Chapter
III
- The Negro Positions Defined
- As the conflict which was to become
World War II approached, Negroes asked with increasing frequency for the
opportunity that they believed to be rightfully theirs in the first place:
the opportunity to participate in the defense of their country in the same
manner and on the same basis and in the same services as other Americans.
Not all Negroes were agreed on the details of this participation. Some refused
to compromise on anything short of complete integration into the armed forces
without segregation of any sort. Others were willing to accept varying measures
of segregation in the hope of achieving compensatory advances in the form
of additional opportunities for service, promotion, and status within a
segregated system. All were agreed that at least some of the restrictions
existing in the peacetime Army of 1939 should be relaxed.
-
- They had seen how the Navy, in the
years between wars, had been able to eliminate almost all Negroes. They
believed that the Army had quietly ceased the combat training of the old
Negro regiments. They entered the period of expanding national defense with
the conviction that, left to its own devices, the Army, citing the Navy
as precedent and using World War I as justification, might very well refuse
to expand its Negro strength any more than it had to. Knowing little or
nothing about existing War Department plans for an emergency, Negroes were
resolved to prevent the increase of restrictions and, through the use of
every available means, to remove all limitations which operated to prevent
the full employment of Negro manpower within the Army.
-
- By the late 1930's a steadily rising
flow of queries on the subject of Negro employment in the Army came into
the War Department from the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, newspapers and press associations, National Guard unit officers,
groups of World War I veterans, men wishing to enlist, and members of Congress
inquiring on behalf of their constituents. Queries and protests about the
use of Negro troops were normally answered by the War Department until 1940
in a routine and noncommittal manner, according to "precedent letters"
similar to those employed for answering general correspondence on many other
subjects. Such letters, usually prepared by staff agencies and approved
by the Office of the Secretary of War or by the Office of the Chief of Staff,
were deposited with The Adjutant General, who could then use them as a basis
for answering similar letters on the same subject. In the area of Negro
queries, the answers summarize the Army's position on several basic questions,
but usually they did not give detailed or specific answers to direct questions.
-
- If the correspondent questioned
the
- [51]
- restrictions placed on Negro enlistments
by virtue of the small number of Negro units maintained or by reason of
the organization of Army units by race, the reply was likely to read:
-
- In time of peace the Army must be
so organized as to assure a balanced force, containing, in the proper proportions,
elements of all arms and services, and capable of rapid and orderly expansion
in time of war without major changes in the basic peacetime organization.
Consequently, it is necessary to set up specific units to which colored
personnel may be assigned, and these organizations must have a definite
and proper place in the balanced force organizations of the Army as a whole.
These organizations now include units of the infantry, cavalry, quartermaster
corps, and medical corps. They meet our peacetime requirements, and provide
the necessary nucleus for wartime expansion.1
-
- If the correspondent became insistent
and requested further information or presented an argument for a change
in policy, his letter was simply acknowledged, or he might be told:
-
- Your remarks and the contents of
the accompanying paper have been carefully noted. However, under a long
established rule the War Department refrains from participation in controversial
discussions arising from time to time in connection with articles appearing
in the press, or statements made by public speakers or debaters, when the
activities of the Army or its personnel are subjected to criticism.2
-
- By 1940, correspondence on the policy
toward the use of Negro manpower had become
so heavy that The Adjutant General provided duplicated form letters for
replies. Addresses and, when required, additional pertinent materials might
be typed on these.
-
- Congressmen, newspapers, organizations,
and individuals receiving the War Department's form letter replies often
concluded that no actual plans existed for the use of Negro troops other
than those dictated by expediency. The precedent letters helped to convince
correspondents that there was scant hope of promoting the cause of the Negro
by appealing to the War Department directly. The natural alternative was
public agitation that would stir the President and Congress into action.
Thus a succession of public campaigns on the question of the employment
of Negro troops gained in momentum and support as the need for national
defense projects became more widely accepted.
-
-
- In 1938, the Pittsburgh Courier,
then the largest and one of the most influential Negro papers of national
circulation, opened a campaign for the extension of opportunities for Negroes
in the military services. The paper published an open letter to President
Roosevelt, organized a Committee for Negro Participation in the National
Defense, and encouraged its readers to send letters, telegrams, and delegations
to congressmen and other national political leaders asking for an opinion
on the wisdom of forming an all Negro division in the peacetime Army. Many
of these letters, especially those to congressmen, were forwarded to the
War Department for information. As the campaign spread to other papers and
- [52]
- to local organizations, similar
letters arrived from other sources.3
This campaign was well organized and well publicized. Quantities of correspondence
poured into the War Department. When the department did not commit itself
the Negro press, having obtained no positive information, became even more
cynical and critical.
-
- In the late thirties various other
agencies and organizations interested in Negro affairs became aware of the
problem of the Negro in the armed forces. A 1939 conference of the National
Youth Administration (NYA) on the problems of the Negro and Negro youth,
in addition to requesting the further extension of educational and vocational
opportunities which had been stressed throughout the thirties, made a number
of other recommendations to the War Department: Funds for military training
in land grant colleges should be allocated equitably to Negro and white
youths. Educational facilities provided by the Civilian Conservation Corps
(CCC) should be increased so that Negroes might be trained "to take
their places in the leadership of the Camps." Federally supported service
schools such as West Point and Annapolis should be maintained without discrimination
in the admission of students. Restrictions on enlistments in the armed services
should be eliminated. Negroes should be included in the expansion of the
air arm. Negro combat units should be used for other than custodial and
personal services. And the President should appoint a commission charged
with recommending methods of "integration [of Negroes] into all the
armed forces without segregation.4
-
- Older organizations, such as the
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America and the Southern Interracial
Commission, joined with newer groups like the Council for Democracy and
Fight for Freedom in expressing concern about the Negro in the armed forces.
Most of the newer organizations were interested in solidifying public opinion
on the side of the Western Powers. They could not proceed with their public
appeals in the name of the preservation of democracy, many of these organizations
felt, while Negroes constantly reminded them of inequities existing at home.
Fight for Freedom, whose board of sponsors included Senator Carter Glass,
Mrs. Calvin Coolidge, and James H. Hubert, secretary of the New York Urban
League, issued a statement reading in part: "During the past war we
made brave promises of interracial justice after the war would be over.
The promises were forgotten. Today we must prove as we march towards war
that we mean to advance freedom for ALL men here in America." The Council
for Democracy, whose board included Ernest Angell, Fred Bartlett, Abraham
Flexner, Robert Littell, and Leon M. Birkhead, published a pamphlet,
The Negro and Defense: A Test of Democracy, which contained similar
ideas. The interest of these and other civilian groups was not limited to
the War Department but extended to three other federal agencies that had
loose ties with the Military Establishment.
- [53]
- The Civilian Conservation Corps,
a depression born agency originally planned as a relief measure for unemployed
youths, developed into a major youth training program in the late thirties.
It did not provide military training, but its campers were supervised and
served by military personnel of the Officers' Reserve Corps. Between April
1933 and June 1940 approximately 300,000 Negro youths went through CCC camps.5
While Negroes were underrepresented in the CCC on the basis of relative
needs, after 1936 the 9 to 10 percent of Negroes in the total enrollment
of the camps represented approximately their percentage in the single male
population in the 15-24-year age group.6
-
- In the summer of 1937, the War Department
noted that, out of a total of 1,849 CCC companies, 167 were Negro. Two of
these, at Gettysburg, Pa., and Elmira, N.Y., were officered in line and
staff by Negro Reserve officers. Thirty-three medical officers and eight
chaplains in the CCC at that time were Negroes.7
Negro educational advisers were employed in the all Negro camps. In June
1940 approximately 30,000 Negroes were in the 151 all Negro and the 71 mixed
camps, most of the latter being in New England and the Middle West.8
-
- While the CCC was administered in
a manner that carefully avoided giving the
impression that these camps had any direct relation to military service,
the educational, vocational, health, and groupliving training of the youths
concerned, and especially of the Negro youths, was considered by many to
be of tremendous value to the nation as a whole. Criticism of the CCC for
not giving greater opportunities for the development of Negro administrative
leadership began to appear in the prePearl Harbor years. By 1939, as indicated
in the recommendation of the NYA conference mentioned above, the relation
of these camps to the development of latent leadership qualities was widely
recognized.9
-
- The National Youth Administration
helped train mechanics and technical specialists both for use in defense
industries and for possible use in the armed forces. NYA training was superimposed
upon courses which had been developed during the Great Depression. There
was little complaint about these courses, for they generally provided opportunities
for Negro students in most fields of training. The major complaint was that
the courses alone were not enough.10
-
- The third of the agencies whose
activities were looked upon as vital to the interests of Negro participation
in national defense was the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA), which in
1939 began to give pilot training to students in cooperation with colleges
and a few private airfields. This program was begun as part of an effort
to increase the air-mindedness as well as the practical aviation training
of American youth.
- [54]
- Initially, no provision was made
for the specific inclusion of Negro trainees. Since no courses were given
in cooperation with Negro schools or colleges and few Negroes were enrolled
in schools that had courses, there was no significant Negro participation.
This situation brought about the first of a series of legislative enactments
designed to clarify and increase the military training opportunities for
Negroes.
-
-
- In March 1939, while debating a
bill to expand the nation's defense program, the Congress incorporated into
the bill an amendment proposed by Senator Harry H. Schwartz of Wyoming.
This amendment provided that, from among the civilian aviation schools to
which the Secretary of War was authorized to lend equipment for aviation
training, one or more should be designated by the Civil Aeronautics Authority
for the training of Negro pilots. An earlier amendment had been presented
to the Clerk of the Senate by Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire. When
the Schwartz amendment was presented from the floor, Senator Bridges offered
his own amendment as a substitute. It provided "That the Secretary
of War is specifically authorized to establish at appropriate Negro colleges
identical equipment, instruction, and facilities for training Negro air
pilots, mechanics, and others for service in the United States Regular Army
as is now available in the Air Corps Training Center."11
This additional amendment failed to pass, but it
is illustrative of the type of legislation which had support in many quarters.
