Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1976

II.

Operational Forces

A principal and long-standing objective of the Army is to maintain a ready force capable of swift and successful responses to crises without resort to nuclear weapons. To attain this objective, a balancing of costs and manpower resources against national strategy and commitments led the Army in fiscal year 1975 to begin increasing its force structure by three divisions. This increase would provide a structure of 24 divisions, 16 in the active Army and 8 in the National Guard. While continuing to develop its force structure this year, the Army concentrated on improving the readiness of units to perform their missions. It also stressed readiness in terms of the deployment of its forces and assistance to the forces of allied nations.

In raising three more divisions, the Army stayed within its authorized strength of 790,000. As an interesting comparison, the Army last supported sixteen active Army divisions in 1965 when its strength was greater by 180,000. Additional combat spaces needed, some 50,000, came in large part from reductions in the number of spaces occupied by headquarters and support troops. This tailoring resulted in an improved Army-wide combat-to-support ratio, an increase from 50 to 50 in the previous fiscal year to 53 to 47. The Army also affiliated National Guard brigades with the new divisions as a means of rounding out their organization.

The three divisions selected for activation were the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 7th and 24th Infantry Divisions. During the previous year, the Army activated the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California, but organized only one of its brigades. The Army activated the second brigade this year and named the 41st Infantry Brigade of the Oregon National Guard as the division’s roundout unit. The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and the 1st Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, activated in the previous period at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and Fort Stevens, Georgia, respectively, functioned as separate brigades until September 1975 when the Army organized their parent divisions. Designated at that time as the divisions’ respective roundout brigades were the 256th Infantry Brigade of the Louisiana National Guard and the 48th Infantry Brigade of the Georgia National Guard. The Army has scheduled the activation of each division’s remaining brigade for next year.

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As in the case of the three newly organized divisions, all other active Army divisions deployed in the United States, including Hawaii, have reserve component units affiliated for training and mobilization. The Army has given these reserve units priority in the issue of equipment to make them compatible with their parent divisions, to improve their readiness, and thus to insure their capability of early deployment with parent divisions in any mobilization.

In other structural changes, the Army activated another Lance unit, the 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery, at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. This activation raised the number of active Lance nuclear artillery battalions to 8, 2 of which were at Fort Sill and 6 in Germany. Elsewhere, the inactivation of the 1st Battalion, 73d Armor, and the activation of the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, within the 2d Infantry Division in Korea, occurred in the course of the Army’s redistribution of assets to attain the force level of sixteen active Army divisions.

Another adjustment of the force structure involved the reorganization of all sixteen active Army Engineer construction battalions as heavy combat battalions. The change, by giving each battalion more crew-served weapons and demolition sets and adding to its armament the Dragon antitank weapons system, increased its ability to conduct combat and combat support operations, but did not reduce its capacity for performing heavy construction work.

An institutional change affecting the Corps of Engineers during the year reflected the direct role in combat operations that Engineer units have long performed. Heretofore, the Army had classed the Corps of Engineers branch as a combat support arm and a service—definitions that do not include direct participation in battle. Yet, in its classification of units, the Army had placed 80 percent of all Engineer units in Category I, which includes units whose missions involve “destruction of the enemy in support of, or assistance to, the ground gaining troops by fire or other tactical support.” In recognition of the mission and past combat action of most Engineer units, the Army, on 12 September 1975, classified the Corps of Engineers as a combat arm as well as a combat support arm and a service. The combat arms, by definition, are “those branches whose officers are directly involved in the conduct of the actual fighting.”

Another branch action during the year concerned the Chemical Corps. In May 1973, the Army had asked the Congress for legislative authority to discontinue the Chemical Corps. The Army planned to transfer corps functions to other branches, principally to the Ordnance Corps. No further steps could be taken over the next three years, however, because the Congress failed to act on the Army request.

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Knowledge of the plan to abolish the Chemical Corps discouraged prospective officers from electing the chemical specialty. None took a commission in the corps after 1974. For the same reason, officers in the corps transferred to other branches and enlisted men avoided chemical assignments. As this loss of expertise occurred, the United States obtained evidence that the Soviet Union had achieved a superior ability to conduct chemical warfare, both offensively and defensively. Recognizing that the proposal to abolish the Chemical Corps had contributed to the Army’s lesser position, the Secretary of the Army on 12 July 1976 authorized the continuance of the corps as a branch; it was, however, categorized as a combat support arm, not a service as before.

