- Chapter XIII
-
- Toward an Objective
-
- The explanations,
recommendations, and remedies advanced to deal with recurring signs
of unsatisfactory progress in the training of Negro troops were many.
Few observers failed to describe the situation as a complex one.
Certain of the threads which went to make up a tangled skein were
common to most observations and recommendations. The influence of
real and imagined neglect of and discrimination against Negro
soldiers; the educational and experiential backgrounds of the
soldiers themselves; the lack of proper leadership and discipline in
their units; the influence of the press, especially of the Negro
press; the influence of local conditions, especially in the South; the
orientation of white troops and police, especially military police,
toward Negro troops; the failure to move Negro units overseas in large
numbers; and the imperfect dissemination of War Department policies
to officers in the field were the chief points at issue.
-
- That these matters were all
linked together, with interacting implications, began to be recognized
more widely by mid-1943. While there was still a tendency to blame
outside forces-the press and agitators in particular-for the major
difficulties experienced, there was also a growing recognition that
the root of the matter was both deeper and broader than these.
Eighty-five percent of the Army, as one member of the Advisory Committee on Negro
Troop Policies observed somewhat later, had ideas about Negroes that
could not be changed quickly.1 But that did not
prevent Assistant
Secretary McCloy and the Advisory Committee from devoting considerable time and effort to improving the general situation.
-
- McCloy was convinced that a
fair appraisal would show that the Army, by mid-1943, was ahead of
the rest of the country in recognizing and attempting to do something
about its racial problems. He pointed out again and again that
rumors and press concern over discriminatory practices obscured the
attempts of the War Department to eliminate both racial friction
and the major deterrents to effective training. Writing to Eleanor
Roosevelt, the President's wife, he explained:
-
- There has arisen a tendency in
the Negro soldier to believe any wild story of discrimination or
abuse. The story will spread like wildfire and the Negro soldier has
been so sensitized by references to his abused position that he is
prepared to believe anything and does. The Negro press has been
quite careless in reporting and playing up accounts of alleged
mistreatment. By no means all the blame can be traced to the Negro
or the Negro press and . . . there is room for great improvement
- [380]
- in our handling of the Negro
in the Army. General Marshall has recently issued a strong directive
to the Army commanders which should initiate a much closer attention
to the handling of those matters by the responsible officers.
-
- The problem is a national one
but the War Department is making every endeavor to see that the
general condition of Negro troops in the Army is improved and that
causes of friction between them and the white troops are removed.
Unfortunately, the steps which one side feels
would remove the trouble, almost invariably stimulates trouble from
the other side and a solution in one part of the country in a
particular situation can rarely be applied generally.2
-
- Proceeding from the general
point of view that racial conditions in the Army were considerably
better than painted to the public and yet not good enough for the best
utilization of all manpower, Secretary McCloy and the Advisory
Committee set about examining the situation with the intention of
improving it so that Negro troops might be more of an asset and less
of a problem in the training and deployment of an Army at war.
-
-
- General Marshall's
"directive," referred to by Secretary McCloy
in his note to Mrs. Roosevelt, was the result of discussions and
urgings in the Advisory Committee.3 A subcommittee, consisting of
General Davis of The Inspector General's Office, Brig. Gen. Miller G.
White, representing G-1, and Lt. Col. Willard S. Renshaw,
representing Army Ground Forces, had drawn up a report on the general
problem, which became the basis for General Marshall's letter to the
field. The subcommittee's account of the provenance of disorders,
taken from Inspector General reports, became the standard War
Department view of the problem. It was essentially the same account
that McCloy gave to Mrs. Roosevelt, but here the central emphasis was
on command and control difficulties.
-
- Most of the disturbances, the
committee reported and General Marshall so described to the field ,4
began with real or fancied incidents of discrimination or segregation
against Negro troops. No positive action was taken by commanders to
overcome the causes of irritation and unrest. Gossip and rumor
circulated. A minor incident occurring thereafter often brought on a
general disturbance. There was a widespread failure of commanders of
some echelons to appreciate the seriousness of the matters involved
and their responsibility for dealing with them. Few commanders took
preventive measures to forestall impending general disorder. In many
cases commands made allowances for the improper conduct of white or
Negro soldiers, among themselves or toward each other, until
discipline was generally undermined. General Marshall in his
- [381]
- letter reminded commanders
that the maintenance of discipline and good order between soldiers
and the civilian population was a "definite command
responsibility," and that those guilty of derelictions must be
punished by prompt and effective disciplinary measures.
"Failure on the part of any commander to concern himself
personally and vigorously with this problem will be considered as
evidence of lack of capacity and cause for reclassification and
removal from assignment," he concluded.
-
- The Advisory Committee, in its
recommendations to the Chief of Staff, urged that the troop
commander not only be impressed with the importance and difficulty of
the problem but also that he be required:
- (1) To maintain close personal
contact with the situation.
- (2) To follow implicitly the
War Department policies and instructions, in letter and spirit, with
respect to discrimination and the provision of equal facilities.
- (3) To take positive action to
insure early determination of the existence of unrest and
disaffection among troops and to remove the causes therefor, whether
they result from conditions under his jurisdiction or from
unsatisfactory relationships with the civilian population.
- (4) To develop definite
programs within his own jurisdiction for the elimination of causes of
friction on military reservations.
- (5) To maintain close
relations with the civil authorities and secure co-operative action
by them to remove or correct causes of friction between soldiers and
the civil population.
- (6) To discover and suppress
inflammatory gossip, rumors, or propaganda among the troops
themselves, preferably by countermeasures to offset same. When
unrest and the causes therefor are known to exist, he must see that
the troops themselves are aware that he is so informed and are themselves informed as to the
measures the commander is taking to remove the causes.
- (7) When conditions so warrant
and when it is apparent that the means under his jurisdiction are
ineffectual to obtain corrective or remedial action, to immediately
report all facts of the circumstance: to his superior.5
-
- The committee recommended as
well that the commanding generals of the Air, Ground, and Service
Forces be directed to submit specific recommendations for changes in
policies on the treatment of Negro personnel, the use of camp
facilities, the organization of Negro soldiers into units, and the
employment of those units. Negro combat troops, the committee urged,
should be dispatched to active theaters at an early date: "In the
opinion of the Committee, such action would be the moss effective
means of reducing tension among Negro troops." 6
The three
principal commands, moreover, should be directed to report to the
Chief of Staff the action they had taken to carry out these
recommendations.
-
- Though much of the action
suggested by the committee was implied in the letter of the Chief of
Staff, the specific recommendations were not forwarded to the major
commands. The committee knew that standing War Department policies and
instructions were not being carried out fully in all commands, am
that in some instances they were not ever fully known; it knew that
commander were not paying sufficient attention to the seriousness of
what was, after all, buy one of many problems with which they were
faced. It believed that training
- [382]
- problems and disturbances were
linked with the over-all question of Negro troop utilization and that
War Department policies themselves were in need of revision. But
there was still a reluctance to interfere with command
responsibilities by pointing out more than that these responsibilities
existed. Ameliorative efforts therefore proceeded in other directions.
