Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1989
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Doctrine and Concepts
The fundamental tenets of the Army's tactical doctrine in FY 1989 were rooted in the AirLand Battle doctrine enunciated in Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, of August 1982 and revised in May 1986. That doctrine has permeated all Army doctrinal publications about combat, combat support, and combat service support, operations, and training. Doctrine is dynamic, and during FY 1989 AirLand Battle doctrine was modified by lessons learned during training and operations, new technology, changing threats, and planning for future doctrinal changes. The development of Army doctrine is a principal mission of TRADOC and its subordinate integrating centers and branch and service schools. During FY 1989 TRADOC concentrated upon the three broad doctrinal areas—Army, joint, and combined. By FY 1989 TRADOC had formulated an efficient process for the development, revision, and publication of doctrinal manuals. These manuals incorporated both theoretical and practical guidance in the form of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The production of doctrinal literature by TRADOC is guided by a Doctrinal Literature Master Plan and a Doctrinal and Training Literature Program.
The preparation of doctrine in TRADOC is done by the organizational level to which it applies. Branch school commandants, for example, prepare basic branch doctrine, TTP field manuals for brigades and lower echelons, and selected multiservice and general subject publications. Commanders of integrating centers prepare doctrine for corps, divisions, and combined arm s brigades, as well as multiagency and general subject doctrine. T h e Commanding General, TRADOC, bears responsibility for doctrine for echelons above corps, the Army 's "capstone" field manuals, and doctrinal publications for joint and combined operations. In formulating doctrine for echelons above corps, the Commanding General, TRADOC, has adopted a task force approach that involves the Army War College, the integrating centers, and a "council emeritus" of retired general officers.
During FY 1989 TRADOC had a systematic process to evaluate doctrine. Changes might be engendered by lessons learned during garrison
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In August 1986 DOD formally institutionalized the concept of Competitive Strategies to identify opportunities to achieve leverage over Warsaw Pact forces by capitalizing on U.S. military strengths to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities. The Competitive Strategies concept is compatible with the major features of AirLand Battle doctrine; it encompasses tactics and stratagems that compel the enemy to react to U.S. initiatives on disadvantageous terms. Both Army unilateral doctrine and the thrust of Competitive Strategies center on the following tasks: (1) to acquire tactical advantage when forces are joined in battle; (2) to fight in depth to reduce Soviet ability to concentrate its superior forces at times and places of its choosing; (3) to compel larger enemy forces to fight on terms for battle established by a smaller Army force; (4) to maintain superior agility to concentrate rapidly and shift decisive combat power; and (5) to link tactical battles and engagements in a larger operational scheme to attain strategic objectives.
AirLand Battle doctrine is the Army's basic warfighting doctrine. It addresses a mid- or high-intensity conflict such as the defense of NATO or a major regional conflict. It reflects the structure of modern warfare, the dynamics of combat power, and the contemporary application of the classic principles of war. It recognizes the three-dimensional, joint and combined nature of modern warfare and that all ground actions will be strongly affected by air operations. While AirLand Battle emphasizes conventional operations, it also recognizes the prospect of a nuclear conflict and serves as a foundation for developing subordinate doctrine, force design, materiel acquisition, and individual and unit training. Basically, AirLand Battle doctrine envisions combat operations that are fluid and fast paced and that employ weapons of unprecedented lethality. These operations may be conducted on both a linear battlefield and simultaneously over the full dimensions of the battle area. They may entail close operations to destroy enemy forces at the point of conflict and deep operations to delay, disrupt, and destroy enemy follow-on, or second echelon, forces.
AirLand Battle doctrine embodies four basic tenets: initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. Initiative places a premium on commanders actively setting the terms of battle. It accords high significance to winning the first battle, and likely with fewer troops than the opposition. Agility emphasizes the ability of friendly forces to act faster than the enemy. Depth underscores the expansion of operations in space and time so that the conduct of the deep battle supports success in the close battle.
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Synchronization is necessary to produce the maximum relative combat power at the decisive point. AirLand Battle doctrine stresses the role of the combined arms team and competent leadership, while the brigade is the basic unit that concentrates combat power to perform specific tactical tasks for the divisions. Doctrine for operations by heavy brigades was published in 1988 in FM 71-3, Armor and Mechanized Brigade Operations. The Armor School, during FY 1989, addressed voids in the doctrine for brigade combined arms operations by preparing FM 71-123, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combined Arms (Heavy), while the Infantry School revised FM 7-30, Infantry, Airborne, and Air Assault Brigade Operations, for use by light forces.
