Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1979

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Force Development, Doctrine, and Training

The U.S. Army fulfills its primary mission—deterrence—by continually seeking to attain maximum force readiness, that is, preparedness to go to war. Striving to achieve this goal in fiscal year 1979, the Army underwent significant changes in force structure, revised and adapted concepts and doctrine to conform to those changes, and vigorously pursued a broad and varied program of training and schooling at virtually every level of the active, reserve, and civilian components.

Alterations occurred in the force structure of the Army in 1979 because of shifts in national strategy, the accelerated efforts to modernize weapons and equipment, the eroding effects of inflation on defense budgets, and the perennial need to balance available forces to meet or deter potential aggressors as well as contingencies that threaten peace or American interests abroad. There was no significant change, however, in the overall configuration of the Army’s structure, which consisted of twenty-four divisions: sixteen in the active Army and eight in the National Guard.

Continuing in the pattern of recent years, the Army employed a variety of sophisticated information and management systems to assist its planning staffs in determining the program requirements for the 24-division force structure. In producing the basic programming document for force structure this year, the Total Army Analysis (TAA) for 1986 instituted some important changes in its methodology. These changes included fully integrating the Army staff, major commands, and interested Army agencies into the data base and allocation review processes; improving model simulation of enemy reinforcement capability and tactics; and improving those techniques designed to provide a more accurate assessment of casualties and the effects of battlefield obscuration and electronic warfare. For the first time, the TAA for 1986 included, in addition to the total force structure requirement, a program force within an established force structure allowance for each year covered. With the objective of institutionalizing, the TAA, the Force Management Directorate and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS)

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prepared an Army Regulation, which defined the terms of the broader participation in the process by the Army staff, major commands, and other agencies. Publication of the AR is scheduled for the second quarter of fiscal year 1980.

With the TAA basic programming document as a guide, the Army used the Force Packaging Methodology management approach to establish force readiness priorities for equipping, training, modernizing, manning, and sustaining combat, combat support, and combat service support forces. Based on their assigned missions, requirements for Army forces, active and reserve, are broken into four groups or force packages. The first, or top priority package, includes the forces and supplies already in Europe which will reinforce NATO within thirty days after mobilization. It also covers those units assigned to support non-NATO contingency operations. The second and third packages are comprised of the forces required to reinforce NATO sixty and ninety days, respectively, after mobilization. The last force package provides for any remaining Army requirements.

The trend has continued for increased reliance on the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. In the event of full mobilization, the reserve components are scheduled to provide more than 52 percent of the armor and infantry battalions, more than 58 percent of the field artillery units, 45 percent of the aviation units, and 65 percent of the combat support and combat service support units in the total Army. In reinforcing NATO in a European war, four National Guard brigades would supplement and deploy with four understructured active Army divisions. In addition, a number of reserve force combat service support units would supplement corps support and theater commands.

Consistent with the priorities established under the Force Packaging Methodology, the Army made changes in fiscal year 1979 designed to improve the combat capability of those forces that would be called upon initially to fight in the event of a war in Europe. Specific force structure changes for Europe include activation of four chemical defense, two signal, and four division missile maintenance companies; phased reorganization of additional aviation units; activation of two Stand-off Target Acquisition System (SOTAS) detachments; transfer of two field artillery battalion equivalents (155-mm. howitzers); and increased tank crewmen. The Army also continued the 5 percent over-manning of those divisions selected to deploy first from the continental United States (CONUS) following the outbreak of a European war. To improve the European forces, the Army plans in fiscal year 1980 for activation of two Combat Electronic War-

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fare and Intelligence (CEWI) battalions, two chemical defense companies, and three decontamination detachments. They also plan to increase manpower in the divisions and brigades, the Corps Support Commands (COSCOMS), the 21st Support Command, and Brigade 75. In addition, the Army provided for Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) reserve planning and an increase in the Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) for active logistical combat service support units.

Improvements in the CONUS force structure in fiscal year 1979 include mechanization of the 24th Infantry Division, and activation of one chemical defense and three Army security companies, one tank battalion, and one air defense battalion (Hawk). For 1980, the Army plans to request activation of three tank battalions and one mechanized battalion, four CEWI battalions, one forward support battalion, two combat service companies, and ten combat service support companies. In addition, the Army projects conversion of two infantry battalions into mechanized battalions and reorganization of selected aviation maintenance units.

The U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) continued to execute a major portion of the force development activities in the active Army in fiscal year 1979. During the year, FORSCOM activated 55 units, inactivated 31, deployed 4 to Germany, reorganized about 400 units, and redesignated the 24th Infantry Division as a mechanized unit. The command executed Phase III of the Aviation Requirements for the Combat Structure of the Army Study (ARCSA III), which involved inactivation of twelve aviation units, including the three heavy lift companies employing the CH-54 Flying Crane rendered obsolete by the improved CH-47D helicopter. In implementing the plan for realignment of air defense capabilities in the continental United States, FORSCOM inactivated the 31st Air Defense Artillery Brigade in Florida, and transferred its three missile battalions (two to Fort Bliss, Texas, and one to Fort Bragg, North Carolina). It also inactivated a missile battalion and its support elements in Alaska. In an effort to make more efficient use of its Transportation Corps troops, FORSCOM inactivated a terminal battalion and a boat company at Fort Eustis, Virginia, and used those troops to activate thirteen movement control detachments, fourteen cargo documentation detachments, and four contract supervision detachments at various locations throughout the command. In accordance with a plan approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the U.S. Army Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), Support Group and FORSCOM’s U.S. Army Sup-

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port Group were consolidated in March 1979 to form a new major Army command, the U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM). Subsequently, in September all active component units in Hawaii and vicinity hitherto assigned to FORSCOM transferred to headquarters, WESTCOM. On 1 October 1979, all Army Reserve units in Hawaii and vicinity previously attached to FORSCOM transferred to WESTCOM for command, management, and supervision. At the end of the fiscal year, FORSCOM inactivated the 4th Brigade of the 2d Armored Division in compliance with the provisions of the Army Realignment Plan set forth in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for fiscal years 1981-85.

