Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1988
"Training is our top priority," Army Chief of Staff Carl E. Vuono stressed as he and Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr., jointly announced training as the Army theme of 1988. High quality training produces a combat-ready Total Army-active, National Guard, reserve, and civilians-that can win on the battlefield. It must focus on individuals, leaders, and units, General Vuono further remarked. Individual training should develop disciplined, physically tough, and technically skilled soldiers. Effective leader training produces commanders/supervisors who possess a combination of technical proficiency, flexible and analytical minds, and the ability to set the example and motivate their subordinates. Unit training, when properly conducted, creates a group proficiency and synergism that promise high unit performance under the rigors of combat.
General Vuono established several training initiatives in 1988. He directed that the General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) meet once or twice a year with principals of the secretariat, Army staff, and major Army commands to discuss training issues. The committee created a training teleconferencing net, which uses the Army FORUM network to enable all Army commands to exchange training information. General Vuono also established senior leader training conferences to evaluate unit training at the combat training centers. The budget ax cut 17 percent of the TRADOC budget in FY 88. According to General Maxwell R. Thurman, TRADOC commander, this reduction forced TRADOC to accelerate its fielding of new training techniques. Examples included expanding the use of training simulators to save time and money and reducing the costs of major training exercises by transporting fewer people and equipment by relying more on pre-positioned assets. Budget constraints required reductions in Army ground and air OPTEMPO, or operating tempo, in FY 88. Army officials had sought active component OPTEMPO of 850 miles and 15.8 hours, respectively, but cut these figures to 725 and 14.5.
The Chief of Staff insisted that FY 88 budget cuts not adversely affect the Army's NCO Education System (NCOES). The system consists of the Primary Leadership Development Course, the Basic NCO Course, the Advanced NCO Course, functional courses for selected NCOs with specific duties, and the Sergeants Major Course. "Our Army cannot function without the expertise of its sergeants of every grade and specialty," General Vuono stated. "NCOs must possess tactical and technical competence which means they must know doctrine, or how the Army plans to fight: Then, NCOs can translate doctrine into tactics and procedures; they can integrate weapons systems, arms, and services to generate combat power," the Chief of Staff continued. "NCOs must serve as role models and ensure that their subordinates fully learn the tasks critical to their unit's warfighting mission." The Secretary and the Chief of Staff confirmed two requirements, in effect but not consistently enforced in FY 88, which link promotion to the NCOES. Effective October 1989 all promotions to E-5 will require successful completion of the. Primary Leadership Development Course. Effective October 1990, all promotions to E-'7 will require successful completion of the Basic NCO Course.
Title IV of the 1986 Defense Department Reorganization Act, which mandated joint officer personnel policy in each armed service, stipulated that, after 1 October 1989, officers must successfully complete an approved joint Professional Military Education (JPME) program and then a joint duty assignment for eligibility for joint specialty designation. Although Congress did not clearly define JPME, it indicated that joint service schools such as the National Defense University, not separate service schools, must sponsor JPME. Because the Army could not meet its JPME requirements through available slots at the National Defense University in FY 88, it obtained permission to establish programs at its senior colleges. In August 1988 the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) authorized a JPME program with two phases. The core curricula of ail intermediate and senior service colleges will incorporate Phase 1. The Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) will conduct Phase 2, a two- to three-month course designed for officers slated for joint duty assignments. The Chief of Staff directed the Army War College not only to conduct Phase 1 instruction but also to revise its curricula to instill a working knowledge of military strategy in its graduates. General Vuono believed that the Army's senior military officers must understand the concepts of strategy both to
advise the national leadership on the use of military power and to apply it skillfully.