Manpower is one of the factors considered in assessing the readiness of Army units. This year the Army succeeded in bringing the personnel strengths of all major active Army units up to the percentages of their total authorized strengths set as goals for the period. The condition of unit logistics, that is, a comparison between the amount and serviceability of equipment on hand and the quantities authorized, is another measurable factor in determining unit readiness. This year logistic readiness improved steadily; nevertheless, at year’s end, some newly activated divisions lacked initial issues of several items of equipment. In April, the Army took a new approach toward advancing logistic readiness through adoption of a Command Logistic Review Team Expanded Program. This program, managed at the department level in the Directorate for Materiel Readiness, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, produces an improved, vertical, bottom-to-top analysis of logistic matters from Army unit to national inventory control point levels. Through this analysis it is possible to determine trends affecting logistic readiness and the best course of future action.

Other circumstances measured or judged in determining unit readiness include training, leadership, and morale. Weighing all pertinent factors, the Army concluded that 60 percent of active Army units achieved assigned readiness objectives this year. A year ago the figure was 57 percent. All divisions except those recently activated and not yet fully organized were judged able to perform their assigned combat missions. Of these, the divisions in the United States were rated either fully or substantially ready; all divisions in Europe were rated substantially ready; and in the Pacific, the division in Hawaii and the division in Korea, with its Republic of Korea Army augmentation, were considered ready to perform their missions. (See deployment table below.)

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DEPLOYMENT OF DIVISIONS, SEPARATE BRIGADES, AND SEPARATE REGIMENTS
30 September 1976

Unit	Location
1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) (—)	Fort Riley, Kansas
2d Infantry Division	Korea
3d Infantry Division (Mechanized)	Germany
4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)	Fort Carson, Colorado
5th Infantry Division (Mechanized (—)	Fort Polk, Louisiana
7th Infantry Division	Fort Ord, California
8th Infantry Division (Mechanized)	Germany
9th Infantry Division	Fort Lewis, Washington
24th Infantry Division (—)	Fort Stewart, Georgia
25th Infantry Division	Hawaii
82d Airborne Division	Fort Bragg, North Carolina
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
1st Armored Division	Germany
2d Armored Division	Fort Hood, Texas
3d Armored Division	Germany
1st Cavalry Division	Fort Hood, Texas
Berlin Brigade	Germany
3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized)1	Germany
3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division (Brigade 75)	Germany
4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (Brigade 76)	Germany
6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)	Fort Hood, Texas
172d Infantry Brigade (Light)	Alaska
193d Infantry Brigade	Canal Zone
194th Armored Brigade	Fort Knox, Kentucky
197th Infantry Brigade	Fort Benning, Georgia
2d Armored Cavalry Regiment	Germany
3d Armored Cavalry Regiment	Fort Bliss, Texas
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Germany

¹Officially referred to as 1st Infantry Division Forward.

As an overall assessment, the Army’s operational forces at year’s end were able to carry out their mission, but with limitations. The larger tasks confronting the Army were to complete its sixteen-division force, fill all equipment needs, and then hone the force to greater readiness.

In Europe, the Army directed its principal efforts toward improving the readiness of U.S. forces in conjunction with the preparations of NATO allies against the growing offensive power of the Warsaw Pact and, in particular, against its increasing ability to attack with little or no warning. These efforts included raising the number of American combat troops stationed in Europe, increasing their firepower, improving the Army’s ability to reinforce them and support them logistically, and refining the ability of the diverse NATO forces to perform as a smoothly functioning team. One objective was to develop an initial conventional defense that was strong enough to force the Warsaw Pact to mobilize before attacking, which would give NATO forces some warning. Further, NATO’s display of a credible reinforcement and sustaining capacity along with its inherent advantages of a superior industrial base would perhaps deter the Pact powers from attacking even though they had mobilized.

