Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1994


Force Development, Training, and Operational Forces

Blueprint for the Future

In FY 1994 the Army recognized that it was on the threshold of a new era. As the world underwent a transition from the industrial age to an information age, the service realized the need to stay ahead of that change. The Army began during the fiscal year to define the parameters of its envisioned twenty-first century force, Force XXI.

The Army conceptualized Force XXI to integrate emerging information technologies with sound doctrine, reinvented organizations, and high-quality people to make a smaller force more lethal, more durable, and more powerful. Force XXI will be ideally suited for joint operations. It will be modular, allowing the Army to generate, project, and sustain force packages that meet the specific needs of a joint force commander. Also, it will rely on advanced technologies that promise to revolutionize the face of war in areas of lethality and dispersion, volume and precision of fire, integrative technology, mass and effects, and detectability. In the Army's vision, command and control on a future battlefield will be based on real­time, shared situational awareness. Echelons will be more specialized as more people gain access to information, and units will rely more on electronic rather than geographic or physical connectivity.

To transform the Army into this future force, the service formulated a Force XXI campaign plan, whose main effort focused on redesigning the Army's operational forces. The effort was supported by parallel measures to reinvent the institutional Army and to develop and acquire information age technologies, for which acquisition reform was vital.

Digital technologies that allow the Army to pass vast amounts of real­time information to all levels will be critical to Force XXI. To integrate all activities related to digitization, the Army created the Army Digitization Office (ADO) in FY 1994. The ADO is developing a digitization master plan that will address elements of technical, systems, and operational architectures; acquisition strategy; integration; requirements; and an eval-


uation strategy. The Army also is working closely with other services to ensure interoperability. The Army plans to digitize a brigade in FY 1996 and to digitize a division and a corps by the turn of the century.

The Advanced Warfighting Experiment DESERT HAMMER VI, conducted at the National Training Center (NTC) in April 1994, was the first use of digital command and control systems and corresponding tactics, techniques, and procedures in a field environment. The experiment was designed to validate the hypothesis that digitization may lead to increases in lethality, durability, and tempo of operations when digital information systems and other advanced technologies are overlaid on existing organizations using current doctrine. The experiment was also designed to highlight an innovative approach to initiating and managing the necessary and fundamental change the Army will experience over the next few years. In the experiment a heavy task force was equipped with digital technology and linked digitally to a brigade. By gathering data during two weeks of intense, almost nonstop, simulator-enhanced, force-on-force battles with the NTC's opposing force, the Army gained significant insights into current organizations and doctrine when used with new capabilities. The equipment was an example of a new way of working that cut across organizational lines, with a great team effort between the U.S. Army Materiel Command, the U.S. Army Forces Command, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the Army Staff. The exercise also demonstrated that experimentation and training can be conducted simultaneously, without degrading either. The warfighting experiment clearly suggested that improvements in lethality, durability, and tempo could be achieved by the application of digital technology to U.S. combat forces. It also underlined the requirement for continued work on the effect of information technology on the Army's future leaders, soldiers, organization, and doctrine.

In FY 1994 the Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) process, named after the historic exercises that General George C. Marshall ordered just before the United States entered World War II, provided a framework to manage the changes occurring in the Army. The LAM furnished a mechanism for the Army to identify new ideas and questions to be resolved and established a basis for consensus among senior Army leaders. It caused selected ideas to be studied and yielded accelerated feedback to Army leaders.

With the advent of Force XXI, the LAM concept moved into a more advanced stage of utilization by the OCSA, during the year. While the LAM's original mandate was to change the way the Army changes, it refocused in 1994 to act as a watchdog over those changes on the road to Force XXI. The Army's senior leadership approved a "campaign plan" developed by the LAM Task Force to serve as the blueprint for the development of Force XXI. The LAM process will synchronize the Army team


effort by ensuring that hypotheses are supported by experimentation—live, virtual, and constructive—to be able to reach conclusions necessary to implement the Force XXI campaign plan. The LAM Task Force is the executive agent for this plan and reports to the CSA, while working with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) on the Army synchronization of the plan. The Army effort to synchronize and coordinate the LAM effort with Force XXI is accomplished through a series of Board of Directors, General Officer Working Group, and Synchronization Work Group meetings.

