Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1994


Organization, Management, and Budget

Organizational Changes

Two new major organizations were added to the Army Staff in FY 1994. Both represented significant milestones in the Army's modernization efforts. General Order No. 8 formally established the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (OACSIM) as a staff agency within the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), on 1 October 1993. The OACSIM's responsibilities included the promulgation of policy and integration of doctrine pertaining to the planning, programming, and operation of Army installations.

Beginning in the 1970s, significant political, economic, and social changes complicated management of installations and magnified the need for central focus and direction. Installation and garrison commanders were ill equipped to deal with the flood of environmental legislation, social issues such as child care and spousal abuse, and dramatic resource reductions and base closures while trying to build a force based in the continental United States (CONUS). Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s a number of studies cited serious problems and inefficiencies in installation management and a lack of emphasis by HQDA. A common finding in all these studies was the absence of a proponent at the Department of the Army (DA) level with knowledge of functional policies and requirements and the authority to coordinate and integrate the two. Recommendations to correct systemic deficiencies varied from establishing a Base Operations Command to creating a single organization on the Army Staff. The Army's senior leadership established the OACSIM as a DA-level proponent to correct these deficiencies. Withdrawn from specified organizations and reassigned to the OACSIM were selected functions and resources: installation and environmental policy from the Chief of Engineers; installation management functions from the Management Directorate, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army (OCSA); the mission of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Office from the OCSA; the mission of the U.S. Army Commercial Activities Management Agency from the OCSA; Installation Support


Modules (ISM) and the major command (MACOM) Internal Support Modules Program from the U.S. Army Decision Systems Management Agency; the mission of the U.S. Army Community and Family Support Center (CFSC) and the Army Family Liaison Office from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER); the mission of the US. Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency (redesignated as the US. Army Environmental Center under the OACSIM) from the Army Corps of Engineers; the mission of the U.S. Army Environmental Office (redesignated as the Office of the Director, Environmental Programs, under the OACSIM) from the Chief of Engineers; housing and facilities policy functions and natural and cultural resource functions from the U.S. Army Engineering and Housing Support Center; intraservice, interservice, interdepartmental, and interagency support functions and the Base-level Commercial Equipment Program from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG).

The establishment of a second new organization on the Army Staff, the Army Digitization Office (ADO), was another significant modernization reform. The trend leading to the establishment of the office began in the early 1990s, as Army modernization faced an uncertain future. The end of the Cold War presented the Army with challenges of modernizing in an austere fiscal environment defined by force structure reductions and dramatic shifts in strategic mission and worldwide deployment. In addition, the Persian Gulf War revealed the need for greater synchronization of military forces. Rapid advances in technology offered the Army an opportunity to meet these challenges better. Several Army weapon systems were upgraded to use the capabilities of emerging digital information technologies, and initial results from testing these digital capabilities were very encouraging.

Following the Persian Gulf War, the CSA identified the need to digitize the battlefield, a primary underpinning of Army modernization requirements, by the turn of the century. In the spring of 1993, the Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA), directed that the concept of Horizontal Technology Integration (HTI), integrating high-payoff technologies throughout the entire force, be institutionalized to increase force effectiveness.

Traditionally, the Army's main effort for developing command and control (C2) systems employed a top-down approach. Various Battlefield Functional Area proponents developed individual automated C2 systems for corps-level operations down to the brigade. These systems were based on principles of vertical integration. This approach restricted the capability of gathering tactical information and created an unfilled requirement at lower echelons to integrate and share critical information within and throughout Battlefield Operating Systems. With the proliferation of battlefield automation, coupled with the speed at which tactical missions


need to be accomplished, the decision to digitize the battlefield through HTI would enable the Army to increase the breadth and depth of command and control through near real-time situational awareness as well as reduce the risks of fratricide.

In the summer of 1993 the Ad Hoc Working Group for the Digitization of the Battlefield investigated various strategies to digitize the Army. Among the objectives it identified was the digitization of a brigade by 1996 and of a division by 1998. In the fall of 1993 the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) directed that an effort be undertaken to study the requirements, cost, and test and evaluation needs and to propose a management plan for digitizing the battlefield. On 22 December 1993, a special task force reported its results to the CSA. Following this report, the CSA commissioned a second special task force in January 1994 to refine the recommendations and establish the organization and charter of an ADO. The VCSA and the Army Acquisition Executive approved the ADO charter on 9 June 1994. It prescribed the ADO mission to oversee and coordinate the integration of all Army battlefield digitization activities. The ADO became the VCSA's instrument for digitization activities throughout MACOMs and the Army Acquisition Executive's instrument for providing guidance, assistance, and direction in acquisition matters related to digitization.

During FY 1994 the Army also continued to execute the decisions reached in the BRAC process. By the end of the fiscal year, the Army had closed seventy-four of seventy-seven installations scheduled for closure by the 1989 BRAC Commission. One of these, the Presidio of San Francisco, was transferred to the Department of the Interior in October 1994, with Sixth U.S. Army continuing to occupy facilities on the Presidio under a special permit. Of 656 overseas closures announced through October 1994, the Army executed 493 full and 37 partial closures in Europe; 17 full and 7 partial closures in Korea; and 1 closure in Panama. Under the 1991 BRAC recommendations, the Army closed the Woodbridge Research Facility of the Harry Diamond Laboratory in Virginia; closed Fort Ord, California, and transferred two land parcels to the University of California; closed Sacramento Army Depot, California; completed the move of the 5th Infantry Division from Fort Polk, Louisiana, to Fort Hood, Texas; and initiated the move of the 10th Special Forces Group from Fort Devens, Massachusetts, to Fort Carson, Colorado.

Army civilian personnel services underwent a major reorganization during the fiscal year. In accordance with DOD plans to consolidate and streamline civilian personnel services throughout, the Army began establishing regional Civilian Personnel Operations Centers (CPOCs). The Army planned to establish ten regional CPOCs, seven in CONUS and three overseas. As CPOCs are established, Army installation Civilian


Personnel Offices are to be reduced and reorganized to provide assistance as individual advisory centers.

Two regional CPOCs began operations in FY 1994: the National Capital Region, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and the US. Army Europe Region, Seckenheim, Germany. The Army identified the remaining eight CPOC regions as the Southeast Region, the Northeast Region, the South Central Region, the Southwest Region, the West Region, the Korea Region, and the Pacific Region. The locations of CPOCs in the remaining eight regions are to be determined.