-
-
- On the question of the
relationship of the press to morale, the Bureau of Public Relations,
which was centrally concerned with public and press reactions, was
especially disturbed not only by Army relations with the Negro
press but also by recurring suggestions from G-2 and from field
commanders that portions of the Negro press be censored or otherwise
controlled.7 In the summer of 1942 when such suggestions had been
frequently made as a result of the Negro press coverage of the racial
disturbances of that year, the bureau replied that it was attempting
to help, rather than hinder, the Negro press in obtaining and
printing accounts of Negroes in the Army. "The policy of this
Bureau," it told G-3, "has been to work for a higher degree
of factual accuracy in published reports of the activities of Negro
troops, to emphasize the many favorable aspects of Army practices and
policy in racial matters, and to encourage the reconsideration of articles or
editorials of a critical or controversial nature."8 The
bureau gradually became a center for the regular visits of Negro
reporters and it in turn sent its representatives for visits to the
Negro publishers and to their annual conferences. A weekly illustrated mat service especially planned for Negro papers and the
encouragement of public relations officers in the field to stimulate
the reporting of news of Negro activities brought an increase of
information on Negro soldiers in both the Negro and the metropolitan
white press. A Special Interest Section to serve the needs of the
Negro press was organized within the bureau in the summer of 1942
and Negro officers were brought in to operate it in 1943. Visits to
maneuver areas were arranged for Negro reporters so that the
progress and seriousness of the training of Negro troops could be
observed at firsthand.
-
- The bureau maintained a weekly
analysis service of trends in the Negro press which sorted stories
according to their favorable or unfavorable presentation of news
concerning the Army. These analyses, plus those of Elmer Davis' Office of War Information, showed early that the Negro press was
hungry for news of Negro soldiers and that it would use almost every
item which the bureau could supply. In the summer of 1942, when so
many unfavorable reports of the treatment of Negro soldiers in the
Army appeared in the Negro press, a bureau analysis of the contents of
one issue of the Pittsburgh Courier showed twenty-six articles
attacking racial discrimination in general, eight attacking racial
- [383]
- discrimination in the Army,
and one attacking discrimination in the Navy. Of general news
concerning Negroes in the Army, there were twenty-three articles, all
favorable, and two on the Navy, both favorable. The ratio of critical
Army to critical general articles (8 to 26) was considered by the
bureau an improvement. The preponderant effect, the bureau
concluded, was not produced by editorials but by headlines and
pictures. It proposed to keep a steady supply of news items and
pictures flowing to the Negro papers.9 This it did, with the flow
increasing as more war news became available. Most of the bureau
news releases found wide use.
-
- Despite these efforts, the
reporting of events in a manner critical of the Army continued. In the
opinions of field commanders, such articles were damaging to the
morale of troops. In addition to making suggestions that all or
particular Negro papers be placed under surveillance for possible
subversive activities, a number of posts and stations from time to
time banned one or another paper from sale in exchanges or libraries.10 Few posts went so far as the Antiaircraft Training
Center at Fort Bliss, Texas. There, after the 1943 disturbances,
Negro newspapers which, in the opinion of the commanding general,
contained material of "such an agitational nature as to be
prejudicial to military discipline within the training center"
were banned from the post entirely. All mail received at the Fort
Bliss post office for Negro
battalions was delivered to the camp's postal officer, who extracted
"objectionable newspapers." The remaining mail was then
delivered, with the training center commander directing the final
disposition of newspapers. While the legality of this procedure was
endorsed by the Eighth Service Command's Director of Military
Intelligence and by the Censorship Officer, El Paso Branch, Office
of Postal Censorship, the Antiaircraft Command, when informed of the
practice, sought further advice from the War Department.
-
- Army Ground Forces, upon
receipt of the Antiaircraft Command's report, telephoned the
commanding general of the Antiaircraft Command to have the commanding
general of the Fort Bliss training center discontinue his practices
immediately. As an emergency measure, Ground Forces G-2 thought, a
commander might properly stop a particular paper or an issue, but to
do so permanently "would only serve to supply ammunition for
agitation to colored papers." 11
-
- Evidence of the unauthorized
prohibition of Negro newspapers in libraries, reading rooms, service
clubs, and post exchanges continued to reach the Bureau of Public
Relations. Inquiries of service commands had revealed no formal
bans, for actions of this type had not been taken through regular
channels. But in some cases post intelligence officers, without an
order from the post commander, had proceeded to ban papers. In at
least one case a unit intelligence officer did so after receiving
- [384]
- from his service command the
information that though the service command had no approved or
disapproved list of papers, on certain posts specific papers, which
were named, had been banned. The bureau felt that if it had not
pursued its investigations below the level of camp commanders, it
"might have been placed in the position of stating that there was
no truth in the report . . . ." It took the position endorsed by
Army Ground Forces earlier that so long as newspapers and magazines
enjoyed post office privileges local commanders should not ban them
from installations without War Department approval. The bureau was
certain that, through its liaison officers, it would be able to remedy
public relations situations considered damaging to morale. The
bureau's position was approved by the War Department and commanders
were so informed. 12
-
- Both Negro and white editors
and publishers became concerned with the influence which their
papers had upon tense racial situations. How irresponsible editing
had helped foment the Harlem riot of 1943 and how rumor clinics and
careful handling of news had helped avert threatened racial
difficulties in Indianapolis and Washington were discussed in the
official organ of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Certain
Southern dailies, such as the Mobile, Alabama, Register and the
Shelby, North Carolina, Star made determined efforts to describe
regularly in their columns the activities of Negro men and women in
the war, giving Negro readers "the feeling that their work in defense of democracy is
appreciated," and giving to the general public some picture of
Negro participation in the war.13 Negro editors and publishers, when
defending their own editorial practices, often arrogated to
themselves much credit for initiating changes in Army policy,14 but
they also began to check more frequently with the Bureau of Public
Relations and the Office of the Civilian Aide before printing accounts
of disturbances and discriminatory practices.15 They could and did
point out that they had refrained from using many of the stories which
came to their attention.16 But enough stories remained on their
front pages to make Negro papers easy targets as sources of
disaffection during most of the war.
-
- The Bureau of Public Relations
learned early that the manner of presen-
- [385]
- ANP CORRESPONDENT AND MEN OF A
SIGNAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION
- somewhere in France, 13 July 1944.
-
- tation and phrasing of news
releases about minorities was as critical in the development of
favorable attitudes as the news facts themselves. "Being
cognizant of [the] adverse effect of publicizing most Negro troops
serving overseas in World War I, as 'labor battalions,' " the
bureau had the War Department inform overseas commands in June 1942
that "the War Department announced the recent arrival of Negro
troops in Northern Ireland without reference to composition."
