Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1993

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Structuring and Training the Force

Force Development

Fiscal year 1993 marked the advent of a wide spectrum of initiatives to better evaluate and record the readiness of the active component and reserve components. Within the ARSTAF, the ODCSOPS Force Readiness Division monitored readiness and efforts to improve the indicators to measure it. Outside the ARSTAF, a number of Army committees looked for means to improve the clarity of the status reports and to improve readiness projections in the Unit Status Reporting System.

On 19 May 1993, the Secretary of Defense established the Defense Science Board Readiness Task Force (DSB-RTF), with a charter to review DOD-wide readiness management systems and indicators. The task force's goal was to determine which system could best be utilized to detect the early warning signs of "hollowness" or degradation. Consisting of representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, the service staffs, and other external agencies, the task force met each month, beginning in June, to collect information for its recommendations. The DSB-RTF plans to continue soliciting input and to publish a final report in May 1994. Defense planning guidance providing the first articulation of readiness standards for deploying forces was one of the task force's interim recommendations. The guidance included descriptions of readiness goals for each component, by force package and deployability.

In July 1993 the House Armed Services Committee requested the General Accounting Office (GAO) to assess the adequacy of readiness indicators for the services. To meet this requirement, the GAO sent investigators to various Army installations, including the National Training Center (Fort Irwin, California), the 24th Infantry Division (Fort Stewart, Georgia), and the 4th Infantry Division (Fort Carson, Colorado). During these visits the GAO sought to identify and validate several significant readiness indicators at the unit and installation levels. Among other factors, the GAO looked at the effect of borrowed military manpower on overall readiness and at the impact of reduced funding on training readiness. When completed, the GAO's findings will be incorporated into various readiness studies.

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Also in July 1993, the Army published an update to AR 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (USR). The new regulation is scheduled to be effective in October 1993 for the active component and in January 1994 for the reserve components. AR 220-1 describes changes in evaluating equipment and personnel readiness that more accurately reflect the unit level readiness state. The publication also incorporates readiness lessons from the Army's participation in the Persian Gulf War. Later versions of the regulation are expected to reflect evolving readiness reporting requirements.

The Army developed the Installation Status Report (ISR) in July and August 1993 as a means for the Chief of Staff to monitor the fitness of the Army's existing infrastructure. A product of the USMA's Operations Research Center, under the supervision of the ACSIM, the ISR evolved into a useful tool to identify issues affecting force readiness. Information from the report was included in subsequent readiness reports and studies. For example, the ISR data on installation support for power projection and quality of life were included in the Chief of Staff's expanded definition of readiness. In light of growing funding constraints, the senior Army leadership, with the support of Congress, concluded that the new definition of readiness should cover more than the availability of soldiers, equipment, and training. The expanded definition included factors such as quality of life, maintenance backlog, modernization, leadership, base operations, property maintenance, environmental concerns, and financial funding. All agreed that this presented a better picture of the "health of the Army" based on a wider variety of readiness factors and programs.

Constrained funding forced the ARSTAF to set priorities for readiness issues and to look more closely at its management of the new Contingency Force Pool (CFP), a highly ready and deployable group of combat support and combat service support units from the active and reserve components. The ODCSOPS Force Readiness Division began monitoring CFP readiness in FY 1993 and spearheaded initiatives to reduce funding shortfalls and maintain the highest possible readiness levels. The CFP's overall readiness increased each quarter of the fiscal year. By the end of the fiscal year, the CFP had reached readiness goals set by ODCSOPS and the senior Army leadership. The success of this ARSTAF effort led to the development of parallel initiatives by the Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) to ensure the readiness of their CFP units through two mobilization enhancement initiatives, BOLD SHIFT and Project PRIME, respectively.

