Attack on the Pendleton Line
As the 1st Marine Division drew back to the curving Pendleton line at the right of the IX Corps sector on 23 April, Marine aerial reconnaissance disclosed numerous enemy groups moving south through the ground surrendered by the ROK 6th Division the night before. They appeared to be van forces moving well ahead of main bodies, though the latter were not sighted. The Marine intelligence staff concluded that the groups nearest the marines were attempting to get into position for a strike against the division's main supply route.1
If this was the case, the 120th Division, 40th Army, which had missed the opportunity to enter the marines' open left flank the previous night, also failed to find the open path to Ch'unch'on. In a shallower southeastward swing out of the ground along the division boundary, begun about 2000, the division's 359th and 360th Regiments launched repeated frontal assaults behind mortar fire against two battalions of the 1st Marines and a battalion of the 7th Marines now covering the division's left. The Chinese made no earnest effort to move through the gaps between battalions, a mistake that allowed the marines to concentrate defensive fires; the supporting fire delivered by the 11th Marines and Army artillery from Chich'on-ni was particularly effective. The Chinese kept heavy pressure on the three battalions all night but could deliver no penetrating blow. Frequent but far weaker attacks in other sectors of the Marine front by forces of the 115th and 116th Divisions of the 39th Army faded out at dawn.2
Starting the division's withdrawal to line Kansas about daylight, General Smith held to three engaged battalions and supporting artillery in position to contain the attack from the west and cover the units to the east as they vacated their inactive sectors. The artillery was to follow, with displacing units spaced to insure continuous support of the three battalions bringing up the rear. Smith's air officer requested twelve planes an hour to help cover the rearguard action.3
As the marines in the east dropped off the line in the early light of the 24th, Chinese entered Hwach'on town and the dam area but did not pursue the
withdrawal to the Kansas line. The more persistent forces of the 120th Divi sion to the west began to lap around one of the covering battalions located along the Chich'on-ni road shortly before dawn; two hundred or more reached the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion behind the marines as that unit was preparing to displace. A half dozen crews set up machine guns in hills sloping to the battalion's position while riflemen and grenadiers crept into a field and cemetery close to the artillery pieces. The first "round" fired was a roll of toilet paper flung by a startled artilleryman who discovered several Chinese crawling toward him when he walked into the cemetery. Startled themselves by the unusual missile, the Chinese allowed the man to run back to his battery; but minutes later, machine gunners and riflemen opened fire while grenadiers tried to reach the nearest self-propelled howitzers.4
The commander of the 92d, Lt. Col. Leon F. Lavoie, a stickler for setting up an elaborate defensive perimeter that required two or three days to develop fully, had established the basic positions by dark on the 23d. Most positions had been vacated just before daylight as the battalion began to get into march order, but Lavoie's forces were able to reoccupy them in time to take on the first line of Chinese. Enemy grenadiers reaching a howitzer during the battalion's rush to battle stations were shot down before they could damage it; direct howitzer fire blasted the Chinese machine guns in the hills; and fire from the perimeter, which bristled with .30caliber and .50-caliber machine guns on ground mounts and armored personnel carriers, swept the field and cemetery with devastating effect. Fire from tanks the marines sent to join the battle added to the enemy toll. Within two hours the artillerymen destroyed the Chinese force and were in march order for the artillery displacement. The battalion's losses in the engagement were four killed and eleven wounded.5
The withdrawal of the rearguard battalions was a costly running battle with 120th Division forces who followed the marines the entire distance to line Kansas. Ample artillery fire and numerous air strikes steadily weakened the pursuit, although at a price in aircraft. Chinese fire downed three Corsairs and one observation plane. Much reduced by the time the marines were back in old positions on the Kansas line, the Chinese were unable to mount more than mild assaults, all unsuccessful, and no reinforcements arrived to strengthen them. As indicated when no major attack developed anywhere on the 1st Marine Division front by daylight on 25 April, neither the 120th Division nor the divisions of the 39th Army, whose operations had been minor from the start, would attempt further action of any scale.6
