in Japan and Okinawa was reduced slightly as a result of this reorganization.

A reduction of U.S. forces in Korea during 1971 resulted in the formation of the first combined corps in U.S. Army history. The I U.S./ ROK Corps (Group) Headquarters was activated on July 1, 1971, at Uijonbu to bridge the gap created by the departure of an American division and other elements. The combined headquarters is commanded by a U.S. Army lieutenant general, has a major general of the Republic of Korea Army as a deputy commander, and has a combined American-Korean staff. It has proved to be extremely effective in providing command and control following the employment of additional Korean troops along the demilitarized zone. The headquarters operates like that of a standard American field army and is responsible for a key section of the demilitarized zone.

The United States is engaged in a five-year program, extending through fiscal year 1975, to upgrade the Republic of Korea's armed forces. An important part of the program involves the transfer of excess military equipment to those forces. By June 30, 1972, about $95 million in equipment had been transferred from withdrawing U.S. to Korean forces, including aircraft, tanks, wheeled vehicles, and all of the standard equipment of eight U.S. maneuver battalions whose missions had been assumed by the Korean Army. Excess military equipment in Vietnam is also being offered to the Korean armed forces to meet known materiel requirements. In addition, the Republic of Korea has contracted with Colt Industries, Inc., for the production of M16 rifles, and other coproduction programs for wheeled vehicles and communications equipment are being encouraged.

Congressional cuts in the fiscal year 1972 military grant assistance portion of the foreign aid program constrained modernization plans and resulted in an annual program of about $150 million for Korea,

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some 40 percent less than had been requested. Officials in both the Defense and State Departments made strenuous efforts to obtain congressional support for a recommended $235 million in grant aid for Korea for fiscal year 1973. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, in February 1972, informed the House Appropriations Committee that "We are going forward with a five year modernization program. Progress depends on congressional appropriations, year by year, and the action by Congress on our military assistance request last year was a great setback to this program."

Although South Korean ground forces are adequate to meet a ground attack from the north, North Korea has air superiority, and would retain numerical superiority even after the completion of the five-year modernization program, a significant threat in view of the fact that Seoul-the capital and center of military, economic, and social life of the republic-is only thirty-five miles south of the demilitarized zone. American and South Korean efforts are equally important as the Asian nation moves toward self-sufficiency.

Relations between the United States and Japan continued to be guided by considerations of mutual security. The return of the Ryukyuan archipelago to Japanese control had a salutary effect on American-Japanese security relationships, and leaders of both countries reaffirmed these ties as the period closed. As the agency responsible for governing the Ryukyus during the period of American tenure, the U.S. Army played an important role in fostering bilateral co-operation and friendship and conditions conducive to political stability and economic development in the affected region.

Japan's determination to avoid a resurgence of militarism and her constitutional renunciation of war dictate a military establishment designed to defend that nation against conventional aggression only. As a result, she relied upon the U.S. strategic umbrella for protection against nuclear attack, and the Mutual Security Treaty which assures Japan of that protection also provides the United States with a number of major bases to support our regional security obligations.

Negotiations concerning the future political status of the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands have been of some interest to the Army. In May 1972 it was agreed that a Compact of Free Association should be drafted that would provide the Micronesians with full authority over internal affairs and the United States with full authority and responsibility for foreign affairs and defense. As negotiations proceed, the Army will be especially interested in defense land requirements and leasing procedures, finance, and a status-of-forces agreement.

Several developments were connected with renegotiation of the U.S.-Philippines military base agreement. Most of the technical issues

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involved were resolved in a meeting of the formal working group in January 1972. Unresolved technical issues relating to criminal jurisdiction, taxation, and base land relinquishment, along with those requiring political decisions, such as Philippine authority over U.S. bases and the duration of the agreement, were referred to the ministerial level for resolution. No date had been set, as the year closed, for a resumption of these discussions.

President Nixon's announcement on July 15, 1971, that he would visit the People's Republic of China, affected U.S. relations with all of our Asian allies. On the heels of the announcement, the joint Chiefs of Staff were tasked to analyze the U.S. military presence on Taiwan, and the Army contributed to that study and to subsequent appraisals concerning exchanges and trade with the People's Republic of China and the impact of the presidential trip. The movement toward improved relations with China added a new dimension to Army planning concerning the Pacific and the Far East, one that was expanding as the year closed.

Because of increased logistic support requirements for Laos, the U.S. Army's support element in Thailand was assigned to provide primary logistics support of U.S. military assistance in Laos. The conversion was scheduled to take effect on July 1, 1972, and as fiscal year 1972 closed, U.S. Army Support, Thailand, had assumed control over all storage and stocks connected with the Army portion of military support to Laos.

The United States Army's powerful armored/mechanized/nuclear-supported force remained on station in central Europe in fiscal year 1972 as the keystone of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's land defenses. Major elements were 2 armored divisions, 2 V3 mechanized infantry divisions, and 2 armored cavalry regiments. Supporting units included nuclear-capable artillery units.

In April 1972 the Office of the Secretary of Defense approved a program to improve conventional combat forces in Europe. Reorganizations and reductions in headquarters and support units will permit the activation in September 1972 of two new armored battalions which will ultimately be equipped with the new M60A2 tank armed with the Shillelagh missile system; deployment of two attack helicopter companies from the United States to Europe, equipped with the AH-IG Cobra helicopter; deployment of a Chapparal-Vulcan air defense battalion from the United States to Europe, adding to the Army's lowlevel air defense capability; and the organization of an airborne battalion combat team in Europe. The latter will be a self-supporting force

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with organic field artillery, capable of operating as an independent unit or as part of a larger force.