Force development in the reserve components in fiscal year 1979 emphasized changes designed to increase their capability to support and augment units of the active Army in a European war or in other contingency operations. The Army continued, for example, the Reserve Component/Active Army Affiliation Program, with the goal of improving reserve unit readiness. By the end of the fiscal year, ninety-three reserve component battalions and sixty-nine company and detachment size units were in the program.

Similarly, changes in the FORSCOM Reserve Component Troop Action program supplemented force development activities in the active Army units. FORSCOM had planned for fiscal year 1979 activation of twenty-four Army Reserve units, inactivation of thirty-two, and reorganization or conversion of seventeen. However, some activations were deferred because of equipment and support shortages. Some inactivations of field depots and corps support groups were also deferred until the Army determined future requirements. Consequently, FORSCOM completed only a portion of the program during the fiscal year, activating ten Army Reserve units, inactivating sixteen, and reorganizing or converting twelve.

Consistent with the Army’s program for force modernization, development of new or technically improved weapons systems and equipment progressed in fiscal year 1979. But, most major items under development did not reach the designated units. This was the case, for example, with the XM1 tank, the improved TOW (tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided) missile system, the XM2 infantry and XM3 cavalry fighting vehicles, the General Support Rocket System (GSRS), the AN/TPQ-36 mortar locating radar, and the U.S. Roland-SAM short-range missile. However, some new weapons systems did reach the units. Following acceptance by the Army at the end of October 1978,

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nineteen UH-60A Black Hawk helicopters were delivered to Army aviation units. In the summer of 1979, two battalions were armed with M60A3 tanks before problems in the production of fire control components temporarily delayed further deliveries. In July 1979, ninety-one fire control operator/maintainers and launcher crewmen graduated from the contractor conducted training program for operation of the Patriot/Improved Hawk missile, soon to go into production. They will form the cadre of the 4th Battalion, 62d Air Defense Artillery, which will be armed with the Patriot.

The introduction of new types of weapons and equipment established the need for fundamental changes in the future organization and composition of basic combat units of the Army. In early 1976, the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) undertook a long-range study to determine the best size, mix, and organization of a heavy division (both armored and mechanized). The purpose of the study was to develop a plan that would accommodate the demands of the many new weapons and equipment systems that would be introduced into the Army’s division by the mid-1980’s. As the study progressed, it became known as the DIVISION 86 project. Its objectives broadened to include not only new systems but also tactical and organizational concepts, a framework for force structure analysis, and a means to identify required modifications in training. A detailed description of the heavy division studied and tested since initiation of the project appears in the Department of the Army Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1978. During 1979, TRADOC conducted three workshops which discussed the progress of the DIVISION 86 project and established the need to present the results to the Army Commanders Conference in October 1979 and to the Chief of Staff in July 1980. The workshops discussed the findings and conclusions of a number of studies relating to key problems, concepts, and materiel systems of the heavy division. Specific topics included tactical maneuvers such as delay and disruption of enemy second echelon forces, the airland battle, and the standoff target acquisition system. The participants also discussed the basic aspects of structural framework: what should be the nature and composition of the corps in which the division would operate and should the brigade organization be flexible (drawing its supporting elements from a division base) or fixed (with most of the elements forming an organic part of the brigade). The proposed DIVISION 86 organization that emerged as an objective plan comprised more than 19,000 soldiers and featured four company tank and mechanized battalions, four

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tank platoons, nine-man mechanized infantry squads, antiarmor companies, eight-gun howitzer batteries, a composite eight-inch General Support Rocket System (GSRS) battalion, and an air cavalry attack brigade.

Force modernization also created the need for reorienting and restructuring general support maintenance elements in the corps. In May 1979, the Vice Chief of Staff approved a Restructured General Support (RGS) concept that envisioned establishment of six commodity-oriented support battalions: wheel vehicle, combat vehicle, communication and electronic support, aviation support, missile support, and ground support equipment. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG), appropriate major commands, and other Army activities collaborated in the development of tables of organization and equipment, revision of the applicable parts of the TAA, consideration of the problems of unit conversion, and other actions necessary to carry out the RGS concept.

The Wartime Medical Posture Study, begun in September 1978, comprehensively reviewed the status of medical support with respect to a NATO/WARSAW Pact conflict. The study, accomplished by representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services, analyzed resource requirements for each service’s medical support and assessed its capabilities. It revealed special problems requiring further study in the area of medical corps staffing of table of organization and equipment units, the number of operating rooms in those units, and patient care.

The Joint Contingency Construction Requirements Study (JCCRS) II represents the second phase of a study originally undertaken in November 1975 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in conjunction with the services. JCCRS II will develop the Civil Engineering Support Plan Generator (CESPG), which will provide the data to determine worldwide joint construction requirements and the forces needed to fulfill those requirements.

