As the final arrangements for the reconvening of the truce negotiations were made in October 1951, developments on the international scene gave no indication that a quick settlement of the Korean War might be in the offing. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in strengthening their military capabilities and those of their allies.
In the United States President Truman signed the National Security Act on 10 October and Congress voted over seven billion dollars for foreign economic, technical, and military aid ten days later. The new National Security Agency established under the act would co-ordinate all of the foreign aid programs. The bulk of the military aid would go to the countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to help bolster their ability to defend themselves against aggression. On 22 October the members of NATO agreed to permit Greece and Turkey to join the organization, thus broadening the NATO area of responsibility considerably. Of the fourteen nations now included in NATO, eleven were contributing units to the United Nations Command.1
The Soviet Union in the meantime had exploded its second and third atomic bombs in October, serving notice that it had embarked upon an ambitious nuclear program. Stalin publicly pledged friendship to Communist China and received a message of thanks from Kim Il Sung of North Korea for Russian assistance to the N.K. forces. In Moscow Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky informed the U.S. Ambassador that the Soviet Union would not bring pressure upon the Communist negotiators in Korea to modify their truce demands. Thus, the prospects for swift action on the conclusion of an armistice dwindled even before the meetings resumed.
The Line of Demarcation
On 24 October a fleet of nine 2 1/2 ton trucks moved out of Munsan-ni and crossed the Imjin River. Loaded with tents and equipment the convoy rolled into the tiny village of Panmunjom and its cluster of mud huts. Swiftly the tent city to house the conferees rose and a crew of forty men worked intently to install the flooring, lighting, and heating that the approach of cold weather now made necessary. By the following day the new site was ready.
The main conference area had several large tents set aside for joint use and three that were to be at the disposal of the UNC delegates and the press. Half a mile south the service echelons set up
the mess, communications, security, and engineer facilities that would support the negotiations and aid in neutralizing the truce conference area. Overnight, Panmunjom became famous.
When the delegates convened on 25 October in the big conference tent, it almost seemed as though there had been no hiatus. The Communists were formally correct and meticulous as always, and only the presence of two new faces on their side of the table gave evidence of change. Nam Il introduced General Pien Changwu and Maj. Gen. Chung Tu Hwan who had replaced Teng Hua and Chang Pyong San respectively as Chinese and North Korean delegates. Admiral Joy in turn presented the credentials of Maj. Gen. Lee Hyung Koon, head of the ROK Field Training Command, and now the ROK representative in lieu of General Paik Sun Yup.
Since both sides had accepted the security arrangements worked out by the liaison officers during the long recess, the Communists proposed that a joint office of the liaison officers be established to supervise the details of the agreement. The UNC delegates agreed that the liaison officers should handle the investigation of incidents and carry out inspections at the truce site. This minor matter settled, Nam suggested that the meetings of the subdelegates on the line of demarcation be resumed. The same four delegates, General Hodes and Admiral Burke for the U.N. Command and Generals Lee and Hsieh for the Communists, were named to meet on Item 2 that afternoon.2
During the August sessions on the line of demarcation, it will be remembered, the UNC negotiators had given up their initial stand that air and naval effectiveness be reflected in the battle line and the Communists had indicated that they might be ready to discuss a line other than the 38th Parallel3. Ridgway had won approval to settle on a demilitarized zone not less than four miles wide with the line of contact as the median just before the Communists called off the meetings.
In the interim the UNC delegation had not been idle. Joy informed Ridgway in mid-October that he and his staff had worked up a short paper and had mapped out a specific demilitarized zone based on the line of contact. He did not intend to make the map the sole basis of discussion, but he would not permit any major alterations to be made in the UNC line.4
Thus, the UNC subdelegation was ready to present the new proposal at the first meeting, but the initial exchanges between General Hodes and General Lee developed into a sparring match:
Gen. Lee: Do you have any idea about the military demarcation line?
Gen. Hodes: We ended the last conference before the suspension by asking for your proposal. Do you have one?
Gen. Lee: We would like your opinion first.
Gen. Hodes: We gave our opinion many times, and asked for your proposal based on our proposal. As it was your proposal to have the subdelegation meeting, we expected you to have a proposal. Let's have it.
Gen. Lee: You said you had made a new
proposal, but we have heard nothing new which will break the deadlock.
Gen. Hodes: That's right, you haven't.
Gen. Lee: We have established a subcommittee to break the deadlock. The deadlock can be broken only if we have a mutually satisfactory proposal.
Gen. Hodes: Right. What is your proposal to break the deadlock?