In the X Corps sector to the east of the marines, an attack opened near dawn on the 24th by the North Korean 12th Division thoroughly disorganized the ROK 5th Division and carried the North Koreans through Inje by mid
morning. (See Map 33.) The North Korean 6th Division at the same time continued to push the left and center units of the ROK III Corps away from Route 24. The two enemy divisions reduced the pressure of their attacks only after their point units had driven two to five miles below Inje. Given some respite, the South Korean forces were able to organize defenses strong enough to hold off the two enemy divisions' continuing but weaker attempts to deepen and widen their salient. To the northeast, the North Korean 45th Division again displayed its inexperience on the 24th in unsuccessful attacks on the 32d Infantry of the U.S. 7th Division at the immediate left of the ROK 5th Division and against the 23d Infantry of the U.S. 2d Division anchoring the X Corps' west flank above the eastern tip of the Hwach'on Reservoir. Opposite the 23d Infantry, some four hundred troops of the 45th made the mistake of assembling in a steep-sided draw near the village of Tokko-ri in full view of an artillery forward observer with Company C. The observer brought down a battalion time on target barrage of fifteen volleys using rounds tipped with variable time fuses. Afterward the observer saw just two North Koreans come out of the draw. The only ground gained by the 45th Division during the day was a gift from the 32d Infantry as the regiment pulled back to ridgetop positions that allowed it to tie in with the ROK 5th Division below Inje and
thus contain the North Korean salient along its southwestern shoulder.7
As a result of the 1st Marine Division's withdrawal to line Kansas, General Almond late on the 24th ordered changes in 2d Division dispositions. On the morning of 25 April the 23d Infantry was to drop back to positions just below the eastern tip of the Hwach'on Reservoir, a move that would place the regiment on the exact trace of line Kansas; beginning on the 25th General Ruffner was to make daily physical contact with the Marine division's right flank located near the village of Yuch'on-ni at the western tip of the reservoir. The latter step was a hedge against the possibility that enemy forces might penetrate the right of the Marine line and make a flanking or enveloping move against the X Corps through the otherwise unoccupied ground below the reservoir. To screen this ground and maintain contact with the marines, Ruffner organized Task Force Zebra under the commander of the division's 72d Tank Battalion, Lt. Col. Elbridge L. Brubaker. Included in the task force were a platoon of tanks from the 72d, the 2d Reconnaissance Company, the division's attached Netherlands and French battalions, and, later, the 1st Ranger Company.8
General Almond on the morning of the 25th ordered an afternoon attack by the ROK 5th Division to retake Inje and the high ground immediately above the town as a first step in regaining line Kansas. As worked out by Almond with General Yu, the leftmost units of the ROK III Corps were to join the advance. Yu's attackfor reasons not clear-did not materialize, and although the ROK 5th Division recaptured Inje, enemy pressure forced the unit to return to its original positions below the town. Ever aggressive, General Almond planned to attack again on the 26th. But, as he would soon learn, any attempt to retake line Kansas was for the time being out of the question as a result of a second failing performance by the ROK 6th Division in the left half of the IX Corps sector.9
The enemy formations approaching the ROK 6th Division on the 23d were from the 60th Division, 20th Army, and 118th Division, 40th Army. The 60th Division, which had stampeded the South Koreans the night before, was on a southwesterly course as the 20th Army continued to guide on Route 3 in its advance toward Seoul. That direction would take the division into the I Corps sector after no more than a glancing blow at the ROK 19th Regiment at the left of the 6th Division's front. Forces of the 118th Division moved south through the right half of the South Korean sector on a line of march that would carry them to the ROK 2d and 7th Regiments and, if maintained, to the British 27th Brigade's blocking position above Kap'yong.10
When the leading enemy forces
struck the ROK line just after dark, the South Koreans bolted south almost immediately, disordered columns of troops and trucks flooding the two valleys converging at the British brigade's position. The New Zealand artillery, Middlesex battalion, and 213th Field Artillery Battalion, which had gone up the valleys to support the 6th Division, had scarcely deployed before South Koreans began passing through their areas. The three battalions withdrew behind the Australians and Canadians, negotiating the cluttered valley roads with no loss of men or equipment except for a howitzer of the 213th Field Artillery Battalion which had to be run off the road to avoid striking a group of milling South Koreans.11