The Army’s policy of relying upon reserve component units to augment the active Army in contingency situations requiring mobilization has, in recent years, been threatened by inadequate numbers of trained soldiers in the ARNG and USAR. Since the adoption of the all-volunteer Army as the major source of manpower for the Army, membership in units of the Selected Reserve has declined until, at the end of fiscal year 1979, it stood at 130,000 below the 660,000 peacetime goal authorized by Congress. In the same period, the Individual Ready Reserve, the principal source of trained soldiers to fill vacancies in units upon mobilization and as replacements for initial battlefield casualties,

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has declined to less than 200,000. This figure was significantly below the number that would be required until newly trained draftees would become available to sustain the Army’s combat forces. The situation was further provoked because most of the shortages were in the critical areas of combat and medical skills.

Beginning in 1977, the Army took steps to solve the problem of mobilization manpower shortages. In August of that year, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs established a plan for providing effective management and utilization of the Retired Reserve in the event of mobilization. Under the plan, these reservists would be ordered to active duty when not enough qualified active reservists or inactive national guardsmen were available. Various categories of the Retired Reserve would be called to fill the CONUS post, camp, and station positions, thus freeing active personnel for overseas duty.

Before August 1977, very little information about Regular Army retirees was retained in the Army’s computerized files. Consequently, personnel officials had to procure the additional data required from other sources, such as that in the files of the U.S. Army Finance and Accounting Center and from questionnaires sent out to approximately 38,000 retired Regular Army officers and 45,000 retired Regular Army enlisted personnel. To facilitate the successful operation of the retiree mobilization plan, Army personnel officials set up a system for assembling the essential data needed concerning each retiree. Data on grade, age, physical qualifications, and other pertinent information is now available in computerized data banks. Also, files are available on those Regular Army retirees who meet the requirements for placement in Category I (those retired less than five years who satisfy age, grade, and medical criteria). The effort was concentrated on Regular Army retirees pending changes in policy and statute necessary to permit reserve retirees to be ordered to active duty.

The development of concepts and doctrine is an integral and indispensable element in the modernization of weapons systems, equipment, and the force structure of the Army. Concepts provide the philosophical framework while doctrine provides the fundamental principles that must precede, accompany, and guide the modernization process. In fiscal year 1979, Army development and activities at all levels were affected by the introduction

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of new concepts and doctrine and revisions to those previously established.

At the international level, Army representatives contributed to the formulation of doctrine concerning weapons limitation. In 1979, Army representatives participated in two conferences sponsored by the United Nations concerning weapons limitation—a preparatory conference in Geneva, 19 March-13 April, and a formal conference in the same city, 10-28 September. The conferences considered the prohibition or restriction of certain conventional weapons which may be injurious to the user. The delegates also considered limitations on small caliber, high velocity projectiles; mines and booby traps; incendiaries (including napalm); and a prohibition of munitions with fragments not detectable by X-ray.  

The Army continued to work in fiscal year 1979 on a number of broad concepts designed to bring into focus all factors essential to achievement of a level of force readiness that would assure its success in dealing with any future conflict in which it might become involved. In November 1978, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) distributed Army-wide a new document, the Battlefield Development Plan (BDP). This plan gives focus to TRADOC’s efforts in materiel development and training, force structure, and concepts and doctrine development. The BDP is keyed to a view of the battlefield in terms of two related concepts—the central battle and force generation. The central battle is a tangible representation of combat by a division operating in a corps in Europe. Force generation addresses the problem of how to concentrate the combat power of the division in the central battle. Each of these concepts is viewed in terms of five critical tasks on the battlefield. The critical tasks for the central battle are target servicing, air defense, suppression-counterfire, command-control-communications (C3) electronic warfare, and logistical support. The critical tasks for force generation are interdiction, C3 electronic warfare, force mobility, the fusion of surveillance, and reconstitution of forces damaged or destroyed. This dual analytical approach provides a systematic means and a new functional focus for assessing the division’s deficiencies and for developing, studying, and testing needed systems.

The role of automated systems in future military operations and the ever-widening proliferation of these systems in the Army has made interoperability—the ability to operate effectively together—a necessity. Consequently, both TRADOC and the U.S. Army Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) have taken measures to solve the problem. In January 1979, ODCSOPS

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organized an Army Interoperability Office to manage and coordinate these efforts. TRADOC and DARCOM have established plans that come under the purview of this office. TRADOC’s Army Battlefield Interface Concept 78 (ABIC 78), approved in December 1978, presented concepts for the interoperability requirements of all battlefield automated systems that will go into operation through the year 1985. The 1979 version of this plan (ABIC 79), sent to the Department of the Army for approval in October 1979, updated ABIC 78, incorporated systems to be placed in the field in 1986, and included interoperability requirements for echelons higher than corps, with other services, allies, and NATO. DARCOM’s Battlefield Automation Interoperability System Engineering Management Plan (BAISEMP), approved by the Department of the Army in May 1979, provides management techniques which that command will use in developing, testing, placing in the field, and managing ABIC interoperability requirements. In relation to development of interoperability plans, TRADOC, in June 1979, approved a contract for preparation of a Technical Interface Concept (TIC), which will specifically identify and locate all information on the battlefield.