After the better part of an hour was spent continuing this stimulating conversation, the UNC delegates decided that the Communists had no proposal to offer. Following a short recess, they made the opening gambit- a concrete demilitarized zone traced on the map. In general, Hodes explained, the zone was based upon the line of contact, but in order to make each side's defenses more secure the UNC forces would withdraw along the east coast and in the Kumsong area and the Communists would be expected to do the same in the Kaesong area. Not unexpectedly, the Communists rejected this proposal the following day and countered with a map of their own that was much more favorable to them. Their adjustments gave the U.N. Command some indefensible territory on the Ongjin and Yonan Peninsulas in return for the J-Ridge, Bloody, and Heartbreak Ridges, the Punchbowl, Kumhwa, and Ch'orwon. Hodes, in turn,
found the Communist suggestion unacceptable, but at least a start had been made and the enemy had not mentioned the 38th Parallel.5
Although General Lee stoutly asserted that the Communists were not "merchants," but rather "military men of revolutionary spirit," when Hodes inquired whether the enemy position was for bargaining purposes, the horse trading began. The crux of the matter was the Kaesong area which the UNC delegates claimed was necessary to protect the approach to Seoul. If the site for the negotiations had not been placed at Kaesong, the UNC forces would probably have taken the city, Hodes declared. And besides, since the U.N. Command would have to give up the offshore islands that it controlled adjoining enemy-held territory, Kaesong would be fair compensation. Hodes pointed out that the Communists would also benefit from the UNC withdrawals from the areas around Kaesong and Kumsong, but
the enemy wanted no part of a trade that would involve the loss of Kaesong.6 Possession of Kaesong was important politically and psychologically as well as militarily since it lay south of the 38th Parallel and the ROK Government had been insisting upon its return. As a symbol it was worth far more than a greater amount of territory in central or east Korea.7
At first the Communists were willing to barter. They were agreeable to an exchange on the central and eastern fronts to straighten out the line of defense. But, as the UNC delegates persisted in their demand for Kaesong, the enemy lost interest. After several fruitless days of discussion, the Communists proposed a 4-kilometer demilitarized zone based solely on the line of contact. This, they asserted, was their best and last proposal.8
General Ridgway had thought that the UNC map which had been presented would be the final offer with only minor changes permitted. But his superiors reminded him that the U.S. minimum position was the maintenance of the security of Line KANSAS. If KANSAS had an adequate outpost line of resistance, certain adjustments in the proposed line of demarcation on the map would appear to be practicable, they informed the Far East commander on 30 October.9
The instructions from Washington and the determined Communist stand on Kaesong led Ridgway to issue new orders on 2 November. He told the UNC delegates to retreat to the second-line position which placed the city in the demilitarized zone. The last concession, Ridgway went on, would be to concede the Kaesong area, provided that the Communists agreed to the adjustments on the eastern and central fronts and permitted the UNC forces to locate its outpost line of resistance on the west bank of the Imjin River.10
For the next two days Hodes and Burke conducted a dogged campaign to budge the Communists, but to no avail. The enemy was firmly resolved not to give up Kaesong. By 4 November Ridgway and Joy had decided that a settlement based on the battle line with appropriate minor adjustments would be the best they could hope for.11
When the subdelegations met on the following day, General Hodes presented the UNC compromise offer. This accepted a 4-kilometer demarcation zone based on the actual line of contact at the time of the signing of the armistice with "appropriate adjustments." Three officers from each side would work out the battle line and would be prepared to give it to the delegation prior to the completion of the truce. In the meantime, the UNC proposal recommended that the conferees proceed to other items. on the agenda.12
The Communists showered a barrage of questions on Hodes and Burke, but their interest swiftly waned when they
discovered that the UNC delegation would not rule Kaesong out of any future adjustments that might be made. Then General Lee launched his assault. Item 2 must be settled now, he declared, and a military demarcation zone fixed before discussion of other agenda items could begin. Postponement of the matter until the armistice was signed was out of the question, Lee and his colleague, Hsieh, maintained, since agreement in principle was not enough. The Communists insisted that the current line be determined and that it should serve as the line of demarcation, despite Hodes's assertion that the present line would have no validity unless the truce was completed quickly. Otherwise, a new line and demilitarized zone reflecting changes on the battlefield would have to be agreed upon.13
To Admiral Joy the enemy's stand indicated that the Communists intended to make the line of demarcation worked out at this time a permanent rather than a temporary settlement and he thought that this effort should be resisted.14 In Washington, U.S. political and military leaders agreed, but with definite reservations. If the UNC delegation maintained a hard-and-fast stand on Kaesong and the line of demarcation too long, they told Ridgway, it would appear to be a major concession when the UNC finally accepted the Communist position. Public opinion at home, Ridgway was told, would not understand a breakdown of negotiations over Kaesong, in the face of recent Communist concessions. Therefore, if the Communists flatly rejected the UNC proposal to postpone agreement on the line of demarcation, the enemy's line of contact in the Kaesong area should be accepted quickly. To prevent the Communists from making the line of demarcation permanent, they suggested to Ridgway that a time limit be set for the completion of the other agenda items. If no agreement was reached at the expiration of the limiting period, the demilitarized zone would be subject to revision.15
General Ridgway did not object to the JCS counsel on Kaesong, but he felt strongly that agreement to the present line of contact as a permanent line, subject only to minor adjustments, would be a mistake. In the 8 November subdelegate meeting, Ridgway pointed out, the Communists had indicated that they did not think that any major change in the battle lines had taken place since July. If the summer and fall campaigns of the Eighth Army were thus ignored, then the enemy obviously intended to cling closely to whatever line was now determined upon. This would in itself amount to a de facto cease-fire during the time period set and time extensions would doubtlessly be sought by the Communists and granted by the U.N. Command for the settlement of other agenda items. A cease-fire while the negotiations were still going on would be to the great disadvantage of the U.N. Command, in Ridgway's opinion, and if he had to give up Kaesong, he wanted to stand inflexibly upon the principle that the line of contact on the effective
date of the armistice must be the line of demarcation.16
The JCS were not willing to go quite so far. They agreed that the UNC delegation should press for acceptance of a postponed line of demarcation, but not that this would be the final position. Since the Communists had made substantial concessions on the location of the line, the JCS thought that an early agreement satisfying the UNC major requirements should be sought. Otherwise the enemy might even revert to its former stand on the 38th Parallel.17
In the meantime the subdelegation meetings had reached an impasse. The Communists grew more adamant in their stand for a 4-kilometer zone based on the line of contact with no adjustments either at the present or in the final settlement. They paid little attention to Hodes's charge that they wanted the demarcation line settled so that they could take their time on the other agenda items.18
The session on 14 November was particularly spirited. After General Lee admitted that agreement to a demarcation line now would amount to a de facto cease-fire, Hodes attacked the concept. General Hsieh became annoyed and then abusive. He called Hodes "Turtle egg" -an especially insulting term in Chinese.19 "Only the Devil," he charged later, could believe that the U.N. had good faith and loved peace. Hsieh also slurringly referred to Admiral Joy as "the senior delegate of your delegation, whose name I forget."20
Although the UNC delegates ignored the insults, Hodes evened the score the following day in a reference to Nam Il as "your senior delegate whose name I trust you are able to recall." But progress in the negotiations outside the jibe level was slow.21
Military and political leaders in Washington were becoming impatient and on 14 November they instructed Ridgway to accept the Communist line of demarcation in the interest of reaching an early agreement. Since the Communist proposal not only met the U.S. basic position on the maintenance of the security of Line KANSAS, but also provided protection for Line WYOMING, they did not consider that agreement amounted to concession. By placing a time limit of one month for the completion of the rest of the agenda, they evidently hoped to forestall a slowdown of operations for an extended period of time and to spur the enemy to greater speed in the negotiations. They told Ridgway that the military pressure upon the enemy should not be lessened, but at the same time admitted that no major change in the line of contact favorable to the United States was likely during the next month. Air and naval action, on the other hand, would not be affected by the agreement.22
The UNC delegation earnestly sought to eke some advantage from the enemy as they readied their next offer, but with little success. Each day they would relax
over a few games of solitaire or bridge to ease the strain of dealing with their stubborn opponents before they took up the cudgels again. Finally on 17 November, they reluctantly presented the new proposal which met the Communist position on the line of demarcation, but tacked on the thirty-day time limit.23
After several days of questions and careful study of the UNC proposal, the Communists were almost satisfied. Still they held out for UNC agreement that the line of demarcation would not be revised until after the other agenda items were settled. Although the expiration of the thirty-day limit without the conclusion of a truce would witness the termination of the line of demarcation's validity, the psychological effect of placing it along the existing line of contact might carry over into the post-thirty-day period. The U.N. Command balked briefly, then accepted the enemy's proposal. By 23 November the staff officers were hard at work tracing out the battle line.24
Disputes over the real location of the line of contact that the staff officers could not agree upon were referred back to the subdelegation and in the course of one such discussion an unusual incident took place. As both sides claimed possession of a particular hill in the central sector, General Hodes arranged for a telephone connection between the conferees and the officer in charge on the hill in question. In Hsieh's presence he called the unit commander and confirmed that the U.N. Command still controlled the hill. This annoyed Hsieh and he whispered in Chinese to his staff officer, "never mind. It will be ours tonight." Lieutenant Wu, the UNC interpreter overheard this remark and when he repeated it to Hodes later on, the UNC force on the disputed hill was alerted for an attack.25 However, despite the warning, superior Chinese forces drove the UNC forces off the hill and Hodes had to admit the next day that the enemy now had possession and had to adjust the line of contact.
