- Chapter XV
-
- Overseas Deployment
And The Nature Of Units
-
- An additional practical
consideration in the employment of Negro troops, hardly foreseen in
Army mobilization plans, developed in the first year of active
operations. Placing Negro units in camps within the continental limits
of the United States was a constant problem to the Army, but,
beginning in early 1942, assigning them overseas gradually assumed an
air of high international intrigue. Combat units were more seriously
affected by this development than service units, but all types of
Negro units were affected by the problem of overseas deployment.
-
-
- After Pearl Harbor, General
Headquarters compiled a list of units considered ready for overseas
use at once or expected to be ready in the near future. These included
a number of Negro units.1 But from early 1942 on,
- it became a matter of common
knowledge within the General Staff that no matter what the state of
readiness of Negro units happened to be, the steadily increasing
number of American units departing for overseas locations would not
include any large number of Negro troops until the War Department
established a definite policy on their assignment and use overseas.
Once established, carrying out such a policy continued to be a
problem, increasingly localized as decisions on particular areas were
made, but lasting up to the end of the war. The question extended
beyond considerations of military utility, except in the broadest
sense. It was a compound of the overseas commander's desire to avoid
racial troubles in his area, of fears that the Negro units would be
less adaptable and less efficient than white units of similar types,
and of the objections of foreign governments and local authorities.
-
- By March 1942, G-3 of the War
Department wanted to know who was re-
- [428]
- sponsible for maintaining
liaison with the State Department on those phases of the question
which had become enmeshed in international relations. Brig. Gen.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, then chief of the War Plans Division, replied
that lie was maintaining such a liaison. The problem was proving
exceedingly difficult, he explained, for, as yet, he had found no
foreign country where Negro troops would be welcomed. The War Plans
Division, he said, had finally decided to send both Negro and white
troops together as American troops without indicating to the
authorities at their destination what their racial composition was.2
-
- Though such a policy would
have insured the shipment of Negro units overseas it alone was no
solution, for certain areas, including American territories, were
already requesting the withdrawal of Negro troops who had been sent
overseas and others were requesting that none at all be sent. Reasons
for the opposition of local authorities ranged from fear of
miscegenation and an increase of economic unrest among local
populations because of the higher rates of pay of American Negro
troops to purely political considerations in countries with exclusion
laws.
-
- Governors of British West
Indian and Atlantic possessions on which American bases were located
were especially apprehensive lest the balance of colonial authority be
disturbed by the arrival of well-paid and well-clothed American Negro
troops. A delegation from Bermuda, in Washington to confer upon
the establishment of the
American base there, urged that no Negro troops be sent to their
islands. The 99th Antiaircraft Regiment, scheduled to be part of the
garrison for Trinidad, met opposition from local British authorities,
whereupon the Caribbean commander, Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews,
recommended that a white unit be sent in its place. St. Lucia wanted
neither continental Negro nor Puerto Rican troops.
-
- Elsewhere Australia, whose
"White Australia" immigration policy dated back to the
establishment of the Commonwealth at the turn of the century and even
farther back in some of its states, informed the War Department
through the Australian Embassy in Washington that it would not agree
to the dispatch of more Negro troops to Australian territory. This
position was later modified to permit a limited number to enter, with
the stipulation that they were to be withdrawn at the end of the
Australian emergency. The Australian situation was complicated by
clashes between Negro and white soldiers in which the American
commander, Lt. Gen. George H. Brett, felt the civilian population
might become involved. General Brett recommended the withdrawal of all
Negro troops. Both Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, of the Western Defense
Command, and Governor Ernest Gruening of Alaska informally opposed
sending Negro troops to Alaska, with Governor Gruening stating that he
felt the mixing of Negroes with the native Indians and Eskimos would
be highly undesirable. The Air Forces requested that no Negroes of any
branch be sent to Iceland, Greenland, or Labrador. Panama requested
the withdrawal of a signal construction company sent
- [429]
- to the Canal Zone in the fall
of 1941.3
Chile and Venezuela advised the State Department that Negro
coast artillery units would not be accepted there. The special
representative to Liberia, Col. Harry McBride, advised that colored
troops would not be satisfactory there, since their rate of pay would
place them in a preferred status with reference to the local
population. Even within the United States commanders preferred to
avoid using Negro troops in defense positions.
-
- Secretary Stimson made short
shrift of the objections. Of Alaska and Trinidad he commented,
"Don't yield," and, again, "No, don't yield." To
the Australian proposal and to Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger's suggestion
that the use of Negro troops in his Southern Defense Command be
avoided because of the probability of race riots, he answered with a
flat "No." On the Panama request he commented, "Tell
them they must complete their work-It is ridiculous to raise such
objections when the Panama Canal itself was built with black
labor." On Iceland, Greenland, and Labrador he mused,
"Pretty cold for blacks" and on the
proposal for Liberia he replied, "Nonsense." But for Chile
and Venezuela he established it principle that was to last through
most of the war when he commented, "As we are the petitioners
here we probably must comply."4
-
- G-1 proceeded to draw up a
policy for the employment of Negro troops overseas which provided that
they would not be employed in extreme northern stations and that they
would not be utilized in a country against that country's will when
the United States had requested the right to station troops in the
country concerned. In all other cases, Negro troops would be
dispatched without prior request for agreement on the part of the
theater or other commander and without notation as to the color or
race of personnel.5
-
- No other staff agency concurred
fully with the G-1 recommendations as originally written. Newer developments
and existing regulations were involved in some of the non-concurrences.