But the move was "nullified" by
theater statements that these troops were intended for the Services of
Supply only. These statements, the bureau cautioned, were interpreted as an attempt to label all Negro troops overseas as
noncombatant. While both the War Department and overseas commanders
were to "see that overseas arrival of Negro troops is well
publicized at each opportunity," the arrival of noncombatant
Negro troops was to be discussed in each instance as "Negro
troops" without reference to
- [386]
- their composition, the
communication directed.17 News and pictures of
Negro soldiers which
reinforced the traditional beliefs that the Army had little
intention of employing Negroes as combat soldiers, the bureau
realized, were almost as damaging as none at all.
-
- News of Negro soldiers was not
only useful in public relations but it was also a morale factor among
soldiers themselves. Negro troops were quick to notice the absence
of news about them or about their units in newspapers, magazines, and
newsreels. The men of the gad Engineer General Service Regiment
constructing the Alcan Highway from the Alaska end, for example, felt
that their work received no public recognition in comparison with that
of other units on the highway. "They want their friends to read
about their regiment and feel that they understand their outfit is
making an important contribution to the war effort," an officer
of the regiment reported. The failure of correspondents to visit their
portions of the road or to mention them in their articles "had a
bad effect on morale and esprit de corps of the individual soldier and
his regiment." 18
-
- As larger numbers of Negro
units were deployed overseas, the Bureau of Public Relations
co-operated with Negro newspapers in getting their war correspondents into the theaters. In 1943, the Bureau of Public
Relations and the Civilian Aide encouraged thirteen papers to organize
a pool of correspondents so that better coverage might be available to all from among
the limited number of correspondents available.19 By the end of
the war, every major theater had been visited by at least one Negro
war correspondent.
-
-
- Aiding the Bureau of Public
Relations in its attempt to improve public and soldier attitudes
through the news was the film, The Negro Soldier,20 completed in the
fall of 1943 and distributed in early 1944. This film was begun within
the Special Service Division as one of a series of educational films
designed to supplement the Why We Fight orientation films. As a
pioneer venture in Army and film history, it received careful
attention from a number of people. When Frank Capra sent the first
complete script to General Osborn it had already had the benefit of a
full memorandum on "Things to Do and Not to Do" by the
division's consultant, Dr. Donald Young, and the skills of some of the
best film and drama technicians.21 The
finished script, done by Jo
Swirling and Ben Hecht, was, Capra felt, "far superior to
anything we have had. Done with taste and repression, this may not
only be an information picture, but may also serve as an emotional
glorification of the Negro war effort."22 It was just this
emotional quality of the script that worried the Washington
headquarters. "It is
- [387]
- undoubtedly a powerful script
but the fact that it is, as you say in your letter, an emotional
glorification of the Negro war effort," General Osborn replied to
Capra, "puts it in a different class from the one we had intended
and makes us very doubtful about showing it to troops without changes
that would mean practically recasting the script." 23
-
- Dr. Young and Capt. Charles
bollard, analyzing the script from an audience reception angle, felt
that it had been improved over an earlier version by the addition of
a minister and mother as narrators. But, they pointed out, the new
characters must be handled carefully:
-
- The woman should not be a
"mammy." Her race should be determinable only by her color;
not by her dress or manner. The preacher might well be a relatively
young man, typical of the new clergy of the cities. The emotional
element in the situation should not be overstressed either in the
language of the script or in the diction of the characters.
-
- Much of the sermon and the
soldier's letter was "just plain corny"; too often Negroes
were reminded of the more bitter experiences of their past. The
authors inadvertently "probe[d] at least one old wound on every
page." Young and bollard recommended that since the film was to
be shown as "produced by the War Department" it was doubly
important that the script adhere rigidly to fact, and that it avoid
all reference, direct or indirect, calculated to remind Negroes of
old grievances.24
-
- After much discussion, the
film went into production in January 1943.25 Within the framework of
a Negro church service, enabling the use of a choir with the
minister's sermon as the connecting narrative thread, the film
unfolded a chronicle of the Negro soldiers' participation in past
American wars. Then, through the medium of a letter read by a proud
mother in the congregation, it detailed the story of a Negro recruit,
his training, and his rise to a second lieutenancy. The film was
produced with a restraint and dignity previously rare in films on
Negro subjects. Eventually, it was ordered shown to all troops
"without special emphasis or introduction to the
audience." 26
-
- Before the film was ordered shown
to all personnel, it was previewed by two groups of soldiers, one white
and one Negro, both so chosen as to be representative of the Negro and white
Army populations. The film was well received by both Negro and white soldiers,
with nine-tenths of the Negroes and two-thirds of the whites saying they
"liked it very much." There was less than I o percent difference
between Northern and Southern white soldiers in the percentage liking the
film. Most soldiers felt that the film gave an accurate picture of the Negro
soldier, with less than three
- [388]
- percent of the Negroes and
five percent of the whites thinking the film mostly one-sided or
untrue.27 A short version of the film was made available in June 1944
for civilian exhibition.
-
- Appearances of Negro soldiers
in Army-produced films, except in glimpses, were rare until after the
production of The Negro Soldier. Subsequent films, such as
Westward Is Bataan,28 paid greater attention to the role of Negro
soldiers, especially service troops. The orientation film for
Americans in Britain, Welcome to Britain 29
contained a brief
treatment of the difference between the British and American
points of view about race. The Air Forces produced for the third
anniversary of the Tuskegee Army Air Field a film, Wings for This Man,30
recounting the achievements of that training school and its
graduates. At the request of the theater, a producing team went to
Europe in 1944 for a film on the Negro's part in the European
offensive, released as Teamwork.31 While not all of these ventures
were unqualified successes, they were useful as morale and
informational material for Negro and white soldiers and for the
general public.
-
-
- Taking advantage of materials
newly collected by the Research Branch of the Special Service
Division, the Advisory Committee sponsored in 1943 the publication
of an unprecedented pamphlet intended to inspire improved leadership
in Negro units and to inform officers in the field of the official War
Department position on the employment of Negro troops. Such a
statement had been urged from time to time in the Advisory Committee,
whose members had felt that much of the difficulty experienced in
Negro units was traceable to a lack of knowledge and to
misinterpretation of War Department policies and points of view. The
need for definitive information was pointed up by continuing requests from unit commanders and by the use, on certain posts, of
unauthorized instructional materials culled from sources of varying
reliability. The War Department pamphlet, issued as Command of Negro
Troops,32 was prepared in the Special Service Division and in the
Joint Army-Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation as one of a series
on command policies.33 The Special Service Division, in its manual
for orientation officers, the Guide to the Use of Information
Materials, in use since October 1942 as an office memorandum and
distributed generally in December 1942 ,34 had already set the tone
for this publication
- [389]
- by declaring: "Problems
of race are a proper concern of the Army only so far as they affect
the efficiency of the Army, no more, no less," and "To
contribute by act or word toward the increase of misunderstanding,
suspicion, and tension between peoples of different racial or
national origin in this country or among our Allies is to help the
enemy." Though limitations to its concern were set, that the Army
had a concern with "race" was freely admitted in a way which
would have been impossible in 1940. The division's "Pocket
Guides" and "Language Guides" for American troops in
foreign countries were contributions to an understanding between
soldiers and alien but friendly populations.