By 27 November the last details were ironed out and the demarcation line agreed upon. (Map III) With its task completed, the subdelegation on Item 2 adjourned at the end of its thirty-seventh session.
It had been a tortuous road that the subdelegates had followed since 17 August when they had held their first meeting. Initially the UNC representatives had labored to move the enemy from its stand on the 38th Parallel and toward a settlement along the actual line of contact. This had been successful. During the long suspension of the talks the Eighth Army had carried out its offensives and won improved positions along most of the front. When the conference resumed in late October, the UNC delegation had an additional objective- to secure, or at least demilitarize
Kaesong. But this meant a departure from the concept of the line of contact, since the Communists still held Kaesong. Despite all the arguments and inducements that the U.N. Command had unveiled, the enemy remained unimpressed and became more firmly resolved to keep Kaesong.
While the United Nations Command delegates still felt that they might get Kaesong, they had been willing to sit down and draw a line of demarcation right away. But as chances for Kaesong became slimmer, they changed their attitude and attempted to defer mapping out the line until the armistice was ready to be signed, in the hope that the situation would be altered and the Communists might be more amenable to giving up Kaesong at that time.
The Communists, on the other hand, had been more consistent. Once they had discarded the 18th Parallel, they had shifted to the line of contact. After a brief flirtation with the idea of adjustments, they had been quickly disenchanted by the UNC insistence upon adjusting the Kaesong area out of Com-
munist hands. From this point onward the enemy delegates clung steadfastly to an immediate settlement on the line of contact with no adjustments other than those involving minor terrain features.
Although the Communists had been forced to concede on the 38th Parallel, they had won on establishing a line of demarcation that lasted until the closing moments of the war.26 Admiral Joy later wrote that he regarded this as a turning point in the negotiations, for the United States lacked military pressure to lever the Communists into more reasonable attitude after this agreement and Joy believed that it cost the United States a full year of war in Korea.27 Whether this was true or not, the President and his advisors had decided that the U.N. Command should compromise in the interests of securing an earlier armistice and in view of the fact that the enemy had already made considerable concessions. With Item 2 finally out of the way, work could now begin on Item 3, the setting up of the machinery to administer the truce.
Opening Skirmishes on Item 3
The early instructions to Ridgway had been quite specific on the several points that were to be taken up under Item 3. They stated that the Military Armistice Commission and its observer teams must have free and unlimited access to all of Korea so that they could inspect whenever necessary to insure compliance with the terms of the armistice. They also informed Ridgway that there should be no reinforcing the number of personnel or increasing the amount of war equipment during the armistice period. This, of course, did not preclude the exchange of individuals or units on a man-for-man basis or the replacement of wornout equipment.28 These two principles in modified form- the right to inspection and replacement but no augmentation- formed the cornerstones of the UNC approach to Item 3.