In consonance with the overall thrust of Force XXI during FY 1994, the director of Army Safety and the safety directors of Army major commands (MACOMs) developed a strategic plan, Safe Force XXI, that identified Army safety objectives and the requirements to achieve them. Safe Force XXI is intended to integrate safety risk management into all of the Army's missions. Safe Force XXI has six goals: (1) to ensure that the Army is a safe place for people to live and work; (2) to integrate effective force protection processes into all Army training development; (3) to ensure that force protection is integrated into all levels of doctrine; (4) to develop force protection strategies for equipment modernization and acquisition; (5) to structure force protection to sustain any force mix and support any mission, including contingency operations and operations other than war; and (6) to integrate force protection into all aspects of leader development training.

Safe Force XXI recognizes that Army soldiers habitually face a challenging array of hazards. Safe Force XXI intends to ensure that Army operations, training, materiel systems, and support services are designed to reflect the requirements and operational limitations of soldiers as they perform their missions within this risky environment. An example of a Safe Force XXI initiative is soldier endurance. Soldiers performing mission tasks over long periods of time in fatiguing environments face greatly increased risks in effectively and safely conducting those operations. Commanders' guidance for judging soldier endurance must provide information on increases in safety risks as soldiers' performance decreases. A human performance initiative of Safe Force XXI will establish a coordinated course of action among the training, medical, test, and operational communities to provide objective measures and disseminate these as guidance to commanders Army-wide.

Joint and Army doctrine drive the Army's modernization vision. The Army's concept is to overwhelm the enemy throughout the depth and breadth of the battlefield by executing simultaneous operations. Modernization goals in FY 1994 stressed achieving an overmatching capability to ensure land-force dominance. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, published in September 1993 by the


Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), became the nation's warfighting doctrine for the conduct of joint and multinational operations throughout the range of military operations. The publication provides operational and organizational guidance for the exercise of command and control of joint forces during campaigns, major operations, and battles.

On 14 April 1994, two U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters transporting personnel participating in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT were accidentally shot down over northern Iraq by two U.S. Air Force F-15 air­craft. Based on the results of the subsequent investigation, the Secretary of Defense initiated a series of corrective actions that applied lessons learned. Corrective actions within the doctrinal arena focused on a thorough review of extant joint and service doctrine and the accelerated development and promulgation of joint procedures to ensure that such an accident would not recur. Based on a decision by the CJCS, the Army implemented doctrinal changes in July 1994 that were formalized in the accelerated publication of Joint Publication (JP) 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, in November 1994. JP 3-56.1 enhanced existing guidance in JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, and included specific guidance that addressed command and control procedures during military operations other than war. Under the new guidance, Army rotary-wing aircraft had to operate on air tasking orders or flight plans to provide positive control in highly volatile situations. Under normal conditions, Army rotary-wing aircraft using established air­space procedures continued to operate under the control of the land force commander.

During FY 1994 the integration and improvement of joint doctrine continued. The Army was the lead agent for twenty-four publications during the fiscal year. Table 11 lists joint publications finalized in FY 1994.

Of particular importance during the fiscal year was the development of doctrine for information-age warfare. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command led the way in this effort. The importance of information warfare was clearly demonstrated with work on Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations. This new field manual describes these activities as continuous, combined-arms operations that enhance and protect the commander's decision cycle while adversely influencing his opponent's. This is the first intellectual step toward a new doctrinal paradigm of knowledge-based operations enabled by information-age technology. The emerging doctrine stresses the importance of disrupting the enemy's decision cycle through attacks on his command and control systems. These coordinated attacks use the elements of electronic warfare, physical destruction, psychological operations, deception, and operational security. At the same time, the doctrine emphasizes the requirement to increase the speed and accuracy of the friendly decision cycle through enhanced com-



JP 1-02.2

Joint Electronic Library

JP 1-02

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

JP 2-01.1

Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Targeting

JP 3-01.4

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

JP 3-01.5

Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense

JP 3-07.1

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense

JP 3-07.3

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations

JP 3-07.4

Joint Counterdrug Operations

JP 3-11

Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense

JP 3-50.2

Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue

JP 3-54

Joint Doctrine for Operations Security

JP 3-58

Doctrine for Military Deception

JP 4-01.3

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control

JP 4-02

Doctrine for Joint Health Service Support in Joint Operations

mand and control. The combination of attacking an adversary's use of information while enhancing and protecting friendly information provides a decisive advantage.