To accommodate these force improvements, three major headquarters and a number of miscellaneous units, detachments, and support elements-all of which had served their purpose-will be eliminated. Included are the U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army Support Command; U.S. Army Materiel Command, Europe; and the Advance Weapons Support Command. Necessary missions and functions of the three headquarters are being absorbed by other major headquarters remaining in the force structure.

This force improvement plan, to be implemented over a two-year period, will provide a significant increase in conventional combat capability. At the same time, the introduction of the Lance missile system to replace the Honest John and Sergeant systems will improve the nuclear deterrent capability. Improvement along both conventional and nuclear lines will enhance the readiness and flexibility of American forces and the NATO defense of western Europe.

To standardize equipment the Army also prepared during the year to replace the Berlin Command's 105-mm. self-propelled howitzers with the 155-mm. version. The exchange was to take place in August 1972 when Berlin's 94th Artillery elements would be at the Grafenwohr training area in West Germany.

The possibility of a reduction of forces in Europe was an active subject in East-West diplomacy during the year. In October 1971 the United States participated in a NATO effort to arrange exploratory discussions with the Soviet Union on mutual and balanced force reductions in central Europe. Although these exploratory talks did not materialize, the communiqué following the January 1972 meeting of Warsaw Pact nations announced a willingness to discuss reductions of forces. The most significant development came in the May 1972 summit meeting of the United States and the Soviet Union, at which the heads of state agreed to enter into discussions on reciprocal reductions of armed forces and armaments, first of all in central Europe. As U.S. Army forces-conventional and nuclear-are a key element of NATO forces, these negotiations are likely to play a major role in Army force levels and posture in Europe.

The major American consideration in any decision on force reductions would be the continued security of the NATO nations. The USSR, because of its geographical position, can mobilize and reinforce its forces in central Europe much more rapidly than NATO. This and other areas thus present problems that must be taken into account in the preparation for and conduct of negotiations. The U.S. Army has participated in a number of studies seeking militarily acceptable options.

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In fiscal year 1972, U.S. Army, Alaska, the Army component of the unified Alaskan Command, continued to be responsible for the ground defense of Alaska. The year was highlighted by reorganization and the start of a reduction in military manpower. When this reduction is completed in the coming fiscal year, the major forces remaining assigned to U.S. Army, Alaska, will be an infantry brigade with three infantry battalions and a field artillery battalion, and a diversified aviation battalion tailored for operations in Alaska.

The ground defense of the Panama Canal Zone continued to be vested in the U.S. Army Southern Command and its 193d Infantry Brigade of three maneuver battalions. The 3d Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), located within the Canal Zone, primarily supported military assistance training in Latin America but comprised also a fourth maneuver battalion to support the command in the event of an emergency.

The emphasis at the jungle Training Center, Fort Sherman, shifted from individual to unit training, including company-size elements of the Army and battalion-size units of the Marine Corps. Although the center is supported by Army funds and is intended to train U.S. military units and personnel in military operations and survival in a jungle environment, it is not an integral part of the Army school system. Most foreign students who have trained there have done so in conjunction with their courses at the U.S. Army School of the Americas located at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone. This school was organized in 1946 to support U.S. military assistance groups, attaches, and missions; here Latin American military and paramilitary personnel are taught U.S. military technical skills, leadership, military doctrine, and irregular warfare operations. In the period of this report, sixteen military groups provided assistance to Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

In the past fiscal year there was no change in the status of Army forces allocated to defend the continental United States. The Hercules batteries defending the urban and industrial complexes remained constant, while the Army participated in Defense Department reviews of air defense objectives and alternative force structures.

Army readiness fluctuated during fiscal year 1972 under the turbulent conditions attending withdrawal from Vietnam and contraction of

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the active Army Reserve Component readiness lagged behind that of the active Army but improved gradually, especially in the logistics area, as a result of the increasing availability of equipment released by the liquidation of the Vietnam War.

Late in calendar year 1971 the Congress directed a 50,000 man-year reduction for fiscal year 1972. To meet it the Army instituted a special early release program through which first term enlisted personnel, with some exceptions, were released from five to six months ahead of normal schedules, while a four-month delay in legislative action to extend the draft retarded the acquisition of new personnel. Qualitative considerations had to be sacrificed to meet quantitative goals, leading to serious imbalances in personnel qualified in various military specialties. A rapid decline in trained strength early in calendar year 1972 led the Secretary of Defense to cancel the early release program in May for at least ninety days. May 1972 was the month in which the Army "bottomed out" in its personnel situation. Recovery, on the other hand, was hampered by the move toward a zero draft and an all-volunteer force.

Successful efforts at all levels to reduce an overstrength in general support forces made it possible to increase the strength of the Strategic Army force. Personnel turnover in the Continental Army Command gradually eased as the year closed, with shortages of qualified enlisted men and a mismatch of personnel and positions as the problems most frequently reported.

As reported last year, the Army in 1971 instituted a unit-of-choice recruiting program to spur enlistments in the combat arms. The success of this effort led to the expansion of the technique to the noncombat arms under a Special Unit Enlistment program. Selected major units within the continental United States and in Hawaii were thus able to recruit individuals for specific skill training and assignment. These recruiting innovations gathered momentum and demonstrated a measure of success far exceeding expectations-so much so that the program was extended to additional units, with anticipated beneficial effects on strengths in Strategic Army Force and Reforger units-the latter those stateside elements earmarked to augment Army forces in Europe using prepositioned equipment.