The modifications stemmed from the field. On 1 August Admiral Joy suggested that along with no augmentation of troops or equipment the U.N Command should insist that there be no construction or rehabilitation of airfields.29 Two months later, Ridgway attempted to clarify the UNC position on free and unlimited inspection. Pointing out to the JCS that the enemy had indicated its willingness to permit inspection in the demilitarized zone, but had consistently resisted observation or inspection in territory under its exclusive control, Ridgway questioned the need for unlimited inspection. Insistence upon this principle might prolong or even cause the Communists to break off the negotiations. In the opinion of the United Nations commander, inspection at selected ground, sea, and air ports of entry would provide sufficient security for his forces. Moreover, he believed that the Communists would exploit the right to unlimited inspection in the intelligence field to an unacceptable degree if it were granted them. Under the circumstance Ridgway felt that the UNC initial position on inspection should insist upon: observation by joint teams
at ground, sea, and air ports of entry and communication centers, with freedom of movement for those teams over principal transportation lines; joint aerial observation and photoreconnaissance over all Korea; and complete joint observation of the demilitarized zone. As a final position, the UNC delegation could concede aerial observation and photoreconnaissance. His superiors approved the initial position several weeks later, but reserved judgment on any modifications until the negotiations disclosed the Communist position more thoroughly.30 As Maj. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, the Army G-3, pointed out to General Collins, the Air Force was strongly opposed to sacrificing aerial observation and it might turn out that the Communists would prefer to dispense with the ground observer teams.31
As negotiations on Item 2 drew to a close in November, General Collins and Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte experienced some doubts about Communist acceptance of the inspection principle. The real deterrent to a resumption of hostilities, they felt, lay in the maintenance of sufficient power in the Korean area rather than in inspection. Since the Communists might prefer to permit the negotiations to be broken off over this issue, the Chief of Staff and his Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, General Bolte, questioned whether inspection would actually provide security for the U.N. Command and how it could best be carried out.32
Ridgway's answer on 23 November reinforced his earlier stand. In his defense of the need for inspection he reminded the JCS that enemy air power had been steadily increasing. In recent weeks it had challenged the UNC air effort south of the Ch'ongch'on River. If the enemy air bases were set up and maintained in North Korea, they could eventually pose a serious threat to Japan in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. For Ridgway the principle of inspection, which the United States had been insisting upon since the initiation of negotiations with the USSR in 1946 over the control of atomic energy, was a basic U.S. position and could not be discarded in Korea without having an adverse reaction upon future negotiations with the USSR. As for the mechanics of inspection, he believed that forty joint teams, some located permanently at ports of entry and others roving, could cover Korea adequately. If the enemy would not accept inspection, Ridgway felt that the UNC delegation should be authorized to break off negotiations.33
Several days later the U.S. leaders informed Ridgway that lie should present his initial position requiring inspection on Item 3 and then modify it by conceding aerial observation and photoreconnaissance if it proved necessary. However, they were still firmly opposed to having the onus for cutting off the negotiations over this point fall on the U.N. Command. Any decision to cease
the discussions, they declared, must be made by the Communists.34
When the plenary session at Pamnunjom resumed on 27 November, there was one newcomer to the conference table. Maj. Gen. Howard M. Turner, who had commanded a bombardment division of the Eighth Air Force during World War II and more recently had been commanding general of the Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines, replaced General Craigie.
After Admiral Joy had presented Turner's credentials, he immediately broached a new subject. To save time in the discussions that would take place on Item 4, Joy proposed that prisoner of war data covering the names and nationalities of all the prisoners and the location of POW camps be exchanged so that each side could study the information in advance of the formal meetings. Nam Il acknowledged the suggestion and then proceeded to discuss Item 3.
In Nam's opinion, Item 3 could be settled quite easily if the five principles he now advanced were accepted by the UNC delegates. The first declared that all armed forces should cease hostilities on the day the armistice was signed. Within three days all armed forces should be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone and within five days should be cleared from the rear areas, coastal islands, and waters of each side. These were principles 2 and 3. Each side would agree that there would be no armed forces or action in the demilitarized zone as the fourth principle, and finally both sides would designate an equal number of members to form an armistice commission to be jointly responsible for the concrete arrangements and for the supervision of the implementation of the agreement.
Basically there was little in the Communist proposal to quarrel with, as far as it went. But Admiral Joy was quick to point out to Nam that it failed to cover important areas. The mechanics for beginning a cease-fire and for clearing all the troops from the demilitarized zone were fairly simple, Joy maintained, but it was essential that both sides adopt measures to reduce the possibility of a resumption of hostilities. There were several ways in which this could be done. Neither side should build up its military supplies, equipment, or personnel in Korea during the armistice and restrictions should be placed upon the construction and rehabilitation of military facilities for offensive purposes. If both sides accepted these conditions, Joy went on, neither would acquire a significant advantage. To assure compliance with these limitations, Joy proposed that a supervisory organization, with joint observer teams, be established and given sufficient authority and freedom of movement to keep all Korea under surveillance. The UNC 7-point formula for solving Item 3 in effect broadened and clarified the Communist five principles.35
But the enemy soon indicated that it would not accept the UNC extension of the Communist proposal in its initial form and on the 28th the attack began. Nam centered his guns upon the UNC
restrictions upon increases in forces, supplies, equipment, and facilities and the granting of free access to all of Korea for the joint observer teams. As far as the Communists were concerned, Nam declared, they believed that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea was a necessary condition for a final peaceful solution of the Korean problem. However, the U.N. Command insisted that this be handled by the political conference to follow the armistice and the matter of restrictions and reduction of forces belonged, therefore, in the province of the political conference. Insofar as the UNC proposal for the observer teams was concerned, this was "entirely unnecessary" since there would be no restrictions applicable under the military armistice and consequently no need for inspection. Thus, by disposing of the restrictions, the Communists shrugged off the inspection principle, too.
As the UNC delegation counterattacked, Admiral Joy dismissed the Communist references to the withdrawal of foreign troops as inappropriate. The enemy's 5-point plan, Joy went on, was too limited in scope to provide the "bridge to peace" that the Communists spoke so frequently about. He then proceeded to explain the UNC seven principles in more detail and pointedly emphasized that restrictions on the build-up of forces must be part of any armistice that the U.N. Command would accept.36
The main battle lines were now plainly discernible. Since the U.N. Command enjoyed a military advantage in the air over the Communists, it desired to maintain the status quo and preserve its superior air capability during the armistice period. Hence the UNC insistence upon no increase in military facilities, which, in essence, meant airfields. To make sure that the enemy did not violate this principle required that its companion, inspection, be also included. The Communists, on the other hand, were just as determined to oppose any restrictions upon their opportunity to strengthen their air capability during a truce. If they could avoid agreement upon this principle, there would be no need for inspection.
The ensuing week witnessed a continuous maneuvering for position on both sides. Defending its 7-point program, the U.N. Command argued that either side could reduce its forces and capabilities during the armistice if it so desired, but since the length of time that the armistice would endure was unknown, it was vital for the security of the UNC forces that there be no upsetting of the balance of military power.37 The enemy delegates in rebuttal charged that the U.N. Command was attempting to prevent the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Korea, and to intervene in the internal affairs of the People's Republic. This was quickly denied by the U.N. Command, which asserted that only airfields would be affected by the restrictions. Roads, railroads, and other facilities could be restored.38
On 3 December, the Communists made the first concession. They offered to expand their original five points to seven. Principles 6 and 7 read as follows:
6. In order to insure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall undertake not to introduce into Korea any military forces, weapons, and ammunition under any pretext. 7. In order to supervise the strict implementation of the stipulation of paragraph 6, both sides agree to invite representatives of nations neutral in the Korean war to form a supervisory organ to be responsible for conducting necessary inspection, beyond the demilitarized zone, of such ports of entry in the rear as mutually agreed upon by both sides, and to report to the joint armistice commission the results of inspection.39
The new Communist proposals threw the UNC delegation on the defensive as they were unprepared for either the drastic restrictions upon all military forces and equipment or for the introduction of neutral nations to perform the task of inspection.40 After a brief recess they submitted a list of questions to clarify the new points and then suggested that Item 3 be given over to a subdelegation to work out a solution.41 While the UNC delegates explored the implications of the Communist move, there would be time to get new instructions from Washington.
