Chapter
IV
- From the beginning of World
War II in Europe to Pearl Harbor the active Negro enlisted strength of
the Army increased more than twenty-five-fold, from 3,640 men on 31
August 1939 to 97,725 on 30 November 1941.1 By the end of December
1942, Negro enlisted strength had risen to 467,883.2 As already noted
this expansion, like the expansion of the whole Army, was far greater
than prewar plans had contemplated. In achieving its Negro strength
the Army faced and overcame many administrative problems. Others it
was unable to solve. Many of these problems revolved about the
question of maintaining a proportional balance between Negroes and
whites, a question that was ever present between 1941 and 1943. It
affected most of the normal processes incident to the expansion of
over-all Army strength.
-
- The Army's difficulty in
making room for additional Negroes meant much more than a simple
adjustment to large numbers of Negro inductees. The expansion of the
Army to its maximum authorized strength was theoretically limited only
by the nation's manpower, by appropriations, and by the Army's ability
to provide training facilities.
-
- Training facilities involved
not only the need for new housing and equipment but also plans for new
units, cadres, training and replacement centers, and officers to
supervise training and tactical units. All too frequently one or more
of these elements were unready or unavailable in carrying out the
expansion as planned. These uncertainties affected white trainees too,
but not to the same extent as Negro trainees, for white units existed
in all branches and in most types. Existing units could provide for
the relatively orderly reception and training of white recruits, but
the few Regular Negro units were unable to form the needed base for
the twenty-five-fold increase in Negro strength before December 1941.
In the fall of 1940, Negro recruits destined for most arms and
services were assured neither units, billets, nor training cadres.
-
-
- The plan of 1937 for the
utilization of Negro manpower in the event of mobilization had
provided for an initial rate of increase of Negro strength which would
be higher than that for whites in order to bring the proportion of
Negroes in the Army up to their proportion in the available manpower
of military age. Thereafter, the rate of increase was to continue at
the level of the population
- [88]
- ratio. Since separate Negro
units were to be continued, all calculations had to be based on a
close accounting of men by race. The development of the necessary
administrative machinery for determining and controlling racial quotas
presented immediate difficulties. Furthermore, since the census of
1940 had not been completed by the time the Selective Service Act went
into effect, the exact proportions and the geographical distribution
of Negroes in the manpower of military age were not available until Selective Service
registration figures
could be compiled. The dual method of receiving men by ordinary
volunteer enlistments and through inductions, the latter including
volunteers who entered the Army through Selective Service, complicated
the matter of fixing quotas by race. Quota calls, fixed by the Army,
had also to be adjusted to the availability of housing and units as
well as to the rate of acceptance of volunteers.
-
- To make matters even more complex,
in the first year of mobilization a little more than 13 percent of those
classified 1-A (available for immediate induction) were Negroes instead
of the 9 or 10 percent expected. The 3 or 4 percent variation from the estimate
may not appear to have been very far off, but when this percentage was applied
to large numbers of men it made a considerable difference, in this case,
forty to fifty thousand additional men. As time went on, the proportion
of Negroes in Class 1-A showed every likelihood of increasing instead of
diminishing. Relatively few Negroes had industrial, technical, and professional
jobs that carried a deferred classification. Proportionately more Negroes
than whites were therefore available for Class 1-A Neither the Navy nor
the Marine Corps used Selective Service in the first years of the draft
and neither accepted Negroes, except that the Navy used them as messmen
and in a few other classifications. White volunteers for the naval services
were likely to reduce further the proportion of whites as compared to Negroes
in the Selective Service Class 1-A category.
-
- If "the balance of Negro
and white manpower" was to be maintained, quota calls had to be
divided not only among the nine corps areas and subsequently into
state and local board quotas but also into racial quotas within those
areas according to local racial distributions. To add to the
administrative complexities of the situation, the Army, basing its
theory on World War I test scores and actual distribution of skills
among Negroes, desired proportionately more Northern than Southern
Negroes for technical and combat units. As if these complications were
not enough, no final decisions on locations, types of units, or
housing facilities for Negro selectees had been made by the fall and
winter of 1940-41 . Several branches-notably the Signal Corps and
the Air Corps-were still attempting to avoid accepting any Negroes,
and others were attempting to keep their number as small as possible.