The Army's logistic readiness remained relatively stable during fiscal year 1972. As the period closed, 91 percent of all reporting units had achieved their authorized levels of organization for equipment on hand. Reorganizational adjustments under certain (H-Series TOE) equipment authorizations caused some equipment shortage and a corresponding deficiency in readiness, but there were no major logistical problems in the period. As noted above, there was logistical improve-

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ment in the Reserve Components despite the diversion of some programmed assets.

The Army's training readiness, both individual and unit, lagged behind personnel recovery and was complicated by heavy commitments within the continental United States as the summer of 1972 opened. Acute shortages still existed at year's end within various hard skill, long lead-time occupational specialties, and recovery would take some time. While unit training was continuing where possible, satisfactory levels will depend upon the achievement of personnel goals.

It is evident from the foregoing that, while there has been great improvement in Army readiness, manpower is the key to resolving most of the problems in this field. While further recovery is anticipated through the last half of calendar year 1972, concern exists for the remainder of fiscal year 1973 and for 1974 as well. It is difficult to predict progress, as it depends upon such unknown quantities as legislation (authorizing combat arms enlistment bonuses and radio television advertising, for example), decisions on draft calls in fiscal year 1973, and progress in achieving an all-volunteer force.

Because of their size, complexity, and worldwide dispersion, American military forces require sophisticated communications systems for effective command and control. Organization, facilities, equipment, methods, and techniques must be constantly monitored, modified, and modernized to insure that command and control over military forces is exercised in an efficient and responsive manner. Recently, automated equipment has come to play an increasingly important role in command and control, requiring constant updating of programs and systems.

In October 1971, for example, Honeywell Information Systems, Inc., was awarded a contract for standard computer systems for the Worldwide Command and Control System. The Army was designated to procure seven of thirty-five systems under the contract. These will be installed between October 1972 and September 1973 at Headquarters, Department of the Army, for operations and intelligence use; Headquarters, U.S. European Command; Headquarters of the U.S. Army's European, Pacific, and Continental Army Commands; U.S. Army War College; and Headquarters, U.S. Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service. The Army continued to support the unified U.S. European and Southern Commands in this technical field and participated in the worldwide system program through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in representation on an Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Standards Policy Group.

The master plan of the Headquarters, Department of the Army

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Command and Control System, and the plans of each operations center in that system are reviewed annually to appraise facilities, personnel, and funding and to determine resource requirements for five future fiscal years. The original master plan was that of fiscal year 1970; that for fiscal year 1973 was approved on March 1, 1972.

Since 1966 the departmental headquarters has recognized the need for a new command building for the primary Headquarters, Department of the Army general war headquarters (DEPTAR/MAIN). The cost of a separate installation, estimated at about $8 million, was considered prohibitive. An alternative plan for an addition to an existing building, costing about $2 million, was submitted to the Congress in the fiscal year 1973 military construction budget. In June 1972 the House of Representatives deferred the project for at least one year. Improvements in ADP equipment at existing facilities were not dependent upon congressional approval of new command facilities, and a UNIVAC 490 computer was installed at DEPTAR/MAIN late in 1971. A worldwide computer system will be received in fiscal year 1973.

There were changes in the Army Operations Center system during the period of this report, some completed, some initiated, and all designed to permit the center to meet the information requirements of national command authorities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Army Chief of Staff. Proponency for all station codes used within Army information systems to report the location of Army units was centralized within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, improving the interface between unilateral Army systems using Army codes and Army component systems of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System using joint station codes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Force Status and Identity Report was revised worldwide in March 1972 and the Army Operations Center System's forces files were redesigned to accommodate new data elements. In June 1972, work, was begun to convert the Army system to make it an integral part of the worldwide automated data processing update program.

The Department of the Army participated in NIGHT TRAIN 72, a command post exercise sponsored by the joint Chiefs of Staff to exercise and train the joint organization, the military services, selected Defense Department agencies, and four unified and specified commands in planning for and coping with minor contingencies. The scenario portrayed a situation in which the United States was responding to a request for assistance from a friendly government. The participants had an opportunity to develop planning options and use selected narrative and automated reporting systems to expedite decisions under emergency conditions. The Army Operations Center, appropriate staff agencies, and seven major commands participated in the exercise.

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Because of a decrease in the level of large-scale demonstration connected with civil disorder, U.S. active military forces were not deployed during fiscal year 1972. However, against the possibility of a disturbance connected with the Governors' Conference at San Juan, Puerto Rico, in the period of September 10-14, 1971, a Marine regiment assigned to the Atlantic Command was placed on alert and a liaison representative of the Army Chief of Staff and a Department of the Army liaison team were sent to the island to co-ordinate with local officials and Department of justice representatives. The conference was held without incident and the standby forces were not deployed. This was the first instance of detailed planning to deploy forces in a civil disturbance outside of the continental United States.

Despite the downturn in civil disturbance, training continued at the Civil Disturbance Orientation Course at Fort Gordon, Georgia. The course is conducted by the Army for personnel of municipal, state, and federal agencies, to provide a general knowledge of civil disturbance planning and operations. The emphasis is given to preventive and preparatory measures during an actual confrontation. Twenty-two classes are conducted each fiscal year; in 1972, 782 civilians, 342 National Guard, and 340 active military attended the course.