Services of Supply, G-2, and G-3 recommended that the theater commanders
be notified of the racial composition of shipments so that "proper
arrangements" might be made for their reception. Army Air Forces objected
that the retention of the proportionate repre-
- [430]
- sentation rule in the United
States without a corresponding rule for overseas shipments would leave
larger proportions of Negro troops in the United States for whom
neither proper uses, stations, assignments, nor controllable
percentages would be possible.6 The War Plans Division, now
redesignated the Operations Division (OPD), agreed with this
objection.
-
- The Operations Division had another
reason for withholding concurrence. A message had been received from London,
over General Marshall's name, stating that Negro units should not be sent
to the British Isles at all.7
This would alter entirely any policy being considered, for it was to the
United Kingdom that large numbers of American units, including the very
necessary aviation and general service engineers, were to be sent under
the BOLERO plan. After it developed that the staff message had been sent
without General Marshall's knowledge, the Operations Division determined
that in planning troop shipments for the British Isles, Negro service troops
would be included in "reasonable proportions." 8
G-3 now objected to the new phrasing of the revised policy directive, for
the Chief of Staff had by then
(25 April) decided that there would be no positive restriction on the use
of Negro troops in Great Britain, while the Operations Division was preparing
to limit their use to the services. As finally issued, on 13 May 1942, tile
policy directive contained the original provision plus the stipulation:
"There will be no positive restrictions on the use of colored troops
in the British Isles, but shipment of colored units to the British Isles
will be limited, initially, to those in the service categories." Theater
commanders would be informed of orders moving Negro troops to their commands
but they would not be asked to agree to their shipment beforehand. The policy
provided as well that the commanding generals of Army Air Forces, Ground
Forces, and Services of Supply would "insure" that Negro troops
were ordered overseas in a proportion not less than their percentage in
each command.9
-
-
- Settling upon a policy for the
deployment of Negro troops overseas did not solve the problem of
either their overseas locations or use. Theater commanders were still
responsible for committing troops to action either in combat or in
combat support. They still determined, in large measure, the types and
numbers of units which they required. Their requests received the
greatest attention of the War Department and of its Operations
Division, whose function it was to see to it that the
- [431]
- theaters had the units and
personnel needed to accomplish their missions. Theater commanders were
known to cancel or reduce requests for certain types of units when
informed that only Negro units were available. The Theater Group of
Operations Division followed the practice, which (as pointed out by
Brig. Gen. Patrick H. Tansey, Chief of its Logistics Group) was
directly contrary to War Department policy, of asking theater
commanders specifically if they "could use" or if they
"desired" certain Negro units as substitutes for white units
with a lesser degree of availability.10 Commanders could still
request the deletion of Negro units from movement orders. Often they
could get compliance from the War Department, for few felt that the
War Department could or should dictate to theater commanders in such a
matter.11 There were always some commanders who, like Lt. Gen.
Delos C. Emmons in Hawaii, stated that while they were disturbed by
the potential problems implied for their areas, they realized the
problem facing the War Department and would therefore accept their
proportion of Negro units.12 Similarly, when General Marshall asked
General Douglas MacArthur, as Supreme Commander in Australia and the
Philippines, for his personal attitude and recommendations on the
proposal from Australia that no more Negro troops be
sent there and that those already there either be returned to the
United States or moved on to New Caledonia or India, General MacArthur
replied:
-
- I will do everything possible
to prevent friction or resentment on the part of the Australian
government and people at the presence of American colored troops
replying your nine one seven. Their policy of exclusion against
everyone except the white race known locally as the "White
Australia" plan is universally supported here. The labor
situation is also more acute perhaps than any place in the world. I
believe however by utilizing these troops in the front zones away from
great centers of population that I can minimize the difficulties
involved and yet use to advantage those already dispatched. Please
disabuse yourself of any idea that I might return these troops after
your decision to dispatch them. You may be assured of my complete
loyalty and devotion and my absolute acceptance of any decisions that
you may make. I visualize completely that there are basic policies
which while contrary to the immediate circumstances of a local area
are absolutely necessary from the higher perspective and viewpoint.
You need never have a doubt as to my fulfilling to the maximum of my
ability whatever directive I may receive.13
-
- But the willing acceptance of
a racial problem additional to those already confronting theater
commanders was not likely. Subordinate staffs often found ways to
avoid accepting Negro units. Therefore, the rate of movement of Negro
units overseas was slow, too slow to satisfy the military agencies in
the zone
- [432]
- of interior who were
responsible for the training and housing of Negro units, too slow to
satisfy the agencies of the War Department who had to placate Negro
groups and their sympathizers who kept inquiring about the use of
Negroes overseas, too slow to satisfy congressmen and residents of
areas which had sent large numbers of white and relatively few Negro
soldiers overseas, and too slow to satisfy the Operations Division and
the major commands that had to fill overseas requisitions from the
troops and units available.
-
- At the time the policy on the
overseas movement of Negro troops was established, only 15,679 Negro
troops were overseas, with 1,459 en route and 22,629 proposed for
overseas destinations.14 Though the actual number overseas more than
tripled by the end of 1942, the percentage of Negroes overseas was
still considerably less than proportionate to their over-all strength in
the Army.15 The likelihood of solving the problem of the adequate use
of Negro troops overseas seemed so slight in the spring of 1942 that
The Inspector General, Maj. Gen. Virgil L. Peterson, and Brig. Gen.