Training needs for individual marksmanship and physical fitness of Army personnel received attention during FY 88. Recent reviews of marksmanship throughout the Army revealed a need for improvement. Some soldiers lacked such rudimentary skills as the ability to zero their individual weapons. The General Officer Steering Committee discussed this topic at its September 1988 training theme meeting. Chief of Staff guidance at the meeting focused on three salient points. First, all commanders/leaders must emphasize good marksmanship. Second, trainers should fully use training devices to develop shooting skills and to conserve scarce resources. Third, soldiers must recognize that marksmanship represents a fundamental skill critical to military job performance. The physical demands faced by light infantrymen who travel long distances on foot with combat equipment over rough terrain has rekindled concern about physical endurance. The Army Physical Fitness School and other Army agencies have been restudying soldier load-bearing performance that publication of a new field manual (FM) 21-20, Physical Fitness Training, will address. It advocates a minimum of four physical training sessions per week for light infantrymen. These include two sessions of muscular strength/endurance development, a cardio-respiratory workout, and a road march/load-bearing session, which makes increased demands for distance, load, speed, and terrain difficulty
The Army initiated other training plans and programs in FY 88. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) hosted development of a Long-Range Logistics Training Master Plan to enhance combat service support warfighting for active and reserve components and civilians through the year 2008. The plan will emphasize such areas as technical skill proficiency, the combat service support Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), and civilian training. Because of shortages in qualified Apache helicopter pilots, TRADOC redesigned the fourteen-week Apache Aviator Qualification Course into a more concentrated ten weeks, effective February 1988. TRADOC expected yearly Apache pilot production to increase from about 450 to 650. Another initiative seeks to improve reserve component military occupational specialty qualification by retraining active component soldiers for specific reserve component unit vacancies before they leave active duty. Even though the concept would detract from the functioning of the active force, the soldiers would remain available for active force needs while in training for their new reserve jobs.
The Combined Arms Training Activity, the Combined Arms Center (CAC), the Army Training Board (ATB), the Logistics Center (LOGC), and the Soldier Support Center (SSC) have redesigned the ARTEP and made it more usable by small unit leaders. Begun in 1975 and now in its fourth stage, ARTEP permits commanders to evaluate unit training as a complement to individual training. The first generation consisted of one book for battalions through squads, three levels of training (Ll-L3), and a system of different tasks and standards for each unit echelon. In 1978 the second generation ARTEP introduced a single standard for all echelons of a unit. The third generation, introduced in 1982, provided lists of minimum essential tasks and more detailed training and evaluation guidelines. Fourth generation ARTEPs now provide separate manuals for mission training plans and battle drills. In effect, the battalion ARTEP, which had covered the unit from commander to the squad, now contains separate books to simplify the training evaluation responsibilities for leaders of each echelon of the battalion. The new ARTEP introduced the term tactical techniques. Unlike rigidly standardized battle drills, tactical techniques allow commanders to modify procedures to accomplish various training tasks successfully.
Training Facilities and Devices
Implemented in January 1987, the Combat Training Centers (CTC) program provides a broad training strategy that incorporates four programs-the National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC). As a comprehensive mechanism, it trains soldiers from privates through corps commanders in scenarios that realistically simulate low- to high-intensity combat. Operational at Fort Irwin, California, since 1982, the NTC serves as the Army's primary CONUS training facility for armor and mechanized infantry units. It trained twenty-eight heavy battalions, which included National Guard units, in FY 88. Brigade commanders and staffs have participated with the battalion undergoing rotation at the NTC since 1987; 1988 saw the employment of a heavy/light brigade. During 27 February-11 March 1988 two battalions (5th Battalion, 16th Mechanized, and 2d Battalion, 34th Armor) of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) trained with 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Irwin. Sizable Air Force Military Airlift Command (MAC) and Tactical Air Command (TAC) contingents support
training operations at the NTC and facilitate the testing of multiservice Army-Air Force operational tactics and procedures.