-
- The pamphlet on the command of
Negro troops recognized an equal or greater problem of understanding
between soldiers of different races within the American Army and
attempted to deal with it within the framework of military necessity.
Though the preparation of the pamphlet on command was begun early in
1943, and though its first appearance was on 27 September of that
year, it represented such a major departure from previous Army
practice that its actual distribution to the field, after successive
readings and many suggestions by members of the Advisory Committee and
by other interested agencies, was delayed until early 1944. It was
then distributed to all Army units containing Negroes and to their
higher headquarters.
-
- The pamphlet, divided into
sections on Negro manpower and on problems of command, was intended
"to help officers to command their troops more effectively by
giving them information which will increase their understanding of their men."
35
It
stressed the fact that "Colored Americans, like all other
Americans, have the right and duty to serve their country to the very
best of their individual abilities" and that "the Army has
the right and duty to see to it that its personnel of all races do so
serve." 36
It examined the problem of Negro adjustment to the
Army, comparing it with the adjustment problems of "a white
soldier from California" as they differed from "a white
soldier from Maine or Florida." While showing that the Negro
population, on the average, had had inferior schooling, less skilled
work experiences, and that "its role in the life of the Nation
has been limited," it went on to counter stereotyped notions of
Negroes by pointing out that "No statement beginning 'All
Negroes' is true, just as no statement beginning `All Frenchmen,' 'All
Chinese,' or `All Americans' is true." 37
Comparing the status
of Negroes in World War I with progress made in World War II, it
sought to reassure troop leaders of the potential value of their
units.
-
- The problems of low ACCT
scores, classification and assignment, illiteracy, resentment on the
part of Negro troops, and other sources of difficulty for Negroes
and their commanders were discussed briefly and in simple language
under such headings as "Know Your Men," "Good Soldiers
Are Made, Not Born," "Little Expected, Little Gained,"
and "Negro Soldiers Are Americans." The pamphlet went
specifically into the dangers of loose and offensive language, going
farther than
- [390]
- either General Davis or judge
Hastie had originally requested. It advised:
-
- Many people who do not mean to
be insulting use terms, tell jokes, and do things which are
traditionally interpreted by Negroes as derogatory. Such words as "boy," "Negress,"
"darky," "uncle," "mammy,"
"aunty," and "nigger," are generally disliked by
Negroes. There is also dislike of the pronunciation of the word
"Negro" as though it were spelled "Nigra," because
it seems to be a sort of general compromise between the hated word
"nigger" and the preferred term "Negro." Colored
and Negro are the only words which should be used to distinguish
colored soldiers from white . . . . It is difficult, if not
impossible, to characterize all behavior which is resented by Negroes, but perhaps the
simplest, if too general, way to express it is to say that troop
morale will suffer if the words or acts of officers imply either
racial hostility or a patronizing, condescending attitude.38
-
- The burden of the text was
that the commander of Negro troops was faced with no new problems but
only with the task of extending "to a specific situation the
teachings of everyday experience in the handling of men." 39
To
this end, a catechetical check list of fifteen points for commanders
was appended to the pamphlet and included as well on an inserted,
pocket sized card which the commander could remove and consult at any
time. This check list, suggested by Colonel Leonard, the Secretary of
the McCloy committee, posed the following questions for the commander:
-
- 1. Have I made due allowances
for any lack of educational opportunity in my men?
- 2. Have I made proper effort
to teach my men skills they have not previously had opportunity to
acquire?
- 3. Have 1 provided literary
classes for those needing them?
- 4. Have I used words and
phrases that my men cannot fully comprehend?
- 5. Have I taken great pains
with AGCT IV's and V's to explain to them the consequences of AWOL
and venereal diseases?
- 6. Have I provided the most
intelligent and responsible soldiers with a good chance to earn
promotion and to use their best abilities, even at the expense of
having them transferred from my command?
- 7. Have I done or said things
that might wound the sensibilities of my men?
- 8. Have I protected the rights
of my men in their relations with the public?
- 9. Have I required of my
troops soldierly discipline, appearance, and conduct in their
relations with the public?
- 10. Have I provided my public
relations officer with as many items as possible relating to
commendable performances by my outfit and individual soldiers in it?
- 11. Have I exacted the
highest degree of discipline, care of equipment, care of grounds and
buildings, etc., while making allowances for limitations on ability to
perform where lack of education and mechanical skills may be a
handicap?
- 12. Have I given my
organization the opportunity to acquire pride and confidence in itself
by giving it missions for which my men show superior qualifications?
- 13. Have I excused my own
shortcomings as a commander by attributing inadequate training to lack
of ability on the part of my command instead of to my own failure to
correct shortcomings?
- 14. Have I constantly kept
before my men the reasons why we fight?
- 15. Have I subordinated all
else to my duties as a commander, and have my men been brought to
realize the paramount place of the war effort?
-
- The most elaborate of the
intracultural educational media designed to aid training and
diminish disciplinary and attitude problems was Leadership and the
Negro Soldier, begun at the end of 1943 and issued as ASF Manual M-5
in
- [391]
- October 1944. This document
was prepared at the request of Army Service Forces' Military
Training Division for use as a course text in ASF officer candidate
and officers' schools. It was especially desired by the Transportation
Corps, which was then receiving large numbers of officers by transfer
from overstaffed branches like antiaircraft artillery for whom
retraining materials preparatory to their duty with Negro troops were
needed. The manual came equipped with tests and questionnaires for
classroom use. For a ten-hour course, each of its eight chapters was
to provide "the main substance" of a one-hour lecture;
another hour was to be devoted to a showing of the film, The Negro
Soldier, and another to a discussion of the pamphlet, Command of
Negro Troops. A digest of state and federal laws of importance to
Negro troop commanders and a list of readily available reading
materials were appended. Officers and civilians within the Army and
in other agencies whose primary work was concerned with minority
relations in the military or in the general cultural life of the
nation were requested to prepare drafts of chapters dealing with
aspects of the Negro soldier which they were especially fitted to
discuss.40
-
- The manual, essentially a more
detailed extension of Command of Negro Troops, was intended to give
a general description of Negro life in America as it affected military
service and command. In addition to its use in ASF schools, the
manual was distributed to each
company of Negro troops in ASF, to all orientation officers, and to
any requesting agency or unit of the other major commands. "The
issue is not whether the Negro will be used in the War," the
foreword to the manual pointed out, "it is how effectively he
will be used. This question cannot be evaded. Furthermore, it cannot
be met successfully by uninformed judgments on the basis of civilian
associations and personal views on the subject. The problems involved
are as technical as any other problem of personnel, and can be
solved only with the benefit of special study, full information, and a
serious interest in their resolution."
-
- These instruments of deeper
understanding and of a more serious application of principles of
command to special problems in which too few of the Army's officers
were well-grounded were warrants of the Army's determination to
assure the maximum and most effective use of all manpower. That they
came so late in the war was regrettable, but unavoidable. There was
still a residual fear that the Army's efforts in this direction
might be misinterpreted and that they might create new problems by
focusing attention upon old ones. "It is essential that there
be a clear understanding" Manual M-5 therefore warned,
"that the Army has no authority or intention to participate in
social reform as such but does view the problem as a matter of
efficient troop utilization."
