Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1988
American national security interests derive from broadly shared values-political freedom, human rights, economic prosperity, and other considerations. The national leadership has articulated the following points as America's major national security objectives.
1. To safeguard the interests of the United States and its
allies by deterring aggression and coercion. If deterrence fails, to defeat
armed aggression at the lowest possible level of hostilities and establish
postwar terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies.
2. To encourage and assist U.S. allies and friends in defending themselves against aggression, coercion, subversion, insurgencies, and terrorism.
3. To ensure U.S. access to critical natural resources, worldwide markets, the oceans, and space.
4. To reduce Soviet military presence throughout the world, to increase the cost of Moscow's use of subversive force, and to encourage change within the Soviet bloc for a more peaceful world.
5. To prevent the transfer of critical military technology and knowledge to the Soviet bloc and other potential adversaries.
6. To pursue equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements and to emphasize compliance.
7. To defend and advance the cause of freedom, democracy, and human rights throughout the world.
Despite recently proclaimed initiatives by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev for perestroyka (restructuring of the Soviet economy), glasnost (openness), and signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Soviet military power still poses the major threat in the world to the United States and its allies. The Soviet Union has publicly acknowledged that in recent years it has committed 15-17 percent of its gross national product (GNP) to defense programs, while America has spent about 6 percent. The
investment in war-fighting capability by the Warsaw Pact in the last twenty years has created a significant quantitative force advantage over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in both strategic nuclear and conventional weapons that cannot be undone overnight. The Soviets are pursuing programs to upgrade their ability to project military power to distant areas-expansion of air and sealift for ground forces, increased access to facilities outside the Soviet homeland, and development of their first conventional aircraft carrier. The Soviet Union also sponsors an impressive military assistance program, which provides military equipment, technical services, and some direct operational support to forty-two Third World countries.
The Defense Department defines the spectrum of potential armed conflict as spanning a range from low (low-intensity conflict, unconventional warfare, and terrorism), mid (minor conventional warfare, major conventional warfare), to high (nuclear warfare). An assessment of the strategic balance indicates that the U.S. should retain, for the near future, the capability to deter a Triad (land, air, and sea-launched) direct nuclear missile attack. The burden of deterrence and America's defense continues to shift to conventional forces in general and to the Army in particular. America's national defense posture, however, depends upon joint service planning and unified action. The major combat forces of the U.S. serve under unified and specified commands. Their respective commanders in chief (CINCs) control combat operations based on guidance received directly from the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The CINCs rely upon their subordinate component commanders from the military services for personnel, equipment, and administrative support.
To fulfill its responsibility to the CINCs, the Army must design and field an optimal combination of forces (heavy, light, and special operations) strategically positioned in either the U.S. or overseas. It must also effectively employ the reserve component the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. In recognition of the inherent joint nature of modern warfare, the Army adopted the Air-Land Battle as its fundamental combat operations doctrine in 1982. While honoring the timeless principles of war, it also emphasizes operational art, low-intensity conflict, and light division operations. Espousing the tenets of initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization, Air-Land Battle envisions the battlefield in close, deep, and rear areas to ensure unity of action and success in combat. The close operations bear the ultimate burden of victory
or defeat; the deep operations shape conditions for future close operations; while rear operations ensure freedom of maneuver, operational continuity, and uninterrupted service support.
America's worldwide concerns for peace and economic opportunity must adapt to resource constraints. The wide variety of international threats, the need to distribute national resources among a broad range of needs, and the limitations of both modern technology and time to execute national objectives constrain both the civilian and military sectors. The Department of the Army (DA) employs the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES), linked to the Department of Defense Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), and the joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Strategy Planning System to allocate its resources effectively. Thus, the Army translates the missions assigned by the national leadership and war fighting requirements identified by the unified and specified commanders into programs within budget constraints. Continuation of the budget reductions of the mid1980s caused the Army in fiscal year (FY) 1988 again to set strict priorities for its programs. The Army's real growth figure of 12.6 percent for FY 81 dropped to 3.4 by 1984. This downward trend continued to a minus 1.9 percent level by FY 88. The FY 88 budget emphasized essential force combat readiness exemplified by able and well-trained personnel assigned to forward-deployed or quickly deployable units led by thoroughly prepared leaders. Further, the Army concentrated on CINCs' priority requirements, terminated marginal programs, slowed the pace of modernization, and thus minimized the impact of tight money upon force structure.
