Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1988


Mobilizing, Deploying, and Sustaining the Army

The functional areas of mobilizing, deploying, and sustaining the Army represent important elements both in deterring and successfully conducting war. With the 1985 Mobilization Functional Area Analysis the Army developed a program to improve its mobilization and deployment capability. Major initiatives included models to project total force ammunition requirements upon mobilization. and a strategy for expanding the peacetime training base. Recent development of the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System has greatly improved the Army's ability to mobilize its approved force structure. Strategic mobility assets, the responsibility of the Air Force and Navy, have improved but shortfalls remain. Sustainment means the ability to maintain a level of personnel and materiel necessary to conduct successful combat operations. Adequate CONUS-based assets and pre-positioned war reserves along with a ready industrial base and host-nation support agreements facilitate sustainment, but deficiencies exist in all of these areas.


Provisionally established on 1 October 1987, the Total Army Personnel Agency (TAPA) acquired two new directorates, one for mobilization and operations and another for civilian personnel. The director of the Mobilization and Operations Directorate, a general officer who also serves as a director on the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel staff, oversees Army manpower mobilization procedures. The presence of Army National Guard and reserve officers in this directorate, plus the Civilian Personnel Directorate within TAPA, now permit one Army agency to develop and execute policies for mobilization of all four components of the Total Army-active, guard, reserve, and civilian. In FY 88 TAPA acquired a new computer software system to facilitate its mobilization


planning, the Mobilization Manpower Planning System (MOB-MAN), which operates as a module of the Headquarters, Department of the Army, Decision Support System. It shows projected figures for manpower surpluses and shortfalls by military occupational specialty/area of concentration for the early months 5 of mobilization. The sources of manpower that MOB-MAN evaluates include all categories of the active and reserve components and retirees.

Large numbers of individual replacements already trained and, if possible, preassigned, comprise a significant personnel pool for. the mobilization process. Soldiers in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), who are still completing their military service obligation after either active or reserve component duty, and the retired ranks represent the primary sources for trained individual replacements. In FY 88 the IRR pool totaled about 287,500. Since retirees remain subject to recall. to active duty, the Army has classified 503,000 of them by age and physical status and given preassignment orders to 126,000. The IRR screening program, which began in 1986, seeks to determine the readiness and availability of the IRR population by requiring one day of involuntary active duty training per year from its members. In FY 88 97,694 soldiers attended their screening day, while 7,156 others performed training with active and reserve component units. Another 12,002 updated their records by mail. Thus, 116,852 IRR personnel received credit for screening in FY 88 from a target population of 187,231. The program exempted several categories of personnel, which included field grade officers, soldiers within one year of expiration of service, and those in the quality improvement program. Army officials regarded the FY88 IRR screening program as a success.

In October 1987 the Defense Resource Board directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel to lead a review of military retiree mobilization requirements. He, in turn, reconvened a Pretrained Individual Manpower Working Group under the Office of the Secretary of Defense Mobilization Steering Group to conduct the review. The TAPA performed a detailed comparison of needed mobilization manpower skills with retiree skills. Its analysis indicated that some 150,000 Army retirees qualified to meet military needs. Of 210,000 matched for civilian manpower requirements, 72,000 possessed skills likely to meet unfilled Army civilian manpower requirements which left 138,000 for possible assignment to other federal agencies with defense-related missions. The Air Force advised that it had 70,000 surplus military retirees which the Army could utilize. In September 1988


the Pretrained Individual Manpower Working Group recommended revision of Defense Department Directive 1352.1, Management and Mobilization of Military Retirees, to implement several suggested changes with which the Army concurred. These changes included development of service-specific plans to assign military retirees not needed for military jobs to civilian ones, to assign retirees excess to service needs elsewhere within the Defense Department or to other, federal agencies, and selective use of retirees to backfill active duty billets.

Several mobilization exercises tested the readiness of the reserve component in FY 88. Federal law grants the president authority to mobilize as many as 200,000 Selected Reservists without declaring a national emergency. During 23-25 October 1987 the Secretary of Defense directed the first nationwide call-up of Selected Reservists to evaluate their ability to respond quickly in times of crisis. The test took a statistically valid sample of personnel from all of the armed services, which involved 119 units located in 34 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. About 6,100 soldiers participated in the exercise with favorable results. In November Army National Guard and reserve units assigned to the First U.S. Army area took part in another large mobilization exercise, Operation GOLDEN THRUST 88. Some 13,500 soldiers from 115 units moved with their equipment to 12 mobilization stations scattered from New England to Virginia. Assisted by 34,000 other soldiers and civilians, they underwent in-processing and preparation for overseas replacement. Mobilization stations used available facilities-gymnasiums, recreation centers, armories-to house and process troops. Following in-processing, units spent the remaining time performing their annual two-week training at their mobilization stations. Despite an early snowstorm which covered parts of the Northeast with a foot of snow, GOLDEN THRUST 88 proceeded on schedule and provided useful experience to participating units on the workability of. various systems and procedures.