ROK forces began streaming into the 27th Brigade's lines around 2000, the heavier flow coming down the northeast valley into the position of the Australian battalion. After a chaotic and clamorous passage through the blocking position, ROK leaders were able to slow the wild flight-getting safely behind the 27th Brigade seemed to have a calming effectand eventually assembled the forces just off Route 17 about five miles southwest of Kap'yong town. On the morning of the 24th General Chang notified General Hoge that he had collected and was reorganizing between four thousand and five thousand men, about half the division's strength.12
The 60th Division, keeping to its southwesterly course, had not pursued the ROK 19th Regiment after putting it to rout in the Kap'yong valley. The 60th next would be in contact with the 24th Division in the I Corps sector. The 118th Division stayed on the heels of the South Koreans racing down the northeast valley, its 354th Regiment reaching the Australian battalion about 2200 as the din of the South Korean retreat through the 27th Brigade began to subside.13
Intent on pursuing the South Koreans and probably unaware of the Australian position, the van forces of the 354th Regiment kept to the valley, splitting as they approached a long, low north-south ridge rising as an island in the valley's mouth. Company B of the Australians and the 1st Platoon of Company A, 72d Tank Battalion, were atop the southern end of the ridge overlooking the valley road passing by on the east. The remaining three companies of the Australian battalion were east of the road on the crest and upper slopes of Hill 504. To the north, the 4th Platoon of tanks was on outpost, two tanks on the nose of the island ridge, three astride the road in the flat ground just beyond. In the village of Chuktun-ni behind the island ridge, the road ended in a junction with the Kap'yong valley road coming in from northwest. Near Chuktun-ni, the Kap'yong road reached a ford across the Kap'yong
River on the upper arm of the large bend that turns the river's flow from southeast to southwest. The command group and 2d Platoon of the tank company were deployed astride the road just below the ford, whence the tanks could fire up both the Kap'yong and northeast valleys. The Australian battalion's command post, protected by a small group of pioneer, police, and signal troops, was located against some low hills not far to the left rear of the tanks. With the leading Chinese confining their march to the valley, one group following the road, the other swinging wide through the undefended valley floor west of the island ridge and southeast along the Kap'yong, the American tankers on outpost and at the ford were first to be engaged. The approaching Chinese reached the two positions almost simultaneously. 14
Upon a Chinese approach, the 4th Platoon had standing orders to withdraw from its outpost to a blocking position on the road between the forces on the island ridge and those on Hill 504, but the tankers were under fire before they realized that the oncoming troops were not more retreating South Koreans. A brief exchange of fire in which the tank crews fought with hatches open for better vision in the darkness cost the platoon four wounded (two of them tank commanders), and the platoon leader was fatally shot as the tanks turned to withdraw. The leaderless survivors pulled out in disorder toward the 2d Platoon at the Kap'yong ford. The 1st Platoon leader, 1st. Lt. Wilfred D. Miller, ran down to the road from his position on the island ridge and stopped the tanks at the blocking position, but Chinese appearing from the north forced him back up the ridge, and the 4th Platoon continued toward the river crossing.15
The ragged withdrawal took the platoon from one fire fight to another. Tank company commander 1st. Lt. Kenneth W. Koch, afoot and under considerable fire, reorganized the platoon under the command of a sergeant and deployed it alongside the 2d Platoon against the Chinese attacking from the northwest. With the road open as far as the ford, Chinese entered the battle from the north, and the two leading groups, now joined, widened their assault to include the small force of Australians defending the battalion command post. Numbers of Chinese infiltrating or skirting the ford area settled in the high ground bordering the Kap'yong road on the west. Those moving deepest reached and exchanged fire with the Middlesex battalion, which had taken a reserve position athwart the road two miles behind the Australians. North of the ford, following formations of the 354th Regiment spread out to attack the forces on the island ridge and Hill 504.16
Lt. Col. 1. B. Ferguson, the Australian battalion commander, was hard pressed to direct the defense. South Koreans charging through his position had torn out his wire from command post to companies, and he could communicate with the forward units only inter-