The Army supported the U.S. Secret Service in explosive ordnance disposal at an increased rate during fiscal year 1972. The assistance consists of protecting the President and Vice President of the United States, candidates for those offices, and visiting heads of foreign states, by providing personnel trained in the handling and elimination of explosive hazards. As a result of the additional activity engendered by the 1972 national election campaign, Army support was provided in connection with 622 missions, with a total of 78,698 man-hours expended. Army personnel also responded to over 4,700 requests for assistance from civil authorities regarding hazards associated with bomb threats, rendering homemade bombs safe, disposal of war souvenirs, and transportation accidents involving explosives. A decrease in the number of requests in this area might be attributable to the results of the training program and the increasing capability of civil law enforcement agencies for dealing with this type of hazard.

At the request of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and with all costs funded by the Department of Justice, the Army established a course to train public safety and law enforcement officers to render safe and dispose of improvised explosive devices. The initial three-week course of instruction began on January 18, 1971, at the U.S. Army Missile and Munitions Center and School, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, with one course per month. The large number of requests for attend-

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ance at the course led to its expansion to two classes per month beginning in October 1971. Student output was increased to 400 per year.

The Army provided military support in disaster relief as well as in civil disturbances. Of thirty-five declared major disasters monitored during the year, three were of more than routine significance. Since the Secretary of the Army is the executive agent for all Department of Defense support furnished in declared major disasters, the Directorate of Military Support, the action agency for the executive agent, closely monitored the floods in Logan and Mingo Counties, West Virginia, during late February and March 1972. Support included forty-three Army personnel and such major equipment as helicopters, generators, commercial radios, trucks, and laundry, bath, and purification units: Also in March 1972, when a barge loaded with 640 tons of chlorine broke loose on the Ohio River near Louisville, Kentucky, the Army provided personnel and equipment, including a hospital train, in response to a request for assistance from the Office of Emergency Preparedness. Torrential rains in the Rapid City, South Dakota, area resulted in a presidential declaration of a major disaster on June 10, 1972. While the bulk of the support was furnished by the Air Force, at the peak of the floods the Army furnished fifty-five personnel, two helicopters, ten vehicles, and miscellaneous communications equipment. While this support was being provided by the Sixth U.S. Army, the First U.S. Army was heavily committed in relief operations connected with Hurricane Agnes throughout the states of Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, and Virginia. At the close of fiscal year 1972, the Department of the Army along with the Departments of the Air Force and the Navy had committed over 500 personnel, 50 aircraft, and a long list of materials including 6,900 blankets, 6,000 cots, 135,000 sandbags, and 150 vehicles. Under the authority provided by DOD Directive 3025.1, disaster assistance was also provided to fight a forest fire on the Apache Reservation in the vicinity of White River, Arizona, during the period of June 28-July 9, 1971.

The Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) Program continued at five test sites (three Army and two Air Force) during the fiscal year. The program has demonstrated that the concept of using military helicopters and paramedical personnel to respond to civilian emergencies is operationally feasible. It has also been a source of training and motivation for the medical unit. It brings together military and civilian authorities and provides efficient procedures to make the military contribution rapid and effective. Military feasibility was established by the fact that MAST missions were successfully carried out by regularly constituted units with no additional resources committed to the program. Based on test results and evaluations of two principal

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studies by Ohio State University and Stanford Research Institute, the military departments recommended limited expansion of the MAST program. The concept of expansion to an additional twenty-five sites was approved by the Secretary of Defense; however, it was determined that no new sites would be established until legislative authority was granted. With approval of the site expansion plan, the MAST Interagency Coordinating Committee (Representatives of the Departments of Defense; Transportation; and Health, Education, and Welfare) visited and co-ordinated with representatives at all proposed sites during February and March 1972. At the end of the year, a total of 2,494 hours and 1,165 missions had been flown, evacuating 1,433 civilian patients. This represents 1.6 missions per day, 2.0 patients per day, and an average of 2.1 hours per mission. As the year closed, legislation was introduced in Congress which would authorize the Secretary of Defense to utilize Department of Defense resources for the purpose of providing medical emergency transportation services to civilians.

Under the President's program to provide federal resources to help the District of Columbia combat crime, hangar facilities were provided at the Anacostia Naval Air Station in Washington, D.C., to house three helicopters under commercial lease to the Metropolitan Police Department for police use. Fuel for the aircraft was provided by Andrews Air Force Base in nearby Maryland.

Throughout fiscal year 1972, the Director of Military Support acted as the DOD Project Coordinator for matters pertaining to site preparation, medical support, emergency ordnance disposal, and related logistic support for the U.S. International Transportation Exposition (TRANSPO-72), held at Dulles International Airport from May 26 to June 4, 1972. The Army installed 23 Bailey bridges and 5,000 square feet of aluminum matting, supplied 20 general purpose tents, established and operated a transportable hospital, and provided miscellaneous explosive ordnance disposal, engineer, and communications support.

In fiscal year 1972 the U.S. Army and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) embarked upon an experimental personnel exchange program designed to develop a mutual understanding of each other's policies and operations. The program was launched in September 1971 with the assignment of two Foreign Service Information Officers to the Psychological Operations Staff of the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. Two Army officers from that staff were assigned in turn to the USIA. As the year closed, there was interest at the upper levels of the Department of Defense in expanding the program to include all of the military services in the exchange.

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The psychological operations (PSYOP) field has not been exempt from the processes of automation, and during the past year field testing of a computerized psychological operations information storage and retrieval system was begun. The PSYOP Automated Management Information System is a computerized information storage and retrieval system designed to provide for the systematic collection, analysis, dissemination, and use of psychological operations data. Field tests of a Foreign Media Analysis subsystem were conducted jointly by the joint Staff, the Department of the Army, and the 7th Psychological Operations Group, Okinawa, during the first half of fiscal year 1972. As a result of the tests, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 1972 tasked the Commander in Chief, Pacific, to place the subsystem in an. operational status as a separate reporting entity. Development was begun on an assessment and estimate subsystem in March 1972 with the 4th Psychological Operations Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, providing field support.