The relation of the corps to echelons above corps in the conduct of AirLand Battle, as well as the withdrawal of intermediate-range ballistic missiles from Europe, imposed lingering doctrinal questions. During FY 1989 doctrinal planners sought to clarify the corps' dual role as the Army's largest tactical unit and as the link between the tactical level of operations and the strategic level of war. The responsibility for the latter resides with echelons above corps (EAC). The doctrinal role of EAC has been troublesome since the early 1970s, when the Army eliminated the field army and its logistics headquarters leaving no Army headquarters between the corps and the theater commands. This hiatus created difficulties in coordinating Army and Air Force joint operations and in conducting certain unilateral Army support functions that were traditionally the responsibility of field armies and army groups.
During FY 1989 one of TRADOC 's major doctrinal undertakings was to clarify doctrine for echelons above corps and to consolidate it into one manual, FM 100-7, The Army in Theater Operations. This task was deferred until promulgation of JCS Pub. 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. In the meantime, TRADOC tasked the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) to prepare a TTP manual that described the corps ' conduct of deep operations in 1990. Supplementing the more general treatment of this subject in FM 100-15, Corps Operations, the CAC 's TTP handbook also addressed the role of weapons systems such as the Apache helicopter, the Hellfire missile, and the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) for the conduct of deep operations. The CAC also outlined command and control arrangements between the corps and EAC and the coordination necessary for joint operations, especially to suppress enemy air defenses. TRADOC approved a draft of the new TTP manual in July 1989.
In February 1987 TRADOC launched the "Architecture for the Future Army (AFA) Initiative," a multifaceted approach to Army doctrine in the mid- and long-range future. By FY 1989 the AFA initiative had spawned a number of significant projects related to adapting AirLand Battle doc-
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trine to evolving threats, strategies, and technologies. This effort was encapsulated
in formulation of the AirLand Battle-Future (ALB-F) concept, discussed below.
A second outgrowth of the AFA initiative was the conceptualization of a "Blueprint
of the Battlefield," which had more immediate application. The blueprint
defined a hierarchy of functions, or Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS),
performed by Army forces at the tactical level. TRADOC identified seven principal
BOS: maneuver, fire support, air defense, command and control, intelligence,
mobility and survivability, and combat service support. The blueprint was
a comprehensive, functional representation of a combined arms force and emphasized
what actually occurs on the battlefield. The seven functions were divided
into sub functions and tasks linked to specific units, systems, and soldiers.
Before the tactical blueprint was promulgated, the Army Staff directed TRADOC to apply the same analytical methodology to the operational level. Six theater operating systems (TOS) were identified as major functions — movement and maneuver, fires, protection, command and control, intelligence, and support. This blueprint also analyzed the functions performed by joint and combined forces. A third blueprint was being prepared in FY 1989 for the strategic level of war. The Army Staff considered BOS to complement AirLand Battle doctrine and to have potential value in mission planning, in computer-assisted analysis of force planning and force design, and as a resource for instruction in Army schools and centers.
Late in FY 1988 General Vuono directed the integration of heavy and light forces. His goal was to employ various mixes of the two forces in divisions, corps, and echelons above corps. In a subsequent directive the Chief of Staff instructed TRADOC to review the force structure in FY 1989 to determine the best way to configure and employ a light-heavy force. TRADOC studied the employment of composite task forces at the National Training Center and during REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) 88, in which the 10th Mountain Division participated. A key finding was that integrated heavy-light forces caused the enemy to disperse his forces more than when these forces were used separately. Certain combinations of forces, such as air assault and heavy forces, were more lethal and highly flexible. Light forces, moreover, enhanced intelligence and target acquisition and infiltration of enemy defenses. Integrated forces posed significant differences in command and control and logistical support. Each force had different ammunition requirements, and light forces were more dependent on aerial resupply. TRADOC did not formulate an authoritative doctrinal statement on heavy-light forces in FY 1989, but Army doctrinal planners were moving toward incorporation of light forces into a corps that consisted primarily of heavy forces and light forces augmented by selective heavy force elements. The heavy-light forces study
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contributed positively to a contemporary evaluation of light infantry divisions
(LID). (See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the assessment of Lids.)
During FY 1989 the Army's analysis of heavy-light forces was also concerned with formulating realistic training. Through the Battle Command Training Program and other exercises, the Army filtered many relevant observations and lessons through TRADOC's Concept Based Requirements System. The cancellation of REFORGER 89, however, prevented the Army from further testing a light brigade in concert with heavy forces in Europe. General Vuono urged Army commanders to seize every opportunity to jointly exercise heavy-light force mixes, including special operations forces.