During fiscal year 1979, interoperability became a joint effort between the Army and the Air Force in developing and improving coordination of air-land forces on the battlefield. Prior to issuing a joint document, both services reviewed concepts designed to provide more effective Army/Air Force coordination in tactical situations involving several corps. Through the AirLand Forces Application Agency at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, the two services published joint mission analyses (MAA) on reconnaissance-surveillance and destruction of enemy air defenses, and are preparing other analyses on air-air defense and close air support-battlefield interdiction. The joint air attack team (JAAT) training of Air Force units and Army attack helicopter units continued, including joint countering of enemy attack helicopters.

The concept of command and control—the exercise of authority and direction by designated commanders directing forces in the accomplishment of missions—like that of interoperability, has become the focal point of many systems in the Army, some in operation and others still under development. In 1976, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, to consolidate these systems, created the Army Command and Control Master Plan (AC²MP). This plan will consolidate requirements and provide solutions for problems. The objective of the plan is to pro-

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vide the Army with a means for managing all developments in the command and control area. In fiscal year 1979, the Under Secretary of the Army, Vice Chief of Staff, and the Command and Control Council approved the framework upon which the AC²MP was based and the plan was put into effect. The framework was derived from an investigation into Army forces engaged in a variety of hypothetical situations, including nuclear and conventional conflicts in Europe, Korea, and Iran; civil disorders; disaster relief; noncombat evacuation and similar crisis missions; and in reconstituting military forces and supporting civil defense following a major nuclear attack on the continental United States. The framework included consideration of command and control functions for headquarters in five categories or systems elements: intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; data collection and processing; communications; facilities; and command aids. The requirements derived from these categories were matched against projected Army capabilities in 1985 and deficiencies were identified. The AC²MP framework was then formulated so as to provide the Army with a credible, balanced capability consistent with fiscal realities, achievable in three phases (1985, 1989, and 1992). The AC²MP calls for establishment of an all-source analysis center/system (ASAC/ASAS), expansion of a tactical operations system to the corps headquarters, increased emphasis on systems interoperability, improved communications to avoid jamming, devising ways to ensure survivability of the command and control mechanism in a conventional war, development of long-range moving target indicators, increased capacity and accuracy of communications intelligence sensors, and improved communications and continuity of operations for rebuilding military forces following an enemy attack in the continental United States. AC²MP stipulates that the equipment needed to establish and operate the various command and control systems should be funded competitively under the regular planning, programming, and budgeting system.

One of the many command and control systems under development in the Army in 1979 was the Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE) for the field artillery. A divisional artillery unit at Fort Hood, Texas, became operational with the system in April 1979, and other Army units will receive TACFIRE in early 1980. The Army’s goal is to have TACFIRE operational in all designated units by 1984.

In the process of force modernization, the Army continued to apply new or improved concepts and doctrine to a variety of weapons systems. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

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(DARPA), the Air Force, and the Army continued in an “Assault Breaker” technology investigation program. The objective of this program is to demonstrate the technological feasibility of concepts pertinent to acquisition and engagement of moving armored formations at long range. As the investigation progressed, the Army ascertained that any concepts evolving from the program would have to be incorporated into plans to develop a weapon system designed to replace the current Lance missile system. Consequently, TRADOC prepared a Mission Element Need Statement (MENS) describing the need for a Corps Support Weapon System (CSWS). This CSWS envisioned a corps-level nuclear and nonnuclear interdiction weapon that would be more effective than Lance in range, efficiency, lethality, accuracy, and the type of targets that it could engage. The Army expects to begin a CSWS development program following a concept definition on an evaluation of alternative concepts.

There were a number of developments relating to antiarmor weapons systems during fiscal year 1979. Early in the year, TRADOC’s Special Study Group for Close Combat Antiarmor Weapons Systems recommended to the Vice Chief of Staff and the Under Secretary of the Army competitive development of a supersonic laser beamride antiarmor missile. Lack of funds and commitments with our European allies prevented approval of the program, but, in lieu of it, the Army sanctioned a major effort to improve the TOW antiarmor system. The Army also approved continued production of the improved TOW missile, with the goal of increasing the inventory of that weapon to established war reserve requirements. TRADOC and DARCOM undertook a study of the medium-range antiarmor system to correct any defects in its operation. This system was also discussed with our European allies. Safety problems were discovered in the Viper antiarmor rocket system, under development to replace the present Light Antitank Weapon (LAW) as the antiarmor weapon for the individual soldier. Accordingly, distribution of the weapon to field units was postponed for a year to permit redesign of certain components.

Improvement in overall safety and security was the objective of two new study programs relating to Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM’s). The first, to be carried out jointly by the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, will assess feasible alternatives pertinent to modernizing the Medium Atomic Demolition Munition (MADM). The second, also jointly sponsored, will be concerned with the cost and feasibility of modernizing the Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM).

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During fiscal year 1979, force modernization brought major changes and new developments to the concepts and doctrine relating to Army logistics. In May 1978, the Department of the Army Select Committee approved twenty-one logistics concepts pertaining to planning, policy, doctrine, and training in the Communications Zone. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), assigned TRADOC the task of carrying out the doctrinal and monitorial actions required to translate the twenty-one concepts into operational reality. The U.S. Army Logistics Center drew up a plan to implement the concepts and, following approval by TRADOC, they will be submitted to HQDA, for final review and approval.