Benjamin O. Davis, then his assistant, questioned the wisdom of
continuing to train and equip Negro units which could not be used in
the various theaters. The major current effort had to be directed
toward providing combat forces. Later, when new fronts opened, when
requirements on existing fronts were increased, and when the United
States was likely to have a freer hand in the employment of units,
they counseled, Ne-
- [433]
- gro troops might be more
readily used. In the meantime, they suggested that activation of Negro
units be retarded until more places to use them were developed.16 With
the concurrent pressures of Selective Service and the need to supply
more and more units to receive Negro selectees, this suggestion,
though it would have helped solve the problem of overseas deployment,
could not be followed.
-
- For the remainder of 1942 the question
of the deployment of Negro troops overseas continued to be a major factor
contributing to the over-all problem of their general employment and placement
in units. So long as few Negro units were ready for overseas shipment and
so long as the heavy build-up of American forces overseas was still in the
future the full solution of the problem could be deferred. But with nearly
a million American troops going overseas in 1942 and with the prospect of
a ten million-man Army in the offing, the question could not lie dormant
for long. The task force planned for Liberia in the late summer or early
fall of 1942 was expected to take care of a number of Negro units,17
but no comparable grouping of Negro troops was planned for any other area.
-
-
- During June 1942 the G-2
Division produced two papers on the use of Negro troops overseas, one
on the Caribbean and one on other areas. The
Caribbean paper suggested that local populations did not "look
with favor upon the use of American negro troops on their soil,"
as evidenced by riots in Trinidad and Panama involving Negro troops
and in Jamaica, the Bahamas, St. Lucia, and British Guiana between
white and nonwhite elements of the local population. The paper
asserted that there were no military reasons for stationing Negro
troops in the tropics and that there were grave political and
psychological disadvantages to doing so:
-
- Our colored troops have a higher
standard of living than the native colored troops and populations. In some
instances the pay of colored troops is more than that of white foreign troops.
The local authorities try to keep the native populations contented with
a low standard of living. Obviously, a situation will be created which will
result in an unfavorable comparison which is bound to cause local disturbances.
Before the arrival of colored troops at sortie bases, the white and native
populations were getting along well. Trouble arose as soon as our colored
troops disembarked . . . .
-
- Therefore, G-2 recommended, no
Negro troops should be sent to the Caribbean or "anywhere in
Latin America."18
-
- To this reasoning the
Operations Division, using Stimson's comments and the newly adopted
policy on overseas movements to bolster its refusal to recommend
changes in the policy of using Negro troops "wherever they can be
used in [the] Caribbean,"19 replied that there was no record of
"any considerable difficulties" in the use of Negro troops
then in the Caribbean. A concession to the Panama Government on tile
removal of
- [434]
- the Negro signal unit upon the
completion of its job had been made, "in the interest of
completing defense site agreements with Panama." This was done
"purely as a compromise"; it was distinctly not desired by
Secretary Stimson. On the political-economic question, the Operations
Divisions observed:
-
- While it is true that our
colored troops have a higher standard of living than the native
colored troops and populations and a higher wage scale than white
foreign troops, it is pointed out that our white troops also are on a
higher and entirely different living standard than the troops and much
of the population, white or native, of countries in the Caribbean and
South America. The sense of this paragraph seems to be that the War
Department should defer military necessity in favor of meeting the
desires of local authorities to maintain conditions which are
diametrically opposite to those which the President has gone on record
as stating to be the American ideals. It is believed, therefore, that
any concessions which the War Department is forced to make should be
held to a minimum.20
-
- The Operations Division
decided that there were three good military reasons for sending Negro
troops to the Caribbean: (1) ". . . this theater, as well as all
others, should absorb its proportionate part of the colored units now
in existence or to be organized"; (2) Negroes are
"peculiarly adaptable to tropic as opposed to more rigorous
climates"; and (3) since the requirements for general efficiency
in the Caribbean will not be so great as in the more active theaters
and since Negro units are generally less efficient than white units,
they can be employed in the Caribbean to release white troops for other
theaters.21 Each of these reasons would be advanced later in support
of deploying Negro troops to other overseas areas.
-
- Later in June G-2 produced a
general survey which considered the attitudes of native populations,
the local political, economic, and psychological disadvantages for the
allied nations, and the possible action to be taken in normal as
opposed to emergency situations in the employment of Negro troops in
overseas areas. Greenland and Iceland disliked all foreigners, the
paper said, and difficulties between their civilians and American
white troops had already occurred. "Since the natives are totally
unfamiliar with negroes, it is probable that they would regard them
with even greater hostility," G-2 reasoned. The government and
people of Canada and Newfoundland "recognize the necessity for us
to send United States troops, regardless of color, to their
territory," and no serious difficulties should be expected in
these countries. Nor should there be "basic factors"
precluding sending Negro troops to Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
since "the American negro troops stationed in England during the
World War created no unsolvable problems, and they were generally well
treated." The British and French Pacific islands should raise no
legitimate objections. On the other hand, British India, where
"political difficulties . . . are of an especially complicated
and grave nature," Australia, which maintained "a sharp
color line," and New Zealand, which did not have a color line
between whites and Maoris and did not wish to create one, should
receive Negro troops only with the ac-
- [435]
- quiescence of their
governments. Negro troops should be sent to Australia and New Zealand
only in an emergency and for a limited period. "Their
presence," G-2 felt, "would undoubtedly build up hostility
to the United States throughout Australia." From the Middle East,
British West Africa, British East Africa, the Belgian Congo, and
French Equatorial Africa, no objections save the economic should be
received. "Minor difficulties may arise, however, due to the
French and Belgian custom of handling their colored troops with
greater strictness than their white troops." Liberia, "being
a colored nation," could have no objection other than the
economic, but in South Africa, "the appearance of American negro
troops would undoubtedly further influence the very ticklish political
situation in this dominion." On the grounds that
"propinquity" with white troops in garrison life would be
unavoidable, that overtaxing civilian facilities would result, or that
social, economic, or racial tensions already existing would be
intensified, G-2 did not recommend the assignment of Negro troops to
Ascension Island, Alaska, or Hawaii. Nor was their use in China looked
upon favorably. "While the Chinese are not race-conscious, their
Government is ready to exploit politically any action which can be
distorted to appear discriminatory. They will undoubtedly complain of
any Negro combat troops sent to China as second rate and will seek to
make a political issue of the matter. In view of the abundant seasoned
labor supply in China, the sending of negro labor troops there is
superfluous," G-2 declared. G-2 recommended that it be consulted
on the inclusion of Negro troops whenever a task force was planned
for a new area.22
-
- While there were points on
which it might have been argued that G-2's conclusions were in error
and while its predictions did not work out to the letter, country by
country, the paper was a further indication that the use of Negro
troops overseas was a worldwide matter, fraught with complexities as
varied as any within the United States. The paper was circulated to
all groups in the Operations Division and to the Secretary of War. It
helped re-enforce the air of pessimistic apprehension on the whole
question of the ultimate employment of Negro troops that was beginning
to beshroud War Department agencies. "Very interesting and
thoughtful paper," Assistant Secretary McCloy observed.23
Should
we include Negro troops in the Penhryn and Aitukaki task forces?