All of these factors helped to delay the mobilization of the Negro
portion of the Army considerably, and as a result the expansion of the
Army began without obtaining anything like the officially desired
initial proportionate balancing of white and Negro troops.
-
- Since calls for Negro troops,
according to the Selective Service Act and according to the laws of
chance by which the
- [89]
- draft lottery was operated,
should have occurred on the whole at the same rate as for white
troops, Selective Service proceeded to classify Negroes as their names
appeared on local board listings. When their numbers were reached,
Selective Service, lacking sufficient Army requisitions for the
numbers of Negroes available, sent them "notices of
selection." These notices indicated that the recipients had been
selected for induction and that they would be ordered to report at a
later date-how far off Selective Service could not say. Many Negroes
quit or lost their jobs because of these notices. Some, not actually
inducted for months, complained bitterly about the delay and about
their resulting unemployment, for employers were reluctant to hire a
man who already had a notice of selection. Of course delayed
inductions affected white as well as Negro inductees, but in a much
lower proportion of instances.
-
- With the low and uncertain
economic position of Negroes as the dominant factor and with the
"passed over" policy as an added incentive, many Negroes
volunteered through Selective Service. As of 30 September 1941, the
number of Negro volunteers was 38,538, or 16.1 percent of the total
number of volunteers entering the Army through Selective Service and
more than a third of all the Negroes in the Army. Of the volunteers
awaiting induction on this date, 25-3 percent were Negroes.3 The
volunteer-through-Selective-Service figures were made higher because
of an additional factor: it was still almost impossible for Negroes to
volunteer through regular recruiting stations.
All volunteers moved to the top of local Selective Service board lists
without regard to race. In some cases, the rate of Negro volunteering
was so high that local boards did not have to call on selectees at all
to fill their quotas.
-
- Calls for Negroes up through
January 1 941 were deferred. The February call was for but a small
part of the Negroes originally allotted for that month. In New York,
for example, 900 Negroes were selected in January 1941 and notified to
expect induction in February. Because of construction delays at Fort
Devens, Mass., where they were to have been sent, approximately 500 of
these men were not inducted in February but were carried over to
March. Those originally scheduled for the February and March calls
were consequently delayed. In the District of Columbia, l,100 white
men and no Negroes at all were called for March.4
-
- Time did not improve the
situation. By September 1941, the total number of Negroes passed over
and awaiting induction was 2'7,986, with the possibility that 1 7,399
of these would remain uncalled on 1 January 1942. To these, the
Negroes who were reached in October, November, and December and were
not to be inducted in those months had to be added.5 For February
1942, the voluntary enlistment of Negroes through recruiting stations
was reduced to fifty a week-five from each corps area. The March
selectees were reduced to a minimum in an attempt to avoid the
threatened congestion of available housing in reception centers,
units, and in-
- [90]
- stallations.6
By early 1943, the War Manpower Commission estimated that approximately
300,000 Negroes had been passed over to fill white calls.7
-
- Some local boards protested
vigorously. "We do hereby record our belief and opinion," an
Ohio local board wrote, "that the February call for nine white
men is unfair, unjust, and discriminatory against both the white and
colored races. This arbitrary method of induction of men by color
rather than by order number we believe is a flagrant and totalitarian
violation of both the letter and spirit of the law." 8
South
Carolina boards likewise objected that too few Negro selectees were
being called.9 The Director of Selective Service warned:
-
- This general situation permits
both Negroes who have volunteered for induction and white men who have
higher order numbers, but who are inducted before the Negroes with
lower order numbers, to claim, whether justified or not, that there is
discrimination contrary to the provisions of the law.10
-
- He recommended that
"unusual efforts" be made to bring requisitions for each
state into line with the racial distribution of the population of the
state.
-
- This situation did not grow up
overnight, nor was the War
Department unaware of the possibility of its development. From the
time of the debates on the Selective Service Act, the General Staff
divisions had warned of the necessity for prompt action to prevent
such a racial imbalance in the expanding forces. But the staff
divisions could not agree on how, short of strict induction by order
number, such a situation could be prevented. Induction by order
number, the staff divisions feared, might produce what was considered
an even more undesirable imbalance: a tremendous disproportion of
Negroes in comparison with whites which would, at the end of the first
year's training, be followed by a reverse imbalance.