Management and Information Systems

In June 1992 the Joint Staff published C41 for the Warrior, which addressed joint force operational/interoperability issues. This initiative was the centerpiece of the effort to achieve a unified and global C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence) system to support the requirements of the joint warfighter, consistent with national security plans and DOD policy. The Army responded to this initiative with the publication of The Army Enterprise Strategy. The strategy provided the single, unified vision for the Army C4I community in two documents: The Vision, published in July 1993, explained the Army Enterprise Principles; and The Army Enterprise Implementation Plan, published in August 1994, identified the tasks to be accomplished in order to achieve the goals of The Vision.

Among these tasks was the development of a technical architecture. To facilitate this development, the Army Science Board conducted an eight-month study, beginning in January 1994, that examined the Army's vision of the future, including combat doctrine, organization, materiel, and the growing need for information management to support the Army in the twenty-first century. The study recommended developing a technical architecture that identified a common set of standards to guide the definition, design, and development of the Army's Battle Command systems. The Army then organized the Technical Architecture Task Force in September 1994 with the mission of providing the first version of the technical architecture by December of that year.

Army personnel management benefited from two notable automation improvements during FY 1994. The Army made the Mobilization Manpower Planning System (MOBMAN) more flexible in supporting mobilizations and planning analyses.. The Army also fielded the Replacement Operations Automation Management System (ROAMS) to manage personnel flow better in military operations and emergencies.

The MOBMAN is the Army's sole system for compiling all the information needed to support HQDA military manpower analyses that identi-


fy expected personnel surpluses and shortfalls for specific scenarios, operation plans, and contingencies. It compares the total requirements (force structure and net casualty replacement needs) with the anticipated total supply of trained manpower available, including reserve component personnel. Because it was originally designed to support only full mobilization planning analyses, MOBMAN lacked the flexibility of meeting the Army's post-Cold War needs.

The Army enhanced MOBMAN in FY 1994 to increase its flexibility in supporting partial mobilization planning analyses. The enhanced MOBMAN can provide quick-response (24-72 hours) operational support analyses that focus on deploying forces on Time-Phased Force Deployment Data. This capability supports the HQDA ODCSPER Manning Analysis of Readiness and Supportability process that allows the ODCSPER to participate in formulating ODCSOPS decisions for the supportability of contingency and operational plans. For planning, MOBMAN also gained the capability of supporting analyses for all levels of mobilization. These analyses are part of the ODCSPER Mobilization Manning Plan process that identifies likely sources of individual manpower to fill Army personnel shortfalls.

ROAMS, the Army's other personnel automation initiative, also provided greater flexibility in support of contingency and operational plans. One of the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command's (PERSCOM) major missions upon execution of an Operation Plan (OPLAN) approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or of military operations in support of an emergency is to manage individual non-unit-related personnel flow to the theater and ensure that supported units are maintained at an acceptable personnel strength level. To meet these challenges, PERSCOM developed ROAMS to assist the supporting Army Component Commander (ACC) in projecting individual manpower needs for specified periods and to track manpower movement to the theater of operations during OPLAN execution. ROAMS interfaces with the Total Army Personnel Database (TAPDB) to obtain personnel data related to assigned replacements. Three program modules in ROAMS support this mission: (1) Automation of the Theater Shelf Requisitioning Process (AUTOREP); (2) Non-Unit-Related Personnel Flow Computer Assisted Program (FLOWCAP); and (3) Automation of the Casualty Analysis Process (AUTOCAP).

AUTOREP sorts casualty replacement data and generates data on replacements and filler personnel. AUTOREP generates data on personnel by comparing the theater's wartime personnel requirements with the peacetime authorizations. It displays the filler data in the area of concentration (AOC) and the military occupational specialty (MOS) and by rank. The program sorts projected aggregate casualty information by personnel category, AOC and MOS, and grade and rank for a specified theater of


operations to predict the number of replacements required over time. The ACC is tasked to pre-position a theater replacement list at PERSCOM as part of the planning process.

FLOWCAP supports the PERSCOM mission by managing the flow of individual filler and casualty replacement personnel to the theater of operations. It provides the CONUS Replacement Centers (CRCs) the capability to manage, schedule, control, and track the flow of replacement personnel from the CRC through the aerial port of embarkation. It provides manifest data for the Air Mobility Command and advance arrival information for the ACC. It also generates internal reports for the CRCs to manage and process replacements at the CRC.

AUTOCAP provides the capability to adjust the difference between projected and actual requirements. This difference is based on the projected casualty estimate of non-unit-related personnel flow to the theater of operations as captured in FLOWCAP It is also based on actual casualty data supplied from the Army Casualty Information Processing System. AUTOCAP allows the ACC or PERSCOM the ability to adjust future projected casualty requirements based on OPTEMPO, OPLAN changes and updates, and changes in structure or policy.

In FY 1994 the Army began developing automated system improvements to streamline civilian personnel processes in accordance with DOD regionalization plans. Army systems under development included the Personnel Action system to process and track personnel actions; the Core Document system to classify civilian positions; the Automated Reduction -in-Force system to process reduction-in-force actions; the Retirement system to process retirement actions; the Training system to process and track employee training; the Standard Automated Inventory and Referral system to track job vacancies and employee referrals; and the Injury and Unemployment Compensation system to track and process injury and unemployment compensation actions. The Army also continued refining the Army Civilian Personnel System (ACPERS) database of civilian personnel positions and employees. The Army is working on evolving ACPERS into the Defense Civilian Personnel Data System, which eventually will link into the Defense Civilian Payroll System.

During the fiscal year the Army completed fielding of the Army Food Management Information System (AFMIS). The AFMIS automates installation food service and troop subsistence activity processes. Automating these processes meets a congressional mandate that the Army and the other services automate their worldwide food service programs because of subsistence fraud, waste, and abuse identified in a 1981 Defense Audit Service audit. Software development began in 1981 but, due to three processing concept changes, system deployment did not begin until 1990.


The Army completed fielding approximately one-third of its total fifty-seven AFMIS sites in 1994. AFMIS consists of four modules: (1) Troop Issue Subsistence; (2) Troop Issue Subsistence Activity-Warehouse; (3) Installation Food Advisor; and (4) Dining Facility Operations. In addition, AFMIS is mandated to automate dining facility head counts. But, because there is no standard DOD identification card, the Army did not begin developing this module during the fiscal year.

The Army Information Systems Selection and Acquisition Agency (ISSAA) awarded four major contracts in FY 1994. One contract award, potentially worth $15.4 million, went to provide nonpersonal technical services to support Keystone, an automated personnel system aiding 3,000 Army users in enlistments, reenlistments, and assignments. One contract, potentially worth $249.4 million, went to provide the next generation of bar code equipment and services, as well as related technologies, to the DOD and the Coast Guard. Another contract, potentially worth $98.8 million, went to provide the Program Executive Officer for Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS) with commercial off-the-shelf computer equipment and support services to meet worldwide tactical requirements. ISSAA also awarded a contract, potentially worth $135 million, to provide the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, with automation equipment to support more than forty computer-based simulations annually.