Operations Division asked G-2 a few days later.24 There is no
objection to their use at these bases, G-2 replied.25
-
- As a matter of fact, G-2 had
said in the survey of foreign countries, "It is not felt that the
difficulties almost certain to arise in case negro troops are used
abroad should in themselves cause a decision not to so utilize our
negro manpower. The military situation alone should decide whether
negro troops should be accepted in any specific area . . . ." 26
But if the risks were as great as outlined, who would willingly add to
the theater commanders' burdens
- [436]
- the threat of civilian unrest,
international displeasure and rifts, and intra-military disorders?
Combined with already pressing shortages in shipping, the
unsatisfactory training progress of many Negro units, and the urgency
of advancing plans for offensive as well as defensive operations, it
was easy to justify deferments of Negro units' movement dates.
Moreover, the successive disorders between Negro and white troops in
1941 and 1942 led to a serious questioning of the psychological and
emotional trustworthiness of Negro troops in foreign countries.
-
-
- In the meantime, reports from
overseas areas tended to indicate that some of the problems feared by
the War Department, short of full-scale disturbances, were actually
materializing. Getting Negro troops into particular areas at all was
sometimes a delicate operation; maintaining them in other areas was at
times equally difficult. During the planning conferences for setting
up the Persian Gulf Command, for example, many questions arose about
the use of Negro troops at the ports. Whether Negro troops should be
used at all, whether they should be used "experimentally,"
whether they should operate specific ports from which all native labor
would be evacuated, whether they should be mixed with local labor,
whether they should be permitted any contact at all with local labor,
or whether the matter of their use should be left entirely with the
American commander were all questions discussed in and between London
and Washington before the decision was reached that Negro port units
would be used in a manner to be decided
by the American commander with the understanding that "in no case
should we let the impression be gained that the use of colored troops
is `experimental.' " 27
Similar questions came up whenever the
employment of Negro troops in a given area was suggested.
-
- Negro units sent early to overseas
areas sometimes faced more than the problems of poor equipment and clothing
that plagued many American units leaving the country in the first year of
the war. The lone Negro unit sent to the Belgian Congo, Company C of the
27th Quartermaster Truck Regiment, which was employed in the construction
and servicing of the southern trans-African air ferry route, became the
subject of considerable diplomatic correspondence in 1942. American troops,
including the quartermaster company, arrived at Matadi, Belgian Congo, on
29 August 1942. On 1 September the assistant military attaché of
the Belgian Embassy in Washington referred to the War Department a message
from the Belgian Government-in-Exile's Minister of Colonies protesting that,
in February, at the time agreement on the proposed air line was reached,
assurances were made that no Negro troops would be included in the construction
party. The War Department disclaimed knowledge of such an agreement, and
the assistant military attaché and the Ambassador informally
- [437]
- advised that they had no
knowledge of the "commitment" either.28
-
- In the meantime, Capt. James.
V. Harding, commander of the truck company, requested an immediate
change of station, for upon his unit's arrival in the Congo local
authorities protested so loudly that the troops were aware of the
attitude of the Belgian Government. Harding reported:
-
- Racial restrictions are
extreme, and no consideration is given our Colored troops above that
of the Native Negro by the local white population .... There are no
places where our troops may go to be served food, or drink, in
contrast to the freedom which is enjoyed by our white troops . . . .
The Native villages are `off limits' to all American troops due to
sanitary conditions and safety precautions, and this effectively
precludes any possibility of correcting the situation . . . . Our men
are accorded the same pass privileges as White troops in the area, but
exhibit no desire to avail themselves of such privileges as they state
that a general outward and bold exhibition on the part of the populace
showing Colored soldiers' presence and services are not wanted makes
their status very obvious . . . . The condition of the Native
population is exciting considerable comment among our men who are
rapidly becoming to feel that the things they are fighting for are [a]
fallacy.29
-
- Belgian authorities kept asking
the unit's officers why the U.S. Government had sent Negro troops over the
protests of the Congo Government. When the American officers answered that
they carried out their orders without question, "it is seen that information
seeps back to the troops that their officers are not able to explain why
they are here when they are not wanted." The heavy venereal disease
rate among the only native women with whom the men could associate and a
developing disrespect for the military service as a result of the conditions
in which the company found itself were "playing havoc" with morale.