-
- In October 1940, G-1 urged
that the War Department make provision to bring the Army's proportion
of Negroes up to to percent, since new census estimates indicated
that, instead of the expected 9 percent provided for in the 1940 PMP,
10.07 percent of the population affected by the draft would be
Negroes. "The longer the delay in setting up such
requirements," the Personnel Division warned, "the greater
will be the number of Negroes which will ultimately have to be taken
to meet the requirements of the law and satisfy public demand." 11
Though G-3 objected that disruption of construction of housing and
hospitalization facilities or an increase in the number of Negroes in
overhead would result, the War Department, in December 1940, directed
that the troop basis for the distribution of trainees be refigured so
that by July 1941 to percent of the
- [91]
- men in training under the
Selective Service Act would be Negroes.12
-
- Answering Selective Service's objections
to the disproportionately low acceptances of Negro selectees, the War Department
explained that it had been impossible to take a "proper percentage
of negroes because of lack of shelter and cadres." The department promised
Selective Service that it would "make every effort" to keep the
proportions of white and Negro selectees balanced if Selective Service would
keep a check on the states to prevent them from placing "an undue proportion"
of Negroes in Class 1-A.13
-
- In March 1941, G-3 estimated
that because of their higher rate of volunteering, their lower
economic status, and their consequent lower percentage of draft
deferment, the proportion of Negroes entering the Army might go as
high as 14 percent. Replacement center allocations should therefore be
increased to provide for a 13 to 14 percent proportion of Negro
selectees and existing Negro units should be brought up to full
strength. An infantry replacement center for Negroes should be
established at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and a to percent overstrength
should be authorized for Negro units and overhead troops. To provide
for additional Negro troops, new construction and the substitution of
Negroes for white troops to the extent necessary were recommended. G-3
observed as well that, unless the War Department made reasonably
prompt provisions for the induction
of Negroes, legal action might compel it to do so.14
-
- The Supply Division pointed
out that it would be more economical to convert white units in the PMP
to Negro and use existing or planned housing rather than construct
additional housing especially for Negroes. G-4 estimated that
$13,554,400 would be needed to build a replacement center at Fort
Huachuca and to provide the additional construction needed elsewhere
for the accommodation of Negro selectees.15 Maj. Gen. William Bryden,
Deputy Chief of Staff, agreed that this expenditure was not justified.
Housing vacated by National Guard units departing at the end of their
year's training might be used by Negroes. Moreover, General Bryden
felt, if the Army refused to induct illiterates the number of Negro
selectees would be reduced.16 The G-3 recommendations were
approved by the Chief of Staff with the stipulation that no additional
construction was to be authorized. Temporary overstrength was to be
housed in tents, and if necessary excess personnel was to be sent
direct to units instead of to replacement centers.17
-
- When the first requisitions
for inductees were submitted to the states by corps area commanders in
November 1940, it was impossible to determine by race the number that
would appear. Some states had not broken their regis-
- [92]
- trants down by color. Only the
Fourth Corps Area 18
submitted requisitions to the states by color,
and the Fourth was able to do so only because delays in construction
caused a corresponding delay in the submission of the corps area's
requisitions. This delay gave the commanding general time to request
permission of the War Department to submit, on his first call,
separate requests for whites and Negroes.19 An excess of men over
available space was likely in any event, for the National Guard units
already inducted had brought more men than anticipated. The allotted
strength of Guard units had been increased for the fiscal year 1941
and many of these units had recruited to full peacetime strength. A
number of inactive Guardsmen had also been called to duty. Moreover,
Regular Army enlistments under the authorized increase from 242,000 to
375,000 enlisted men had exceeded expectations. As a result of shelter
shortages, instructions were sent to all corps area commanders
directing them to specify the numbers of men desired by color in all
future periods.20 Since no information on the total number of Negroes
and whites who would be inducted would be available until the first
induction period closed on 28 November, all corps area commanders were
authorized to use reception centers for temporary assignments to take care of any
excess in either race.