By some members of Congress, it was discussed and voted upon as though it
would accomplish the same ends as the Schwartz amendment which was adopted.
Both amendments were direct outgrowths of a campaign for admission of Negroes
to the Air Corps. This campaign was the most widespread, persistent, and
widely publicized of all the prewar public pressure campaigns affecting
the Negro and the Army.
-
- Negroes had been attempting to gain
entrance to the Air Corps since World War I. In 1917, when they tried to
enlist in the Air Service of the Signal Corps, they received the answer
that no colored aero squadrons were being formed "at the present time."
Applications for that branch therefore could not be received; but, if, "later
on," it was decided to form colored squadrons, recruiting officers
would be notified to that effect. 12
Requests for service as air observers also were made during World War I.
A plan was broached in the Office of the Director of Military Aeronautics
for the use of Negroes for fatigue and police duty at airfields to relieve
regular men, but this was not looked upon with favor.13
A few Negroes were in construction companies of the Air Service, but none
engaged in any form of flying or of aircraft maintenance.14
-
- Early postwar requests for the establishment
of Negro air units of the Or
- [55]
- ganized Reserves were considered
"impossible" to grant on the ground that no Negro officers had
previously held commissions in the Air Service and that, since no Negro
air units existed, there was no justification for the appointment of Negroes
as flying cadets. 15
In 1931, when existing Negro ground units were reduced to provide for the
fifth increment of the Air Corps expansion, critics pointed out that the
only way to prevent the reduction from working an injustice would be to
open the Air Corps to Negroes so that they might at least retain the overall
strength originally allotted to them.16
To suggestions in this vein the War Department replied that from the beginning,
the Air Corps "gathered in men of technical and mechanical experience
and ability. As a rule, the colored man has not been attracted to this field
in the same way or to the same extent as the white man. Particularly is
this so of aerial engineering." So many applications from college trained
men were being received, the War Department added, that "many white
applicants are being denied places."17
To this the secretary of the NAACP answered:
-
- It is obvious that colored men cannot
be attracted to the field of aviation "in the same way or to the same
extent as the white man" when the door to that field is slammed in
the colored man's face . . . . There are thousands of excellent colored
mechanics in the country and if the
War Department did not prejudice the case by definitely excluding them,
we feel sure that there would be no difficulty in finding and developing
men with all the qualifications required of pilots, mechanics, and all the
other functions included in the air service.18
-
- Eight years later Senator Schwartz
summed up the point of view of those who felt that legislation was the only
guarantee of full Negro participation in the military defense of the nation
when he remarked:
-
- Somebody may say, "There is
no provision in the bill now which would prevent a Negro receiving such
training," but, Mr. President, I can only judge the future by the past.
I believe the situation is such that unless we give this specific and affirmative
recognition, possibly our qualified Negro citizens will not have an opportunity
to become air pilots.19
-
- This argument for the inclusion
of specific references to Negroes in national defense bills was to arise
frequently in succeeding months. It was to culminate in the provisions concerning
race written into the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.
-
- The Schwartz amendment was enacted
as a part of Public Law 18, effective 3 April 1939.20
Its subsequent
- [56]
- history illustrates some of the
many difficulties involved in legislation of this type. It also illustrates
the influence which such legislation had on Army planning.
-
- When it became clear that the bill,
including the Schwartz amendment, was likely to be approved by both Houses
and signed by the President, there was some inclination within the Air Corps
to believe that the amendment might make it necessary for the Air Corps
to train Negro pilots and to form at least one Negro air unit. At the request
of Brig. Gen. Barton K. Yount, chief of the Training Group of the Office
of the Air Corps, the Air Plans Section prepared a plan for the training
of Negro pilots and a Negro unit based on the assumption that it "will"
be necessary for the Air Corps to proceed with such training. "However,
further study of the act by several different individuals on the General
Staff and in the C. A. A. has developed the belief that such steps will
not be necessary," the chief of the Plans Section reported .21
-
- As interpreted by the Air Plans
Section, the bill merely authorized the Secretary of War to lend equipment
to accredited civilian aviation schools at which personnel of the Military
Establishment were pursuing a course under competent War Department orders.
One or more of these schools would be designated by the CAA for the training
of any Negro pilot. The CAA would name one of the schools which the Air
Corps was to use for primary training. This school would offer Air Corps
training, and also civilian training. "The letter of the law would
certainly be fulfilled, and it is believed that the spirit would also be
fulfilled 100%. There is absolutely nothing that directs us to enlist negro
flying cadets. The original intent was to use the C.A.A. and the matter
crept into this bill thru misunderstanding. By being left in, it assures
the Negro of training at a school of such high standards that `personnel
of the Military Establishment are pursuing a course' there." 22
-
- General Yount agreed that all that
was necessary under the law was for the Air Corps to request the CAA to
designate "one of our approved schools (Chicago, for example) where
negroes may be trained under Civil Aeronautics Authority regulations and
by the Civil Aeronautics Authority." Still, he felt, the War Department,
under its interpretation of the law, might rule that Negro pilots must be
enlisted as flying cadets and that they must be trained in the same manner
as white pilots under the expansion program. In that case, CAA would probably
have to designate one of "our approved schools" for Negro training.
After completing training at a civilian school, Negro cadets could be sent
to Randolph Field and later to Kelly Field. "It is possible that this
would
- [57]
- create a difficult situation although
it could be taken care of," General Yount thought.23
-
- But, once begun, the process of
training would not end here. The Air Corps' Reserve Division had already
pointed out that, if a Negro flying cadet successfully completed training
at the Air Corps Training Center, he "must reasonably be considered
as being qualified" for a Reserve commission. While commissioning such
a trainee was not mandatory under the law, "it would, at the same time,
prove difficult, if not impossible," to refuse such a commission.24
Once a Negro cadet was commissioned, General Yount felt, a demand, "backed
by politics," would be made for the continuation of his training.25
-
- Continued training would be possible
by assignment of Negro reservists to white units. In Yount's view this would
be "ruinous to morale." One or more Negro Reserve or Regular Army
units in which Negro Reserve officers could continue their training might
be established. Neither funds nor estimates existed for either type of unit.
Either type, because of the time needed to train enlisted men, would have
to have white senior officers, noncommissioned officers, and mechanical
personnel. "This is not considered practicable," General Yount
concluded. Reserve units, moreover, could be expected to multiply as Negroes
in different parts of the country requested them. Therefore, General Yount
recommended, the Air Corps should
confine its action to a request for authorization to plan training in "one
of our approved schools and under the jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics
Authority." 26
His recommendation was approved by General Arnold, who then requested War
Department approval.27
-
- The Judge Advocate General, when
asked for his opinion, more than agreed with the Air Corps. He further construed
the act to contain a directive to the CAA only, with absolutely "no
duty . . . imposed by such language on the War Department." The War
Department nevertheless decided that, "in the present instance and
notwithstanding such interpretation," it would be advisable to cooperate
with the CAA in carrying out "what appears to be" the intent of
Congress. The Air Corps was therefore directed to confer with the CAA to
obtain its designation of an accredited civilian flying school and to agree
upon the aircraft and equipment required.28
-
- The Air Corps proceeded to follow
the line of action approved by the War Department. General Yount conferred
informally with Robert Hinckley, chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Authority,
who agreed to designate a school and train a number of Negro pilots under
the CAA program. "Inasmuch as this may be discussed in the press and
may cause some political repercussions . . . ," the Chief of the Air
Corps wrote, "it is recommended that the entire subject be discussed
with the Secretary of War in order that he may be thoroughly informed as
to the War Department pro-
- [58]
- cedure in this case, i.e., `The
Civil Aeronautics Authority will train the negro pilots in accordance with
the provisions of H.R. 3791.' " 29
-
- Despite the cautious analysis of
and approach to Public Law 18, the decision as reached was to cause continued
misunderstanding and dissatisfaction. Negroes and many of the congressmen
supporting the amendment had considered that it ended once and for all the
discussion of whether or not the Air Corps would train Negro pilots.30
The Air Corps, seeking to explain its interpretation of the law, had prepared
a letter to Senator Morris Sheppard, chairman of the Senate Military Affairs
Committee. But before it was sent the Office of the Chief of Staff informed
the Air Corps not only that "for the time being" the War Department
would take no action in connection with the training of Negro pilots but
also that "no more publicity will be given this matter than is absolutely
essential." 31
In light of these directions,
the prepared letter was not sent.32
-
- Informing the Senate committee was
nevertheless necessary, General Arnold thought. Senator Schwartz had visited
him and General Yount with urgent demands that training for Negro pilots
be initiated. Representatives of Negro organizations had "called and
expressed an opinion that they will continue to agitate in Congress for
the passage of additional legislation if something definite is not done
for pilot training for their race in the very near future." Informing
Senator Sheppard of the proposed plan "may do much to allay this agitation,"
General Arnold felt.33
On 25 May he took the matter up personally.34
As a result, a suggested letter went to Secretary Woodring for his signature.
But this letter was lost or mislaid and a substitute was not sent forward
until 10 June.35
The letter was dispatched to Senator Sheppard on 12 June, too late to accomplish
its original purpose, for in the meantime the hearings on H.R. 6791, the
Supplemental Military Appropriation Bill for 1940 providing funds for the
Air Corps expansion program, had produced testimony that further convinced
congressmen and the public that the Air Corps, under Public Law 18, was
going to train Negro pilots.