"This unit does not desire [to] return to the United States,"
the commander continued, "but I do request your serious consideration
toward sending it to a theatre where it can do its job unhampered by complete
isolation and antagonism on the part of the local population." The
commander added a note: he had made a personal survey of Pointe Noire, French
Equatorial Africa, when moving the unit into French territory was being
considered to improve the situation, but he found the colonial policy there
to be no better .30
-
- By the time this letter had passed
through channels, with indorsements indicating that the situation was "unnecessary,
disgraceful" and "getting worse," radio messages from the
Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Central Africa, requesting authority
to transfer the company to Liberia, had been received and permission to
do so had been granted. The personnel of the company, less officers, were
transferred.31
-
- Similar problems, neither so
urgent nor so simply solved as those encountered in the Congo, were
developing elsewhere. Representative of these were the situations in
northwestern Canada, Alaska, and in the British Isles.
-
- The policy on the use of Negro
troops overseas had stated that Negro units would not be sent to
extreme northern climates, but the immediate need for
- [438]
- units to be used in the
construction of the Alaska Highway had dictated the use of available
Negro engineer units on the project. For more than a year after their
arrival, the wisdom of sending the Negro engineer units so far north
was debated within the receiving command, within the War Department,
and in other executive agencies of the government. Travelers,
observers, and residents of the areas gave conflicting reports on both
their efficiency and their desirability in northern areas. The morale
of many United States troops in Alaska and northwest Canada in the
first year of the war was dangerously low, because of insufficient
clothing, monotonous food, poor shelter, long tours of duty, and the
visible contrast between troop conditions and those of contract
laborers who, often employed on the same jobs, were better fed, more
adequately clothed, and better paid. Few troops going to northern
regions in 1942 had had specialized preparatory training, such as that
later given to mountain and desert troops; nor in many cases was
appropriate clothing and equipment provided for them. Often units were
sent directly from the warmer camps in the continental United States
without any previous cold weather experience; frequently the officers
were as ignorant as their men of the proper use of the different items
provided for cold weather use.32
-
- For Negro troops, the problems
of the Far North were greater than for the average American unit. Few
Negroes in the service units sent there had had experience with living
in even the colder parts of the United States; they were completely unacquainted with
northern wilderness conditions. The 97th Engineer Separate Battalion,
located in encampments where temperatures down to 63° below zero
were encountered, was described by one observer as "pathetically
ill-equipped [and] doing little else but hibernating at present . . .
. As a result of worn out clothing and lack of essential equipment,
their outdoor working capacity has been reduced to a small fraction of
summer efficiency . . . ." 33
At the same time civilian
workers, properly prepared and cared for, were continuing to work out
of doors. The isolation of troops in Alaska and northwest Canada,
increased in the cases of Negro units by the refusal of many towns to
admit them even to their streets and shops, contributed to low morale
..34 Less sparsely populated areas registered protests similar to
those of American mainland communities.
-
- The problem was not confined to
northern Canada and Alaska. Lt. Gen. Kenneth Stuart, Chief of Staff of the
Canadian Army, complained informally to Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy
Chief of Staff, over stationing Negro antiaircraft troops in Canada as part
of the defense of the Sault Ste. Marie locks. General McNarney persuaded
the Canadian general of the necessity of leaving these troops in Canada,
but the objection was another indication of the general feeling toward the
use of Negroes in foreign areas. 35
- [439]
- The decrease in efficiency of
Negro troops coupled with maltreatment of equipment and supplies
caused many observers, and eventually The Quartermaster General, to
urge that no Negro troops, and, indeed, no troops who had not been
inured to life in cold climates, be sent to the Far North.36 But there
was a powerful counterargument against removing Negro troops from the
Northwest Service Command and Alaska. The difficulty of gaining
overseas acceptance of Negro troops was so great that this sparsely
populated area appeared to be one where, if anything, Negroes might be
used in increasing numbers. "[It] eliminates to a large extent
the delicate social problems involved," G-4 observed, "and
in view of the numerous areas to which these troops cannot be sent, it
would appear that the bulk of our forces in areas where Negro troops
can be used to fulfill military requirements should be negro
units." Proper training and administration would eliminate
excessive maltreatment of equipment; the morale question in isolated
areas affected all troops, G-4 contended, adding with a touch of
irony: "It is recognized that if it were possible to assign
troops born and raised in northern climates to Arctic commands, their
efficiency would be greater than that of personnel from hot climates.
However, it is not believed that such procedure will be practicable as
existing units normally comprise personnel from various sections of
the country and to break up these units would result in loss of unit
training time and create other un-warranted administrative
difficulties." 37
Despite later sporadic protests regarding the
condition of Negro troops in the Far North, there they remained with
white troops as builders of the Alaska Highway and, later, as garrison
and maintenance units.
-
- The big foreign location question
of 1942 concerned the British Isles. Not long after Negro troops began to
arrive, British public opinion and American travelers and journalists began
to express qualms about the developing situation. All agreed that the British
people readily accepted American Negro troops. The problem lay in the importation
of American racial patterns to Britain by American white troops, resulting
in clashes, ideological and physical, between American troops and between
British civilians and American soldiers. British soldiers resented the barring
of public places to American Negro troops and instructions to be "polite
to colored troops, answer their queries and drift away" given to their
units.38
British townsfolk were somewhat bewildered and increasingly resentful of
the intrusion of American racial mores upon their own customs. The employees
of restaurants professed not to see why Negroes should be barred. Landladies
who replied to white troops, "Their money is as good as yours, and
we like their company" had their counterparts among the more ideologically
minded who observed that "it seems silly to talk about democracy when
we have white and black troops
- [440]
- who will not talk or mix with
one another." 39
-
- Opinions on the solution of
the problem differed. As the United Kingdom became more and more
crowded with American troops, plus British and Commonwealth forces and
the units of other Allied nations, debate on the matter increased.