In FY 1993 the Army reviewed its retiree preassignment program in light of the changing world situation, downsizing, and significant budget constraints. DOD Directive 1352.1, issued 2 March 1990, stated the DOD policy that physically qualified military retirees could be ordered to active duty to fill personnel shortfalls due to mobilization or other emergencies,

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as described in Title 10, U.S. Code 672 and 688, and that the services could use as many retirees as necessary to meet security needs. The directive also required that services issue preassignment or contingent preassignment orders to retirees slotted against mobilization positions. Because a major war might prevent the preparation and transmittal of mobilization orders, orders should be prepared in peacetime for all retirees who are assigned, voluntarily or not, to positions that must be filled within thirty days of mobilization. Based largely on Persian Gulf War experience, current retiree preassignment guidance envisions the need for retirees to fill specific individual slots on the assumption that a large-scale call-up is improbable. Retirees might not be required for every contingency because each contingency would require different individual skills and expertise. Publishing, maintaining, and tracking retirees' preassignment orders were costly, complicated by the array of possible contingencies, and prone to change from turnover among retirees available to serve in the program. The Army can prepare only a limited number of preassignment orders owing to the increased cost of publishing, amending, and revoking orders. In the final quarter of the fiscal year, the DCSPER recommended a change to DOD Directive 1352.1. The DCSPER proposed using a memorandum containing preassignment instructions to serve the same purpose as a preassignment order, but without the order's requirement for amendments, revocations, or detailed tracking. The memorandum would eliminate preassignment orders and allow for issuing assignment orders only to those retirees approved for recall to meet specific requirements. While the DCSPER awaited approval for the submitted recommendation, the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) suspended issuance of preassignment orders. Approval of the DCSPER's memorandum plan was expected during the first half of FY 1994.

Completing a process that it had begun after the Persian Gulf War, the Army in June 1993 published a revised version of the 1986 FM 100-5, Operations. Like its predecessors, this field manual defined the Army's doctrine for defending the nation and accomplishing other missions assigned by the National Command Authorities. The new FM 100-5 did not include any major changes in tactical doctrine. The Army had successfully used the 1986 AirLand Battle version of FM 100-5 both to win the Cold War in Europe and to defeat Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf War. While the Army was staffing the manual in late 1992, the Army Vice Chief of Staff (VCSA), General Dennis J. Reimer, acknowledged that the new doctrine would not include any revolutionary changes from the AirLand Battle doctrine used during the Persian Gulf War. According to the VCSA, changes in the new FM 100-5 addressed multiple threats and the Army's role as a power-projection force, reflecting its ability to deploy forces. In addition, the VCSA said that the new manual would

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contain a little more emphasis on the deep attack, but that most of the doctrinal differences were evolutionary changes that reflected shifting world situations.

The new FM 100-5 focused more on force projection and recognized that the post-Cold War Army is smaller and based primarily in CONUS. Strategic mobility became critical because the Army had to be able to deploy quickly for any crisis or contingency. The new doctrine also acknowledged the growing importance of operations other than war (OOTW). These expanding missions included peacekeeping, disaster assistance, and nation building, all of which FM 100-5 covered in a new chapter on OOTW. This chapter also envisioned combat troops being called upon to serve in a new role-to provide support to specialists, such as medics and engineers, who may be deployed to accomplish an operation's primary mission. The 1993 FM introduced the concept of battle space, or the use of the entire battlefield to dominate the enemy at any given location. FM 100-5 also manifested an increased emphasis on joint U.S. operations and combined operations with foreign allies. The FM added the concept of "versatility" to basic AirLand Battle tenets of agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization. Army leaders stressed versatility to help the power-projection Army prepare for both combat and operations other than war, as well as joint and combined operations.

During the fiscal year the Army played a major role in the preparation of Joint Publication 3.0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, published by the Joint Staff in September 1993. Joint Publication 3.0 was the keystone of a series of publications on joint operations. The Army was the lead agent for its publication. Doctrine for Joint Operations provided planners a framework for thinking about the full range of joint and multinational military operations from war to OOTW. FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, also published in FY 1993, represented a combined Army and U.S. Marine Corps effort to establish doctrine for a growing OOTW mission. The Army addressed other OOTW doctrinal issues, such as multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations, in the draft FM 100-23, Peace Support Operations, which was being staffed for final approval in FY 1993. Once approved, it is expected to be published in early 1994.

