Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1980


Force Development, Doctrine, and Training

In fiscal year 1980, the U.S. Army continued in its long-term effort to develop forces with the doctrine and training essential for dealing successfully with whatever contingencies might arise in the support of national policy. The trend of events in Europe and the Third World combined with the requirements of a far-reaching program of force modernization to focus major attention on the key role of rapid mobilization in future conflicts. Hence, during the year, the Army—in shaping and altering force structure, devising new and changing old doctrinal concepts, and determining the emphasis and focus of training—concentrated on development of forces capable of mobilization and deployment with a speed and efficiency never hitherto achieved by an American army.

Force Development

The twenty-four division force structure, sixteen active and eight reserve component, remained the central element in the Total Army, comprised of all active, reserve, and civilian components. To guide in the ongoing development of this force structure as it responded to the evolving requirements of national strategy, force modernization, budgetary limitations, and other fundamental factors, the Army again employed with increasing effectiveness the sophisticated planning tools it has used in recent years.

This year, for example, the Force Management Directorate in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS) used the Total Army Analysis (TAA)—the computer-assisted method that each year develops the force structure of the Army Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)—to project future force requirements for the 1983-87 period. The purpose was to establish for this period the need for nondivisional tactical support units, adjust projected force requirements to make them consistent with anticipated budgetary limitations, and ascertain plans for force development. The Directorate also employed the TAA to analyze the 1987 force requirements for Army 86, Korea, and integrated warfare that would involve use on the battlefield of both nuclear and nonnuclear weapons. ODCSOPS served as the proponent agency in the preparation of Army Regulation 71-11, issued in April 1980, which formalized the TAA process and established its responsibilities.


During fiscal year 1980, ODCSOPS also contributed to improving the system for establishing the relative priority status of the various elements—Program-Development Increment Packages (PDIP)—comprising the fiscal year 1982-86 Program Objective Memorandum (POM), a major tool in budgetary planning for forces development. In response to a directive from the Vice Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), Lt. Gen. Glenn K. Otis, set up a task force which worked out a system for priority ranking of the some 760 increment packages. This then became the Army’s priority list, used through various DOD reviews and by the Army staff as the basis for drawing up the fiscal year 1983-87 POM.

For several years, the Army has been endeavoring to improve its methodology for attaining the data it needs to make decisions on the size of its forces. In August 1979 the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) in ODCSOPS renewed a study project begun earlier, but temporarily suspended, on Improving the Definition of the Army Objective Force Methodolgy (IDOFOR). Phase I of the study, completed in July 1980, analyzed methods for developing alternative forces to be used in conventional theater-level warfare in Europe. Subsequent IDOFOR phases in the next two or three years will apply the methodology to other theaters and the integrated battlefield, to development of acquisition strategy for a selected force, and to analysis of the CONUS base.

Additional data for decision making on the size of Army forces was also a prime objective of the Combat-to-Support Balance Study (CSBS), undertaken by the CAA in late 1979. In August of that year the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed the Army to conduct a joint study with OSD to determine under various conditions the appropriate size of American combat support forces in a European conflict. Since the OSD request appeared to raise questions on the balance between combat and logistic support in the Army’s force structure, General Meyer directed that the Army study ascertain the proper composition and organization of tactical logistics support to be programmed for fiscal years 1982 through 1986. The study presumed a representative European conflict, involving mobilization of USAREUR forces, and taking into account tactical support needed to meet, requirements for ammunition, engineers, fuel supply, maintenance, military police, services, supply, and transportation. Distribution of the CSBS is scheduled for early fiscal year 1981.

An important source of tactical combat support for the Army in the event of a NATO conflict would come from those countries, the so-called host nations, where American troops are stationed. Because of the Army’s need this year to commit additional support units to the


Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) for use in non-European contingencies, it sought ways to reduce the requirements for Army units of this type in the NATO area. Consequently, the United States initiated negotiations in 1980 with the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the BENELUX countries with the goal of securing from these host nations increased civil and military assistance. In planning development of force structure for the near and long term, the Army’s Total TAA process applied estimates of host nation support, including that which may become available under future agreements.

During fiscal year 1980, the Army continued to employ a number of computer-oriented management and information systems to supply the data essential to TAA and related force structure planning studies. The development team for the Vertical Force Development Management Information System (VFDMIS) further expanded its facilities for providing data on Army management requirements in both peacetime and wartime by preparing a comprehensive description of functional requirements to be incorporated into the system. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army Communications Command designated its Communications System Agency as project manager to procure terminal equipment for VFDMIS and establish its telecommunications network.

In the development of the Force Development Integrated Management System (FORDIMS), efforts of HQDA slowed because of the inability of major commands to manage their manpower resources in compliance with the strict rules of the system’s guidance tracking. This process is designed to provide HQDA with the means to keep accurate track of all changes in its forces and to supply information on the audit aspects of force, manpower, and dollar data in the Army’s budget submission. HQDA is developing less restrictive guidance tracking with the goal in view of having FORDIMS fully operational in fiscal year 1981.

When FORDIMS becomes operational, it will function in tandem with the Structure and Composition Systems (SACS) designed to provide the Army with lists of personnel and equipment requirements for its units. When VFDMIS becomes operational, it will replace FORDIMS in this role. In September 1980, following consultation between the ODCSOPS and USAMSSA, the Army awarded a contract to the General Research Corporation to improve the Logistic SACS’s (LOGSACS) Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP). The process contained in this plan can be used to determine the equipment changes required to field new weapons systems or equipment items being introduced to augment or upgrade the Army’s mission capabilities.


Further enhancing the Army’s ability to achieve optimum results in organizing, manning, and equipping its units to carry out their assigned missions was The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS), developed and maintained for the ODCSOPS by the Computer Systems Command. During 1980, the Army extended Vertical-TAADS (VTAADS)—the system providing documentation for major commands and agencies—to the U.S. Army Element, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, bringing to seventeen the total employing VTAADS. It also extended Installation-TAADS (ITAADS), the system applying the documentation program at the installation level, increasing to fifty-five the total using VTAADS. With a total of seventy-two users, TAADS has become one of the largest operational Automatic Data Processing Systems (ADPS) in the Army.

Both SACS and TAADS, as well as other existing systems, contributed significantly to the development of an automated data base for use in management of prepositioning of materiel configured to unit sets (POMCUS), the advance emplacement in Europe of equipment for divisions scheduled for rapid deployment in contingency situations. Principal users of the data base will be the Army staff, major commands, and the U.S. Army Depot System Command. Steps taken in 1980 identified POMCUS units in the LOGSACS and began changes required to standardize POMCUS and provide it with an authorization system keyed to existing systems, including TAADS, Force Accounting System (FAS), and TOE.

Accurate manpower information is essential to organizing and managing Army forces of all types. Casualty data is an important component of personnel information. Consequently, with a view to improving access to casualty data, the Chief of Staff directed the DCSOPS to devise a means to provide from a single source reliable estimates of casualty data to whomever in the Army might need it. In April 1980, ODCSOPS initiated a study of the problem, presenting guidelines as to its scope and objectives and dividing the task of carrying it out between the U.S. Army Soldier Support Center (USASSC) and CAA. The USASSC, after reviewing available computer models, recommended to the Study Advisory Group (SAG) that the Army Model Improvement Program (AMIP) be used to create a single process capable of furnishing a reliable source of analytically derived casualty data. In September, the SAG approved a revised study approach. Concepts Analysis would provide a short-term improvement for estimation of casualties at the theater level. A more comprehensive study to be completed in 1982 would aim at long-term improvement for their estimation in the AMIP.

Developed in March 1980 and presented to key military and civilian leaders in DOD, Army 90 is a briefing which presents the


Army’s views on its goals and direction during the coming decade. It stresses the need for a flexible and deployable force structure that would enable the Army to fight with other services anywhere in the world and identifies the primary objectives for improvement as new organization and doctrine, increased firepower, enhanced electronics, tactical and strategic mobility, and sustainability. The briefing also describes the desired mix of heavy and light divisions and how the Army intended to use POMCUS and enhanced airlift and sealift to improve its strategic mobility. In addition, the briefing assists in preparation of the Defense Consolidated Guidance, an annual publication of the Secretary of Defense, which lays out the programming direction all the services should pursue together with fiscal guidance levels for a five-year period.

Over the next ten years, the Army will undergo the most ambitious peacetime transformation and modernization program in its history. The goal is to field modernized forces, more versatile and capable, in the 1990s. The blueprints for the Army are the TRADOC Army 86 force design studies which began in 1976 and include the heavy division (DIV 86), the infantry division (ID 86), the heavy corps (Corps 86), echelons above corps (EAC 86), and an embryonic contingency corps. These studies advance an extensive redesign of the Army’s tactical and support organizations tied to new battle concepts and to the new generation of weapons programmed for the future force in the context of a projected 1986 threat. Army 86 also establishes a force development and modernization process that furnishes a new basis for future organizational review and development.

During 1979, task forces at the TRADOC centers and schools, under the direction of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, designed DIV 86, the 20,000-man heavy division. General Meyer accepted the concept in principle in October 1979 and, after modification, approved it formally on 1 August 1980. DIV 86 introduces significant innovations in its basic three maneuver brigade structure. Noteworthy were an air cavalry attack brigade, eight self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer artillery batteries, and a combined 8-inch gun and multiple launch rocket system battalion. The heavy division’s mechanized infantry battalions contain four rifle companies and TOW missile companies; the armor battalions consist of four tank companies with four tank platoons consisting of three tanks apiece. DIV 86 also features composite brigade support battalions designed to implement the concept of “arm, fuel, fix, and feed forward.” All these organizations were keyed to concepts of maximum firepower forward, improved command and control, increased fire support and air defense, and improved combination of arms, an increased leader-to-led ratio with smaller


and less complex fighting companies and platoons, and disruption and attrition of the enemy’s follow-on echelons.