Army automated intelligence capabilities also continued to evolve in FY 1994. On 29 October 1993, the Defense Acquisition Science Board awarded a contract for an upgraded Block II All Source Analysis System (ASAS). The ASAS is a modular, tactically deployable, computer-assisted Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) processing, analysis, reporting, and technical control system consisting of evolutionary sets of hardware and software modules that perform system operations management and security, communications processing and interface, input message processing, intelligence processing and reporting, target identification and nomination, and intelligence collection management. The Army System Acquisition Review Council approved the fielding of twelve Block I systems on 29 July 1993. An ASAS variant, the ASAS-Extended (ASAS-E), provides ASAS capability to additional units not scheduled to receive Block I ASAS. ASAS-E uses the Army Tactical Command and Control System Common Hardware/Common Software Support and provides open architecture, assured interoperability, and growth capability. Block I and ASAS-E systems will be upgraded with Block II enhancements beginning the second quarter of FY 1995.

Another intelligence initiative, the Force Integration Master Planner (FIM), is an automated decision support system and force analysis model. It provides Plans, Programs, and Budgeting System (PPBS) analytical


support for current and future IEW systems and force structure throughout intelligence functional areas. These areas include collection, processing, and dissemination. The purpose of the FIM is to validate the objective architecture in the Army Intelligence Master Plan by providing empirical data to support resource decisions in the IEW mission area.

In FY 1994 the FIM consolidated approximately fifty databases. This consolidation of databases is the basis for the power of the FIM. Previously, not all these databases were available in one place. Their seamless integration provides for improved IEW resource planning. The database information is used by force integration planners and combat and materiel development officers to plan and program the IEW force structure. It enables retrieval and assessment of all available pertinent information for a particular analysis. The FIM provides the user with the ability to assess many options rapidly.

With the continuing evolution of the capabilities of the Organizations and Cost Analysis component of the FIM in FY 1994, considerable time and effort were devoted to developing the Operational Capabilities Analysis (OPCA) component during the fiscal year. Effective 1 October 1993, the FIM OPCA component began to measure the operational added value of tactical U.S. Army signal intelligence and electronic warfare systems. A similar function for U.S. imagery systems and supporting processors, such as the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and the Joint Surveillance and Targetry Attack Radar System (JSTARS), will become available later during FY 1994. Ultimately, FIM will provide a total system-of-systems function for collecting, processing, and disseminating within the IEW mission area at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

During FY 1994 the Army Safety Center developed the Army Safety Information Services and Technology (ASIST) system to correct identified deficiencies at HQDA and better support commanders' risk management requirements. ASIST is the information management component of the Army's safety strategy (Safe Force XXI). It is intended to expand and transform the Army's database, which is oriented toward safety practitioners, into a risk management information system, easily accessible from existing and emerging unit and installation information support systems.

The Safety Center also developed the Safety Installation Support Module (ISM), one of six ISMs intended for use in development of the Safety Center's Sustaining Base Information Service (SBIS). The SBIS is intended to provide major improvements in quality, standardization, and efficiency in the execution of installation safety programs. The Safety ISM will provide automated processes for inspections, hazard abatement, risk management, and accident reporting and will interface with other automated systems at Army installations and HQDA.


Finally, the Safety Center established an electronic capability to provide to Army installation commanders the inspection findings and analyses of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Department of Labor. The Army uses the OSHA Inspection and Violation System database, available on line for use by the field, to extract information on citations for violations of OSHA standards at Army installations. Other DOD services can also access this information if it applies to them. The Safety Center used this information to draft and distribute the Army "Dirty Dozen" list, the twelve OSHA standards most violated by the Army, for FY 1993 and FY 1994.

The US. Army Audit Agency (AAA) introduced several significant automation initiatives during FY 1994. First, as part of its efforts to improve client services, the AAA automated its entire schedule of audits. The schedule is issued as near to the beginning of the fiscal year as possible to include the latest changes. Previously, as a result of numerous unprogrammed requests and other disruptions, much of the information had become outdated by the time clients received the schedule. The automated schedule overcomes these deficiencies by allowing Army MACOMs and other interested activities real-time, on-line access that reflects updated changes as they occur. The automated schedule also reflects projected entrance and exit dates and includes audit objectives. In addition, the AAA developed a new feature, the Audit Followup module, for its information management system. This new feature facilitates the production of the AAA follow-up function Semi-Annual Report to Congress. Finally, the AAA incorporated newly designed AAA performance measures into its information management system, thereby facilitating reporting of AAA internal process improvements.

FY 1994 saw the adoption of a new automated identification card in the Army, the Real-Time Automated Personnel Identification System (RAPIDS). The new DOD automated card was approved for testing on 1 October 1993. Testing took place at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, from October to December 1993. Worldwide implementation and fielding of the new RAPIDS equipment began in January 1994. Eighty-three Army identification card issuing sites were established in CONUS, and 39 outside CONUS, during the fiscal year. An additional 81 Army sites remained to be established in FY 1995.

FY 1994 marked an automation milestone for the U.S. Army Drug and Alcohol Operations Agency (USADAOA). USADAOA completed fielding the Drug and Alcohol Management Information System-Field (DAMIS-FS) to sixteen CONUS installations. USADAOA also created a prototype Service to the Nation/Drug Demand Reduction (STN/DDR) database to collect information about and report on the many volunteer services, programs, and resources Army installations are providing com-


munities in support of Service to the Nation and the National Drug Control Policy. The findings of the database revealed that of 96 CONUS installations surveyed, 62 installations, or 64 percent, accomplished 154 STN/DDR programs; 41 installations Army-wide conducted Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) programs; and overall, STN/DDR programs involved 263,530 participants, 56 percent of whom were military youth family members, and 3,385 staff members, 41 percent of whom were active duty soldiers or Department of the Army civilians.

During FY 1994 a major effort was under way to provide automated data processing support for management of reserve component programs. The goal was to provide improved capability, especially for conducting joint operations, of using microcomputers at the local level. The reserve components recognized that on-line communication and interaction with larger systems are essential to reduce delays, improve efficiency of operations, and make current information available to various levels of command.