mittently by radio. Losing all artillery support put the Australians at further disadvantage as the Chinese enlarged their attack. After withdrawing down the Kap'yong valley, the New Zealand unit and 213th Field Artillery Battalion had established positions between the Middlesex and Australian battalions; but when the enemy attack intensified, Brigadier Burke ordered the two units into safety positions behind the Middlesex. Dawn came before they could again answer calls for fire.17
Nor was support available from the 4.2s of Company B, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion. Communications had not yet been established with the mortar position in the valley behind Hill 504 when the Chinese spread out to assault the Australians, and the mortar company, in any case, left its position shortly afterward. Fearful of being overrun, the mortarmen abandoned thirty-five vehicles loaded with equipment and retreated over a minor road ten miles east to Ch'unch'on.18
During a nightlong series of assaults, the three Australian companies on Hill 504, in spite of their lack of artillery and mortar support, lost only two platoon positions and later regained one of these. Company B and the platoon of tanks on the island ridge had little trouble holding their ground and took a high toll of Chinese crowded along the valley road when they were exposed in the light of burning buildings set ablaze by fire from the tanks. Enemy forces got among the tanks at the ford, but the two platoons stayed in position, the tankers firing in all directions, even at each other, to keep Chinese from getting on the tanks. A 3.5-inch rocket fired from the hill above the Australian command post damaged a tank, killed one man, and wounded two. Another tanker was wounded when two crews drove south from the ford and eliminated a block on the Kap'yong road that aidmen had discovered while transporting other casualties to the rear. In exchange for these losses, the tankers killed more than a hundred Chinese before the attack faded out about daylight.19
Well before dawn the Chinese attacking the battalion headquarters area were threatening to overrun the command post. In answer to Colonel Ferguson's request to Brigadier Burke for reinforcements, a Middlesex company started forward but, on encountering resistance by Chinese in the hills edging the Kap'yong road, inexplicably turned east and withdrew over the route used earlier by the American 4.2-inch mortar company. Compelled to withdraw, Ferguson started his headquarters vehicles and troops toward the Middlesex position, using the two tanks that had cleared out the roadblock to cover the move. Fire from the hills above the road forced sections of the column to halt and take cover from time to time but caused no casualties and was easily silenced by the tanks. The only loss during the withdrawal was Ferguson's own jeep, which had a wheel blown off by a mortar round. The two American engineer companies biv-
ouacked within sight of the road meanwhile mistook the passing headquarters forces for the beginning of a general withdrawal and themselves pulled out in haste and confusion, abandoning tentage, several trucks, kitchens, and a water point they had installed.20
From the new battalion command post, Colonel Ferguson shortly before dawn ordered Company B to leave its isolated position on the island ridge and join forces with the companies on Hill 504. The company remained engaged until after daylight, when the Chinese began withdrawing to the north. Company B and the tank platoon whipped the withdrawing troops with fire for over an hour. As a sort of finale to the engagement, a patrol reconnoitering a route to 504 brought back about forty prisoners bagged near the northern edge of Chuktun-ni. Moving roundabout to avoid Chinese still attacking 504, Company B, with prisoners in tow, occupied a rear position on the hill about midmorning.21
In the continuing engagement on Hill 504, daylight and artillery support from the New Zealanders gave the Australians the advantage. Although the Chinese attacked repeatedly, almost at half-hour intervals, they were now fully visible, and each dash from cover to cover brought down an assortment of telling Australian fire. Except for a misdirected air strike in which Marine Corsairs dropped napalm on one Australian company, killing two, injuring several, and destroying some weapons and equipment, "the situation rather resembled sitting in the middle of a wheatfield at dawn potting rabbits as they dashed hither and thither."22
The battalion nevertheless was potentially in danger of encirclement. A three-mile gap between the Australians and the Canadians to the west, whose position had not yet been seriously tested, and a far greater expanse of open ground to the east gave the Chinese room to close in. Evacuating Australian casualties and replenishing supplies also became a problem with most of the road between Hill 504 and the Middlesex position kept under Chinese guns from the bordering high ground.