-
- Senator Schwartz, on 26 May, had
told the committee of his conviction that
- [59]
- the appropriation bill required
an amendment providing a specific amount for training Negro pilots. Both
General Yount and General Arnold had told the Senator that they were encountering
difficulties in carrying out the provisions of the existing act. "Of
course," the Senator said, "you understand the same as I do, whether
we want to admit it or not, that back under this is a feeling in the Army
and in the Navy that bringing these Negro pilots and giving them this opportunity
will result in some embarrassment one way or another on account of social
or economic conditions." ' He indicated that General Arnold had told
him that the Air Corps, "without trouble," could give Negro pilots
training for ninety days at a civilian school, ninety days at Randolph Field,
and ninety days at Kelly Field, with the Randolph Field phase probably added
to a civilian school. The Kelly Field phase, where "they are flying
in squadrons," would be more difficult, but the War Department could
handle this. "I hope the committee will amend the bill because I do
think the War Department needs a little urging," Senator Schwartz continued.36
Similar proposals for specific sums to be earmarked for the training of
Negro pilots were made by Negro witnesses.37
-
- Representative D. Lane Powers of
New Jersey sought to determine the need for legislation earmarking special
funds for this purpose. On 5 June he asked Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring
if, under Public Law 18, one or more schools would be designated for Negro
pilot training. Secretary Woodring, who had not yet received the draft letter
to Senator Sheppard, replied that the matter was being considered. "We
are trying to work this out in fairness to those colored people who are
rightfully entitled to this training. We are going to try to work this out
honestly in the interests of every citizen of the United States," the
Secretary said.38
"You are definitely going to train some Negro pilots, are you not?"
Powers asked. Woodring replied, "We are planning to do so." 39
-
- To further questions the Secretary
continued to answer in the affirmative. Though he did not say specifically
that the War Department itself was going to train or use Negro pilots, the
impression was left that the Secretary had committed the Army to a program
of training and using Negro pilots, trained in the primary phase at a civilian
school, from which they would go into military training. This impression
had been heightened by the general understanding that, although CAA was
to train primarily civilian pilots, these men would constitute a military
reservoir from which the Travelling Flying Cadet Board could pick the best
for further training.40
-
- When the appropriations bill came
to the floor of the House, Representative Louis Ludlow of Indiana proposed
a new amendment providing that one million dollars of the eight million
planned for expanding the training of military pilots be set aside for training
Negro pilots. This would be "sheer justice," Ludlow said, for,
if war comes,
- [60]
- Negroes will be conscripted on a
widespread scale, and it is just as certain as anything in the future can
be that a considerable proportion of Negroes with aviation training will
be sent into air combat detachments. It would be positively cruel and inhumane
to assign Negroes to the combat air service without giving them the means
to protect themselves. The protection to which they are entitled is a thorough
course in combat air training, the same course that is given to white air
pilots . . . . Now is the time to begin that training.41
-
- The Ludlow amendment passed the
House but it did not remain in the bill.
-
- Nothing in the meantime happened
in the training of Negro military pilots. In the fall of 1939 the CAA did
establish, under its own authority, Civilian Pilot Training (CPT) units
at several Negro colleges, including Tuskegee, Howard, Hampton, West Virginia
State, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical, and Delaware State. A
few Negroes also enrolled in CPT courses at other colleges and universities
in the North. During the first year of the CPT program, 100 Negro college
students were given training; of these 91 qualified for civil licenses a
record as good as that of white students, a national magazine remarked.42
The CAA also announced the designation of the North Suburban Flying School
at Glenview, Ill., as the school required by Public Law 18, but no Negroes
were sent to this school, though new barracks had been built there and white
flying cadet classes were being
sent there. To the continuing requests for information on training Negroes
for duties with the Air Corps, the War Department had a standard answer-
a variation on what had become a familiar theme to the more persistent inquirers:
-
- It has long been a policy of the
War Department not to mix colored and white enlisted men in the same tactical
organization and, since no provision has been made for any colored Air Corps
units in the Army, colored persons are not eligible for enlistment in the
Air Corps.43
-
- The general public impression that
there was a connection between the CAA program and the opening of the Air
Corps to Negro flying cadets and enlisted men meanwhile continued. The actual
participation of Negroes in the CPT program did not allay agitation for
full participation in Air Corps training; rather, it increased the range
of such agitation. The refusal of cadet boards to consider the applications
of Negroes who were successful participants in the college program gave
further leverage to the campaign.
-
- Nor was the legal interpretation
of Public Law 18 clearly understood. In January 1940, during the debate
on the supplemental appropriations bill,44
Senator Bridges sought to discover the status of flying training for Negroes.
Reading from a letter in which the War Department returned a Negro's application
for flying cadet training because "there are no units composed of colored
men,"
- [61]
- Senator Bridges declared, referring
to Public Law 18:
-
- I find that that provision of the
law was not carried out .... I think that is a rather serious thing. I am
in sympathy with these appropriations and the general purpose of this bill
for the national defense; but I should like to have it a matter of official
record that the law was passed. It was passed, I assume, by Congress in
good faith to provide training for the colored men of this country who desire
to participate and secure training as aviators in the United States Army;
and apparently the law today has been ignored.
-
- Turning to Senator Elbert Thomas,
Senator Bridges asked ". . . has the Senator any suggestion as to just
how Congress should go about seeing that the law is carried out?"
-
- Similar questions about Public Law
18 arose from time to time in committees and on the floors of both Houses.
Most of the answers given left the impression that the CAA program was initiating
training which would be continued by the Army once enough pilots and mechanics
had obtained rudimentary training. In March the Chief of the Air Corps,
Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, informed the House committee on appropriations
that he felt that the Chicago school would take care of the matter of training
Negro pilots.45
The Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, on at least two occasions
left a similar impression with committee members. On one of these, after
explaining that "there is no such thing as colored aviation at the
present time" but that the CAA was the proper place to begin it, the
general was asked by Representative Ludlow, "So you
expect to give reasonable consideration to the Negro in that respect?"
Marshall replied, "We are doing that right now." 46
It was implied by the White House and so interpreted to the Negro public
that the War Department would accelerate and expand CAA training and that,
when enough specialists and pilots were available, Air Corps units composed
of Negroes would be organized.47
Delays at Glenview were explained by the difficulty of obtaining the twenty
qualified students needed to begin instruction.48
-
- The completion of CPT courses by
the first Negroes naturally raised the question of what the next step in
their
- training and use would be. The Air
Corps and the Army were developing their own internal approach to the question.
Despite the general statements of the impossibility of forming Negro air
units, within the General Staff there was strong minority opinion that all
branches, including the Air and Signal Corps, should be required to absorb
their proportionate share of Negro enlisted men in time of war. The question
was: how could this be done in the Air Corps while maintaining racial separation?
-
- In the Air Corps, traditional officer
enlisted men relationships had been up
- [62]
- set by the appearance of the pilot-officer
who had to work with enlisted men who might not be under his command at
all. A pilot's plane might be serviced by enlisted men who were members
of a base squadron on an airfield several hundred miles from his home station.
He might have to work with men of a strange weather unit or operations section.
Visions of wholesale breaches of the codes of interracial etiquette arose
whenever it was considered that a Negro pilot might be forced to land at
a strange airfield for an overnight stay.
-
- As great a quandary was created
by the question of making use of existing facilities to train Negro pilots
and enlisted men for whom neither units nor a body of experience capable
of forming initial units and ground crews was available. Recognition of
the cost and unwieldiness of duplicating training facilities in a service
in which complete separation of the races was unlikely led to the suggestion
that the Air Corps might make a departure from Army practices and train
Negro and white airmen together. "The training of white and negro pilots
in the same unit is out of the question," G-3 answered. "The idea
of mixed units does not prevail among the educated negroes, who were members
of a committee which met with C. A. A. and Army members to make arrangements
for the course of instruction at the Chicago School of Aeronautics, as they
favor the idea of colored units." 49
On the other hand, in face of the Air Corps' opposition, the provision of
separate units for Negroes seemed unlikely. "There are no type units,
combat or service, for which it is recommended that negro personnel be used
. . . ," the Air Corps had informed G-3.50
Arguments against training Negro pilots included the scarcity of experienced
Negroes in commercial aviation, the "lack of interest" of Negroes
in aviation as evidenced by the number of private licenses which they had
allowed to lapse, the absence of Negro units in the air forces of other
countries, and the time ("several years"), which would be' needed
to train enlisted men to become competent mechanics for use in ground crews
of separate Negro units. Another potent argument was based on the fact that
Negro pilots would make necessary a large increase in the number of Negro
officers. Extracts from the testimony of World War I were cited to demonstrate
that their superiors, their subordinates, and Negro officers themselves
lacked confidence in their abilities. It was concluded that "the hazards
of flying either in peace or war are such that the lack of confidence in
any pilot of a combat unit not only creates timidity in the other pilots
of the formation, but creates a mental hazard which in reality becomes a
material hazard. Thus any such unit whether it is composed of white or negro
pilots is useless as a combat unit either in peace or war." 51
-
- This reasoning was not known to
the Negro public in detail. Negroes summed up the Air Corps' position by
simply asserting that the Air Corps had no intention of admitting that Negroes
could fly and that it had less intention of being found in error by giving
them the chance to prove that they could. Lack of op
- [63]
- portunities for Negroes to find
employment in defense industries, especially in aircraft factories, was
tied in with the protests. The Crisis used as the cover of its July
1940 issue a photograph of planes on an assembly line across which was printed:
FOR WHITES ONLY. The caption read: "Warplanes Negro Americans may not
build them, repair them, or fly them, but they must help pay for them."
Varying the same theme, the magazine's December 1940 cover showed a training
ship over a beautifully laid out field. This time the caption read: "FOR
WHITES ONLY- a U.S. Army Air Corps training plane over the `West Point of
the Air' Randolph Field, Texas. Negroes are not being accepted and trained
by the Army Air Corps at any field in the Nation, despite all the talk of
national unity and of the urgency of every group serving in national defense."
On the same cover the magazine headlined two protest articles, "When
Do We Fly?" by James L. H. Peck and "Jim Crow in the Army Camps,"
by "A Negro Soldier." 52
-
- Negro critics did not know that
out of Public Law 18 had come, in 1939, a plan for the training of a Negro
air unit. The plan forecast that, since there was no reservoir of Negro
pilots and mechanics, it would take "several years" before a Negro
unit could be realized. Holding that "the training of pilots should
present no special problem," the authors of the plan explained:
-
- It is believed that it would be
fairly easy to obtain a small number of qualified candidates for as many
classes as desired. It might be necessary and desirable to establish a special
section or class at the Training Center for those who survived the primary
course. Specially qualified graduates could be sent to the Technical School
for courses in engineering, armament, photography, and communications, if
desired. The training of negro pilots should be so timed that a negro unit
would be available for their active duty. Likewise, the training of negro
enlisted men should present no great problem as separate classes could be
held at the Technical Schools. The greatest difficulty would probably be
in getting the quality of enlisted men necessary for this technical training.