The Army National Guard (ARNG) benefited from a number of automation initiatives during the fiscal year. The ARNG implemented and tested the Inter-Component Data Transfer (ICDT) process in July 1994. The ICDT process is a methodology developed to increase the frequency and efficiency of transferring personnel information between components. The ICDT enables intercomponent transfer of soldiers' automated personnel records for initial active-duty training, active-duty training, temporary tours of active duty longer than thirty days, and federalization. It is intended to facilitate loading soldier accession data upon enlistment, to receive the U.S. Army Recruiting Command Army Recruiting and Accession Data System records, and to route the record to the gaining component. When the ICDT is completely implemented, information will pass from the point of origin, through the TAPDB, to the appropriate personnel field system within forty-eight hours.

ARNG unit motor pools and organizational maintenance shops use Unit Level Logistics System-Ground (ULLS-G) computer systems for managing unit-level repair parts and maintaining maintenance records. After the Persian Gulf War, the ARNG reached an agreement with the Army Staff that the Department of the Army would furnish ULLS-G to early-deploying ARNG units and the ARNG would use congressionally added funds to purchase ULLS-G for its later-deploying units. As of 31 September 1994, all ARNG Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) units had been issued ULLS-G hardware and each state had a trained support cadre in place.

The development of ULLS-Aviation and ULLS-S4 (battalion logistics) software also began in FY 1994. With anticipated fielding in mid FY 1995, the ULLS-Aviation system automates the crew chief requirements


within the aviation flight company and the maintenance and supply operations within the aviation activities.

The ARNG also continued to modernize and expand several areas of tactical automation. The Standard Property Book System-Redesign (SPBS-R) is a means of centralizing property book accounting and providing greater visibility of assets to battalions and larger tactical units. Ninety percent of the ARNG's SPBS-R systems were fielded in high-priority deployable Contingency Force Pool (CFP) units by the end of FY 1994. Conversion and training for SPBS-R in ARNG tactical units should be completed during the second quarter of FY 1995. SPBS-R I/TDA (Installation/Table of Distribution and Allowances) is a multiuser system that replaces the Equipment Status Report module of the Supply Accounting Management Information System at the U.S. Property and Fiscal Office. This conversion began during the second quarter of FY 1994 and should be completed during the second quarter of FY 1995. SPBS-R I/TDA training is being conducted on-site or at nearby active Army military installations.

The ARNG is completely revamping calibration management with the introduction and fielding of the Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment Integrated Material Management System (TIMMS). In FY 1994, TIMMS ancillary hardware, consisting of smart terminal, printer, CD-ROM player, and modem, was being prepared for immediate fielding. Fielding is expected to be completed during the third quarter of FY 1995.

In finance, the ARNG expended considerable efforts toward improvement of the Automated Fund Control Orders System (AFCOS) during FY 1994. Extensive systems changes were programmed and tested during the first quarter, with fielding completed to all states, territories, and the District of Columbia during the next two quarters. The changes to AFCOS provided program and fund managers with significantly improved control and far more efficient use of funds available to the ARNG for active duty programs.

The Standard Army Maintenance System-Levels I and II(SAMS I/II) is available in the Army National Guard. This maintenance and readiness management system is essential to direct and general support maintenance operations in the ARNG. In FY 1994 SAMS UII was operating on an obsolete tactical Army combat service support computer system that required hardware and software upgrades.

The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) experienced mixed progress with automation during FY 1994. Deployable USAR units received off-the-shelf automation hardware for the logistics STAMIS, yet no corresponding equipping at the management levels occurred. Consequently, there was not an overall net increase in automated logistics management in the Army Reserve during FY 1994. The Army Reserve operates two internal


logistics programs, including center-level application software, which provide limited unit-level logistics operations; however, these have not been updated due to restrictions on upgrading functions that duplicate those in the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS).

The Army has historically recognized the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) requirements for computer hardware and software in the Army Reserve in organizations not governed by a TDA. Since the TDA structure of the Army Reserve includes most of the peacetime command and control headquarters, effective logistics automation management in the Army Reserve is impeded. The lack of internal interoperability between MTOE units, which include CFP units and TDA units, keeps MTOE units from acquiring the automation usage and experience needed to be as fully trained as their active component counterparts.

Equipping the Army Reserve has frequently occurred at the end of the Army equipment-fielding process. The Army has started to equip Army Reserve CFP units in Department of the Army Master Priority List sequence but continues to equip the remainder of the Army Reserve at the end of the process. Traditionally, funding has not been available to complete the equipping of the Army Reserve. If this trend continues, only CFP MTOE units will be interoperable with their active component counterparts. If other than CFP units are required for an operation, the Army will be required to equip and train these units in STAMIS operations upon mobilization.

During FY 1994 the Army Reserve made a transition to a single-source personnel system. This system, the Total Army Personnel Database-Reserve (TAPDB-R), eliminated the need for maintaining various personnel systems, such as the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program, and the Troop Program Units (TPU), to support the total Army Reserve. The Standard Installation/Division Personnel System-Army Reserve will continue to transmit unit personnel data to TAPDB-R until the RCAS interface is fully developed and fielded. The TAPDB-R personnel system supports a central database for all three Army components under a single-source data repository. TAPDB-R will also serve as the primary source of USAR personnel data to support the personnel and pay system interface and USAR retirement repository.

The RCAS began FY 1994 with 381 units fielded with hardware and office automation software and ended by completing the fielding of 1,500 units. The RCAS is a secure, automated information system that supports the decision-making needs of commanders, staff, and functional managers responsible for reserve component forces. When RCAS is completed, over 8,000 units will be connected through a wide area network. Once fielding of hardware and applications of software have been completed, the RCAS program will be capable of exchanging information systems. In addition


to accurate information supporting mobilization planning and execution, commanders at all levels will have the ability to assess training strategies and monitor the logistics functions.

Economies and Efficiencies

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller (ASA FM&C) directed an Army-wide study of the Internal Review Program in 1994. Internal Review is a command and control element that provides professional audit and related services for command and senior management officials. Internal Review facilitates the commander's role as a steward of Army resources. Internal Review offices provide comprehensive or quick-response audits of known or suspected problem areas or areas where additional efficiencies are believed to exist, advice and analysis on the status of internal management controls within the organization, additional advisory and consulting services for management as needed, a point of contact for commanders for all external audit organizations, and follow-up audit services to ensure that audit recommendations for corrective actions were implemented in a prompt and effective manner. Based on the results of the study, several initiatives were undertaken during FY 1994. As part of a strategic planning effort, an Army Internal Review vision with a focus on customer needs and high-quality audit services was adopted. The Internal Review Program was redesigned to provide a broader spectrum of audit and related services to customers. Guidelines were formulated for performing quick-response audits in accordance with Government Auditing Standards. The Army also adopted an Internal Review Awards of Excellence Program. Finally, under joint sponsorship of the ASA FM&C and the Auditor General, a program of instruction was developed for an eight-hour course on "Serving the Internal Review Customer" to be released during FY 1995.