Force Structure

In FY 1993 the Army maintained one corps and two divisions in Europe and three divisions in the Pacific area to help meet regional conflicts and deployments. To assist these units during emergencies, the Army created the CFP, which includes one corps and five divisions from active component forces based in CONUS. The CFP represents the leading edge

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of the Army's power-projection capability and consists of airborne, air assault, light and mechanized infantry, and armored divisions. Army plans call for a reinforcing element of two corps and four active component divisions, and ultimately a sustainment force of eight reserve component divisions to follow the CFP during deployments from CONUS.

In FY 1993 the Army continued examining the mix of maneuver elements in heavy divisions. The armored and mechanized infantry divisions that fought during the Persian Gulf War had ten maneuver elements. There were six armor battalions and four mechanized infantry battalions in an armored division and five armor and five mechanized battalions in a mechanized infantry division. The end of the Cold War and downsizing, however, significantly affected this division mix. In the post-Cold War era, Soviet tank forces no longer posed a threat, and Army leadership desired more multipurpose divisions. By organizing an armored division of five armor and four mechanized infantry battalions and a mechanized infantry division of four armor and five mechanized battalions, the Army created heavy divisions that were mirror images of each other. These divisions had very similar capabilities, and the Army could deploy them almost interchangeably for several different types of operations or deployment missions. With fewer maneuver battalions, the heavy divisions were more deployable and better suited for the new power-projection Army.

In addition to making the heavy divisions more deployable for the growing number of overseas missions, the Army's decision to eliminate one maneuver element from each heavy division reduced the division force structure by seven battalions without cutting the number of divisions (the most visible sign of Army force structure strength). After the Army changes its division mix, it expects to have freed seven battalions, almost a division equivalent, without actually cutting another division. The seven battalions could be inactivated or used to increase the strength and readiness levels of other divisions and brigades. During the hurried downsizing in the years following the Persian Gulf War, the Army sought ways to cut force structure while maintaining as many divisions as possible, and this division restructuring was an important organizational modification.

By the end of FY 1993 the Army consisted of 4 corps, 14 active Army divisions, and 8 National Guard divisions. Under current plans the Army's force is scheduled to shrink. The Secretary of Defense's Bottom-Up Review (BUR) recommended that the Army continue to reduce to ten fully organized active Army divisions. The BUR also recommended cutting reserve component force structure to five divisions and thirty-seven combat brigades. Fifteen of these brigades would be "enhanced" to increase readiness and improve their ability to deploy throughout the world. The enhanced brigade is expected to assist the active Army's ability to reinforce units deployed to meet future regional conflicts.

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The BUR recommended cutting the number of active divisions, but the remaining active divisions would be fully funded to avoid becoming "hollow." The Army decided that each active division in the new force structure would maintain three brigades, which could be accomplished by reorganizing and realigning resources during the downsizing effort. One division, the 7th Infantry Division (Light), consisted of only a headquarters and one maneuver brigade. The 1st Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light), completed its prescheduled move from Fort Ord, California, to Fort Lewis, Washington, during FY 1993. The 6th and 7th Infantry Divisions are scheduled to be inactivated by the end of the next fiscal year, with two additional active Army divisions scheduled to inactivate by FY 1997. Two National Guard divisions also were inactivated in FY 1993, and their resources were used to improve other Guard divisions and units.

Another force structure change took place on 16 December 1992 when the Army inactivated the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and transferred its personnel and equipment to the 2d Armored Division. Except for a brigade at Fort Hood, Texas, only the Headquarters, 2d Armored Division, had been active (at zero strength) since the end of FY 1991. The resources from the 5th Division's two inactivated brigades were used to activate the 2d Armored Division's two remaining maneuver brigades at Fort Polk. These two brigades prepared for a move and a permanent change of station to join their sister brigade, because the entire division is scheduled to be stationed at Fort Hood.

Most Army divisions reorganized their division support commands (DISCOM) and converted from single-function battalions (that is, separate medical, supply and transport, and maintenance battalions) to multifunctional support battalions before the Persian Gulf War. The 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, which had retained their DISCOM organization, began adopting the new configuration in October 1992. Plans call for assigning one forward support battalion to sustain each of the three maneuver brigades in an airborne division and for a main support battalion to provide support for the other divisional elements. Each multifunctional support battalion is scheduled to have a company to provide medical support, one to provide maintenance, and another to perform the supply and transport function. The conversion to support battalions is scheduled for completion by the middle of the next fiscal year.