At the outset of FY 88, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff underscored the importance of maintaining the productivity level of quality personnel, military and civilian, which the Army has attained in the last several years. Non-prior service recruits with high school diplomas exceeded 90 percent of enlistments. They also scored consistently in the top three test score categories (TC) I-IIIA of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) at a 60 plus percent range, while the number scoring in TC IV has remained well under 10 percent. The Army leadership, however, voiced strong concern about a declining pool of quality manpower, a widening disparity in Army pay compared to private industry, and reductions in recruiting resources. Recent successes both to recruit and to retain personnel have resulted directly from funding for such incentives as educational benefits and cash enlistment bonuses. Active public affairs efforts also positively affected recruiting and retention. In its reenlistment program for FY 88 the
Army planned to target bonuses by grade/military occupational specialty (MOS) and to require retraining/ reclassification for those reenlistment-eligible soldiers in overstrength specialties.
An aggressive Enlisted Force Alignment Plan, which coordinates promotion, reenlistment, and reclassification by grade and job specialty, has reduced a shortage of active component noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the most important unbalanced combat arms specialties from about 29,000 to 10,000 since FY 84. While the Army hoped for continued improvement with the NCO shortage in FY 88, it faced another officer strength reduction mandated by the FY 87 Defense Authorization Act-2 percent for FY 88. The reserve component, which now comprises about half of combat and more than 60 percent of combat support/combat service support forces in the Total Army, sought to upgrade its equipment readiness and mobilization responsiveness. Women in the Army looked to better opportunities for promotion and advancement following a centralized review of the Army's Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC) System. The Army leadership intended to continue full utilization of its civilian work force as a productive sustaining base and to avoid any reduction that would borrow military manpower and thus reduce tactical unit readiness.
The Chief of Staff sees a direct relationship between Army quality of life programs and combat readiness and fully supports their development and improvement. The programs encompass services and facilities that personally affect soldiers and their families and strongly influence job efficiency and retention. Facilities revitalization pertains to family housing, modernized barracks, child and health care facilities, commissaries, and recreation facilities such as youth and bowling centers. A tight budget for FY 88 portended modest growth in most of these areas. The Army expected to improve existing family housing and to add only about 700 new units. Congress froze the Variable Housing Allowance (VHA), a benefit designed to supplement soldiers' quarters allowances and make' off-post housing more affordable, at the FY 86 rate for FY 88. The Army expected to continue construction of child care centers at a reduced level and to improve the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) by extended use of private sector medical personnel and facilities. Surcharge funds paid by commissary patrons offered a means to upgrade perhaps 12-15 commissaries in FY 88. Emphasis by the White House that business activities in the armed services operate with minimal appropriated funds forecast modest improvement of family recreational facilities.
At the inception of his tenure as head of the Department of the Army, Secretary John O. Marsh, Jr., inaugurated a practice of declaring a particular Army theme for each calendar year that became the focus of special attention. For the years 1981-87 the Army themes included winning spirit, physical fitness, excellence, families, leadership, values, and the U.S. Constitution. Secretary Marsh and Army Chief of Staff, General Carl E. Vuono, chose training as the theme for 1988. Describing it as the Army's top priority and cornerstone of combat readiness, General Vuono further emphasized that the Army must execute high quality training to deter war, and, should deterrence fail, to reestablish peace through victory on the battlefield. Army training programs concentrate upon three areas-leaders, units, and individuals. The Army's trained leaders serve as its wellspring and set the standards for the Army of today and the future. The Officer Education System strives to produce active and reserve component officers who possess a combination of tactical and technical proficiency, a growing knowledge of the dynamics of strategy and joint combat operations, and the ability to lead men effectively under the stress of combat. General Vuono pledged to continue development in FY 88 of the joint ,service officer program, an area of Army training emphasized by the Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986. Army public affairs sought to emphasize the importance of training both to soldiers and the public through speeches, extensive soldiers' radio and television coverage, and production of print news stories.
Concerned about more budget cuts than those already indicated in early FY 88, the Chief of Staff affirmed that the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) would retain high priority. He stressed its value in producing uniformly high standards in job proficiency, military occupational specialty competency, military bearing, and commitment to professional values and attributes throughout the NCO Corps. The Army's combat training centers, two of them initially operative in FY88, provide demanding training for units and their commanders against realistic opposing forces. Since 1982 the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, has trained armor and mechanized infantry units and now extensively uses Air Force close air support in its exercises. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), located primarily at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, began training nonmechanized infantry forces for low- to mid-intensity conflict in October 1987. Begun in early 1988 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and capable of operating at any installation with a corps/division battle simulation system, the
Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) provides division and corps commanders and their staffs with intensive training in their wartime duties in a simulation environment.