The new 17,773-man ID 86 emphasizes new technology, a strong antiarmor capability, and versatility—which includes tactical mobility, ability to survive a high intensity battlefield, and strategic mobility. Infantry divisions have the mission of attack, defend, and delay in NATO and contingency operations elsewhere. Containing three maneuver brigades, the infantry division fields eight motorized infantry battalions, two mobile gun battalions, organic brigade engineer companies, an air cavalry attack brigade, a military intelligence battalion (CEWI), and a towed artillery and multiple launch rocket system company. ID 86 limits motorized infantry battalions to three rifle companies and a TOW missile company, while the mobile gun battalion encompasses four rifle companies. The Chief of Staff approved ID 86 for planning and testing purposes together with a contingency corps structure for continued development and analysis on 18 September 1980.

Corps 86 unites corps battle and support organizations and concepts to direct the central battle while concurrently disrupting follow-on echelons; protecting rear areas; sustaining and reconstituting combat power; integrating the air-land battle; and clarifying combat service support, communications, and intelligence relationships between corps, division, and echelons above corps. General Meyer approved Corps 86 for planning as the required force for a NATO corps, numbering 85,118 at D-day to D plus 30 days and reaching 131,973 by D plus 180 days.

Finally, the TRADOC task forces completed the first phase of the EAC study laying the doctrinal groundwork and structuring the Army’s echelons above corps for the Central European Theater in 1986 in the context of the integrated battlefield, joint and combined operations, and a maturing theater of operations. In the second phase of the study, the command’s task forces intend to refine EAC operational concepts into doctrine and TOEs, develop modified EAC concepts and structure for operations in other areas of the world, and pursue training implications and a transition plan. On 1 August 1980, the Chief of Staff approved the EAC operational concept and organization structure for the general design of the theater army.

General Meyer directed implementation of the 9th Infantry Division High Technology Test Bed (HTTB) project and approved the design of a computer program for organizing and executing the effort on 19 June 1980. Given the standard infantry division as a base and employing the ID 86 study as a guide, the activities associated with HTTB will be directed toward developing a light division designed to facilitate rapid deployment, exploit technological opportunities, and


meet the requirement for lean, hard-hitting forces. The test bed initiative was an extension of the force structure concepts advocated in the Chief of Staffs white paper of March 1980.

Through field tests and supporting analyses, HTTB will provide an evaluation of the operational, organizational, doctrinal, and technological opportunities and concepts for enhancing the command and control, firepower, tactical mobility, survivability, flexibility, and sustainability of the infantry division, with major emphasis on improving its strategic mobility. When changes, modifications, or alternatives prove advantageous, the Army, where possible, will permanently incorporate them in the 9th Infantry Division. In any case, successful concepts, design changes, or other innovations will be exported to other Army divisions. The 9th Division, then, will begin a gradual and deliberate transition from its organization during fiscal year 1980 to that of a modern, high-technology division. The Chief of Staff has already decided to form the Air Cavalry Attack Brigade (ACAB) as part of the 9th Division. At the end of the fiscal year the Army was simultaneously pursuing three initial tasks. It took immediate action to increase 9th Division capabilities through near-term force design and modernization changes. Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, organized the test bed effort itself, including the establishment of a Test Group at Fort Lewis, Washington; and CAC and the Test Group planned for testing in fiscal years 1981, 1982, and 1983 through 1987, the years in which the project is programmed but not yet in the budget. New Zealand, Australia, and Canada indicated an interest in assigning officers to Fort Lewis for the test bed project.

The Army Staff began the initial stage of an analysis to determine whether the Army could afford the Army 86 units. Using the Total Army Analysis, the study will produce the total force requirement and an affordable program force from which the staff will develop transition plans. The first draft transition plan was scheduled for presentation to the major Army commands (MACOMs) for comment in January 1981. The staff plans to program Army 86 in TAA-88 and prepare a long-term statement of force objectives and funding in POM 84-88.

The fiscal year 1980 Authorization Act deleted all research, development, test, and evaluation funding for the Tactical Operations System (TOS). The committee language supported the concept for the system but not the program presented by the Army. Congress denied the funding request without prejudice. The need for a system for controlling operations and for providing essential command information remained. HQDA developed an acquisition strategy during the fiscal year which provided for a new start based on an immediate,


although limited, operation capability from which the full-blown program could evolve. Accordingly, the Army submitted a Mission Element Need Statement (MENS) for the Force Level and Maneuver Control System (SIGMA), formerly TOS Operations Control and Command Support System, to OSD for approval and began introducing the Tactical Computer Terminal (TCT) in Europe to fulfill the immediate requirement for fiscal year 1980.

SIGMA provides combat commanders of corps and subordinate echelons and their staffs the means by which they can receive, store, and retrieve accurate, up-to-date information upon which to base estimates and plans. It provides direction to the control systems of fire support, air defense, intelligence, administration, and logistics, giving the commander critical information from those systems. In addition, it allows corps to communicate with subordinate units and control their maneuvers by receiving terrain, location, and status information and distributing orders to subordinate commanders.

International Agreements

Circumstance and national policy since 1945 have required the Army to act as an instrument for projecting national power overseas during peace as well as during war. Soldiers, as a consequence, have come to play a more important role in the formulation and execution of foreign policy than in the halcyon days of isolationism: They provide information about the military implications of treaties and executive agreements in the negotiation stage and operate within their confines once the agreements come into force. Often international understandings, not all of which are written, require military conversations for implementation. The U.S. Army has been engaged in staff conferences with foreign armies on a continuing basis since the opening of the meetings “on the standardization of arms” with representatives of the British services in London in August 1940. In fiscal year 1980, international agreements continued to affect the Army on the levels of both the highest national policy and the exchange of purely professional information with friendly armies.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II to the full Senate without substantive amendment in November 1979. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, President Carter requested that the Senate defer its consideration of the treaty. Although the Senate continued to hold the treaty in abeyance, the importance of equitable and verifiable limitations on nuclear arms to the nation’s security and foreign policies impelled continuation of the SALT process.

In December 1979 the U.S. and its North Atlantic Treaty


Organization (NATO) allies decided to follow two parallel tracks to enhance alliance security: modernization of long-range theater nuclear forces accompanied by an offer to the Soviet Union to begin bilateral talks on limitations of appropriate theater nuclear weapons leading to negotiations in the SALT III framework. The NATO decision resulted from a long process of negotiation beginning in May 1977 when the heads of state of the NATO countries concluded that their governments needed to examine theater nuclear force modernization. The Nuclear Planning Group created the High Level Group (HLG), chaired by David E. McGiffert, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, to develop theater nuclear force modernization plans for NATO. The substantial modernization and expansion of Soviet long- and short-range nuclear capability, coupled with the greatly improved overall quality of its conventional forces, prompted serious alliance concern. These trends undermined the theater balance of power and cast doubt on NATO’s ability to deter war. On 12 December 1979, after intense debate, the NATO foreign and defense ministers concluded that the alliance should pursue the dual strategy. Specifically, the ministers decided to modernize NATO’s long-range nuclear force by deploying 108 Pershing II launchers and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe; withdrawing 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe as soon as feasible; accommodating the 572 long-range theater nuclear warheads within the reduced level; pursuing arms control intitiatives on long-range theater nuclear forces; and examining the precise nature, scope, and basis of adjustments resulting from long-range theater nuclear force deployments and their possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO’s theater nuclear force stockpile. The Soviets initially refused to begin talks, apparently hoping to divide the alliance and induce it to revoke the modernization program. When allied resolve became apparent, the Soviets agreed in July 1980 to enter talks with the United States. Preliminary exchanges were to begin in October.

The issues involved in theater nuclear force limitations were complex. Achieving an acceptable agreement promised to be slow and difficult. The United States government, however, had repeatedly expressed its belief that a proper arms control agreement would enhance national security and the prospects for peace. In that spirit, the Carter administration pledged to press for meaningful progress in theater talks and the ratification of SALT II as soon as feasible.

The government continued preparations for the second and final session of the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate


Effects. The International Affairs Division of the Office of The Judge Advocate General participated in two preparatory sessions in September 1978 and March 1979 and the first session of the conference in September 1979. It also provided the senior Army representative on the United States delegation to the second session of the conference which opened at Geneva, Switzerland, on 15 September 1980 and continued into October.

In 1980, TRADOC continued a U.S. Army program of staff talks with the General Staff of the Army of the Federal Republic of Germany begun in 1975. The eighth set of formal talks, held at Fort Rucker, Alabama, in April 1980, followed the format that had evolved in earlier meetings: to first seek agreement on major operational concepts; to then go on to define selected materiel items and to define and evaluate certain materiel, organizational, and operational concepts; and, finally, to cooperate in materiel, training, and logistical requirements. In September 1980, the two army chiefs of staff cosigned a concept paper on electronic warfare and a joint paper on camouflage—bringing to thirteen the number of U.S.—German formal agreements on basic military questions. German and American staff officers worked on six more concepts in 1980. The two armies looked ahead to joint operational concepts for command and control, continuous operations, armor forces in the 1990s, land battle of the 1990s, Army requirements for tactical air support, and tactical communications.