A high school education would be desirable.53
-
- According to this plan any type
of unit could be organized, but from the point of view of complexity in
maintenance and operation difficulties a single-engine unit was deemed best.
This narrowed the choice to pursuit or observation squadrons. A single pursuit
squadron would have to fit into a group, but an observation squadron could
be a comparatively independent unit. Therefore the latter was the recommended
"initial unit." The process of forming the Negro unit would be
gradual, with
- [64]
- initial key supervisory and technical
enlisted personnel white. White officer personnel would be necessary to
start with, except for "plain piloting and observing." As Negroes
became proficient, they would move into responsible positions. It was nevertheless
believed that at least three white officers should be left with the unit
permanently. The unit should be Regular Army, for though the initial cost
would then be higher, continuing costs would be less. If a Reserve or National
Guard organization was formed, "the probability of political demands
for additional units would probably run the resulting cost to a much higher
figure than shown for a single Regular Army unit." A practical problem
was posed by the lack of an allotted unit which could be used. There were
but two new observation squadrons planned for the expansion, one for Hawaii
and one for Panama. Conversion of an existing unit was considered inadvisable
"as the services of the unit would be practically lost during the conversion
period." The alternative was to request funds and authorization for
an additional unit, which, if an observation squadron, would cost nearly
four and a half million dollars. A new station, probably near Chicago, was
considered desirable. 54
-
- This plan, while not used in 1939,
was essentially the same as that which was put into operation in 1941. If
the legislation of 1939 provided nothing else, it produced the first few
Negro civilian pilot trainees and a plan which the Air Corps could employ
later to initiate training of Negroes as military pilots.
-
-
- By 1940 concern arose that, unless
some assurances were given Negroes that they would have an opportunity to
participate in the defense of the nation, subversive influences would find
a fertile field for fifth column activities among a disaffected Negro population.
A concrete basis for this apprehension appeared to be demonstrated by the
circulation of such articles as "Negro Yanks Ain't Coming Either- Remember
1917" which appeared in a New York communist publication aimed primarily
at a Negro audience; 55
by the use of the Negro issue in the isolationist press's attacks on the
proposed selective service bill; by open criticism of such Negro leaders
as A. Phillip Randolph, Walter White, and their organizations for being
too conservative and ineffective; and by the development of exotic Negro
cults which held that the bearing of arms was against the tenets of their
newfound faiths.56
-
- Certain newspapers did not hesitate
to use the Negro issue in their campaigns against American entrance into
the war. The New York Daily News, for example, carried full-page
pictures of the Ku Klux Klan and of Southern sharecroppers. The captions
read, "Should We Fight to Save the World . . . While These Things Continue
at Home?" and "Negroes have No FREEDOM OF SPEECH, No FREEDOM FROM
TERROR In the South." "Tell your president, senators, and congressmen,"
the paper suggested to its readers, "that you want democracy to work
properly at home before you fight
- [65]
- for it abroad." 57
In similar vein, isolationist magazines carried articles such as "Should
Negroes Save Democracy?" 58
-
- In April 1940, at its annual meeting
in Washington, the National Negro Congress, a loose federation of Negro
groups organized in 1936, passed a resolution that if America ever went
to war with the Soviet Union they would refuse to fight. "This is treason,"
Representative Robert G. Allen of Pennsylvania informed the House.59
A. Phillip Randolph, head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and
twice president of the congress, refused reelection to a third term and
then resigned from the organization, explaining that the congress, having
accepted financial support from the Communist Party, had lost its independence
and would lose all possibility of mass support from Negroes. "It seems
to be beyond the realm of debate," he said, "that the Negro people
cannot afford to add to the handicap of being black, the handicap of being
'red.'" 60
After this, Representative Hamilton Fish of New York, a former officer of
World War I's Negro 369th Infantry, declared that "99 1/2 percent of
American Negroes are loyal American citizens." 61
-
- During 1940 and 1941, street corner
and park speakers harangued crowds about the necessity of unity among the
world's darker peoples, of whom the Japanese, as the most powerful, were
the natural leaders. They played upon the latent anti-Semitism of Negro
areas to show that Nazi Germany had reason and logic behind its racial policies.
The British record of colonialism in Africa and the West Indies came in
for its share of opprobrium. The old Universal Negro Improvement Association
(remnant of the Garvey Back to Africa Movement of the twenties) , the Ethiopian
Pacific Movement, the World Wide Friends of Africa, the Peace Movement of
Ethiopia, the Brotherhood of Liberty for the Black People of America, the
Development of Our Own, and various cult groups of "Moorish" and
"Arabic" Negroes, some dating back thirty years with escapist
members who denied their kinship to American Negroes and gave their allegiance
to none but the crescent flag of Islam, all came under suspicion as foci
of subversive infection. "You have no stake in the war," many
of these cults' street speakers confided to their Negro audiences. "You
will not be allowed to fight the Germans anyway they're white; if you are
sent to fight anyone it will be the Japanese, your colored darker brothers."
62
- [66]
- Although these organizations had
few members, their activities were taken as signs that the traditional loyalty
of Negroes might be weakening. Stafford King, Civilian Aide to the Secretary
of War for the State of Minnesota, who had previously written to the War
Department several times on the problems of CMTC and CAA training for Negroes
in his state, now wrote:
-
- We are, if we can believe one-tenth
of what we hear and read, facing the definite possibility of revolution
from within or invasion from without, or both. A united people is the one
and only defense against either of these contingencies. No subdivision of
government should by arbitrary rule bar a whole class of citizens from volunteer
service. There is no physical, moral or patriotic reason why the colored
man, after passing the regular tests, should be denied enrollment in the
regular army, the National Guard, the ROTC or the CMTC.
- I have no hesitance in suggesting
to you, Sir, that if and when the colored men are so denied the volunteer
service which is given to their white, yellow and brown brothers, they become
easy prey to the smooth tongue of him who reminds them of their inequalities
and promises that under some new type of government, Communist, Fascist,
or Nazi, such inequalities will be erased.63
-
- Newspaper columnists and Army officers
sounded the same warning. The commanding
general of the Fifth Corps Area reported to the War Department that, of
several hundreds of Negroes applying to recruiting stations in his area,
most had to be turned away. "Their disappointment and dissatisfaction
after having met with failure in their efforts to get into the Army, makes
them fertile ground for the activities of subversive agents, in the opinion
of some of our Recruiting Officers," he wrote.64
-
- Replying to such inquiries and comments
with what were essentially form letters began to seem inappropriate to Maj.
Gen. Emory S. Adams, The Adjutant General. To one of the earlier letters
of Stafford King, he prepared a form answer and delivered it to the Secretary
of War with a memorandum attached:
-
- 1. The attached reply to Mr. Stafford
King on his letter regarding the status of Negroes in the Regular Army has
been prepared in accordance with past policies and precedents, but fails
to reach the crux of the situation in my opinion because the policies and
precedents are not in accord with the state of affairs in the United States.
- 2. The colored race is entitled
to greater and better representation in our Army for obvious reasons, many
of which are set forth in Mr. King's letter, and this whole subject should
have careful and immediate study to determine the future policy of the War
Department in the premises.
- 3. It is recommended that this study
be initiated without delay.65
-
- To this recommendation, G-1 replied
that it was collaborating with G-3 on just such a study.66
- [67]
- The preparation of studies in itself
did little to solve the dilemma of the use of Negro troops. Negroes and
their partisans, knowing nothing of the contents of these studies or of
the importance attached to them, continued to carry their case to the public
and the Congress. Comparisons with World War I were used skillfully by Negro
spokesmen, with a constant overtone of "We want no repetition of the
tragic errors of that war." They made speeches, they wrote articles,
they consulted with men in high places, they appeared at Congressional hearings,
they utilized the services and sought the aid of the better known members
of the boards of their organizations. They hoped that, by working before
the declaration of war, before the beginning of large scale expansion of
the Army, they might escape the necessity of deciding which was to come
first once war was declared: a struggle to obtain additional rights and
privileges or a quiescent acceptance, once war began, of a status quo which
they were convinced had long since been proved impractical. Their aim was
full integration of Negroes into the armed services as Americans and not
as a special class of citizens. "We will be American soldiers. We will
be American ditch diggers. We will be American laborers. We will be anything
that any other American should be in this whole program of national defense.
But we won't be black auxiliaries," Dean William H. Hastie of the Howard
University Law School declared.67
Under known Army policies, it
seemed doubtful to many Negroes that they would be anything other than grudgingly
accepted auxiliaries.
-
-
- In the summer of 1940, two new Congressional
bills to increase the size of the Army, incidentally affecting the employment
of Negro troops, engaged the attention of the War Department. One would
have given the President authority to assign officers and enlisted men during
fiscal year 1941 to the various branches of the Army in "such numbers
as he considers necessary .... Provided, that no person shall be excluded
from any branch of the military establishment on account of race, creed,
or color." The G-3 Division felt that passage of legislation containing
this provision would "disrupt completely plans for the organization
of an effective military force." 68
G-1 predicted that such a provision would make it impossible to limit Negro
enlistments to a number proportionate to the Negro population. Conceivably,
the bulk of the Regular Army might become Negro. Because of the uncertainty
of the number of Negro enlistments, no "balanced force" could
be maintained if Negro and white units were to be kept separate. The legislative
proposal might force the Army to organize Negro units in every arm and service.69
After getting the General Staff divisions' views, Secretary Woodring summarized
the department's objections to the provision, linking them to the Japanese
threat and to the possibility
- [68]
- that passage might endanger the
maintenance of segregated units:
-
- It is impossible to forecast definitely
what its effect might be. Its retention in the bill might result in the
enlistment of Negroes or Japanese in numbers out of all proportion to the
colored population of the country. Such a result would demoralize and weaken
the effect of military units by mixing colored and white soldiers in closely
related units, or even in the same units. It might also have a dangerously
adverse effect upon discipline should it be necessary to have colored and
white troops in the same units or closely related units. I have no objection
whatever to negro troops but must not be required to take them in such numbers
as to prevent the proper organization of the army. I strongly urge the conferees
to strike this provision from the bill.70
-
- The joint conferees of the House
and Senate substituted a provision which read, as passed: "Provided,
That no Negro, because of race, shall be excluded from enlistment in the
Army for service with colored military units now organized or to be organized
for such service." 71
This substitution left the manner of the enlistment and employment of Negroes
exactly where it had been before.
