Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1994
The Army accomplished much during the fiscal year. Whether facilitating the delivery of relief supplies to Rwandan refugees in Zaire, upholding democracy in Haiti, deterring aggression in Kuwait and Korea, assisting earthquake victims in California, fighting fires in the American West, or assisting flood victims in Georgia and Texas, the Army met its commitments in serving the nation at home and abroad. At home, approximately 4,100 active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve personnel responded to domestic emergencies during the year. The number of deployments abroad, meanwhile, escalated threefold after the end of the Cold War. Soldiers and units making repeated deployments faced a multitude of risks in carrying out combat operations and operations other than war. In Somalia, for example, eighteen Army soldiers serving in support of Operation SUPPORT HOPE paid the ultimate price for their service as a result of a firefight between U.S. soldiers and forces of Somalia warlord General Mohammed Farah Aideed.
Facing an array of domestic and foreign commitments proved especially challenging as tight fiscal constraints continued a downward trend that began in FY 1986. The Army's Total Obligation Authority request for FY 1994 represented a $3.1 billion decrease, or a decline of over 6 percent, from FY 1993 levels. Operating with fewer dollars, Army leaders made difficult choices in allocating their financial resources. Planned personnel cuts were accelerated to preserve crucial modernization programs. Active Army end strength was reduced to 540,000 soldiers by the end of FY 1994, as compared with the revised FY 1993 end strength of 575,000. While this smaller force was stretched thinner in serving the nation at home and abroad, key modernization programs such as the development of the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter, the Advanced Field Artillery System, and the Javelin antitank missile system remained solvent through the purchase of a limited number of new weapons. For example, the Javelin missile system was funded only to begin low-rate initial production during the fiscal year. Resource constraints also slowed modernization by deferring procurement of modern replacement systems. Deferred procurement increased operation and maintenance expenses, particularly
in aging equipment. Slower modernization also adversely affected the issue of modern equipment to the National Guard and Army Reserve, prolonging an existing problem of force incompatibility.
The steep decline in resources, coupled with funding unanticipated contingency operations, reduced the Army's readiness. Although Congress did approve a supplemental appropriation to offset these added costs, the contingency costs exceeded the supplemental funding. In addition, the President provided Foreign Assistance Act aid that required the Army to provide equipment and services out of existing resources to participating foreign nations. To offset these unforeseen costs, the Army withheld $140 million from major Army commands. This action caused funds to be diverted from training and quality-of-life programs, directly affecting readiness. The scope of unit training was reduced or canceled, and the purchase of all but essential repair parts was severely curtailed. Quality of life was undermined when real property maintenance was deferred to fund civilian salaries and other nondiscretionary costs, such as transportation and supplies.
The Army made substantive progress in restructuring itself to better meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era. The forward-positioned Cold War force of eighteen active divisions in FY 1989 had transformed to a power-projection force of twelve divisions based largely in the United States by the end of FY 1994. The service reached an important milestone in forging a new partnership with the reserve components. The active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve moved closer than ever before toward developing a seamless total force. The reserve components' role in the Contingency Force Pool, high-priority units to support eight and two-thirds Army divisions in the event of a national emergency, demonstrated that the Army placed a high premium on reserve component readiness and the maintenance of balanced resource levels in the Army's new partnership. The Army also sought to eliminate unnecessary obstacles to service. Following guidance from the Secretary of Defense to the services to open more specialties and assignment opportunities to women, the Army significantly expanded opportunities for women. By the end of the fiscal year women composed 13 percent of the active Army, as compared to 12.5 percent at the start of the fiscal year. By the end of the fiscal year, 91 percent of the Army's career fields and 67 percent of Army positions were open to women.
Looking to the future, the Army embarked on a dynamic new conceptual course to reshape itself into a smaller, more lethal, informationage, capabilities-based force for the twenty-first century called Force XXI. The Army set the stage for the creation of Force XXI through the establishment of the Army Digitization Office to oversee and coordinate the integration of battlefield digitization activities throughout the Army. In
conducting the Advanced Warfighting Experiment DESERT HAMMER VI at the National Training Center, the first test of digital command and control systems in a field environment, the Army demonstrated that the application of digital technology to US. combat forces could significantly improve their effectiveness. The experiment linked a digitally equipped heavy task force to a brigade.
In the transformation from a forward-deployed, threat-based force to a capabilities-based force, operating largely from the continental United States, the Army's revised modernization concepts no longer focused on systems but on capabilities. The Army improved its sustainment capabilities by joining with its sister services in formulating strategic mobility programs vital to the nation in the post-Cold War era. In accordance with the congressionally mandated 1992 Mobility Requirements Study, which recommended that the Army place an armored brigade afloat, the Army established an interim Army Pre-positioned Afloat package to respond to major regional contingencies. This package, pre-positioned on twelve ships, consisted of an armor brigade set of equipment. Corps- and division-level combat support and combat service support units and fifteen days of supply were also pre-positioned. These measures demonstrated that the Army was on the right path to achieving greater flexibility in meeting regional contingencies. However, additional ships that would not be available until FY 1995 were still needed to complete the contingency corps's supply package.
The changing role of Army installations in the post-Cold War era represented a substantial shift from the past. Installation readiness took on increased importance as Army installations became power projection platforms from which forces are launched and supported in the field. To enhance installations as power projection platforms, the Army invested in numerous improvements, including rail and airfield upgrades and improved warehousing capabilities. For example, the Army's purchase of 187 railcars for pre-positioning at key installations for rapid deployment was only an installment of a planned procurement of 1,630 railcars by FY 2001. At the same time, however, repeated underfunding on base operations presented installation commanders with difficult choices in having to divert funds from operational tempo to pay for essential services.
The Army's commitment to environmental stewardship remained a top priority. The service continued this commitment through a strategy of compliance, restoration, prevention, and conservation. The Army spent close to two billion dollars on the environment. This amount represented approximately half of the amount spent on operational tempo during the fiscal year.
The Army also made significant progress in finance and business reform. In transforming its financial management to conform with the
Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, the Army broke new ground with initiatives that revised physical inventory policy, valuation of assets, identification of outcome-oriented performance measures, and management control. In implementing the initiatives of the National Performance Review, the Army cut red tape by waiving restrictive regulations that impeded good business practices. The Army improved research, development, and acquisition methods and turned to a greater reliance on purchasing nondevelopmental, off the shelf, items.
By the end of 1994 the Army was well on its way in evolving from a threat-based Cold War force into a power projection, information-age, capabilities-based force. Serving the nation in a climate of reduced budgets, continued downsizing, and increasingly varied obligations and missions presented the Army with a number of complications. Readiness, modernization, quality-of-life programs, vehicle and equipment maintenance, and real property maintenance were all adversely affected as Army leaders made difficult choices in responding to the nation's needs at home and abroad. Looking toward the future, the promise of digitization and Force XXI provided a valuable frame of reference for how the Army of the post-Cold War era would modernize and appear in the twenty-first century. Force XXI also signaled that a dramatic break in how the Army operates as a fighting force may be on the horizon. In addition, by the end of the fiscal year it was also clear that a major demographic change was occurring in the Army. There was no doubt that the Army would be composed of greater numbers of women than ever before.
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Last updated 19 December 2003