The success of the NTC prompted development of a major light unit training facility. Planning initiated in 1983 resulted in creation of the JRTC in 1987 with an operational headquarters temporarily located at Little Rock Air Force Base and a temporary primary maneuver area at Fort Chaffee (Arkansas). On 5 October 1987, elements of a task force from the 3d Battalion, 504th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, parachuted into Fort Chaffee as the first light unit rotation at the new facility. It consisted of an airborne infantry battalion, an aviation task force, and a full range of combined arms assets. Light forces require considerable air support, so the TAC assigns a squadron to provide that support when requested by the rotating light unit commander. Air National Guard units in Arkansas and Oklahoma supplied close air support for the opposing force. A task force from the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, experienced logistical problems in its December 1987 rotation at the JRTC because it relied on a task force from another division, the 82d Airborne Division, to provide combat support shortfalls. Establishment of a brigade headquarters relieved this problem for subsequent unit rotations. Seven units trained at the JRTC in FY 88, six active component and one reserve. The Army continued to pursue a permanent site for the JRTC.
Headquartered at the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the Battle Command Training Program provides advanced combat training to division and corps command staffs through battle simulation. The concept incorporates an observer/ controller staff, a standardized threat, and a comprehensive after-action review package supported by the corps/division battle simulation system. Mobile trainer teams can direct the process at any installation with the requisite battle simulation system. The program consists of two phases. Phase 1 allows the commander and his staff to participate in Air-Land Battle discussions, threat updates, decision exercises, and simulation familiarization during a 3-5 day period. Phase 2, the WARFIGHTER Command Post Exercise, lasts 9 days and trains the commander and his staff in an environment that replicates combat. During 25-29 January 1988 the BCTP conducted the first WARFIGHTER exercise with the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) and I Corps at Fort Lewis, Washington. Missions performed included passage of lines, river crossings, exploitation, hasty attack and defense, and deliberate attack. Division and corps participants agreed that the exercise significantly enhanced their
warfighting capabilities. In FY 88, the 7th, 9th, 24th, and 47th Infantry Divisions underwent the BCTP.
The fourth member of the CTC Program, the Combat Maneuver Training Center, is developing at the Hohenfels Training Area in West Germany. When completed, it will provide training similar to that available at the National and Joint Readiness Training Centers. Authorized in 1984, this center had formed an operations group cadre by FY 88 that consisted of observer/controller teams, training management and lessons learned sections, and an opposing force detachment. The operations group cadre has begun standardized observer/controller training for USAREUR units. Headquarters, USAREUR, expects the Combat Maneuver Training Center to reach full capacity by FY 91. It will have three combined arms observer/controller teams plus other assets needed by an adequately resourced combat training center for live maneuver task forces such as a feedback instrumentation system along with artillery and aviation participation.
In 1984 the Army initiated a range modernization program to support the live fire and maneuver training requirements of AirLand Battle doctrine and the accompanying introduction of modern weapons systems. It consists of standardized ranges for individual and group training and a family of computerized targetry, Remote Engaged Target Systems (BETS), which portray a realistic opposing force. Congress funded eleven range projects for the National Guard in FY 88. They included a multipurpose range complex for heavy weapons at Gowen Field, Idaho, a multipurpose training range at Eglin, Florida, and nine small arms record fire ranges. The Army plans to build sixteen military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) facilities, which teach soldiers how to fight in cities and towns. Classes began in October 1987 at a new MOUT facility located at Fort Hood, Texas. Engineers started construction of a MOUT facility at the Hohenfels Training Area, and Congress approved funding for a MOUT complex at Fort McClellan, Alabama. Construction also began in FY 88 on the Army's first aerial gunnery range located at Fort Rucker, Alabama, designed to combine RETS and hard targets and to score, control, arid evaluate the gunnery of Apache and TOW/Cobra helicopters.
The III Corps, the Program Manager for Training Devices, the Infantry and Armor Schools, and the Armaments, Munitions, and Chemicals Command began development of two range projects in FY 88. Designed for tank/Bradley fighting vehicle proficiency training in local training areas, Phantom Run Instrumented MILES Enhancement (PRIME) can monitor and reconstruct platoon free
play MILES (multiple integrated laser engagement system) engagements against a computerized MILES-compatible target array. PRIME combines existing training devices-basic M1 and M2/3 MILES, laser targets interface device, instrumented MILES and automatic tank target systems-with future nonsystem training devices such as Thru Sight Video and enhanced telemetry for real position location and new range control computers to provide event driven MILES tactical training. Installed at Fort Hood, Texas, in May 1988, a prototype PRIME began seven to eight months of user testing. Enhanced RETS Range Control Station (ERETS), a software program upgrade that operates on standard Army personal computers and a proposed replacement of the RETS Range Control Station, promises the additional capabilities of event driven scenarios, programs that allow trainers to modify target engagements during firing exercises, and color zoom representations of the range and exercise scenario for after-action reviews. During FY 88 armor and infantry ERETS testing occurred at Fort Hood, Texas, and Fort Benning, Georgia, respectively.