-
- But the net effect of the original
proposal was to increase the allotment of Negro combat units in the Army
for the first time in twenty years and to provide types of units in which
Negroes had not previously been employed. For, although the provision, as
originally worded, was stricken from the bill, the War Department could
not be certain that it would
not reappear and become a part of final legislation. In an effort to "forestall
the re-inclusion of this provision," the Chief of Staff authorized
Maj. Wilton B. Persons, Office of the Secretary of War, to inform "appropriate
conferees" that the War Department was making definite plans to organize
"a considerable number" of additional Negro units of the ground
forces under the provisions of a second bill, authorizing an increase of
the Regular Army by another 95,000 men. Major Persons reported that the
matter was "handled with satisfactory results." 72
-
- The new Negro units added under
this compromise were: one 155mm. gun field artillery regiment; two coast
artillery antiaircraft gun regiments; one general service engineer regiment;
twelve quartermaster truck companies; and one chemical decontamination company.
Each of these units, except the second coast artillery regiment and the
chemical company, was within the Negro allotment contained in the current
Protective Mobilization Plan, although not all of those activated were units
designated specifically in the PMP as Negro. The total strength of the new
Negro units was to be 4,595 or 8.4 percent of the 55,000 increase authorized
for ground troops. The Negro strength of the Army was to be more than doubled
by the addition of the new units.
-
- Providing this augmentation illustrated
some of the difficulties and administrative annoyances inherent in expanding
the Army's Negro strength. They foreshadowed many of the later
- [69]
- problems which the Army was to face.
In the first place, since the PMP represented a balanced force, the addition
of Negro units could not be accomplished simply by constituting new Negro
units to be added to the PMP. Several of the new Negro units had to be provided
from among organizations that already existed but that were designated for
whites. The 349th Field Artillery (155mm.), for example, was withdrawn from
the Organized Reserves, re-allotted to the Regular Army, changed to a motorized
regiment, and designated Negro.73
The 502d and 503d Coast Artillery (AA) regiments, white Reserve units, were
re-designated 76th Coast Artillery (AA) and 77th Coast Artillery (AA) and
made Negro Regular Army units. The 1st Chemical Decontamination Company,
which was white in the PMP, was made a Negro unit. Of the new units, only
the 41st Engineer Regiment and the 48th Quartermaster Regiment had been
Negro all along.74
-
- In the augmentation plans and activation
orders, companies of the 48th Quartermaster Regiment were designated for
activation with Negro personnel, but the 48th, although so indicated in
the PMP, was not designated "Negro" in the War Department's orders.
The Third Corps Area, to which the unit was allotted, therefore had to ask
the War Department whether its intention was to activate the companies of
this regiment with Negro enlisted men. The query was natural, since the
47th Quartermaster Regiment, now designated Negro, had been
white in the 1939 PMP and since the mid1940 augmentation had originally
included eight companies of the 47th which were now deleted. The War Department
replied that its intention was to activate the 48th Regiment with Negroes.75
-
- The new white units in the expansion
of the Army were opened for enlistment on I August, but enlistments in Negro
units were delayed until 15 August. Certain of the Negro units could not
be housed at their assigned stations until the construction of "Negro
housing" was completed. They were to be activated at temporary stations
and moved later. Providing cadres for the new types of units was a difficult
problem. Time was needed to prepare the Negro cadremen, who had to be obtained
from existing units of the traditional branches, for their task of establishing
and training units in new branches.
-
- The organization of new Negro units
in the Regular Army raised questions within the Army. Would these units
become permanent parts of the Regular Army? Would the branches have difficulty
in inactivating them once the emergency was over? Would their establishment
mean that other arms and services besides the Infantry and Cavalry would
now have a peacetime "Negro problem?" 76
-
- Certain of the arms and services
still did not believe that they should be given the task of organizing Negro
units at all. Specific objection came from the General Headquarters (GHQ)
Air Force,
- [70]
- which asked that the 1st Chemical
Decontamination Company be exchanged for a white unit. Such a company in
air operations, the GHQ Air Force said, must be broken down into small detachments
for use at various bases and distributing points. The detachments must live
and mess with other Air Corps units. Since all other units of the GHQ Air
Force were white, the decontamination company should also be white.77
The Chief of the Air Corps asked for favorable consideration of the request.
G-3 pointed out that the method of utilization described by the GHQ Air
Force was but one of many and that during peacetime such a unit need not
be used in this manner at all, unless it could be so employed with minimum
difficulties. The request was not approved and the unit was activated with
Negroes.78
-
- Opening enlistments for Negroes
in new Regular Army combat units was distinctly news in the civilian press.
In Detroit, for example, Army recruiting made an all-time record for the
city on 15 August, the day when recruiting of Negroes began. "Those
enlisted today included 29 Negroes, the first Negroes to be enlisted for
combat units here since 1920," the Detroit News reported. Chicago recruiting
offices broke the national record by enrolling over 100 men in a day.79
-
- The pattern set in the establishment
of these new units was in several ways typical of later Army experience.
The re-designation of white
units to receive Negroes, the semi confusion of the racial identity of units,
delays in assembling units caused by lack of housing and trained cadres,
objections to the receipt of Negro units by branches of services, and the
readiness of Negroes to enter new units were to be repeated many times during
mobilization and during the course of World War II.
-
- The legislative compromise out of
which the new units came had additional significance. It was the first of
a series which, by adding a few units here, and subtracting a few there,
caused a relatively haphazard development in the expansion of Negro strength.
The expansion was often based more on expediency than on either military
necessity or sound planning. Existing plans were often altered by factors,
frequently nonmilitary, which interfered with the orderly procedures visualized
for the expansion of Negro strength.
-
-
- The legislation of 1940 primarily
affecting the employment of Negro troops by the Army was the Selective Training
and Service Act. When first proposed, this legislation contained a preamble
which read in part: "The Congress further declares that in a free society
the obligations and privileges of military training and service should be
shared generally in accordance with a fair and just system of selective
compulsory military training and service." Nevertheless, Negroes and
supporters of their efforts to obtain full military training, remembering
that Public Law 18 of April 1939 had produced no pilots,
- [71]
- pressed for additional safeguards.
-
- Rayford W. Logan of Howard University,
chairman of the civilian Committee on Participation of Negroes in the National
Defense Program, testified before the House Committee on Military Affairs
that amendments to the Selective Service bill which stated specifically
the intent of Congress should be inserted. He asked that a new subsection
be added: "No provision of this act shall be construed or administered
so as to discriminate against any person on account of race, creed, or color,"
or, as an alternative, "In the selection and training of men as well
as in the interpretation and execution of the provisions of this act there
shall be no discrimination against any person on account of race, creed
or color." 80
Other spokesmen, Charles H. Houston, NAACP civil rights lawyer, and Owen
D. Young, representing the American Youth Commission, urged the adoption
of amendments similar to those proposed by Logan. Proposals that Negroes
be given safeguards leading to fuller service made a favorable impression
on the committee, for much of the testimony before it had been from pacifist
and other groups opposed to the bill. Representative Paul J. Kilday of Texas
asked Professor Logan, "You are not asking for the exemption of your
race, but you are asking that they be put into it?" Logan replied,
"Yes, and it seems to me extraordinary that they are not." "I
think your stand is in marked contrast to some of those who have been here,"
Kilday commented.
-
- Anti-discrimination amendments were
introduced in both the House and Senate, despite the fact that the bill,
as reported out by the committees, contained sections forbidding discrimination
against volunteers and requiring selection "in an impartial manner."
Representative Hamilton Fish of New York introduced an amendment in the
House which was essentially Logan's alternative amendment. It applied to
selectees only. Senator Robert F. Wagner, also of New York, sought to include
specific mention of aviation units as well as to make it mandatory that
men be selected "without regard to race, creed or color." Both
proponents urged that Negroes be guaranteed the right to serve in any branch
without restrictions because of color.
-
- There was little direct Congressional
opposition to the amendments as such, but the debate on the subject of Negroes
in the proposed Army training program illustrated not only the effect of
political pressures on the Congress but also the political results of public
interest in the subject. The debates covered the range of public reaction
to the question of legislative guarantees of Negro participation in the
preparedness program. Some congressmen asserted that the amendments were
not aimed at the prevention of discrimination against Negroes at all but
at the breakdown of segregation within the Army. Senator Allen J. Ellender
of Louisiana objected that the amendment would lead to racially mixed units
and his colleague, Senator John H. Overton, arguing on the distinction between
discrimination and segregation, said:
-
- I understand from members of the
general staff that there is no discrimination whatever against the colored
race. They are, however, placed in separate units,
- [72]
- while the desire on the part of
a certain class of our population is that there should be mixed units. If
we should undertake to establish mixed units in the Army, it would be subversive
to discipline, subversive to morale, and would not be of benefit either
to the colored or to the white race .... I think I am justified in making
the observation that if they are excluded from the air forces it is because
the Army is not ready yet to have separate units. I think that would be
the only reason.81
-
- Senator Tom Connally of Texas, recalling
the Civil War, and the Houston riot of World War I, said of the Wagner proposal
-
- I think the Senator from New York
does not properly interpret the spirit of the colored race. He may interpret
the spirit of one or two of them who are on salaries around here to agitate
the colored people; he may speak for one or two colored lobbyists; but he
does not speak for the great mass of the American colored people. Most of
them are hard working, most of them mean well; most of them want to do right;
most of them want to serve their country if their country needs them. A
few of them want continually to agitate, disturb, stir up discussion, and
raise the devil about what they speak of as their political and social rights.82
-
- Senator W. Warren Barbour of New
Jersey, on the other hand, contended that anything less than equitable distribution
of Negroes among the arms and services would constitute discrimination.