According to General Maxwell R. Thurman, who commanded TRADOC from June 1987 to July 1989, the AirLand Battle-Future is the framework for developing heavy forces doctrine, organization, and equipment for the 1990s and beyond. Work began on the AirLand Battle-Future concept in November 1986, and by FY 1989 its main features were discernible. Based on the thirty-year Army Long-Range Planning Guidance, AirLand Battle-Future is divided into two time frames, one of fifteen years and a second of thirty years. The debt of AirLand Battle-Future doctrine to AirLand Battle doctrine is manifest in the fifteen-year outlook. For the thirty-year period, TRADOC planners had begun studying more radical departures from ALB doctrine and force architecture as part of the Army 21 concept. Work on Army 21 actually antedated planning for AirLand Battle-Future, but was eventually superseded by the latter. An Advanced Concepts Study was also under way in FY 1989 to explore future force design and doctrine beyond the thirty-year framework of the ALB-F studies.
TRADOC completed a rough draft of the AirLand Battle-Future concept toward the end of FY 1989. The new doctrine appeared applicable across the entire operational spectrum-general war, regional conflict, and low-intensity conflict. AirLand Battle-Future assumed the diminished significance of a contiguous, linear operational front on the Central European battlefield in contrast to an open front. This assumption had enormous doctrinal and operational implications for heavy forces and led to a closely related doctrinal development in FY 1989.
AirLand Battle-Future envisioned operations over a corps area much larger than the NATO corps of FY 1989. Army doctrinal planners delineated a four-step approach to combat: the early detection and assessment of attacking forces; destructive strikes by massing indirect fires, primarily by corps artillery brigades and other strike weapons; rapid maneuver to com-
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plete destruction of enemy units; and the recovery of U.S. forces to the rear
for regeneration. To execute this concept, AirLand Battle-Future doctrine
called for a forward-deployed heavy corps of about 145,000, organized for
offensive maneuver in a greatly expanded area of operations. Controlling as
many as five divisions, the post-1995 corps would borrow some functions and
units from its divisions and have corps artillery, aviation, and engineers;
a support command; and other functional units such as an armored cavalry regiment
and up to three separate maneuver brigades.
The tactical division contemplated in the AirLand Battle-Future doctrine would be more agile and flexible after it gave up some of its functions and manpower to the corps and brigades. The proposed heavy division would have 13,600 men, a triangular organization from brigade to company, and a more austere division base. The primary functions of division headquarters would be command and control and integration of its subordinate components. AirLand Battle-Future doctrine also entailed major changes in logistics support with more centralization of battlefield maintenance and combat supply operations. Realization of the AirLand Battle-Future concept and its implied force design would depend upon exploiting advanced technology to conserve manpower. Army planners also underscored the necessity for more strategic lift to enable a rapid projection of combat power, improved battlefield mobility, and tailorable units. Along with initiative, synchronization, and depth, endurance in AirLand Battle-Future doctrine assured that Army units would sustain high levels of continuous combat. Although AirLand Battle-Future did not reject forward-deployed forces in regions essential to U.S. national interests, it gave added recognition to contingency forces suitable for regional conflicts and specialized forces geared to low-intensity conflict and security assistance.
While work on ALB-F continued, a related study, AirLand Battle-Future (Heavy) (ALB-F[H]), addressed the role of heavy forces in mid- to high-intensity combat in Central Europe. TRADOC assigned the task to the U.S. A my Combined Arms Center in September 1987. The AirLand Battle-Future (Heavy) Study Group developed several options for combat operations of heavy Army forces in Europe by the year 2000. In the summer of 1988 the Commander of TRADOC , General Thurman, chose one concept as the basis for further development of ALB-F(H) that stressed simultaneous operations in the main battle area and the enemy 's rear. In waging the deep battle, ALB-F ( H ) would rely on more lethal and accurate long-range artillery and enhanced target acquisition systems. Nevertheless, ALB-F(H) adhered to the strategy of the late 1980s wherein U.S. forces would fight as part of a NATO flexible response but without intermediate nuclear forces. The ALB-F(H) had numerous ramifications for future force design. The
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concept gave high priority to the synchronization of combat operations among
all echelons from corps to battalion and required high flexibility that allowed
transfer of maneuver elements between corps, divisions , and brigades. Assigned
to corps control, contingency and reserve forces would be structured for both
semi-independent operations and commitment in a decisive action. To wage the
deep battle, corps would control artillery and missile firepower, previously
allocated to divisions, and would also carry major responsibility for winning
the counterfire battle. The ALB-F(H) study group briefed senior Army commanders
and completed its work at the end of May 1989. Apparent changes in the Warsaw
Pact threat in Europe raised doubts on the validity of many of the ALB-F(
H) assumptions. By the summer of 1989 TRADOC suspended work on the ALB-F(H)
and the Army 21 project and concentrated on further development of AirLand
Battle-Future doctrine.