Staff talks with the British Army continued into their third year with formal meetings in Aldershot, England, in October 1979 and at Fort Monroe, Virginia, in March 1980. Conducted in a combat developments framework, the British talks sought to develop joint tactical concepts, set interoperability goals, and select materiel requirements with potential for standardization and interoperability. They also provided a forum for an informal exchange of views at the general officer level and for an annual updating of concepts of the Warsaw Pact threat and on developments in science and technology. The fiscal year 1980 discussions centered on concepts for land-air operations during the 1990s, command and control, countermobility, and Army requirements for tactical air support. A serious exchange of ideas and interests in materiel systems continued. The British remained committed to cooperative U.S.-British-German-French development of a multiple launch rocket system and their interest in the goal of interoperable automated battlefield systems continued.

The TRADOC discussions with the French Army staff went into their second year with a second round of talks held in Paris in May 1980. Less formal than the German and British conversations, the meetings with the French emphasized the exchange of ideas at the


Army level rather than the pursuit of formal agreements. The May talks centered on the French and U.S. corps concepts and on concepts for the employment of armed helicopters.

Concepts and Doctrine

Doctrine, in the military context, is the body of fundamental, authoritative principles which guide the actions of the services in their support of national objectives. Concepts refer to the underlying philosophical stance upon which doctrine is based and they are articulated primarily to provide additional clarity for doctrinal statements. Although other subjects also received attention in fiscal year 1980, the Army focused on concepts and doctrine related to mobilization and rapid deployment.

The development of this emphasis has evolved over the past four years as the Army conducted a series of mobilization exercises which revealed serious deficiencies in mobilization and deployment doctrine and procedures. During November and December 1976, the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) conducted the Army’s first large-scale mobilization exercise, known as Mobilization Exercise 76 (MOBEX 76). Post-exercise findings indicated that FORSCOM would have to narrow the span of control of the exercise and decentralize some of the operations. As a result, the command assigned additional responsibilities in both pre- and post-mobilization phases to the commanders of the CONUS armies and individual installations. Specifically, FORSCOM authorized its CONUS army commanders to review and approve reserve component mobilization plans, to grant concurrence in installation plans, and to exercise review authority in installation mobilization plans. FORSCOM also authorized those commanders to supervise the post-mobilization training of deploying units and to assist Headquarters, FORSCOM, in redistributing personnel and materiel in order to expedite training and deployment of Army units.

During October and November 1978, the existing mobilization system was again tested in Exercise NIFTY NUGGET/MOBEX 78. MOBEX 78 represented the Army’s portion of a joint exercise by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and other concerned federal government agencies, which was designed to review and practice all the mobilization and deployment actions required during the first thirty days of a general war. It also served to evaluate the efficiency of the Army’s corrective actions taken as a result of experience in MOBEX 76 and the implementation of its mobilization improvement program.

Following the completion of MOBEX 78, FORSCOM learned that serious deficiencies still existed in its mobilization plans and


procedures. Typical major problems underscored by this exercise—as reported upon last year—included deficiencies in existing personnel systems, mobilization station capacity, training base expansion, medical support, materiel and ammunition supply, industrial preparedness, automation and communications support, rapid reinforcement planning, manpower, and command and control capabilities. During the remainder of 1979, FORSCOM developed and carried out an updated mobilization improvement program designed to correct the deficiencies stemming from MOBEX 78, the first simulated, government-wide mobilization since World War II.

The 1976 and 1978 mobilization exercises also revealed major deficiencies in Army staff planning which included poor planning and coordination between the active component and the reserve components, failure to tailor its mobilization plans to fit its operational plans, and poor organizational planning for the transition from peacetime to wartime. These deficiencies attracted the attention of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the Army. During the summer of 1979, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown recognized a need to improve coordination and planning in the area of manpower procurement during mobilization. On 22 August 1979 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics (MRA&L) sent a memorandum to the Secretary of the Army requiring the Army to work closely with the Selective Service System (SSS) in pursuit of this goal. The U.S. Military Enlistment Processing Command (MEPCOM) is a DOD field agency responsible for operating and supporting the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES). HQDA acts as the executive agent for the DOD in all matters pertaining to the operation of MEPCOM and the AFEES.

On 21 August 1980 the director of the SSS and the commander of MEPCOM signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding combined examination and induction processing. During mobilization, the SSS and MEPCOM will jointly manage the flow of registrants to the AFEES, in accordance with manpower requirements established by the DOD. MEPCOM and SSS began work on establishing a joint computer facility at Great Lakes Naval Base, Illinois, known as the Joint Computer Center (JCC) and scheduled to become operational in the middle of the summer of 1981. They will also establish a backup automatic data processing facility for use in the event of a major computer outage.

The JCS established the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) on 31 March 1979. Service Memorandum 185-79 directed that JDA serve as a central coordinating authority for mobilization deployment planning and execution. It charged JDA with developing on a priority basis a system which, making use of existing arrangements, would support


deployment planning and assist concerned staff agencies and commands in managing movements and tracking deployments of units, supplies, and personnel during an actual deployment. JDA developed the Joint Deployment System (JDS) by using the Deployment Management System (DEPMAS) created by USREDCOM as its basis. Integration of the JCS Unit Status and Identity Reporting System (UNITREP) and individual reporting systems used by the service component commands of USREDCOM completed the structure of the JDS.

Prior to the development of a crisis situation, the JDS complements the deliberate planning procedures defined in the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) by assisting the unified commands in refining data and resolving shortfalls in their Operation Plan Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). The JDS also provides a means via the Worldwide Military Command and Control Systems (WWMCCS) intercomputer network whereby planned deployment data can be routinely maintained to ensure that the data is accurate and up-to-date. During exercises and crisis situations, the JDS complements the crisis action system procedures defined in the JOPS and Time Sensitive Operations Procedures (TOP) by monitoring the status of unit, logistic, and personnel deployments through updates to the deployment data base by Operational Readiness Report (OPREP)-1 messages from unified commands. The JDS manages changes in transportation schedules during deployment through interaction with the Transportation Operating Agencies (TOA) and it provides the JCS with an analysis of the impact on the deployment plan when the JCS decides to change the sequence of force deployment. The JDS also gives interested staff agencies and commands continuous reports on the current status of deployment during a crisis situation. During fiscal year 1980, the Army participated in conferences to refine TPFDD for various joint plans and in maintenance procedures for other joint plans; it also took part in several exercises involving the JDS during the year.

The Army continued to focus its attention on its mobilization planning deficiencies that were highlighted by MOBEX 76 and MOBEX 78. The response to these deficiencies came at two levels—further detailed examination of the problems and, concurrently, immediate reform of those flaws that were readily apparent. CAA conceived a study of the requirements for total mobilization to satisfy U.S. strategy in a worldwide conflict focused in NATO based on the after action report on MOBEX 78, which noted a lack of detailed assessment of manpower, resources, industrial base requirements, and force requirements during sustained conflict. The main thrust of this critique suggested a need to first reexamine the total problem


rather than immediately implement specific reforms. CAA designed the Requirements for Total Mobilization Study (RETMOB) to address the question of force requirements in a sustained conflict in an analytical way and to provide a point of departure for subsequent studies addressing other complex requirements of expanding and sustaining the Army in wartime. RETMOB focused on divisional forces rather than support units and attempted to determine the magnitude of the force needed under total mobilization requirements. After making certain assumptions, the study established a theoretical force ratio between friendly and opposing forces necessary for a successful defense of Western Europe and constructed a trend line of force levels over a period of time. The study, still in progress at the end of the fiscal year, consisted of three phases. In phase one, scenario development, the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) published a long war scenario on 1 March 1979. It focused on a protracted war which lasted for more than two years and required the United States to implement its plans for total mobilization. Phase two, scenario approval, involved refinement of the SSI study by ODCSOPS working in conjunction with CAA and the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence’s (OACSI) Red Team, a group of intelligence analysts who specialize in Soviet affairs and play the aggressor forces in war games. The results went to CAA on 26 June 1980. The third phase, force analysis, continued through the end of the fiscal year with a draft depicting division force requirements for Allied Forces, Central Europe, expected to be completed soon by CAA.

Army Command and Control Study (ACCS)-82 was chartered to make recommendations to improve CONUS command and control with emphasis on the transition from peacetime to wartime operations. Completed in the summer of 1979, ACCS-82 recommended development of an Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS). The DCSOPS established the AMPS Office in his Directorate of Operations in October 1979. The new organization sought to systematize and formalize Department of the Army mobilization planning. The office would clarify major command and Army Staff responsibilities and integrate the mobilization planning done by all the major commands. It would knit together near-term and mid-range planning and ensure that mobilization and deployment planning meshed. By applying automatic data processing to the planning process, the AMPS office sought to improve the results. ACCS-82 envisioned that the office would document the planning system, fill voids in the process, resolve conflicts in guidance, and compile a comprehensive set of instructions which would provide usable centralized


guidance to all Army commands, both active and reserve components.

The instructions, the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS), were scheduled for publication in four volumes beginning early in fiscal year 1981. The AMPS staff envisions AMOPS as a single, integrated planning system which will support Army participation in joint operations and deployment planning, and support mobilization and deployment planning under the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Department of Defense Mobilization Master Plan, and the Department of Defense Policy Guidance for Contingency Planning, still in draft form as of 30 September 1980. In addition, AMOPS will provide short-range, current capability planning and replace the current Army Capabilities Plan and Headquarters Department of the Army Mobilization Standard Operating Procedure, and dictate revision of selected Army regulations. Principal planning products of AMOPS will be the HQDA Mobilization Plan and major command mobilization plans, which collectively will be called the Army Mobilization Plan.