In World War I, he said, many Negroes were
-
- ... wholly and only in labor battalions.
They were given only this sort of work which, while important in itself,
was discriminatory. The fact that so much of that really nonmilitary duty
was confined to that one race proved that it was discriminatory; and this
is not fair, it is not right, it is not American.83
-
- Senator Schwartz recalled that,
a year before, the Congress had passed a bill (Public Law 1 8) which authorized
the Army to train colored pilots. The Army, he continued, had not been able
to "work out that provision" because of the social implications
involved. He reminded the Senate that recruiting notices reading "white
only" had disturbing effects among the Negro population. Negroes with
whom he had talked, he pointed out, believed that "a very large number
of colored men were not with colored regiments, but they were with a white
artillery regiment and with other regiments, taking care of horses polo
ponies, probably." Though the War Department had not created "what
they call the social situation in the South and in the Army," he continued,
"they are trying to meet the situation for they must and will work
with it and produce a plan where Negroes, such as pilots, would not have
to be working with white pilots." 84
-
- When the Selective Service Act was
finally passed, it contained two specific provisions against discrimination
because of race or color. The first, in section 3 (a), provided: "That
within the limits of the quota determined under section 4 (b) for the subdivision
in which he resides, any person, regardless of race or color, between the
ages of eighteen and thirtysix, shall be afforded an opportunity to volunteer
for induction into the land or naval forces of the United States for the
training and service prescribed . . . ." The second, in sec-
- [73]
- tion 4 (a), read: "That in
the selection and training of men under this act, and in the interpretation
and execution of the provisions of this act, there shall be no discrimination
against any person on account of race or color." 85
The inclusion of these provisions did not of itself satisfy those opponents
of discrimination who visualized a draft Army which, with segregation as
a pattern, would spread discriminatory practices over the entire United
States.
-
- Although the Army had stated several
times that, if the Selective Service bill passed and became law, Negroes
would be inducted in proportion to their strength in the manpower covered
by the law, there was an additional provision in the law which caused Negro
leaders some concern. Section 3 continued:
-
- Provided further, That no man shall
be inducted for training and service under this act unless and until he
is acceptable to the land or naval forces for such training and service
and his physical and mental fitness for such training and service has been
satisfactorily determined: Provided further, That no men shall be inducted
for such training and service until adequate provision shall have been made
for such shelter, sanitary facilities, water supplies, heating and lighting
arrangements, medical care, and hospital accommodations, for such men, as
may be determined by the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy,
as the case may be, to be essential to public and personal health.
-
- The questions raised by this section
were: Would Negroes be "acceptable to the land or naval forces?"
Would the force of "unless and until" provide a means of limiting
service "unless and until" the armed forces had a need for
the individual Negro? Could lack of
shelter or hospital accommodations for Negroes be made a limiting factor
in their induction? 86
-
-
- To obtain answers to these and other
questions, leaders of Negro organizations prepared a memorandum setting
forth what they considered minimum requests. The text of this memorandum
was presented to President Roosevelt, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox,
and Assistant Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson at a White House conference
on 27 September 1940.87
The portion of the program applying to the armed services read:
- The following are important phases
of the integration of the Negro into military aspects of the national defense
program.
- 1. The use of presently available
Negro reserve officers in training recruits and other forms of active service.
At the same time, a policy of training additional Negro officers in all
branches of the services should be announced. Present facilities and those
to be provided in the future should be made available for such training.
- 2. Immediate designation of centers
where Negroes may be trained for work in all branches of the aviation corps.
It is not enough to train pilots alone, but in addition navigators, bombers,
gunners,
- [74]
- radiomen, and mechanics must be
trained in order to facilitate full Negro participation in the air service.
- 3. Existing units of the army and
units to be established should be required to accept and select officers
and enlisted personnel without regard to race.
- 4. Specialized personnel such as
Negro physicians, dentists, pharmacists and officers of chemical warfare,
camouflage service and the like should be integrated into the services.
- 5. The appointment of Negroes as
responsible members in the various national and local agencies engaged in
the administration of the Selective Service Training Act of 1940.
- 6. The development of effective
techniques for insuring the extension of the policy of integration in the
Navy other than the menial services to which Negroes are now restricted.
- 7. The adoption of policies and
the development of techniques to assure the participation of trained Negro
women as Army and Navy nurses as well as in the Red Cross.88
-
- The White House had already directed
the War Department, on 5 September, to prepare and hold a statement to the
effect that "colored men will have equal opportunity with white men
in all departments of the Army." 89
General Marshall informed his Personnel Division that, at a cabinet meeting
on 13 September, the President had stated that "he had been troubled
by representations of the Negroes that their race under the draft was limited
to labor battalions." The Army informed the President that it planned
to give Negroes "proportionate shares in all branches of the Army,
in the proper ratio to their population-approximately 10 percent."
The President then suggested that the War Department, "in conjunction
with the Navy," publicize this fact. "The Secretary of War wishes
an exact statement of the facts in the case, and as to how far we can go
in the matter," the Chief of Staff wrote.90
-
- On 16 September 1900, the day the
Selective Service Act was approved, the War Department issued a press release
headed "Expansion of Colored Organizations Planned." When the
Selective Service System began to operate, the release reported, 36,000
of the first 400,000 men called would be Negroes. The release listed all
Negro units, including the new August units, and mentioned the CAA program,
adding that "the creation of additional colored combat organizations
is now under consideration." It implied, but did not state, that these
would include Air Corps units.
-
- On 8 October 1940, Assistant Secretary
Patterson, "as the result of a conference in your office on September
27," submitted to President Roosevelt a full statement of policy, already
approved informally by the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. The
President penciled his "O.K." and initials on this memorandum,
thereby giving his approval to a policy which remained in effect throughout
the war. On the morning of 9 October it was released to the press by the
White House.91
This first comprehensive statement on the subject read:
-
- It is the policy of the War Department
that the services of Negroes will be utilized on a fair and equitable basis.
In line with
- [75]
- this policy provision will be made
as follows:
- 1. The strength of the Negro personnel
of the Army of the United States will be maintained on the general basis
of the proportion of the Negro population of the country.
- 2. Negro organizations will be established
in each major branch of the service, combatant as well as noncombatant.
- 3. Negro reserve officers eligible
for active duty will be assigned to Negro units officered by colored personnel.
- 4. When officer candidate schools
are established, opportunity will be given to Negroes to qualify for reserve
commissions.
- 5. Negroes are being given aviation
training as pilots, mechanics and technical specialists. This training will
be accelerated.
- 6. At arsenals and army posts Negro
civilians are accorded equal opportunity for employment at work for which
they are qualified by ability, education, and experience.
- 7. The policy of the War Department
is not to intermingle colored and white enlisted personnel in the same regimental
organizations. This policy has been proven satisfactory over a long period
of years, and to make changes now would produce situations destructive to
morale and detrimental to the preparation for national defense. For similar
reasons the department does not contemplate assigning colored reserve officers
other than those of the Medical Corps and chaplains to existing Negro combat
units of the Regular Army. These regular units are going concerns, accustomed
through many years to the present system. Their morale is splendid, their
rate of reenlistment is exceptionally high, and their field training is
well advanced. It is the opinion of the War Department that no experiments
should be tried with the organizational setup of these units at this critical
time.92
-
- The White House, in releasing the
statement, implied that it was the
result of the 27 September conference with Negro leaders. The measure of
the protests which went up from Negroes was the measure of the distance
between the White House announcement and their proposed program. The men
who had attended the White House conference were especially annoyed by the
implication that they had endorsed the announced policy.93
They were specifically disturbed about points five and seven. The announcement
embodied the main points of a policy adopted (although not announced) by
the War Department in 1937, in its planning for mobilization; and the final
paragraph repeated, in almost identical phrases, the statements made in
the many Adjutant General letters which had gone out to individuals all
over the country. Nevertheless, this statement, which contained the basic
Army policy in force throughout the war, was afterward referred to within
the War Department as the Presidential directive on the use of Negro troops
and as a Presidential sanction for policies derived therefrom .94
-
- Had the policy announcement been
made earlier, as had been intended in the 1937 recommendations, reaction
to it might have been slight, for the details of the announcement went beyond
what the Negro press and public had expected or requested as late as the
beginning of 1940. Coming as it did, after the Selec-
- [76]
- tive Service Act, which had already
legalized proportionate representation of Negroes through the operation
of a random choice lottery, the question of manner of service was the only
one left which was of primary concern. The statement on air training had
less than the ring of conviction about it, since no training of the sort
was being given by the Army. The reference to Regular Army units, over half
of which were less than two months old, helped clinch the belief, held by
most Negroes, that there was a wide gap between the words and the intentions
of the War Department. "Of all the shabby dealings of America with
a tenth of her citizens," The Crisis commented in its issue following
the announcement, "none is more shameful or more indefensible than
the
- refusal to give Negroes a fair
chance in the armed forces." The editorial continued:
-
- The citizens' army that is to be
trained under the Selective Service Act will find shortly that the Army
and the Navy are being run very much like country clubs. Americans discovered
that in 1917, but there was a war to be fought at once then and there was
not much they could do about it. Now it should be different and the peacetime
army and its civilian relatives, given a space to think and act before actual
warfare interferes, may force some changes.95
-
- Thereafter, and throughout the war,
The Crisis, and most of the Negro press, while praising the signs of change
within the Army which meant greater opportunities for Negroes, continued
to attack the Army's segregation policy, even in connection with such installations
as the Tuskegee Army Flying School, which trained the Negro pilots for which
the press had worked so long,
and in connection with the activation of Negro divisions. A Negro journalist
commented shortly after Pearl Harbor that no Negro leader in 1942 could
write a "Close Ranks" editorial of the 1918 model if he expected
to maintain his influence. "For in the last war," he argued, "in
spite of the acknowledged bravery of Negro troops, they suffered all forms
of Jim Crow, humiliation, discrimination, and indeed slander- a pattern
being followed today." 96
One of the NAACP's most prominent officers, William Pickens, for example,
was discharged by the organization as an apologist for segregation after
he had commended the Army's work at Tuskegee and at Fort Huachuca.