During the fiscal year the Army also studied the environmental impact and other effects of moving a heavy brigade from Germany to Fort Lewis, Washington, beginning in FY 1994. The brigade, expected to be the 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, is scheduled to be inactivated and its assets moved by rail and ship from Germany to Fort Lewis. It is expected to become the CONUS-based brigade for the 2d Infantry Division in

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Korea. The Secretary of the Army is expected to approve these actions sometime during the second quarter of FY 1994. In addition, a brigade of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) is scheduled to inactivate, and its equipment is to be used to outfit a ship in the Pre-positioned (PREPO) Afloat Program.

As the U.S. Army reduced its presence in Europe, it also participated in a force structure realignment with significant impact on the future of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) military organization. In April the German 5th Panzer Division became part of the American V Corps and the U.S. 1st Armored Division was integrated into the German II Corps. These changes reflected NATO's decreasing military assets and a transition to more multinational military organizations.

As the end strength of the Army decreased, inactivations of TOE units continued in FY 1993. Although the decreases in Army divisions and brigades were the most obvious force structure changes, there was a corresponding decrease in units supporting combat divisions. Many combat support and combat service support units that escaped inactivation were reorganized and redesignated to reflect the changing missions and capabilities of the post-Cold War Army. Various branch proponents reevaluated force structure requirements in light of changing missions and resources. Table 10 shows select active component force structure from FY 1990 to FY 1993, and Table 11 shows active component divisions, by type, from FY 1990 to FY 1993.

TABLE 10-SELECT ACTIVE COMPONENT FORCE STRUCTURE,
FY 1990 TO FY 1993

Note: Except for one brigade, the 2d Armored Division was at zero strength at the end of FY 1991. Strength totals do not include battalions assigned to support TRADOC's training base or elements of the 1st Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions, which are active at zero strength at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York. Brigade and ACR figures do not include the 75th Ranger Regiment. Light infantry battalions include any not classified as mechanized infantry, such as airborne or air assault.

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TABLE 11-ACTIVE COMPONENT DIVISIONS (BY TYPE),
FY 1990 TO 1993

The Army continued efforts during the fiscal year to field a light armored cavalry regiment to support rapid deployments of the XVIII Airborne Corps and to serve as the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Opposing Force (OPFOR). Throughout much of the Cold War the Army maintained two armored cavalry regiments (ACR) in USAREUR and a third in CONUS. During the Persian Gulf War, the 2d ACR (from Germany) and the 3d ACR (from Fort Bliss, Texas) deployed Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and helicopters to help liberate Kuwait. ACRs were a powerful combat force, but during rapid deployments their heavy equipment gave logisticians almost the same problems as mechanized brigades. Under the post-Cold War drawdown, Army planners decided to gradually remove all the ACRs from USAREUR, leaving the 3d ACR as the only "traditional" ACR. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the ARSTAF, however, were already working on plans for a more readily deployable "cavalry" regiment. The new light armored cavalry regiment was designed to provide significant firepower but retain the versatility to deploy quickly for a wide range of contingency missions, from peacekeeping to a general war.

During FY 1993 the Army continued to develop a light ACR. The CSA approved plans in FY 1992 to return the 2d ACR to Fort Lewis, Washington, and to use the assets of the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) to organize a light ACR. The CSA called the 2d ACR the Army's "first purpose-built 21st-century combat unit." The regiment is scheduled to have three cavalry squadrons, an aviation squadron, and a support squadron, as well as an air defense artillery battery, an engineer company, a chemical company, and a military intelligence company. Pending the development and fielding of the Army's new light tank, the armored gun system (AGS), the ground squadrons of the light ACR are expected to be

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equipped with High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) and with HMMWVs mounting Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles.