In another development in this field, the Army authorized partial activation of a PSYOP Support Activity in June 1972, the result of a joint Staff request for support for increased psychological operations in Indochina. A concept and a proposed organization for this element had been developed following studies by the Army's PSYOP staff in 1970-71, studies which indicated a need for an element capable of providing PSYOP intelligence analysis, planning, and other assistance to the joint Staff. The activity was located temporarily in the Army Operations Center and was staffed by two officers from the departmental PSYOP staff, two USIA exchange officers, and selected Army mobilization designees assigned to the Department of the Army staff.

The decline in the over-all size of the Army's Special Forces that began in 1969 levelled off in fiscal year 1972. As the year closed there were four active Army Special Forces Groups. Three of these were converted to a new "H" series Tables of Organization and Equipment and are now in a battalion and company configuration. The last will follow suit in the second quarter of fiscal year 1973. A part of the conversion was the inactivation of the 8th Special Forces Group in Panama and its replacement by a battalion of the 7th Special Forces Group from Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Emphasis was placed during the period on overseas training for reserve component special forces units. Training was conducted in both Europe and the Middle East, and this will be expanded in the coming year. Such training not only advances unit readiness but also enhances recruiting and retention of personnel in these organizations. The four reserve component Special Forces Groups were scheduled for conversion to the "H" series tables during the first quarter of fiscal year 1973.

Special Forces units stationed in the continental United States have participated regularly in domestic action projects as adjuncts to training exercises. Personnel have received valuable experience in exercising their professional skills while participating in these projects. Such projects, co-ordinated with federal, state, and local agencies, have contributed to an improved standard of living for many citizens while improving unit efficiency.

There was progress during the reporting period in the Army's ability to perform civil affairs functions in support of national security objectives. In August 1971, for example, a Department of the Army Committee for Civil Affairs Development was established as a consultative body to bring together key elements of the Army's active and reserve civil affairs communities and insure that civil affairs elements are adequately organized and trained and capable of conducting operations under diverse circumstances. Two formal meetings were held, and five subcommittees were organized to address problems of concepts and doctrine, manpower, training, organization, research, and studies.

The committee contributed to a survey of civil affairs officer personnel assets in the Army Reserve and to the development of improved tables of organization and equipment that would reflect the changing missions and objectives assigned to the Army to further the President's strategy for peace. The committee was a focal point of study efforts to define the role of civil affairs in domestic civil defense as well as the civil-military role of indigenous armed forces. It also assisted in the development of a computer-assisted gaming technique to train civil affairs units and personnel, gave attention to functional seminar training, and contributed to plans for a comprehensive body of civil affairs training literature.

In late 1969, the International Committee of the Red Cross proposed consultations to improve humanitarian law as set forth in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols. The following year, the committee submitted a provisional agenda and documentary materials for consideration. An initial conference of government experts representing thirty-nine nations was held at Geneva, Switzerland, during May and June of 1971. A delegation from the United States attended, and this conference developed proposed texts of two draft protocols designed to supplement existing humanitarian law. The two protocols were designed to deal with international armed conflicts on the one hand and internal conflicts on the other. As appropriate, each dealt with the behavior and protection of the sick and wounded, including the protection of medical aviation, protection to be afforded the civilian popula-

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tion, protection for civil defense personnel, and reinforcement of the law presently in force.

A second conference was held in Geneva in the period May 3-June 2, 1972. Delegations attended representing seventy-four nations and international organizations. The U.S. delegation consisted of twenty government experts and included U.S. Army representatives from the Offices of the Judge Advocate General and the Surgeon General. At this conference the U.S. delegation sought to improve the protection to be given to medical aviation personnel, the sick and wounded, and aviators in distress; to improve the implementation of existing law, particularly the establishment of the protecting power for prisoners of war; to prevent undue expansion of the protection afforded guerrillas without commensurate responsibilities; and to prevent the erosion of protection afforded civilians.

The results of the conference were mixed. The subject of protection for sick and wounded appeared ready for final agreement to be worked out in a diplomatic conference. Discussion of other subject areas revealed sharp divisions of opinion and the expectation of some difficulty of resolution in a diplomatic conference. At the conclusion of the meetings, the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross announced plans for a diplomatic conference in mid-1974 to ratify revised protocols adopted at the 1972 conference.

In another area of activity with humanitarian considerations, the incident of the Lithuanian seaman who attempted to defect from a Soviet vessel on November 30, 1970, highlighted a need to insure that all U.S. government personnel are informed of procedures for handling requests by foreign nationals for political asylum and temporary refuge. Long-standing U.S. policy has provided that foreign nationals, from within the United States, who request asylum of the United States government owing to persecution or fear of persecution should be given full opportunity to have the request considered on its merits. The policy stipulates that the request of a person for asylum shall not be arbitrarily or summarily refused by U.S. personnel and that each request must be dealt with on an individual basis, taking into account humanitarian principles, applicable laws, and other factors. As a party to the 1951 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the United States has an international treaty obligation to refrain from forcibly returning a refugee to conditions of persecution if residing within areas subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

The President in 1971 re-emphasized the U.S. commitment to the provision of asylum for refugees and directed that appropriate departments and agencies of the government, under State Department coordination, take steps to bring to every echelon of the government that

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could possibly be involved with persons seeking asylum a sense of the depth and urgency of America's commitment to the 1951 Protocol.