On 4 December the enemy accepted the UNC proposal for establishing a subdelegation and appointed Generals Lee and Hsieh as members. Admiral Joy named Generals Turner and Hodes.
When the subdelegation met that afternoon, Lee soon made it clear that there would be no rotation of personnel or replenishment of equipment under the Communist plan and that his side would brook no interference with the reconstruction of facilities in North Korea. The latter was a purely internal matter and inspection was out of the question. In the course of the next session, Lee also revealed that the Communists had not fully developed their concept of the organization and utilization of the neutral nations group. Possibly three to five nations would be invited by both sides, Lee stated, and the neutral organ would operate independently out of agreedupon ports of entry. As for the Military Armistice Commission, its duties and
authority would be limited strictly to the demilitarized zone.42
After studying the Communist's explanation of the neutral nations' role, Joy and his staff were hopeful but cynical. They felt that a deal might be worked out within a reasonable time. Since they placed little faith in the enemy's promises and thought that the Communists would eventually find some way to circumvent effective inspection behind the lines anyway, the neutral nations' solution might answer the needs of the U.N. Command as well as a military armistice commission.43 But until guidance arrived from Washington, Joy admitted that all the U.N. Command could do was to delay and stall by asking questions and criticizing the Communist proposal. He urged the submission of a UNC counterproposal to regain the initiative: one that would insist upon rotation and replenishment but would create a neutral nations organization in place of the Military Armistice Commission, would drop the claims of the U.N. Command to retain coastal islands north of the demarcation line after the armistice, and also would cease to demand restrictions against rehabilitating airfields, only against constructing new airfields. In his opinion, this would give the U.N. Command all that it required and be very hard for the Communists to refuse.44
General Ridgway agreed that the U.N. Command had to take a stand soon or face the prospect of an unfavorable reaction throughout the free world. On 7 December he pressed the JCS to at least announce the points on which the U.N. Command would not concede. First and foremost of these, he held, was the divorcement of the neutral nations' inspection teams from the authority of the Military Armistice Commission. Differing sharply with the UNC Panmunjom delegation, Ridgway wanted to reject categorically this portion of the Communist proposal, since he felt its acceptance would permit the injection of all sorts of political matters foreign to a military armistice.45
As no immediate answer to Ridgway's message was forthcoming, the subdelegation continued to mark time. Two new officers, Admiral Libby and Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh, sat in at the 6 December meeting and thereafter to gain familiarity with the issues and Communist techniques. But until a new policy was laid out, the discussion by the UNC delegation had to be vague and could not get down to cases.
It should not be assumed, however, that the JCS were inactive during the period. Policy had to be worked out with the State Department and since the United States was engaged in political and military conversations with the British in early December, the Joint Chiefs were inclined to be cautious. Under the circumstances they preferred not to take irrevocable positions at this stage of the negotiations.46
By 7 December, after consultation with Secretaries Marshall and Acheson, the JCS had hammered out a new position and requested the President to approve it. Pointing out that there were four main issues at stake on Item 3, they told the President that there could be no shift in the UNC stand on rotation and replenishment, since these were essential. Some concessions could be made in permitting the rehabilitation of facilities, but any decision relating to airfields under this concession would have to be referred to Washington if it became the last obstacle to an armistice. As a final position, the JCS went on, the U.N. Command would agree to withdraw from islands north of the demarcation line and to the use of neutral teams of observers. However, the neutral nations selected to provide the observers must be mutually agreed to by both sides and the teams must be responsible to and subject to direction and supervision of the Military Armistice Commission.47
At first President Truman objected to a policy allowing the enemy to rehabilitate its roads, railroads, and other facilities which the United States and its allies had destroyed at great expense in lives and materiel. But the JCS explained that there was a strong feeling, particularly in the State Department, that the armistice might be the only agreement reached on Korea for a long time and that it would be impossible to prohibit rehabilitation over an extensive period. Furthermore, the United States itself intended to carry out a program of reconstruction and rehabilitation in South Korea. The President bowed to these arguments and approved the new instructions which were forwarded to Ridgway on 11 December.48
On that same day there were indications that the week's delay in the negotiations might have been beneficial. The U.N. Command had been constantly urging the Communists to set up a subdelegation on Item 4 in order to exchange prisoner of war data and the enemy finally agreed to meet that afternoon. General Lee and Colonel Tsai would take over the negotiations on Item 4 while General Hsieh and Colonel Chang would carry on the discussions on Item 3.
Later during the debate, Hsieh made the first break in the deadlock when he asked in a tentative fashion whether the UNC would accept the idea of the neutral nations carrying out inspections if the Communists gave in on the maintenance of forces and agreed that there be a single directing head rather than two organs supervising the armistice. Although Hsieh apparently was just probing the UNC position, there was now a possibility of a compromise.49
Armed with the instructions from Washington and the hint from Hsieh that the Communists might be receptive to a modification of their stand, the UNC delegation presented a new package proposal on 12 December. It featured the concession by the U.N. Command of the islands along the coast and in territorial waters north of the demarcation
line and agreement to the concept that the neutral nations acceptable to both sides furnish personnel for the observer teams. On the other hand, the Communists must permit rotation and replenishment and agree that the neutral nations be under the Military Armistice Commission. There was no change in the UNC stand on airfields, and reconstruction and rehabilitation were still forbidden. Since this was a package proposal, Turner told Hsieh that it must be accepted in toto or not at all.50
Hsieh spent the next session attacking the UNC plan, and Turner in turn counterattacked. When Hsieh assailed the rotation and replenishment principle, Turner pointed out that acceptance of the Communist view would in effect constitute the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea since attrition eventually would eliminate all but native troops. The enemy had agreed to discuss this problem under Item 5 and not Item 3, Turner maintained, scoring a point.51
On 14 December Hsieh presented an alternate suggestion which accepted the UNC concessions and in return offered to permit the U.N. Command to rotate 5,000 men a month. Turner ridiculed the low figure. Upon further questioning, Hsieh admitted that even the 5,000 rotatees would have to be approved by the Military Armistice Commission each month and that the Communists could conceivably veto any rotation if they so desired since they would have equal membership in this group. This made the enemy's proposal even more unacceptable and the negotiations began to bog down again.52
Thus, by mid-December, the Communists had shown a disposition to compromise on inspection- the issue which the JCS and the UNC leaders had feared might be the greatest stumbling block to an agreement on Item 3. True, there remained many details to be worked out on the composition of the neutral nations organization and its duties and relationship to the Military Armistice Commission, but the principle, at least, had been accepted. The enemy was also willing to retreat from its extreme stand against rotation provided a suitable quid pro quo was offered. But the price for this concession- freedom to develop and rehabilitate airfields during an armistice- was one that the U.N. Command was vehemently opposed to.