PROUD SCOUT 88, a joint Chiefs of Staff command post mobilization exercise conducted in November 1987, assessed the current readiness and recent progress of the armed services in planning for mobilization and deployment. Unlike 1978 exercise NIFTY NUGGET, which considered a European operation plan only, PROUD SCOUT looked at multiple theater deployment. Coincident with Army participation in this exercise, a comparison of its present versus 1978 mobilization status by functional area revealed a mixed but essentially positive scorecard. Substantial progress had occurred in guidance documents and personnel management. The


Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System and the mobilization and deployment planning systems of FORSCOM and TRADOC outline policy guidance and procedures. Army personnel mobilization has profited by preassignment of individual reservists and retirees to specific jobs, fielding of the mobilization cross-leveling system, and creation of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Emergency Action Procedures Guide.

The comparison of the Army's current mobilization status with that of 1978 also showed that Army mobilization station operations, deployment, logistics, and the industrial base have made moderate progress. Mobilization station operations have gained from the addition of mobilization assistance teams. The Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan, which provides scheduled flow and closure of units on mobilization stations, and the Post Mobilization Training Support Requirement System, which determines training support requirements for mobilizing forces, further assist mobilization station operations. Creation of the Joint Deployment Agency and the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) facilitate centralized management of deployment. In the area of logistics improvements, the Headquarters, Department of the Army/Major Army Command Logistics Data Network and the ODCSLOG mobilization plan outline crisis decision planning and action. Establishment of the Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning Process links the needs of the CINCs with the capabilities of the industrial base. Army training base expansion has made limited progress since 1978. Despite improved training base expansion planning and development of the CONUS Replacement Center concept, major shortfalls still exist in equipment and facilities for training base expansion that must follow mobilization.


Deployment means transporting personnel and materiel to military operations sites usually located overseas. The Army depends upon the Air Force and the Navy to deploy ground forces. In 1981 Congress mandated a mobility study that established a strategic airlift goal of 66 million ton miles per day (MTM/D). The Air Force has relied upon an assortment of aircraft to meet this goal including the C-5B Galaxy, the C-141B Starlifter, the KC-10 tanker-transport, and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program, which can utilize civilian aircraft for military purposes. Estimates place the MTM/D current resource figure at 46, while the Revised Intertheater Mobility Study suggests that the actual requirement exceeds 115


MTM/D. Under joint consideration by the Air Force and the Army throughout the 1980s, the C-17 Airlifter represents the next generation transport expected eventually to provide about 27 MTM/D for Army airlift needs. With about the same wing span as the C-141, the C-17 carries twice the payload, or 172,200 pounds, and has the outsize equipment capability of the C-5. Further, with its ability to land on a 3,000-foot runway, it can transport cargo intercontinental distances yet fly directly to forward area airfields. The Air Force plans to build 210 C-1 7s by the year 2001 at a cost of $37 billion. FY 88 monies provided for construction of the first two C-17s with their delivery anticipated in 1990.

Major force deployment and resupply depend directly upon strategic sealift, which delivers 95 percent of the dry cargo and virtually all of the petroleum products needed by the Army in wartime. The Navy's Military Sealift Command performs this function and relies upon its ships and the combined assets of the Ready Reserve Fleet, U.S. flag and U.S.-controlled vessels, and available allied ships. Evaluations vary on the number of U.S. ships the Army needs in wartime because of such variables as the potential number of active theaters and the availability of allied shipping support. Furthermore, the civil fleet concentrates upon container ships, whereas the Army requires large numbers of roll on/roll off and breakbulk vessels. The Transportation Command estimates that for a three-theater war, the U.S. would need a civil fleet of 650 vessels. It now numbers about 370 and, at the current rate of decline, may drop to as few as 220 by the year 2000. With more than 100 ships, the Ready Reserve Fleet will revert from control by the Navy to the Maritime Administration in FY 89 but retain its strategic sealift role. In a positive development in recent years, the Navy has acquired eight fast sealift ships (SL7s) which, with their shallow draft and 55 knot speed, can move 5,000 tons of cargo rapidly to almost any port. The Army supports a revival of the U.S. merchant marine and expanded production of specialized fast surface ships.