Army planners have recognized that the increasing lethality of modern warfare, the high mobility of defense forces, and the limits on available resources dictate that in military operations the maximum number of combat vehicles possible must be returned to the battlefield if the Army is to be able to sustain the combat effectiveness of its forces. Information forthcoming from the DIVISION 86 restructuring studies and from other recent investigations of support concepts have further emphasized the significant role of vehicle recovery to successful operations on the modern battlefield. The Army, therefore, inaugurated a Battlefield and Evacuation Study to be completed in two phases: tracked vehicles by the end of fiscal year 1979 and wheeled vehicles in fiscal year 1980. Following reviews of the preliminary results of the study and a briefing of the Under Secretary of the Army, the scope of the study was expanded to include certain aspects of the DIVISION 86 study. With this expansion, completion of the first phase was extended to fiscal year 1980 and the second phase was extended to 1981. In addition, a third phase, to be completed in 1982, will ascertain the appropriate doctrine for recovery and evacuation at the corps level.

The Munitions Systems Support Structure (MS3) study, which TRADOC has been conducting for a number of years, continued in 1979. The broad purpose of MS3 is to make a critical analysis of ammunition support from the port to the brigade area. Directed in the beginning to the 1976-80 period, TRADOC has extended MS3 to cover the 1981-89 period as well. In April 1979, TRADOC submitted a final draft of the original MS3 report to the Department of the Army and briefed the Army staff on its results. Following the briefing, the staff suggested that TRADOC investigate some related issues and present its findings in March 1980. Some of the MS3’s conclusions as of the end of fiscal year 1979 were: current doctrine and organization concepts

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for ammunition support units are inadequate to meet user requirements for Class V support; the munitions support structure needs to be extended into the brigade rear in order to provide responsive support; and support units proposed by the study would be responsive and cost effective.

The quality of individual and unit training constitutes a key element in the attainment of force readiness. In fiscal year 1979, the Army, striving to achieve maximum effectiveness in all aspects of training deemed essential to force readiness, devoted much effort to improve its training program and facilities.

The training program of the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), the largest of the Army’s commands, was representative of what was done on an Army-wide basis. Consistent with the total Army concept, FORSCOM’s program provided for training both the active and the reserve components, recognizing that the capability and training requirements of each differed. FORSCOM emphasized that, for commanders in both components, providing good training was their primary task. The principal goal of this training was to produce units that could mobilize and deploy effectively on the modern battlefield at the least cost. Consequently, FORSCOM’s training programs were designed to aggressively seek long-term improvement while maintaining short-term readiness. The objectives for unit training were to increase development and employment of junior leaders, make the most of each soldier’s training day, and increase the proficiency of the individual soldier and the unit in performing the tasks set forth in the appropriate training manuals and training programs.

While actual training in FORSCOM was decentralized to the maximum extent feasible, certain fundamental principles guided training management at all levels. The standard philosophy for training management was formalized in the newly developed Battalion Training Management System (BTMS). The BTMS identified critical training management tasks performed at each leadership level in the battalion. In coordination with TRADOC’s Army Training Board, FORSCOM began installation of BTMS in February 1979. In a series of workshops designed for both the active and the reserve components, BTMS provided the training skills, knowledge, and techniques to all the leaders within a battalion at one time so they possessed the same baseline skills. The workshops presented the principles of performance-oriented training, decentralized training, and training management, with emphasis on management participation. They also

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addressed techniques for scheduling training based on the needs of units and individuals.

Placing the BTMS into operation in FORSCOM required development of long-range (one year) and short-range (three months) training plans as a prelude to preparation of weekly training schedules. Whenever possible, training objectives at the company and battalion level were expressed in terms of proficiency in individual training tasks from the soldier’s manual and unit tasks from the Army Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP), which is described in more detail later in this chapter. For units not part of the Strategic Army Force (STRAF), training was based on the unit’s mission. Therefore, mission-related unit training was achieved in conjunction with normal day-to-day operations. These units also conducted training programs designed to maintain a high level of individual proficiency and professionalism in personal knowledge subjects, military occupational specialty (MOS) skills, physical fitness, and individual weapon proficiency. Company commanders specified individual training objectives that were related to proficiency in the unit training objectives of the same period or cycle. Subordinates were permitted maximum flexibility in determining how to train and how to achieve the proficiency specified by their training objectives. Under the BTMS, individual training was integrated in all phases of unit activity. Unit commanders conducted periodic internal evaluations as a supplement to those conducted by higher headquarters to determine if they were achieving their training objectives.

Special efforts were made to assure that the BTMS-oriented training was effective with all FORSCOM units. Active component commanders established training priorities to ensure that diversionary activities such as special duty, administrative appointments, general educational classes, honor guard, fatigue details, and routine medical care posed only a slight disruption to the training program. Commanders of combat support and combat service support units sought opportunities to perform field training by supporting other troops at realistic field sites under tactical conditions. Those commanders of support units who did not have this opportunity conducted their own quarterly periods of field training to provide experience in carrying out unit missions. Finally, the commanders of FORSCOM’s active component units used every opportunity to maintain small unit integrity when conducting training and support missions. In this way they achieved maximum training effectiveness by assigning support missions to squad, platoon, or company size units on a

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rotational basis for specified periods rather than through assigning tasks on an individual basis.

The Army completed the integration of male and female recruits in initial entry training. As of this fiscal year, there was no differentiation in basic training or in training programs for MOS’s open to women.