General Ridgway flew to Korea on 17 December and after canvassing the members of the UNC delegation forwarded an estimate of the situation to the JCS. Concerned with the approach of the thirty-day deadline on the line of demarcation, he told his superiors that an extension, unless it was for a very short period of time and the conclusion of the negotiations was in sight, would have a harmful effect upon his forces. He admitted that neither he nor his staff were agreed upon what the Communists intentions were, but argued that the best way to expose them lay in setting out the UNC firm position in unequivocal language. Warning that the time could come when the UNC might have to face a breaking off in the negotiations, he felt that the decision to meet such a crisis
should be readied in advance. Ridgway especially deprecated the policy pursued in the past of abandoning positions since this had only tended to make the enemy more obdurate and demanding.
Then, turning to the problems at hand, he strongly urged that the U.N. Command stick to its stand on airfields and rotation. In addition, the U.N. Command should insist upon neutral aerial inspection and photoreconnaissance to watch the enemy's airfields and for free movement of neutral observer teams throughout Korea over major lines of communication. The tasks assigned to the Military Armistice Commission and the neutral observer teams should be made mandatory so that the Communists could not block action by these organs. In the opinion of himself and his staff, the critical matter was airfields and the making of an armistice might well hinge on the acceptance or nonacceptance of this principle.53
Domestic Problems and Foreign
After meeting with the State Department and securing Presidential approval, the JCS replied to Ridgway the following day. The Washington leaders appreciated the fine effort that Ridgway and the UNC delegation were making despite many difficulties. But the consensus of official opinion held that a political conference after the armistice would probably be unsuccessful and consequently the armistice might be the only agreement for some time. In that event its character must provide for a greater degree of permanency and the conditions imposed must be of a type that could be enforced over a long period. The U.S. political and military leaders felt that Communist violations of the armistice would probably consist of demonstrations, threats, and equivocations rather than renewed aggression. And in their view the major deterrent to another outbreak of hostilities in Korea would be the Communist realization that further aggression would bring full retribution. The United States was working on a declaration to this effect which would be signed by as many of the United Nations participating in the Korean War as could be persuaded; it would be issued after the conclusion of the armistice. The United Kingdom had already indicated that it would support such a statement.
In the light of these considerations. U.S. leaders preferred not to take final positions on all the issues now under discussion, as this would destroy the ability of the United States to maneuver or adjust if new elements were introduced by the Communists. Neither did they care to establish a given point at which the negotiations would be broken off. Instead they listed the positions that Ridgway and his staff should now support. Since it would be impracticable to enforce the rehabilitation of airfields for any length of time, they were willing to permit some airfields, excluding those suitable for jet operations, to be rebuilt and maintained. As for aerial observation, this was desirable but not essential and should not be a part of the UNC final position. Either adequate rotation of personnel should be authorized or as long as there was no over-all increase in forces, no limit at all should be fixed.
In the matter of replenishment, the important issue was that there be no augmentation of combat aircraft. On this Ridgway should be adamant. The Washington leaders agreed that the neutral observer teams should be stationed at the major ports of entry and have freedom to move wherever their duties demanded. It would not be necessary to have all the observer teams in place when the armistice went into effect, but the Military Armistice Commission and some of the teams should be on hand. If the deadline of 27 December approached and progress was still being made in the negotiations, Ridgway was authorized to propose an extension of up to fifteen days.54
The differences in approach to the intricate task of negotiating with the Communists were sharply delineated in this exchange between Ridgway and his superiors. The Far East commander and his staff believed that continuing concessions could only indicate weakness to the enemy and that the best course was one of strength and firmness. Only when the Communists realized that the U.N. Command intended to cling steadfastly to its principles and would yield no more, would they get down seriously to the business of fashioning an armistice. The Washington leaders, on the other hand, inclined toward a flexible approach based upon the practical necessities for a long armistice period. This meant playing the Communist game of shifting, adjusting, and maneuvering for advantages and avoiding fixed positions that might precipitate a break in the negotiations. Inherent in this approach were the hope that eventually a reasonable and workable armistice agreement would be reached that would end the hostilities in Korea, and the knowledge that as long as the U.N. Command continued to be willing to negotiate, the Communists would be forced to bear the onus for a breaking off of the conference. The influence of this latter consideration upon the thinking of the government in Washington was constant and important.
For behind the American leaders the pressure for an early solution to the Korean War through a cease-fire and armistice was mounting. By mid-December the desire to halt the growing casualty lists and to free U.S. and U.N. forces in Korea for redeployment elsewhere became stronger. As the negotiations dragged on, the allies of the United States became more reluctant to apply additional measures against Communist China and disinclined to contribute more troops to Korea. It was also evident that as long as the war continued and the United States poured resources into a hot war, the flow of military assistance to areas engaged in the cold war had to be restricted. Influences at home and abroad increasingly favored a minimum settlement of the Korean War by means of an armistice and the unification of Korea by political means.