OPTEMPO, or operating tempo, refers to the Army method that measures the assignment of operating and sustaining resources to a particular training strategy in order to predict levels of combat readiness. For ground OPTEMPO, expressed as an annual operating rate in miles/hours for major items of equipment, the Army hoped to allocate 850 miles for active component armored vehicles in FY 88. For air OPTEMPO, expressed as the number of hours flown per month by a rotary wing (helicopter) aircraft crew, the Army sought 15.8 hours for the active and 9.8 for the reserve component. Army planners intended to expand the use of training devices and simulators in FY 88, which provide effective instruction and cost less than live training. Examples of these training devices and simulators include the precision laser gunnery system for tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) and the computer-based instruction system, which teaches such complex topics as satellite equipment repair. At the same time, Army leaders sought continued progress in creation of the multipurpose range complex and standardized military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) facilities for necessary live fire and maneuver exercises. To improve the combat readiness of the reserve component in FY 88, the Army leadership sought accelerated overseas deployment training and higher levels of military occupational specialty qualification. Anticipated new regional training sites for maintenance and medical skills would provide improved performance in those specialties.
Successful implementation of Air-Land Battle doctrine demands modern equipment and systems for the interrelated close, deep, and rear combat operations. Because of equipment shortages and obsolescence in the early 1980s, the Army decided in 1983 to establish a ceiling indefinitely for its active component strength and to concentrate available resources on equipment modernization. Since that time, major systems fielded in sizable numbers include the M1 Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter, multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), and the Patriot and Pershing II (PII) missile systems. This modernization process has utilized the Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) Program. MANPRINT incorporates assessments of human strengths and limitations, coupled with health hazards assessment and systems safety in the development of new equipment, so that the soldier and the equipment function together more effectively
and safely. The Army's modernization process also is pursuing materiel improvements for battlefield command, control, and communications; deep operations; and air defense.
Successful deep combat operations disrupt the enemy's command and control systems and retard its offensive initiatives. To prepare in this area, the Army is developing a series of sensor, information, and command and control systems that it will fuse with weapons systems for a coordinated deep operations capability. Weaponry for deep operations includes the multiple launch rocket system, designed for counter battery missions and suppression of enemy air defenses, and the Army Tactical Missile System (AT-ACMS), a long-range, all-weather, conventional ballistic missile system. For improved intelligence gathering, the Army and Air Force together are producing the joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) that can observe the enemy in excess of 100 kilometers from the front line. Another intelligence-producing device in development, the All Source Analysis System (ASAS) will integrate information from a variety of sources. The Army also is seeking upgrades in its special operations aviation to enhance human intelligence gathering carried out behind enemy lines.
Rear operations in Air-Land Battle focus on sustaining the tempo of combat and preparing for the next phase of a campaign. Protection of command and control, facilities, and sustainment, along with forward area and theater air defense, represent primary concerns in this sector. The Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) integrates the five battlefield functional areas maneuver control, fire support, intelligence-electronic warfare, air defense, and combat service support by a common computer network. Its five integral parts include the Maneuver Control System (MCS); Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS); All Source Analysis System (ASAS); Forward Army Air Defense Command, Control, and Intelligence (FAADC21); and Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS). The Army is acquiring several communications packages that will facilitate efficient command and control procedures. Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) provides divisions and corps with secure voice, data, and facsimile transmission. Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) serve as combat net radios that operate in voice and data modes in an electronic warfare environment. Joint Service Communications Systems (TRITAC), an Army/Air Force project, will produce high speed digital transmission, switching, terminal, and system control equipment for theater tactical forces.
Regarding air defense, the Forward Area Air Defense (FAADS) System will employ sensors and guided missiles in a five-part configuration to provide protection from enemy aircraft to division areas. The Army anticipates that the Patriot missile, possessed with the ability to operate in an electronic countermeasure environment, will remain as its primary theater air defense weapon for the foreseeable future. Growing biochemical stockpiles by potential aggressor nations have caused serious concern to the United States. In 1986 Congress approved destruction of the American unitary chemical stockpile and its replacement by binary modernization. In early FY 88 the Army began preparing a proposal for safe destruction of its unitary chemicals and planned continued procurement of chemical agent monitors, decontamination systems, and improved protective face masks. It also sought funding for nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance vehicles and standoff detectors for tactical units.