Fielding of the light ACR began in FY 1993 when the 2d ACR's headquarters moved to Fort Lewis and the regiment's squadrons began activating, using the assets of the 199th. While executing a major reorganization, the regiment moved its home base from Fort Lewis to Fort Polk, Louisiana. As part of the move, two squadrons tested the regiment's deployability in Exercise OCEAN VENTURE III by loading more than 900 pieces of rolling stock aboard a Navy Fast Service Ship (FSS) at the Port of Tacoma, Washington. The FSS then sailed to within three miles of the North Carolina coastline, where the ACR's equipment was transferred to landing craft and brought ashore at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina. The exercise demonstrated that even under austere conditions, light cavalry forces could be deployed by sea. The 2d ACR completed its reorganization and moved to Fort Polk by the end of the fiscal year. Only the regimental aviation squadron remained to be activated in FY 1994, using the assets of the 4th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, but this 2d ACR element is expected to be stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Training

The Army's training goal in FY 1993 remained the preparation of a "Trained and Ready" force capable of completing any mission. The increasing number of deployments for operations other than war has heightened the need to train to Army standards. During the fiscal year the Army Staff worked to redefine training readiness and to more closely integrate the training of active Army and reserve component units.

Declining budgets, smaller force structures, and time spent away from training due to OOTW deployments forced the ARSTAF to maximize the Army's training investment at every level of the training base. In FY 1993 the Army continued to realign the training support structure as well as provide new training to active and reserve component units through the Total Army Training Study (TATS). The CSA approved TATS on 22 April 1993. TATS realigned the active and reserve component training support structure and created a new support structure incorporating new initiatives such as the Future Army Schools-Twenty-one (FAST) and BOLD SHIFT, cohesive, efficient, and mission-focused structures capable of providing enhanced collective and institutional training support to the Total Army. Both FORSCOM and TRADOC were developing concept plans to support TATS and expected to submit these plans for HQDA approval in FY 1994.

At the core of Army training improvements is the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS), which uses a flexible system of training events

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and resource menus to plan and manage training. CATS identifies the most effective way to train its forces to an Army standard. CATS helps provide the training strategies for the total force and ensures that those plans interface with new combat developments, the systems approach to training (SAT), and the development of training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS). The TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, the Army proponent for CATS, issued important guidance during the fiscal year. TRADOC Regulation 350-35, The Combined Arms Training Strategy, published 14 May 1993, defined CATS' roles and functions; and TRADOC Pamphlet 350-10, Combined Arms Training Strategy Development, published 23 August 1993, described how to develop CATS to get the most out of training. Separate CATS strategies were developed for the institution, the individual, and the unit.

The Army funded training using CATS as much as possible in FY 1993. Service schools developed unit strategies by the type of battalion. The Combined Arms Command-Training (CAC-T) and Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) developed descriptive unit strategies for echelons above battalion. These strategies served as guides for unit commanders and helped establish a sequence of representative training events to sustain a unit's proficiency in mission-essential tasks. Various models calculated total miles traveled by vehicles in order to execute training events, while historical data was used to establish cost factors per training mile. The Army used this information in the planning, programming, budgeting cycle to justify and allocate sufficient resources. The Army also considered adopting an automated support program for CATS that would produce and update future strategies. Other Army automated systems under current development are expected to integrate CATS in the Training Module.

During the fiscal year the Army continued to seek improvements in the "troop schools" that conduct contracted training courses for soldiers. Since 1982 the AAA and the GAO had reviewed the Army's management controls over troop schools in three separate reports. Both agencies recommended that the Army consider alternative training sources for troop schools and develop controls to ensure that needs assessments were conducted before installations contracted for training. AR 350-41, Training in Units, published 19 March 1993, established the management controls recommended in the audits. The regulation listed sixteen courses authorized for contracting and directed all commands to consider the most cost-effective alternatives before contracting a course. AAA is expected to complete a confirmation audit by 20 July 1994 to determine whether AR 350-41 corrected the deficiencies noted by GAO and AAA audits and whether units followed the regulation. AAA planned to focus on several FORSCOM installations. Forts Bragg and Hood were the most likely loca-

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tions. If the Army cannot correct internal control weaknesses, DOD is expected to direct the Army to discontinue troop schools in FY 1995.

The Army revised DA Pam 350-38/39, Standards in Weapons Training, in FY 1993. This revision was the culmination of a CSA-directed review of all training strategies and set an ammunition budget for FY 1994 of $293 million, which is expected to fully support the training ammunition requirement and allow the Army to meet its revised training plans. Maintaining readiness and weapons proficiency proved challenging during the fiscal year as the cost of training ammunition continued to increase.