The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 prompted increased concern in the development of joint concepts, doctrine, and training. The 1986 act charged the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop joint doctrine for the armed forces; by FY 1989 several joint doctrinal statements had been published. Joint Pub. 1-01, Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint TTP Development Program, constituted the Joint Doctrine Master Plan. Approved by the services and the JCS in February 1988, this plan specified publications in several categories — intelligence; operations; logistics; plans; and command, control, and communications. The master plan established thirty-six publication projects and a developmental process. The Army was assigned development of several major doctrinal publications which included Joint Pub. 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, later changed to Doctrine for Joint and Unified Operations, and Joint Pub. 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low -Intensity Conflict. TRADOC, supported by the Command and General Staff College, prepared Joint Pub. 3-0, which underwent interservice review and coordination during FY 1989. Written for unified and specified commanders, joint task forces, and their components, Joint Pub. 3-0 set forth a doctrinal framework for the employment of forces in joint operations and a national position for combined doctrine. In translating national strategy into assigned missions and military objectives, it presented joint planners with capabilities and concepts for the use of component forces.
The phrase "spectrum of conflict," commonly used in Army doctrine to indicate the tripartite division of conflict into levels of high, mid, and low intensity, by late FY 1989 gave way to "operational continuum." It defined several possible strategic environments-peacetime competition,
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conflict, and war. Peacetime competition encompassed disaster relief, joint
training exercises, nation building, peacekeeping, counterdrug operations,
and military show-of-force. Conflict embraced counterterrorism, contingency
operations, and insurgency/counterinsurgency situations. War could occur at
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and was characterized by sustained
armed conflict.
Joint operational doctrine also stressed the uniqueness of each theater and local conditions and abjured a rigid joint structure based on service equity or specific force structure arrangements. It also served as a basis for joint training, contributed to joint military education, and enabled unified and specified commanders to better assess their force requirements. During FY 1989 the JCS assigned the Army responsibility to prepare additional doctrinal publications specified in the Joint Doctrine Master Plan that included joint logistics, chemical operations, rear area operations, and fire support. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics of the Army Staff was responsible for preparing Joint Pub. 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support to Joint Operations. Army agencies both contributed to and reviewed drafts of publications prepared by other services. Army units also evaluated joint doctrine for planning and operations during joint exercises such as SOLID SHIELD 89 in the continental United States in September 1989 and BRIM FROST 89 in Alaska.
Throughout FY 1989 General Vuono took a personal interest in the development of joint doctrine. As areas that required more development, he singled out doctrine for joint and combined operations at echelons above corps and theater levels. He also noted the intimate connection between the development of joint doctrine and the training of Army officers for joint service.
Before Congress mandated greater joint cooperation between the services in 1986, the Army and the Air Force had worked together to develop techniques and procedures for close air support and airlift of Army forces and air base ground defense outside the continental United States (OCONUS). A my and Air Force initiatives were institutionalized in such joint organizations as the Tactical Air Command (TAC)-TRADOC AirLand Forces Application Agency (ALFA) in 1975. The Military Airlift Command (MAC)-TRADOC Airlift Concepts and Requirements Agency ( ACRA), established in 1984, during FY 1989 was actively developing joint doctrine for airlift in theater combat and airborne operations, aeromedical evacuation, employment of the C-17 transport, and future airlift requirements. To further joint training and joint combat capabilities in tactical air operations, on 14 January 1989, the JCS approved the concept of a multiservice Joint Tactical Air Operations Interface training program.
Since 1986 the Army and the Air Force have participated in another joint doctrinal effort at the Army-Air Force Center for Low-Intensity
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Conflict (A-AF-CLIC), located at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. The nineteen-person
center has three divisions- operations, support, and intelligence-and works
with four categories of low-intensity conflict (LIC)-support to insurgency/counterinsurgency,
combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations.
The center is the principal proponent for Joint Pub. 3-07, Doctrine for Joint
Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, and has collaborated on development
of FM 100-20/AFM 2-20, Military Operations in LIC. Through its doctrinal manuals,
occasional publications of papers and bibliographies, conferences, and programs
of instruction, the center has raised awareness about LIC both within and
outside the military establishment.