The Army also began developing the Mobilization Base Requirements Model to provide a method of determining the manpower, equipment, and force structure required in CONUS to mobilize, deploy, train, and sustain the total Army during full mobilization. The work consists of three phases. During the first phase, which ended 30 September 1980, a Department of the Army study group developed an initial design concept and defined the scope to the CONUS base. The second phase, scheduled for completion on 1 July 1981, will involve the design of a model and creation of a preliminary program. During the third phase, CAA and a private contractor will complete programming, testing, and implementing the model. The CAA anticipated completion in April 1982.

In fiscal year 1980 the Army introduced the CAPSTONE program. It aligns active and reserve component units in accordance with their wartime mission. CAPSTONE reflects the requirements of a mature European theater (D plus 90 days) and the concomitant expansion of the major commands in CONUS to train, deploy, and sustain twenty-four divisions as well as prepare for total mobilization. It is the basis for major improvements in unit planning and training for their wartime role.

The Army developed the Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS), an automated data processing system, to assist in the preparation for and rapid execution of personnel mobilization actions and thereby correct deficiencies revealed in the 1976 and 1978 mobilization exercises. MOBEX 78 demonstrated that prepositioning


data on reserve personnel at mobilization stations greatly assisted the process. During 1979, RCPAC worked with representatives from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER), the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN), and FORSCOM to develop a set of procedures that the Army could use to mobilize the members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and to accession all reserve component personnel, both unit and IRR, to the active component data base.

The resulting system, MOBPERS, seeks to complete as many actions as possible during peacetime so that transfer of information will be minimal after M-day. It requires ODCSOPS to provide complete mobilization locator data (ALOC) and authorization (VTAADS) data to MACOMs, MILPERCEN, RCPAC, and the mobilization stations on a periodic basis. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) provides RCPAC with the mobilization requirements. RCPAC will utilize NG unit personnel data to identify the reserve component mobilization requirements. Using the total active component and reserve component requirements, RCPAC will preassign IRR members to mobilization stations based on requirements of each unit at the station. It will furnish the mobilization stations with the reserve component unit and IRR accession data. MOBPERS will generate up-to-date reports identifying shortfalls and assets for use by RCPAC, ODCSPER, FORSCOM, MILPERCEN, specialty branches, and mobilization stations. Monthly MOBPERS reports to mobilization stations will advise the installation commanders what personnel will become available upon mobilization to meet requirements to fill early deploying units and to staff installation requirements.

MOBPERS gives an installation commander a unique flexibility during mobilization. He can use the unit that MOBPERS has selected for an IRR member or change the assignment. Having the basic information prior to mobilization allows the installation commander to adjust assignment priorities as required. MOBPERS also develops a list of excess personnel by military occupation specialty (MOS) for each unit on an installation. The installation commander can reassign excess personnel, regardless of component, to other units to “top them off” prior to deploying. This procedure, called cross-leveling, has generated considerable concern in the Army National Guard for fear that Guard units could lose authorized personnel as well in the absence of written ODCSPER and FORSCOM guidance on cross-leveling limitations and procedures. During the year, the Army limited cross-leveling to units within a single installation. In fiscal year 1981 it proposes to test cross-leveling between installations.

The Army fielded MOBPERS throughout the service at an RCPAC-hosted conference conducted from 8 to 11 September 1980


in St. Louis, Missouri. The conference trained users in MOBPERS procedures; distributed MOBPERS pre-position data to mobilization stations; discussed the interrelationship between MOBPERS, the Standard Installation Division Personnel System (SIDPERS), and SIDPERS-Wartime (WT); and provided information on personnel procedures for use during MOBEX 80. The SIDPERS stores individual data about members of the active and reserve components so that it can be transferred and updated automatically without the need to fill out additional forms. SIDPERS-WT is a streamlined version of the peacetime SIDPERS. In the former the number of data items per individual is dramatically reduced.

During the year, the Army developed a program for the recall of retired Regular Army and reserve component personnel if they are needed in a future full mobilization. RCPAC worked on a data base on retired personnel. The major commands and the field operating agencies have identified CONUS positions on tables of distribution and allowance (TDAs) and mobilization TDAs that could be filled by retirees. RCPAC provided an analysis of an assets-requirements match to ODCSPER on 11 October 1979. It was one of the deciding factors to continue the Retiree Mobilization Program.

Section 672 (a)(1), Title 10 United States Code provides authority for ordering members of the Retired Reserve to active duty in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress. Section 3504, Title 10 United States Code provides that the President may order any retired member of the Regular Army to active duty. An opinion by the Office of The Judge Advocate General indicated that the Army can issue preassignment orders to Regular Army retirees, but to meet statutory requirements Retired Reservists can only be issued instructions predesignating their mobilization station. When the contingencies of Section 672 (a)(1) are met those predesignated Retired Reservists who are needed will be issued mobilization orders.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed to age ceilings below which retirees would be subject to recall: general officer—64, warrant officers—62, and all others—60, excluding 0-1s and E-4s and below. The Army identified retirees in three categories. In Category I, they meet age and grade criteria, were not retired for permanent disability, and retired less than five years ago. Category II retirees are the same as Category I except that they retired more than five years ago. Category III consists of all others.

HQDA Letter 601-80-2, 26 March 1980, established a revised time schedule for development of the retiree recall system and preassignment of retired Army personnel for mobilization; set up a pilot program for the issuance of mobilization preassignment orders to some Regular Army retirees beginning in May 1980 and extension


of this program during fiscal year 1981; and provided policies, procedures, and responsibilities for implementation of the fully extended program.

The pilot program began in May 1980 with the mailing of mobilization preassignment orders to 1,102 Category I Regular Army retirees preassigning them to Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Lewis, Washington; and Fort Riley, Kansas. These orders direct when and where to report for active duty following news media announcement of full mobilization. The Army expects full expansion of this program to all Category I Regular Army officers and enlisted men and Category II Regular Army officers in January 1981. Provided that Congress establishes the necessary statutory authority, the Army will ultimately expand the Retiree Mobilization Program to include the issuance of preassignment orders to Category II Regular Army enlisted retirees and to Category I and II Army of the United States (AUS) retirees. As of 30 September 1980 the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was reviewing proposed legislative changes to allow preassignment of AUS retirees.

In fiscal year 1980, DOD approved the program to allow retirees to augment the sixty-seven AFEES. The department directed the Army to furnish 2,626 retirees, many of whom have medical skills. As of 30 September 1981, HQDA had worked out detailed procedures with the DOD and MEPCOM. The Army expects to fill all positions identified for retirees by January 1981.

The 1976 and 1978 mobilization exercises affirmed what experts already knew: The Army lacked a workable wartime personnel replacement system. The problem was threefold in that there was a doctrinal void on how the replacement system should work, there were no units in the force structure designated to accomplish the mission of CONUS based replacement operations to support a theater of operation, and the Army had not specified which command had the responsibility to establish personnel replacement centers.

ODCSPER, in conjunction with TRADOC’s Soldier Support Center, developed a CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) concept during fiscal year 1980. General Meyer directed that MOBEX 80 include a test of the concept. During the exercise, personnel identified as individual fillers would report to CRCs established at selected TRADOC installations, where they would be equipped, processed, and transported to nearby aerial ports of embarkation for movement to the theater of operations.

The great cantonments and facilities that supported the World War II, Korean War, and Vietnam War mobilizations are in the main gone from the real property inventory of the Army. The few remaining temporary World War II wooden barracks have little or no


life or utility left for future national defense emergencies. During fiscal year 1980, the Chief of Engineers initiated action to define construction requirements, project by project, for the first 180 days of a full mobilization of the force. The Corps of Engineers also reviewed and updated emergency policies, procedures, and organizations related to mobilization.

In preparation for its role in Exercise PROUD SPIRIT/MOBEX 80, FORSCOM established a separate MOBEX Task Force within its Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in December 1979. During the remainder of the fiscal year, the FORSCOM task force attended a series of planning conferences hosted by the JCS, the Department of the Army, and FORSCOM. It prepared the FORSCOM MOBEX 80 Exercise Directive as well as a FORSCOM Evaluation Plan and associated Data Collection Plan. It also planned for and conducted FORSCOM’s Installation Commander’s Conference in April 1980, which centered on mobilization and FORSCOM’s overall role and responsibilities in MOBEX 80, scheduled for November 1980. The task force developed a two-year cyclical model for the mobilization and deployment exercises that will use the lessons learned and issue improvements and solutions from the previous MOBEX in determining the objectives for the next exercise. In 1976, OMB published Circular A-109 which charged the services to perform mission area analyses. A mission area analysis (MAA) is an examination of the capability of an organization to perform its assigned functions. For the Army this means its ability to conduct land warfare and involves an assessment of its ability to counter the threat posed by the land forces of potential enemies at the present time, in the mid term, and in the long term. If there is a gap between enemy and U.S. capabilities in favor of the former, the question becomes one of how best to fill it. Is it a matter of changing doctrine or organization, improving existing weapons or developing new ones, or simply a question of more men and equipment? In 1979 the Department of the Army provided TRADOC with guidance on how to conduct mission area analyses and made the command responsible for twelve MAAs which encompassed its development functions. TRADOC reviewed existing studies within each mission area and began to develop a preliminary analysis, an effort the command labeled Phase I. Phase II will consist of a more comprehensive analysis. By the end of the fiscal year, TRADOC had completed six Phase I MAAs, had drafted four more, and had begun work on the remaining two.