Some Britons were of the opinion that the solution lay with the
American Government, which should limit the numbers of Negro troops
sent to Britain and use "every device of persuasion and
authority" to convince white American troops that Negro troops in
Britain could not be treated as they were in the States.40 Others
thought the solution lay in billeting white and Negro troops in
different small towns.41 American observers offered similar solutions;
they advocated a reduction in the number of Negro troops sent to
Britain and a concentration of them in port areas, where British
contacts were of a more cosmopolitan nature .42
-
- All of these solutions and
more were tried, with varying success, but the problem of the British
Isles remained with the War
Department.43 It
remained a limiting factor in the ready dispatch of units overseas,
for the heaviest concentration of American troops overseas was in the
United Kingdom until the final invasion of Europe. Any limitation upon
their use there affected the over-all employment of Negro troops
overseas.
-
-
- Differences in the rate of
movement of Negro and white troops overseas gradually affected the
projected use and training of Negro troops. As early as January 1942,
the Army Air Forces contended that limitations on the overseas
shipment of Negroes justified a reduction in the proportions of
Negroes that it should receive. Failing to achieve a reduction in its
proportion of Negro troops, the Air Forces then proposed that every
task force organized in 1942 should contain one aviation squadron for
each air base group, air depot group, or materiel squadron.44 This
proposal was approved, but it did not work out in practice. Shipping
limitations prevented the dispatch of any but the most patently needed
service troops.
-
- For at least one type of
service unit that had been activated in large numbers, the medical
sanitary company, there appeared to be little or no overseas need. The
Medical Department, in letters of November 1942 to all surgeons
overseas, pointed out the availability of medical sanitary companies
satisfactorily
- [441]
- MEN OF A QUARTERMASTER TRUCK
COMPANY
- enjoy the hospitality of a British
pub and ask questions of the local constable.
-
- trained for employment in the
theaters and suggested that surgeons urge their theater or base
commanders to request these units if the need for them existed.
Practically no requests for sanitary companies came from overseas
commanders, for their work could usually be accomplished by other
service troops or by combat units located near bases 45
Earlier in
the year, after Ground Forces transferred all sanitary companies to
Service Forces as having no function in combat zones and after they
were divorced from the general
hospitals to which they were to have been attached, medical sanitary
companies appeared to have no potential overseas usefulness at all.46
Attempts to reorganize them as units "designed for useful work
rather than merely as a method of clothing and feeding negro
soldiers" 47
came to naught as proposals in early 1943 to
force-ship one with each general hospital, to make them parts of
anti-malarial teams in which white detachments pro-
- [442]
- vided the specialists and
Negro units the labor, or to enlarge them into epidemological
companies were considered and discarded .48 While casualty evacuation
units and island commands with malarial and other disease prevention
problems later found them useful, sanitary companies were symbolic in
1942 and 1943 of the apparent uselessness of many Negro units,
especially of those which had been formed primarily for the purpose of
absorbing Negro soldiers.
-
- Unlike medical sanitary
companies, air base security battalions were in potential demand
overseas. These units could perform a function which, theater
commanders agreed, was a highly important one. To defend airfields
without them, it was often necessary to detach infantry from divisions
or use expedients that took other types of combat forces away from
their primary duties. Although theater and Air Forces commanders
insisted upon the need for specific units for the defense of critical
airdromes, in many theaters there was strong opposition to the use of
Negroes for this purpose. Yet, 175 of the 194 security battalions
activated or scheduled to be activated in the 1943 Troop Basis were
Negro units. G-3 feared that, instead of accepting Negro units, white
units trained for other functions would be used to defend airfields
while the Negro units, specifically trained for this purpose,
would remain unused in the United States.49
-
- The deployment of air base security
battalions faced the further handicap of doubts that, with their existing
organization, these battalions, regardless of their race, were the most
effective means of defending airfields. Theaters felt that the units should
be more flexible. They should be readily divisible into at least two parts,
for most air bases contained a number of outlying fields. The units had
too many heavy weapons and yet had no protection for the unit, as such,
against low-flying aircraft. Motor transport was needed in the headquarters
detachment and the overall use of personnel in the units was considered
excessive.50
Little by way of increasing the effectiveness of these organizations was
attempted. To increase their effectiveness greatly would have meant a severe
drain on available equipment. Even so, during 1942 theater requests for
air base security battalions came in such numbers and with such frequency
that Army Air Forces, for a time, felt that it would be impossible to keep
up with the demand unless the activation and training of these units were
"expedited and augmented."51
-
- In February 1943, the
Operations Division reported minimum theater and defense command
requests for 161 normal air base security battalions, 70 additional
fixed companies, and one additional semi fixed company. The United
Kingdom alone wanted 50
- [443]
- AIR BASE SECURITY TROOPS
RACING TO THEIR HALF-TRACKS
- during an alert, North Africa.
-
- battalions, plus 50 fixed
defense companies.52 So many requests for variants on the normal
battalion indicated serious organizational problems for these units.