Force Development

In FY 1994, for the second consecutive year, the Army published its formal plan for force modernization activities. The document, entitled "The United States Army Modernization Plan Update (FY95-99)," charted the changes that the Army had experienced during the past year as it continued to modernize the force. The modernization vision centered on ensuring an Army capable of establishing and maintaining land-force dominance on future battlefields. The vision contained five objectives: projecting and sustaining the force; protecting the force; winning the information war; conducting precision strikes; and dominating the maneuver battlefield.

More than at any time in the last half century, the Army has become based in the continental United States, with a much diminished forward presence. Crisis response places increasingly heavy premiums on the Army's ability to project and sustain forces on short notice for extended periods of time. The Achilles' heel in this modernization objective is suf-


ficient air and sealift assets. The Army continued staunch support of the C-17 air transport and Fast Sealift programs of the Air Force and Navy, respectively.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, along with cruise and tactical ballistic missile technologies, posed increased threats to Army forces during the year. In response, the Army placed significant emphasis on a two-tiered missile defense. The upper tier consisted of the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system currently in development, which will intercept tactical ballistic missiles at extended ranges and high altitudes. THAAD is intended to provide coverage to defeat missile threats directed against military forces as well as critical and strategic assets such as population centers and industrial resources. THAAD is scheduled to begin flight tests in 1995. The lower tier will engage incoming missiles operating below the ballistic space of THAAD and will consist of the Patriot missile system, with third-generation improved capabilities, and the Corps Surface-to-Air Missile (CORPS SAM) system. CORPS SAM, which is currently in concept development, is intended to fill a critical need by protecting maneuver forces and critical assets, providing 360­degree coverage against short-range tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and manned aircraft. This emphasis, coupled with improvements in Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) protection, is intended to ensure improved soldier effectiveness under any conditions. NBC improvements included the development of the M93 Fox NBC reconnaissance system, the M40 and M42 protective masks, the M43 aircrew mask, and the M17 lightweight decontamination system.

Emphasis in winning the information war hinges on having superior command and control systems, protecting them from exploitation and degradation, and attacking the adversary's comparable command and control and decision-support mechanisms. In FY 1994 the Army emphasized the use of proven tools of destruction, electronic warfare, operational security, deception, and psychological operations. During the year, and looking ahead to the near future, the Army focused on building superior command and control systems such as the Command and Control Vehicle, a replacement for selected M577A1 command post carriers; the Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control System, an automated means of furnishing timely data to forward-area air defense weapons; and the Combat Service Support Control System, an automated system designed to assist the combat service support commander and staff in rapidly collecting, storing, analyzing, and disseminating combat service support information.

During FY 1994 the Army continued to emphasize modernization objectives to improve its capability to conduct deep-attack precision strike operations against any threat. Part of the Army's modernization


strategy focused on buying a limited number of new weapons such as the RAH-66 Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter and the Advanced Field Artillery System and Future Armored Resupply Vehicle. The latter is a 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer system, supported by a fuel and ammunition resupply vehicle, which is intended to provide a dramatic increase in artillery fire support. In addition, to ensure the capability to dominate the maneuver battle, the Army emphasized upgrades and modifications of existing land systems through Horizontal Technology Integration (HTI) and Vertical Technology Integration (VTI). The Army's major HTI effort during the year was the digitization of the battlefield, applying digital technologies throughout the force to effect an enhanced capability for all systems. The Advanced Warfighting Experiment DESERT HAMMER VI, conducted at the National Training Center, examined the first use of digital command, control, and communications systems in a field environment. VTI allowed the Army to apply an enabling technology within an existing system to upgrade operational capability, to reduce cost, or to improve its warfighting capability. A good example of VTI in FY 1994 was the Patriot Advanced Capability III program, which enhanced the operational capabilities of the Patriot air defense artillery missile system with an improved missile and radar, enhanced system emplacement capability, launcher modifications, and a remote launch capability.

In FY 1994 the Army also began implementing the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI). ARI, approved for implementation by the CSA in FY 1993, contained five objectives: correct the structural deficiencies of the 1985 Army of Excellence; reduce logistics requirements; reduce costs; modernize the entire fleet; and remain within resource constraints. U.S. Army, Europe, and Forces Command led the Army's transition to the ARI structure.