During the fiscal year the CSA directed the DCSOPS to conduct an ammunition Functional Area Assessment (FAA) to improve ammunition management. The CSA planned to use the FAA to develop a programming and budgeting plan in support of the FY 1996-2001 POM and to provide the basis for managing the Army's ammunition stockpile. The assessment urged the Army to support the training ammunition requirement in full, but the senior Army leadership made no commitment. Budgeting for other training costs fared well in the POM development. These increases derived from the growing reliance on high technology training devices to offset the Army's shrinking ground resources and to mirror high technology weapons acquisitions.

In FY 1993 the Army continued conducting unilateral, joint, and combined training exercises. The Army conducted unilateral exercises at all levels from HQDA to corps and below, while the joint and combined exercises were usually conducted under the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CJCS exercises provided Army units with the opportunity to train under the operational control of the war-fighting Commanders in Chief (CINC) and helped ensure that U.S. forces were trained to accomplish CINC war plans. The Army participated in approximately fifty CJCS exercises during the fiscal year.

FUERZAS UNIDAS was a series of small-scale command post exercises (CPX) conducted in several Latin American countries during FY 1993. The U.S. Southern Command and the host nation planned and conducted these exercises to portray low-intensity conflict. The small unit simulations particularly enhanced platoon- and company-level training. U.S. Army, South (USARSO), FORSCOM, and TRADOC personnel provided support for these exercises and helped run the simulations. During the fiscal year FUERZAS UNIDAS exercises were conducted in Uruguay, Peru, Honduras, Venezuela, Ecuador, Paraguay, Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, and Colombia.

The U.S. Southern Command also sponsored FUERTES CAMINOS, a series of joint and combined engineer and construction missions conducted in a number of developing countries within Central and South America. The exercises were designed to help host country nation-building projects

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and contributed to their economic growth. Both active Army and reserve component engineer units, together with host nation forces, dug wells and built roads, schools, and dispensaries. Exercises were held in Panama, Guatemala, and El Salvador in FY 1993.

In FY 1993 KEEN EDGE, the annual large-scale joint and combined field training exercise (FTX) conducted in Japan, sought to increase the readiness and interoperability of the U.S. and Japanese forces. Army participants in the exercise, held in November 1992, included a brigade task force from the 6th Infantry Division (Light), elements of the 12th Special Forces Group, and combat service support units from CONUS. Also in FY 1993, COBRA GOLD, an annual medium-scale FTX and CPX in Thailand, worked to improve the military relationship between the American and Thai armies. A battalion task force from the 25th Infantry Division (Light) and elements of the 3d Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, represented the Army during the exercise.

TEAM SPIRIT and ULCHI-FOCUS LENS are major annual exercises conducted in Korea with the Republic of Korea military. TEAM SPIRIT, the Army's largest FTX, involved more than 200,000 participants in FY 1993. Held in March, the exercise aimed to improve combat readiness through joint and combined training that included global and tactical deployment. The exercise also practiced receiving reinforcements from outside Korea. Participants during the 1993 exercise were I Corps, 25th Infantry Division (Light), and a large number of reserve component combat service support units from CONUS. The Commanding General, U.S. Forces Korea, ran ULCHI-FOCUS LENS, a large-scale, computer-assisted, joint and combined CPX. The exercise was conducted in conjunction with the Republic of Korea's national mobilization exercise and used enhanced computer simulations up to the theater level. Player cells from the 2d Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 2d Armored Division, 25th Infantry Division (Light), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and XVIII Airborne Corps participated in the exercise from 19 August to 15 September.

In FY 1993 the Central Command CINC sponsored INTRINSIC ACTION, a joint and combined FTX conducted in Kuwait. The exercise incorporated unit rotations, and several times during the fiscal year a heavy battalion task force deployed to Kuwait by air and utilized pre-positioned supplies and equipment to become operational. Training included small unit tactics and a live fire FTX with Kuwaiti troops. Three INTRINSIC ACTION exercises were held during the fiscal year. FORSCOM provided forces for the first two exercises and USAREUR the last.

During the Cold War, REFORGER(Return of Forces to Germany) was the Army's premier annual training exercise that tested mobility and prepared the Army for large-scale deployments from CONUS to Europe.