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Army strength in Europe remained about 199,000. Alteration of this figure to include more combat spaces had started during the previous year under the provisions of the Nunn Amendment to the 1975 Military Appropriation Act (Public Law 93-365). The amendment obliged the Army to cut 12,414 noncombat spaces from its European strength, 6,000 of these by the end of the previous fiscal year and the remainder by 30 June 1976, and authorized an increase in combat strength by a like amount. This year the Army made the additional cuts and continued to raise its combat strength.

The Army’s major move this year in increasing its combat strength in Europe involved the deployment of a reinforced brigade (Brigade 76) to Germany between March and June 1976. The headquarters and all units of the force, except for one mechanized infantry battalion from the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas, and two nondivisional field artillery battalions from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, were from the 4th Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), stationed at Fort Carson, Colorado. The brigade headquarters and support battalion moved to Germany in a permanent change of station (PCS) status and the remainder of the force on a temporary duty (TDY) basis. It was the intent of the Army to return the TDY units to the United States after six months, replace them with other TDY units for the next six months, and continue the rotation indefinitely. But, in May 1976, Army Chief of Staff General Fred C. Weyand decided to convert most of the force to PCS status at the time of the next rotation in October 1976. General Weyand made this decision because of an adverse effect on parent units in the United States in sustaining the rotation and because family separations caused by TDY for extended periods were damaging morale. As a result, the next replacement units were to deploy with 84 percent of their members in a PCS status; persons deploying on temporary duty were to be replaced at the end of their tours through the normal individual replacement system.

Other measures to increase Army combat strength in Europe included the deployment of the 235th Aviation Company (Attack Helicopter) from Fort Knox, Kentucky, to Germany in June 1976. Additionally, the combat strength improved as a result of the reorganization, mentioned above, of Engineer construction battalions as heavy combat units. Three of these battalions were located in Europe. A final step involved raising the manning levels of other combat units stationed in Germany.

Increasing the firepower of combat units meant, in part, improving ammunition supplies. Accordingly, the Army during the year raised ammunition stockage levels and adjusted storage locations in Europe. Studies on the subject also pointed to the need for more artillery, es-

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pecially conventional artillery. In relation to this need, the Army has had under development for some time a nonnuclear warhead for the Lance missile, and the Congress has authorized its procurement for next year. Once equipped with the new warhead, the six Lance battalions in Europe will possess a valuable flexibility in their nuclear capability and their ability to contribute to a conventional war by supplementing the fire support available from cannon artillery and tactical aircraft. The Lance weapon has added advantages in that it can be used under all weather conditions and is less vulnerable to countermeasures than are other fire support weapons. The Army also decided during the year to increase the density of antitank guided missile systems in Europe.

Improving the Army’s ability to reinforce and sustain the forces in Europe involved a variety of activities. One effort made, though not completed, was to fill prepositioned materiel configured to unit sets (POMCUS). This prepositioning of materiel is the concept of storing most of a unit’s TOE equipment in unit sets in a potential combat theater so that only the unit’s personnel and some minor equipment need be airlifted into the theater to provide rapid reinforcement.

REFORGER 76, the eighth annual strategic mobility exercise to test U.S. and NATO plans and procedures, was significantly different from previous exercises. In earlier instances, the troops of the 1st Infantry Division and support units moved to Europe by air and participated in field training exercises using prepositioned equipment. This year, in the largest and most complex exercise to date, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) deployed to Europe, transporting its personnel by air and its equipment by sea. Not only did this deployment introduce the airmobile concept to the REFORGER training series but also demonstrated the ability of the United States to reinforce NATO by sea. For related reasons, the Army during the year supported Air Force and Navy efforts to increase their respective airlift and sealift capacities.

Under the plan put into force during the previous year, called Minimum Required Logistical Augmentation, Europe, the Army made further progress in developing a wartime line of communications through the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) for U.S. forces stationed in central Europe. The original line through France had had to be given up when the French limited their participation in NATO. Also aimed at improving materiel readiness in Europe was a Modernization of Logistics (MODLOG) project begun by U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), in September 1975. One goal of the project is the establishment of an air line of communications next year for shipping selected repair parts (Class IX) from the New Cumberland Army Depot, Pennsylvania, the distribution depot responsible

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for supporting the eastern United States and Europe. A second objective is to develop a limited general support supply base for USAREUR major subordinate commands, including the installation of the Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply Subsystem. When this objective is fully accomplished, the subordinate commands will be able to go directly to the supply base in the United States for support; and USAREUR’s existing intermediate logistic structure will be dismantled.