Wary of losing the battalion if it remained on 504 another night, Brigadier Burke at midmorning ordered Colonel Ferguson to withdraw behind the Middlesex. The American tankers, who had used the morning respite to refuel and rearm in the company bivouac area, came back into action, one group under Lieutenant Miller initially carrying Ferguson and staff members over the fireswept road to 504 to organize the withdrawal. Miller's group also delivered ammunition and brought back casualties, making a second trip to get all the Australian wounded out. Another group, under Lieutenant Koch, the company commander, carried volunteers from Company B, 74th Engineer Combat Battalion, to the vacated 4.2-inch mortar position and covered them while they drove out the
vehicles abandoned by the mortar company. On a final round trip, tankers protected the engineers while they retrieved their own equipment left behind during their hurried morning withdrawal.23
After completing the evacuation of casualties and equipment in midafternoon, the tankers moved north to the ford area to ward off any Chinese moving down the Kap'yong valley while the Australians were withdrawing from 504. The New Zealand artillery blinded the Chinese on the slopes of 504 with smoke and trailed the Australian rearguard with high explosive rounds as the four companies moved one at a time down a long ridge sloping southeast to the Kap'yong River. Crossing the stream a mile and a half behind the tanks, the Australians passed through the Middlesex battalion not long after dark. The tanks dropped back after the rearguard company crossed the river but stayed forward of the Middlesex until it was clear that no Chinese had followed the withdrawal. The night and day of battle had cost the Australians thirty-one killed, fifty-eight wounded, and three missing, the tank company two killed, eleven wounded, and one missing.24
Instead of following the Australian withdrawal, the 354th Regiment, much reduced after its attacks on Hill 504 but apparently being reinforced by at least part of another regiment of the 118th Division, turned toward the Canadian battalion on Hill 677. The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry commander, Lt. Col. J. R. Stone, originally had deployed his four companies on the crest and northern slopes of 677, but after Chinese began moving into the hills along the Kap'yong road a step that placed them to the right and right rear of the Canadians, Stone shifted Company B to a southeastern slope against the possibility of an attack via the battalion's back door.25 Mortar and long range machine gun fire struck the company at 2200, one of the machine guns firing tracer ammunition to direct an assault by two hundred Chinese that followed. A smaller group slipped up a gully from the southeast to attack the battalion's command post and mortars located in rear of Company B. A larger force, clearly visible to the Canadians in the moonlight, meanwhile began fording the Kap'yong to the east. A heavy concentration of New Zealand artillery fire broke up the force crossing the river, and, just as effectively, Canadian mortarmen and machine gunners almost literally blew back the Chinese attacking up the ravine. Company B beat off the first Chinese charge, lost a platoon position to the second, then successfully weathered a succession of assaults lasting most of the night.26
A stronger attack about 0200, evidently by fresh forces coming out of the Kap'yong valley, hit Company D defending the Canadians' left flank from the 677 crest. The first assaults, launched across a saddle from the west and up steep slopes from the south, carried Chinese into the company's de-407
fenses in such numbers that the Company D commander was able to drive them out only by calling down artillery fire on his own position. Following charges kept pressure on the company, nicking its position here and there, but gradually wore down under the company's defensive fire and heavy pounding by the New Zealand artillery.27
Under additional fire from two platoons of Company A, 72d Tank Battalion, which maneuvered within range near dawn, the Chinese gave up their attacks on the Canadian flanks about daylight but stayed in contact with a heavy delivery of fire. Since the continuing Chinese control of the Kap'yong road as far south as the Middlesex position kept the Canadians from using it to bring up a resupply of ammunition and rations, Colonel Stone, as the enemy assaults died out, requested an airdrop. In remarkable time given the long route Stone's request had to take, C-119s from Japan delivered the supplies six hours later. By that time, however, the Chinese fire had begun to diminish, and at 1400 Company B patrols found the Kap'yong road open. By late afternoon the 118th Division, bloodied at Hill 504 and again severely punished by the Canadians in exchange for ten killed and twenty-three wounded, gave up the battle and withdrew north.28