Two serious training abuse incidents occurred in the summer of 1978. The first incident, at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, resulted in the death of two trainees on the first day of training due to heatstroke. General court-martial proceedings found two drill sergeants guilty of involuntary manslaughter, negligent homicide, and dereliction of duty. The second incident, at Fort Dix, New Jersey, involved the systematic abuse of twenty-two trainees by five drill sergeants. Three of the five drill sergeants were convicted of trainee maltreatment. Subsequent publicity led to hearings on the incidents by the Investigations Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee. The Secretary of the Army, the commander of TRADOC, the Chief of Staff, and other individuals directly involved in the incidents testified at the hearings.

The TRADOC commander was concerned that these incidents indicated existence of widespread and deep-seated leadership problems in the training base. Accordingly, he established a task force to conduct a study of the matter. The study revealed significant differences in the basic training among TRADOC’s nine training centers. Consequently, the TRADOC commander formed a committee composed of commanders from the nine training centers to examine the problems and make recommendations to standardize the procedures in initial entry training. The Committee of Nine submitted its report in July 1979 to the TRADOC commander who, on the basis of those recommendations, issued a statement of training practices for the centers. The statement emphasized that positive leadership in basic training was the best way to avoid an atmosphere conducive to abuse and degradation of the individual trainee.

Seeking to increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the initial training of recruits, the Army undertook in 1976 a test of the One Station Unit Training (OSUT) concept. Traditionally, the Army’s training for recruits had been conducted at two installations, with basic training at one station and advanced individual training at another. Under OSUT recruits received all initial entry training in one unit and at one installation. In the first test of OSUT, TRADOC demonstrated that the length of time required for initial entry training could be cut without a

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loss in the quality of the training results. When the Army attempted to establish OSUT for infantry at Fort Benning, Georgia, Congress directed the Army to conduct a second test in which a specific comparison would be made between OSUT and two station training (TST). TRADOC conducted the OSUT/TST test during January-May 1979. OSUT test companies received all their training at Fort Benning, Georgia. Companies undergoing TST training received the first phase at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and the second phase at Fort Benning. Test results demonstrated that there was no statistical difference in trainee performance between the two methods but that OSUT was more efficient than TST by $7.3 million in annual operating costs. TRADOC determined that OSUT at Fort Benning would be the most effective and efficient means of providing training. The Secretary of the Army delayed his decision on OSUT, because of the proposed closing of Fort Dix with its large Army Training Center. In another realignment action, the Department of the Army announced in June 1979 that basic training and advanced individual training at the U.S. Army Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Texas, would be converted to OSUT, resulting in an anticipated annual savings of $4.8 million.

In both individual and collective combat training, the Army endeavored to provide the soldier with the realistic experience and special knowledge needed to prepare him for his role on the battlefield. To enhance realism, Army training leaders expanded the use of the Opposition Force (OPFOR) concept. In 1979, training involving an opposition force, complete with weapons and equipment comparable to that which would be used by potential enemy units was underway in every major Army unit. The scope varied from orientation to complete integration into tactical exercises. Plans for the new National Training Center (see below) included integrating OPFOR into its collective training program.

Enhancement of realism in the training of large Army combat units was the primary reason for development of the National Training Center (NTC). The Army knew from experience that exposure to realistic battlefield conditions in training contributed significantly to the ability of the soldier to survive and to the sustainability of units in actual combat. But no existing Army installation had the land required to create a battlefield with sufficient opposing forces to present a realistic threat, or the instrumentation necessary for evaluation of the results of unit training. The NTC, as conceived by FORSCOM with support from TRADOC, would provide the facilities needed to give

heavy combat battalions two weeks of intensive combat training. This training would include air deployment; equipment retrieval from prepositioned stocks; deployment onto the battlefield; training under realistic time-space factors against the OPFOR; evaluation of unit operational training; operation in an electronic warfare environment; integration of artillery, helicopter gunships, and U.S. Air Force close air support and aircraft fire support to complement maneuver operations; and redeployment experience.

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In fiscal year 1979, the Army made significant progress toward establishment of the NTC. In May, the NTC concept was refined and approved by the commanders of FORSCOM and TRADOC at a meeting at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Following the preparation of environmental impact studies of three feasible sites in California and Arizona, the Army convinced California’s Office of Planning and Research that the NTC could operate without significant harm to the California environment. In August, the Army chose Fort Irwin, California, located in the high Mohave Desert, as the site for the NTC. The site, although not entirely comparable to the Central European environment, fulfilled the basic requirements for an NTC. It was large (642,805 acres), isolated, had extensive unused facilities, a varied and rolling terrain (providing a realistic battlefield environment), and was in close proximity to Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps installations, facilitating combined arms operations. With initial budgeting commencing in fiscal year 1980, plans call for the NTC to achieve full operation in fiscal year 1984.

After studying the possible closure of Army Training Centers at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, and Fort Dix, New Jersey, the Army announced on 29 March 1979 plans to close the Army Training Center at Fort Dix, and to transfer its training missions to centers at Fort Jackson, and Fort Knox, Kentucky; Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; and Fort Bliss, Texas. Subsequently, the Secretary of the Army decided that Fort Dix would remain open and the Secretary of Defense agreed.