-
- By no means all comments on the
announcement of Army policy, by or on behalf of Negroes, were adverse.97
It was often pointed out that, under the new policy, Negroes would have
broader opportunities than they had had in the past. Some Negroes wrote
to the War Department to say that they thought it a "fine thing"
to give the Negro a place in the armed services in proportion to Population.
Others, including Negro college officers and presidents, offered their services
as advisers to the Secretary of War and in capacities in which they would
be able to stress the need of national unity to Negro audiences.98
But
- [77]
- GENERAL DAVIS
-
- the majority of the comments and
correspondence criticized one or another of the announced policy decisions.
- In the wake of criticisms, other
commitments were made. Bishop Richard R. Wright, chairman of the Colored
Division of the National Democratic Headquarters, asked Stephen Early, Press
Secretary to the President, if anything had been done by the Republicans
since the Spanish-American War to make permanent additions of Negro Regulars
to the Army and if it was "a fact that under the present administration
the Negro has gotten more recognition in the
Army than ever before, and what is the record?" G-1 made no attempt
to answer the first of these questions, but in response to the second it
compiled a list of the new Negro units recently approved and of those planned
for the near future.99
On the basis of this information Assistant Secretary Patterson informed
the White House that, in addition to the new units already provided, three
infantry regiments, one engineer regiment, eight engineer battalions, "and
the necessary ordnance and quartermaster troops" would be formed in
the spring from Selective Service men.100
"Also from Selective Service personnel, 2,250 men will be trained in
Air Corps units," Patterson's memorandum concluded.101
The next day a supplementary memorandum, delivered to the White House by
Maj. Walter Bedell Smith, indicated that the 4th Cavalry Brigade was being
formed and that it would be one of two, the other brigade to be white, forming
the 2d Cavalry Division.102
Thus, in answer to the demands of the 1940 political campaign, the War Department
committed itself to action in terms of specific units, filling out the announcement
of 9 October that though Negroes would remain in separate units they would
be represented in
- [78]
- all arms and services. These units
were all to be provided, but the manner and nature of their provision was
yet to be worked out. The question of the manner and nature of their employment
was still further in the future.
-
- Two more steps were taken within
this same preelection week. On 25 October Col. Benjamin O. Davis, senior
Negro officer in the Army, was nominated for promotion to brigadier general.103
On the same day Secretary Stimson appointed William Hastie, Dean of the
Howard University Law School, as his Civilian Aide on Negro Affairs. 104
-
- The first of these appointments
received widespread attention in the national press, for this was the first
time that a Negro had achieved general officer's rank in the United States
Army. The second appointment was widely noted as a sign that the Army intended
to expand its Negro strength with a minimum of difficulties. The political
significance of the appointments was not overlooked. Some viewed the Davis
promotion as a Roosevelt administration attempt to counteract Negro opposition
to the October policy announcement. In promoting General Davis, Time commented,
the administration was already violating its announced policy, since he
would leave his all Negro command, the 369th New York National Guard Regiment,
for the new 4th Cavalry Brigade, containing the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments,
both of which, as Regular
- [79]
- Army outfits, had all white officers.
The white officers could be replaced by Negro Reserve officers, but even
then the policy would be violated, since Negro Reserve officers were not
to be used in Regular Army units. The easiest way out, the magazine continued,
would be to retire General Davis on his sixty-fourth birthday due the next
July, for "By then the election will be over." 105
The Negro press, in general, greeted the promotion with approval, though
indicating that it alone was not enough.
-
- For the Hastie appointment, the
Secretary of War had a World War I precedent. In 1917, Newton D. Baker had
made Emmett J. Scott, secretary to Booker T. Washington at Tuskegee, his
Special Assistant with approximately the same purpose in mind the provision
of some means of liaison and some source of interpretation between the Negro
public and the War Department. Moreover, the appointment of special advisers
on questions affecting the Negro public had been an increasing tendency
among federal agencies during the preceding eight years.
-
- Judge Hastie undertook his duties
on 1 November 1940. In his letter of appointment, Secretary Stimson described
these duties to be "to assist in the formulation, development and administration
of policies looking to the fair and effective utilization of Negroes
in all branches of the military service."
106
The Secretary's letter continued:
-
- I hope that you will be able to
assist us in the development of and improvements in the War Department's
plans for the organization of Negro units in each major branch of the service,
and for the utilization of Negro reserve officers, candidates for commissions,
and aviation cadets. I also hope that you will be of assistance to us in
connection with policies involving the employment of Negroes on civilian
status at army establishments and by army contractors.
-
- It will be part of your duties to
investigate complaints concerning the treatment of Negroes in the military
service or in civilian employment in the War Department. In this connection,
I hope it will be possible for you to spend time visiting camps, posts and
stations for the purpose of observing and reporting to me upon matters of
Negro participation in the national defense.
-
- It is my expectation that you will
cooperate with the Negro representatives on the Selective Service Committee
and in the Labor Section of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National
Defense, where appropriate.
-
- Such recommendations as you may
from time to time wish to make should be submitted to me through the Assistant
Secretary of War.
-
- You may be assured that the officers
and establishments of the War Department will cooperate with you in carrying
out the tasks which I have outlined. Instructions are being issued that
you be consulted on matters affecting Negroes in the army, and that all
information necessary to the effective execution of your duties be made
available to you.
- [80]
- Judge Hastie considered these manifold
duties to be the "general task of facilitating the equitable integration
of the Negro into so much of the National Defense Program as falls within
the jurisdiction of the War Department." 107
His office, consisting of himself, one assistant, and a secretary, proceeded
to gather information from General Staff divisions and from the chiefs of
arms and services in an attempt to determine and appraise the existing plans
and developments in the Army's use of Negro troops. Hastie, acting upon
the information available to him, initiated recommendations, generally through
the Secretary of the General Staff, occasionally through one or another
of the assistant chiefs of staff, and at times directly to the Assistant
Secretary (later, Under Secretary) of War, Judge Patterson. Most of the
policy proposals specifically affecting Negroes were referred to the Civilian
Aide for comment, although judge Hastie complained early that too frequently
such matters did not come to his attention until the proposals had been
completely formulated and presented for final approval. As a result of the
publication of a directive concerning the construction of welfare and recreational
facilities for Negro troops on which judge Hastie had not been consulted,
the chiefs of arms and services and the General Staff divisions were instructed
that "Matters of policy which pertain to Negroes, or important questions
arising thereunder, will be referred to judge William H. Hastie, civilian
aide to the Secretary of War,
for comment or concurrence before final action." 108
-
- Individual complaints from soldiers
and civilian employees of the Army, proposals and complaints from Negro
organizations, and problems ranging from the employment of Negro hostesses
and librarians in service clubs to the constitution of Negro combat units
were referred to the Civilian Aide's office for comment and consultation.
Routine requests for information and "daily visits and inquiries by
persons seeking employment" consumed a large part of the time of the
office and prevented the Civilian Aide from giving his full attention to
the larger aspects of his duties.109
Nevertheless, through personal contacts with the chiefs of War Department
agencies and through informal inquiries, judge Hastie, in the first few
months of mobilization, considered a variety of questions of major importance,
including: the proportionate distribution of Negroes in the arms and services;
the use and training of Negro officers, chaplains, and nurses; recreational
and welfare facilities for Negro troops; the use of Negro civilian personnel
in Army installations; Negroes in Civilian Conservation Corps camps; Negroes
in National Youth Administration projects on Army posts and stations; and
the relations of the War Department with the Negro press.
-
- At the outset Hastie was furnished
a complete list of existing units and of those planned through June 1941.
He
- [81]
- was assured that Negroes would be
excluded from no arm or service, though it was explained that the Armored
Force was not an arm but a combination of arms and services. "There
are no negro units in the armored corps," G-1 said, "but there
are mechanized units in the 9th and 10th Cavalries." 110
Negro aviation units, about which Hastie had inquired specifically, would
follow when the National Youth Administration and Civil Aeronautics Authority
programs had trained enough civilian pilots and mechanics. "If this
program is to be safe," G-1 said, "it must progress carefully,
step by step. Plans are now being developed for training of negro military
pilots, when this program has progressed sufficiently to provide the requisite
ground personnel." Negro officers, dentists, and doctors would be used
in the three existing National Guard regiments and in the one new regiment
to be formed in February. Nurses would be procured for "hospitals which
are used exclusively for negro patients" and qualified pharmacists
were free to compete for Reserve commissions. "With representative
units in all arms and services the problem of utilization of skilled negroes
is in general no different from that of the skilled whites," G-1 noted.
"The utilization of the exceptionally skilled white is limited, and
it will be the same in the case of the negro." In the classification
and reception of Negroes at reception centers or in the admission of men
to specialist schools, no discrimination would be permitted. Selection for
schools would depend entirely upon the "particular suitability of the
selectee for the duties for
which he is to be trained." 111
-
-
- General interest in the question
of the employment of Negro troops widened during the year 1940. A number
of yearend articles on the subject appeared in nationally distributed publications.
Walter White, secretary of the NAACP, summed up his views in the opening
words of an article:
-
- From the manpower angle, the largest
defense headache ahead of the United States Government is likely to be the
status of that 10 percent of our population which is Negro. The Negro insists
upon doing his part, and the Army and Navy want none of him.112
-
- To a large extent, despite the War
Department's announced expansion of its employment of Negroes, White's brief
picture was correct. The use and status of Negro manpower did become one
of the major "headaches" of the war. What White did not state
was that a profound difference in interpretation of the Negro's "part"
existed. There were those who insisted that there was no possible meeting
ground between the two opposing points of view.