On January 7, 1972, the Acting Secretary of State forwarded to all government departments and agencies a copy of comprehensive procedures for handling requests for asylum by foreign nationals in the United States and abroad. The procedures were forwarded for the guidance of all government personnel who were likely to have contact, in the course of their duties, with foreign nationals. The Department of Defense in turn promulgated a directive (No. 2000.11) on March 3, 1972, to make the asylum procedures applicable to all military departments, defense agencies, and unified and specified commands.

To insure uniform policies and procedures, the Department of the Army issued Army Regulation 550-1 on May 25, 1972, assigning to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations staff supervision for the implementation of policies and procedures concerning the handling of political asylum cases arising in areas of departmental responsibility. A part of that responsibility includes notification to and co-ordination with the Department of State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

In his foreign aid message to Congress on April 21, 1971, the President proposed a realignment of foreign aid into two programs, one oriented to military assistance, the other to economic and humanitarian assistance. In addition to the established elements of military assistance (grant aid, foreign military sales, donation of excess military equipment), the proposal sought to include public safety and supporting economic assistance under a comprehensive International Security Assistance Act, with all other forms of aid consolidated under a separate act. Thus the term "security assistance" entered the Department of Defense vocabulary, expanding the familiar term, "military assistance."

The President also proposed-and in fact established-a Coordinator for Security Assistance, at Under Secretary level in the Department of State, to advance this program. The Defense Department reorganized its headquarters in September 1971 to create a Defense Security Assistance Agency, and the Army Staff in turn shifted some personnel and restructured its Military Assistance Division in order better to be prepared to handle the anticipated program. Further organizational and program realignments were studied to advance the objectives of the Nixon Doctrine: to assist allies and other friendly nations to achieve self-sufficiency, to participate in mutual defense, and to carry their fare share of the burden.

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As a result of revisions in the over-all unified command structure, the Army took over from the Air Force the responsibility for administrative and logistical support of military assistance advisory groups and missions in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. United States Army, Europe, was designated the Army's executive agent to provide this support beginning on January 1, 1972. This date was later extended to July 1, 1972, in order to accommodate budgetary considerations and allow time for a smooth transition between the services.

To carry out their portions of the Defense Military Assistance Program in fiscal year 1972, the Army and the other services operated for the first eight months on the basis of temporary continuing congressional funding authorizations. On February 7, 1972, the Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, which followed past patterns of such legislation, thus rejecting the President's proposed realignment of foreign aid. Despite the delay, Army operations were not seriously affected, and materiel, training, and other programed services were furnished to friendly countries as planned.

Since 1967 there has been a gradual trend away from grant aid in favor of foreign military sales in countries that are capable of participating in the sales program. To a limited extent, the sales effort received an indirect boost from a provision of the 1971 Act that required grant-aid countries to deposit in host country currency to the account of the United States a sum equal to 10 percent of the value of the grant-aid program. Although some countries took exception to this provision, there has been general acceptance and little adverse impact on the grant-aid program or on Army security assistance operations, except for military assistance training in several countries.

To increase foreign military sales in line with Defense Department objectives, the Army suggested early in 1972 that briefing teams orient and instruct U.S. country teams and host country representatives on the various aspects of the sales program. The Army later proposed that teams be dispatched to Latin American and African countries during the first quarter of fiscal year 1973. The Office of the Secretary of Defense indicated that the existing practice of sending custom tailored teams composed of Defense Security Assistance Agency, military department, and industry representatives to foreign countries for specific missions was the preferred approach.

The downturn of the war in Vietnam generated renewed interest in excess defense materiel, including weapons and equipment of all kinds. Excess stocks have been used in the past to meet grant-aid military sales requirements at reduced cost to the United States. During fiscal year 1972 the General Accounting Office, the Defense Security Assistance

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Agency, and the military services all reviewed this subject, not only in Vietnam but worldwide.

In line with the Nixon Doctrine, the Defense Department continued to develop total force planning, which by definition includes the use of allied forces as well as the active and reserve forces of the United States to meet threats in various geographical regions of the world. A fundamental concept-to rely on allied manpower in the affected region with U.S. materiel and combat support-continued, in effect, the policy prevailing in Vietnam. It also continued the competition between U.S. and allied forces for American funds, materiel, and other resources. When those resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all claimants, those concerned with resource allocation and distribution require guidance concerning priorities. While such guidance with respect to allies is available in several Defense Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff documents, it has not been reflected adequately in either of the basic Army documents used for this purpose: the Department of the Army Master Priority List, and Army Regulation 11-12, Logistic Priorities. Army Staff' attention was directed to this area in the past year.

A related problem raised through the concept of total force planning is the paucity of information on the operational readiness of allies. Such information is essential if the United States is to place a reasonable degree of confidence in the validity of such planning. For a variety of military and political reasons, this information is often not available. U.S. Army elements of military assistance advisory groups in foreign countries are much too heavily burdened with other tasks to undertake to report on allied operational readiness. Their personnel strengths, already reduced over the past few years, are reduced an additional 15 percent by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971. The Army has brought this problem to the attention of higher authority and suggested that host countries be relied upon to furnish pertinent data in good faith as a contribution to common defense objectives. A decision on the proposal and possible format for host nation reporting of operational readiness were being considered as the year closed.

