Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1982

4

Manning The Army

The most important asset in the Total Army is people. Quality people, adequately trained and in sufficient numbers in all components-active, reserve, and civilian-are the key to success in maintaining the Army's combat capability.

During fiscal year 1982, the active Army succeeded in meeting both qualitative and quantitative recruitment goals, in large measure because of the higher compensation levels provided in fiscal years 1981 and 1982. The combination of bonuses and educational benefits available to enlistees, in addition to the pay, significantly helped the Army to reverse a previously unfavorable situation. For the first time in nearly a decade, military pay approached a level comparable to the private sector. With the optimum result in recruitment, the Army was in a position to be selective in acquiring as well as in retaining soldiers. The Army's continuing success in meeting near-term recruitment for the past two years enabled it to deny retention opportunities to soldiers who failed to measure up to Army standards.

The Army was dependent upon the reserve components as well as the active force for Total Army mission capability. Critical requirements for wartime combat support were assigned to reserve component units. They provided one-third of the Total Army's combat divisions and approximately two-thirds of its combat support. The personnel status of reserve component units, while still below desired levels, improved. The Army's manning goal was to provide enough reserve component personnel to man units at levels consistent with readiness objectives. The Army planned to continue improving its reserve component unit strength through extensive reenlistment programs and by recruitment of quality soldiers who would remain in the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. Toward this end, the Army expanded the Full Time Unit Support Program and actively supported the Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP). These initiatives were designed to provide full-time manning of both early-deploying and early-mobilizing-but-non-deploying reserve component units, and to improve recruitment and retention in selected reserve component units by paying cash bonuses and giving educational assistance.

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The strength level of the pretrained individual manpower pool of the reserve components remained unsatisfactory during the year, but did improve. Consisting of the Individual Ready Reserve, the Inactive National Guard, the Standby Reserve, and military retirees, this pool provided individual replacements for both active and reserve component units that would be required in wartime until the training base could provide replacements. This manpower pool had a shortfall of some 100,000 enlisted personnel in combat specialties, but contained a surplus of soldiers in several noncombat military specialties. To help eliminate the shortfall, bonus funds were requested for those who enlisted and reenlisted in the Individual Ready Reserve. Additionally, the Army requested authority to increase the total military service obligation from six years to eight.

Individual states also helped to improve the personnel status of the reserve components. Thirty-two states provided educational assistance and other benefits to National Guard personnel, and Hawaii extended benefits to selected reservists. These initiatives assisted in solving personnel acquisition and retention problems in the reserve components.

Even adequate strength levels lose some of their value when units suffer from personnel turbulence, which diminishes readiness and combat effectiveness. To eliminate the adverse impact of turbulence in the active force, the Army began a program of personnel stabilization and unit replacement under which soldiers train and work together and are assigned as a unit both overseas and in the United States. After three years, Personnel will form new stabilized units, be assigned to other jobs, or be released from active service, as appropriate.

The unit replacement system complements the American Regimental System program, the first phase of which was recently implemented. Composed of battalions linked under one regimental flag, or "color," the system is based on paired battalions serving in the continental United States and overseas. The regiment is the community in which a soldier is assigned and with which he identifies throughout his entire Army career. Although it is a nontactical unit, the regiment creates an environment that fosters cohesion and commitment while improving morale, training, and readiness.

To enable these new manning programs to work, the Army must make the maximum number of personnel available for service in combat-related units and supporting activities. In pursuit of this objective, the Army implemented during the past two years a civilian hire substitution program to replace military spaces

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with civilian spaces where feasible. Civilian substitution freed soldiers to perform their combat roles while enhancing readiness by increasing stability and expertise in the Army's sustaining base.

The Army relied heavily on its civilian work force of 391,000 dedicated men and women to perform tasks necessary for the daily operations of the three uniformed components. These tasks directly affected the readiness and war-fighting capability of America's Total Army.

Because a well-trained, uniformed, and professional civilian work force must have competent leadership to be most effective, the Army focused more effort on leadership development. The Total Army's continuing goal was to develop leaders at all levels who possessed the highest ethical and professional standards and who were committed to mission accomplishment and to the well-being of subordinates. Because of its critical importance on the modern battlefield, the fundamentals of leadership were stressed at all levels of military instruction. Courses in ethics and professionalism were established at all commissioned officers schools and were under development for noncommissioned and warrant officers schools.

Excellence in the Total Army requires a strong cadre of noncommissioned officers (NCO), since the NCOs are both the backbone of the fighting units and the first-line trainers and supervisors of new and junior soldiers. Teaching the NCO corps how to lead, train, and teach is therefore a critical task. Consequently, the Army put increased emphasis on providing leadership and technical training both at schools and in field units. Believing that greater initiatives must be taken by junior leaders if the Army is to be successful in peace and war, the Army encouraged a command climate which reenforced basic values and empowered leaders at all levels to act decisively and creatively. Personnel systems were aligned to support unit performance and leadership development at the lowest levels. These efforts developed tomorrow's leadership while simultaneously improving the readiness of today's Total Army.

The active Army entered fiscal year 1982 with an authorized strength of 780,300 men and women. In February 1982, the Army asked Congress to increase the end strength to 784,000. During June, however, it became apparent that the prospect for congressional approval of the increase was not favorable. Con-

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tributing to the decision to keep the end strength at 780,300 was the additional cost associated with unprogrammed growth of the actual strength in the second quarter to 791,000. To achieve an end strength of 780,300, the Army implemented policies emphasizing the recruitment and retention of quality soldiers and the discharge of poor performers. As a result, the overall quality of the force was significantly improved, and the active Army reached an end strength of 780,391. On 10 September 1982, only twenty days before the end of the fiscal year, Congress raised the end strength authorization to 782,500, too late for the Army to retarget the actual end strength.

Throughout fiscal year 1982, the Army implemented a series of personnel management and strength policies to improve the quality of the force and to meet end strength and budget limitations. These policies enabled the Army to raise its standards for enlistment and reenlistment, to assign "re-up" objectives by MOS, and to reduce the migration rate of first-term soldiers in the combat arms. With the availability of day-to-day strength information, management capabilities within the Army have been greatly enhanced.

During fiscal year 1982, the active Army force structure was manned on the average at 101.4 percent of authorizations, with an average overmanning of 9,200 for the year. On 30 September 1982, active Army strength was as follows:

^a An end strength of 782,500 was authorized on 10 September 1982, too late to program for fiscal year 1982.

Fiscal year 1982 was an excellent recruiting year for the Army in terms of both quality and quantity of accessions. As in fiscal year 1981, the Army met its programmed recruiting goals. Army recruiters reached their fiscal year 1982 objectives of 127,000 volunteers on 12 July 1982, nearly three months before the end of the fiscal year. The commanding general of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command stated that "the service was more successful in attracting people this year than at any time since the government scrapped the draft in 1973 in favor of filling its military

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ranks with volunteers .... Because of the recruiting success, the Army has stopped enlisting people for fiscal year 1982 and started stockpiling for fiscal year 1983."

In fiscal year 1982, the active Army recruited a total of 130,198 men and women, more than 5,000 over the total programmed objective of 125,100, and 104 percent of its objective. Total nonprior service (NPS) accessions were 120,353 (104 percent of the goal); prior service accessions were 9,845 (104 percent of the goal). Of the non-prior service recruits, 103,571 (86 percent) were high school diploma graduates, a 9.3-percent improvement over fiscal year 1981.Recruits in mental category IV numbered 23,121, or 19.2 percent, well below the 25-percent ceiling mandated by Congress and an improvement of 36.5 percent from fiscal year 1981.

Recruiting trends for the last three years are shown in Table

TABLE 1 - ACTIVE ARMY RECRUITING TRENDS

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Recent success in Total Army retention programs has also resulted in end strengths that surpassed those programmed for each element of the active Army and the Selected Reserve, but a significant shortage still existed in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), which is the Army's pretrained manpower pool, and in aviator strength. As a result of both post-Vietnam War force reductions and the end of the draft, IRR strength declined from over one million men and women a decade ago to a low of under 150,000 in 1977. The strength in fiscal year 1982 of about 213,000 was far short of the 453,800 required. Efforts were being made to correct the deficiency. Army aviator strength was improving, and the Army's warrant officer objective should be reached during fiscal year 1983. The fiscal year 1983 budget included funds to increase the number of trained warrant officer aviators from 800 to 1,000.