Congress eliminated the Army’s Theater Nuclear Force Survivability, Security and Safety (TNFS3) funds for fiscal year 1980, and the Army removed the TNFS3 study funds from the fiscal year


1981 and subsequent budgets. The Department of Defense directed the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) to support the tactical nuclear survivability programs of the services. During 1980, DNA provided $182,550 in direct support of the Army’s TNFS3 program, $100,000 of which went to fund TRADOC’s System Analysis Activity (TRASANA) wrap-up of the TNFS3 program. The money was used for salaries and administrative expenses. TNFS3 action groups received $82,550. A total of five action groups (Pershing, Storage Sites, Cannon, Lance, and Atomic Demolition Munition) composed of U.S. and NATO military officers, government officials, and contractor personnel met to reduce the reams of TNFS3 studies to usuable documents. The most significant effort was to determine the priority of the system corrections. At the end of the fiscal year, the Army staff was reviewing the Pershing report while the Army was planning to publish a NATO version of the report, and the MACOMs were commenting on the Cannon report which was at the Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group (JAIEG) for review prior to release to appropriate allies. ODCSOPS anticipated that the storage site report would be published in January followed by the Atomic Demolition Munition and Lance reports.

TRADOC conducted the Tactical Nuclear System Program Review (TNSPR) on 18 and 19 December at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. System Program Reviews are meetings designed to provide senior Army management consideration of critical tactical nuclear issues which require special attention. Attended by senior Army leaders from the major commands and the Army staff, the sessions were chaired by General John W. Vessey, the Vice Chief of Staff. The TNSPR began with a series of background briefings on the concept for theater nuclear weapons employment, integrated battlefield operations, nuclear stockpiling, selective release procedures, NATO nuclear operations, and the TRADOC action plan. Four panels consisting of general officers then formed to address operations on the integrated battlefield; command, control, communications, and intelligence; battle support and reconstitution; and training.

Following the program review, TRADOC prepared a summary report which the HQDA TNSPR Steering Committee reviewed. The committee recommended to General Meyer that he approve the summary report recommendations, modified to include chemical issues common to the integrated battlefield. On 18 July 1980 the Chief of Staff directed TRADOC, DARCOM, FORSCOM, and Communications Command to develop implementation plans. One month later, a Chief of Staff Memorandum ordered the appropriate Army staff agencies to also prepare implementation plans. General Vessey will chair a series of in-process reviews on both chemical and nuclear


systems to coordinate action and measure progress. Users, combat developers, and trainers will participate. The first in-process review was scheduled for 18 December 1980.

During fiscal year 1980, the alleged use of chemical agents in Afghanistan and Laos focused attention on the Soviet capability to wage chemical war and to defend themselves in a chemical environment. These events presented a need to reassess the U.S. chemical warfare policy and capability. Secretary of Defense Brown directed the Defense Science Board to analyze the problem. The study, conducted at the U.S. Naval Ocean Systems Center, San Diego, California, from 3 to 15 August 1980, sought to: define the significant element of the chemical warfare policy, doctrine, and capability of potential enemies; determine the role of the U.S. offensive and defensive chemical capabilities in both long term and short term strategies; evaluate the U.S. chemical warfare defensive posture as it relates to inhibition of operational capabilities, equipment design, proper mix of science and technology to accomplish programs and the development of requirements; define the near term and long term research, development, test, evaulation and acquisition strategies for offensive capabilities; and determine the status of our NATO allies’ chemical warfare capability and how U.S. policy and posture should be coordinated. Participants in the study included representatives from all the military services, the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, academia, and industry.

They concluded that chemical warfare should receive more of a focus at the level of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the threat of chemical warfare was real and significant, the U.S. defensive chemical posture had to be improved, and demilitarization of U.S. chemical weapons was a serious issue that had to be resolved rapidly. The Secretary of Defense supported the idea of a focal point in his office and as an interim measure, pending a permanent arrangement, created an ad hoc Chemical Warfare Steering Committee with representatives from Defense, Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the military departments under the sponsorship of the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy. The Secretary directed the committee to recommend an organizational structure and develop a draft plan to guide Department of Defense management of chemical warfare.

On 28 and 29 May 1980 General Vessey chaired the Chemical System Program Review (CSPR) at Fort McClellan, Alabama. Five general officer panels considered the employment of chemical weapons and chemical force structure; chemical weapons systems; training; sustaining the force on the integrated battlefield; and smoke


doctrine, materiel, and training. The panelists defined the problem, conducted their analysis, and proposed remedial actions in terms of the concept of the integrated battlefield—the idea that the Army must be prepared to fight from the first day of war on a battlefield where all conventional, chemical, and nuclear weapons are employed. They produced the Chemical System Program Review Action Plan, a prioritized, time-phased blueprint for chemical readiness from the present to the early 1990s. It represented the first time that the Army had come to grips with the problems of chemical warfare and produced an action plan which moved chemical issues from the periphery and into the mainstream of preparing the Army for the modern integrated battlefield.

In cooperation with the Army, the American Defense Preparedness Association (ADPA)—a nonprofit organization composed of academicians, military officers, and industry representatives which seeks to facilitate coordination between industry and the military on critical defense problems—sponsored a symposium at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, from 30 October to 1 November 1979 on nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense systems. The Army hoped to stimulate increased interest among qualified domestic and foreign companies in NBC defense efforts. To lend emphasis to the importance with which the Army viewed chemical defense and industry’s potential role, the then Under Secretary of the Army, Dr. Walter LaBerge, presented the keynote address. Dr. LaBerge suggested the following priorities: total NBC protection for all new vehicles, effective collective protection for current vehicles, introduction of cooling for the individual protective overgarment, research and development management to ensure a comprehensive and coordinated effort, special emphasis on medical support systems and effective antidotes for self-aid and first-aid, and high level involvement and follow-up to sustain momentum and a sense of urgency. ODCSOPS, which handled the Army side of the conference, expressed satisfaction with the degree of industry involvement and the candid exchange of views.

TRADOC inagurated the how-to-fight series of field manuals in 1976 with the publication of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, “Operations.” With the series well along in production in fiscal year 1980, the command began planning the revision of the manuals to incorporate new doctrine based on the systems, tactics, and organizations stemming from the Army 86 Studies. The series revision would also incorporate the chemical contingencies of the “integrated battlefield,” and put more emphasis on the offense, on enemy operational maneuvers besides breakthrough operations, and on worldwide contingency operations as well as NATO.


In 1977 TRADOC began to emphasize doctrine in the development process. On 1 October 1979 the command established the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine to further order and clarify the production of doctrine. TRADOC intended the new office to formulate sound doctrinal fundamentals in the form of operational concepts for placement at the base of all future Army developments—materiel, force structuring, and training as well as doctrine. In June 1980 TRADOC published the first two of these operational concepts, one on Army tactical intelligence and the second on tactical command and control. The command followed in September with an operational concept for the employment of smoke.

General Donn A. Starry, the commander of TRADOC, also moved to settle the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth into its role as the organization that would manage a larger doctrinal literature program. Encompassing the how-to-fight and how-to-support manuals and other doctrinal literature produced by the Army schools, the integrating centers, and elements within the Combined Arms Center, the program would stress the active participation of instructors who are expert in their subject matter in the actual writing.

Throughout the year, TRADOC studied and developed concepts relating to chemical warfare, electronic warfare, personnel replacement operations, the integrated battlefield, and air-land operations in the 1990s. The command examined the logistical support concept for the Army portion of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). Work with the U.S. Air Force’s Tactical Air Command (TAC) contributed to some of the most important doctrinal work produced during the year. The two commands worked through the joint Air-Land Force Applications Agency at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, on a variety of projects. The two services continued development of joint air attack team tactics and training, a team concept that had proved effective in providing Air Force A-10 aircraft and Army attack helicopters a much higher degree of survivability than when each operated independently. The Applications Agency prepared a draft joint counter-air and air defense interim operational concept, and representatives of the two services agreed to a joint operational concept for suppressing enemy air defense.

In May 1978 the Department of the Army Select Committee approved twenty-one logistics concepts for use in planning, policy, doctrine, and training. HQDA directed Headquarters, TRADOC, to act as the executive agent for translating the concepts into doctrine and implementing the doctrine. U.S. Army Logistics Center (USALOGC) developed and obtained approval for the implementation plan. A


Department of the Army General Officer In-Process Review (GO IPR) examined the plan in June 1980. During the review, the Army decided that the role of the U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) did not include general support maintenance. At the end of the fiscal year, USALOGC was executing its implementation plan and preparing for a review of actions taken and planned for January 1981.

The U.S. Army Missile and Munitions Center and School initiated a study of munitions system support structure (MS3) in 1975 to determine the doctrine and organizational structure for conventional and nuclear ammunition support and for missile supply and maintenance support best suited for the period 1976 to 1980. The study concluded that the Army should establish ammunition transfer points (ATPs) in the brigade trains of divisional and separate brigades, replace the current direct support/general support conventional company with separate direct support (DS) and general support (GS) units, combine the existing DS and GS special ammunition companies into a DS/GS unit, create a missile support battalion to provide general support of missile systems, improve the man-machine ratio to provide increased efficiency, and incorporate the throughput of ammunition into doctrine.

Throughput of ammunition is the concept that ammunition should be shipped as far forward as possible, bypassing intermediate storage areas and supply echelons in the system rather than transporting it in successive stages, thereby avoiding multiple handling. HQDA reviewed the original study and requested that TRADOC forward additional information. The command provided a transportation impact assessment, a manpower analysis paper, and revised organizational documents. Further staff work uncovered the need to identify the source of manpower spaces for the establishment of ATPs in active component divisions. DCSOPS and DCSLOG identified the necessary trade-offs during the development of Total Army Analysis (TAA) 83-87 in August and September 1983. The Army programmed implementation of the conventional ammunition DS and GS companies and ATPs for fiscal year 1983. The development of doctrinal concepts following the completion of the original draft resulted in a new concept for missile supply that was incorporated into the echelons above corps study. Work by a variety of agencies including the Army staff, TRADOC, and the Army Logistics Center resulted in a modification of the original MS3 organizations to enhance supportability in the reserve components. DCSLOG expected final approval of a modified version of the MS3 study in early November 1980.