-
- Concern over the possible
misinterpretation of the purpose of this and similar materials was
real. A clear statement of purpose disavowing any other intent that
might have been implied was necessary to avoid public controversy of
the
- [392]
- sort which, during the period
of distribution of command of Negro Troops and preparation of Manual
M-5, centered about the proposed use of another pamphlet by the
Army. In January 1944, the Orientation Branch, Morale Services
Division, ASF, ordered 55,000 copies of The Races of Mankind, prepared for the Public Affairs Committee, a private educational
organization, by Professor Ruth Benedict and Dr. Gene Weltfish of the
Department of Anthropology of Columbia University, The pamphlet was
intended for distribution in kits supplied to information and
education officers and to orientation centers. It was selected, the
branch explained, for "adequacy of content and simplicity of
statement of the essential facts regarding races." It was to be
used as an aid in refuting Nazi "master race" theories.
-
- Before the pamphlet could be
delivered to and distributed by the Army, it had become a subject of
public controversy involving two civilian service organizations.
United Service Organizations barred the pamphlet from its service
centers as promoting special interests, whereupon the Congress of
Industrial Organizations' War Relief Committee, calling it
"one of the best answers to Hitler's Aryan creed," announced that it would mail the
pamphlet to all servicemen on its
lists. Argument for and against the pamphlet became entangled in the
domestic race issue, especially in relation to the quotation of
World War I Alpha test scores of Northern Negroes and Southern whites
cited to show the influence of environment and education upon mental
test results. When the Army's purchase of the pamphlet became known,
press comments upon the purchase, both pro and con, were widespread,
despite the fact that the Orientation Branch, by 29 February, had
decided not to use the pamphlet. The House of Representatives
Committee on Military Affairs became interested. On 26 April its
special subcommittee investigating the distribution of publications to
Army personnel released a report concluding that "The committee
is convinced that wartime is no time to engage in the publication
and distribution of pamphlets presenting controversial issues or
promoting propaganda for or against any subdivision of the American
people." 41
The sponsors of Army materials giving a background in
racial and minority matters wished to precipitate no similar
controversy over their instructional material.
-
- Two other attempts to improve
leadership through providing instructional materials, both of them
in the same area and both of them illustrative of the possibilities
for misunderstanding inherent in all save the most carefully prepared materials, were made at the War Department and branch
levels. One misfired and the other never went off.
-
- Disturbed by the mixed effect
of chaplains on leadership and morale in Negro units as reported
both by senior chap-
- [393]
- lains
and by field commanders, the Chief of Chaplains, "in the hope that
a careful reading will help toward a more harmonious relationship,"
reproduced and circulated to all Negro chaplains, their commanders, and
to the Chaplain School copies of a letter on leadership sent by a Negro
chaplain to Chaplain Arnold. The letter had been received during the discussions
of reducing the standards for Negro chaplains to help overcome the shortage
of applicants for the chaplaincy.42
It had been proposed for publication to Negro chaplains at the time, but
it did not appear until just after the National Baptists had discussed in
bitter terms the problems of Negro chaplains. The letter read in part:
-
- .
. . It is with extreme regret that I contemplate the recent difficulties
experienced by some Negro Chaplains, resulting in Court Martial. Much material
is available from which a Chaplain may glean information and instruction,
but there is little or nothing designed to counsel the new Negro Chaplain
in his unique task. Many habits of thought and speech, customary to the
newly commissioned colored minister, must be re-thought and adjusted to
Army Service. Success in the parish ministry is not a guarantee of success
in the Chaplaincy. This is especially true of the successful Negro ministry.
For instance, the 'rabble rousing' success of most successful colored ministers
will always be disastrous, when used, in military service. This technique,
while effective in the parish, is at basis undisciplined and therein we
find its inefficacy for a useful Chaplain. I say "useful" Chaplain
because utility is the objective of the successful Chaplain; Utility for
the good of the service. Religion in the Army is designed I believe to make
its contribution towards the creation and maintaining of a victorious Christian
Army. There is a time and place for the Chaplain to make his contribution
toward the controversial aspects of Labor, Politics and even Race, but that
time and place is not the time of war; not in the service. Unless the new
Chaplain is acquainted early in his career, with these truisms, he will
sooner or later run afoul Army regulations.
-
- The
Race Problem and Race Leadership are naturally a part of the Negro minister's
responsibility. In many communities he is the focal point for adjustment
and intercourse. Unless he is apprised differently early in his career,
the colored Chaplain is apt to imagine himself the Protector of his troops
from the expected injustice of their white officers. This attitude is probably
at the root of the difficulties, recently experienced by some Negro Chaplains.
It is an attitude guaranteed fatal to the success of the Negro Chaplain's
work. With it, he can never be a good Chaplain in terms of usefulness to
both officers and enlisted men. He thereby alienates the officers, some
of whom need and would request his counsel and ministry. Again, he lays
himself open to the charge of Complaint monger, and will find himself with
little time to devote to the soldier consultant who has a perfect record
but who still needs the religious advice and counsel of his Chaplain.
-
- Very
often when dealing with colored troops, a white officer's disciplinary rulings
may be construed as prejudicial. The Negro Chaplain may immediately conclude
that Racial prejudice is being practiced. This may be the case, but unless
it is undeniably true, admittedly true or can be explained in no other way
it should not be so charged. In other words, "for the good of the Service"
Race prejudice is never present unless without the shadow of a doubt. If
a Chaplain will only consider the matter objectively he will realize that
it is very difficult in all cases, and impossible in most, to distinguish
between racial prejudice and the many other types of prejudice with which
ordinary human relations abound. Again, if the Chaplain is not careful he
will sometime find himself ap-
- [394]
- pealing for Race prejudice,
when an unprejudiced judgment would harm some
- man he is trying to aid. At
any rate the technique of deterred judgment as concerns racial
prejudice will not only react to the advantage of the enlisted men
involved but it will give the officer concerned the benefit of the
doubt to which he is entitled. Loose talking and thinking in these
matters is detrimental to the morale of the unit and will eventually
weaken the Chaplain with officers and thoughtful enlisted men alike.
Lousy and indifferent soldiers, of which every unit has its fair
share, will charge all their misfortunes to Race prejudice; the
Chaplain will be tempted to do the same. One day he will find himself
a questionable champion of his Race, but an unquestionable failure
as a chaplain. . . ,43
-
- Reactions from chaplains
ranged from "I am in hearty accord with spirit of the letter. .