While general economic and social conditions have been significant factors in the notable improvement of recruiting, other elements also contributed. These included higher pay, expanded resources, better management, varied training assignment and enlistment options, enhanced educational benefits, and growing public support for young men and women in uniform. The Selected Reserve Incentive Program (enlistment-reenlistment bonuses and educational benefits) and the affiliation bonus program especially contributed to success in the reserve components.

The 1980 Military Compensation Act increased pay by an average of 14.3 percent in 1981 and made it competitive with private sector pay for the first time since the mid-1970s. This factor contributed to the dramatic turnaround in accession and retention of military personnel over the past two years.

Another important component of the recruiting package was the enlistment bonus, a highly flexible and efficient means of improving recruitment in critical MOSS. Enlistment bonuses and the skills for which they were offered could be easily adjusted to reflect ever-changing supply and demand, thereby allowing the Army to react quickly to recruiting problems that might arise because of an improved economy or a reduction in the youth population. Provisions of the Uniformed Service Act of 1981 increased several special and incentive pays, raised the maximum enlisted bonus from $5,000 to $8,000 for four-year enlistments and set a $4,000 maximum for three-year enlistments on a test basis, and improved travel and transportation allowances.

The reenlistment bonus for the IRR was tied to skills that were expected to be in short supply upon mobilization. It authorized up to $900 for three-year reenlistments. Contingency funds

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for the Army have been requested to produce an estimated 20,000 three-year reenlistments in the IRR.

To manage recruiting more efficiently, the Army undertook a detailed and intensive market research study called Recruiter Zone Analysis. It involved a review of demographics and other significant factors of the market in each recruiting district. The analysis considered variables such as current population density of seventeen- to nineteen-year-olds, the number and location of high schools, unemployment, and historical propensity to enlist. Using these variables, the Army could make the best use of recruiter strength and location of stations to take advantage of the market. Under the Ultra Veterans Educational Assistance Program (Ultra VEAP), nearly 4,700 soldiers enlisted for three or four years in one of sixty-two qualifying specialties in exchange for benefits of up to $20,100. Soldiers who participated contributed up to $100 monthly to receive full benefits. To qualify for Ultra VEAP, a soldier had to have no prior service; be a high school diploma graduate; have an Armed Forces Qualification Test score of 50 or more and be in mental category I-IIIA; enlist for active duty; enroll in the Basic VEAP for a minimum of twelve months; and enlist in one of seventy-two selected military occupational specialties.

Reenlistment and recruitment programs of the Army were complementary: improved quality recruitment led to more and better qualified reenlistments. Among the many changes under way in personnel management that brought about improvements in recruitment and reenlistment were continued progress in quality accessions; better alignment of the career force with noncommissioned officers (NCO); filling the total force with appropriate skills in the right grades; building stability and fostering cohesion in units; and providing commanders with increased authority to retain model soldiers and to eliminate ineffective ones.

In the past, soldiers with more than eighteen years of service were, almost without exception, permitted to reenlist or extend their enlistment to remain on active duty until they reached their twenty-year retirement mark. However, a clarification of policy outlined in interim change 16 to AR 601-280, effective on 1 January 1982, stated that major field commanders could deny this opportunity to soldiers who had bars to reenlistment imposed or approved by the Department of the Army (DA), who had refused to take required action to comply with DA assignment instructions, or who did not meet height and weight standards of AR 600-9. The change also denied reenlistment to soldiers who did not make corporal or specialist four during their

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first three years of service, but allowed privates first class to extend their overseas duty long enough to complete a tour, and permitted extensions to soldiers who needed additional time to satisfy a DA-imposed service obligation. Another example of the Army's tougher standards was a new requirement that reenlisting soldiers have three area aptitude test scores of 95 or better on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) Test.

Department of the Army reenlistment objectives for the first quarter of fiscal year 1982 were transmitted to the major commands in September 1981. These objectives represented a change from past practice in that the Army designated specific MOs objectives for initial-term soldiers (those reenlisting for the first time), midterm soldiers (those reenlisting for the second or subsequent time up to ten years of service), and careerists (those with more than ten years of service). The MOs reenlistment objectives were part of the Army's plan to acquire the right number of soldiers with the appropriate qualifications at the proper time.

The Army also used reenlistment policies to help overcome a shortage of 6,000 noncommissioned officers in selected combat arms skills as well as a shortage of 2,400 NCOs in other specialties. This was accomplished by allowing soldiers to reenlist only in their current skills or in shortage skills. Selective reenlistment bonuses for critical skills assisted in this process, as did the fact that opportunities for promotion were higher in skills with greater shortages.

A total of 87,184 men and women reenlisted in fiscal year 1982. This was 1,494 more than had been expected when goals were set for the fiscal year. Significantly, reenlistments were higher than expected in the combat branches of infantry, armor, and artillery, where the Army has experienced chronic difficulties since the end of the draft nearly a decade ago. Active Army reenlistment achievements for fiscal year 1982 were as follows:

Effective 1 April 1982 the Army changed its policies to expedite the separation of "marginal performers." Commanders were now able to discharge marginal performers under the Expeditious Discharge Program (Chapter 5, AR 635-200) without the

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soldier's consent. Commanders could also discharge soldiers with less than six years' service involuntarily and without offering them a board of officers to consider the matter. These changes implemented Department of Defense policies which permitted the identification and separation of individuals who had not adapted to military service. Soldiers separated under the revised policies would receive either an honorable or general discharge.

A close look at the data pertaining to the three-year attrition rates in the active Army indicates two key factors influencing attrition: one was related to the quality of accessions (educational levels of the recruits) and the other to sex. As indicated by the figures in Table 2, rates for soldiers who were high school diploma graduates (HSDGs) tended to be lower than those of soldiers who did not graduate. AFQT categories within the education group were also factors influencing attrition, mainly during the training periods. For instance, high school diploma graduates who were classified as AFQT mental category IV normally had higher attrition during training than the high school diploma graduates in mental categories I-IIIA.

Through fiscal year 1978, attrition rates for male recruits decreased considerably, largely because of the Army's intensified efforts to increase accessions from groups with lower risk of attrition and reduce accessions from higher risk groups. However, quantitative recruiting efforts to meet manpower requirements during the period resulted in slight increases in the three-year attrition rates for fiscal year 1979 through 1980.

TABLE 2 - THREE-YEAR FIRST-TERM ATTRITION RATES
(as percent of accessions)

^a Forecasts based on current historical data and targeted policy changes.
^b High School Diploma Graduates.
^c Non-High School Diploma Graduates.
^d Basic Army policy denied enlistment to NHSDGs; a small percentage of GED certificate holders were enlisted (10% of female accessions during FY 77 and 5% and 1%, respectively, during FY 78 and FY 79).
^e No NHSDG female enlistees programmed during fiscal year 1982.

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The three-year attrition rate of first-term female soldiers recruited since fiscal year 1979 is approximately 15-20 percent higher than that of their male counterparts and has increased considerably among the recruits of fiscal year 1980, largely because many of these recruits were not high school diploma graduates.

After extensive staffing and coordination, a complete revision of AR 570-4 "Army Management," was published in September 1982 with an effective date of 15 October 1982. Highlights of the changes in the regulations included definition of authorities delegated to MACOM (Major Army Command) commanders and those reserved for Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA); definition of borrowed military manpower (BMM) and updated policies; new controls for unscheduled overtime that were realistic and auditable; improved position identification policies; and procedures for submission and coordination of TDA (tables of distribution and allowances) changes requiring HQDA approval.

A readiness problem encountered by the Army in past years was using soldiers from tactical units to perform base operations and installation support functions instead of civilians because of a constrained civilian manpower authorization. Borrowing military manpower had an adverse effect on personnel and unit readiness and decreased job satisfaction. In recognition of this impact Congress authorized the Army an increase of 6,500 civilians in fiscal year 1981 and 10,300 in fiscal year 1982-a total of 16,800-to replace borrowed military manpower and improve near-term readiness. By the end of 1981 about 6,000 civilians were hired, and a total of 1,100 noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and 4,300 other soldiers were returned to their units. During fiscal year 1982, another 6,000 civilians were hired with a concomitant return of enlisted men and women to their soldiering duties.

In fiscal year 1982 the Army's officer program achieved notable success. The officer strength of the active Army continued to increase, rising from 101,850 to 103,463 during the year. The following table breaks down the officer end strength by grade.

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TABLE 3 - ACTIVE ARMY OFFICER GRADE STRUCTURE
30 September 1982

^a This figure includes 354 reimbursable active duty personnel; otherwise total is 103,109.