During FY 1994 a number of Army units underwent inactivation and reflagging as the Army continued to downsize. The 7th US. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM), long the US. military's largest forward-deployed medical command, furled its colors in Heidelberg, Germany. At the height of the Cold War, the 7th MEDCOM provided care for more than half a million soldiers, civilians, and family members in U.S. Army, Europe. The command staffed 2 medical centers, 9 hospitals, 60 health clinics, 94 dental clinics, and 15 veterinary activities. Also during the year the following organizations at brigade/regiment level and above were inactivated or reflagged: (1) the 2d Brigade of the 3d Infantry Division was inactivated in Germany on 15 January 1994; (2) the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was inactivated in Germany on 15 March 1994; (3) the 7th Infantry Division (less 1 brigade) was inactivated at Fort Ord, California, on 15 June 1994; (4) the 6th Infantry Division (less 1 brigade)


was inactivated in Alaska on 1 July 1994; and (5) the Berlin Brigade was inactivated in Germany on 15 August 1994.


Army training continued to emphasize producing a "Trained and Ready" force in FY 1994. Realities such as declining budgets, a smaller force structure, and increased participation in peace operations increased the value of Army training. High-quality training and training to standard were never more important in producing a trained and ready force during turbulent times. The Army Staff continued to focus on redefining training readiness; effectively managing models and simulations; exploring new possibilities at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs); and modernizing training by taking advantage of key technologies to speed the task proficiency of individuals and units.

Redefining training readiness encompassed many initiatives. The Department of the Army recognized that some operational tempo (OPTEMPO) funding generated by the annual Training Resource Model, which examines what costs are associated with Army training, would shift to programs that contained more essential readiness-related items. Army commanders were already forced to maintain a high state of readiness by drawing on the training capital accumulated during the past, living off Operation DESERT STORM supplementals, and using excess spare parts generated during the drawdown in Europe. This represented the greater cause of a "readiness to resource" gap. Monies not spent directly on training exercises had been used to sustain training support, such as ranges, lands, and base operations requirements, all of which were substantially underfunded. To deal with the realities of the changing world and to manage readiness, the Army worked on a new methodology of operational readiness that encompassed the total cost of preparing a unit to go to war. The methodology encompassed OPTEMPO; training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations; ranges; land; and maintenance and force-projection facilities. The concept was not new--it reflected how field commanders obligated their funds to pay for readiness. The Army chose Fort Hood, Texas, as the first site to use the new operational readiness methodology. The service focused on a review of the tank battalion training strategy. Tank units are the most expensive ground unit to fund.

The Army intends to systematically validate this strategy to prevent accidental "hollowness." Units in the field will be measured against this strategy to determine a rating based on the percent of mission-essential task list functions in which they are trained. This rating, along with the funding profile of the unit, will present the Army Staff with a more realistic view of readiness.


In a move to synergize multiple efforts in the rapidly developing environment of models and simulations, the DCSOPS designated the Director of Training as the general officer who would be Headquarters, Department of the Army's (HQDA), single point of contact for all actions relating to simulations. In accordance with this initiative, the Training Directorate underwent a reorganization to form the Training Simulations Division. This division was organized into three branches that mirrored the Army's simulations management architecture: Training, Exercises, and Military Operations; Advanced Concepts and Requirements; and Research, Development, and Acquisition.

The Army also undertook measures to adjust training scenarios at the CTCs to make them more representative of the service's needs. The National Training Center (NTC), for example, conducted a prototype Live Fire Exercise (LFX) with two heavy battalions, a trial deployment exercise, and a divisional cavalry deployment as part of a regular rotation. The NTC also developed the "onward movement" package that placed tactical requirements on the brigade as soon as it arrived in country. The greatest effort at the NTC during FY 1994 was the Advanced Warfighting Experiment, the Army's first attempt to digitize the forces on the battle­field. The Joint Readiness Training Center also made progress during the year toward training the Army by incorporating rotary-wing aircraft into the LFX scenarios and developing peace enforcement scenarios.

Unilateral, joint, and combined exercises are vital for the Army to maintain its training edge. Joint exercises are conducted with another service, and combined exercises are conducted with the armed forces of another country. Joint and combined exercises are normally conducted through the CJCS exercise program, which is designed to improve the warfighting capabilities of the regional combatant commanders in chief (CINCs). These exercises allow Army forces the opportunity to train under the operational control of warfighting CINCs. In the post-Cold War era, budget constraints and reduced force structure have resulted in fewer large-scale exercises with thousands of troops in the field and increased emphasis on smaller, regionally oriented exercises and computer-assisted exercises.