Between 1984 and 1988 the Army and the Air Force had prepared a series of Joint Force Development Initiatives (JFDI) that dealt with close air support. For example, JFDI No. 24 reaffirmed the Air Force's primacy in providing fixed-wing close air support (CAS), while JFDI No. 26 specified that the two services would develop joint positions on new aircraft for this purpose. By the start of FY 1989 JFDI No. 33, Future Close Air Support, addressed concepts for responsive close air support within the context of the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine. One outstanding issue was the selection of an appropriate Air Force ground-attack aircraft that could perform equally well in operations that ranged from low to high intensity and that possessed night and all-weather capabilities. JFDI No. 33 also dealt with several complex issues—the organization of the tactical air control party, the forward air controller concept, the joint planning cycle, and joint TTP for CAS and battlefield air interdiction (BAI). Army planners sought to enhance the influence of the Army component commander in the allocation of CAS, while Air Force planners emphasized the theater-wide responsibilities of the Air component commander. A stalemate on this issue prompted senior representatives of both services in March 1989 to produce a revised concept paper, "Air Attack on the Modern Battlefield." It was forwarded to the two service chiefs on 21 August 1989 and later approved by them. The study addressed general issues such as the respective roles of fixed-wing aircraft and Army attack helicopters in the total air attack system and their interaction with ground forces. The two services agreed that attack helicopters were a legitimate extension of ground combat power and that a joint commander to centralize the air attack system was needed. The Army acknowledged CAS as an Air Force function and also emphasized its massive rather than piecemeal use. While the Air Force was committed to fulfilling its CAS mission, the Army was concerned about the ability of high-speed, fixed-wing attack aircraft to acquire and engage ground targets in a cluttered battlefield environment on first pass. Both services agreed on the need for advanced avionics and munitions.
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In early 1989 several factors intervened to place the entire project in abeyance.
The Federal Republic of Germany considered assigning the German CAS mission
to its ground forces, which would have profound ramifications on interoperability
of NATO CAS forces. Another factor was a growing displeasure in Congress regarding
the selection of a new tactical fighter by the Air Force for its CAS mission.
The Army agreed, in principle, with the Air Force's concept for a multirole
aircraft to perform both CAS and BAI, as long as the aircraft could adequately
perform both missions according to AirLand Battle doctrine. The Army did not
suggest an alternative aircraft design. In 1986 the Air Force had planned
to modernize its A-7 (A-7F) and modify F-16s for the dual CAS-BAI role and
conducted demonstrations of the "missionized" F/A-16 at Fort Hood,
Texas, in September 1988.
Through its participation in the DOD Close Air Support Mission Area Review Group (CASMARG), the Army monitored Air Force design efforts . In January 1989 the CASMARG recommended that a number of A-10s and F-16s be upgraded with new avionics to improve target acquisition, navigation, communications, and night capabilities to enhance their CAS capabilities to support the AirLand Battlefield. For the near term, the Air Force proposed upgrading some A-10s and the F-16 to improve target acquisition and night capabilities. Acting Secretary of Defense William Howard Taft IV approved the proposal in February 1989. DOD deferred a decision on modifying the newer F-16 to an A-16 for a CAS role, but subsequent review by the CASMARG prompted DOD to agree to modify newer F-16s by hardening their surface to reduce their vulnerability to advanced man-portable antiaircraft missiles and by the addition of forward-looking infrared heat sensors to improve target acquisition, digital terrain systems for low-altitude flight and advanced night attack capabilities, and automatic target hand-off equipment to improve air-to-ground coordination. The Army in August 1989 endorsed the A-16 as the preferred CAS aircraft, but DOD had not made a final acquisition decision by the end of FY 1989.
Congressional concern about the difficulties and delays in selecting appropriate CAS aircraft inspired the Dixon Amendment to the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act in September 1988. The amendment mandated that DOD study the feasibility of transferring the CAS mission to the Army and directed evaluations of alternative CAS aircraft. The Army sought to limit the evaluations to the issue of fixed-wing close air support because it did not want to address wholesale changes in roles and missions. Early in 1989 the JCS directed the Army to develop a concept for assuming the CAS mission. TRADOC envisioned a transfer of CAS over a ten-year period without the transfer of Air Force personnel and equipment. Should Congress direct the Army to assume the mission by FY 1992, TRADOC proposed that the Army absorb the
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A-10/forward controller forces intact from the Air Force. The Army would organize
CAS forces into battalions and brigades and assign them to corps or higher
Army commanders for employment as organic tactical forces.