Most of the increase in strength during the past year was among officers with more than four years of service, reflecting improved retention. Although the number of senior active duty officers was growing at a slower rate than the total number of officers, the average grade among active Army officers remained unchanged for two years at roughly 0-3 (captain). This meant that officers had more years of service in grade.

The growth in officer strength did not offset the increased operational demand for another 1,871 officers and the Army's need to have 13,437 officers either attending military or civilian schools or in transit to new assignments.

Early in fiscal year 1982, the Department of Defense proposed management reform legislation for general (and flag) officers in response to a congressional request for accountability and validation of star-rank positions. This represented DOD's first attempt since the Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954 to streamline service procedures for determining numbers, assignments, and qualifications of general (and flag) officers. Key provisions in the proposed legislation would create uniform system accounting for general (and flag) officer requirements; new grade tables and a revised method of determining general (and flag) officer ceilings based on force structure and size, with special support requirements counted separately; a standardized system for all services in reviewing, validating, and reporting on star-billet requirements; and clearly defined authority within DOD to con-

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trol general (and flag) officers. The proposal would exclude the minimum grade requirements on general (and flag) officers assigned to the reserve components and the judge Advocate General Corps.

The recruitment and retention of medical personnel, a persistent problem area in the officer corps, steadily improved in fiscal year 1982. The Army's recruitment and retention efforts exceeded by about one hundred the number of active duty Army Medical Department officers authorized in 1982-16,532 (actual strength) as compared with 16,438 (authorized strength).

Although shortages in several specialties eased, the number of officers in the Dental Corps, Medical Service Corps, and Army Medical Specialist Corps fell slightly short of the minimum peacetime requirements. (Table 4)

TABLE 4 - ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OFFICER STRENGTH
30 September 1982

As a result of current initiatives, Army Medical Department officer strength in the Army Reserve was expected to increase significantly. Nonetheless, Army Reserve Troop Program units were still 55 percent short of physicians and 28.5 percent short of nurse needed upon mobilization. Critical shortages also remained in surgical specialties.

A joint recruiting effort by the Army Surgeon General's Office and the Army Reserve has been in progress since late fiscal year 1980. It produced 656 physicians in fiscal year 1981 and 550 physicians in fiscal year 1982; it was projected to produce 450 physicians in fiscal year 1983 and annually thereafter for troop program units.

Active duty officer accessions totaled 9,417 in fiscal year 1982. Of these, 3,998 men and women came from the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), 885 from the United States Military Academy (USMA), 770 from Officer Candidate School (OCS), and 3,764 from other sources, including 1,633 warrant officers.

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In addition, 8,486 officers entered the Army Reserve, and 6,058 officers received Army National Guard appointments. (Table 5)

TABLE 5 - OFFICER ACCESSIONS
Fiscal Year 1982

^a IRR transfers included in other category; all IRR transfers to ARNG receive an ARNG appointment.

On 15 March 1982 the Precommissioning Branch of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel became the Officer Accession Branch and assumed responsibility for Total Army officer procurement from all sources.

Future officer accessions were based on several projections. The ROTC production should reach the 10,500 range in 1985. Approximately 5,000 officers would be brought to active duty; the remainder would be reserve component accessions. Beginning in 1985 the majority of ROTC duty accessions would be scholarship recipients. The number of those commissioned early and brought to active duty beginning in 1985 would be between 400 and 600. Beginning in school year 1983-1984 12,000 ROTC scholarships would be funded for award. It was estimated that by 1985 the ROTC Scholarship Program would yield about 3,500 officers. All graduate delay students would be brought to active duty after obtaining advanced degrees. USMA output would remain at approximately 900 per year. Beginning in 1986, active OCS would be reduced to an annual output of 550. Within the voluntary active duty program (selective recall, volunteers for active duty, and Commandants Program), selective and invitational recall should remain in the 500 range. Direct appointments in the special branches would be stable, while warrant officer strength would increase by 201 and 487 in fiscal years 1983 and 1984, respectively.

Officer accessions in the reserve components rose as ROTC production increased. In fiscal year 1982, ROTC accessions made up 22 percent of reserve component accessions. By fiscal year 1988, 44 percent of reserve component accessions would be from ROTC, and in the future years as many non-graduate ROTC

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components. As a result, there would be a corresponding decrease in the accessioning of officers in the reserve components from the state OCS program.

The Army Medical Department active duty accessions in fiscal year 1982 were met, with the exception of two Medical Service Corps specialties: sanitary engineering and nuclear medicine. Emphasis shifted from recruiting volunteer physicians to filling vacancies at the community hospital level and accessioning hard-to-get specialists. Medical center assignments for volunteer physicians were restricted to certain critical specialties, while recruitment counselors emphasized the search for qualified physicians to fill the ranks of the post hospital staffs. Although there was a decrease in the number of volunteer physicians (164 in fiscal year 1982 compared with 259 in fiscal year 1981, 332 in 1979, and 326 in 1978), this group still constituted 28 percent of total Medical Corps entries on active duty for fiscal year 1982. Improved physician retention and anticipated increases in accessions from other sources, such as Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP) and Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS), will offset the projected reduction in the Medical Corps volunteer program.

Twelve universities were added to the list of Army ROTC host institutions which had an Army ROTC detachment physically located on their campus. This increase brought the count of host institutions to 315. The number of universities and colleges at which ROTC was available to students grew to over 1,400. This included extension centers that were staffed by ROTC detachments on campuses close by, in the host institutions, and at cross-enrolled schools, which had students academically enrolled who attended ROTC instruction at other schools. The twelve universities added to the list of host institutions were Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Duke University, University of South Maine, Memphis State University, University of Louisville, Winona State University, University of New Orleans, University of Texas at San Antonio, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Northern Arizona University, Boise State University, and California State University at Fresno.

School year 1981-1982 was the first year for allocation of ten two-year scholarships at each of six military junior colleges (MJC): Kemper Military School and College, Wentworth Military Academy and Junior College, New Mexico Military Institute, Valley Forge Military Academy and Junior College, Marion Military Institute, and Georgia Military College. The allocation and award of these scholarships was in compliance with 10 USC 2107.

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During fiscal year 1982, the Army experienced chronic shortages of field grade officers managed under the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). These were the officers assigned to a control branch or specialties other than the Chaplain's Corps, Judge Advocate General's Corps, Medical Corps, Army Medical Specialist Corps, Medical Service Corps, Dental Corps, Veterinary Corps, and Army Nurse Corps.

To alleviate the shortage of approximately 4,600 field grade officers needed to fill authorized duty positions and remain within the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) constraints, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel developed a plan to align the Army officer personnel inventory with its authorized duty positions in the field grade ranks. Designated as Force Alignment II, the plan would replace 3,600 field grade positions with company grade positions and an additional 1,000 field grade positions with civilian positions. When fully implemented by fiscal year 1984, Force Alignment II would enable the Army to eliminate chronic officer shortages in the field grade ranks.

During fiscal year 1982, the Army reached its goal of filling medical and health service personnel positions that had been in critical shortage during the post-Vietnam War period. Consequently, the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) was in a position to be selective with all of the health professionals it recruited. In general, except for some critically needed surgical subspecialties, the Army's physician shortage was over. There was concern, however, about the effect that the recently enacted (DOPMA) would have on bringing certified health professionals into the Army. Previously, physicians and dentists were given four years of pay credit for formal education (post-bachelors degree), but DOPMA erased that; consequently, entry salaries for physicians and dentists were cut in some cases by as much as $4,000.

In order to provide the armed forces with an officer management policy that was uniform, equitable, and tailored to contemporary manpower requirements, the Department of Defense and Congress in fiscal year 1981 agreed, after sixteen years of effort, on the DOPMA. Congress passed it on 21 November 1980, the President signed it on 12 December 1980, and it went into effect on 15 September 1981. Although DOPMA affected all commissioned officers, including generals, its primary impact would be to create a single promotion system for all field grade officers on active duty and eventually to produce an active Army field grade officer corps that is all Regular Army. The new system would replace the old dual system of permanent Regular Army

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(RA) ranks and temporary Army of the United States (AUS) ranks, as well as an active Army corps of field grade officers that, since the Vietnam War, has consisted of about 7 percent Other Than Regular Army (OTRA) officers.

Following enactment of DOPMA, the Secretary of the Army approved the establishment of promotion competitive categories in October 1981. The nine categories (JAG Corps, Chaplain Corps, Medical Corps, Dental Corps, Army Nurse Corps, Medical Service Corps, Veterinary Corps, Army Medical Specialist Corps, and Army Competitive Category) served as the foundation upon which the Army's officer personnel management system was built.