Since the National Security Council recommended in December that the United States adhere to the policy of avoiding a general war with China and the USSR and of seeking an acceptable settlement in Korea that would not jeopardize the U.S. positions regarding Taiwan, a seat for Communist China in the United Nations, or vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the chances that the war would be broadened in the near
future appeared small. The council preferred to continue the course now being pursued-limited war and economic pressure upon Red China backed by the support of the majority of the United Nations-until a satisfactory armistice was concluded. This would be followed by efforts to reach a political settlement of the Korean problem, but in the meantime the ROK Army would be strengthened and prepared to deter or repel a further attempt by the Communists to take over South Korea. The council was now convinced that with proper training and equipment the ROK Army could eventually bear the brunt of the defense of South Korea. Only if the armistice negotiations failed, would the council consider the additional measures of mobilization and forms of military pressure to solve the situation.
The NSC decision deferred the imposition of a naval blockade against
China and the extension of the air war into Manchuria.55 And since the United States did not feel that the United Nations would support a stricter economic embargo on China at this time, there seemed to be little profit in pursuing that matter either.
Perhaps the case of the British may serve as a graphic illustration of this point. The British had been undergoing a period of economic crisis since World War II and were loathe to place additional restrictions upon their trade with Communist China. It was natural that they should also be concerned about the exposed position of Hong Kong if more pressure were to be applied against the Chinese Communists and that they should view the growing air strength of the enemy's air force in Korea uneasily. Under the circumstances they were most anxious to limit the war to the Korean Peninsula until a settlement could be worked out at the truce table.56
British uncertainties over American policy led to consultations in Washington during late December and January. While British military leaders discussed the implications of broadening U.N. action against Communist China with their American counterparts at the military level, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden conferred with President Truman and his advisors.
Fundamentally, divergencies in policy stemmed from the attitudes of the two countries toward Communist China and Nationalist China. Since the British had recognized the former and established trade relations, they were inclined to regard the new regime as a permanent one. The United States, on the other hand, felt that as long as Communist China remained aggressive and showed no signs of changing its attitude toward the West, there was no point in according the Communists the advantages that recognition would entail, such as a seat in the United Nations or formal trade relations. Besides, the United States had certain obligations toward Chiang Kai-shek and the Taiwan government, which it could not easily avoid. Since the United States acknowledged the economic interests of the British in the Far East, the U.S. policy planners felt that the British must in turn realize that the United States must bear the major responsibility for the area and supply the power to meet this responsibility.57
Although the conferences produced no changes in either British or American policy, the two countries were able to reassure each other. Neither desired an extension of the Korean War and so long as there was no collapse of negotiations, their differences in regard to Communist China could be adjusted. What might happen if the enemy did not agree to an armistice or breached it was also discussed, but since the United States had not reached a firm decision on an alternate course of action, no positive information could be given to the British.58
Actually there seemed to be little choice for the United States unless the situation altered. For those who still believed that a military decision in Korea was either desirable or necessary to settle
the conflict, even if it meant taking on Communist China, General Bolte, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, had some sobering counsel at the end of December. He told Assistant Secretary of the Army Karl R. Bendetsen that the United States had no certain current military capability for reaching a favorable decision in the Far East and no knowledge of how long it would take to acquire such a capability. Only by a drastic change in the global strategy of the United States or through an all-out mobilization of national resources could the military capability be immediately increased. As Bolte pointed out, the first course might cause great danger to the national security and the second would create grave economic problems. Either might play directly into the hands of the Soviet Union.59
From General Ridgway came confirmation of Bolt's position. In commenting upon the apparent willingness of the U.S. policy makers to rely upon a postarmistice U.N. declaration threatening a spread of the war if the Communists made a truce and then broke it, he stated frankly that: ". . . conscience compels me to reiterate my conviction that with presently available military forces this command would be incapable of imposing a threat to Communist China sufficient in itself to deter it from renewed aggression."60
But, as General Collins pointed out to the JCS on 10 January, the very fact that the proposed U.N. declaration did not necessarily restrict a future outbreak of hostilities to Korea posed a new set of circumstances. Under the recent NSC decision the ROK forces would be increased, trained, and equipped to assume the responsibility for the defense of their own territory. Depending upon conditions at the time, the United States might or might not intervene again in Korea if the Communists violated an armistice agreement. In any event the JCS informed Ridgway that he would prepare only contingency plans for U.S. intervention.61
As long as the negotiations continued, however, the prospects for increasing the U.S. effort in Korea appeared forlorn. The shift foreshadowed by the National Security Council action was toward a gradual disengagement provided that a
truce could be arranged. but meantime the Joint Chiefs were faced with the problem of sustaining the present rate of military build-up until the world situation improved. Whether the President or Congress would be receptive to further augmentation of the armed forces while the stalemate in Korea remained unbroken was still a moot question.
With the action on the battlefield still at a low ebb and with little hope of accelerating the pace, the sharpest clashes took place over the conference table. The airfield question limited agreement on Item 3 and a new battle was about to break out over the disposition of prisoners of war.
2 (1) Transcript of Proceedings, 27th Session, Mtg at Panmunjom, on the Armistice Proposal, 25 Oct 51. (2) Msg, HNC 388, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 25 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 231.
3 See Chapter III, above.
4 (1) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 13 Oct 51, DA-IN 6758. (2) Msg, HNC 361, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 15 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 197.
5 Summaries of Proceedings, Seventh and Eighth Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 25 and 26 Oct 51, in FEC Subdelegates Mtgs on item 2, Vol. I. All meetings through g November will be found in this file.
6 Summary of Proceedings, Ninth Session, Subdelegation Mtg on item 2, 27 Oct 51.
7 Msg, HNC 430, Ridgway to JCS, 8 Nov 51, DA-IN 17036.
8 Summary of Proceedings, Thirteenth Session, Subdelegation Mtg on item 2, 31 Oct 51.
9 (1) Msg, CX 56073, Ridgway to JCS, 28 Oct 51, DA-IN 12729. (2) Msg, JCS 85537, JCS to Ridgway, 30 Oct 51.
10 Msg, C 56412, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 2 Nov 51, in FEC 587.2 bk. III, 247.
11 Msg, HNC 425, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 4 Nov 51. (2) Msg C 56599, CINCUNC to American Embassy, Pusan, 4 Nov 51. Both in FEC 387.2.