Logistics and communications were among the areas most in need of combined doctrine in NATO in FY 1989. NATO Army Group commanders lacked wartime control over multinational logistical support except on an ad hoc basis in the midst of combat operations. For the past several years the United States had spurred efforts to unify logistics doctrine among its NATO allies. This effort was recognized by NATO's Military Agency for Standardization and its Logistics Working Party (LOGWP). The U.S. military delegation to the Land Forces LOGWP was headed by members of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG) and had representatives from the Army Logistics Center, the Army Materiel Command, and the Marine Corps. In March 1989 LOGWP completed a draft of the proposed Allied Logistics Publication 9 (ALP-9), which identified doctrinal principles and key considerations for a combined logistics concept. At a meeting of American, British, Canadian, and Australian (ABCA) military communications experts at Monterey, California, in March 1989, the incompatibility between the Army's Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), the British BOWMAN, and the Australian RAVEN tactical communication systems was addressed. The ABCA nations established a working group to study this problem with a view toward complete interoperability in the future. The United States and West Germany, during FY 1989, were working toward a similar objective with regard to tactical communications.
Near the end of FY 1989 the U.S. Army 's Communications Interoperability Master Plan was adopted in principle by the British and Germans. The plan specified requirements and capabilities in terms of the type of information exchanged between allies, the transmission media, and the doctrine and tactics affecting the information exchange process. While the plan would provide the foundation for future development of combined communications doctrine, the Army considered the exchange of ideas between the allied nations a major breakthrough.
As a strategic concept, low-intensity conflict embraces an array of environments that usually entail political-military confrontation between states or groups at a level below conventional war but above the peaceful competition among states. It applies to protracted internecine struggles,
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often between competing ideologies commonly characterized as insurgent or
subversive warfare and terrorism, as well as conflicts between states involving
the use of unconventional and organized armed forces. Low-intensity conflict
is rarely a pure military problem. The Army, which has a long history of participation
in such conflicts, plays primarily a supporting role in securing national
objectives that are fundamentally political, psychological, or economic. Indeed,
the nonmilitary nature of LIC often determines the tactical conduct of supporting
military operations even when conventional military forces are employed. The
military component in low-intensity conflict operations, however, may range
from conventional forces in peacetime contingency operations or peacekeeping
operations, to SOF in irregular or unconventional warfare, to use of advisory,
logistical, medical, or engineer support within the context of security assistance
programs. U.S. national security policy requires reliable, flexible, and highly
professional forces to participate in low-intensity operations. During FY
1989 the Army and the Air Force neared completion of a new document, FM 100-20/AFM
2-XY, Low Intensity Conflict, which will establish Army and Air Force doctrine
for planning and executing LIC operations that will complement AirLand Battle
doctrine.
Special operations are sometimes mistakenly equated with low-intensity conflict operations, but they are one of several means for conducting LIC operations. Special operations forces-Special Forces, Rangers, Special Operations Aviation Units, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations-can be used in all forms of conflict and are customarily assigned to CINCs for execution of wartime and contingency plans. SOF may also be assigned to U.S. country teams or authorized sensitive missions by the National Command Authority. Throughout FY 1989 the Army continued to develop SOF doctrine applicable to high-, mid-, and low-intensity conflicts and to bring SOF doctrine in line with AirLand Battle concepts. In FY 1989 special operations forces doctrine embraced new missions such as counterterrorism and drug interdiction. The four major SOF missions-foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, and direct combat action with Army Special Forces as the principal exponent-can be carried out within either the AirLand Battle doctrine or as part of low-intensity conflict operations.
The evolution of SOF doctrine has paralleled the revision of logistical and administrative support doctrine in the Army. While SOF units have a high degree of self-sufficiency, they have also been equipped with sophisticated equipment that requires extensive logistical support. In the future SOF will rely more on conventional Army-wide support structures than on their own support systems. Under an area support concept, the Army component commander uses the appropriate theater logistics command to support deployed Army SOF units beyond their organic capability. These
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arrangements will help to integrate SOF operations with the broad mission
of the theater commander. T hey will also temper the perception of SOF as
elite elements and help integrate them into the mainstream of the Army.
Despite its refinement in FY 1989, SOF logistical support posed several problems. Support arrangements envisioned under the area support concept could be inadequate in underdeveloped areas. Even in a developed theater, SOF might deploy in advance or operate independently of area support units. At other times it might be infeasible to deploy an area support logistical force. Some SOF-peculiar equipment — the TSC-99 communications central, for example— maybe difficult to support by standard logistics units because of insufficient repair parts or inexperienced technicians. A related problem is the difficulty of assigning officers to hold both special operations and logistical skill code identifiers without rebranching them to the Special Forces Branch. As a remedy, the Army instituted the Special Operations Staff Officer Course, which produces graduates who receive an additional skill identifier that eliminates rebranching.