-
- Many Negroes saw no way in which
- [82]
- any denial of the individual's right
to serve in any capacity for which he was fitted, without reference to race,
could be reconciled with the professed ideals for which the war was being
fought. With appeals to democracy and continued obeisance to the ideal of
the dignity of the individual highly in evidence as justifications for the
struggle in which the world was locked, Negroes continued to point out discrepancies
in the active expression of the "democratic faith" so frequently
propounded by the heads of the government. "A lilywhite navy cannot
fight for a free world. A Jim Crow army cannot fight for a free world. Jim
crow strategy, no matter on how grand a scale, cannot build a free world,"
The Crisis said immediately after Pearl Harbor.113
-
- The Army, on the other hand, insisted
that its job was not to alter American social customs but to create a fighting
machine with a maximum economy of time and effort. The War Department made
it clear that it saw no point in debating "at every point" policy
decisions already made, for though it would answer specific inquiries, it
felt that Negroes, and especially the NAACP, were simply trying to keep
alive a controversy which served no valid military purpose in time of national
crisis.114
The War Department felt, moreover, that it had offered Negroes the opportunity
to serve in all capacities and that that itself was a major removal of discriminatory
barriers and a major concession. From the Army's viewpoint, the
promise of proportional use of Negroes in all types of units provided more
opportunities for service than Negroes were able to take advantage of. Separate
units continued segregation, but the Army felt that segregation was a practice
which it had found in the civilian community and which it had no right to
alter until the civilian community itself had changed its own methods or
had given the Army, through the Congress, a clear mandate to do so.
-
- The Selective Service Act had ordered
that inductees be selected and trained without discrimination and, the War
Department reiterated, it did not itself discriminate against any of its
soldiers. Here was one of the major points of disagreement, for, as shown
in the Congressional debates on the inclusion of nondiscriminatory clauses
in the Selective Service Act, the distinction between discrimination and
segregation in normal usage was not always clear. The meaning of these terms
then and later depended in large measure upon the view of the user. Segregation,
implying only separation, was often considered nondiscriminatory by those
who believed that equal facilities and opportunities could be provided to
both races. To others, including most Negroes, the concept of enforced segregation
was itself discriminatory. The fact of separation not only prevented freedom
of movement and action on the part of the segregated minority (and was therefore
considered an abridgment of basic personal liberties) but also produced
inequalities of facilities and opportunities for the minority. The minority,
being numerically smaller and weaker, had no means of enforcing guarantees
of equal facilities and opportunities.
- [83]
- Moreover, the argument ran, the
very act of formal segregation implied inescapable differences among men
which made common action impossible and which, by denying the common aims
and similar objectives of men was, per se, discriminatory. On the other
hand the courts, through World War 11, held that segregation, as such, was
not discriminatory where equal facilities were provided. Field commanders
therefore saw nothing anomalous in announcing that their racial policy was
"segregation without discrimination" or that no discrimination
could exist in a command or camp which had Negro enlisted men only.
-
- To those for whom the aspirations
of Negroes were a cause, no amount of special consideration in the way of
separate units of diverse types was compensation for the continuing conviction
that the root of all difficulties in the Army's use of Negro manpower lay
in the restriction of Negroes to these particular segregated units. The
crowning irony to many Negroes was that the Army, while insisting upon separate
units, did not go all the way in its segregated pattern and insist that
these units be commanded wholly by Negro, and not by white, officers. "We
deplore segregation in any form," said Professor Rayford-Logan, representing
ten Negro organizations and speaking for seven co-witnesses in 1940, "especially
when it is practiced by the Federal Government. But in accepting these separate
units which are forced upon us, we do so only because of the hope that these
units will be commanded by Negro officers." 115
-
- Negroes therefore used their political
pressures in two directions: the first toward the elimination of segregation
and discrimination in the extension of the use of Negro manpower, and the
second in an attempt to exploit to the fullest the possibilities for the
use of Negroes within a segregated system.
-
- The conflict between the self-defined
interests of the Army and of Negroes continued throughout the war. Appeals
to political power were made by both sides, but no clear legislative decision
was reached. Segregation as a concept remained the root question affecting
the cleavage between the Negro public and the Army; it was basic to Negro
soldiers' attitudes toward the Army and the war; it was useful for political
campaign purposes; and it provided a convenient basket to catch most of
the problems arising in the employment of Negro troops. Yet it was seldom
mentioned in a direct way by either Negroes or the Army during the war,
for it was easier to place greater stress upon the many other facets of
difficulty which the employment of Negro troops provided. Negroes emphasized
clearly discriminatory practices growing out of segregation, such as the
lack of opportunities for advancement, differentials in facilities, and
limitations upon employment. The Army emphasized the low classification
scores, the lack of vocational skills, and other real or apparent deficiencies
of Negroes which, though admittedly they might be the result of deprivations
in civilian life, obviously, in the Army's view, prevented Negroes from
carrying their full share of the military load. These alone, not to speak
of civilian patterns in the sections of the country from which most Negroes
- [84]
- came, were sufficient argument,
from the Army's point of view, to oppose the end of separate units.
-
- But there was other support for
their maintenance. In an opinion survey conducted in March 1943, the Office
of War Information found that nine out of ten whites in five key cities
felt that white and Negro troops should be kept separate, while eight out
of ten Negroes in the same cities were opposed to segregation.116
It was obvious that both whites and Negroes could not be satisfied on this
point if public opinion was to decide the question.
-
- It could be expected that the Army
would attempt to avoid as much as possible the difficulties arising out
of providing units for Negroes. The simplest method would have been to reduce
the number of Negroes entering the Army to a minimum, though under the Selective
Service Act this could not be done legally. But there might be other ways.
There were the protective clauses in Section 3 which provided that no man
should be inducted "unless and until he is acceptable to the land or
naval forces" and until "adequate provision shall have been made
for such shelter, sanitary facilities, water supplies, heating and lighting
arrangements, medical care, and hospital accommodations . . . . " There
were always actual shortages of housing, equipment, and units for Negroes.
Educational and literary qualifications might be placed at a point where
large numbers of Negroes could be excluded.
-
- But the Negro public and its sympathizers,
remembering World War I and now more potent politically than twenty years
before, watched carefully for any evidence of failure to adhere fully to
the terms of stated policy. Moreover, white citizens in areas with sizable
Negro populations did not take kindly to the deferment of large numbers
of Negroes while white men were being drafted. A stream of letters continued
to come into the White House and the War Department; congressmen were kept
busy with inquiries from their constituents; delegations and lobbyists arrived
in Washington with great regularity; new and different points of attack
were discovered as soon as older ones were cleared up or answered. All of
these added up to continuous public pressure, backed by the possibility
of further political pressures.
-
- For Negroes as a whole, throughout
the war, felt that "Our boys in camps [are] being treated so bad";
"They're not being given a fair chance"; and "They're putting
up their lives for nothing to fight for." 117
Relatively few felt that their sons' chances were good in any of the armed
services; only three out of ten felt that their chances for advancement
in the Army included a chance for a commission. Few felt that their troops
would actually be used in battle. Nearly all reported less than full confidence
in the Army's desire to use Negro manpower to the fullest possible extent.118
In voicing their disapproval of the assignment of the majority of Negro
troops to noncombatant duties, most Negroes simply said, "This is supposed
- [85]
- to be a colored man's country, too,"
or "We should all fight side by side." A few added "They
[the whites] will say we did not fight and were behind the lines, so that
they can keep us behind after it's over." 119
Their leaders summed up their position in the slogan that Negroes had to
fight for the right to fight. 120
-
- Interest in the progress of plans
for defense continued high among Negroes. When interest slackened the Negro
press awakened it. The biggest single bloc of news to become available in
years was that dealing with opportunities for Negroes in defense preparations,
civilian as well as military. Despite the expansion of defense industries,
as 1900 closed the unemployment rate among Negroes had been cut only slightly
over that of the darkest depression years. The possibility of enlistment
in the armed forces had so much greater appeal and promise for impoverished
but ambitious youth than the CCC or the NYA that papers needed to do little
to awaken the interest of their readers.
-
- As a source of news about Negro
troops, the Negro press was unchallenged, for few general circulation dailies
carried the normal press releases about the activities of Negro troops.
The importance of these papers in molding attitudes and affecting the morale
of the youths who would become the Negro troops of World War II was very
great. Long before entering the Army many Negroes had formed definite opinions
of their chances in the armed forces from their reading of the Negro press
and from the inevitable family
and barbershop discussions which followed. Few felt that their chances for
advancement or fair treatment were good, but most knew that new opportunities
were possible daily. The importance of news of the armed forces to the Negro
press, evident though it was in the first months of mobilization when the
front pages of Negro papers were filled with news of the armed services,
was not fully realized within the War Department until later in the war.
Only then was a serious effort made to supply the missing details and add
to the variety and veracity of the many armed forces stories carried by
the Negro papers, thereby reducing, though not completely removing, the
aura of mutual distrust surrounding relations between the Army and the Negro
press.
-
- At the end of 1940 it was not possible
to answer all the questions raised by the newly announced policies on the
employment of Negro troops. Some were not yet asked. A certain tally was,
however, possible. The Congress had passed a Selective Service Act with
nondiscriminatory clauses. The War Department, urged by pressures generated
by the political temper of an election year, had announced a basic policy
calling for a proportionate use and distribution of Negro troops. The Army
had begun the expansion of its Negro units and it had acquired its first
Negro general officer. The Secretary of War had acquired an adviser on Negro
affairs.
- Future actions of the War Department
and the Army were critically awaited by the Negro public. Negro selective
service men had not yet begun to be called into the new Army. How the new
policy on proportionate Negro
- [86]
- representation in Army strength
would work out, how the Army would provide units in all its major branches,
was still anyone's guess. Actually, neither Negroes nor the Army had high
hopes for the immediate rapid expansion of Negro strength. No one in 1940
foresaw the huge size to which the Army would ultimately grow or, by virtue
of the proportionate representation policy, the unprecedented numbers of
Negroes which the Army was committed to take and use. Too many details,
ranging from such homely matters as providing training facilities for the
new draftees to more world-shaking
questions of international strategy had yet to be worked out. At the end
of the year the major questions affecting the employment of Negro troops
were distinctly of the homelier, though by no means unimportant, variety.
Upon these homely questions and upon the pressures which they generated,
rather than upon the broad outlines of policy as laid down in mobilization
plans or as dictated by the changing military situation, depended the decisions
around which the employment of Negro manpower in World War II developed.
- [87]
Endnotes
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