Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1990-1991

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Structuring the Force

FY 90 and 91 witnessed substantial changes in U.S. Army force structure. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's programs of perestroika and glasnost continued to reduce tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. During the period, the Berlin Wall came down, the Warsaw Pact disbanded, Germany was reunified, and the Cold War ended. The United States began adapting its defense establishment to a national strategy that was shifting from preoccupation with the Soviet Union in Europe to unanticipated but lower scale threats worldwide. During this tumultuous period the Army began changing to a smaller force, based primarily in CONUS, and focused on regional conflicts. In FY 89 the Army had 770,000 active component personnel and twenty- eight tactical divisions-eighteen active component and ten reserve component Army National Guard (ARNG). At the end of FY 91, active component strength had fallen to 725,445 soldiers, or 6 percent less. The Army had reduced the number of its divisions to sixteen active component and ten ARNG, and steps continued to reduce the force to twelve active and eight ARNG divisions. Six of the eight ARNG divisions would be fully manned, and two of them cadre.

The Army and the Total Force Policy

In 1973 the United States formalized the DOD's Total Force policy. Essentially, the policy required integration of all available armed forces and relied upon reserve components units to augment active component units. The Army established a total force that placed about half the combat forces in the active component and two-thirds of the combat support/ combat service support forces in the reserve components. It also identified reserve component roundout battalions and brigades to train and fight as part of parent active duty units. In FY 90 the Total Army contained twenty-eight combat divisions (eighteen active component and ten reserve component) and twenty-eight separate combat brigades (five active component and twenty-three reserve component). The active components provided forward-deployed, contingency, and rapid reinforcement

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forces. The reserve components included more than half the soldiers in the Total Army and 60 percent of all support units. One-third of the active component divisions included reserve component roundout brigades. In FY 91 the Army inactivated two active component divisions.

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM largely validated the Total Force concept. The service of two reserve component field artillery brigades-the 142d of Arkansas and the 196th of Tennessee-and the successful sustainment support provided by reserve component combat support and combat service support units in the Persian Gulf war exemplified this point. Yet, controversy arose regarding the decision not to send three designated ARNG roundout brigades-the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of Georgia, the 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of Louisiana, and the 155th Armored Brigade of Mississippi-to Saudi Arabia with their parent active component divisions. The FY 91 Defense Authorization Act directed the Department of Defense to conduct a form al study of its Total Force policy. The Secretary of Defense established a Total Force study group to analyze the topic. Released on 31 December 1990, the Pentagon's Total Force Policy Report to Congress concluded that, in the future, U.S. active component forces should be able to deploy rapidly to trouble spots and to sustain themselves for the first thirty days with virtually no support from the reserve components. Under the plan, the active component would continue to use ARNG roundout brigades.

At the end of FY 91, the Army saw several trends that necessitated adjustments to the Total Force policy. These trends included a reduction in the requirement to maintain sizable ready forces for rapid deployment to Europe, and the effect of potential demands for immediate deployment anywhere in the world upon the state of Army training. A smaller Army meant continued reliance on the reserve component to reinforce extended contingency operations, to deal concurrently with a second major contingency, and to be prepared for large scale threats. Finally, the reduced Soviet threat permitted longer timeframes to generate additional U.S. forces. The Army planned to reduce both the active and the reserve components to a smaller but equally capable Total Force during a period of several years. Active component reductions began in FY 90, but the Army planned no reserve component strength reductions for that year pending congressional response to the Total Force Policy Report.

In an effort to optimize the performance of the reserve components in fulfilling the Army's strategic roles, on 1 October 1990 the Army implemented a plan that transferred the Army Reserve (USAR) budget process from the FORSCOM commander to the Chief of the Army Reserve. On the same date, the Army provisionally established the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) as a major subordinate command of FORSCOM. The Chief of the Army Reserve became both its commander and the

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FORSCOM Deputy Commanding General for Reserve Affairs. USARC obtained command and control over all CONUS-based reserve units, except those that report to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). USARC was scheduled to become fully operational by October 1992.