In FY 1994 the Army participated in the following CJCS exercises: FUERTES CAMINOS, joint and combined engineer construction exercises conducted in Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala; INTRINSIC ACTION, the twice-yearly deployment of a battalion task force to Southwest Asia; BRIGHT STAR 94, the deployment of a heavy battalion task force from the 24th Infantry Division to Egypt; KEEN EDGE 94, a computer-assisted exercise to improve interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces; COBRA GOLD, an annual joint and combined command post exercise in Thailand, designed to improve U.S.-Thai interoperability and demonstrate


US. resolve to support Asian nations in the event of hostilities; RSOI, an annual joint and combined seminar in Korea that addresses reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of reinforcing forces; DYNAMIC IMPACT 94, a field and command post exercise sponsored by the commander in chief, U.S. Army, Europe, to reinforce the Southern Region; AGILE PROVIDER 94, a field training exercise for the US. Atlantic Command battle staff and component joint task forces in planning and conducting joint contingency operations; ULCHI-Focus LENS, an annual joint and combined command post and computer-assisted exercise conducted in conjunction with South Korean forces to prepare U.S. forces to deploy rapidly to Korea; and MARKET SQUARE 94, a field training exercise sponsored by the U.S. Atlantic Command involving a contingency scenario.

In order to examine the Army's ability to allocate scarce resources and execute its Title 10 responsibilities, the CSA directed General Headquarters (GHQ) Exercise 94. Set in FYs 1998-1999, and using programmed forces, equipment, and strategic lift for those years, GHQ Exercise 94 employed a scenario involving a major regional conflict and a large operation other than war occurring simultaneously. GHQ Exercise 94 allowed the Army to test Force XXI concepts in a major regional conflict and to work out plans for rotation forces in operations other than war. Each of the exercise's four phases included the active participation of the U.S. Transportation Command, MACOMs, and a crisis-action team from HQDA. A senior-leader seminar, chaired by the CSA, examined insights from each phase of the exercise. The warfighting phase of the exercise meshed with an Army Command and General Staff College exercise and incorporated proposed twenty-first century technology developed by Army Battle Labs.

Insights from this GHQ exercise and the previous one confirmed the Army's requirement for early access to selected reserve component units and individuals and the limitations experienced when the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up is delayed. The exercise also validated the Army's need to attain a complete profile of units, people, and equipment. As a result of this exercise, the Army began to identify and correct problems that arise when scarce resources must be allocated in two contingency plans executed nearly simultaneously. These problems proved particularly acute for combat service support units.

Simulations are the basis for the Army's future training strategy. The Combined Arms Tactical Trainer is the Army's premier simulator program. This program is intended to develop virtual, networkable simulators for training mechanized infantry, armor, aviation, engineer, field artillery, and air defense artillery soldiers. Using this system, commanders will be able to synchronize accurately all battlefield operating systems and perform high-risk and hazardous tasks repeatedly in a safe environment at an


affordable cost. In 1994 the Army linked the Combat Service Support Training Simulation System and the Corps Battle Simulation, allowing commanders for the first time to manage all classes of supply and fully integrate logisticians into a simulated battlefield.

Deployed Operational Forces

Between 1989 and 1994 the Army witnessed a threefold increase in operational deployments abroad. In FY 1994 the Army had anywhere from 16,000 to 24,000 soldiers and civilians operationally deployed to more than 70 countries. As the Army has grown smaller, individual soldiers, civilians, and units have been deployed repeatedly to execute combat operations and military operations other than war.

During FY 1994 Army soldiers and civilians supported maritime interdiction operations in the Caribbean, deployed observers along the Haiti-Dominican Republic border to assist efforts to enforce United Nations (UN) sanctions on Haiti, and supported efforts to house Haitian and Cuban refugees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in Panama, and in Surinam. Army soldiers trained multinational soldiers who were to assist in the reconstitution of the Haitian police forces. In continuing operations, more than 400 soldiers and civilians supported the deployment of Army forces into Honduras to execute humanitarian and civil affairs operations. Army forces also deployed to Puerto Rico to train military personnel from Caribbean Community and Common Market countries in support of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

In Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, U.S. Army troops deployed to Haiti on 15 September 1994 to restore to power the democratically elected Haitian government. Army forces entered the country without opposition and implemented an agreement between the United States and the de facto government. Peak Army strength in the operation reached 18,401 on 13 October 1994.