The Army established an active duty list (ADL) containing the names of Regular Army and eligible reserve officers from which new active duty promotions would be made. Promotion resulting from an ADL board was permanent for both regular and reserve officers. During fiscal year 1982, the grade in which officers were serving on active duty on 15 September 1981 became their permanent grade.

The first ADL promotion selection boards were conducted for grades of captain through colonel during fiscal year 1982. While the up-or-out provisions of the old promotion system remained, there were some important differences. Previously a Regular Army major was guaranteed service until about twenty-one years-the time required for two nonselections to lieutenant colonel. Since ADL promotions were permanent, the time needed to be passed over twice for promotion to a Regular Army lieutenant-colonel was reduced to about seventeen years. The RA officer's only guarantee of reaching and going beyond retirement under the new law was to be promoted to lieutenant colonel.

To accommodate the move toward an all-regular officer corps, the maximum allowable Regular Army officer force was increased from 49,500 to 63,000. The Secretary of the Army approved an all-regular field grade force with promotion to major as the break point for Regular Army integration. This action would be accomplished in phases and affected officers in three categories differently. First, reserve officers on active duty on 15 September 1981 selected for or serving in grades of major and above were administratively offered RA integration if they met certain basic criteria. If they elected to continue service as a reserve officer, they would be released from active duty at twenty years. Second, reserve officers on active duty on 15 September 1981 serving in the company grades would automatically be offered RA integration when selected for promotion to major. These

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officers also could reject integration and could serve until they were eligible for retirement after twenty years, if they so desired. Finally, reserve officers commissioned after 1 October 1981 who were selected for promotion to major had to accept RA integration or leave active duty. Those electing not to become RA would leave active duty voluntarily and would not be eligible for separation pay.

A revision of Army Regulation 600-101, approved in August 1981 and effective on 1 October 1981, transferred to the various Army schools primary responsibility for setting educational and skill standards for commissioned officer specialty codes, warrant officer military occupational specialties, and enlisted career management fields. The proponent schools advised and assisted the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and the Military Personnel Center in developing and carrying out personnel management policies and programs and in operating personnel systems within the purview of their specialty interest and responsibility. The schools dealt with their specialties only in a collective sense and did not have authority over decisions regarding individuals, which were normally handled by the Military Personnel Center or commanders of reserve component personnel agencies.

The Army also instituted changes in the specialty classification system for commissioned officers. Effective 1 March 1982 the engineer specialty career field was revised to improve descriptions of duty, function, and responsibility. Significant in this revision was the creation of Specialty Code 22, Topographic Engineer, formally a skill identifier within Specialty Code 21, Engineer. Specialty Code 31, Law Enforcement, was renamed Military Police.

Effective 1 September 1982, the operations specialty career field was also improved. Significant in this revision was the elimination of the training development specialty career field (formerly Specialty Code 28) and inclusion of these functions within the operations specialty career field. Also included in the newly defined operations specialty career field was the manpower-force management function (formerly an additional skill identifier). The title of the operations specialty career field was changed from Specialty Code 54, Operations and Force Development, to Specialty Code 54, Operations, Plans, Training, and Force Development.

On 15 September 1982, a new concept was approved which would result in a separate career management system for special operations personnel. The new system would include commis-

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sioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel. The system principally encompassed personnel who had been formerly classified in unconventional warfare skill identifiers. Action was under way through a working group to carry out this decision.

In the Army women are authorized to serve in 92 percent of all officer, warrant officer, and enlisted specialties. Women may be assigned to all units except battalion and smaller-sized units of infantry, armor, cannon field artillery, low-altitude air defense artillery, combat engineers, and certain aviation units.

Approximately 10 percent of the active Army was female, while the female share of Army National Guard and Army Reserve troop units was approximately 5 percent and 16 percent, respectively. In February 1981, the active Army announced a decision to pause at a level of 65,000 enlisted women pending a review of policies and programs on the role of women. The Army's criteria, as in all personnel management reviews, would be used to improve combat readiness and enhance mobilization capability. Initial assessment of this review indicated that further analysis would be needed through 1982 and 1983.

As of 30 September 1982, more than 144,000 women were serving in the Total Army: 75,000 in the active force, 20,000 in the National Guard, 34,000 in Army Reserve troop units, and 15,600 in the Individual Ready Reserve.

In January 1982, the Secretary of Defense directed the military services to "aggressively break down those remaining barriers that prevent us from making the fullest use of the capabilities of women in providing for our national defense." Secretary Weinberger's memorandum to the service secretaries affirming the administration's policy to expand the role of military women was a strong, positive statement in an otherwise uncertain year for women in the Army.

In May 1982, the Army announced that it would discontinue coeducational basic training by September, because men were not being challenged enough physically in integrated training companies and were not attaining their full potential. The effective date of the new policy was later changed to October 1982. Although basic training would remain the same for both sexes, male and female recruits would be separated at the company level and below. Men and women had been training in integrated companies since 1978. Training cadre assignments would

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continue to be made regardless of gender, with female drill instructors training men as well as women: Under the new system, female recruits would receive basic training only at Fort Jackson, South Carolina; Fort Dix, New Jersey; and Fort McClellan, Alabama.

Many women leaders considered the decision to end coed basic training a step backward. Army spokesmen, however, insisted that it was not meant to discriminate against women but to toughen the men.

During fiscal year 1982 women were also concerned about delays in completing the review of current Army policies affecting women, which began in May 1981. The Women in the Army Policy Review Group finally completed its study in August 1982 and submitted its report through appropriate staff channels to the Secretary of the Army. By the end of the fiscal year the report still had not been published, although some of the review group's findings were released, stirring up considerable controversy over the future role of female soldiers.

On 26 August 1982, the Secretary of Defense announced the decision, based on the policy review, to increase the number of enlisted women in the Army over the next five years from 65,000 to 70,000. This figure was well below the goal of 87,500 enlisted women set by the Carter administration. At the same time, the Army announced that, as a result of the review group's clarification of the combat exclusion policy, an additional twenty-three military occupational specialties would be closed to women. Furthermore, new physical strength standards and tests would probably bar most women from many other jobs in the Army. Administration officials maintained that those changes would help rather than hinder women by assigning them to jobs for which they are better suited.

Equal opportunity is a program concerned with human development that allows talent, ability, and initiative to flourish through fair and impartial treatment. Equal opportunity programs help commanders and managers create an environment free of discrimination in any form-one that is conducive to cohesion and mission accomplishment.

The Department of the Army Affirmative Action Plan provided a direct link between the efforts of the Department of the Army and the major commands to achieve equal opportunity for all military personnel and their families. Recent assessment re-

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ports indicated that progress toward fiscal year 1982 goals had been favorable concerning women and minority enrollment in officer commissioning programs, promotions, command selections, career schooling, and other career development areas.

As of 30 September 1982, 37.4 percent of active duty personnel were members of minorities (29.4 percent black, 3.9 percent Hispanic, and 4.1 percent others). Blacks made up 8.8 percent of commissioned officers, 6.2 percent of warrant officers, and 32.6 percent of the enlisted force. (Table 6) There remained a tendency for blacks to be even more heavily represented in certain enlisted career management fields that characteristically have had large numbers of blacks-supply petroleum handler and food service.

TABLE 6 - MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN ACTIVE ARMY
30 September 1982
(in percentages)

This is minority representation data only. Data may be different from racial data because white and black information excludes all Hispanics.

A presidential task force on military manpower concluded that the high propensity of blacks enlisting and reenlisting in recent years was based on "the proud heritage of Black service in the military since the beginnings of the nation, which has contributed strongly to the prestige of military service in the Black community," and "the fact that military service offers Blacks better opportunities for responsible work at fair compensation than are available to them in many segments of the private sector."

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The following table shows black enlisted accessions in the Army as a percentage of Total Army enlisted accessions.

The objective of the civilian equal employment opportunity program was to ensure a working force reflective of the nation's diversity in all occupations, grade levels, and employment benefits.

For fiscal year 1982, the Army developed an affirmative action plan for evaluating civilian job categories to determine the representation of minority group members and women. Where groups were underrepresented in the Army work force, they were targeted for increased placement efforts.

During fiscal year 1982, the Army achieved eight of its ten goals for the employment and advancement of minorities and women in the civilian work force. The total of minority personnel in full-time, permanent, appropriated fund positions increased from 59,233 (19.3 percent) to 65,004 (20.3 percent) and the number of women from 115,989 (37.7 percent) to 124,374 (38.8 percent). In grades GS-13 and above, minorities rose from 1,366 (6.4 percent) to 1,501 (6.8 percent) and women from 1,012 (4.8 percent) to 1,167 (5.3 percent). On 30 September 1982 there were 15 members of minority groups and 7 women among the 317 filled positions in the Army's Senior Executive Service (SES), compared with 10 minority group members and 4 women out of 292 filled SES positions on 30 September 1981.