Force Structure Reductions

The Army entered FY 90 with five corps and twenty-eight combat divisions. Some of these units were based in Europe and the Pacific, a contingency corps and a reinforcing corps were located in CONUS, and all of them were reinforced by support units. When FY 91 ended, the Army had eliminated two active component divisions (the 2d Armored and the 9th [Motorized] Infantry Divisions) and anticipated reducing to a 4-corps, 20-division force by 1995. Planners envisioned twelve active component divisions (two armored, five mechanized, two light, one airborne, one air assault, and one infantry); six ARNG divisions (two armored, three mechanized, one light); and two heavy reserve component cadre divisions.

Active component forces would accomplish forward presence and rapid deployment missions with four divisions forward-deployed (two in Europe and two in the Pacific) for immediate response, and five divisions (two heavy, one airborne, one air assault, and one light) as a contingency corps easily reconfigured to fight with special operations forces for response to crises worldwide. The Army would also maintain a reinforcing corps in CONUS capable of deploying after activation of the reserve components, completing varying degrees of post-mobilization training, and making special preparations for the particular contingency. These forces would consist of three active component divisions, rounded out by ARNG brigades for early reinforcing, and a follow-on force of six ARNG divisions. Two reserve component cadre divisions, designed to bridge the gap between activation of the ARNG divisions and total mobilization, would complete the twenty-division Total Army of 1995.

Armies and Corps

There were eight numbered armies in FY 90, but they were reduced to seven in FY 91 with elimination of the Fourth U.S. Army at Fort Sheridan, Illinois. The seven armies were First U.S. Army, Fort Meade, Maryland; Second U.S. Army, Fort Gillem, Georgia; Third U.S. Army, Fort McPherson, Georgia; Fifth U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas; Sixth U.S. Army, San Francisco, California; Seventh U.S. Army, Heidelberg, Germany; and Eighth U.S. Army, Seoul, South Korea. The Third Army

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served as a tactical field army and also as ARCENT, the U.S. Army component command of CENTCOM during the Persian Gulf war. The five continental United States armies (CONUSAs)-the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth armies-commanded the USAR troop units within their geographical areas. They also directed the training of ARNG units within their geographical areas in accordance with HQDA and FORSCOM guidance. FORSCOM assigned the CONUSAs operational control for mobilization and deployment at all mobilization stations in their areas. In the event of full-scale mobilization, the CONUSAs were scheduled to become Joint Regional Defense Commands.

The corps is the highest tactical echelon of the Army, and the primary command and control headquarters for the land battle in-theater. It has two or more combat divisions and permanently assigned nondivisional combat, combat support, and combat service support units that can be allocated to subordinate divisions or utilized independently to influence the battle. During FY 90 and 91 five corps were in the active component -I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington; III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas;V Corps, Frankfurt, Germany; VII Corps, Stuttgart, Germany; and the XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. On 15 August 1991, the Army announced that it would inactivate the VII Corps by 15 April 1992.

Divisions and Separate Brigades

The division is the Army's highest tactical echelon with a fixed organization. Commanded by a major general, a division is a combined arms unit with permanently assigned forces that perform five essential functions- maneuver, air defense, fire support, intelligence and electronic warfare, and combat service support. A division can fight as a self-contained force, but it is usually augmented with corps troops for sustained operations. Each division organizes for combat by assigning missions and allocating divisional resources and troops to its three organic maneuver brigades.

Army divisions are classified as heavy (armored and mechanized), light (light infantry, airborne, air assault, and motorized), or infantry, which describes either a specially organized division, such as the 2d Infantry Division in Korea, or the standard infantry divisions in the ARNG. Heavy divisions are either armored or mechanized infantry units designed to fight against a mechanized enemy in a mid-to-high intensity battlefield. Armored divisions organically consist of six tank and four mechanized infantry battalions and approximately 16,800 men, while a mechanized infantry division has five tank and five mechanized infantry battalions and approximately 17,100 men. In FY 90 the Army had six armored (four active component and two reserve component) and eight mechanized (six active component and two reserve component) divisions

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TABLE 1-FY 90 AND 91 ACTIVE COMPONENT DIVISIONS

(Table 1). As FY 90 began, three heavy divisions were rounded out with reserve component combat brigades (Table 2). This number had increased to four as FY 91 closed (Table 3).