These enhancement initiatives contributed to Internal Review productivity (measured in terms of audit reports issued). Internal Review productivity registered the most significant increase on record, over 33 percent in FY 1994 from FY 1993 levels. Internal Review "value added," which is measured in terms of potential monetary benefits identified per Internal Review auditor, registered a 51 percent increase during FY 1994 over FY 1993. A $291,000 benefit per auditor represented the highest level of savings in the FY 1990-1994 period.

During FY 1994 the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), responsible for demonstrating fiscal stewardship within DOD, emphasized the completion of Antideficiency Act (ADA) violation cases in a timely manner and accountability for violations of the law. An ADA violation is a violation of statutes included in Sections 1341, 1342, and 1517


of Title 31 of the United States Code, Finance and Money. The statutory intent is to ensure that federal employees do not obligate funds they do not have and do not obligate funds for purposes other than those stated in the authorizations and appropriations acts. The statutes provide administrative and criminal sanctions for violations of the act. The Secretary of the Army and senior management within the Army financial community supported the Under Secretary's position.

The Principal Deputy ASA FM&C contacted MACOMs personally to discuss the status of investigations and of required periodic update briefings. Also, the Army Audit Agency was requested to assist in processing of overdue ADA cases and to evaluate the processing procedures. These actions assisted the Army in reducing its backlog of ADA cases from 47 to 25 during FY 1994. This represented a significant reduction from the balance of 37 open cases at the end of FY 1993. The Army took additional actions before the end of FY 1994 to review guidance for processing and reporting ADA investigations and to review programs of instruction to increase awareness concerning causes of ADA violations. In addition, the ASA FM&C completely reviewed the ADA processing procedures to streamline the process.

Public Law 101-510, FY 1991 National Defense Appropriations Act, significantly changed the way the Army managed financial resources. The law eliminated the merged account and limited the availability of all appropriations for obligation adjustment and payments to five years after the appropriation expired. After five years, the expired appropriation and all unliquidated obligations are canceled. Payments associated with canceled appropriations must be supported with obligations from current funds. Prior to this law, unliquidated obligations remained in an expired status for two years, after which time they lapsed into the merged account. The merged account represented a compilation of many fiscal and appropriation combinations, and its unliquidated obligations and unobligated balances were available indefinitely for obligation adjustments and payment of liabilities.

FY 1994 marked the beginning of a new era in resource management because all merged accounts were canceled at the end of FY 1993. Managers needed to develop procedures to diminish the use of current funds to pay liabilities formerly financed by unliquidated obligations associated with canceled appropriations. In response to this need, the ASA FM&C initiated the FY 1994 Joint Reconciliation Program, combining the skills and expertise of accountants, budget and program analysts, contracting professionals, logisticians, legal professionals, and auditors to validate the continued need for goods and services that have not yet been delivered. Although the Army previously used resource managers, accountants, and budget analysts to conduct joint reconciliations, the


closeout of merged accounts in FY 1993 revealed the need for additional participation by logistics, contracting, audit, and legal personnel. The Joint Reconciliation Program will save money by reducing payments from current funds in support of canceled appropriations and by identifying current-year unliquidated obligations that can be deobligated and used for other purposes.

The Resource Management Mentorship Program (RMMP) is an initiative of the ASA FM&C that was also introduced in FY 1994. The program is intended to meet Army Imperatives and Resource Management Future Initiatives for personnel succession planning, to meet affirmative action goals, and to reemphasize supervisory and managerial responsibility through commitment to employee development. The RMMP is a formal mentoring program with an emphasis on acquiring skills. It incorporates different mentoring approaches to assist career comptrollers in training, developing, managing, and retaining the Army's workforce. During the fiscal year, 455 resource management careerists (194 mentors and 261 associates) participated in the program.

The Financial Analysis Directorate, Resource Analysis and Business Practices Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller (OASA FM&C), submits legislative proposals to provide commanders the flexibility to generate additional funds, maximize use of resources, and manage in the most businesslike fashion possible. In FY 1994 the Financial Analysis Directorate submitted six proposals for enactment in FY 1995. First, the Expense/Investment Threshold proposal would provide installation commanders increased flexibility to use the most cost-effective methods in meeting mission requirements by raising the limits of operations and maintenance purchases from $25,000 to $50,000. Without this flexibility, commanders are occasionally forced to maintain aged equipment or to lease new equipment at cumulative costs far in excess of purchase prices for replacing the equipment. Second, the Kuwaiti Reimbursement proposal would allow DOD to create obligations in advance of receipt of cash payments by the Kuwaiti government. Although the treaty between the United States and the Government of Kuwait states that the Kuwaiti government will reimburse the United States for military costs of the continued U.S. presence in Kuwait, the DOD cannot afford to carry the approximately $250 million operating cost from existing total obligation authority until payment is received. Third, the Residual Value Threshold proposal would establish a $10 million threshold below which the review of U.S.-German settlement agreements by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is not required. This would allow the OMB to focus on higher monetary settlements and would accelerate the process for lower monetary settlements. Fourth, the Excess Historical Artifacts proposal would allow the services a broader range of


options for disposing of excess historical artifacts by trading artifacts to compensate for transportation costs and trading artifacts of equal or greater value with other services. Fifth, the Sale and Outreach proposal obtained appropriation language that would authorize the use of funds generated by this program. Sixth, the Residual Value proposal, not to be confused with the Residual Value Threshold proposal, obtained appropriation language that would authorize the use of German funds, paid into a Special Treasury account as a result of the U.S. military drawdown in Europe, for building improvements made at U.S. Army installations.

In FY 1994 Secretary of the Army Togo D. West, Jr., directed that the Army Program Performance and Budget Execution Review System (PPBERS) be expanded and conducted as the Quarterly Army Performance Review (QAPR). The Secretary reached this decision after reviewing the PPBERS process and recent legislative initiatives that included the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, the National Performance Review, and the Government Management Reform Act of 1994. This legislation signaled the transition to more outcome-oriented program management and performance budgeting.

From its start in FY 1982, PPBERS served as the corporate review for assessing the accomplishment of major Army missions through a systematic set of performance indicators. The performance measures in PPBERS were presented quarterly to the VCSA and the Under Secretary of the Army by the Secretariat and the Army Staff. The QAPR expanded PPBERS to allow participants more flexibility in determining core programs, special issues, and related performance objectives and measures. The QAPR also includes presentation to the Secretary of the Army and the CSA in addition to the Under Secretary of the Army and the VCSA.