The Army, in support of American foreign and defense policies, conducts a variety of security assistance programs around the world. These programs provide military resources in the form of materiel, technical assistance, and education and training to promote stability and to contain external or internal threats. Such assistance helps prevent the rise of situations that might require stronger military intervention. In helping beleaguered nations deter or successfully cope with such threats, security assistance programs also help nations to strengthen the fabric of political democracy and economic prosperity. For the Army, security assistance serves several purposes. It contributes to force projection doctrine and forward defense strategy and helps allied and friendly military forces to prepare and fight coalition warfare with American troops. A significant element of the Army's role in security assistance is the professional education and training provided to promising foreign military officers, largely from developing countries. These officers are exposed to U.S. Army doctrine and joint and combined exercises designed to instill professionalism and to facilitate combined operations. The Army also emphasizes logistical and maintenance training for Army equipment provided them by U.S. military assistance programs through instruction at Army schools or the use of security assistance teams in the host country.
Security assistance varies by region and country, and the composition of security assistance teams is determined by the nature of each program. Teams are usually on temporary assignment, and their numbers vary from month to month. As of 28 March 1989, the Army had 38 security assis-
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tance teams with a total of 123 personnel deployed to 14 countries. SOUTHCOM
had 17 teams with 42 people, and all but 1 person served in El Salvador. CENTCOM
had 16 teams with 75 people, PACOM 1 team of 1 soldier, and EUCOM 4 teams
with 5 people. Despite their military nature, security assistance programs
are funded by the Foreign Assistance Appropriation, controlled by the Department
of State. Since FY 1986 Congress has reduced funds for security assistance
by about $1 billion, or to about $4.8 billion in FY 1989. More than 93 percent
of that amount was earmarked by Congress for ten countries. Army leaders called
for a more flexible approach that directed security assistance to countries
most threatened by low-intensity conflicts.
The Army also participates in security assistance programs through the diversion of the Army inventory of equipment and supplies to support grant aid and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs. The FMS program diverts Army assets to support U.S. policy objectives, but recipient countries pay for these items. As of mid-FY 1989 active FMS programs were being conducted with 105 countries and 7 international organizations. The six largest recipients were Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Taiwan, Germany, Israel, and Jordan. The FMS program, supply support arrangements, and grant aid by the Army in FY 1989 totaled $4.3 billion.
The Army has a long history of accomplishments in supporting national space programs and advancing the potential of space for military purposes. It perfected guidance and control systems that enable ground-based air defense systems to intercept and destroy short-range tactical missiles. Since the early 1960s, as part of its Exoatmospheric Re-entry Vehicle Interceptor Subsystem (ERIS), the Army had also explored the technology for a nonnuclear means of intercepting and destroying intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in space. It used this expertise as a participant in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which was launched in 1983 to protect the United States from ICBM and space-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). In FY 1989 the Army continued its research and development of space programs that supported land warfare. The Soviet threat had increased because of Soviet efforts to integrate ground weapons systems with space surveillance, command and control, and targeting assets. In addition, the Soviets deployed an operational anti-satellite (ASAT) system that posed a threat to American satellites for which there was no corresponding American capability.
The U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command (USASDC), headquartered in Arlington, Virginia, carried out research that supported the SDI and managed the national test range at Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific.
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USASDC managed several projects that accounted for approximately 30 percent
of DOD's SDI research and development budget in FY 1989. USASDC helped coordinate
development of the Army Anti-Tactical Missile (ATM) for ground-based missile
defense that encompassed kinetic and directed energy (laser and particle beam)
weapons and space surveillance and battle management systems. The mission
of space control is vested in the U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM), a unified
command; the Army Space Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado, is the Army component.
Spurred by superpower agreements that limited or banned medium-and long-range ballistic missiles and by the proliferation of short- and medium-range missiles among regional powers, the Army shifted its emphasis to theater missile defense (TMD) during the late 1980s to address the threat posed to ground forces by both ballistic missiles (rocket- powered weapons that carry their own fuel and oxidizer and can operate beyond the atmosphere) and air-breathing missiles whose engines require the intake of air for the combustion of their fuel. USASDC is the executive agent for portions of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization's (SDIO) Theater Defense Programs. This mission is carried out primarily by the Theater Missile Defense Applications Project Off ice (TMDAPO) and by other USASDC directorates located in Huntsville, Alabama. The TMD program is divided into four major categories: cooperative efforts with selected U.S. allies; TMD architecture studies; Invite, Show, and Test (IST) programs; and the Extended Air Defense Test Bed (EADTB). During FY 1989 the Army joined in cooperative architecture studies and hardware development with the United Kingdom and Israel. The total value of TMD-related contracts with the United Kingdom was $46 million through FY 1989 and with Israel reached approximately $53 million in FY 1989 alone.