During the year the U.S. Army continued to provide soldiers and civilians to Somalia in support of Operation RESTORE HOPE. As a result of a 3 October 1993 firefight between U.S. soldiers and forces of Somalia war­lord General Mohammed Farah Aideed, in which eighteen Americans died, U.S. forces were augmented with two heavy battalions from the 24th Infantry Division and a support contingent of civilian employees, and the President announced a withdrawal from the operation. In March 1994 most U.S. and UN forces withdrew from Somalia, bringing to an end a fifteen-month presence in that troubled country. Remaining Army personnel withdrew from Somalia in September 1994.

U.S. Army troops deployed to Rwanda for Operation SUPPORT HOPE on 17 July 1994. The operation, which began on 24 July 1994 with a pres-


idential order, was the U.S. government's response to a desperate need for humanitarian relief to alleviate the immediate suffering of refugees fleeing civil war in Rwanda. By 26 July an Army task force organized around a heavy maintenance battalion was providing clean water to combat outbreaks of cholera, assisting in the burial of the dead, and integrating the transportation and distribution of relief supplies. By 3 August the Army and others were producing and distributing half a million gallons of water a day in Goma, Zaire, a major relief site. The respite this provided allowed the UN and other agencies to organize and establish refugee camps. Additionally, the Army contributed to securing the airfield at Kigali International Airport and established a civil-military operations center so that relief supplies could flow directly into Rwanda and thereby entice refugees to return to their homes. By the end of September, the U.S. military joint task force, composed of Army and Air Force personnel, had turned over operations to the UN High Commissioner on Refugees and more than seventy-seven nongovernmental organizations. Peak Army strength had reached 2,415 on 23 August 1994. The operation officially ended on 6 October 1994.

During FY 1994, as part of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, an Army air defense artillery battalion, a security company, and maintenance units in Saudi Arabia continued to support the mission to enforce the UN "no-fly" zone in southern Iraq. The no-fly zone was imposed after the 1991 Persian Gulf War to protect coalition forces in the region from the threat of Iraqi aircraft. Also, in Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION, which began in 1993, the Army continued to contribute to the security of the region by deploying a heavy battalion task force to conduct combined exercises with the Kuwaiti army twice a year.

In the former Yugoslav Republic during FY 1994, the Army had personnel and equipment deployed in support of Operations PROVIDE PROMISE, ABLE SENTRY, and DENY FLIGHT. Soldiers assigned to PROVIDE PROMISE and ABLE SENTRY Served under the UN Protection Force. Operation PROVIDE PROMISE was a multinational airlift of food and supplies to the citizens of Bosnia. Operation ABLE SENTRY supported a UN mission to observe and report violations of UN sanctions and to assist in maintaining stability along the Serbia-Macedonia border. Operation DENY FLIGHT enforced the no-fly zone over Bosnia. American soldiers in Operation PROVIDE PROMISE served in Zagreb, Croatia; Naples, Italy; and Kiseljak and Sarajevo, Bosnia.

The U.S. Army also supported a number of deployments to Asia and the Far East. In July 1994 U.S. Army troops provided hospital support at Chisenau, Republic of Moldavia, as part of Operation PROVIDE HOPE. In March 1994 the Secretary of Defense ordered the Army to deploy a Patriot air defense artillery battalion to Korea. The 2d Battalion, 7th Air Defense


Artillery Regiment, deployed 772 personnel to the Republic of Korea to provide advanced tactical ballistic missile defense. Army soldiers also participated in humanitarian and civic action programs in Cambodia, Bangladesh, the Federated States of Micronesia, Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tonga, and Vanuatu. Construction and medical projects cemented professional ties between the Army and the armed forces of those countries and improved the nations' living standards. In Cambodia, the Army assisted the Cambodian Army in developing a self-sustaining de-mining program. An Army team provided nonlethal, humanitarian de-mining training as part of a train-the-trainer program. Fifty-two personnel were permanently assigned to Joint Task Force FULL ACCOUNTING, conducting investigations, excavations, and recovery operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to trace American service personnel missing in the Vietnam War. The Army also augmented the task force as required with medics, emergency ordnance disposal experts, and technicians from the Clinical Identification Laboratory in Hawaii.

During FY 1994 the Army provided support to civil authorities responding to a wide range of domestic emergencies. The service assisted survivors of the Northridge, California, earthquake and victims of floods in Alabama, Georgia, Florida, and Texas. Army soldiers supported the National Inter-Agency Fire Center, a joint operation of the Departments of Agriculture and Interior, in fighting wildfires in the western United States. During the year the Secretary of the Army called on the services of approximately 4,100 active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve personnel to respond to these domestic emergencies.