Another equal opportunity program the Army used with success was the Severely Handicapped Affirmative Requirement Program (SHARP). The purpose of this program was to increase the number of handicapped employees, including disabled veterans, with special emphasis on individuals with severe handicaps. Accessions for the eighteen-month period from 1 October 1979 to 31 March 1981 were 116,540; of these, 451 or.39 percent were severely handicapped. Between 1 April 1981 and 30 September 1981, 307 of 37,887 accessions or .81 percent

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were severely handicapped individuals. As of 30 September 1982, 6 percent of the Army's work force was made up of disabled veterans, including 1 percent who were 30 percent or more disabled.

An area of continuing concern was the evidence or perception of sexual harassment. As part of the Army-wide effort to combat sexual harassment, special training programs for military and civilian personnel, both male and female, were begun. During fiscal year 1982, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command developed standardized training to counter sexual harassment for use in all enlisted and officer service schools and in ROTC courses. The Army also produced standard, high quality training programs on the prevention of sexual harassment to present to civilian employees and their supervisors. Finally, a revised Army Regulation 600-21, "Equal Opportunity Program in the Army," which explicitly defines sexual harassment and prohibits it in the Army, was prepared for publication during fiscal year 1983.

The Army considered alcohol and drug abuse a readiness issue and a command problem. Commanders focused on the impact of abuse on the readiness of both units and individuals. The Army acted to eliminate drug pushers from its ranks. It also tried to rehabilitate abusers; those who could not be rehabilitated were separated from the Army.

The Army Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program (ADAPCP) provided alcohol and other drug abuse identification, treatment, and rehabilitation for active duty military personnel, civilian employees, family members, and Army National Guard and Army Reserve personnel on active duty. The 1,984 military and civilian personnel associated with the program staffed 3 residential treatment centers, 5 USAREUR extended care facilities, and 179 counseling centers. Each year, the ADAPCP returns to duty approximately 19,000 soldiers, the equivalent of a reinforced division. About 3,000 rehabilitation failures are separated annually. Recent success in recruiting and retaining more high quality soldiers enabled the Army to toughen its standards on alcohol and other drug abuse during fiscal year 1982.

In a complete revision of Army Regulation 600-85, "Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program," effective 1 January 1982, the Army updated its policies in this area. At the

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same time, senior leaders began a concerted effort to reduce the adverse effects of alcohol and other drug abuse on soldier proficiency, morale, and combat effectiveness. Marijuana and alcohol, the most heavily abused substances among younger service members, became key targets in the overall program to toughen standards and reduce substance abuse.

The revised regulation introduced a three-track system of treatment for soldiers exhibiting varying degrees of involvement with drugs and alcohol. Track I provided education in short-term awareness for persons displaying limited involvement with drugs, particularly marijuana. Aimed at the occasional or experimental abuser, it emphasized the adverse physical, psychological, and career consequences that could occur as a result of abuse. Track II, designed for individuals with more profound abuse patterns, provided a variety of outpatient counseling services. Track III provided intensive short-term residential treatment, followed by supportive outpatient programs for a period of one year.

Soldiers enrolled in rehabilitation programs were expected to show individual initiative and steady progress in overcoming alcohol and drug-related problems. Commanders closely monitored their progress through consultation with ADAPCP rehabilitation teams. If it became apparent that an individual was not responding, the commander could separate the soldier from the service after ninety days of treatment. Those who failed rehabilitation could receive honorable or general discharges, as warranted by their military records.

As a further crackdown on marijuana and other drugs, commanders who had probable cause to believe that members of their units were using drugs could direct that urinalysis testing be conducted on any of them. Positive lab results from these specimens could be used as evidence in judicial and administrative procedures.

Other initiatives included increased awareness through education, a program to upgrade counselor skills, better program assessment through expanded management information, and improved identification capabilities by using portable testing devices. Positive support to provide wholesome alternatives to drugs and alcohol, such as physical fitness centers, better living and working conditions, and improved morale and welfare activities, was essential to achieve the Army's goal of reducing alcohol and drug abuse among soldiers.

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Although it was difficult to measure discipline in the Army with precision, statistics on certain infractions and punishments gave a useful insight into trends in the discipline of the force. Table 7 compares indiscipline indicators for fiscal years 1974 through 1982. This year's indiscipline rates were below those of fiscal year 1981 in all but one category-drug offenses other than use and possession of marijuana, which registered a slight increase of less than 1 percent. More important, discipline has improved significantly in all categories since the inception of the all-volunteer force, with particularly impressive results in desertion and absences without leave.

In fiscal year 1982 absenteeism was at the lowest level in recent history. The desertion rate of 11 per thousand was the lowest since 1962, and the AWOL rate of 27.3 per thousand was the lowest since the Army began recording AWOL data regularly in 1952. Factors contributing to the favorable rates included better quality of men and women entering the Army, command emphasis on preventing absenteeism through leadership, and increased unit cohesion.

The number of court-martial cases also decreased, from 10,438 in fiscal year 1981 to 9,856 in fiscal year 1982. The breakdown of court-martial statistics for fiscal year 1982 was as follows:

^a Special courts-martial involving bad conduct discharges.

Nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice, was imposed in 140,191 cases, compared with 156,497 cases in fiscal year 1981.

During fiscal year 1982 significant changes were made in Army regulations on military justice, the Manual for Courts-Martial, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Public Law 97-81 amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) so that commanders could place on involuntary excess leave those service members who had received a punitive discharge and were awaiting appellate review of their court-martial. The law also placed a two-year statute of limitation on petitions to The Judge Advocate General for review under Article 69, UCMJ, and permitted service secretaries to define, by regulation, the reasonable availability of individually requested military counsel.

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TABLE 7 - INDISCIPLINE INDICATORS
(rate per 1,000)

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Executive Orders 12340 and 12383, signed 20 January 1982 and 23 September 1982, respectively, amended the Manual for Courts-martial Executive Order 12340 changed the standards and procedures for acting on requests for individual military counsel, for dealing with prisoners after trial, for serving Courts of Military Review decisions and petitions for review to the Court of Military Appeals, and for submitting applications to The Judge Advocate General under Article 69, UCMJ. These changes implemented the Military Justice Amendments of 1981. Executive Order 12383 changed the pleading, proof, and punishment for controlled substances and drug offenses; defined the offenses of distribution and possession with intent to distribute; and generally increased maximum punishments for drug offenses, except for off-duty possession and use of less than thirty grams of marijuana or certain other drugs having a relatively low potential for abuse. These were specifically defined as schedule IV and V controlled substances in Section 812, Title 21, United States Code.

A revision of Army Regulation 27-10, "Military justice," was published on 1 September 1982 with an effective date of 1 November 1982. It incorporated twenty-one permanent and numerous interim changes to the 1968 edition of the regulation. Major changes were made in the administration of nonjudicial punishment and the filing of related records in the official personnel file of the service member.

Proceedings under Article 15, Uniform Code of Military justice, were now divided into formal and summarized versions, allowing commanders more flexibility in dealing with minor offenders and enabling them to dispose of minor infractions more quickly. The new, summarized Article 15 carried a maximum punishment of extra duty for fourteen days, restriction for fourteen days, an oral reprimand or admonition, or any combination thereof. These proceedings would not become a permanent part of the soldier's official military personnel file. Instead, records of summarized Article 15s would be maintained in the unit personnel files for two years after the date of punishment or until the soldier transferred to another unit, whichever came first. Records of formal Article 15s, however, would be kept in the individual's official file either in the performance or restricted portion, at the discretion of the commander imposing the punishment. Under certain conditions, commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel in grades E-6 and above could petition the Department of the Army Suitability Evaluation Board to transfer records of nonjudicial punishment from the performance to the restricted portion of the personnel file.

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The revised regulation on military justice also provided for more direct involvement of senior noncommissioned officers in the nonjudicial punishment process.

The prisoner population in the Army correctional system reached a low of 1,661 (1,531 Army) in February 1978, but then began to increase steadily, reaching a high of 3,124 (2,804 Army) in July 1981. During fiscal year 1982 the number of prisoners remained high, and by the end of the year some stabilization became apparent. On 30 September 1982, there were 2,994 prisoners in Army confinement facilities, including 2,559 Army personnel. The high number of Army prisoners was attributed to tougher treatment of offenders by commanders and the longer, more severe sentences imposed by courts-martial judges.