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REFORGER units were to reinforce troops stationed in Germany in order to thwart an attack from the east. In FY 1993 senior U.S. Army commanders in Europe did not believe this was a relevant scenario any longer and sought to structure an exercise to simulate deployment of forces from Germany to another location to fight with a combined force. The worsening situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the possibility of U.S. intervention prevented USAREUR from designing the new scenario. Instead, the FY 1993 REFORGER consisted of the Army Reserve's 310th Support Command (Theater Army) and Headquarters, USAREUR, conducting a computer-assisted exercise (CAX) to simulate logistical reinforcement of the European theater. The exercise revealed the strain of receiving forces in an area with limited transportation facilities. The Army also decided that beginning in FY 1994 the exercise would be renamed ATLANTIC RESOLVE.

Elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 82d Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 10th Mountain Division, and the 3d Special Forces Group participated in OCEAN VENTURE, a large-scale FTX held between 1 and 20 May 1993. The CINC of U.S. Atlantic Command sponsored OCEAN VENTURE to train the Atlantic Command staff and service component commanders in crisis action planning procedures in a low- to mid-intensity contingency operations scenario.

The Combat Training Center (CTC) program was in transition during FY 1993. In July the JRTC completed its move from Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, to Fort Polk, Louisiana, and reduced the number of training rotations. As part of a training modernization effort, the U.S. Army Simulations, Training, and Instrumentations Command (STRICOM) began testing Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) Instrumentation Systems in August.

The Army continued to prepare for future CTC rotations through the CTC Master Plan in FY 1993. The master plan outlined training for the projected force beginning in FY 1994 and included plans for the Army to allocate major resources during FYs 1996-2001 to sustain future CTC rotations. The plan also called for the Army to make major investments (using RDTE, OPA, and MCA funding) to upgrade CTC "instrumented battlefields" so units can employ modern combat systems in accordance with operational doctrine. These upgrades support training analysis and provide feedback on the use of the new battlefield systems. In addition, Army investments are expected to support continued improvements to CTC instrumentation and training devices based on future technological updates.

During the fiscal year, the National Training Center (NTC) conducted twelve two-battalion armor/mechanized brigade rotations. Typically, four of the twelve annual rotations involve a third light infantry maneuver battalion, but in FY 1993 a total of twenty-four heavy and seven light

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maneuver battalions rotated through NTC. Each standard NTC rotation included the brigade headquarters, two mechanized infantry or armor battalion task forces, the aviation brigade (-), and the doctrinally appropriate combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) units. Support units included a direct support field artillery battalion, a forward support battalion, an engineer battalion (-), a military intelligence platoon, a signal company, an air defense artillery battery, and other units that collectively form the brigade "support package." Training scenarios at the NTC focused on conventional mid- to high-intensity conflict. The rotating units participated in exercises against opposing forces (OPFOR) portrayed by the 177th Armored Brigade. During the fiscal year the Army planned for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, which is scheduled to inactivate in Europe beginning in early FY 1994, to replace the 177th as the NTC's OPFOR unit in FY 1995.

During FY 1993 the JRTC conducted eight two-battalion light infantry brigade(-) rotations. Sixteen light maneuver battalions and eight supporting heavy company teams rotated through the center. Each standard rotation included the brigade headquarters, two light infantry battalion task forces (which also included mountain, airborne, air assault, special forces, and ranger units), the aviation brigade (-), and doctrinally appropriate brigade CS and CSS units. The brigade's third maneuver battalion task force participated through a Brigade/Battalion Simulation (BBS) supported CPX. A Special Forces battalion (-) and Psychological and Civil Affairs units were present for all rotations, and ranger battalions and Special Operations Forces (SOF) aviation units joined at least one rotation. JRTC scenarios concentrated on conventional, peacekeeping, and special operations low- to mid-intensity conflict.