In FY 1994 the Army also made a significant contribution to the DOD effort in counterdrug operations. Even as the budget decreased, the Army's commitment to counterdrug operations expanded. On a daily basis, the active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve contributed approximately 4,100 soldiers to these operations. More than 200 soldiers and Army civilians were permanently assigned to the three existing joint counterdrug task forces or detailed to federal agencies to coordinate military support. The Army provided operational support, reconnaissance, maintenance, intelligence analysis, linguist support, engineer support, equipment, facilities, training, and planning support to drug law enforcement agencies in the United States. Outside the United States, the Army provided counterdrug support to foreign host nations through regional unified commands. This support included counterdrug and psychological operations training, aviation support, and intelligence, as well as planning and reconnaissance. Army aviation assets were particularly involved in counterdrug operations, with more than 16,000 flying hours logged during the first three quarters of FY 1994. In addition to flying support, the


Army loaned aircraft to the U.S. Customs Service and trained pilots and crews for drug-enforcement agencies. These agencies had a high demand for Army linguists and intelligence analysts as well.

Army Special Operations Forces

Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) units provide a broad range of military capabilities in support of national security. These forces include Special Forces, Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations units. SOF missions include unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, and counterterrorism. SOF also participate in security assistance, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, counterdrug, and combat search and rescue operations. Many special operations units reside in the reserve components; 97 percent of the Army's civil affairs units and 70 percent of its psychological operations units are in the Army Reserve. SOF units are often called upon for service in military operations other than war. In FY 1994 SOF units participated in Operations RESTORE HOPE, PROVIDE COMFORT, PROVIDE PROMISE, and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. The Army has increased SOF participation in joint, multinational, and unilateral exercises. SOF participation has also increased at the Combat Training Centers and in the Battle Command Training Program. In FY 1994 each Army corps had a Special Operations Coordination Element to integrate SOF into corps plans and training.

Military Intelligence

In FY 1994 the Army played a major role in joint intelligence training developments. The service cooperated in formulating three new joint courses of instruction to provide training to personnel that may be assigned to joint service positions. First, the Joint Targeting Training Program is a course designed to train joint service personnel in the basics of service-wide targeting and weaponeering, which was found to be deficient during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. During the year this course program was retitled the Joint Targeting School of the U.S. Atlantic Command. Second, the Joint Task Force (JTF) Managers course is designed to train both military and civilian personnel in grades E-6 to O-5 and GS 11-14 to serve in a standing JTF, supporting component service, element, agency, or combat command. Third, the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) course is designed to provide personnel above the grade of E-5 assigned to joint intelligence billets with essential skills to conduct effective all-source intelligence analysis.

When these courses were being developed, the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT) worked to promote


Army influence in the Joint Targeting Training Program, which the Navy and Air Force initially viewed as an aviation exercise. As a result of these efforts, the Army Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process, along with Army Field Artillery methods, were added to the course to make it acceptable as a joint effort. Training for the JTF and JIC courses began in FY 1994. The Joint Targeting School course was expected to begin in FY 1995.

Army Regulation 350-3, Tactical Intelligence Readiness Program (commonly known as REDTRAIN), provides funds to senior intelligence officers to maintain the readiness of intelligence soldiers, primarily in tactical intelligence units. During FY 1994, the regulation underwent revision to incorporate changes recommended by an Army Audit Agency report of 29 May 1992. The most recent publication date of the regulation was 20 November 1984. All commands participating in the REDTRAIN program concurred with the regulation revisions by 12 August 1994. There were four primary regulatory changes: (1) decentralizing primary supervision and management of the program from the Department of the Army Executive Agent, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, to the primary commands participating in REDTRAIN; (2) introducing a REDTRAIN inspection program; (3) providing for REDTRAIN programs funded by DA to supplement units' REDTRAIN budgets; and (4) opening REDTRAIN to company grade officers. Publication of the revised regulation is set for the first quarter of FY 1995.

Also during FY 1994 the Army's new National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) was provisionally activated in Charlottesville, Virginia. The center's mission is to produce and disseminate ground forces intelligence to military leaders and to provide scientific and technical, as well as general, military intelligence to deploying forces. Also, the center will manage the Army's Foreign Materiel Exploitation Program and foreign materiel acquisition requirements. The center will become fully operational by 1 October 1995, when Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center personnel relocate from Washington, D.C. Other elements of the NGIC will be based at the Washington Navy Yard and at Fort Meade and Aberdeen Proving Ground, both in Maryland.