The Army Correctional System in fiscal year 1982 consisted of twelve CONUS detention facilities, six OCONUS facilities, the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks (USDB) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the U.S. Army Retraining Brigade (USARB) at Fort Riley, Kansas. Installation detention facilities held pretrial prisoners as well as short-term prisoners after trial. The USDB held long-term prisoners, and the USARB operated a retraining program for selected offenders, offering the opportunity to return to duty. Because of declining numbers of prisoners eligible for the retraining program, the brigade assumed the additional mission of confinement without training. This adjustment allowed successful management of the high prisoner population.

After a year of study to determine the best management structure for Army law enforcement, the U.S. Army Military Police Operations Agency was formally and permanently organized on 22 March 1982 as a field operating agency of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. The agency had been established on a trial basis in March 1981 to monitor implementation of Army law enforcement policy, develop and promulgate operational and technical guidance for military police, and provide guidance and assistance to other Army law enforcement elements.

The Secretary of the Army was the DOD executive agent for administering the U.S. Enemy Prisoner of War and Detainee Program according to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of 12 August 1949. During fiscal year 1982 the Army made steady progress in addressing problems concerning enemy prisoners of war and other detainees that had been raised during training exercises MOBEX 78 and 80 and at a special worldwide conference held in October 1979. In the first update of Army policy on this subject since 1963, Army Regulation 190-8, "Enemy Prisoners of War: Administration, Employ-

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ment, and Compensation," was published on 1 June 1982. In addition, agreements were made with the Republic of Korea and the Federal Republic of Germany which would allow the United States to transfer custody of prisoners of war captured by American forces to host nations while retaining the responsibility of processing and accounting for them. Since host nation support agreements provided only a partial solution to the problem, the Army also developed plans to evacuate enemy prisoners of war to the continental United States.

Civilian personnel play a major role in the Army's readiness and modernization. They develop, procure, store, maintain, and distribute military weapons, equipment, repair parts, clothing, and supplies; provide medical services; and keep open the Army's vital communications network. Civilians also support base operations and training and help improve the quality of life for soldiers and their families.

Although the ratio of military personnel to Army civilians in military functions dropped sharply at the end of the Vietnam War and remained almost constant through fiscal year 1981 (about 2.4 to 1), the number of civilians in military functions (excluding indirect hire support personnel overseas) decreased greatly in absolute terms-from 367,300 in June 1972 to 315,000 in September 1980. Since 1974 the number of Army civilians in military functions dropped about 10 percent, while overall federal employment decreased only 1 percent over the same period. Despite a supplemental budget request, congressional approval, and a hiring surge in the Department of the Army, civilian strength, including indirect hires overseas, only increased from 360,500 to 371,200 in fiscal year 1981.

Recognizing the problems caused by the shortage of civilian personnel in the Army and the negative effect that borrowing military manpower had on readiness, Congress authorized the Army an increase of 6,500 civilians in fiscal year 1981 and 10,300 in fiscal year 1982, for a total of 16,800, to replace borrowed military manpower and to improve near-term readiness. This increase resulted in an authorized civilian end strength in military functions-those directly supporting military readiness-of 383,000 in fiscal year 1982.

As of 30 September 1982, 410,855 civilian personnel under appropriated funds were in the Department of the Army. Approximately 31,600 of these were employed in civil functions,

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predominantly in the Corps of Engineers. At the end of fiscal year 1982, total Department of the Army strength not under appropriated funds was 33,125, a decrease of 507 from fiscal year 1981., Of the total, 4,018 were foreign nationals, 7,176 were military personnel employed in off-duty hours, and 21,931 were U.S. citizens.

While the recent increases in civilian personnel strength allowed the Army to return the equivalent of one division of soldiers to their units and to strengthen the logistics base, the Army today still has fewer civilian employees than it needs to meet mission requirements. The growing need for Army civilian personnel generated by force modernization and other mission requirements will probably continue to outpace increases in civilian strength ceilings. Furthermore, the shortfall will not be covered by manpower spaces saved through consolidations, realignments, or outside contracting for commercial activities. As the gap between workload requirements and actual civilian strength widens, civilian manpower will be an increasingly scarce resource.

Programs have existed for years, particularly in overseas commands, to help family members of soldiers and civilian employees to find jobs as Army civilians. These programs permit sound use of available skills and support the volunteer Army. The Army currently employs over 20,000 family members in overseas civilian jobs alone.

Emphasis on employment assistance to family members increased during fiscal year 1982. A presidential executive order authorized noncompetitive appointments to competitive service positions for employees returning to the United States after completing twenty-four months in federal positions overseas. OPM published changes that extended reinstatement eligibility to certain employees who-left the federal service to accompany their military or federal civilian family member on overseas assignment and made provisions more flexible for crediting periods of overseas residence and employment toward career tenure. These policy changes and their implementation by the Army will make family members a more viable recruitment source than ever before.

To supplement its Civilian Career Management Appraisal System, the Department of the Army recently developed the Army Civilian Career Evaluation System (ACCESS), which featured computerized rating and referral data, independent appraisals from employees and supervisors, knowledge and skill requirements, and assessment linked to specific knowledge and skills based on their importance to the job being filled.

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Over the past three and one-half years the Army has implemented three performance management systems mandated by the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978: the Senior Executive Service (SES), the Merit Pay System (MPS), and the General Performance Appraisal System (GPAS). These new systems stressed the supervisor's responsibility to establish individual performance standards that support the organization's goals and objectives; to discuss the standards with the employee at the beginning of and during the performance appraisal period; to rate the employee's performance objectively against the standards; and to use the appraisal as a basis for personnel actions such as pay increases, promotions, awards, reductions in grade, reassignments, separations, and training.

Improved recruitment of capable senior executives took place in fiscal year 1982. There were 349 SES positions in the Army, of which 317 were filled by 30 September 1982, a fill ratio of 91 percent. This was a sizable increase over fiscal year 1981 when 292 positions were filled, a fill ratio of 84 percent. Some 76 percent of the vacancies in the SES were in the hard-to-fill engineering and scientific fields. This improvement in fill ratio was attributed to the decline in attrition of senior executives and to timely recruitment. Fifteen minority members and four women were in the Army SES at the end of fiscal year 1982.

The Army SES office instituted two projects to improve recruitment in April 1982-one involved automation of SES records to provide a skills inventory for faster reassignment and referral, and the other was the employment of an executive recruiter to make personal contacts with the private sector, academia, federal agencies, and other recruitment resources.

The Army held its nineteenth SES performance management seminar from 10 to 12 May 1982. Emphasis during the seminar was on developing performance standards and linking them to individual development plans for the enhancement of executive management skills. Twenty-six senior executives and military supervisors attended the seminar.

Recognizing the need for monetary incentives to retain quality senior executives, Congress raised the level of the "cap" on executive salaries in December 1981, but declined to remove it completely. Congress and the OPM also reduced the number of bonuses allowed by the 1978 CSRA from 50 percent to 20 percent of executive strength, which meant that only fifty-two bonuses could be awarded in the Army. Seventeen career SES members received the awards and accompanying bonuses; four received the Distinguished Rank Awards with $20,000; and thirteen received Meritorious Rank Awards with $10,000 stipends.

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The Merit Pay System (MPS) covering supervisors and management officials in grades 13 and above was not fully successful in providing pay incentives for high quality performances. In accordance with the CSRA of 1978, approximately 16,000 GS-13 through GS-15 positions were converted to merit pay status in October 1981. The first year of the MPS was adversely affected by small payouts resulting from the Comptroller General's ruling of 8 September 1981, which stated that the OPM merit pay computation factor and methodology would cost $50 million to $74 million more annually than the GS pay system. Accordingly, the OPM lowered the computation factor for GM employees and increased the guaranteed portion of the October 1981 raise for merit pay employees from 50 percent to 100 percent. To improve the situation the Army has obtained OPM approval for some short-term reform, including an increased funding factor for "quality step increase" experience. This and related changes would yield about $5 million more in merit pay funds for Army civilian employees during fiscal year 1983. OPM also agreed to grant interim authority to provide merit pay employees who had rated at least "fully successful" an annual increase comparable to that given most other federal employees. To achieve long-term improvements in the system, the military services and OSD developed proposals for legislative changes that would permit more equitable treatment of merit pay employees.