." to "Careful reading of this letter many times to be
certain of avoiding misunderstanding causes me to regret deeply
that any man of God, Negro or otherwise, should feel justified in
making some of the statements and observations therein." Some
chaplains felt that they would have benefited had such a statement
been available earlier in their careers. Some disliked the implication that many successful civilian ministers were
"rabble-rousers." Some thought there was overemphasis on
failures which might form the basis for "dubious and widespread
generalization." 44
Most respondents were troubled by the
implications of the letter's comments on chaplains and racial friction. "I can not close my
eyes to what I feel to be a truth upon the assumption that `race
prejudice is never present unless without a shadow of a doubt,'
" one chaplain wrote.45 And another felt that: "The writer
of that letter is certainly an impractical or an inexperienced
chaplain. The chaplain who fails to combat these [discriminatory]
practices is not worthy to carry the CROSS." 46
-
- In reply to the more troubled
chaplains, the Office of the Chief of Chaplains expressed
sentiments such as: "No two men agree fully on any subject,
especially the race question. Anyway, the problem exists and it
behooves each negro and white chaplain to recognize its breadth and
depth and act in the Christian spirit to alleviate as much of the
tension as possible . . . ." 47
To a chaplain who objected to the indorsement of the letter by the Chief of Chaplain's Office, the
reply went: "You are advised that this office did not indorse
all the statements and terms used in the letter sent to all Negro
chaplains and their commanding officers. It was believed that the
letter contained sound counsel and would be suggestive reading for all
concerned. The response from Negro chaplains has proven the wisdom of
this judgment." 48
-
- The Advisory Group of Church
Representatives of the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and
Recreation, headed by Charles P. Taft, determined after this episode
to give its attention to the problem of the chaplaincy and its
relation to the Army's racial problems.
- [395]
- In the winter and spring of
1944 a subcommittee of this group 49
prepared a manuscript, The
Chaplain and the Negro in the Armed Services. It was primarily a
reworking of the material in the War Department pamphlet, Command of
Negro Troops, with the addition of materials on the religious
background of Negro soldiers and specific suggestions on the aid
which both white and Negro chaplains might give to commands and to
soldiers in problems of racial relationships. After committee
discussions with members of the Chief of Chaplain's staff, who were at
first disposed to co-operate in its preparation,50 the manuscript
was presented to the Advisory Group of Church Representatives in
July. The Advisory Group voted unanimously to transmit it to the
Chiefs of Chaplains of both Army and Navy after suggested changes were
incorporated. Chaplain Arnold suggested at this meeting that copies
be sent by his office to senior chaplains for comments before
presentation to the War Department. The manuscript was transmitted to
the Chief of Chaplains on 4 September,51 the same day that Maj. Gen.
Stephen G. Henry, the new G-1, urged in the General Council that all
staff divisions handling matters of racial relationships co-ordinate
their efforts with all other interested agencies. 52
Acting upon an
extracted reminder from the Director of Personnel, ASF,53 the Chief of
Chaplains thereupon forwarded the manuscript asking if the proposed
review procedure was in harmony with this policy.54
-
- The Director of Personnel, ASF,
then forwarded the manuscript to G-1, concurring in the proposal
that it be circulated among experienced white and Negro chaplains
for review and that its revision be submitted by the Chief of
Chaplains through G-1 to the Advisory Committee on Negro Troop
Policies for final approval.55 But
G-1 determined that "The
general tone of the proposed publication is one bordering upon
effecting social readjustment," and believed that
"publication of this manuscript would be subject to
misinterpretation by agitators on both sides of our national racial
problem. The War Department has consistently held that it is not a
medium to effect social reforms." With the concurrence of
Chaplain Arnold, it recommended both against publication and against
circulation to Negro and white chaplains for review and comment.56
Despite Truman Gibson's objections that the reading in G-1 must have
been superficial to merit such a conclusion-he pointed out as an
example that the manuscript's statement that "the Negro is just
another man" bore the penciled marginal query "social
- [396]
- equality?" and that an
examination of the underscored sections indicated that the reader of
the manuscript believed that "the matter of race in the Army
should not be discussed at all"-the pamphlet was held in the
Advisory Committee where action upon it was deferred.57
Partly because
the Advisory Committee held few meetings for the remainder of 1944
and partly because the using service was by now no more enthusiastic
about it than G-1, the manuscript was filed without action and without
further revisions. Other than the letter on their responsibilities a
letter which the Chief of Chaplain's Office denied endorsing
fully-and materials prepared for line officers, chaplains received
no specific instructions on the role they should play in the
leadership of Negro troops.
-
-
- Most members of the Advisory Committee
thought that the directive of 10 March 1943 had clearly defined policy on
the use of post facilities by all troops. This directive forbade the designation
of facilities by race but it permitted their allocation to units provided
that all personnel and all units were given equal opportunity to use them.
Reports from inspectors and from commanders in the next few months indicated
that there was still a lack of information on how the War Department intended
this policy to operate with regard to specific facilities, such as post
exchanges.58
During a discussion of the problem, Secretary McCloy asked the members of
his committee if another order should be issued, whereupon Maj. Gen. Miller
G. White, the G-1, suggested that existing instructions be rewritten instead.
No exchange could refuse to serve any soldier but the instructions had not
made this clear. McCloy therefore asked that a clarification of the 1943
directive be prepared by General White and that, if necessary, a new one
be written and distributed. The Inspector General was requested to add a
report on discrimination in the use of facilities to his routine inspections.
Truman Gibson later requested that special emphasis be placed on the use
of exchanges, transportation, and Army motion picture theaters, for it was
around these facilities that most reported difficulties had arisen.
- The new letter, supplementary
to that of March 1943, outlined specific requirements:
-
- 3. Exchanges.- While exchanges and
branch exchanges may be allocated to serve specific areas or units, no exchange
will be designated for the exclusive use of any particular race. Where such
branch exchanges are established, personnel will not be restricted to the
use of their area or unit exchanges but will be permitted to use any other
exchange on the post, camp, or station.
- 4. Transportation.- Buses, trucks
or other transportation owned and operated either by the Government or by
a governmental instrumentality will be available to all military personnel
regardless of race. Restricting personnel to certain sections of such transportation
because of race will not be permitted either on or off post, camp, or station,
regardless of local civilian custom.
- 5. Army Motion Picture Theaters.-
Army motion picture theaters may be allocated to serve certain areas or
units but no theater or performance in any theater will be de-
- [397]
- nied to any group or
individual because of race.
- 6. Effective compliance with
War Department policies enunciated herein will be obtained through
inspection by responsible commanders and inspectors general. Each
inspector general will be directed that if, during a periodic
inspection [of] a post, camp, or station, he discovers evidence of
racial discrimination or indirect violation of War Department policies
on this subject, he will inform the commanding officer of the
installation that such discrimination is contrary to War Department
policy. If subsequent inspection of the installation indicates that
proper remedial measures have not been taken, the commanding general
of the service command will initiate action to insure full compliance
with the announced policy.59
-
- This directive did not
immediately affect all of the enumerated services at all posts but,
as subsequent inspections by service commands and Army Service Forces
headquarters showed, it gradually dispelled tensions on posts where
restrictions of movement had been a constant threat to good order. The
directive was generally distributed to the lowest echelons by late
summer. It was not generally reproduced for troops on posts, although
some posts published it in daily bulletins. But the press, and
particularly the Negro press, had long since announced the fact of its
issuance, and, eventually, printed copies of the order itself.