Training and Schooling

“In any epoch, the difference between a rabble and an effective professional Army is training,” notes General E. C. Meyer. TRADOC is charged with the development of Army doctrine, organization, equipment, and training. Its mission has placed it in the middle of the controversy over the all-volunteer Army. The public debate has involved many misperceptions. A high school diploma, for example, is not an accurate indicator of intelligence, but it does imply that the graduate possesses the self-discipline and motivation needed to succeed in a long-term task. The real definition of quality, noted General Donn A. Starry, TRADOC commander since July 1977, is military professionalism—a combination of the virtues of competence, commitment, candor, and courage. Well designed training can promote the first trait and help establish an environment that encourages the others to flourish.

In January 1979 the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans requested TRADOC to review the Skill Qualification Test (SQT) program and to recommend changes to streamline it, reduce administrative costs, and make the SQT a more effective training tool. TRADOC completed its review late in fiscal year 1979 and submitted its proposals to the Department of the Army. After a painstaking examination by the Army staff, General Meyer approved the proposals on 29 January 1980. The general strategy for the revised Skill Qualification Test included: shorter tests, less written work, more job orientation, emphasis on performance, concentration on current skill level only, faster feedback, and testing of common tasks. For soldiers in grade E-4 and below, the skill test would not become part of the soldier’s permanent record. The Army intended to implement these changes as soon as the TRADOC schools could incorporate them. In practical terms, however, due to the long lead time in preparing tests, only some changes occurred in fiscal year 1980, the bulk are to take place in fiscal year 1981.

During the spring and summer of 1980, the SQT became a subject of intense debate in Congress. Members of the Senate and House Armed Services Committee used low performance scores on the 1978 and 1979 tests to support arguments regarding the quality of the soldiers. The Department of the Army countered by stating that the SQT was primarily a diagnostic aid in training. It was not a measure of aptitude or trainability. Poor results stemmed from a combination of factors which included the poor design of some tests, high personnel turnover in some units, and unit trainers not yet geared to cope with increased demands of the individual training system.


While the final results of the 1980 tests were not available at the end of the fiscal year, preliminary indications showed a general trend of improved scores. Commanders and NCOs understood the program better and were more comfortable with its requirements. Within ODCSOPS the results permitted the muted hope that the Skill Qualification Test program had turned the corner.

The Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO)—which addresses all aspects of officer education, training, and professional development from precommissioning through career completion—continued with phased implementation during the reporting period. On 21 November 1979, HQDA published a detailed implementation plan which set forth Chief of Staff decisions and guidance as action requirements and target dates for Army staff agencies.

Planning continued for opening the Combined Arms and Services Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in April 1981 with 120 students. The course, which is designed to provide requisite staff skills for duty at division and higher level staffs, will gradually expand through 1985, when all captains will attend the nine-week course between their seventh and ninth years of service.

The Army intends to expand the officer basic courses, originally scheduled for fiscal year 1984, at the earliest possible date in accordance with the wishes of the Chief of Staff. The revised courses will last four weeks. The infantry, field artillery, military police, transportation, ordnance, signal, and chemical schools will revamp their course in fiscal year 1982. The Army will expand the remaining courses in 1983.

On 19 September 1980 the Chief of Staff approved a TRADOC proposal to retain officer advanced courses in their present format. General Meyer thereby reversed a previous decision to initiate precommand courses and short temporary duty (TDY) functional courses for captain-level training. He also directed that TRADOC provide required training for officers upon designation of a second specialty. TRADOC conducted a detailed analysis of enlisted initial entry training, the basic individual and advanced individual training which all new recruits receive when they first enter the Army. The TRADOC study concluded that training should be expanded. More training would develop a more disciplined soldier and alleviate currently recognized skill training deficiencies in the program. TRADOC proposed to expand the length of basic training and one station unit training by one week and the content of programs of instructions by two weeks. The new approach increased emphasis on soldier skills: weapons; physical training; basic rifle marksmanship;


guard duty; nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare; first aid; hand grenades; individual tactical training; and marches and bivouacs received greater attention than in the past. Three new subjects—communications, map reading, and opposing forces—were added. All the major commands (MACOMs) approved the TRADOC recommendations.

Concomitantly with the decision to expand initial entry training came a decision to make it tougher. The perception had grown in the service that standards had declined over the past few years, and a consensus had developed that existing basic training challenged women but not men. Consequently, the new soldier was not tough enough in skills requiring great endurance, strength, and stamina. For over a year prior to January 1980 the Army had experimented with MOS-related physical fitness standards in initial entry training. In that month General Meyer met with General Starry to review the situation. They agreed that the MOS-related system was too complex and was at the root of the lower standards. TRADOC would develop a standard physical training test for all soldiers but with standards adjusted for the physiological differences between men and women. The physical training standards for male trainers had to be toughened.

The revised program separated men and women trainees. At the same time, to improve cadre leadership throughout the service, it standardized two-week cadre courses for all initial entry instructors and unit trainers. It revised the instruction to establish more demanding mental and physical standards. During fiscal year 1981, TRADOC will undertake a thorough evaluation of separate male-female companies and platoons in basic training to determine the optimum level of stress needed “to enhance and enrich” the combat readiness of initial entrants.

The Army undertook a number of actions to strengthen its physical fitness program in addition to the January decisions on initial entry training. In June 1980 General Meyer approved physical fitness testing for soldiers age forty and over. Previous policy had exempted personnel over forty from the physical training test. As a safety precaution, the Chief of Staff limited the over forty test to the two mile run for at least the first year of the program. Another provision in the new policy provided for special medical screening for over forty personnel in conjunction with their biennial or annual physicals. The screening system is aimed at identifying personnel with high risk for cardiovascular disease. The Army Medical Department (AMEDD) tested it at Fort Benning, Georgia, in September and October 1979, and planned to field the final system in fiscal year 1981.

DOD directed the Army in June 1980 to conduct a physical fitness


symposium for the Department of Defense. The symposium, conducted at Airlie House, in Airlie, Virginia, from 17 to 19 June, attempted to determine what actions the services could take to improve the physical fitness of their personnel. Representatives from the services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and physical fitness experts from the civilian community attended. Following the symposium, the conferees gave the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics a list of requirements for improving the physical fitness of armed services personnel.

As fiscal year 1981 approached, the Army mapped out future directions in its physical training program. The new physical training test, scheduled for implementation in October 1980, will consist of pushups, situps, and a two-mile run. The Army staff would prepare a new field manual (FM) to replace the two current manuals (FM 21-20 for men and FM 35-20 for women). Scheduled for publication in early 1981, the new manual would also outline the over forty program. At the end of the year, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel considered measures to strengthen and equalize penalties for officers and enlisted personnel who were overweight or out of shape.

In January 1980 TRADOC correctly predicted that the large number of soldiers scheduled for one station unit training in the summer would severely tax the capacity of Fort Benning, Georgia. A contingency plan developed in March called for TRADOC to provide basic individual training for infantry riflemen and then ship them to tactical units on an individual basis. FORSCOM divisions which provided advanced individual training would also become units of initial assignment. Implemented in April, the program evolved so that it became one of “train and retain.” Fort Jackson no longer served as a funnel. Recruits immediately went to their division for basic individual training. The new initiative grew out of the success of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) in recruiting unit of choice soldiers to begin their training at the same time, remain together throughout basic and advanced individual training, and continue to serve together in the division which trained them. Virtually all FORSCOM divisions participated in the program which, when it ends in January 1981, will have involved some 3,400 soldiers. Analysis of the infantry rifleman advanced individual training program will provide valuable data for the company replacement program now under examination.

On 10 June 1980 General Meyer sent a letter to all commands which implemented the Army-wide Standardization Program. The program seeks to standardize procedures followed by soldiers to maintain and operate major systems. The rationale is that uniform practices will eliminate much wasted time spent teaching soldiers local


modification of basic tasks. Phase I of the program deals with combat arms units; gunnery crew drills; nuclear, biological, and chemical procedures; combat vehicle preoperational checks; and training management. Phase II will add selected tactical features, support procedures, and further training management procedures.

The Battalion Training Management System (BTMS), developed earlier, is part of Phase I of the standardization program. BTMS identifies the critical training management tasks at each leadership level in the battalion. Beginning in February 1979 and extending into fiscal year 1980, TRADOC’s Army Training Board worked in conjunction with FORSCOM to present a series of training workshops for active and reserve component officers and NCOs who had not been exposed to formal instruction in the Army’s latest training concepts. BTMS consists of one seminar and four workshops conducted concurrently during one week. Topics covered include how to plan, conduct, and evaluate performance oriented training. The program’s secondary aim consists of creating within the division or installation a nucleus of experts who can conduct continuing “train the trainer” workshops.

By 30 September 1980, all FORSCOM active units had received BTMS workshops and were sustaining the program with internal resources. General Robert M. Shoemaker, the commander of FORSCOM, gave the BTMS high marks.

There is no question that this TRADOC developed, standard way to teach unit leaders how to train better is a very powerful tool. We are seeing a definite upswing in training proficiency of our leaders after they have applied the lessons learned in BTMS.