12 Summary of Proceedings, Eighteenth Session, Subdelegation Mtg on item 2, 5 Nov 51.
13 Summary of Proceedings, Nineteenth Session, Subdelegation Mtg on item 2, 6 NOV 51. All meetings of the subdelegation on item 2 from 6 November-27 November 1951 are in FEC Subdelegation Meetings, Agenda item 2, volume II.
14 Msg, HNC 426, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 6 Nov 51, in FEC 887.2, bk. III, 263.
15 Msg, JCS 86291, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Nov 51.
16 Msg, HNC 430, Ridgway to JCS, 8 Nov 51, DA-IN 17036.
17 Msg, JCS 86654, JCS to CINCFE, 9 Nov 51.
18 Summaries of Proceedings, Twenty-third and Twenty-fifth Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 10 and 12 Nov 51.
19 According to Chinese legend, a female turtle had to be fertilized by a snake.
20 Summary of Proceedings, Twenty-seventh Session, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 14 Nov 51.
21 Summary of Proceedings, Twenty-eighth Session, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 15 Nov 51.
22 Msg, JCS 86804, JCS to CINCFE, 13 Nov 51. (2) Msg, JCS 86969, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Nov 51.
23 Summary of Proceedings, Thirtieth Session, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 17 Nov 51. According to Admiral Burke, both he and Hodes felt that their usefulness to the delegation had ended at this point. After they had taken such strong stands, Burke wrote, the order to concede would mark them as "pushovers" in the eyes of the Communists. See Ltr, Burke to Mrs. A. A. Burke, 16 Nov 51. In OCMH.
24 Summaries of Proceedings, Thirty-first, Thirty-second, Thirty-third, Thirty-fourth, and Thirty-fifth Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 18-23 Nov 51.
25 Interv, Lt Col James F. Schnabel with Lt Wu, March 1952. In OCMH.
26 For the discussion of the effects of the line of demarcation upon the battlefield, see Chapter IX, below.
27 Joy, How Communists Negotiate, p. 129.
28 Msg, JCS 95354, JCS to CINCFE, 30 Jun 51.
29 Msg, HNC 164, Joy to Ridgway, 1 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 54.
30 (1) Msg, C 52227, CINCFE to JCS, 4 Oct 51, DA-IN 3575. (2) Msg, JCS 84817, JCS to CINCFE, 24 Oct 51.
31 (1) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 11 Oct 51, sub: Clarification of the Degree of Inspection, in G-3 091 Korea, 200. (2) General Jenkins succeeded Gencral Taylor as G-3 on 1 August 1951. Taylor became Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration.
32 Msg, CSUSA (sgd Bolte) to CINCFE, 19 Nov 51, DA-87452.
33 Msg, CX 57838, Ridgway to JCS, 23 Nov 31, DA-IN 2085.
34 Msg, JCS 88226, JCS to CINCFE, 28 Nov 51.
35 Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-eighth Session, Mil Armistice Conf, 27 Nov 51, in FEC, Transcript of Proceedings, Mtgs of the Mil Armistice Conf, 25 Oct 51-19 Feb 52, vol. III (hereafter cited as FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. III).
36 Ibid., Twenty-ninth Session, 28 Nov 51.
37 Ibid., Thirtieth Session, 29 Nov 51.
38 Ibid., Thirty-second, Thirty-third Sessions, 30 Nov, 1, 2 Dec 51.
39 Ibid., Thirty-fourth Session, 3 Dec 51
40 The term "neutral nations" was used very loosely during the negotiations and usually meant those nations that did not have military forces in Korea. The United States would not recognize the USSR as a neutral and the Communists undoubtedly would not have allowed Nationalist China to be placed in this category.
41 Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-fourth Session, Mil Armistice Conf, 3 Dec 51, FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. III.
42 Transcripts of Proceedings, First and Second Sessions, Subdelegates Mtgs on Agenda item 3, dated 4, 5 Dec 51, in FEC Subdelegates Mtgs on Agenda item 3, vol. I (hereafter cited as FEC Transcripts, item 3, vol. I).
43 Msg, HNC 521, Joy to CINCUNC, 5 Dec 51, in FEC Msgs, Dec 51.
44 Msg, HNC 523, Joy to CINCUNC, 6 Dec 5 1, in FEC Msgs, Dec 51.
45 Msgs, CINCFE to JCS, 7 Dec 51, DA-IN 7082 and 7121, in G-3 091 Korea, 213/3.
46 Msg, JCS 88877, JCS to CINCFE, 5 Dec 51.
47 Msg, JCS 89114, JCS to Naval Aide USS Williamsburg, 7 Dec 51.
48 Msg, President to JCS, 8 Dec 5 1, DA-IN 7586. (2) Msg, JCS 89118, JCS to Naval Aide USS Williamsburg, 8 Dec 51. (8) Msg, JCS 89173, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Dec 51.
49 Transcript of Proceedings, Eighth Session, Subdelegates Mtgs on item 3, 11 Dec 51, in FEC Transcripts, item 3, vol. I.
50 Ibid., Ninth Session, 12 Dec 51.
51 Ibid, Tenth Session, 13 Dec 51.
52 Ibid., Eleventh and Twelfth Sessions, 14 and 15 Dec 51.
53 Msg, HNC 588, Ridgway to JCS, 18 Dec 51, DA-IN 11132.
54 Msg, JCS 90083, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Dec 51.
55 JCS 2004/46, 13 Dec 51, title: Method of Curtailment of Wartime Trade with Communist China.
56 JCS 1776/272, 27 Dec 51, title: Korea.
57 JCS 2118/28, 28 Dec 51, title: Divergence of U.S. and British Policies Respecting China.
58 Msg, 130305, State Dept to SCAP, 13 Jan 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 52, G-3 sec., an. 4, pt. III, tab 15.
59 Memo, Bolte for Asst Secy Army (Gen Mgmt) , 28 Dec 51, sub: Comments on Memo . . . Asst Secy Army (Gen Mgmt), in G-3 091 Korea, 348/24.
60 Msg, CX 61348, Ridgway to JCS, 13 Jan 52, DA-IN 19740.
61 (1) Memo, Collins for JCS, 10 Jan 52, sub: Renewed U.S. Intervention in Korea .... in G-3 091 Korea 3. (2) Msg, DA-93080, G-3 to CINCFE, 27 Jan 52.
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