The composition of the QAPR allows principals to observe how success or failure in one program affects other programs. Raising program execution problems in this forum also offers an opportunity for initiating corrective action at the senior management level. This makes the review a powerful management tool for the Army and enables top managers to review, assess, and independently correct program performance shortfalls.

The OASA FM&C continued to exercise responsibility for financial oversight of nonappropriated funds (NAF) in FY 1994 through participation in the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MY-/ -R) Board of Directors. The Comptroller of the Army served as the chairman of the Finance Committee and the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management served as the co-chairman of the Audit Committee.

The Army achieved five significant accomplishments in financial oversight of NAF in FY 1994. First, the OASA FM&C established financial standards for all categories of MWR programs and required briefings by MACOM chiefs of staff on their performance, measured against these


standards, to the MWR Board of Directors Executive Committee. Second, the OASA FM&C incorporated financial performance measured against pro forma projections as a criterion for future funding of major NAF construction. Third, the OASA FM&C reviewed the Armed Forces Recreation Center-Europe (AFRC-E) to determine whether the center could operate without appropriated fund support. The review revealed that the AFRC-E should be able to operate without appropriated funds once its operations stabilize. Fourth, the OASA FM&C established that appropriated funds could be used to cover NAF severance pay requirements at installations affected by BRAC actions. Finally, the Army entered into a partnership with the Air Force to cooperate and share information on NAF financial oversight issues and common areas of concern in Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) management.

The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 aimed at producing more effective general and financial management practices in the federal government. Its purpose was to provide more accurate, timely, and reliable financial information through improved accounting systems, integrated functional and financial management, and strengthened controls. The law designated ten federal agencies, including the Department of the Army, to take part in a series of pilot projects that audited financial statements covering all agency operations. The OMB designated the Army as a pilot for FY 1991 and 1992 reporting and extended the project through FY 1995. In accordance with the Government Management Reform Act of 1994, Chief Financial Officers Act reporting will be mandatory for all federal agencies as of FY 1996.

In FY 1994 the Army submitted the audited financial report for FY 1993. This report resembled a corporate annual report but depicted more than financial information. The report included a message from the Secretary of the Army, an overview of significant accomplishments, and a description of key Army missions and performance. The financial statements, footnotes, and supplemental financial information were prepared by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. Although the General Accounting Office audited Army financial statements for FY 1991 and 1992, in FY 1994 the AAA assumed the responsibility, beginning with the FY 1993 report.

In FY 1994 the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held hearings on the FY 1993 Army financial statements. Similar hearings had been conducted in FY 1992 and FY 1993 on FY 1991 and FY 1992 Army financial statements, respectively. In each of these hearings, the Senate committee criticized the Army for failing to implement the CFO Act fast enough. Although the senior Army leadership strongly supported the successful implementation of the CFO Act, progress had been slowed by the need to resolve long-term problems that required changes in financial systems.


During FY 1994 the AAA issued 507 reports, including formal audit reports. These audits identified $1,777,591,083 in potential monetary benefits, of which the Army agreed with $1,397,635,367. Three of the AAA's more significant reports each identified potential monetary benefits exceeding $100 million: the Army "Maintenance Float" report, $980,300,000; the "Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement, U S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army" report, $199,200,000; and the "Program Executive Officer for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare" report, $123,000,000.

The audit of the Army's Maintenance Float program found that the Army could significantly reduce its operational readiness float program (a reserve of equipment) and still maintain equipment readiness. Less than 6 percent of all Army units reported that direct-support maintenance repair time affected readiness. Also, about 56 percent of the equipment in the program was not considered critical and did not affect readiness. Most of the remaining items in the program either met equipment readiness goals without float assets or had maintenance problems at the unit level. The AAA believed that by reducing the program, the Army could cancel about $780 million in future float acquisitions and use about $194 million in existing float assets to fill other Army requirements.

The AAA also believed that the Army needed to manage and reduce its repair-cycle float program better. The report found that there were no recorded assets on hand to support about $3.5 billion in repair-cycle float requirements, and less than 1 percent of Army units needed repair-cycle float assets to maintain readiness levels. Also, key internal controls, as they relate to maintenance float, were not effective. Through better management and reductions of items, the AAA believed, the Army could reduce planned acquisitions of repair-cycle float assets by about $6 million.

The Army agreed with the AAA recommendations about the Maintenance Float program or proposed reasonable alternative corrective actions. The Army partially agreed with the AAA estimate of potential monetary benefits, reducing them from $980 million to $853 million for FY 1995 to FY 1999. The revised amount represented funds that were put to better use within existing Army programs-funds used to buy equipment to fill unit initial-issue authorizations rather than being spent on planned acquisitions for Float assets.

In the "Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement, U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army" audit, the AAA found that the Army was unlikely to benefit from continued expenditures for military support provided under the host nation support agreement. The AAA believed that the agreement did not respond to a current threat and that U.S. Army, Europe, could not count on support from German units unless Germany was directly threatened. The audit found that the Army could save about $199 million if its requirement for military support under the agreement was deleted. The


audit also found that the Army needed to improve accountability and oversight of host nation support equipment. Equipment valued at approximately $80.4 million was not on accountable records, and the Army did not inventory or inspect equipment stored in German depots. The auditors recommended that the Army initiate action to amend the support agreement to delete the requirements for military support to the US. Army; cancel undelivered orders for German wartime host nation support equipment; cancel delivery of Heavy Equipment Transporter Systems; reconcile equipment account balances with receiving reports; and perform a 100 percent inventory and publish guidance to account for equipment.

On the basis of the report's recommendations, the Army disagreed with dropping all of the German support groups. The service agreed to renegotiate the agreement to reduce the number of German support groups from three to one and cancel contracts in accordance with a single German support group program. Since revised force structure estimates supported the need for heavy transportation, the Army did not agree to cancel delivery of Heavy Equipment Transporter Systems. The Army agreed with the other recommendations and reduced the potential benefits from $199.2 million to $101.3 million.

In the "Program Executive Officer for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare" audit, the AAA found that while the Program Executive Office generally provided adequate life-cycle management of its assigned programs, materiel developers did not. Materiel developers did not use a formal milestone decision review to authorize major modifications and upgrades of some nonmajor programs; did not keep required baseline cost estimates or acquisition plans current; and did not plan to acquire some systems cost-effectively. The audit identified about $123 million in potential monetary benefits. The Army agreed with the AAA's recommended changes to the program and the estimated potential monetary benefits.