With respect to security assistance training, a Washington orientation was developed for presentation to certain categories of personnel prior to assignment. Tailored to fit the specific requirements of the respective countries, it includes briefings by various interested Defense Department agencies, including those of the Army and the other services. During the fiscal year some twenty-eight senior advisory group designees ranging in grade from lieutenant colonel to major general and scheduled for duty in nineteen countries were given the briefing in Washington, D.C.

In the first half of the fiscal year the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the military departments and commanders of unified

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commands, conducted a review of the foreign military training program to determine if it was being implemented within the intent of the Nixon Doctrine and related security assistance objectives, plans, and programs. Several modifications were recommended.

The combined Military Assistance Grant Aid, Military Assistance Service Funded, and Foreign Military Sales programs for furnishing Army training to foreign personnel exceeded the previous year's program in the number of training spaces utilized, the number of personnel trained, and the over-all dollar value. The following table reflects the extent of Army training, support in fiscal year 1972 under the Foreign Assistance Act.

In January 1972, at the request of the government of Indonesia, a military training team of two U.S. Army officers was furnished to assist that nation's armed forces to plan for the systematic development of a modern defense management capability at the military department and Ministry of Defense levels.

On March 10, 1972, the Chief of Staff approved a merger of the Military Assistance Officer and Foreign Area Specialty Programs into the Foreign Area Officer Management System. Consolidation of the two programs was indicated because of their basic similarities. Both are concerned with developing top-quality officers to serve worldwide in command, staff, advisory, and attaché positions requiring area expertise, linguistic proficiency, and socioeconomic and political awareness, together with a sound professional military background. As these programs have grown (433 and 563 members respectively as of June 30, 1972) they have become broader in scope and direction. As the year closed, about 900 positions were identified for the consolidated program, and a steering committee composed of appropriate staff agency representatives was working out implementation procedures.

Friendship, understanding, and peace among the peoples of the world depend to a large degree upon the ability to communicate, and the complexity of some languages in both their written and spoken forms often inhibits verbal intercourse. The ideographic form of the written oriental languages has posed a problem for the Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans, for example, as they seek to use their ancient languages in this modern period of technological competition. The Chinese language is the mother tongue of more people than any other in the world, and the written language of an even larger proportion of the world's population. Yet the oriental nations have not had a means whereby their ideographic languages might be composed for printing purposes. The People's Republic of China has been unable to adapt Chinese to a phonetic (Latin) alphabet because of their inability to use automatic typesetting equipment for ideographs. Now a twenty-year

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1 Australia, Britain, Canada.

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research and development effort by the U.S. Army holds the promise of a breakthrough in this field.

The Army has developed an ideographic composing machine that makes it possible to compose the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean languages rapidly and economically. Two pilot models, the only ones in existence; were delivered to the 7th Psychological Operations Group on Okinawa in November 1970, one to be used there, the other to be used by the group's augmentation detachment in Japan.

For the first time, it is possible to compose ideographic languages on a keyboard-operated photocomposing machine. Prior to this development, large-volume production of ideographic language text was highly restricted and was often done by a laborious calligraphy process before reproduction. With the new machine, an operator who can write Chinese, Japanese, or Korean merely strikes the keys in proper sequence (ideographic languages are written in a stroke sequence, much in the manner that English is written in a letter sequence) to form the ideograph, and a strip of exposed film containing the full text of the assembled ideographs is produced. When developed, the film can be used in any of the conventional printing processes. The machine can also punch tapes; information may be tape-coded and transmitted over regular teletype facilities to another tape at the receiving terminal. The receiving tape in turn may be fed into a second composing machine to produce text at a rate of more than 500 ideographs per minute. These techniques may be adapted to modern printing, telegraph, and computer forms for rapid communication in countries where ideographic languages are used. The machine provides speed and accuracy similar to that of automatic typesetting equipment used in western language publication.

Although the ideographic composing machine does use advanced electronic circuitry, a laser beam, holographic characters, and video systems, it is still about five years behind the state of the art where its components are concerned. Some maintenance difficulties have been experienced, but no insurmountable problems exist. It is planned to develop a second-generation machine based upon experience achieved with the pilot and using the latest advances in component development.

The ideographic composing machine's use in cultural, educational, and informational contexts is readily apparent. It was discussed with the People's Republic of China on the occasion of President Nixon's visit there in May 1972. It should prove to be an effective tool in efforts to educate and inform public opinion throughout the world and to further understanding and co-operation between the peoples of the East and West.

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Tactical Nuclear Weapons Program

In the 1972 fiscal year, tactical nuclear weapons remained a key element in U.S. and allied military force posture. The advent of approximate strategic nuclear parity with Russia narrowed the range of conflicts which can be deterred by strategic nuclear forces alone. Under these circumstances, tactical nuclear weapons acquired increased importance in contributing to the deterrence of large-scale conventional as well as tactical nuclear attack by potential enemies of the United States. In addition, our tactical nuclear capability contributes to preventing attempts at political coercion and provides the President with a range of credible options to counter aggression. These weapons are an integral element of general purpose forces and complement conventional and strategic nuclear capabilities.

The role of tactical nuclear weapons in war and their contribution under peacetime conditions was reviewed during the period of this report to clarify doctrine concerning deployment and employment of nuclear forces in support of theater operations and to expand on guidance for theater commanders, force structure planners, and tactical nuclear weapons research and development efforts. Refinements in doctrine will be helpful to the United States and its allies and will reduce the risk of miscalculation on the part of potential enemies.

A tactical nuclear weapons symposium was conducted at Headquarters, Department of the Army, in December 1971, attended by high level representatives from government, oversea and continental U.S. commands, the scientific community, independent research organizations, and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was the first in a series of efforts to apply a broad base of expertise to the problem of better defining and articulating the role of tactical nuclear weapons for deterrence and termination of armed conflict.