A Land-Use Requirements Study (LURS) prepared for Fort Carson, Colorado, in accordance with guidance contained in Training Circular 25-1, Training Land: Unit Training Land Requirements, was approved in December 1978. The study indicated that there would be a shortfall of between 60,000 and 200,000 acres at the training site, depending on how much land would be environmentally protected. Fort Carson’s need for additional training land was the most critical of the Army installations. Following the review of a preliminary Analysis of

Alternatives study, two sites were chosen for further consideration: the Huerfano River parcel and the Pinon Canyon parcel, both in southeastern Colorado. Fort Carson has begun preparation of environmental documentation on the two sites pursuant to requirements set forth in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

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Forces Command, Training and Doctrine Command, and Western Command have submitted studies on other installations having a shortage of training land. These were under review at Headquarters, Department of the Army, at the end of the fiscal year.

During fiscal year 1979, FORSCOM continued special environmental training at four locations. At Fort Drum, New York, FORSCOM provided a thirty-day training program designed to prepare units for sustained cold weather combat operations in a European environment. This year, cold weather training of the brigade task force began and beginning next year, three brigade task forces will be trained each ensuing year. At Fort Wainwright, Alaska, FORSCOM conducted a thirty-day arctic training program for its infantry battalions having need (because of their contingency plans) for this type of instruction. At Fort Sherman, Canal Zone, FORSCOM trained its CONUS infantry battalions with contingency missions specifying a need for experience in a jungle environment. The field training exercise, conducted over a three-week period at the Jungle Operations Training Center, was divided into three phases: individual unit, small unit, and battalion. At Fort Irwin, California, FORSCOM provided brigade maneuver training for three brigade task forces in 1979. The small unit exchange program continued with U.S. Army units in Hawaii exchanging with Australia and New Zealand and FORSCOM units exchanging with Canada, England, and Italy.

The development, procurement, and use of training devices and simulators attained importance as constraints on resources forced greater reliance on training methods that were economical, energy and materiel efficient, and which assured sustainment of required skill levels. Management of training device activities became a major concern and actions were taken to refine and publish Army policy, resolve personnel and maintenance issues, and improve the research, development, and acquisition of training devices.

Construction of facilities for the Synthetic Flight Training Program continued, with more than twenty buildings completed at training bases in the United States and Germany and approximately twenty more scheduled for construction. These facilities

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will house synthetic flight training for five types of Army helicopters, reducing fuel usage and other operations and maintenance costs by substituting simulated for actual helicopter flights.

In anticipation of a conflict in Europe or other areas where the population lives primarily in towns and cities, the Army began a program to provide training in Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). TRADOC started work in March 1979 on a training plan and in August 1979 published Field Manual 90-10 on procedures for fighting on such terrain. Progress in the program has been slow and training opportunities for NATO and CONUS-based forces have been limited due to lack of training facilities. USAREUR sends five battalions each year to the German Infantry School MOUT training facility at Hammelburg. Local initiative within the Berlin Brigade and 8th Infantry Division in Germany and the 82d Airborne and 9th Infantry Divisions in the United States have yielded good results, but for only a small segment of the force. Funds to construct a special MOUT training facility at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, were cut from the fiscal year 1980 budget, as were funds for a similar facility to be constructed at Hohenfels, Germany, at the USAREUR/7th Army Training Center.

Each year the Army participates in many of the training exercises directed or coordinated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who view them as the culmination of unit and interservice training activities. In 1979, the Army took part in thirty-three such exercises. One of the most important, NIFTY NUGGET/MOBEX 78, occurred in October and November 1978. MOBEX 78 was the first simulated, government-wide war mobilization exercise accomplished in the United States since World War II, and represented the Army’s portion of a joint Army, Navy, and Air Force exercise designed to review and practice the mobilization and deployment actions required during the first thirty days of a war. During MOBEX 78, the Army also tested changes it had made to the span of control and decentralization of some mobilization operations because of the results of its first large-scale mobilization exercise in 1976 (MOBEX 76). In the more comprehensive MOBEX 78, the Army learned that serious defects still existed in its mobilization plans and procedures. Major problems the exercise highlighted included deficiencies in current personnel support systems; mobilization station capacity; training base expansion; medical support; materiel and ammunition supply; industrial preparedness; automation and communication support; rapid reinforcement planning; manpower; and command and control capabilities. Based on these results, FORSCOM developed and

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began a formal mobilization improvement program, with the goal of correcting, before MOBEX 80, various deficiencies revealed in MOBEX 78.

MOBEX 78 also disclosed a serious inadequacy in Army planning for provision of the training base following a major mobilization exercise. Consequently, Training Directorate, ODCSOPS,

formed a permanent mobilization team in January 1979. Planning by this team resulted in an official revision in April by the Army Vice Chief of Staff of the projected capacity of the Army’s training base upon mobilization. In June 1979, the Army staff began a thorough analysis of mobilization capacity, reviewing utilities, facilities, transportation, and equipment limitations as well as scheduling capacities for each installaion.

Army forces also took part in the annual REFORGER exercises in Western Europe. During fiscal year 1979, the Army participated in two REFORGER exercises. REFORGER 78 began in August and continued into October and REFORGER 79 (the first winter exercise in this series since 1973) took place between December 1978 and March 1979. From the United States Army standpoint, the major objective in the exercises was to test the readiness of reserve component units in reinforcing active components already engaged in a European conflict. Two U.S. Army Reserve and two National Guard units took part in REFORGER 78. In REFORGER 79, there were two reserve and three guard units. Both exercises succeeded in deploying a combat unit from the United States to Europe with only a 96-hour notice to participate, respectively, in exercise CERTAIN SHIELD in 1978 and CERTAIN SENTINEL in 1979, both a part of the REFORGER exercises. Besides testing the effectiveness of reinforcement of active component units with those from the reserve components, the two REFORGER exercises provided experience in deploying personnel and equipment, drawing and deploying prepositioned materiel, participating in both command post and field training exercises with U.S. Army, Europe, and allied units of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and returning to home station.