The Army Aviation Modernization Plan, which attempts to anticipate Army aviation needs thirty years into the future, is seeking in the nearer term to provide the unified and specified commands with modernized attack helicopters, day/night reconnaissance aircraft, and improved air assault and lift capability. During the next fifteen years the Army intends to provide some 200 aircraft per year by production and/or modification programs for the Apache, Black Hawk, the OH-58D Army Helicopter Improvement Program (AHIP), and the Chinook helicopters. By the mid-1990s, the Army expects to create a new fleet of helicopters designed for light attack/armed reconnaissance missions and, at the same time, to retire large numbers of outdated utility and observation aircraft.
The Army leadership anticipated continuance in FY 88 of the Dedicated Procurement Program. The program has been improving short-term readiness of the reserve component by providing reserve units with major combat and support equipment such as M113A3 armored personnel carriers and a wide variety of trucks. Anticipating the loss of Pershing missiles following the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed in late 1987, the Army looked to reinforce its nonstrategic nuclear forces posture in FY 88 by modernizing artillery-fired atomic projectiles and fielding a follow-on to the Lance missile system.
Contingency preparations by Army planners entail pretraining and preassignment of individual replacements for the mobilization process. The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and retirees represent the primary sources for these personnel. The former, who number about 287,000, retain a military service obligation following either
active or reserve component duty. Some 500,000 retirees, classified by age and physical status, also remain subject to active duty. In recent years, the Reserve Component Mobilization Exercise Program has facilitated resolution of potential problems in preparing for mobilizations. Army leaders, however, feared cutbacks in this program in FY 88 because of budget constraints.
Prompt and effective deployment of personnel and materiel for contingencies demands adequate strategic air and sealift. The Defense Department airlift goal of 66 million ton miles per day remains far short of realization, but the Air Force's C-17 Airlifter, still in the developmental stage, would sharply reduce the anticipated shortfall. Strategic sealift, the responsibility of the Navy's Military Sealift Command, remains insufficient for the deployment and sustainment of major forces. The conversion of commercial container ships and the Surface Effect Fast Sealift Program represent promising, but only partially developed, additions to existing Defense Department sealift resources.
Sustained combat operations require pre-positioned war reserves of equipment and supplies supplemented by existing Continental United States (CONUS) based assets and the industrial base or the combined resources of the government and private industry to create and maintain military materiel. The Army has placed war reserve stocks in strategic locations worldwide in order to provide the unified and specified commands with an initial supply of ammunition, major end items, fuel, and secondary materials pending the opening of a regular line of communications from the U.S. during wartime. Although America's war reserve status has improved in recent years, the mixture of old and new equipment complicates the effort to maintain war reserve stocks. The pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets (POMCUS) refers to prestorage of organizational equipment in company and battalion packages for the rapid reinforcement of NATO by units based in CONUS. The Army hoped to increase the stockage level of POMCUS sets and to begin issuance of its new deployable medical systems in FY 88.
The host-nation support (HNS) agreement reached in 1982 by the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) for sharing the costs for a selected number of German reservists and civilian logistics support during a war in Europe necessitated continued congressional funding in FY 88. The Army Depot Maintenance Program, which maintains materiel so that it will function efficiently in combat, in recent years has received only 70-80 percent of the funding necessary to meet sustainment requirements. Responsible
for overland distribution of bulk petroleum to all the armed services in wartime, the Army has lacked adequate funding for complete fielding of its modernized Inland Petroleum Distribution System (IPDS) introduced in 1987. Increased monies for both depot maintenance and bulk petroleum distribution did not appear forthcoming at the outset of FY 88.
The Army strives to shape its force structure-the number and configuration of combat, combat support, and combat service support units-to accommodate the force requirements of the warfighting CINCs. This process must adjust, however, to the national defense priorities established by Congress, the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In early FY 88, the Army faced a total force strength reduction of about 10,000 personnel and. formulation, as dictated by the 1986 Defense Department Reorganization Act, of more definitive joint operations doctrine. Blessed with liberalized budgets in the early 1980s and cognizant of the increasing need for rapidly deployable combat units, the Army has been rebuilding heavy divisions-armored and mechanized infantry-and is expanding light forces. It reintroduced the light infantry division and lightened the design of specialized airborne and air assault divisions. Spending for special operations forces has increased in the 1980s; for FY 88 the Army targeted money for continued modernization of its aviation, communications, psychological operations material, and equipment research and development. Public support of the Army remains critical to sustaining advances in force structure.
Last updated 17 November 2003