-
- This did not settle the
matter. The First Corps Area (New England) discovered that Connecticut
boards were not inducting by color. The First's requisitions had to be
increased to cover this contingency. It was instructed to hold at Fort
Devens Reception Center any excess Negroes who might appear. They
could be used in the 336th Infantry, scheduled for activation in
February 1941,21
-
- Corps areas were not mutually
exclusive organizations in the disposition of selectees. The Fourth
Corps Area, by its own request, was given authority to submit
requisitions to the states for 5,500 white and l,000 Negro men. But
the Second Corps Area (New York, New Jersey, and Delaware) was
authorized to ship 500 Negroes to Fort Benning, Georgia, in the Fourth
Corps Area for the 24th Infantry and ego to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in
the Eighth Corps Area (southwestern states) for the 25th Infantry. The
commanding general of the Fourth Corps Area radioed the War Department
that shelter was not available at Benning for the 24th's new men, The
Second Corps Area was then instructed to ship no men to Benning but to
send the entire 790 to the 25th Infantry.22
-
- The result was that for
several months Negro inductees were assigned to units neither by
occupational specialities, by educational background, by tested
aptitudes, nor by any other classification method. They were assigned
accord-
- [93]
- ing to the numbers of men
received and according to the availability of space in units. A unit
which required 250 men in order to reach its authorized strength would
not receive them if its station had no additional housing for Negro
troops, while a unit which needed no additional men but whose post had
available housing might be swamped with successive increments of men.
Normally, reception centers assigned men on the basis of occupational
skills, in accordance with tables which had been worked out for each
branch of service, and, later, for each type of unit. These tables
showed the approximate proportion of each occupational speciality
which a given type of unit would require. But so long as replacement
centers were not receiving Negroes and so long as the number of Negro
units was small, Negro selectees had to be assigned primarily on the
basis of the numbers and not the types of men required. The new Negro
units, from the beginning of the expansion of Negro strength,
therefore received large numbers of men who did not fit the needs of
the unit. This was frequently true for white units as well, but seldom
for the same reasons and seldom with so little probability of
correction.
-
- The 41st Engineer General
Service Regiment, one of the new units activated in August 1940,
discovered by the end of December 1940 that most of its selectees did
not have "the qualities of intelligence, education and initiative
highly enough developed to qualify them for duty in a general service
regiment." 23
Engineer general service regiments were supposed to
be able to do all types of engineer work in army
areas, including construction of roads and bridges and operation of
utilities. The unskilled labor unit with which these units were often
confused was the engineer separate battalion. It was not widely
realized that general service regiments required a high percentage of
skilled labor and a relatively high average of ability on the part of
the individual men. The Chief of Engineers recommended that reception
centers send only men of average or better classification to these
units. The War Department in denying his request stated that it was
impossible, at the time, to assign Negroes on any other than a
numerical basis. It suggested that whenever new Negro engineer units
with lower requirements, such as separate battalions, became
available, the 41st could transfer its unsuitable men to these units.24
-
- The 7th Aviation Squadron
illustrated the opposite effect of assignment by availability.
Aviation squadrons were, primarily, labor units assigned to air bases.
Of the 7th Squadron's 220 men, most of whom had come from the Middle
Atlantic States, approximately half had high school and college
training at a time when new combat units were bemoaning the lack of
adequately schooled selectees. The occupational qualifications of the
men in this unit, as compared with their educational qualifications,
illustrated another major difficulty in organizing new Negro units.
Despite the relatively high educational qualifications of the men of
this unit, few skilled occupations were represented. Aside from
teachers and students, the better-trained men, on the
- [94]
- average, had no higher
occupational skills than the less well trained men. Most of those with
a year or more of college training had been working as porters,
shipping clerks, sales clerks, maintenance men, bartenders,
chauffeurs, kitchen helpers, and miners. What secondary skills these
men might have had could not be determined from their occupational
histories. The more highly skilled men, such as auto mechanics, sheet
metal workers, power pressmen, factory foremen, carpenters, and
photographers were seldom high school graduates. The relationship of
jobs to education was directly related to the prewar economic status
of Negroes. Young graduates of high schools and colleges had had to
take whatever jobs were available; skilled jobs were scarce.