An Army-wide Merit Pay Planning Conference held during 10-11 February 1982 reviewed the first year's experience under the MPS and recommended the following: guaranteed full, comparable increases for employees rated fully successful or higher; additional guidance for MPS coverage; and a higher merit pay funding factor for quality step increases.

In other actions related to merit pay, the Army adopted guidance of the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) on MPS coverage, which resulted in the removal of approximately 3,000 employees from the system; OPM approved the Army's request to raise the quality step increase factor from 0.1 percent to 0.3 percent; and the OPM granted the Army's request for a full, comparable increase to merit pay employees rated fully successful or higher, provided that the increase was reviewed case by case and was not automatic. The Army also joined other services and OSD in supporting legislation for the return to the GS pay system and cash rewards for superior performance.

During the past year the Atlanta Field Office completed the first part of a two-phase GPAS evaluation. Twenty-one Army activities participated in assessing the DA experience during the

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time before implementation and in the early stage of GPAS. The activities reported on the effectiveness of the system, the perception of the system by supervisors and employees, the level of satisfaction, the use of system information, and the degree to which GPAS goals were attained, and provided recommendations for improving the system. In response to problems identified in the evaluation, the Army issued guidance on the relationship between major job elements and individual standards and on the appraisal of collateral duties. A draft AR 690-400 clarifying and simplifying the GPAS, as well as the merit pay system, was coordinated late in the fiscal year.

As a means of controlling labor costs, Congress has required DOD to reduce the number of high grade positions (GS-13 and above) over the past several years. Specifically, Section 811 (a) of the 1978 DOD Authorization Act called for a 6-percent reduction of DOD civilian personnel in the grades of GS-13 and above. The 1980 DOD Authorization Act (PL 96-107) extended the reduction through 30 September 1980. The DOD Authorization Act of 1981 required that the total number of DOD high grade civilian personnel could not exceed 96 percent of the number employed on 30 July 1977, and that after 30 September 1982 the total number of high grade civilian personnel could not exceed 94 percent of the 1977 level. The DOD Authorization Act of 1982 repealed the high grade civilian reduction requirement and the Office of the Secretary of Defense established the Army's fiscal year 1982 ceiling of 18,892 high grade civilian personnel as the new baseline. OSD would allow a 6-percent growth (1,134 positions) above the baseline without prior approval during fiscal years 1982 and 1983.

The DA high grade civilian personnel requirements reported by commanders for fiscal years 1982 and 1983 reflected the need for a 14.8-percent growth above their 1981 assigned ceilings. Meeting these requirements would have amounted to a 17.6percent rise above the baseline. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, which was designated the executive agency for managing the Army's high grade civilian resources, provided program guidance on the subject to major commands and Army staff agencies. DCSPER directed aggressive position management and emphasized the role of commanders in managing their high grade civilian personnel resources.

In a move to enhance superior performance, the Army distributed a revised AR 672-20 on incentive awards, which became effective on 1 July 1982. The criteria for the sustained superior performance award (SSPA) and the quality step increase (QSI)

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were revised to be consistent with the General Performance Appraisal System. SSPA remuneration was increased to allow a maximum cash award of 15 percent of the basic pay rate.

During fiscal year 1982 charges of unfair labor practices continued at a high rate. To prevent too much legal action from being taken, the Army urged several changes that would encourage informal attempts at resolution before formal charges were filed. However, the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), created by the CSRA of 1978, continued to expand the scope of bargaining in federal labor-management relations. Federal courts upheld several of the authority's early decisions, such as those requiring bargaining on stays of disciplinary actions and on details by seniority. Only in assigning work and in contracting out was management's right not to bargain left intact. Federal courts reversed FLRA decisions in several cases, such as the appeals on disciplinary actions against National Guard technicians and the disallowance of per diem expenses for union representatives who are granted official time to attend contract negotiations.

More and more of the recent advances in office technology and automated management information systems are being applied to improve timeliness, correctness, and effectiveness of operations in civilian personnel offices (CPOs). In this connection, The Adjutant General's Office conducted a study on the requirements of medium-sized CPOs. The study suggested that cost savings of approximately $70 million could be realized over a five-year period by purchasing $20 million worth of office automation equipment and services for nearly 200 civilian personnel offices. A request for funding the equipment was submitted under the DOD capital improvement program, and a project steering committee was established as well as a full-time task force to support the effort.

On 7 January 1982, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs approved the charter for the Army Civilian Personnel System (ACPERS), a centralized management system that would provide total personnel information requirements for mobilization and peacetime. Designed to support changing needs at all levels within the Army command structure and projected to replace all automated civilian personnel systems now used in the Army, ACPERS implementation was scheduled for fiscal years 1984 and 1985.

To improve efficiency in managing its civilian employees, the Army also simplified pertinent regulations. The Civilian Personnel Center coordinated a thorough review of these regulations, and those found to be unnecessary or overly complex would be

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recommended for elimination or streamlining. Separate efforts were either under way or under consideration to simplify SES recruitment procedures, the performance appraisal procedures under the Merit Pay and General Performance Appraisal systems, career management policies and procedures, and the administration of the Merit Pay System.

At the end of fiscal year 1982, the Army was ready to implement the first phase of a new system for manning combat arms units. The New Manning System (NMS) objectives were to reduce personnel turbulence, to improve cohesion, and to enable soldiers to cultivate a meaningful and lasting sense of belonging to one of the Army's valorous and distinguished regiments.

For the most part, the World War II combat soldiers served in one regiment for the duration of the conflict. Many who came ashore in North Africa in 1942 were still soldiering under the same regimental colors on the Elbe River in May of 1945. The veterans of that war look back with immense pride at their shared experiences and their total commitment to their units and to their comrades in arms.

That kind of commitment and system of manning and sustaining the Army has never been totally recaptured in the post World War II period. In the Korean conflict, soldiers accumulated points determined by their exposure to hostile fire; those with a prescribed minimum were eligible to return home. In the years between Korea and Vietnam, the Army, with some notable exceptions like the GYROSCOPE and the Overseas Unit Replacement System experiments, focused on an individual replacement system to sustain units.

With the coming of large-scale involvement in Vietnam, the active Army expanded rapidly and formed units for deployment to satisfy ground force requirements. Because the one-year tour policy remained in effect after the introduction of units, the Army resorted to the use of an "infusion" technique, in which soldiers with varying rotation dates were put into the units to preclude the instantaneous breakup of the units one year after arriving in country. While there were some good reasons for sustaining the force this way, the potential for developing the enduring commitment and relationships so characteristic of the World War II experience was severely diminished.

The post-Vietnam era saw a series of new dimensions in manning the Army. The draft system ceased to exist and the Volun-

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teer Army was introduced. The focus was on the efficient use of human resources and the cost of maintaining adequate manpower in uniform. In this resource-driven environment, it was natural that the Army would again resort to a manning system that would distribute soldiers efficiently in accordance with priorities. The individual replacement system served the Army well. Flexible and efficient, it facilitated management and put soldiers where the Army needed them quickly and fairly. However, it also generated personnel turbulence. The constant flow of personnel into and out of units made it extremely difficult to foster cohesion and group solidarity, especially in the small combat arms units which were the cutting edge of the Army. Personnel turbulence inhibited improved combat effectiveness and impeded commanders in their efforts to develop and maintain cohesive, well-trained units. Having recognized the systemic shortcoming of the manning process, the Chief of Staff, Army, in early 1981, directed several initiatives designed to analyze and correct the Army's manning system.

Project COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training), initiated by FORSCOM under the proponency of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), began testing the effectiveness of accessioning, training, and introducing into the operational forces (both CONUS and OCONUS) twenty company-sized combat arms units formed for a three-year life cycle around a group of first-term soldiers who were recruited specifically for these units.

The Regimental System Study, developed by the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), sought to enhance cohesion by adopting an American regimental system that drew on the British and Canadian models. Although the 1957 Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) redesignated U.S. Army units to reflect their association with nontactical regiments in order to preserve the continuity of distinguished units, the last phase of that initiative, establishment of a regimental headquarters, was never implemented. The TRADOC study reviewed such concepts as regional affiliation, recruitment, package training, and a regimental headquarters and concluded that the regimental system could be applied to the U.S. Army's combat arms. TRADOC was then given the mission to develop a plan to implement an American regimental system. The primary consideration in developing the system was the organizational relationship between regiments and existing organizations, brigades, and divisions. Subsequently, four concepts were developed. Concept Alpha involved reinforcing the present force structure by

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superimposing regiments on existing brigades. Soldiers would be affiliated with a grouping of stateside-overseas battalions with a U.S. home base. Concept Bravo recommended assigning administrative functions to a Colonel of the Regiment. Concept Charlie would establish a regimental headquarters separate from tactical units and include combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) elements. Concept Delta envisioned converting from a division-based Army to one founded on combat, combat support, and combat service support regiments.