The Invite, Show, and Test program solicited off-the-shelf technologies for consideration in the TMD program. Promising technologies were tested at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. A notable IST achievement in FY 1989 was the Extended Range Intercept Technology (ERINT) Program. ERINT's goal is to enable flight test vehicles to attain higher altitude and longer range intercepts through a more powerful radar, a larger booster, and a more lethal warhead. During FY 1989 USASDC continued work on an Extended Air Defense Test Bed to simulate the air defense systems that confront NATO countries. The EADTB consists of computer simulations that analyze defenses against aircraft, tactical air-to-surface missiles, cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles. It is being designed to operate as a unilateral American system or in a NATO network. A prototype system was made available to the U.S. Air Force in Europe and the Army Air Defense Artillery School in FY 1989.
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The Army's growing role in SDI research engendered several organizational
changes during FY 1989. The Joint Tactical Missile Defense Project Office
(JTMDPO), previously an element of the Air Defense Program Executive Office,
was transferred to the Missile Command and renamed the Joint Tactical Missile
Defense Management Office (JTMD-MO). This organization reported to the Commander,
U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM), and managed the development of tactical missile
defense systems in the Army. The Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) and High-Medium
Altitude Air Defense (HIMAD) program executive offices were consolidated under
the Air Defense Program Executive Officer.
On 9 January 1989, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) recommended both a kinetic energy (KE) and a directed energy (DE) ASAT program. DAB was favorably impressed by USASDC experience in developing satellite-killing warheads that used ground-based interceptors and also the command's management of the Ground-Based Free Electron Laser technology program. In response to the DAB, the Acting Secretary of Defense, on 6 March 1989, directed the Army to lead a multiservice kinetic energy ASAT program. The ASAT joint program will be established at the Army's Strategic Defense Command in Huntsville, Alabama. Since the ASAT system will eventually have both land- and sea-based platforms, the Navy will also participate.
Work on the Army's Exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle Interceptor Subsystem constitutes the first phase of the SDI. It entails converting the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL), used to test SDI technology, to an ASAT weapon. SDI's second phase entails development of several directed energy lasers, including free electron and chemical, that will be developed by the Army and the Air Force, respectively.
The Army achieved another milestone in its SDI role on 13 July 1989 with the first successful space flight that demonstrated the feasibility of the Beam Experiment Aboard Rocket (BEAR) of the Neutral Particle Beam (NPB) program at the White Sands Missile Range. The experiment demonstrated for the first time that the NPB platform can operate in a space environment. Some critics felt that the ASAT system was indistinguishable from strategic antisatellite or antimissile systems and hence was banned under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Proponents of the ASAT stressed its legitimacy because of its use in destroying enemy targeting satellites before they can launch or guide rockets against conventional land forces and ships. The Air Force was designated as the lead service for developing a single comprehensive space surveillance and battle management system for total responsibility of all DOD ASAT capabilities.
Because the Army's role in space programs was increasing, the U.S. Army Space Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, a part of TRADOC, was formulating doctrine, training, organization, and materiel for space
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support to land forces. It emphasized space systems support to battlefield
commanders with communications, intelligence, navigation, and mapping. One
example of this effort was doctrine related to the Global Positioning System
(GPS), used by pilots and all armed services personnel to pinpoint their location
anywhere in the world.
The Air Defense Artillery School was preparing the Anti-Tactical Missile Defense (ATMD) System Operational and Organization Plan for TRADOC, based on the Joint Tactical Missile Defense (JTMD) Operational Concept promulgated in April 1988.
—Doctrine serves several purposes. It bridges strategy and force structure and also guides training. While supporting the strategy from which it is derived, it is the foundation for policies and actions of the Army pertaining to force design, modernization, personnel, logistics, and training. During FY 1989 the Army continued to develop and refine doctrine and concepts that would enable it to operate successfully across the continuum of military operations. While AirLand Battle doctrine and its derivatives were best suited to the operations of heavy forces in the defense of Europe, the underlying concepts of ALB were applicable to mid-intensity regional conflicts. Fiscal Year 1989 also witnessed an expansion of low-intensity conflict and peacetime engagement of conventional and special operations forces. The Army's involvement in the nation's space effort also attested to the extension of its doctrinal perspective. Not only was the Army fashioning concepts for ballistic missile defenses, it also was evolving concepts governing the use of space-based systems to augment land combat in theater missile defense and navigational systems. Finally, the expanding doctrinal focus in FY 1989 pointed to the necessity of formulating doctrine and concepts for the Army's effective participation in joint and combined operations.
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