An armored division was removed from the active component in FY 91. On 15 September 1991, the 2d Armored Division stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, was dropped from the active force, although formal inactivation was postponed until a future date. The 2d Brigade, 2d Armored Division, was inactivated in August 1990. The division's 1st Brigade, the famed "Tiger Brigade," attached to U.S. Marine Corps forces during Operation DESERT STORM, was inactivated on 20 May 1991, and the officers and men became the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. The 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division, remained in Germany and had not been officially redesignated and assigned to another unit by the end of FY 91.

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TABLE 2-FY 90 ACTIVE COMPONENT (AC) DIVISIONS
WITH RESERVE COMPONENT (RC) ROUNDOUT BRIGADES

Another heavy unit, the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), was inactivated on 15 December 1989 as part of the budget cuts required under the QUICKSILVER program. The 4th Infantry Division was targeted for the cut since it was the only heavy division in CONUS with three brigades. To compensate for the loss, the division was assigned the 116th Cavalry Brigade of the Idaho National Guard as a roundout brigade (Table 3). QUICKSILVER also caused a restructuring of the separate 194th Armored Brigade to a 1,068-man, armor-heavy task force that consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, three armor companies, two mechanized infantry companies, a reserve component armor company, a field artillery battery, a supply and transport company, and a support battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment. The restructuring was completed on 30 September 1990.

The Chief of Staff, Army, approved the implementation of the Engineer Restructure Initiative, later called the Heavy Division Engineer Brigade, on 5 March 1991 as part of the Army of Excellence process. This initiative called for an engineer brigade organic to each heavy division, which would provide one engineer battalion for each of the maneuver brigades and an engineer brigade headquarters for overall command and control. USAREUR previously had reorganized its engineer assets in a test of the concept, which was validated in combat during Operation DESERT STORM. Implementation was scheduled to begin in Europe and Korea in FY 92 and within FORSCOM during FY 92-94. Projected plans called for implementation for the five heavy ARNG divisions during FY 95-97.

Light divisions are configured for rapid deployment and immediate insertion into trouble spots worldwide. In FY 90 the Army had five light

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TABLE 3-FY 91 ACTIVE COMPONENT (AC) DIVISIONS
WITH RESERVE COMPONENT (RC) ROUNDOUT BRIGADES

infantry divisions (four active component and one reserve component), and three other active component light divisions-one airborne, one air assault, and one motorized-but it eliminated the motorized division in FY 91 (see Table 1). Four active component light divisions were assigned reserve component roundout brigades in FY 90, but during FY 91 this number was reduced to three (Tables 2 and 3). On 5 February 1989, QUICKSILVER directed restructuring the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) by 1991 to a separate motorized brigade with a strength of 3,900 men. Inactivation of the 9th, formerly known as the High Technology Light Division (HTLD), began in FY 90, but official inactivation of the division was rescheduled for 15 August 1992. Having inactivated its 2d Brigade in February 1988, the 9th inactivated its 1st Brigade in FY 90 and both its Division Artillery and 3d Brigade on 15 February 1991. The soldiers and equipment of the 3d Brigade were re-formed into the separate 199th Infantry Brigade.

The Army had one active component infantry division, the 2d Infantry Division in Korea, and five reserve component infantry divisions during FY 90 and 91 (see Tables 1 and 4). No major structural changes were made to those units during that time. In 1990, however, HQDA announced a planned consolidation of the 42d Infantry Division of New York, the 26th Infantry Division of New England, and the 50th Armored Division of New Jersey, all ARNG units, into one heavy division by 1993.

In April 1990 the Army began studying the feasibility of incorporating cadre divisions into the Total Army. The end of the Cold War permitted more time for the United States to detect and counter a resurgent Soviet or other major threat. Reconstituting units under full mobilization relies on

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TABLE 4-RESERVE COMPONENT (NATIONAL GUARD) DIVISIONS

stockpiled or produced equipment and on soldiers drafted and trained after mobilization. Estimates in 1991 indicated that it would take two or more years before new units could be formed, equipped, trained, and deployed. Planners decided that the Army needed units that could attain combat readiness more quickly than newly formed units and that would be less expensive to maintain than fully structured active or ARNG divisions.