The study recommended implementing Concept Alpha by fiscal year 1983. Analysis included investigating the implications of regimental affiliation, recruitment, training, unit rotation, personnel, and logistical management. A Concept Alpha feasibility analysis of unit rotation concluded that battalion-level rotation was possible.

The Army Cohesion and Stability Study (ARCOST), which addressed numerous initiatives to reduce turbulence, improve stability, and enhance cohesion, was made under the proponency of the Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER). It identified current personnel policies that undermined unit stability and cohesion, concluded that the individual replacement system created excessive turbulence, and recommended a unit replacement system. The study recommended a regimental structure, including aligned battalions, home-based careerists, regional recruiting, and stateside-overseas rotation.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans initiated three programs to reduce the frequency of structure changes-Management of Change, Implementation of Change, and MTOE Standardization. The Management of Change policy reduced authorization document changes by limiting the time period during which MTOEs can be modified. The Implementation of Change policy required changes to be applied expeditiously. The MTOE Standardization policy required that like-type unit authorizations be governed by the same document.

The U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) conducted a series of related studies, called Unit Replacement System Analysis (URSA), to evaluate the feasibility and sustainability of a unit replacement system. The first two studies addressed the impact of company- and battalion-level movement on personnel policies and procedures, distribution of manpower resources, and the budget. The studies concluded that a unit movement concept was feasible and that it would significantly increase personnel stability in the units.

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The Army Personnel System Review, conducted by The Inspector General, identified and studied each of eight personnel processes or "manning functions"-structure, acquire, train, distribute, deploy, sustain, develop, and separate. These functions were managed by various agencies and, while each could effectively accomplish its own objectives, the policies, procedures, and management information system for each process evolved somewhat independently of the others and were not mutually supportive. For instance, when the structure function was reviewed, the large number of authorization documents and the frequent modifications to these documents were found to be disruptive to the other functions. Because of the time needed for the acquire, train, and distribute functions, personnel were sometimes programmed and managed by procedures based upon structure requirements that were no longer valid. The eight manning functions needed to be synchronized into an interactive system.

In another study, entitled Personnel Replacement System Policy Analysis, the General Research Corporation concluded that the individual replacement system caused personnel turbulence and disrupted unit cohesiveness. The study further asserted that personnel policies had evolved that supported the philosophy of the individual replacement system and had therefore institutionalized the problem; it recommended a unit replacement system and related policy changes.

A follow-up study, Turbulence: Definition and Measurement, linked turbulence with specific policies that caused personnel movement between units. It identified the individual replacement system as the predominant cause of turbulence, and personnel management by unit as the most positive corrective action that could be taken.

All of these studies emphasized that the problem of personnel turbulence was inherent to the system, requiring basic philosophic changes rather than modifications to present procedures. Units, not individuals, must be the focus of personnel management. Unit continuity, group cohesion and stability, and organizational loyalty and affiliation should be the objectives of personnel management. The "human goal" was unit readiness. Therefore, an entirely new manning system was required.

Using these initiatives as a basis, the Chief of Staff, Army, directed the formation of a task force to develop and implement a manning system that would enhance combat effectiveness by keeping soldiers together longer. He also directed that this objective be pursued through the rotation and replacement of units in

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an environment where career soldiers were offered the opportunity to have a CONUS home base within the framework of an American regimental system.

Accordingly, the task force developed a New Manning System which would integrate the eight manning functions, employ unit replacement, and affiliate soldiers with a unit, institution, or location. Under the new system, units-initially company- and battery-sized-were formed by bringing first-termers and the cadre together immediately after initial entry training of the new soldiers. The soldiers in the newly formed unit would remain together in FORSCOM for approximately eighteen months. Stabilization would permit cohesion and bonding to develop trust and affiliation-intangible elements so important to increasing combat readiness. Movement into and out of the unit would not be allowed except in extreme cases, such as compassionate reassignment or discharge. After eighteen months, the unit would deploy overseas to a long-tour area. Units going to short-tour assignments would serve twenty-four months in CONUS, then deploy. The deployed unit would move to its location outside the continental United States and serve out the remaining portion of its three-year life cycle. At that point first-termers either would leave the service or reenlist. Career cadre would be reassigned, and another like-type unit would take over the equipment and mission of the dissolving unit.

This unit formation, movement, and life cycle was the essence of Project COHORT. Future units formed under the New Manning System would also be called COHORTs after the Roman unit and the acronym for Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training. COHORT units would embody the principles of stabilization (in a unit) and unit movement. Both these factors foster esprit de corps-that intangible "why men fight." The Army can and does teach men how to fight; it even teaches when and where. To motivate a man to risk his life is something that cannot be learned; it must be believed.

During the next three years, a comprehensive field evaluation will follow the progress of the New Manning System. The evaluation process will be carried out on a fix-as-we-go basis in order to identify proper paths to achieve New Manning System goals. If problems are encountered, solutions will be devised immediately. By the end of the evaluation period, required policies, regulations, and actions should have been accomplished, and the New Manning System should be in place and institutionalized. This is no simple matter, because hundreds of personnel policies are geared to the individual, not the unit. These

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policies must be ferreted out and modified or scrapped to build a new unit movement system. Field commanders, staffs, and personnel managers all have a part to play in this endeavor. The goal is to have soldiers train together, grow together, share together, and stay together, building the bonds of cohesion in a common purpose, anticipating each other's needs, caring for one another, and ultimately fighting for one another, if necessary.

The first of the combat arms companies that enlisted together, took basic and advanced training or one-station unit training together, and moved to their first operational unit together have deployed to Europe. Both units were from Fort Carson, Colorado. Soldiers in Company B, 6th Battalion, 32d Armor, left on 24 September 1982 to become part of the 2d Armored Division Forward in Garlstedt, Germany. Soldiers in Battery C, 1st Battalion, 19th Field Artillery, left on 29 September 1982 to join Battery C, 1st Battalion, 14th Field Artillery, also in Garlstedt. At the end of fiscal year 1982, twenty-seven other COHORT companies were on duty at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort Ord, California; Fort Polk, Louisiana; and Fort Riley, Kansas. Overseas, they will be stationed at Boeblingen, Garlstedt, Goeppingen, and Neu Ulm in Germany; Vicenza, Italy; and Fort Wainwright, Alaska. Current planning calls for an increase to about eighty rotating companies by the end of fiscal year 1985.

The American Regimental System, a separate but related action within the New Manning System, will have many facets. The heart of the system, as noted earlier, will be the affiliation of soldiers with a regiment for the entire length of their service. Regiments themselves will be home-based at a CONUS location. The regimental colors will be located at the home base of those CONUS battalions assigned to that regiment. Regiments will be pure organizations, for example, infantry regiments that have only infantry battalions as subordinate elements. The same is true for light, mechanized, airborne infantry, armor, cannon field artillery, and air defense regiments. A soldier who is a member of a certain regiment can then expect recurring assignments to the regiment when his normal career progression causes him to be assigned to troop duty. Right now, only infantry, armor, cannon field artillery, and air defense artillery regiments have been paired with similar CONUS battalions, and those paired battalions have been linked to form regiments. Regiments will normally consist of four like-type battalions, two outside the continental United States and two within.

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The regimental system will enable a soldier to develop a sense of belonging to a distinguished and legendary regiment. When soldiers today are reassigned, they must constantly develop a new allegiance, cultivate new relationships, and acclimate themselves to a new organization's environment. The regimental system will define a community of battalions both in CONUS and overseas. Soldiers will experience recurring assignments to the battalions of this community, thus reducing the scope and impersonality of the assignment alternatives. A soldier will be able to affiliate with his regiment for the duration of his career.

The regiment will change a soldier's focus from "mine" to "ours" and will operate as an entity without affecting the present brigade, tactical, or combined arms organization. The regiment will be represented by an honorary Colonel of the Regiment and an adjutant. Their purpose will be to give meaning to the system and organize individual efforts to institutionalize the concept. The first six adjutants have been designated by the Military Personnel Center. They will act as regimental adjutants at first as an additional duty. The process of selecting the first honorary colonels of the regiment has already begun. Retired colonels and above are the prime candidates for this honorary position. The Army will work with them to further develop the entire concept, duty standards, and other related matters.

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