The Engineer School began a permanent move in June 1988 scheduled for completion in 1990. The change will consolidate engineer officer training, previously conducted at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, with engineer enlisted personnel training already in place at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Except for military intelligence, all of the other Army branches had already consolidated officer and enlisted personnel training at the same location. Among other advantages, the move will facilitate more intensive field training opportunities, which include battle drills, full-scale breaching operations, and mining training that the crowded conditions at Fort Belvoir had restricted. In another Army school development, a sniper school opened at Fort Benning, Georgia, in FY 88. In addition to extensive marksmanship training, the three-week course instructs trainees in various field craft skills-observation, range estimation, camouflage, stalking techniques, and concealed movement. Company D, 2d Battalion, 29th Infantry, and instructors from the Army Marksmanship Unit conduct the course and fire the M21 rifle system, which consists of an M14 (matchgrade) with the ART-1 scope.
The Army Exercise Program encompasses joint and combined exercises sponsored by the JCS and the CINCs of the unified and specified commands as well as those which involve only Army
units. The reserve component participates in all major JCS exercises, and planners attempt to arrange force lists that assign active and reserve component units according to CAPSTONE alignments. In FY 88 the Total Army participated in fifty-three JCS exercises. Field exercises permit Army units to experience total force training in their combat missions, joint operations with their sister services, and interoperability familiarization with allied forces. Although more restricted because of reduced training funding, overseas deployment of CONUS units to many countries of the world remained an inherent part of the Army Exercise Program. In FY 88 Army units conducted exercises in Central America, Europe, North Africa, Southwest Asia, Korea, and other Pacific nations.
Some Army units participated in exercises overseas during FY 88 that entailed actual confrontations with hostile forces. During this period both combat aviation and support forces contributed significantly to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) operations in the Persian Gulf. Stationed aboard U.S. Navy ships, Army helicopter crews conducted both reconnaissance and attack missions. First to document that the Iranians were laying mines at night in international waters, they successfully attacked the Iranian ship Ajar and repelled numerous attacks upon allied shipping by Iranian gunboats. In March 1988 Jose Azcona Hoyo, President of Honduras, asked the Reagan administration for help in stopping some 2,000 Nicaraguan Sandinista troops reportedly intent upon seizing a large Contra supply depot in Honduras. President Reagan agreed to provide a U.S. show of force and instructed the Defense Department on 16 March to form a joint emergency deployment readiness exercise. The JCS created a joint task force for deployment to Honduras named Operation GOLDEN PHEASANT.
Primary ground troops assigned to GOLDEN PHEASANT consisted of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 504th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the 2d and 3d Battalions, 27th Infantry, 7th Infantry Division (Light), stationed at Fort Ord, California. Lead elements of these units departed their home stations on 17 March within 18 hours of the alert. Within 30 hours, 52 Air Force sorties transported 2,950 soldiers and airmen and hauled more than 890 short tons of equipment to Honduras. The four battalions assumed defensive positions with Honduran units near the towns of Juticalpa, Tamara, San Lorenzo, and Jamastran. Faced with U.S. and Honduran determination, the Sandinistas canceled their intended incursion into Honduras. While U.S. ground personnel engaged in no substantive armed contact with the Sandinistas, an aviation accident resulted in minor injuries to
ten servicemen. A UH-1 Huey helicopter of the 18th Aviation Brigade from Fort Bragg crashed on 21 March six miles from Juticalpa while en route from Palmerola Air Base in central Honduras. By 28 March the four U.S. Army battalions sent to Honduras for Operation GOLDEN PHEASANT began redeployment to their home stations. Army officials concluded that the exercise went well. It affirmed that doctrine, building units by Army of Excellence standards, fielding high quality equipment, and realistic training produce mobile, combat-ready soldiers capable of short notice deployments.