A further purpose of the MODLOG project was to transfer certain logistic functions from USAREUR to agencies in the United States. In one such move, USAREUR transferred the operation of its ports to the Military Traffic Management Command. USAREUR also will place remote areas, which are outside the major subordinate commands, on direct support from the United States.

MODLOG has the additional goal of increasing host nation support. The United States has long relied on its European allies for logistic support, primarily for rear area requirements. This year’s REFORGER exercise, for example, depended heavily on host nation support along the lines of communications. The support provided included stevedoring, medical service, equipment recovery, billeting, rations, and petroleum, oil, and lubricants. The exercise disclosed the need to expand this source of support, and during the year USAREUR opened negotiations with host nations to obtain their acceptance of additional logistic functions.

To improve the effectiveness of NATO forces working as a team, the Army progressed in interrelated areas collectively called NATO Rationalization/Standardization/Interoperability. Rationalization means the development of concepts for achieving the most efficient use of defense resources. The focal point of this effort was a Department of Defense steering group whose Army member came from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The steering group worked toward achieving common ground in doctrine, systems, and readiness among NATO forces and a NATO defense based on collective security, not uncoordinated, single-nation efforts. In a related activity, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics participated with a newly formed Logistics Rationalization Group in improving mutual logistic support. Negotiations of the group with representatives of other NATO members led to improvements in resupply, joint use of storage sites, maintenance of equipment, transportation support, and logistic support from the civil sector.

Standardization means uniformity, and interoperability means compatibility in doctrine, equipment, systems, and procedures. The DOD steering group regarded standardization as a long-term goal and interoperability as a short-term goal. The Army, nevertheless, moved forward in both areas during the year. Petroleum products used by land forces

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were standardized. There was some standardization of equipment, and studies were undertaken to improve the interoperability of other equipment through use of adapters, common components, and interchangeable spare parts. Representatives of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the German Bundeswehr eliminated major doctrinal differences; the Army’s Field Manual 100-5 on operations and the German Army’s equivalent now correspond. In four field training exercises conducted during the course of REFORGER 76, the participation of allied forces was greater than during similar exercises in the past. As a result, the exercises provided valuable lessons in both standardization and interoperability.

Facilities needed to support NATO military forces as a whole are funded through the NATO Infrastructure Program. The U.S. share of program funds is provided through Military Construction, Army, authorization and appropriation acts. The U.S. share this year, which was about 20 percent of the total funding, amounted to $107.1 million and consisted of $71 million in appropriations, $4 million in recoupments, and $32.1 million in unobligated money from earlier appropriations.

In the spring of 1975, following the fall of the Republic of Vietnam and Cambodia, the Army began to participate in a program for handling Indochinese refugees. It operated a center on Guam for processing refugees for further movement to the United States and other countries (Operation New Life) and two reception centers at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, for handling refugees entering this country (Operation New Arrivals).

The Army closed the Guam center near the end of the previous year after processing about 112,000 refugees. It continued to operate the reception centers until December of this year. The Army handled over half of the 130,000 refugees entering the United States; the Air Force and Marine Corps processed the remainder. The refugee program involved more than 8,000 Army members and cost almost $62 million.

In a related activity, the Army helped to constitute and operate a joint Refugee Information Clearing Office (JRICO). Initially, the purpose of this office was to assist service members who wished to sponsor or provide other resettlement aid to former armed forces members of the Republic of Vietnam and the Khmer Republic. Once in operation, the office handled a wider range of matters raised by military and associated individuals and groups seeking to help a broad cross section of the refugee population.

The joint office staff was composed of members of the respective reserve components of the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force (the Navy

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maintained a similar but separate office). The Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel acted as host for JRICO operations, providing facilities and administrative support. Established on 4 June 1975, the office functioned until the end of January 1976, by which time it had handled thousands of sponsorship cases and other requests for information and assistance.