Cadre divisions are partially manned and equipped units that are filled and trained in the event of war. In peacetime, a cadre division consists of a skeletonized division organization of about 3,000 trained officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Upon mobilization, the division would be filled with an influx of equipment and drafted or recruited soldiers who would be trained by the cadre leadership and then deploy. An armored cadre division could attain combat readiness twelve to fifteen months after mobilization. TRADOC began full development of the cadre division concept in a force development concept analysis during FY 90 and 91. Army leadership expected to make implementation decisions prior to submission of the 1994-99 Defense Plan.

As FY 90 began, the Army active component had four separate brigades (one armor, one mechanized infantry, and two infantry) and three armored cavalry regiments (Table 5). Additionally, the third brigades from both the 1st Infantry Division and the 2d Armored Division were based in Germany. The reserve component had twenty separate brigades in the

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TABLE 5-SEPARATE BRIGADES AND ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENTS (ACRS)

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ARNG (five armor, six mechanized infantry, and nine infantry), three in the USAR (one each of mechanized infantry, infantry, and light infantry), as well as two armored cavalry regiments in the ARNG. As mentioned earlier, the 194th Armored Brigade was reconfigured to an armored heavy task force during FY 90. During FY 91 the 197th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) was inactivated and its resources were assigned to the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) to form its third brigade. At the same time, the soldiers and equipment of the former 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) became the 199th Infantry Brigade (Motorized). Also during FY 91 the 1st Infantry Division (Forward), the third brigade of the 1st Infantry Division in Germany, was inactivated. When FY 91 ended, there were four active component separate brigades: one armor, one mechanized infantry, one infantry, and one motorized infantry. There were no changes to the armored cavalry regiments.

Special Operations Forces

Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) add to the theater commander's broad range of military options. Comprising nearly 70 percent of the Department of Defense's SOF personnel, Army SOF consists of special forces, rangers, special operations aviation, psychological operations units, and civil affairs units. On 1 December 1989, the Army activated the U. S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) as the sixteenth MACOM and made it the Army component of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). In October 1990 USASOC assumed command of all reserve component SOF, which meant that reserve component SOF training, operations, and budget would be aligned with active component SOF activities. Additionally, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC), an active component command, was to control all special forces units. The U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) (USACAPOC), a reserve component command, was to control all civil affairs and psychological operations units.

Special forces train and assist foreign military and paramilitary forces in unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and can conduct direct action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance missions. They are capable of conducting integrate d, joint, and combined operations in remote, urban, or rural environments during peace and war. As FY 90 began, there were four special forces groups in the active component, two in the ARNG, and two in the USAR. On 29 June 1990, the Army activated a group headquarters, the 3d Special Forces Group, and a battalion in the active component, bringing the total for FY 91 to five active component and four reserve component groups.

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TABLE 6-RANGER REGIMENTS AND SPECIAL FORCES GROUPS (SFG)

Rangers are highly skilled light infantrymen employed primarily for unique missions that have a specific objective, are time sensitive, and require direct action. They may conduct these operations independently or in support of other special operations forces. The Army's only ranger unit in FY 90 and 91 was the active component's 75th Ranger Regiment, which consisted of a regimental headquarters and three ranger battalions (Table 6).

The highly trained crews and modified aircraft of Army special operations aviation (SOA) provide the unique capability to support SOF missions at night and during adverse weather. During FY 90 and 91 the Army had one active component SOA regiment that consisted of three active component and one reserve component battalions, two active component separate companies, and one active component forward-deployed detachment.

Civil affairs (CA) forces support the commander's relationship with civil authorities and the local populace, promote mission legitimacy, and enhance military effectiveness. CA operations assist the military effort in all operational environments and support both other SOF and general purpose forces. In FY 90 and 91 there was one active component civil affairs unit, while the USAR had the remainder of the Army's civil affairs assets: three commands, four groups, five brigades, and thirty-six civil affairs units. Psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel support friendly forces at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. PSYOP units plan campaigns consisting of selected themes and use various media to disseminate these messages. These campaigns seek to influence the attitudes, opinions, and behaviors of selected friendly, enemy, and neutral audiences. The Army maintained one PSYOP group and four battalions in the active component, as well as three groups, six battalions, and twenty-two companies in the reserve components during FY 90. In FY 91 the number of reserve component companies increased to twenty-seven.