Logistics over the shore (LOTS), means the off-loading of Army cargo in either friendly or hostile territory where operational ports do not exist. Public law and Defense Department regulations assign this mission to the Army, and an Army/Navy memorandum of agreement on strategic mobility established a joint effort for the modernization of LOTS equipment. The Army is procuring several new watercraft models and is investigating the usefulness of others. It has fielded 24 ILACV-30 air cushion vehicles, each capable of delivering 25-30 tons ashore, and 4 logistics support vessels each with a 2,000-ton capacity as discussed in


Chapter 4. Anticipating delivery of the new 2,000 class Landing Craft, Utility (LCU), in FY 89, the Army is also considering development of a 15-knot, 100-ton air cushion vehicle able to off-load Abrams tanks and other heavy equipment. Army and Navy watercraft and cargo-handling units tested roll on/roll off discharge platforms, floating causeways, and causeway ferries at a joint LOTS exercise associated with LOGEX 88 in August. The Army intends to procure these LOTS systems.


The Army Chief of Staff has placed special emphasis upon sustainment because of the anticipated speed and lethality of modern battlefield operations. Sustainment goes beyond logistics and plays a major role in concepts of operational art. It involves assembling the correct numbers and types of personnel and materiel in the proper place and at the right time to generate decisive combat power. The warfighting CINCs demonstrated their concern with sustainment doctrine at the August 1987 Senior Army Commanders Conference by requesting a better way to measure materiel sustainment than the current method, days of supply (DOS). Asked by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to investigate alternatives, the National Defense University sponsored a symposium of retired general officers from all of. the armed services. Their findings, released in FY 88, advocated retaining the DOS measurement but augmenting it with other means to manage selected items. One model they developed evaluates the crews, munitions, end items, and maintenance required by specific weapons systems. The model also groups the weapons systems into threat categories and estimates their capability to perform effectively for stated time periods. Plans called for testing the model in FY 89.

The Army maintains war reserve stocks of ammunition, weapons, fuel, and secondary items strategically located worldwide for the immediate wartime consumption by the CINCs prior to establishment of a supply pipeline from CONUS. Stockpiles have grown 50 percent during the last eight years, but funding constraints, coupled with increases in wartime requirements caused by force structure changes and modernization, have kept the Army from fully realizing its war reserve goals. The Army received about half of its war reserve stock funding request in FY 88, and stocks remained at about half of anticipated wartime needs. Several existing arrangements with European allies reinforce Army materiel and personnel needs for NATO contingencies. Begun in 1961, pre-positioning of


materiel configured to unit sets (POMCUS) permits the Army to store equipment in Europe in company- and battalion-size packages. Modernized equipment is augmenting POMCUS inventories-Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, warm basing or storing general hospital equipment, deployable medical systems, and other items. Army units have withdrawn vehicles from POMCUS for REFORGER exercises many times and, in recent years, have experienced less than a 1 percent operation failure rate with such vehicles. For the REFORGER 88 exercises, the Army withdrew 3,024 vehicles from POMCUS, 2,115 wheeled and 909 tracked.

Analysis of the Warsaw Pact threat to NATO in the late 1970s indicated that the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) would more likely defend against a main attack than the Central Army Group (CENTAG). The U.S. agreed to reinforce the NORTHAG area and, in the FY 85 budget, Congress authorized purchase of the U.S.-controlled Reichel Logistics Facility located there. The facility contributes to the logistical support of NATO and also serves as a community support base for several thousand Army personnel and their families. The Reichel facility needs further funding to function effectively both as a logistical center and as a community support base. The U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany concluded a wartime host-nation support agreement in the early 1980s whereby, in exchange for U.S. force commitments, during contingencies the West Germans will provide about 50,000 reservists and civilians for logistic support to USAREUR. Organized into 100 security and combat support/combat service support units at 83 installations, this West German support equates to 35,000 spaces that the U.S. Army otherwise would have to provide. The U.S. finances some German unit materiel and all costs for civilian pay, operations, and maintenance of the 83 installations.