Tests of an air base security battalion, held in the fall of 1()42 at
Orlando, Florida, revealed that the units, as then organized, were not
equipped to defend airfields effectively. At best, their mission would
have to be a delaying one in the event of a heavy ground attack.53
-
- New tables of organization for
the units, including a tank platoon and a transportation section, were
provided by April 1943 54 Though a few units were so reorganized, by
that time the whole question of the shipment of these defensive units overseas was
being restudied. The Deputy Chief of Staff directed that requests for
them be justified by theater commanders,55 with the result that most
outstanding commitments were deferred or canceled. "It is
unlikely that theater commanders will require negro Air Base Security
Battalions, or any other negro units, to the extent of offering
justifications for their use," General Arnold wrote in protesting
the retention of battalions which apparently were not going to be
used. Forty-nine Negro battalions with approximately 20,000 men and
eleven white battalions were then awaiting shipment. Fourteen Negro
battalions were overseas. Some fifty-five battalions were awaiting
activation. Although
- [444]
- there was continuing evidence
that many of these units might have proved useful in the theaters,
since other types of units continued to be diverted from their main
missions for the defense of airfields, the bulk of the air base
security battalions activated were not to be employed overseas.56
-
- While air base security
battalions and medical sanitary companies were growing both in number
and in difficulty of shipment by virtue of their nature as well as
their race, other units required in the theaters were left in the
continental United States simply because they were Negro. If these
units had Negro officers, overseas demands for them were reduced
further, for certain theaters were willing to accept Negro troops if
they were commanded by white officers but not if the officers included
Negroes. This was a position endorsed by G-2 as a necessary
"disciplinary" limitation on the shipment of Negro troops
overseas.57 In turn, the negative disposition of theaters toward units
with Negro officers affected assignments and promotions in those units
authorized Negro officers. The question of enlarging the number of
engineer units to which Negro officers could be assigned, discussed in
September 1942, was complicated by the information that units
designated for early shipment to Europe were not eligible, since Negro
officers were not desired in Great Britain at the time.58 Thus, in
addition to the restrictions under which assignment agencies were
operating in placing Negro officers, allowance had to be made as well
for the time and place of their units probable employment.
-
-
- It was not long before
requisitions began to arrive for specific types of units, service and
combat, which could only be filled by the few available units of these
types remaining in the country. When these units were Negro, the
requests sometimes remained unfilled although Negro units were
available for shipment. At times, such requests required the rapid
activation or conversion of white units while available Negro units
remained idle. Occasionally, such requests could be filled with little
difficulty. In January 1942, the Iceland Base Command asked for three
white chemical decontamination detachments, but the only
decontamination units in the United States were Negro. In this case,
the detachments were small, so the required number of white men could
be made available from the Chemical Warfare Replacement Center at
Edgewood Arsenal and especially trained for this work.59
-
- At other times, filling such
requests produced administrative complications which the headquarters
concerned considered wasteful and unnecessary. In October 1942, among
the units required for Australia, all of which were to be white, was a
quartermaster sterilization battalion. But the only sterilization
- [445]
- battalion available was a
Negro unit. "This practice of specifying white units for theaters
of operation open to Negro units in this case not only eliminates the
only unit available for the assignment but, in general, has
undesirable results," Army Ground Forces complained to the
Operations Division, through which all such requests came.60 When the
Southwest Pacific, in 1943, wanted a light tank battalion, the only
one available was a Negro unit while the requisition called for a
white unit only. Similar difficulties developed in furnishing an
antiaircraft battalion to the Far East and a tank battalion to Europe.61
-
- While some Negro combat
units-the 24th Infantry in the South Pacific; the 369th Antiaircraft
Artillery in Hawaii; the 76th Antiaircraft Artillery in Fiji; the 77th
Antiaircraft Artillery in Tongatabu; the 99th Antiaircraft Artillery
in Trinidad; and the 1st Battalion, 367th Infantry in Liberia-had been
sent overseas early, others, like the 9th Cavalry, were moved to
staging areas preparatory to shipment overseas only to be refused by
the theaters to which they were to go. Such units had then to return
to a training camp. The theaters argued that they already had enough
Negro troops or that they needed another type of unit more urgently.
The South Pacific, for example, wanted a cavalry regiment but it
wanted no more Negro units. French control of local natives was
delicate enough not to aggravate it further by the presence of
additional Negro troops, the theater informed the War Department. In
any event white officers would be required because no local natives
were commissioned officers. 62
The possibility that other combat
units in the United States, especially regiments and divisions, would
be required or accepted grew dimmer as the months rolled by. As the
supply of white units grew, the chances of ready shipment for Negro
units decreased sharply.
-
- In spite of the fact that the
three major commands had been directed to ship Negro units overseas in
proportions not less than the percentages of Negro troops in the
commands, under conditions such as these compliance was impossible.
Army Ground Forces, when the development of this pattern was first
confirmed, wanted to know if the directive had been rescinded. If it
were still in force, AGF recommended, theater requirements should be
filled with available troops "regardless of the fact that
preferences have been expressed for white units."63 AGF's
proposal had no practical results.
-
- In the summer of 1943, G-3
undertook to investigate the entire situation surrounding the shipment
of Negro units overseas. By then the apparent inability of the War
Department to ship Negro units was having effects beyond the area of
the operational use of Negro troops. The whole question of the
provision of Negro units, combat and service, had to be reassessed.
Adherence to the formula of proportional representa-
- [446]
- tion of Negroes in all
branches, which had already begun to weaken, was involved to the
extent that G-3 was about to recommend that all Negro combat units be
inactivated so that their personnel might be used for non-technical
service units, on the assumption that these, at least, could be sent
to theaters and used. While all of the agencies concerned had been
aware of the difficulties of shipping Negro units for some time, the
question now began to spill over into the area of the possible
usefulness of any Negro units, either in training in the United States
or in operations in the theaters. The breaking point in G-3's
tolerance of the steady worsening of the situation came in connection
with the training of units for amphibious operations.