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Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC)

Closing bases has always been one of the Army's most contentious restructuring actions. As national strategy changes pointed to a smaller Army centered in CONUS, the DOD considered realigning and closing Army bases, as well as those of the other armed services. Reshaping the Army's installations is an ongoing process. By the close of FY 91, two rounds of base realignment and closure actions (BRAC I and BRAC II) were under way with more to follow. No major Army installation had completed closure procedures by September 1991; however, many minor ones-family housing sites, storage facilities, and remote Nike sites- identified for closure under the first round, BRAC I (see below), had been closed. In these instances, the active component mission of the installation had been relocated to another installation, or the installation was transferred from Army control as required by law.

On 3 May 1988, the Secretary of Defense chartered an independent commission to recommend military bases within the United States and its possessions for realignment or closure. The BRAC Commission submitted a report to the Secretary of Defense on 29 December 1988 that identified more than 100 Army installations for serious consideration. The commission assumed that the DOD force structure would remain relatively stable, so it focused on realigning and closing those installations that were inefficient or outmoded, or were duplicating the mission of another post. Defense authorization amendments and the Base Realignment and Closure Act (Public Law 100-526) of 24 October 1988 required the Secretary of Defense and Congress to accept all or none of the commission's recommendations. On 18 April 1989, the House voted down a resolution of disapproval of the commission's report. No action was taken by the Senate, so the recommendations became legally binding after mid- May 1989.

The DOD must complete all realignment and closure actions specified in the commission's recommendations by 30 September 1995. Implementation of BRAC I affected 133 Army installations. Fifty-seven would undergo some realignment in their assigned units, while seventy-seven would close, fifty-three of these were housing sites located apart from an Army installation. On 29 January 1990, the Secretary of Defense announced that the Department of Defense was considering realigning twenty additional bases and closing another thirty-five. This was known as BRAC II but was not commission-directed or mandated by public law. The list included eight Army bases and portions of several commands and the USAR for realignment, and thirteen for closure. Seven of the thirteen slated for closure were Army ammunition plants, and they were to be retained in a layaway status (Table 7). Whereas BRAC I assumed an Army

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TABLE 7-BRAC II REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE RECOMMENDATIONS

active component strength of 781,000 in the mid-1990s, BRAC II considered global security changes and fiscal realities and envisioned active component strength reduced to 630,000 by 1995.

BRAC III, also not commission-directed or mandated by public law, announced by the Department of Defense on 19 September 1990 as the third base realignment and closure initiative, called for implementation of proposals to reduce or close operations at 113 Army installations and sites overseas. These proposals were the direct result of programmed overseas force structure reductions during upcoming years. The proposals identified actions on 101 sites in Europe, including disestablishment of two Army military communities in Germany, Bad Tolz and Neu Ulm, and

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TABLE 8-BRAC 91 REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE RECOMMENDATIONS

called for reduction in operations or closure at twelve sites in Korea. The majority of the sites were scheduled to begin scaling back or closing in FY 91, with the remainder to begin in FY 92 or later.

Concerned about the Secretary of Defense's January 1990 recommendations in BRAC II, Congress passed the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), known as BRAC 91, which required equal consideration for all DOD installations concerning possible realignment or closure. This legislation halted any closure actions for bases on the January list that employed more than 300 people. The act established new procedures for realigning or closing CONUS installations. It directed the formation of an independent commission to review base realignment and closure recommendations made by the Department of Defense during the following five years. The act required the commission to convene in 1991, 1993, and 1995 to evaluate base realignment and closure recommendations from all of the armed services and to forward its recommendations to the President and Congress for approval. The Army withdrew its proposals that did not comply with the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990, including many of the proposals made in BRAC II. BRAC III proposals were not affected by the legislation.

In November 1990 the Secretary of the Army established a Total Army Basing Study group and directed it to recommend realignments and closures. The group divided Army installations into seven categories and analyzed each category by using five existing measures of merit, which were

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defined in terms of Department of Defense criterion 104 (military value) and criterion 7 (community infrastructure). Each measure of merit was weighted to determine the military value of the installations and make recommendations on realignments and closures. The Army Staff reviewed the study group's proposals and recommended approval; the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff then approved the list, as did the Secretary of Defense. The independent commission reviewed the Secretary of Defense's recommendations and adopted most of the proposals. Six bases and seventeen laboratories were scheduled for realignment and five bases for closure (Table 8).

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