Western Command completed its BTMS instruction during the year. In May, Eighth United States Army completed BTMS cadre training, and USAREUR began its BTMS cadre training in August, anticipating completion by the end of December. The TRADOC staff prepared a draft Field Manual 25-2, How to Manage Training, which was distributed for comment in September. The manual incorporates the BTMS system and, when approved, will replace Training Circular (TC) 21-5-7, Training Management in Battalions.

The Training Management Control System (TMACS) is an automated aid to help the unit commander plan training, evaluate the benefits and resource impact of training plans, and record training accomplished and resources expended. Designed for operation by soldiers without specialized computer backgrounds, TMACS was extensively tested in the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 82d Airborne Division, and the 172d Light Infantry Brigade in 1978.

Both the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Financial Management and the Chief of Staff


approved implementation of TMACS throughout the Army as a common costing methodology for unit training. This means that all battalions in the service will calculate the cost of individual training events the same way by using a common list of training events: the number of miles traveled, the amount of ammunition consumed, etc. The battalion training day (BTD) will measure training intensity. The differentiation between equipment and nonequipment intensive training, measured in terms of cost per event category in a BTD, will permit increased accuracy in determining training costs. General Meyer designated the ODCSOPS as the proponent agency for TMACS, and assigned FORSCOM responsibility for fielding the system. The system should begin to affect the Army budget in 1982 and will be fully implemented during 1983.

Fiscal year 1980 marked the second full year of operation for the Training Ammunition Management Information System (TAMIS), the automatic data system that compiles ammunition expenditure data to ensure authorizations are not exceeded and to provide historical collaboration of annual requirements. Experience gained through TAMIS contributed to better balanced ammunition procurement programs in the 1981 budget and in the 1982 through 1986 program objective memorandum. In both cases procurement is less than required to provide training ammunition at historic levels. The Army extended the TAMIS to most CONUS installations during fiscal year 1980.

Constraints on training continued during the fiscal year. Ammunition shortfalls, inadequate land and facilities, and the increasing costs of fuel, parts, and moving to and from training areas reinforced the move toward greater emphasis on training devices and simulators. In addition to improving quality of training, the devices and simulators can also compensate for resource shortages.

The Army made increased efforts to ensure that training devices supporting major new weapon systems received sufficient priority to allow early delivery concomitant with placing the weapon in the field. Major Army commands procured nonsystem training devices locally at accelerated rates to sustain soldier skills between infrequent major field and live firing exercises. Local procurement supplemented the continuing Armywide efforts.

During 1980, a program objective memorandum addressed training devices and simulators in detail for the first time. It described and justified each item of training equipment costing more than $1 million in any one year. This effort helped to focus Army and Department of Defense attention on the costs, cost trade-offs, and training benefits derived from the development and procurement of devices and simulators.


Faced with a decade of modernization, the Army moved to ensure that adequate training accompanied the introduction of new equipment. Army Regulation (AR) 350-35, New Equipment Training and Introduction, published in December 1979 and effective 15 January 1980, required coordinated planning by equipment developers, Army trainers, and the receiving organizations and encouraged innovative forms of training. Because some equipment that the Army planned to introduce in the eighties would require totally new concepts and skills and because commands differed greatly in their capacity to absorb new materiel, the regulation tailored training to meet local conditions. Planning for fielding the XM1 tank and infantry and cavalry fighting vehicles during fiscal year 1980 dramatically illustrated the new policy. The plan called for variations in the receiving major Army commands but provided for detailed crew-level training of every newly equipped unit over the years of materiel fielding.

During 1980, the Army made a major shift in emphasis in aviation training. It directed the major commands to perfect techniques and tactics to meet the current threat and to undertake a vigorous training effort to support the ground commander around-the-clock, with particular emphasis on providing support during adverse weather conditions.

To accomplish this new approach in aviation training the U.S. Army Aviation Center and School at Fort Rucker, Alabama, revised the Aircrew Training Manuals to reflect increased combat oriented individual aviator tasks and iterations. The Army directed the major commands and the U.S. Army Aviation Center standardization teams to emphasize combat mission capability when conducting unit evaluations. TRADOC began to develop a realistic joint airspace management plan. U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) expedited aircraft work modification orders which will improve the night vision goggle training capability. New aviators at Fort Rucker began receiving early training on meeting the threat posed by sophisticated Soviet weaponry. Instructors at Fort Rucker emphasized realistic nap-of-the-earth flying.

In fiscal year 1980 Army aviators flew over 1.2 million miles in rotary and fixed wing aircraft and over 275,000 hours in flight simulators. As more simulators become available, particularly those with visual displays, they will allow the substitution of simulator hours for flying time with no loss in efficiency but with considerable savings in cost.

Planning during the fiscal year for mobilization of the Army training base concentrated in two areas: refinement of earlier, staff generated capacity estimates and programming resources required to accommodate the training base expansion required for mobilization.


A thorough analysis conducted on an installation-by-installation basis revealed that while the mobilized training base could provide enough trainers to accept 133,000 new soldiers during the first month of mobilization, the availability of equipment and supplies might severely limit the training capability. Although the Army had sufficient equipment to accommodate this first month surge of trainees at the end of the fiscal year, other high priority claims might divert these supplies.

An exercise is planned for early in fiscal year 1981 to test equipment distribution during an emergency. Fiscal programming initiatives in the Army program objective memoranda for fiscal years 1982 through 1986 provide for substantial initial mobilization investments in supplies, planning, personnel, and equipment for the mobilization training base.

As a result of President Carter’s decision to upgrade the nation’s conventional warfighting capability in Europe, the Secretary of Defense directed the Army to increase the amount of Prepositioned Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) in Europe. Force Packaging Methodology, an Army program, provides planning levels for equipping Continental United States POMCUS units and late deploying reserve component units at levels as low as 10 and 50 percent of TOE, respectively, in order to achieve additional POMCUS and sustain the D to D plus 30 force. In October 1978 General Frederick J. Kroesen, the Vice Chief of Staff, directed the Army staff to define the impact of additional POMCUS and report it to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Army conducted two assessments to determine the Minimum Equipment Levels for Training (MELT) for active and reserve component units.

The purpose of active component MELT was to assess the impact on personnel, logistics, training, support requirements, and structure of a 30 percent equipment reduction and to identify approaches which would offset adverse impacts. FORSCOM conducted the assessment at Fort Carson, Colorado, from January through December 1979 and provided its report to HQDA on 19 March 1980. FORSCOM indicated that while a 70 percent equipment level can work, it does so only at high cost. Reduced equipment levels resulted in overextended resources and required intensive management of training, support, logistics, funds, personnel, and structure. MELT also caused negative training and readiness impacts due to increased turbulence and use of nonstandard techniques.

Reserve component MELT proposed to determine the minimum equipment levels required for training capabilities necessary to support war plans. An ad hoc group, sponsored by ODCSOPS, conducted the assessment with major command


participation. Results indicated that no single equipment level is appropriate for all units. Many factors influence required equipment levels, including geographic dispersion, training levels, unit strength, and deployment goals. Equipment withdrawals down to 50 percent will not meet reserve component premobilization or post mobilization requirements.

On 10 April 1980 General Meyer received a briefing on the results of both assessments. The Army will continue to meet established POMCUS objectives by selectively reducing equipment levels, using the parameters determined by the MELT assessments.

During fiscal year 1980, TRADOC developed a standardized Reserve Component Noncommissioned Officer Education System to enhance the professional development and knowledge of soldiers assigned to both Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve units. Established by combining the best of current ARNG courses, Army Reserve programs (to include the primary NCO course for combat arms), and active component lesson modules, the program focuses on training required of soldiers in combat arms, combat support, and combat service support units. The Army scheduled the program to begin formally on 1 October 1980. A number of ARNG State Academies and Army Reserve Schools incorporated these programs well in advance.

The Army also completed plans during the fiscal year to acquire adequate training land for combat units stationed at Fort Carson, Colorado. The shortage of space for maneuver training has adversely affected combat readiness of these units. Combat units need sufficient space to maneuver against an opposing force over actual distances in realistic time. It is essential that each battalion be able to train at its home station to attain basic combat skills before participating in advanced training at the Army’s National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. As early as December 1978, the Army approved studies which verified that existing maneuver training areas at Fort Carson were inadequate for mechanized training. Subsequent analyses identified two possible training sites in southeastern Colorado that are within one day’s travel from Fort Carson. Both sites contain over 200,000 acres which would provide adequate space for training while preventing environmental damage to the terrain from overuse. Units at Fort Carson would travel to the area twice a year to conduct mechanized maneuvers under simulated tactical conditions. The Army will select one site and later present it to Congress for approval.

The Army developed the concept of a national training center in 1976 to provide combat battalions advanced, intensive training and objective evaluations of unit performance on a realistic battlefield.


Common scenarios, instrumented ranges and permanently stationed controllers, an operations group and opposing forces (OPFOR) will eventually provide an independent measure of Army training readiness. The Army will phase the NTC into Fort Irwin over the next four years. By fiscal year 1984, 21 FORSCOM battalions will rotate to the NTC for two weeks annually. The Center will concentrate on training at the battalion task force level. Currently under license to the California Army National Guard, Fort Irwin will become a FORSCOM installation on 1 July 1981. FORSCOM is the lead agency in planning and operating the NTC. TRADOC has a support role; it is developing the NTC training environment.