TEAM SPIRIT, a joint/combined strategic deployment and field training exercise sponsored by the CINC, Pacific Command (PACOM), strives to improve the combat readiness and interoperability of U.S. And Republic of Korea (ROK) forces. Thirteenth in a series which began in 1976, TEAM SPIRIT 88 assembled some 200,000 ROK and U.S. troops for 10 rigorous days of training in late March and early April 1988. The ground combat phase took place at Yoju, 50 miles south of Seoul. The scenario commonly used for TEAM SPIRIT exercises allows both sides to practice offense and defense. The orange forces took the offense until D plus 4 when both sides regrouped, and then the blue forces counterattacked. United States Army presence with the orange force included about 11,500 2d Infantry Division soldiers and a mixture of other Eighth U.S. Army personnel. WESTCOM and I Corps supplied some 11,300 soldiers for the blue force. Major elements included 4,000 25th Infantry Division (Light) personnel, 1,000 from the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), and 1,500 from I Corps' 331st Corps Support Command. Many of them Roundout units, Army Reserve and National Guard units participated in significant numbers.
Several major innovations by the U.S. armed services occurred at TEAM SPIRIT 88. Opposing force strength increased to multidivision size; unit leaders had more freedom in decision making; combat units dispersed over a wider area; and tactical air support for ground elements increased over previous exercises. The USS Midway's carrier task force conducted exercises with the ROK navy and supported a combined Marine landing on the southeast coast of Korea. TEAM SPIRIT 88 witnessed the first ROK/U.S. combined naval gunfire support exercises, initial use of the U.S. Navy's air-cushioned landing craft to transport materiel ashore, and the first use of combined tactical command structure at sea. A combined landing force conducted a simultaneous surface and helicopter-borne assault similar to previous exercises. In a new development, after the assault forces secured the beachhead, the Commander of Marine
Forces Korea assumed command of the Republic of Korea and U.S. Marines for sustained operations under the Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command.
REFORGER (return of forces to Germany)-a training exercise that involves strategic deployment of American forces from the U.S. to Europe, field training with U.S. forces stationed in Europe and also our NATO allies, and redeployment to the U.S.-affirms the resolve of the U.S. To honor its NATO commitment. American officials felt that REFORGER 88 assumed special significance since the eventual elimination of intermediate-range nuclear weapons focuses renewed interest upon conventional forces. Twentieth in the series, REFORGER 88 conducted its primary activities during the period of August-November 1988. About 125,000 soldiers participated: 103,000 Americans, of whom 17,000 came from CONUS bases, joined 16,000 West Germans; 5,100 Canadians; and 250 Frenchmen and Danes. Flown by the U.S. Air Force Military Airlift Command to destinations in Belgium and West Germany, primary units consisted of the following: 6,500 from the 1st Infantry Division; most of the 197th Infantry Brigade or 3,000 troops; the 3d Armored Cavalry of 3,800; the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division; and about 2,500 reserve component soldiers from 34 reserve and 48 National Guard units.
REFORGER 88's main field exercise, CERTAIN CHALLENGE, executed during 12-22 September, encompassed a maneuver area of 16,000 square miles in the West German states of Bavaria, Baden Wuerttemberg, and Hesse along a 100-mile front, which ran from Heilbronn east to Bamberg. Pitting two corps against each other, the CERTAIN CHALLENGE scenario posed a conflict between two fictional countries, Northland and Southland. Southland forces moved into a disputed part of the maneuver area, and the Northland forces sought to drive them back. Rather than a NATO versus Warsaw Pact exercise, both corps commanders tested NATO doctrine and enjoyed independent control over their units. As with most training exercises, neither side won. Both of them, however, improved their skills in adapting to the demands of independent fast paced ground combat.