"Extra! U.S. Army Bans Jim Crow in PX's, Buses and
Theaters," one paper headlined its story.60
Another captioned
an editorial: "Four Years Late." Subsequently it published
the full text of the directive itself, under the first page headline,
"Here It is!" 61
With the directive readily
available in the more widely circulated Negro papers, it was not long
before most Negro soldiers knew of its existence.
-
- Some commanders and some
governors and congressmen of Southern states were disturbed over the
intent and effect of the directive. Replies to inquiries clarified War
Department policy as much as the new letter. Replying to a protest of
Governor Chauncey Sparks of Alabama that the new directive would break
down segregation in the South, Acting Secretary Robert P. Patterson
restated the War Department's views:
-
- There has been no change in
the Vicar Department's practice concerning segregation of races. The
most recent publication is a letter of July 8th which reiterates a
previously announced policy and enjoins compliance therewith. I
presume that the notice mentioned in your telegram stating that the
War Department has ordered the termination of race segregation refers
to this letter.
-
- The War Department has
maintained throughout the emergency and present war that it is not an
appropriate medium for effecting social readjustments but has insisted that all soldiers, regardless of race, be afforded equal
opportunity to enjoy the recreational facilities which are provided at
posts, camps and stations. The thought has been that men who are
fulfilling the same obligations, suffering the same dislocation of
their private lives, and wearing the identical uniform should,
within the confines of the military establishment, have the same
privileges for rest and relaxation.
-
- I appreciate greatly your
interest in this problem but I am sure you will understand the War
Department's viewpoints in reference to it.62
- [398]
- While the point of view that
within the military reservation standard treatment of all soldiers
was to prevail was not included in any official War Department
statements to the field, the new interpretation that racial separation
applied to units only and not to other activities became standard
within the higher levels of the War Department. Subsequent answers to
similar inquiries on the same directive were based on this letter.63
General Marshall's redrafted version added another slant:
"Occasionally it is necessary to reiterate former
announcements, as was done in this instance, in order to admonish
those who may not be diligently complying with a prior order."
Continuing, he observed: "It is unfortunate that this directive has been publicized as setting forth a new War Department
racial policy, and I see no justification for such publicity. The
intent of the War Department was to insure continued fair treatment
of all military personnel in the use of recreational facilities at
military reservations and in the use of government
transportation." 64
Secretary Stimson, in answering the reply of
one of the protesting congressmen who had already received the War
Department's interpretation, reiterated this viewpoint and
distinguished between interference with local customs and the conduct
of affairs within the Military Establishmen.65 Thus the new letter,
through these interpretations, provided for the first time a clear
distinction between Army racial policies to be applied on federal
military reservations and local civilian laws and customs to be
observed by members of the Military Establishment when off-post.
-
- Most posts gradually adapted
themselves to the specific instructions of the letter on facilities.
Post facilities could still be designated for specific units or areas,
but no facility could now be designated exclusively for specific
units or areas. For the most part the new clarification of the use
of facilities was adopted in whole or in significant part, although
examples of evasion and indirect discouragement continued to be
found by inspectors. A few months after the issuance of the
directive, Colonel Leonard, the secretary of the Advisory Committee,
observed that:
-
- It was significant that the
recent War Department letter on this subject was interpreted by
both white and colored personnel as a radical change in policy.
Commanding officers believed it necessary that conferences be held for
the organizations of the command to explain the meaning of this
letter, and many colored soldiers believed that all local instructions
on these subjects were rescinded.
-
- Bus transportation in general
has been improved, due in part to the reduction of personnel at many
camps. However, at some camps, as at Camp Claiborne, bus
transportation is still considered unsatisfactory by colored
personnel. Continuous study of this subject is necessary by camp
authorities to insure fair treatment to all.
-
- The principal difficulties at
Post Exchanges had to do with restaurant service,
- [399]
- particularly for civilian
patrons, and also white attendants objected to
serving Negro personnel. These difficulties have been satisfactorily
arranged.
-
- At several camps, there was
objection to any separation at theaters, particularly by the Air Force
personnel at Fort Knox and at Walterboro Air Base. At Fort Knox the Commanding Officer believes it
for the best interest to all to separate theater audiences into four
groups as follows: officers, both white and colored; soldiers
accompanied by women; unaccompanied white soldiers; and unaccompanied
colored soldiers. At Walterboro Air Base colored personnel refused
to attend theaters until the orders requiring separation were
withdrawn.
- Camps have become adjusted to
the above-mentioned letter and no further trouble is anticipated.66
-
- The fact that anyone could use
any facility was enough to turn the tide of Negro soldiers' morale
upward on many posts. Men often continued to use the exchanges and
theaters in their own areas-they were closest-but they now had less
reason to resent the existence of facilities which were no longer
forbidden territory. On some posts, facilities were so arranged that
it was less convenient for Negroes to use any others than those
which had formerly been specifically designated for them. At Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, by late 1944 it was reported:
-
- No racial discrimination is
practiced although there is a general tendency for the units made up
of Negro soldiers to use the facilities most convenient to them. This,
however, is due to personal desire and convenience: All soldiers are
permitted to use any post theater, exchange, or other facilities . .
. . No discrimination or segregation is practiced. Negroes may ride on
any bus and occupy any seat on the intra-camp of [or] Fort Bragg-Fayetteville
service. However, to expedite service specified buses are assigned
runs to designated areas and of the twenty-three (2g) buses regularly
assigned seven (7) operate direct to the colored area. Of the
thirty-two (32) regularly assigned schedules, five (5) are scheduled
to the colored area. . . ,67
-
- At Fort Lewis, Washington,
which had been sloughing off the visible signs of discrimination for
many months, conscious efforts to avoid any semblance of segregation
were obvious by the end of the year. In the Engineer Training Section
of the Army Service Forces Training Center, where most Negro troops
were then located, Negroes freely used the main exchange and theater
adjacent to headquarters as well as those located in their units'
areas. Championship athletic teams were organized from all Engineer
unit teams to play the Medical Section for Training Center
championships. A show, The Sons of Bridges, with a mixed cast and two
orchestras, one white and one Negro, was produced. Minor
altercations, of no serious consequence and of no racial significance,
occurred but they were quickly controlled. "The best indication
of the relationship between white and Negro troops stationed
here," one observer wrote, "is evidenced by daily
observation of mixed groups walking to and from the bus station."