That two battalions and a tank company had withstood attacks no weaker, and perhaps stronger, than those that twice had routed the ROK 6th Division underscored how completely control had broken down in the division. The huge tally of equipment lost as a result of the division's successive debacles emphasized the breakdown further. Major items lost by the South Koreans included 2,363 small arms, 168 machine guns and Browning automatic rifles, 66 rocket launchers, 2 antitank guns, 42 mortars, 13 artillery pieces, and 87 trucks. The three American fire support units-987th Armored Field Artillery Battalion; 2d Rocket Field Artillery Battery; and Company C, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion-stymied by overturned South Korean vehicles and other abandoned equipment on their withdrawal route during the night of the 22d, lost 15 105mm. howitzers, 13 4.2-inch mortars, and 73 vehicles. Hundreds of other items- 242 radios alone- lengthened the list.29
General Hoge used no euphemisms in rebuking General Chang for the conduct of the division, summing it up as "disgraceful in all its aspects."30 Hoge nevertheless considered Chang one of the better ROK commanders- and the 6th Division representative of all ROK divisions- and did not seek his relief. To place blame solely on Chang, in any case, would be to make him a scapegoat. Lack of leadership and control on the part of all grades of officers and non-
commissioned officers had caused the division's disintegration. With exceptions that only proved the rule, deficient leadership indeed continued to be the major weakness of the ROK Army.31
The ROK Army chief of staff, General Chung, attempted to explain to General Van Fleet that the 6th Division's breakdown and the wider leadership problem came from a lack of training. He was right to the extent that ROK troops and leaders at every level and in every unit suffered from sketchy military schooling. But Van Fleet refused the explanation, pointing out to Chung that the 6th Division had conducted itself creditably in past operations and that the making of officers could not be confined to the mastery of military skills. A high sense of responsibility, devotion to duty, physical and moral courage, and the will to fight for homes and families were fundamental to competent military leadership; these were the attributes, he emphasized, that, along with training in military science, had to be developed among South Korean officers and noncommissioned officers if the ROK Army was to be a capable and dependable force.32
The rout of the ROK 6th Division could not have happened at a worse time for President Rhee's attempt to put more men under arms. On 18 April the ROK representative to the United Nations, Col. Ben C. Limb, had asked the joint Chiefs of Staff for arms and equipment for ten additional divisions, and on the 23d, following the 6th Division's first collapse and preceding its second by only hours, Rhee had submitted a personal request for the same. The request had some appeal in Washington by raising the prospect of eventually using additional South Korean formations to replace American units. General Ridgway and General Van Fleet, however, argued successfully against any immediate increase in ROK divisions. There was no way, they insisted, that American personnel and other resources could be spared to provide the supervision and training for an expansion as long as heavy fighting continued. In any case, a need to develop competent leadership, not a need for more men, was the primary problem of the ROK Army and certainly was prerequisite to its enlargement. The ROK 6th Division's dissolution illustrated the point. Creating new divisions without able leaders, Van Fleet said, would be "a criminal waste of badly needed equipment."33
Ridgway, Van Fleet, and Ambassador Muccio personally delivered the refusal to President Rhee. Their message was blunt: from the minister of defense to the lowest level of command in the ROK Army, leadership was inadequate, and under this serious weakness was eliminated there would be no more talk about the United States arming and equipping additional divisions. Rhee nevertheless continued to lobby for support of a larger army, but he would get no substantial help until improved pro409
grams began to produce the professional talent needed to lead existing and additional forces.34
1 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, Apr 51.
2 Ibid.; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East Central Front, pp. 113-15.
3 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, Apr 51.
4 Ibid.; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, "Artillery in Perimeter Defense," Narrative.
5 For a detailed account of this battle see Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, pp. 154-65.
6 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, Apr 51.
7 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 24 Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 POR, 24 Apr 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 7th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
8 X Corps OI 160, 24 Apr 51; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
9 X Corps OI 161, 25 Apr 51; Rads, X 18709 and X 18718, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 25 Apr 51.
10 Eighth Army PIR 286, 24 Apr 51; Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division, p. 69.
11 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 23 Apr 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Ltr, Peploe to CG Eighth Army, 5 May 51, sub: Report on Disintegration of the 6th ROK Division in Military Operations During the Period 22-24 Apr 51; Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division, p. 67; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, "Tanks Above Kap'yong," Interv with Johnson.