Commanded by CENTCOM from a temporary headquarters at March Air Force Base, California, GALLANT EAGLE 88 assembled 30,000 soldiers, airmen, marines, and sailors and fought a simulated Middle Eastern war in the western U.S. during July-August 1988. U.S. Army light units participated with Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps units and aircraft from twenty western U.S. bases in the exercise. Brigades from the 7th Infantry Division (Light) and
the 82d Airborne Division joined the 1st Marine Division and airborne companies from Great Britain and Egypt at the Marine Corps' Desert Training Center at 29 Palms, California. Supply operations constituted a major part of the training since any military contingency in the Middle East would depend heavily upon resupply support. Elements of the 377th Theater Army Command and support units tested supply operations by transferring food, fuel, and spare parts from the beaches at Camp Pendleton, California, to units fighting 200 miles away in the Californian desert at 29 Palms. Other training activities included special operations, mass casualty exercises, medical evacuation, air base defense training, and live range firing. After-action reviews indicated that GALLANT EAGLE 88 contributed to the efficient joint functioning needed by CENTCOM for success in potential combat operations in Southwest Asia.
LOGEX 88, an Army theater logistics command post exercise conducted in CONUS in August 1988, resulted in a number of lessons learned. Several of them follow. Doctrinal and operational concepts about Army combat service support of class I, bulk III, common user V, and line haul transportation to Air Force elements need improvement. In joint combat operations, the Theater Army must prepare to provide supply support early and also to assume enemy prisoner of war and graves registration responsibilities for Marine Corps units. Combat service support must keep pace with maneuver forces to ensure that decisive combat power exists at the right time and place. Another lesson from LOGEX 88, Army units still do not consistently train according to CAPSTONE alignments. A joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) exercise conducted at Fort Story, Virginia, accompanied LOGEX 88. It permitted Army and Navy watercraft and cargo-handling units an opportunity to test new systems and techniques. These included use of the Army's roll on/roll off discharge platform to remove wheeled vehicles from a fast sealift ship, cargo transfer operations using the Army's logistics support vessel, testing of the Army's new floating causeway and causeway ferries, and demonstration of a modified Navy Seabee ship to deploy the Army's outsize watercraft equipment.
The Combined Arms in a Nuclear/ Chemical Environment (CANE) Program of Force Development Test and Experimentation (FDTE) has been accumulating data and evaluations of a simulated nuclear/chemical environment on an integrated battlefield. Phase IIB of the CANE FDTE took place at Fort Hood during 1-23 March 1988. Members of the 1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division, participated in four realistic Air-Land Battle maneuvers for sustained periods up
to ten hours, which involved force on force maneuver, live fire, and air support in a nuclear/chemical environment. Some 1,950 soldiers, 148 vehicles instrumented for measuring data, and 187 trained observers participated in the exercise. The TEXCOM Field Instrumentation System collected sophisticated weapons engagement data and added essential battlefield realism. The Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama, will validate CANE FDTE IIB test results, which the Army will then assess to determine their implications upon doctrine, force structure, training, and materiel development.
Reserve Component Training
Concerned about the adequacy of reserve component training, the Chief of Staff tasked TRADOC and FORSCOM in November 1987 to develop a comprehensive reserve training strategy for the future. The Reserve Component Training Strategy Task Force deliberated until August 1988 and investigated four primary training areas-individual, collective, post mobilization, and Individual Ready. Reserve (IRR). They identified a number of problems: training time limited to thirty-nine days a year; excessive administrative distractions and unit reorganizations; a heavy load of annual military occupational specialty reclassifications; and nonstandardized training evaluations. The task force submitted fifty-two training initiatives to the Chief of Staff on 31 August 1988. He approved the strategy in principle and implementation of all initiatives which required no additional funding. The Chief of Staff directed that the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS) assume proponency for the Training Development Action Plan, development of a resourcing plan, and staffing of draft DA Circular 350-88-XX, Reserve Component Training Strategy. In a related development, in response to an Inspector General Forces Training Assessment released in July 1988, FORSCOM and the National Guard Bureau (NGB) began a combined effort to publish a joint reserve component training regulation 350-2, Reserve Component Training, scheduled for publication in FY 89.