68
Several months later the same observer, on a return trip, noted:
-
- Racial relationship continues
to be very good at Fort Lewis. No discrimination was observed either
on the post or in Tacoma and Seattle. Adequate Theatres, Post Ex-
- [400]
- changes, Chapels and Service
Clubs are available in the areas occupied by Negro troops; however,
negro troops were observed in other Theaters and Exchanges. The
general attitude is to consider them as other soldiers . . . .69
-
- Though Fort Lewis received men
with no better AGCT scores and civilian training than other centers
and though an acute officer and instructor shortage existed there,
training as well as morale were better than average: Of 1,111 Negro enlisted students enrolled in eight specialist courses, 987 or
88.8 percent satisfactorily completed their courses. Both the AWOL and
the courts-martial rates for Negro troops were lower than for white
troops. Of the substandard men marked for discharge processing (1,010
in November, 60 percent of them Negro) a number were returned to
basic military training. One such group of f o8 men was organized into
a separate company with three platoons of three squads each; results
were "exceptionally" good. With small squads and platoons,
more individual attention could be given: thirty-six of these men went
quickly into regular training units; a few were court-martialed and
discharged; and the rest were retained for the completion of basic
training. Officer attitudes encountered were also exceptional:
"None of the officers questioned had any objections to serving
with Negro troops. In fact the majority expressed their surprise that
such duty was not as `bad' as they had anticipated." 70
-
- At a number of other stations
adjustment to the new directive in word and spirit was a longer
process. Some camps moved the office of the exchange officer to what
had been a Negro exchange, designating it the main camp exchange and
transforming the main exchange into a unit or area exchange; others,
after ordering all personnel to obey the directions of attendants,
experimented with instructions that ushers in theaters or field houses
and attendants in bowling alleys were to direct Negro patrons to
specified seat locations or aisles; at still other camps word of their
new privileges was assiduously kept from Negro troops. But at most
posts the new directive, for all practical purposes, removed a chief
bone of racial contention. Where, because of area distances or other
factors, it made no marked difference in the habits of enlisted men,
Negro or white, the directive nevertheless assured Negro soldiers
that, in principle, the War Department had endorsed its oft-repeated
assertion that all soldiers were treated alike in the eyes of the
Army. This knowledge raised morale higher in many units than the
construction of the most elaborate service club or exchange had
achieved in many another instance.
-
-
- Complementing these efforts
was the development, within Army Service Forces, of a system of
periodic inspections and recommendations by teams of officers. After
mid-1944 Army Service Forces had control of most Negro troops within
the continental United States either through their assignment to ASF
units or to posts under ASF control. In
- [401]
- October 1944 the command
devised a system making its major staff divisions directly responsible
for particular activities connected with the training and use of
Negro troops. Though racial relations "in general" were
much better on most posts than complaints to the War Department would
indicate,71 to keep them good at posts where they had been good all
along, to obtain lessons from these posts which could be applied
elsewhere, and to improve conditions in areas where long-standing
reputations for difficulties simply built new problems were major
functions of the ASF observation teams.
-
- ASF's Deputy Chief of Staff for
Service Commands was charged with co-coordinating all policies and programs
affecting Negro troops and of CO-coordinating ASF policies with those of
the General Staff and of the Ground and Air Forces. The Director of Plans
and Operations was to expedite the movement of troops overseas and, where
possible, shift a portion of the troops from Southern to Northern camps
near cities with sizable Negro populations, at the same time holding conversions
of existing Negro units to a minimum. The Director of Personnel was to concentrate
on improving leadership in Negro units and to increase the preparation and
use of orientation and recreational facilities for Negroes on posts. The
Director of Military Training was to designate an officer to make frequent
inspection visits on Negro training as well as distribute special instructional
material. All staff agencies were to maintain at least one officer to whom
racial problems could be referred. Inspection teams, composed of representatives
of each of the major ASF agencies, were to make frequent trips to ASF installations.
72
Colonel Leonard, previously secretary of the Advisory Committee, became
the officer in charge of co-ordination in the Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Service Commands. The field observation committee, known as
the Leonard Committee, made intensive surveys of the larger and more critical
posts and areas, making some recommendations on the spot and keeping a close
check on general trends in racial matters as they affected training and
morale. The work of this committee produced notable results where its recommendations
were followed, but its organization so late in the war gave it a scant year
of intensive activity.73
-
- By this time a majority of the
Army's troop strength was overseas 74 and the domestic scene, while
retaining importance, was of less general concern in the employment
of Negro troops. Ground Forces training stations were progressively
closing. For better training and supervision, small service units were
concentrated in Army Service Forces Train-
- [402]
- ing Centers by type.75 Air
Forces stations, generally operating under manning tables with
their aviation squadrons absorbed in one or another section of the new
base units, were tending, in the face of manpower shortages, to use
Negro soldiers according to individual qualification and according
to the stations' needs.
-
- At the Richmond Army Air Base
in 1945, for example, men of "C" Squadron, the former
aviation squadron, were assigned to the motor pool as drivers,
mechanics, and general duty men, and were used as cleaners, special
vehicle operators, and special purpose operators in refueling,
escorting, and parking planes. "And we have good success with our
boys on the line," the squadron commander indicated. The
field's supervisor of aircraft maintenance and supply reported that
on the flight line "They are fair. They are a little bit slow,
but that's only natural." 76
-
- The Leonard Committee's visits
revealed a generally increasing awareness of the nature of its
problems among higher commanders and among white and Negro junior
officers. It found that the War Department's efforts were paying
dividends in better discipline and training. It found many an officer
whose views generally coincided with those of one commander who,
remarking on the subject of improving
racial relations within the Army, declared of Negro troops:
-
- The only thing I try to do
deliberately is to try very much to impress them with the idea that
there is no possible discrimination here and that we are always
fair. We allow them to go anywhere on the post. They are told that,
and after the invariable few days in which they always go from place
to place to see if we really mean it, they keep fairly well to
themselves and behave quite well. I always inculcate in every new
officer that he must not refer or even think about a Negro
"problem" or "situation"; and to always think of
and act toward them as soldiers among other soldiers. If they
misbehave they are punished promptly and exactly the same as a white
soldier for the same offense. We try to bestow somewhat more praise
and encouragement among them than among the whites as they react well
to it and need it more than the whites. One thing we never do is to
"study" them as though they were something special, nor do
we make any special effort to "understand" them. Normally
they do not want to be "studied, understood nor uplifted."
If they get the idea that you look on them as a "PROBLEM" they immediately try to
qualify for it. If you treat them normally and casually they do not
tend to get such an idea . . . .77
-
- None of these efforts, despite
their salutary effect upon the morale of Negro soldiers and upon
relations between Negro and white soldiers, served of themselves
to correct the major problems which the Army was facing in the
employment of Negro troops. Unfortunately, by the time most of the
new
- [403]
- policies became effective the bulk
of Negro units, including the large combat units, were already formed, trained,
and moulded under circumstances considerably less favorable to their fullest
employment. It was in the nature of America's preparation for war that this
should be so, for until the problems presented themselves there was no machinery
for remedying them. Nevertheless, all of the correctives of the later war
years showed a greater awareness of the country's stake in the adequate
use of available manpower and all of them helped create a better atmosphere
for the employment of Negro troops. As guarantees of War Department support
for commanders who sought to increase the morale and motivation of their
men, and as guides to useful techniques in training and in the amelioration
of petty fictions, as well as more serious disturbances, they were valuable
to unit and higher commanders. That they did not entirely prevent future
problems did not diminish their usefulness. They were additional steps toward
the objective of preparing Negro units for the main business at hand-movement
overseas and the further prosecution of the war.
- [404]