Nevertheless Judge Hastie felt that these men, despite the misuse of
their training in civilian life, would have been more useful in
technical and combat units than in the squadron to which they were
assigned.25
-
- In an attempt to rectify the
situation produced by numerical assignment without specific relation
to qualifications, a series of shifts in procurement requisitions took
place in the spring of 1941. Fifty semiliterate selectees, to be
employed as aircraft hands, painters, mess attendants, and guards,
were ordered transferred from the 34th Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) to
the Air Corps at Chanute Field, Illinois. These men were to be
replaced by fifty relatively skilled men-receiving and shipping
clerks, electricians, automobile mechanics, metal workers, radio
operators, and draftsmen-from the Second Corps Area. The shift was
explained as necessary in order to give the 34th Brigade a better
distribution of intelligence and skills. The Second Corps Area, it was
thought, could best provide the skilled men desired by the 34th and at
the same time provide the skilled men needed to complete the Chanute
Field requirement, while the 34th Brigade could provide the unskilled
men needed at Chanute from its own overabundant supply of untrained
men.26
-
- Similarly, a requisition on the
Sixth Corps Area (Michigan, Wisconsin, and Illinois) for 596 selectees for
shipment to the Ordnance Replacement Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Maryland, was canceled. The 34th Brigade was directed to send 300 low scoring
selectees to Aberdeen. The Second Corps Area would send 596 selectees to
the 34th Brigade with qualifications determined by antiaircraft regimental
tables of organization, and 296 men to the Ordnance Replacement Center.
The reasoning was the same: some 300 men of the Fourth Corps' 34th Brigade
were in low classification grades or illiterate; ordnance ammunition companies
"need approximately 50 percent skill and intelligence; 50 percent should
be `strong backed' labor." It was assumed that the Second Corps Area
could provide the skill and intelligence needed by both types of units,
while the Fourth Corps Area could provide the "strong backed"
labor from men already misassigned to the 34th Coast Artillery Brigade.27
- [95]
- Similar shifting of
procurement quotas continued through the spring of 1941. New Fourth
Corps Area allotments for the 99th and tooth Coast Artillery (AA) (SM)
to be activated at Camp Davis, North Carolina, were canceled and
re-allotments were made to include Northern and Middle Western areas in
order to give these regiments "required occupational skills and
intelligence not available in colored selectees from the Fourth Corps
Area." 28
-
- Shifts of personnel, though
calculated to relieve the maldistribution of skills and training in
certain units, could also relieve the pressures created by large
numbers of passed-over Negro selectees in politically sensitive areas.
For one shift, G-1 noted that "postponing induction of 16o8
colored selectees from June to July in the Fourth Corps Area will have
no repercussions in that corps area," while for another shift it
was explained that passed-over Negro selectees in Illinois could be
taken care of by a reallotment of corps area quotas .29
-
- Actually, the shifts for
purposes of improving the distribution of skills had little good
effect. Despite the fact that Northern corps areas had a greater
percentage of skilled Negroes than Southern, the availability of the
desired types of men at a given time in a given reception center was
limited. So long as assignment by numerical availability and not by
careful classification methods was employed, Negro units in which the
shifts occurred were not much
better off after the shifts than before. Many other units in which
maldistribution resulting from numerical block assignment occurred had
no opportunity to benefit from subsequent transfers of men.
-
- Other annoyances arose out of
the necessity of balancing white and Negro manpower by units.
Occasionally a unit appearing as Negro in the War Department
mobilization plan or, later, in the troop unit basis was carried as
white by the corps area or command to which it was allotted.
Radiograms directing reallotments of whites and Negroes then bounced
back and forth between the War Department and the corps area and camp
commanders concerned. At times, such difficulties were corrected
before shipment was made.30 In a few instances Negro troops appeared
when whites were expected and sometimes the reverse occurred.
-
- The situation arose, in part,
from the decision to remove the term "colored" as an
inseparable part of a unit's designation. Older Negro units had
carried the identification as a part of the unit name, for example,
47th Quartermaster Truck Regiment (Cld). In 1940, as a result of
protests over the similar designation of certain National Guard units
and as part of the decision that all Army units were to be trained,
equipped, and employed alike, regardless of race, the identifying term
was dropped.31 Des-
- [96]
- ignations such as "this
is a colored unit" or "a colored unit" were permitted,
if needed. Obviously, such designations were cumbersome and might
easily be overlooked. To avoid repeating these awkward phrases, the
custom of using an asterisk and an accompanying footnote indicating
race soon came to be the accepted means of identifying Negro units in
station lists, orders, or in any list of units.32 Since asterisks
could easily be transposed to the wrong unit or omitted entirely,
station and troop lists became notoriously unreliable in this respect.