In accordance with the earlier request of the government of Thailand, the Army completed the withdrawal of troops, equipment, and supplies from Thailand during the early part of 1976. Remaining in the country were the joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand, and the Defense Attache Office. The U.S. troop strength there at the end of this year was 218, of which 111 were Army personnel.

In carrying forward the project of reducing U.S. presence on Okinawa, the Army in November 1975 transferred responsibility for handling excess stocks on the island from U.S. Army, Japan, to U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command. The latter command determined which items were in demand and began returning them to depots in the United States. By year’s end, over $24 million worth of materiel was sent back to this country.

Army strength in Korea remained steady at approximately 33,000. In the 2d Infantry Division, however, there was sufficient transfer of support spaces to combat spaces to increase the division’s combat strength significantly. In the area of logistic support for the defense of Korea, President Gerald R. Ford on 30 June 1976 signed into law an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 so that Defense funds could be used for the materiel support of allies. The amendment set ceilings of $93.75 million for fiscal year 1976 and the transition quarter, all of which was allocated to the Army to allow it to add ammunition to the Republic of Korea Army War Reserve for allied use in the event of hostilities.

Taking a theater-wide view, the U.S. Army in the Pacific Review Group, an ad hoc body formed in November 1975 and cochaired by operations and logistic representatives of the Army staff, assessed present and future U.S. interests in the Pacific and the Army forces and facilities required to support them. Westpac III, the designation given to the review group’s enumeration of forces, bases, and war reserve materials needed during fiscal years 1978-82 to meet Army requirements in the Pacific, was approved by the Chief of Staff in May 1976.

The Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) is an integration of systems allowing communication among the National Command Authorities (the president and Secre-

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tary of Defense), Joint Chiefs of Staff, commanders of unified and specified commands, and forces in the field. The C³ (command, control, and communications) resources currently employed in the system have been introduced sporadically either as a quick response to a new requirement or to take advantage of newly available technology. A need therefore existed to integrate the WWMCCS more fully.

This year, to meet this need, the Department of Defense awarded a contract for a study to develop a master plan for the WWMCCS. Approved in June 1976, the plan called for certain of its provisions to be carried out by 1985, some of them by the Army. These included the development of Jam Resistant Secure Communications, an Alternate National Military Command Center, a European Command Combat Operations Center, and what was called Rapid Reaction Deployable C³. By September 1976, the Army completed its plan for carrying out these provisions and as the year ended was working out the necessary funding, manpower, and scheduling.

Additionally, the Army in May 1976 took the first steps to create an Army Command and Control Master Plan covering both strategic and tactical requirements. This plan will eventually guide the development of a composite Army command and control system. It is expected that preparing the plan will involve both industry and the Army for about two and a half years. The Army intends the system to be operational by 1985.

The Army also continued to participate in the joint Ground and Amphibious Military Operations program, for which the Chief of Staff is the executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this effort to achieve compatibility among tactical command and control systems used in ground and amphibious operations, the work on technical design and plans for testing went forward separately in four functional areas: intelligence, amphibious operations and fire support, air operations, and operations control.

Since chemical agent munitions gradually deteriorate or become obsolete for other reasons, they must eventually be discarded. Before 1969 the Army handled disposal by open pit burning, land burial, and ocean dumping. An extensive ocean dumping operation in 1969 had to be suspended, however, because of adverse public reaction. The Army then turned to the National Academy of Sciences for recommendations on disposal. Reasoning that there would continue to be strong public opposition to any movement of the hazardous materials, the Academy advised that disposal should take place where the chemical items were located and urged that, in disposing of them, the Army insure the protection of the environment.

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Proceeding on that basis, the Army has begun to develop a Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System at Tooele Army Depot, Utah, which will test the suitability of new automated equipment and processes for on-site disposal. This year the Army also began to survey a number of installations for contamination and any migration of the contaminants and to curb the problems discovered. In associated moves, the Army took steps to improve the physical security of chemical storage sites and, in the interest of conserving resources, to reduce the number of sites by consolidating stocks.