In 1979, the Army revised the system for educating and training officers, which had been under increasing criticism for not producing officers capable of meeting the demands of the modern battlefield. These changes were based on the recommendations of a comprehensive study—the Review of Education and Training of Officers (RETO)—completed in June 1978 by the Officer Training and Review Group in the Office of the Chief of Staff. These recommendations, which are summarized in the Department of the Army Historical Summary for Fiscal Year

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1978, were reviewed and evaluated by the Army staff in late 1978 and presented to General Bernard W. Rogers, the Chief of Staff, in February 1979.

Following approval in May by General Rogers of a majority of the recommended changes, the staff began implementation. Some recommendations are expected to take as long as ten years to phase into the education and training system. Key changes approved by the Chief of Staff provide for improved assessment of cadets and officer candidates in precommissioning programs; more effective screening of candidates who apply for contract status in ROTC detachments; setting up tests for new alternatives to the present four-year ROTC program; development of Military Qualification Standards (MQS) as the basis for early career development; altering the officers basic and advanced courses based on analysis of training; and creation of a nine-week Combined Arms and Service Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The school, which would begin operating in fiscal year 1981, would provide staff training for all officers at some time between their seventh and ninth year of service. The Command and General Staff College (C&GSC) would continue and there would be no change in the number of officers selected to attend it.

The West Point Study Group, established as a result of the honor code violations at the United States Military Academy in 1976, had issued more than 200 recommendations in 1977 covering almost every aspect of the institution’s operations. In June 1979, the Superintendent of the Academy reported to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) that the eleven committees he had appointed to consider those recommendations had reviewed and acted upon more than 90 percent of them. He requested, and DCSPER approved, that no further reports of compliance would be necessary.

Fiscal year 1979 saw further development and refinement of the existing computer-oriented training management systems. The Army’s Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP), the so-called systematic front-end analysis designed to derive training missions and critical collective tasks, continued in operation. With assistance from Army schools, the analysis will further examine missions and tasks, with the goal of establishing training hierarchies and relationships for collective training as a guide to formulating training sequences and objectives. Other projects in the planning stage relating to ARTEP and alternate methods of training will establish a system of priorities in unit training missions and provide a system for collective training development. Also under

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design for use in the ARTEP computer information systems is an improved feedback system for self-correcting and other purposes.

The Training Management Control System (TMCS), a computerized method for costing battalion training days and accounting for training ammunition expended, continued under development in 1979. The system is designed to assist the unit commander in planning training, evaluating the resource impact of training plans, and recording training accomplished and resources expended. The TMCS consists of computer programs in small, portable, yet powerful, off-the-shelf type minicomputers, which can be operated without special training. TMCS summarizes battalion training resource requirements at the division level, providing information on available battalion funds, petroleum, and training ammunition allocations, and budget development and justification. In September, the Chief of Staff approved TMCS as the Army-wide method for ascertaining the cost of unit training. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans was designated the proponent agency and FORSCOM the responsible agency for the system.

Supplementing and supporting TMCS in determining training ammunition requirements from the battalion to the major command level was the Training Ammunition Management System (TAMS) and the Training Ammunition Management Information System (TAMIS). Development began on TAMS in late 1975 and in May 1979 the Vice Chief of Staff approved the system for operation, replacing the common table of allowances system. The TAMIS was approved as a Class A standard system during the year and will be extended to forty CONUS installations in fiscal year 1980.

The Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) achieved major expansion in its area of operation in 1979. Additional agencies brought into the system were the National Guard Operating Activities Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; the U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; the U.S. Army Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Texas; the U.S. Army Signal School, Fort Gordon, Georgia; and the U.S. Army Engineer Training Center, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The inclusion of these agencies represented the first phase in expansion of ATRRS to all Army schools and training centers, to be completed during fiscal year 1980. Of the several changes made in ATRRS during the year, the most important were development and testing of a quota management system as a means to control solicited (in-service) training; an interconnection be-

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tween ATRRS and REQUEST, the automated recruit quota system, to permit sharing of data on class schedules and student reservations; and commencing development of an ATRRS subsystem, to be designated the Mobilization Training Management Information System.

The purpose of the Army Study Program is to provide a formal means for the Army secretariat, staff, and the major Army commands to examine critical problems that arise in the planning, programming, and budgeting decisions of the Army’s defense mission. Under the Management Directorate in the Office of the Director of the Army Staff, the Study System executed the annual Army Study Program, employing both in-house and contract facilities. In fiscal year 1979, the program comprised more than 500 studies and analyses. Of these, approximately 85 percent were conducted by Army organizations, with the remainder finalized under contract by nongovernment organizations or individual consultants.

The comprehensive review of Army study and analysis activities, begun in July 1978 at the direction of the Under Secretary of the Army, was completed in April 1979. The primary objective of this review was to ascertain how, in a period of declining monetary and personnel resources, to increase the efficiency of the study program without reducing its effectiveness. The ad hoc study group chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary for Operations Research made recommendations concerning what problems would be selected for study, the efficient use of resources and procedures in conducting those studies, and the organization of integrated study programs, providing guidance and control. Implementation of the study group’s recommendations has begun and many will be completed by March 1980.

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