In November 1993 the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO). The establishment of the DARO represented a significant shift of U.S. Code Title X responsibility away from the services. Reconnaissance requirements and money that were formerly designated for Army-specific programs became part of a joint forum controlled at the DOD level instead of at the service level.

The DARO reports to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology and is charged to unify existing airborne


reconnaissance architectures and enhance the management and acquisition of manned and unmanned airborne assets. Directed to assess the air­borne reconnaissance needs of the United States through 2010 and to develop and implement a strategy to meet them in a timely and cost-effective manner, the DARO published The Integrated Airborne Reconnaissance Strategy in March 1994. This document presented a strategy for developing a comprehensive, integrated, and efficient airborne reconnaissance capability. The DARO's strategy addressed platforms, sensors, data links, data relays, and ground stations. The DARO was organized to satisfy the national security community's desire for common platforms and processors and represented one of a growing number of joint programs to maximize investment return in an era of declining budgets. The Army's current and future systems will operate within this joint service architectural framework, created as a result of DARO's efforts and directions.

During FY 1994 the Army established a four-step Army Intelligence Priorities Process (AIPP) for ensuring that intelligence priorities are identified and intelligence support is assessed. Formerly, the Army Staff and MACOM commanders had no requirement to identify high-priority intelligence needs based on their Title X mission. This resulted in different, unfocused efforts at the highest level of the intelligence community. With the Army's focus changing from a threat-based force to a global, capabilities-based force and with shrinking resources, the Army needed to establish its intelligence priorities and consistently state them throughout the Army, DOD, and national intelligence organizations.

On 4 February 1994, the DCSOPS and the DCSINT cosigned a memorandum giving guidance for each MACOM and the Army Staff to identify their organization's high-priority intelligence needs annually. Intelligence needs must be based on Army planning and programming guidance as contained in the Army Plan. Annually, each MACOM and the Army Staff develop Priority Intelligence Needs (PINS) based on planning and programming guidance. The PINS are major questions concerning foreign military forces and technological trends addressing specific countries and time frames. All PINS are forwarded to the Army Priority Intelligence Needs Coordinating Group for review and integration into the Army's PIN List. On 13 June 1994, the CSA signed a memo to the CJCS identifying the first Army PIN. When the Army PIN List is approved by the CSA, it is forwarded to the Army's Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning Working Group, where intelligence categories and priorities are identified to support the CSA's Army PINs. The approved PIN List is also forwarded to DOD for incorporation into its planning system. The Army Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning Working Group will assess the Intelligence support quarterly and brief the Army Priority Needs


Coordinating Group semiannually. The first annual assessment will be in November 1995 by the DCSINT.

Nuclear Biological, and Chemical Issues

During FY 1994 the Army activated the U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM). The mission of the new command is to develop and procure nuclear, biological, and chemical defense equipment for American soldiers. CBDCOM will also provide central management for chemical weapon treaty compliance, assist in installation-level restoration and contamination control operations, and provide technical escorts for planned or emergency disposal of chemical agents, munitions, and other hazardous materials. By October 1994 the Command will include all elements of the U.S. Army Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency.

Army in Space

Space must be controlled to win the ground battle. Space has become an integral component of the Army's technological and operational evolution. The success of Force XXI will be critically dependent upon the exploitation of space assets, capabilities, and products throughout the entire spectrum of military operations. Space assets and technology are key to gathering, managing, and disseminating information to provide a decisive advantage. Space allows land-force commanders to see the battlefield better and to locate and destroy enemy forces. In an environment of rapid political, technological, and economic change, Army access to national, civil, allied, military, and commercial space capabilities and products is essential to successful operations.

In FY 1994 the use of space products continued to spread throughout the Army-products for navigation, position location, intelligence, terrain, weather, targeting, mapping, communications, and early warning served soldiers at all levels of command. Space products were used in every major operation the Army undertook during the fiscal year, both for war and military operations other than war. For Operation RESTORE HOPE in and near Rwanda, the Army used space-based early entry communications, satellite image mapping, global positioning systems, and national intelligence assets. For Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, the Army made use of all those capabilities, plus satellite weather imagery, radio range extension and video transmission, and secure video-teleconferencing capabilities between commanders on the scene and in the United States, using an experimental National Aeronautics and Space Administration satellite. Although a large user of space products during


the fiscal year, the Army had less than 5 percent of the military space budget and only 2 percent of the people in military space programs.


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Last updated 19 December 2003