Since 1961 the Army has maintained an aggressive Value Engineering Program encompassing both in-house and contractor efforts. In FY 1994 the program achieved $326.6 million in in-house savings and $40.5 million in contractor savings. Investments of $32.4 million for in-house value engineering programs and $3.1 million for contractor value engineering programs produced returns of 10.1:1 and 12.9:1, respectively. The total Army value engineering saving of $367.2 million represented 43 percent of DOD value engineering savings.


The Army submitted a budget that was in line with President Clinton's planned $60 billion cut to the defense budget for FY 1994-FY 1997. The Army requested $60.7 billion in Total Obligation Authority (TOA) for FY


1994. This represented a $3.1 billion decrease, or a decline of over 6 percent in TOA from FY 1993, not including supplemental funding, and continued a downward trend that began in FY 1986.

Faced with tight budget constraints, Army leaders accelerated planned personnel cuts in FY 1994 to preserve some critical modernization programs. The budget submission for personnel provided for a smaller force of high-quality active and reserve component forces. Active component strength was reduced to 540,000 soldiers by the end of FY 1994, an additional reduction of 35,000 soldiers from the revised FY 1993 active duty end strength of 575,000. The budget provided funding to continue the Voluntary Separation Incentive Program (VSIP) and the Special Separation Benefit and to expand the number of voluntary separation tools available by adding an early retirement program for military personnel. The ARNG and the USAR were realigned and reduced to end strengths of 410,000 and 260,000, respectively, in FY 1994, to meet force requirements. The budget recognized reduced or transferred functional authorizations resulting in a civilian workforce end strength of 290,257 in FY 1994, down by 18,013 employees from FY 1993.

Quality of life improvements such as upgraded barracks and family housing areas, part of a major, long-term Army effort, remained a top priority in the FY 1994 budget. Army family housing provided $1.25 billion

for the operation and maintenance of 165,000 military family dwellings. Barracks renewals at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Campbell and Fort Knox, Kentucky; Fort Rucker, Alabama; and Fort Lee, Virginia, accounted for $265 million in the FY 1994 package. Another $207 million was earmarked to build, upgrade, or replace family housing at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; Fort Irwin, California; the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York; Fort Meade, Maryland; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Bragg; and Fort Lee.

Despite reduced funds, the budget represented a concerted effort to maintain training and readiness standards. The budget focused on the Army's emergence as a power-projection force ready to meet regional

threats. To ensure that the Army was prepared for such contingencies, funding was directed to the Army's Strategic Mobility Program, which would rapidly project force anywhere on the globe. At the unit level, funding provided for increasing the training tempo at the combat training centers during FY 1994. Simulators and simulations were used more extensively to supplement costly field training. Crew-level training maintained an operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of 800 miles per year for combat vehicles and 14.5 flying hours per active duty crew per month. The budget provided full funding for all known statutory and regulatory environmental requirements. The budget continued the Combat Training Center Strategy and funding to improve realism and to increase the number of participat-


ing units at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany.

The budget submission for Army modernization provided for continuing the upgrade of M1 Abrams tanks to MlA2s, the upgrade of Bradley fighting vehicles to M2A2s, and the development of an A3 model. This directly supported the Army's initiative to digitize the battlefield. The Hellfire II airborne antitank missile system continued to be funded in FY 1994. The budget also provided for low-rate initial production of the Javelin antitank missile system in FY 1994 and continued production of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launcher. The budget provided for the third year of UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter multiyear procurement and continued to fund satellite communications systems, communications command and control programs, and various electronic equipment programs. The budget also set ammunition funding at $734.4 million and conventional ammunition demilitarization funding at $53 million in FY 1994.

The budget submission for the Army Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDTE) program provided funding for several modernization programs, including the development of the Advanced Field Artillery System (AFAS) and the Future Armored Resupply Vehicle (FARV); the RAH-66 Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter; and antitank missile systems that include the AH-64D Apache Longbow Hellfire, the Javelin, the Non-Line-of-Sight (N-LOS), and product improvement programs for MLRS.

Each year the DOD submits to Congress an omnibus reprogramming action that incorporates all reprogramming requests submitted by the services. Because congressional committees approve only specific items and disapprove others, some of the Army's approved requirements received partial funding from sources provided by other services. The Army's increases in FY 1994, which totaled $223,779,000, were approved and funded by Army appropriations and the balance was paid for by the other services. The decreases, which totaled $206,969,000, were taken from other Army programs that were not fully executed.

The Army's proposed $61.1 billion budget request for FY 1995 did not stand on its own but represented the first in a series of budgets through 1999 based on defense guidance in terms of missions, forces, and personnel strength resulting from the 1993 Bottom-Up Review. The FY 1994 budget required the Army to be at an active duty end strength of 540,000. The Bottom-Up Review would require cuts of 30,000 in 1995; 10,000 in 1996; and 5,000 in 1997. In FY 1995, the active Army would have 25,000 fewer soldiers and 2 fewer divisions than the Bush administration's 12division Base Force of 520,000 soldiers. The active Army would be reinforced by 575,000 National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers organized


into 37 brigades, including 15 enhanced readiness brigades. These latter units, all from the National Guard, would be capable of deploying to overseas hot spots within three months of mobilization.

Army active divisions, which numbered 18 in FY 1989, would be down to 12 in the FY 1995 budget and would be cut to ten by FY 1997. At the same time, National Guard divisions that totaled ten in FY 1987 would be down to eight in the FY 1995 budget and are identified at five (plus) in defense guidance for FY 1997.

The Army TOA request for FY 1995 was similar to the FY 1994 TOA but represented differences in the appropriation categories that signal changes in focus and priorities. Military personnel costs were lower in the FY 1995 budget request. The FY 1995 budget request for operations and maintenance appropriations increased to improve readiness accounts. This increase came at the expense of funding for procurement and RTDE. The FY 1995 budget requested a $1.8 billion increase in operations and maintenance funding, from $19.7 billion in FY 1994 to $21.5 billion for FY 1995. The FY 1995 request for procurement would drop $800 million from the FY 1994 budget to $6.1 billion for FY 1995. The FY 1995 request for RTDE would drop $100 million from the FY 1994 budget to $5.3 billion for FY 1995. Under the FY 1995 budget request, the Army sought to apportion 43 percent of its budget to personnel programs; 35.1 percent to operations and maintenance; 9 percent to the purchase of weapons and equipment; 8.3 percent to research and development; 1.3 percent to military construction projects; and 2.1 percent to family housing. Table 1 summarizes appropriations for the FY 1994 budget and the FY 1995 budget request.