The Army National Guard consists of 3,457 battalions or separate units situated in 4,600 facilities at 2,858 locations throughout the U.S. and its territories. They represent most skills found in the active component and constantly challenge their commanders with their multiple training needs. Units must travel an average of 40 miles to a local training area, 128 miles to their major equipment storage sites, and 154 miles to a major training area. The New Jersey
National Guard High Technology Training Center opened at Fort Dix, New Jersey, in October 1987 as a partial answer to the problem and also as a test bed for maximizing technology as a training tool. A multipurpose training site geared to the National Guard (five of its ten divisions reside in the Northeast) and the reserve, it also trains active component personnel. Totaling more than 70,000 square feet, the center can accommodate 250 full-time students and 200 more on weekends and train them in armor, artillery, and maintenance techniques with a large number of simulation devices, panel trainers, computer graphics systems, the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System, and the largest assortment of small arms training devices in the Army inventory.
FIREX 88 assembled 17,000 soldiers, predominantly National Guard personnel, distributed among 14 artillery battalions, various combat support/combat service support elements, 35 high performance aircraft, 163 helicopters, and a remote piloted vehicle for a training exercise in the Utah desert during 5-26 June 1988. Several years in planning, FIREX 88 required arduous preparation. For example, engineers-spent a year preparing roads and storage sites, while an environmental impact study took thirty months. A live fire exercise centered upon I Corps Artillery, FIREX 88 used Tooele Army Depot as the marshaling area, while Camp W. G. Williams and Dugway Proving Ground provided the firing areas. Adhering to the expected fast-moving pace of Air-Land Battle, most units changed location at least three times. Several battles occurred simultaneously, the farthest one about 60 miles from the corps tactical operations center. I Corps fought the main battle on a three-division front with artillery firing provided by the Pennsylvania 28th Infantry Division Artillery, the Wyoming 115th Field Artillery Brigade, and the Missouri 135th Field Artillery Brigade. Brig. Gen. James M. Miller, I Corps Artillery commander, believed that the exercise resulted in highly productive training for his widely scattered units that must respond effectively to potential hostilities in countries located throughout the expansive Pacific Ocean area.
CALUMET CARGO 88, a nationwide cargo transportation exercise, which involved some 1,900 soldiers from 10 National Guard and 22 reserve units and 455 trucks, took place during 9-25 July. Designed to improve staff planning and teach wartime command and control, it also provided technical and tactical training for transportation personnel. The 319th Transportation Brigade located at Oakland, California, a subordinate unit of the 124th Army Reserve Command, served as exercise command headquarters. Four organizations acted as command and control centers across
the country-369th Transportation Battalion, Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; 353d Transportation Battalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; 484th Transportation Battalion, Fort Carson, Colorado; and the 818th Transportation Battalion, Sharpe Army Depot, California. In a unique aspect of the exercise, participating units transported cargo, which varied from clothing to heavy equipment, for various Defense Department agencies normally moved by commercial carriers. Examples included 40 modular homes for the Air Force from Tonapah, Nevada, to Cold Lake, Alberta, Canada, and 64 M113A3 armored personnel carriers from Fort Pickett, Virginia, to Fort Indiantown Gap. Units reduced commercial shipping costs by 75 percent for the 12,1'79 tons they transported over 962,397 mission miles which, in turn, considerably lessened the training exercise cost.