Congress provided initial funding for the NTC in the fiscal year 1980 budget. These funds provided for initial staffing of the NTC, facility rehabilitation at Fort Irwin, and some initial startup costs. The Army published AR 350-50, which details the policies and major command responsibilities, on 15 March 1980. By 30 September, HQDA had approved the staffing levels of the NTC and Fort Irwin. The Army Science Board established an ad hoc subgroup to review the second generation of NTC instruments. Its interim report, published in September 1980, strongly supported the NTC program and recommended several actions to enhance the NTC instrumentation system. The Army also established a general officer steering committee during the year to oversee the establishment of the NTC. Chaired jointly by the Deputy Commanders of FORSCOM and TRADOC, the committee also includes the director of training, ODCSOPS, TRADOC’s deputy chief of staff for training, the assistant chief of engineers, the commander of the TRADOC Combined Arms Training Activity, and the commanding general of the NTC and Fort Irwin.

The Army’s training for urban combat remained inhibited in fiscal year 1980 because of the lack of adequate training facilities. Approximately 10 percent of U.S. Army units in Germany had access to training facilities. In the United States local initiatives at Forts Lewis (Washington), Campbell (Kentucky), and Benning (Georgia) provided innovative training for only a small segment of the force. The Army plans to construct urban warfare training facilities beginning in fiscal year 1981 and ending in fiscal year 1986. All U.S. divisional installations as well as the Hohenfels Training Area in Germany will receive a facility. The first, scheduled for Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1981, received Congressional approval during the fiscal year. The urban warfare training facilities, in addition to correcting a long neglected training deficiency, will provide the experimental training necessary for the validation of doctrine, combat developments, and equipment testing.


The JCS Exercise Program is an extremely important aspect of Army training. These exercises train the Army to participate in both joint and combined operations. The Army took part in forty-nine JCS exercises during the period 1 October 1979 through 30 September 1980. Six were command post exercises, four were communication exercises, and thirty-nine were field training exercises. The latter varied in size from battalion level operations to multi-division exercises such as REFORGER in Europe and TEAM SPIRIT in Korea.

Small unit (platoon and company) exchanges with allied countries continued during fiscal year 1980. During these exchanges, which are from two to four weeks in duration, visiting U.S. or allied small units participate in operational training with host units and become familiar with each other’s weapons and equipment. The active Army exchanged with Australia, Canada, Italy, New Zealand, Panama, and the United Kingdom. The Army Reserve exchanged with the United Kingdom, and the Army National Guard exchanged with Barbados, Norway, and the United Kingdom.

The Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) is an automatic data processing system which identifies the Army’s individual training requirements at any particular time at the MOS and at the course level. The training base then provides the class schedules designed to meet these needs. The major commands may then use ATRRS to fill the class vacancies.

The ATRRS underwent a major expansion during fiscal year 1980. A number of other agencies came into the system, including the Schools Branch, U.S. Army Military Personnel Center; DARCOM; U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia; U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky; U.S. Army Training Center, Fort Jackson, South Carolina; U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; U.S. Army Military Police School and U.S. Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama; U.S. Army Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Virginia; U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, Massachusetts; U.S. Army Ordnance School, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; U.S. Army Institute of Administration, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana; U.S. Army Missile and Munition School, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona; U.S. Army Judge Advocate General School, Charlottesville, Virginia; Defense Language School, Presidio of Monterey, California; Institute for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. The inclusion of these agencies represented the second phase in the expansion of the ATRRS to all Army schools and training centers. The Army anticipated completion of the third phase in fiscal year 1981.


ODCSOPS, TRADOC, the National Guard Bureau, and several user agencies initiated several improvements to the ATRRS during the year among which is a Mobilization Training Management System, a subsystem of the ATRRS which allows mobilization planning from the level of the Department of the Army staff to the individual installation. The systems team in the ODCSOPS Training Directorate made significant progress on relating the ATRRS to the Automated Recruit Quota System (REQUEST), an automated data system run by MILPERCEN which USAREC uses to manage recruitment. The team began work on linking the ATRRS with the Military Occupational Speciality, Enlisted Strength, and Personnel Management Forecasting System (FORECAST), an automated data processing system in the prototype phase. The team also expanded the Quota Management System, an on-line terminal system to reserve seats in Army schools.

The Senior Services Colleges (SSC) consist of the Army War College, Naval War College, Air War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National War College, and the British, Canadian, and Australian War Colleges. In fiscal year 1980, the Chief of Staff approved selection by specialty to attend the SSC. The 1980 Selection Board used this criteria to choose students for the 1981-82 academic year. The Selection Board indentifies the best qualified officers in each specialty and makes selections based on the specialty population of appropriate rank and experience in 50 percent of all selections. Minimum floors and maximum ceilings for all specialties ensure equitable distribution. The board makes the remaining selections from among the best qualified without regard to specialty. Concomitant with these reforms the Army began a gradual reduction in the years of eligibility for selection to sixteen through twenty-one years of service. It will allow exceptions “for singularly outstanding officers” with twenty-two and twenty-three years of service. This change will be complete in 1983.

The Army War College continued to work on creating a fixed site computer supported battle simulation system (wargame) for corps command groups during the year. The objective of the program is to sharpen that tactical decision making skills of Army senior commanders through conduct of two five-day exercises per year. The War College expected the program to become fully operational in 1984.

The college aimed pilot efforts toward the development of mission specific packages, a computer simulation for a specific mission, for the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) and VII Corps. The division level effort at Fort Riley, Kansas, resulted in a successful test of a prototype package in August 1980. This combined effort by


the War College and the contractor, Ketron, Inc., provided a good exercise of the 1st Division’s emergency deployment procedures and events at Fort Riley and equipment issue in Germany. Concurrent efforts with the VII Corps focused on development of a prewar package and a war-fighting scenario. The Tactical Command Readiness Program provided the potential for major commands to analyze, through use of wargame, “real world” problems ranging from predeployment, deployment, and combat to a return to predeployment status.

In approving the Review of Education and Training of Officers recommendations in May 1979, the Chief of Staff directed that TRADOC develop and test a standardized screening vehicle for use by the Officer Candidate School (OCS), Reserve Officer Training Corps, and the U.S. Military Academy programs. TRADOC hoped to implement a perfected program by 1 September 1981. It envisioned psychometric testing, a standard medical examination, and a performance-based assessment of leadership. TRADOC developed a concept for testing the two-year ROTC program assessment program proposed by RETO. The concept called for the Army to conduct the test during the 1981-82 academic year in sixteen schools across the country. Resources for the test would come from within programmed Army resources. TRADOC also continued development on Military Qualification Standard (MQS) I for the professional education and training of cadets and company grade officers through the tenth year of commissioned service. MQS I would provide minimum qualification standards for the U.S. Military Academy, OCS, and ROTC to standardize the competency level of lieutenants reporting to Officer Basic Courses. The Army planned to implement MQS I on a test basis at all schools in the 1981-82 school year.

TRADOC conducted ROTC Basic Camp at Fort Knox, Kentucky, in three cycles from 19 May through 14 August 1980. A total of 3,266 cadets reported to the camp, and 2,901 graduated. TRADOC held the ROTC Advanced Camps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Riley, Kansas; and Fort Lewis, Washington. Of the 7,612 cadets who attended, 7,256 graduated and 332 received commissions at the end of camp. At the request of the Department of the Army, TRADOC gave fifty-five ROTC cadets ranger training during the year. Working in coordination with the U.S. Army Infantry School, TRADOC developed a 14-day precourse of instruction in prerequisite military skills and physical fitness for ROTC cadets who volunteered for ranger training. The cadets then attended the regular 58-day ranger course at the Infantry School. Thirty cadets earned their ranger tabs.

The U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA) provides a


unique opportunity for selected senior noncommissioned officers to broaden their education and, in doing so, ultimately prepare for positions of greater responsibility. Until 6 June 1980, ODCSPER had both a policy and operational responsibility for the USASMA. On that date the Army transferred operational responsibility to the Commander, MILEPERCEN. ODCSPER retained policy responsibility and authority to approve the Letter of Instruction for USASMA Selection Boards, board membership, and selection board results. MILPERCEN became the office of record for the USASMA and assumed responsibility for maintaining the USASMA Policy Book, determining and announcing eligibility requirements, providing technical support to the board, and controlling and monitoring class assignments.

During fiscal year 1980, the Army devoted increasing attention to chemical operations. TRADOC established a separate Chemical School at Fort McClellan, Alabama, on 14 December 1979.

The Enlisted Education Branch, a new organization within the Office of The Surgeon General, became the focal point for all medical training issues involving enlisted personnel. Its primary responsibilities were to determine and validate the need for new military occupational specialties and additional skill identifiers and to develop training programs to support them. An additional skill, identifier indicates that an individual has added training in a specialty closely related to but distinct from his military occupational specialty. At the close of the fiscal year the branch was studying several high skill areas for inclusion into new enlisted medical fields, including health physics technician, cytotechnologist, cardiac pump perfusionist, echocardiographic technician, and urology technician.

In other medical training and education actions, the Continuing Health Education Branch developed and managed a series of ninety-four educational experiences entitled “Professional Postgraduate Short Course Program,” sponsored two Army Medical Department (AMEDD) national conferences to improve continuing health education opportunities offered by the Army, and successfully completed reaccreditation by the American Medical Association. Also during fiscal year 1980, the Military Schools Branch put into operation a computer-oriented Quota Management System (QMS). This effort involved preparation of solicitation documents requesting input on 177 AMEDD courses; these were distributed to twenty-six different addressees. Additional documents listing approximately 130 other Army and other federal agency courses were also distributed to eleven different addressees for input. The Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATTRS) forms a major portion of the QMS. The


ATTRS required constant updating of all AMEDD training requirements by component and participating agencies. Graduate Medical Education continued to be a strong viable program during the past year, providing high quality training and a key incentive to the health profession recruitment and retention effort.



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