12 After Action Intervs, Blumenson, "Tanks Above Kap'yong," Interv with 1st Lt Wilfred D. Miller, Plat Ldr, 1st Plat, Co A, 72d Tank Bn; Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 94; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Ltr, Peploe to CG Eighth Army, 5 May 51, sub: Report on Disintegration of the 6th ROK Division in Military Operations During the Period 22-24 Apr 51.
13 Eighth Army PIR 286, 24 Apr 51; Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 94; Wood, Strange Battleground, p. 74.
14 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 92; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, "Tanks Above Kap'yong," Interv with Koch.
15 After Action Intervs, Blumenson, "Tanks Above Kap'yong," Narrative and Intervs with Koch, Miller, Pfc Leroy W. Ritchotte, 4th Plat, and Pvt Robert B. Brown, 4th Plat.
16 Ibid., Intervs with Koch and Lt A. Argent, Intel Off, 3d Bn, Royal Australian Regt.
17 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 95; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, "Tanks Above Kap'yong," Interv with Johnson.
18 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 95-96; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, "Tanks Above Kap'yong," Interv with Argent.
19 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, pp. 96-104; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, "Tanks Above Kap'yong," Intervs with Miller and Koch.
20 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, pp. 96, 98-99; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, "Tanks Above Kap'yong," Intervs with Cpl William O. Suiter, Jr., Co A, 72d Tank Bn, Padgett, and Sgt Harold Burros, Sgt John L. Mazyck, Cpl Haywood Butler, Cpl Mason F. Scott, Pfc James Jackson, Pfc Johnnie L. Lewis, Pfc Johnnie Barksdale, Pfc Arthur Lee Gayles, and Pvt Robert J. Booker, all of Co B, 74th Engr Bn.
21 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, pp. 99-100; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, "Tanks Above Kap'yong," Interv with Miller.
22 The commander of Company A, quoted in Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 101.
23 Wood, Strange Battleground, pp. 74-76; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, "Tanks Above Kap'yong," Intervs with Koch and Miller.
24 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, pp. 105-06; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, "Tanks Above Kap'yong," Interv with Koch.
25 American tankers making one of their runs on the Kap'yong road as the Canadian company took position mistakenly opened fire on it and wounded one man.
26 Wood, Strange Battleground, pp. 76-77.
27 Ibid., pp. 77-78; Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division, p. 69.
28 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Wood, Strange Battleground, p. 78; Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division, p. 70. For their stand above Kap'yong, the Australian and Canadian battalions and Company A, 72d Tank Battalion, were awarded the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation. For personal efforts in support of the Australians, 1st Lt. Kenneth W. Koch and 1st Lt. Wilfred D. Miller of the tank company each received the Distinguished Service Cross.
29 DF, Eighth Army G4 to Chief of Staff, 10 May 51, sub: Report on Disintegration of ROKA 6th Div, in Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div (1 May), 1951.
30 Ltr, Gen Hoge to Gen Chang, 28 Apr 51, in Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div (1 May), 1951.
31 Ltr, Gen Hoge to Gen Van Fleet, 28 Apr 51, in Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div (1 May), 1951.
32 Ltr, Gen Van Fleet to Gen Chung, 2 May 51, copy in Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div (1 May), 1951.
Military Advisors in Korea, p.
Policy and Direction, pp. 394-95; Ridgway,
The Korean War, p. 176;
Ltr, Gen Van Fleet to Ambassador Muccio, 3 May 51, copy in Eighth Army AG File,
6 ROK Div (1 May), 1951.
34 Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 161, 176; Ltr, Gen Van Fleet to Ambassador Muccio, 3 May 51; Ltr, Maj Gen H.I. Hodes, Dep CofS, Eighth Army, to CINCFE, 5 May 51, sub: Republic of Korea Army Losses, copy in Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div (1 May), 1951. For detailed accounts of the expansion of the ROK Army during 1952 and 1953, see Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, and Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, U.S. ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966).
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