Following the symposium, the Army organized an Interagency Advisory Council to contribute technical expertise in connection with a study on nuclear weapons concepts, scheduled for completion in December 1972.

Civil defense is a vital part of the nation's over-all strategic posture and is essential to the protection of the people in the event of nuclear attack upon the United States. A strong civil defense organization throughout the United States not only serves as a deterrent to attack but could also serve to tip the balance for survival of the nation should an attack occur.

Civil defense provides protection in peacetime too. It is useful in

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safeguarding people from violent storms, earthquakes, civil disorders, environmental hazards, and other threats to life and well-being.

For the past eight years, responsibility for civil defense has been assigned to the Secretary of the Army and has resided in the Office of Civil Defense, Department of the Army. On May 5, 1972, a major organizational change occurred when the Secretary of Defense established the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) as an agency of the Department of Defense under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense, to carry forward the civil defense role under Defense Department policies, directives, and instructions. At the same time, the Office of Civil Defense, Department of the Army, was disestablished and its funds, personnel, manpower spaces, and other resources transferred to the DCPA.

During fiscal year 1972, major emphasis was placed on development or updating of emergency plans, establishing emergency operating centers, improving warning and emergency communications capabilities, and providing emergency power sources. The need for increased professionalism was stressed, as was the value of training, including participation in emergency operations simulations.

The on-site assistance program received top priority in the realigned civil defense program during fiscal year 1972. The objective is to give concrete and immediate assistance, in addition to comprehensive long-range readiness help, while making use of existing federal, state, and local resources; i.e., a surplus and excess property program, planning, training, and technical assistance. By the close of fiscal year 1972, on-site visits by joint civil preparedness teams had been made or were scheduled for 213 localities in 41 states and Puerto Rico.

The responsibility and manner of passing alert messages to federal agencies was under review during the year. The federal portion of the civil defense system is the National Warning System. Almost instantaneous attack warning information can be disseminated to state and local warning points from three national warning centers continuously manned and operated for the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency by U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command warning officers. The system includes 297 warning points at federal installations throughout the United States and 870 state and local warning points, a total of 1,167 as of the end of the fiscal year. The National Warning System was credited with saving many lives in disasters that occurred throughout the nation during the fiscal year. It was used to disseminate timely tornado warnings in six states and to co-ordinate activities during a three-day blizzard in Nebraska. During Hurricane Agnes, it was used extensively by the states to pass flood warnings and relay requests for emergency equipment during severe flooding.

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The Decision Information Distribution System, a low-frequency radio network, has been designed to improve and expand nationwide warning. A contract was let and construction was in progress at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, on the first of ten transmission facilities. This facility will serve a ten-state area from Virginia to Massachusetts and will be operational early in 1973. It could form the basis for automatic indoor home warning. Special low-frequency home warning receivers are under development, along with devices which could be incorporated in regular television or entertainment radios.

The Emergency Broadcast System is designed for use by the President and national, state, and local officials to reach the public promptly with emergency information preceding, during, and following an enemy attack. Its plan is designed to fulfill requirements of the White House, the Office of Emergency Preparedness, and the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. The Emergency Broadcast System is managed by the Federal Communications Commission in co-operation with the broadcasting industry. By the end of the fiscal year, more than 3,000 broadcast stations had been authorized to participate in the system, and DCPA is providing fallout shelters, emergency generators, and ancillary equipment for 569 of these stations through the contract supervision of the Corps of Engineers and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command. This protection program permits the stations to remain on the air during national or local emergencies to broadcast essential information, including that originating from the emergency operating center during day-to-day disasters and under attack conditions.

An objective of DCPA is to provide the entire population of the United States with protection from radioactive fallout that could result from nuclear attack. In the past ten years, much progress has been made toward this objective.

The National Fallout Shelter Survey, conducted for DCPA by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, continued during fiscal year 1972 to locate potential fallout shelter space. As in the past few years, survey operations continued to be principally of an updating nature.

Military support for civil authority received increased emphasis from the armed services during the fiscal year. All services have recognized the need for a strong civil preparedness program and have developed comprehensive survival and recovery plans to assist civil authority in the event of natural disaster or enemy attack.

The Army has primary responsibility for providing military support. The Commanding General, U.S. Continental Army Command, and continental U.S. Army commanders provide planning guidance to state adjutants general in the preparation of military support for civil defense

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plans in each of the forty-eight contiguous states. In Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, similar plans are developed by the appropriate unified command and the state adjutant general. Current plans call for each adjutant general, when called to federal service as a state area commander, to exercise operational control over military units made available for transattack and postattack military support missions for civil defense.

The Army established eight civil defense support detachments to augment communications and security personnel at DCPA Federal Regional Centers throughout the country in the event of enemy attack or natural disaster. In addition, mobilization designee positions for Army, Navy, and Air Force reservists in direct support of civil defense activities were authorized by a Department of Defense directive. The objective of this new program is to strengthen the emergency capabilities of civil authority at federal, state, and local level by augmenting civil preparedness staffs with properly qualified military reservists.

The transfer of the civil defense agency from the Office of the Secretary of the Army to the Office of the Secretary of Defense has not changed the mission of the Army either in its military support to civil defense role or in the concept of military support to disaster stricken areas. The Army will continue to provide communications support to the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency; the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command will be responsible for the operation and maintenance of civil defense communications, and the Department of the Army will provide wholesale logistics support for civil defense communications.

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