Overseas deployment training (ODT), a highly visible demonstration of the Army's determination to fulfill its role in meeting America's overseas defense commitments, provides realistic training to its reserve components through participation in single service, joint, and combined exercises. Begun in 1976 with 26 units/cells (small groups of personnel), ODT trained more than 55,000 personnel in 3,364 units/cells in FY 87. Budget constraints, however, dropped the number to about 45,000 soldiers in 2,536 units/cells in FY 88. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans exercises broad responsibility for ODT, while FORSCOM, in coordination with the reserve components chiefs, manages the ODT program. Army officials try to arrange ODT for reserve component units according to the following schedule-every 3 years for early deploying units with a latest arrival date at an actual or potential combat operations site between D and D+30 and every 5 years for those units arriving on D+31 or later. In recent years, some reserve component units have controlled their ODT by participating in the Deployment for Training (DFT) program in Central America. A DFT normally provides a company or smaller unit a short period of training in basic skills in a jungle environment.
Litigation filed separately during 1987-1988 by two state governors, Rudy Perpich of Minnesota and Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts, directly affected ODT They asserted that the Militia Clause to the Constitution reserved to governors the authority to train the National Guard; therefore, they could cancel ODT in Central America for their National Guard units, which the Defense Department had planned. The Montgomery Amendment to the FY 86 Defense Authorization Act prohibits a governor from withholding approval for OCONUS deployments for any of his or her guard
units because the governor objects to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such training. A federal court in St. Paul, Minnesota, ruled against Governor Perpich, but the appeals court had reached no decision by the end of 1988. In a 25 October 1988 decision, the First U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Boston upheld the constitutionality of the Montgomery Amendment. The 65th Public Affairs Detachment of the Massachusetts National Guard, a unit Governor Dukakis specifically declined to send to Honduras, accordingly trained there during May and June. Federal authorities anticipated that one or both governors would appeal the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.
United States armed forces began periodic combined training exercises with Honduran forces in the mid-1960s and, at the request of the Honduran authorities, have maintained a visible presence in that nation since 1983 with exercises of increased number and size. The U.S. government established joint Task Force Bravo at Palmerola Air Base in August 1984 to serve as headquarters for U.S. Forces and exercises in Honduras. Among the 1986 exercises, reserve component engineers conducted a road-building project in north central Honduras called BLAZING TRAILS. A continuation of BLAZING TRAILS, FUERTES CAMINOS (Strong Roads) built a 14-kilometer road which linked the towns of Jocon and Yoro in the Yoro region about 150 miles north of the Nicaraguan border. From October 1987 through June 1988 12,000 U.S. Army soldiers, largely reserve component, worked for Task Force 111 on FUERTES CAMINOS in concert with Honduran forces. U.S. Army medical and dental teams, veterinarians, civil affairs soldiers, and entomology detachments worked hard, not only to support Task Force 111, but also to improve living conditions for villagers of the region.
The reserve component has performed ODT in many foreign countries in recent years, and favorably impressed federal government spokesmen advocate its expansion. In OPENING ROADS 87, 8,000 reserve component personnel of Task Force 1169 traveled to the Andes in Ecuador and, under very difficult terrain conditions, improved 10 kilometers of existing road, built a 300-foot bridge across the Rio Hollin, and constructed 5 kilometers of new road on the other side of the river. Another example, during February June 1988 the Army Reserve 411th Engineer Battalion conducted ODT in the Philippines, Exercise VALENTINE MABUHAY. The unit constructed a 30,000-square-foot classroom and barracks facility for a Philippine training school that provided valuable experience in deployment and redeployment skills and sustained operations in a remote area. Recently, the Senate Appropriations
Committee has encouraged the Defense Department to explore other ODT missions, which the reserve component could assume. In response to the request, the Army submitted a proposal to test and implement a concept for reserve component heavy equipment maintenance companies designed to reduce the theater general support level maintenance backlog for USAREUR while conducting ODT. Congress appropriated funds in FY 88 to test the proposal during FY 89-90.
The Chief of Staff requested an assessment of the ODT program in FY 88 by the CINCs and Army component commanders of the unified and specified commands. Two-thirds of those questioned had commented by November 1988, and all of them responded favorably. The CINCs stated unanimously that ODT effectively supports their missions. Army component commanders remarked that ODT strengthens CAPSTONE relations and enhances reserve component readiness for mobilization, deployment, reception, and employment.
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Last updated 17 November 2003