Contingency operations and foreign assistance in FY 1994 created unanticipated resource challenges that had an adverse impact on the Army's readiness. To support contingency operations during the fiscal year, Congress approved a supplemental appropriation. Contingency costs, however, exceeded the supplemental funding provided. To execute Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, the Army was forced to invoke the Feed and Forage Act for the amount of $127 million. To accommodate contingency costs, the Army withheld $140 million from MACOMs. This action diverted funds from training and quality of life programs and delayed, deferred, or canceled programs that had a direct readiness impact. Unit training was reduced in scope or canceled, and the purchase of all but priority repair parts was severely curtailed. Quality of life suffered as real property maintenance was deferred to pay civilian salaries and other nondiscretionary costs, such as transportation of supplies and equipment. In addition, the President granted $56.8 million in aid to foreign nations under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), requiring the services to tap their existing resources to provide equipment and services. This depletion of assets further affected readiness.



  FY94 FY95

Military Personnel, Army



Operation & Maintenance, Army



National Board for Promotion of Rifle Practice














Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles






Other Procurement



Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation



Military Construction, Army



Base Realignment and Closure



Army Family Housing











Reserve Components


National Guard



National Guard Personnel, Army



Operation & Maintenance, Army National Guard



Military Construction, Army National Guard



Army Reserve



Reserve Personnel, Army



Operation & Maintenance, Army Reserve



Military Construction, Army Reserve









Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

As Army forces returned from forward bases to the United States, units were stationed at aging posts where the infrastructure was often inadequately funded. Some quality of life programs, such as child development and family support, were adequately funded, but many other important programs, such as Whole Barracks Renewal and Family Housing Revitalization, were not. Central support activities that directly affect unit readiness, such as depot maintenance and logistics operations, were also underfunded. These activities involve rebuilding and repairing equipment and components and transporting, supporting, securing, and deploying the


Army worldwide. Resource constraints required that the Army defer procurement of modern replacement systems, a practice that increases operation and maintenance expenses, particularly in aging equipment. Slower modernization also adversely affected the issuance of modern equipment to the National Guard and Army Reserve, prolonging an existing problem of force incompatibility. Modernization of the telecommunications infrastructure required to support these central support activities was also underfunded. Continued resource constraints prevented the timely replacement of obsolete communications equipment and cable plants. As modernization resources continued to decline, critical industrial base capabilities were being lost, particularly smaller subcontractors and vendors who provided key high technology components. This added to future weapon system costs and development time but, more importantly, increased the cost of spare parts for fielded systems and directly affected Army readiness.

The reserve components also faced resource challenges during the fiscal year. The ARNG operation and maintenance account was underfunded by $188 million in FY 1994. The shortfalls resulted from causes that included an increase in end strength from 345,600 to 410,000, an increased cost of air OPTEMPO, and numerous directed reductions during the year. The reduction in air OPTEMPO and flying-hour program affected ARNG aviation safety and proficiency. Ground OPTEMPO mileage was reduced, affecting the level of proficiency in some combat and combat support units. The budget reduction required the ARNG to realign the funding for higher-priority and lower-priority units, which in turn reduced readiness.

The USAR budget shortfall was $40.2 million. The shortfall and funding constraints occurred early in the fiscal year, degrading training and preventing units from scheduling training operations. Army Reserve units not associated with the contingency force pool were not funded to execute more than minimal unit training. Equipment shortages continued to affect readiness and the ability to meet training standards. Funding shortfalls also prevented commanders from allowing soldiers to attend annual training with their assigned unit.

The Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for FY 1996-2001 was forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in June 1994. This POM was a particularly important document because it provided for completion of the final phase of the Army drawdown and for the transition of the Army into the twenty-first century. Basic source documents providing guidance for the FY 1996-2001 POM were the Army Plan FY 1996-2011; the Bottom-Up Review, published in October 1993; and Defense Planning Guidance FY 1995-1999, dated September 1993. These, in conjunction with detailed instructions from the OSD to the services on POM requirements, set the parameters for formulating the FY 1996-2001 POM.


FY 1996, the first year of the POM, will mark the seventh year of Army reductions since the fall of the Berlin Wall. By the end of FY 1996, the Army was programmed to be at the end-state force structure and end strength directed by the Bottom-Up Review and Defense Planning Guidance-ten active component divisions and an end strength of 495,000. Similar goals were programmed for the National Guard and Army Reserve.

A major challenge in formulating the FY 1996-2001 POM was maintaining "program balance." This refers to the task of adequately funding each leg of the readiness-modernization-quality of life triad to ensure a trained and ready force. This balance was to be achieved in the face of what the Army leadership characterized as an "affordability crisis" that resulted from programmed reductions in the Army budget, particularly in the FY 1996-1998 time period.

The FY 1996-2001 POM incorporated initiatives for change that were taking place within the Army. Strategic changes (post-Cold War environment), intellectual changes (such as new publications like Field Manual 100-9, Domestic Support Operations), and technological changes (such as the Army digitization effort) were all factored into the POM to facilitate the Army's transition to the twenty-first century.

Within the context of the POM for FY 1996-2001, the focus of the Army's modernization strategy was achieving land force dominance. Toward that end, the modernization strategy was couched in terms of five objectives: (1) project and sustain the force; (2) protect the force; (3) win the information war; (4) conduct precision strikes throughout the battlefield; and (5) dominate the maneuver battle. Achievement of the five modernization objectives throughout the battlefield is a function of the Army's ability to protect and enhance weapons systems with four capabilities: (1) "owning the night," the capability of operating in darkness; (2) digitization of the battlefield; (3) use of smart munitions; and (4) use of artillery deep fires. Given an austere fiscal environment, the Army recognized that efficient management of modernization was required to identify and gain leverage from high-payoff technologies.

POM strategy for Research, Development, and Acquisition focused on modernization, in the first instance, by component upgrade with a restricted number of new starts. Modernization is to be executed by force package, a discrete grouping of fighting units ordered by warfighting priority. Within the Army Science and Technology program, the POM FY 1996-2001 perpetuated the science and technology investment articulated in the Army Science and Technology Master Plan. The POM provided core resources to identify and exploit technologies and continue infrastructure reductions resulting from in-house consolidations.

Overall, the POM strategy emphasized RDTE at the expense of procurement, and low procurement-to-RDTE ratios complied with Defense


Planning Guidance standards. Many programs were protected, but not necessarily sufficiently funded. A concern expressed in the POM was that not funding or underfunding key modernization programs would ultimately erode the technological superiority of future forces.


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Last updated 19 December 2003