The only battalion-level maneuver training site for units based in Europe is the Combat Maneuver Training Center. During the fiscal year each maneuver battalion in USAREUR received an opportunity to train at the CMTC. The Army funded the CMTC for 231 training days in FY 1993 and plans to increase that to 308 training days beginning in FY 1994. Each battalion is expected to participate in a five- to seven-day force-on-force exercise every fourteen months. In FY 1993 training was scheduled through brigade rotations in which each battalion cycled through the force-on-force phase and a simulation-supported CPX. Most brigades spent time at the Grafenwoehr Training Area honing their skills through live fire and gunnery exercises before going to the CMTC at Hohenfels. The CMTC scenarios focused on conventional operations or operations other than war in low- to high-intensity conflicts. During each rotation additional division- and corps-level units supported the rotating brigade from maneuver areas near Hohenfels. These additional units also took advantage of the CMTC scenario.

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Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) scenarios focus on mid- to high-intensity conflicts. In FY 1993 each rotation consisted of a five-day doctrinal seminar at Fort Leavenworth, followed six months later by a Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) supported CPX at the unit's home station. Reserve component divisions, however, conducted both events at Fort Leavenworth. A corps CPX lasts seven days, and division exercises last for five days. During the fiscal year the BCTP conducted fourteen "division equivalent" Warfighter Exercise rotations with eight active and three reserve component divisions, one corps headquarters, and the Command and General Staff College's PRAIRIE WARRIOR exercise. The Army anticipated that the probable future annual training for the projected force structure would be two corps rotations, eight active component division rotations, and two to three reserve component division rotations, as well as continued support to PRAIRIE WARRIOR. SOF units were integrated during all corps rotations in FY 1993.

The Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (CATT), which uses networked simulation technology, continued as the Army's highest priority training simulation project during FY 1993. CATT received full funding and set the standard for virtual training simulations throughout the Army. CATT's first subprogram, the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT), is scheduled for fielding in FY 1994. The first prototype of the system-an M1A1 tank module-is expected to yield numerous training benefits. Throughout FY 1993 the Army expressed growing interest in fielding other CATT subprograms (Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer [AVCATT], Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer [FSCATT], Engineer Combined Arms Tactical Trainer [ENCATT], and Air Defense Combined Arms Tactical Trainer [ADCATT]) in upcoming years. In FY 1993 the Army funded all these programs in the FY 1996-2001 POM. AVCATT is scheduled to go into production in FY 2002, FSCATT in FY 2003, ENCATT in FY 2003, and ADCATT in FY 2006.

The family of constructive simulations stabilized during FY 1993 to include the CBS; the BBS; JANUS, the Army's battle focused trainer; and the Tactical Simulation (TACSIM). In FY 1993 the Army upgraded CBS to version 1.5 and minimal funding provided for future upgrades, based on Warrior Simulation 2000 becoming available in FY 1999. In FY 1993 the Army planned to upgrade CASCOM's Combat Service Support Tactical Simulation System (CSSTSS) to version 1.3 for participation in General Headquarters Exercise 94. The upgrade is expected to provide much improved combat service support game play. The Aggregate Level Simulation Protocol (ALSP) confederation of models in FY 1993 included CBS, Air Warfare Simulation (AWSIM), TACSIM, Navy Warfare Simulation (NAWSIM), and limited connectivity with the Marine Tactical Warfare Simulation (MTWS). This confederation also is expected to sup-

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port the General Headquarters Exercise 94 and is scheduled to support ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 94 and ATLANTIC RESOLVE 94.

Joint and combined exercises involve most echelons and support combatant commands' operational plans. During FY 1993 FORSCOM reviewed the impact of increased frequency and scope of CJCS- and CINC-directed exercises on the Army. Preliminary indications revealed that these leader-intensive exercises reduced the quality of unit-level training. Exercise controller requirements, player requirements, and support requirements diverted battalion and brigade commanders' attention from unit battles to the training of higher headquarters and staffs. FORSCOM is conducting a feasibility study examining brigade-tailored CTC densities. Under this concept, three maneuver battalions rotate through or train simultaneously at a maneuver CTC. Through scheduling of longer brigade rotations, once every two years, the operational pace in low-density units may be reduced. The command is scheduled to report its findings during FY 1994. FORSCOM's CONUS-based active component divisions train several nonaligned reserve component units. In FY 1993 the Army sought to set priorities for active component division training support of early deploying reserve component maneuver and CFP units. Plans call for TATS training organizations to be activated to train remaining reserve component forces.

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	Last updated 30 October 2003