In wartime, the U. S. Navy's Offshore Petroleum Discharge System delivers bulk petroleum to combat theaters, while the Army distributes fuel overland to all U.S. forces. Successfully tested in 1987, the Army's Inland Petroleum Distribution System (IPDS) consists of tactical pipeline as well as associated storage and pumping equipment. Despite ongoing funding problems, Army logisticians expect to have more than 40 percent of the CINCs' IPDS requirements either constructed or under contract by the end of FY 89. The Army and the Air Force are attempting to reduce the number of battlefield fuels from three to one, as specified in Defense Department Directive 4140.43, Fuel Standardization, March 1988. Phase I of the single fuel on the battlefield initiative (SFOB) calls for conversion from JP-4 (naptha and kerosene) and DF-2


(diesel) to JP-8 (kerosene). The Central Europe Pipeline System began distributing JP-8 in December 1986 and converted from JP-4 to JP-8 for aircraft fuel during FY 88. The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has approved conversion from JP-4/DF-2 to JP-8 for the Pacific Command. Phase II of the SFOB initiative will seek to eliminate the use of automotive gasoline from the Air-Land battlefield force by the year 2010.

In 1980 the Defense Department designated the Army as executive agent for land-based water resources. The Army's Tactical Water Program has focused on water support for the Central Command and development of assets for water detection, production, treatment, storage, distribution, and cooling. Since its inception, the program has spent almost $400 million for assorted equipment such as 600-gallon-per-hour reverse osmosis water purification units (capable of removing salt and NBC contaminants), storage and distribution systems, semitrailer-mounted fabric tanks, and water chillers for the 400-gallon water trailer. Future equipment plans include 3,000-gallon-per-hour reverse osmosis water purification units. By incorporating the latest technology, logistics unit productivity systems (LUPS) both reduce the need for combat service support personnel and increase productivity. For example, in echelons above corps transportation units, 7,500-gallon petroleum tankers are replacing the 5,000-gallon ones, which increases delivery by 50 percent. By adding pumps, filter separators, and 20,000and 50,000-gallon collapsible fuel containers, petroleum supply companies have improved their receipt and issue capability from 685,000 to 1,244,000 gallons per day.

Program 7 consists of central supply and transportation (7S) and depot maintenance (7M). Central supply and transportation provide for the routine operation of major Army supply depots and materiel readiness commands. These depots and commands distribute items that range from spare parts for major weapons systems to writing pads. This program also finances operation of Army worldwide transportation, industrial preparedness, and ammunition plants. Depot maintenance includes materiel maintenance-modification and repair of unserviceable end items (aircraft, vehicles) and secondary items (engines, transmissions)-as well as maintenance support activities that pertain to maintenance engineering and training and publications about proper maintenance procedures. Buying power for central supply and transportation declined 7 percent in FY 88. Near-term readiness requires high priority for satisfying secondary item needs, so end items took second place in depot maintenance funding and


maintenance support activities, third. Materiel maintenance obtained funding for about 79 percent of its requirements in FY 88. Secondary items received money for more than 90 percent of requirements but end items only 60. Maintenance support activities received about 50 percent of requested funding.

The Army uses Research Department Explosive (RDX) and High Melt Explosive (HMX) as basic explosives for munitions and tactical missiles as well as propellants for strategic missiles rather than TNT because of their superior energy. Holston Army Ammunition Plant, Kingsport, Tennessee, produces all of the RDX/HMX consumed in the U.S. and 90 percent of that used by all of the nations friendly to the U.S. Currently, Holston can produce 20 million pounds of RDX and 700,000 pounds of HMX a month, whereas U.S. mobilization projections would require twice these amounts. Construction of two new plants at existing Army ammunition facilities will increase production of RDX/HMX. Congress approved funding in FY 88 for a three-year construction project to build a plant at Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant, Shreveport, Louisiana, capable of producing 2.5 million pounds of RDX a month. The Army programmed money in FY88 for a pilot plant to produce HMX at the Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Marshall, Texas. Plans called for implementation of a new classified process for creating HMX called MUSALL (Monsanta, Under Secretary of the Army, Lawrence Livermore) at the Longhorn facility, but further development of the MUSALL plant must await congressional funding.

The general state of U.S. industrial preparedness for contingencies causes ongoing apprehension to the Army leadership. America's industrial base constitutes total government and private industry assets for the manufacture, maintenance, and repair of military materiel for wartime needs. Underfunding of the industrial base in recent years has seriously affected its ability to mobilize during a national emergency. The present industrial base could meet only 60 percent of wartime needs after three years of operation because of major deficiencies in spare parts, rolling inventory, and plant capacity in particular.



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