-
- Training in combined
amphibious operations was under the supervision of the Amphibious
Force, Atlantic Fleet and a similar force under the Pacific Fleet.
Though gas supply, service, and railhead quartermaster troops might be
required for amphibious training, these supporting troops were not to
be Negro, not even in the training phases. G-3 questioned the
desirability of giving amphibious training to any of these supporting
units, since their landings almost always came later in assault waves,
thereby becoming primarily a matter of logistics. Recognizing that the
responsibility for training these and such other supporting units as
antiaircraft gun battalions rested with the commander of the
Amphibious Force, G-3 tried to defer to his judgment in the matter.
Gradually, however, the supply of white service units ran out, leaving
only Negro units available. For the last three divisions to be amphibiously trained in 1943, three
white quartermaster service battalions in support were desired by the
Amphibious Force. Moreover, a desired quartermaster truck company was
to be white, for its personnel was to be used to instruct divisional
personnel in Dukw operations.64 Army Ground Forces, lacking the
requested service battalions, asked permission to substitute Negro
battalions .65 The request was denied. Instead, AGF was directed to
take two white service battalions from the Desert Training Center,
substitute for them one Negro battalion earmarked for overseas
shipment, and, to obtain the third battalion, remove one Negro
battalion from the troop basis, substitute a white battalion, and
activate it.66
-
- Later, two tank battalions
were required for amphibious training to be given on the west coast in
October 1943. Army Ground Forces offered two available Negro tank
battalions. The Operations Division rejected them. In discussions
arising out of this incident, G-3 learned that Army Ground Forces was
having difficulty employing any of its remaining Negro combat units in
any form. The chief of G-3 then instructed his training branch to
prepare a study citing these difficulties, and recommending, if
necessary, that current policy on the provision of Negro units be
reconsidered with a view to inactivating Negro combat units.
- [447]
- G-3 asked Army Ground Forces and
Army Service Forces to supply a list of Negro units whose estimated dates
of readiness fell within the period 1 September 1943 and 1 February 1944.
This list would be compared with the current six months' forecast of units
scheduled for overseas movement. Both the ASF and AGF lists showed that
ready units were not only on the six months' list but clearly listed there
as Negro. The six months' list included, in the Pacific forecast, one Negro
infantry division, the gad, about whose shipment little discussion had been
heard, since the division had been in training but a few months over a year.
Moreover, the requirement of two tank battalions "which brought this
matter to a head" had been canceled by the theater commander and Ground
Forces had been directed to defer their training.
-
- Except for a proposal to
analyze the earmarking of units on the six months' chart to determine
if last minute substitutions of white for indicated Negro units were
being made a short time before shipping dates, G-3 was left with no
solid facts upon which to base a recommendation. While the shipment of
Negro units overseas had been slow in the past, enough other factors
were involved to make it difficult to demonstrate clearly that Negro
units could not be shipped in the future either because of their types
or because of theater commanders' objections to their race. The
six-months' charts indicated that, so far as the administrative
machinery was concerned, Negro units were scheduled for shipment even
though they might not leave the country as scheduled.67
-
-
- The slowness of the deployment
of Negro units overseas during 1942 and early 1943 produced
expressions of concern in the Negro press, including doubts about the
Army's intention of using any of the major units in combat. Upon the
combat acquittal of Negro troops, the Negro papers felt, depended the
future of the Negro in the Army and, to some extent, his position in
American civil life. The commitment of the fighter squadron was of
special concern to the Negro press, for it had been given to
understand more and more frequently that the 99th Squadron was
considered experimental by the Air Forces and that future expansion of
the employment of Negro airmen depended upon the combat record of the
99th. "Today, a year and five months after the beginning of pilot
training not a single one of our fliers is in combat service, although
from time to time, announcement is made that numbers of them have been
graduated and have received their wings," The Crisis commented in
an editorial on judge Hastie's resignation.68 "There has been
considerable talk that our men were not being trained to fight-not
sincerely and thoroughly trained to fight," the same journal
wrote after representatives of the press had observed the gad Division
on maneuvers in Louisiana in the spring of 1943. "It has been
said that the Army was only going through the motions, hoping that
Negro soldiers would not make good when the test came," it
continued, although it reported that the
- [448]
- 93d Division, fully equipped
and well trained, was apparently being prepared for combat. 69 As the
news of conversions and changes in a number of Negro units became a
matter of public knowledge, the persistent questions of the Negro
press became: Will any Negro combat units be left? Will any of those
left be used in combat? The War Department and its major agencies were
quite aware of this phase of the problem.70
-
- The deployment of Negro troops
overseas became, therefore, not merely a question of persuading
theater commanders and foreign areas to take and use Negro troops. It
became a question involving the entire organization and training
policy of the Army as it affected Negro troops. It became, as well, a
question of public policy. More important, from the point of view of
the actual operational employment
of Negro troops, it became a key question in that galaxy of queries
which, by the spring of 1943, formed a cluster whose full effect was:
What, now, can the Army do to salvage usable Negro troops from the
host of units, holding manpower immobile, for which there is
apparently no immediate use? These units included not only the
proportionate absorption units created primarily to hold Negro
inductees -the sanitary companies, the air base security squadrons,
and the aviation squadrons for whom, even when a possible need could
be foreseen, priorities for shipment were so low that space on
outgoing transports could rarely be provided so long as more urgently
needed units and supplies were awaiting transportation, but also the
combat units which the theaters were not prepared to welcome. The Army
had no clear answer to this question until after the first Negro
combat unit engaged in active operations against the enemy in the
summer and autumn of 1943.
- [449]