On the international scene, the United States this year, as in the past, pressed for an agreement on chemical warfare limitations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. To date, however, the conference has failed to reach even preliminary agreement on the essential ingredients of a chemical warfare treaty. On the same subject, the United States also conducted bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union this year, but made no progress.

Meanwhile, given the evidence of the Soviet Union’s superior ability to conduct chemical warfare, the Army took a number of measures to improve its defensive chemical warfare, particularly in Europe. These included the issue of individual and unit protective items of equipment to USAREUR forces and emphasis on obtaining improved chemical agent detectors, alarms, and training devices. Approved organizational changes called for the eventual establishment of a chemical defense company in each division. In addition, chemical warfare training received command emphasis throughout the Army.

In nuclear matters, the Army this year gave attention to achieving more centralized management of nuclear activities, adjusting its tactical nuclear weapons stockpile, and refining nuclear weapons doctrine. In the management area, the Chief of Staff established as a focal point for nuclear as well as chemical matters an office in the Army staff’s Directorate of Strategy Plans and Policy. Additionally, there was a decision to establish, as a field operating agency under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, a new Army Nuclear Agency at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The new agency will represent a consolidation of the existing Army Nuclear Agency, Fort Bliss, Texas, with the Army Nuclear and Chemical Surety Group at Fort Belvoir.

The stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons was the subject of a seven-month study, the Battlefield Theater Nuclear Force Mix Analysis. This analysis provided a basis for requirements and force levels involving new 8-inch and 155-mm. nuclear projectiles and an improved nuclear warhead for the Lance missile. Doctrinal studies undertaken during the year, all aimed at improving the war-fighting and deterrent effect of the tactical nuclear weapons stockpile, dealt with the issues of sur-

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vivability; command, control, and communications; security; and employment planning.

Since World War II, the United States has helped friendly nations improve their ability to defend themselves by providing them with defense articles, services, and training. Originally, this security assistance was mostly grant aid for which the United States received no reimbursement. The predominant type of security assistance has since become foreign military sales whereby foreign governments purchase their defense needs at the rate of about $10 billion annually. Not only the composition but also the size of security assistance has changed significantly over the years.

As the U.S. presence continued to dwindle in the Pacific area this year, the major security assistance development affecting that region was the amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act allowing the use of Defense funds to stockpile materiel for allies. As mentioned above, this year’s expenditure was allocated to adding ammunition to the allied war reserve stocks in Korea.

In Europe, security assistance was a blend of grant aid and foreign military sales, with requests involving the latter, in some instances exceeding the ability of the United States to respond. In the Middle East there was rapid growth in assistance activity as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Jordan, and Israel continued military modernization programs and accelerated the acquisition of sophisticated weapons systems. Security assistance for African countries continued to be hampered by the ceiling on foreign military sales established by Congress; therefore, no significant sales activity occurred this year except with those countries with previously established programs.

Much of the materiel furnished to other nations under the security assistance program has come from Army stocks. This year, however, there was a marked reduction of such withdrawals and diversions of Army goods since there were no major international crises requiring them. Nevertheless, the Army, with a view toward maintaining and improving its own readiness, took measures to conserve its materiel inventory and production. One step, taken early in 1976, was to stop all withdrawals and diversions for the following eighteen months. Because of critical shortages and a need to protect advanced technology, the Army also recommended to the Department of Defense that certain equipment and munitions not be sold to foreign governments.

These steps to protect its materiel readiness aside, the Army fully supported security assistance in the realization that strengthening allies, in effect, amounted to economies in U.S. military forces and savings to

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American taxpayers. Further, assisting other nations to become militarily strong enough to maintain stable regional balances of power was of direct benefit to the United States.

The Army in performing its statutory protective functions responded to 2,166 requests for assistance from the Secret Service, a figure substantially higher than the 791 similar requests received last year. The increase reflected the more numerous protective responsibilities of the Secret Service during a presidential election year.

The Army support requested included vehicles and drivers, helicopters and crews, and medical service. The larger number of requests were for communications and for people experienced in explosive ordnance disposal. The latter expended almost 605,000 man-hours during the year on missions to protect presidential candidates, leading governmental officials, and visiting foreign dignitaries.

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