To prevent such errors, agencies shipping men were ultimately required
to notify the receiving agency that the shipment contained Negroes. If
the men were accompanied by officers, their race was to be indicated
as well. The receiving agency was, by this means, enabled to prepare
billets and other facilities on a separate basis in advance of the
arrival of troops, thus avoiding all-around "embarrassment."
33
Troop lists, despite all precautions, remained unreliable in their
identification of Negro units. Occasional mix-ups occurred throughout
the war.
-
-
- The amount of construction
needed to house the new Army was tremendous. Vast acreages had to be
purchased or leased, and graded and laid out, before construction
could begin. Contracts had to be let, construction gangs had to be
recruited, transported, and housed, and emergency changes in
construction plans had to be made. Priorities for projects had to be
established.34 Despite initial allotments of a portion of the new
construction to Negroes, the provision of housing for Negro troops was
relatively slow and uncertain.
-
- In the spring of 1941, G-4
conducted a survey of all camps and exempted stations to determine
where housing, without additional construction, was already available.
Most exempted stations replied that they had no housing available for
Negro troops, and, in some cases, that they had no housing available
at al1.35 Corps areas reported few camps with facilities for more than
a small number of additional Negroes: 50 at Fort Eustis, 343 at Fort
Belvoir, 5 at Fort Myer, 132 at Fort Knox, 64o at Fort Riley, do at
Jefferson Barracks, 92 at Fort Ord, 202 at Camp Luis Obispo, and 32 at
Camp Edwards were typical of the reports. The entire Fourth Corps Area
had facilities, without additional construction, for only 4,851 more
Negroes, 2,646 of whom could be placed in station complements at
fourteen posts.36
-
- Much of the difficulty arose
from the physical layouts of posts and from the varying definitions of
what constituted available housing for Negroes. Not every area of
currently unused housing was available for Negro troops. An area
constructed to house divisional troops
- [97]
- would normally be held for
divisional use. A division required a continuous block of housing and
the attendant motor parks, shops, and recreational and mess facilities
which were necessary to its efficient training as a unit. Because the
maximum size of a Negro unit in the first years of expansion was set
at the brigade level, divisional areas were not available for Negro
troops at all. Negro units had to be put in the barracks and tent
areas that remained after divisions and their attached units had been
housed.
-
- Theoretically, new housing was
allocated to Negro units on a proportionate basis, but many posts had
not expected to receive a proportionate number of Negroes. Moreover,
the number of Negroes on a given post was expected to be small enough
to allay the fears of surrounding communities-small enough, that is,
to be certain that the white troops present could control any racial
disorders that might arise. This meant that not too many Negroes
though
the numbers often exceeded 10 percent-could be assigned to a given
post.
-
- Again, housing for Negroes had
to be located so as to carry out the principle of segregation by
units. This required an extension of segregation into the allotment of
housing. The main portion of a camp, often constructed in a huge arc
with parade grounds and headquarters near the center and hospital
wards and warehouses at either end, was allotted to divisional and
attached units or to other large units assigned to the camp. Off at a
tangent from the main sweep of camp buildings, a regimental or smaller
area was constructed for Negro troops. All Negro units assigned to the post had to be fitted into
this or similar blocks of housing. Initially these areas, as at Fort
Dix, New Jersey, and Fort Devens, Massachusetts, were at a
considerable distance from the main camp area. Later construction
filled in the intervening spaces, usually with warehouses, stockades,
and motor parks rather than with barracks. Usually the Negro areas
remained distinct and separate, though in some of the newer camps,
such as Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky, and Camp Ellis, Illinois, they
were merely separated from identical white quarters by a parade ground
or a fire break. The Negro area came to be known as such; often it was
so shown on camp layouts. It was, essentially, a separate camp
adjoining the major portion of the post. It was usually provided with
its own branch exchange, its own recreation hall, and, later, its own
motion picture house, its own chapel, and, if the area were large
enough, its own service club and guest house.37
-
- In most cases, the result was
that available housing for Negroes was not measured by available
vacancies but by vacancies in the Negro area. Conversely, available
housing for whites was limited to housing outside the Negro area,
unless all Negroes could be removed from the section of the post
involved. An objection from Fort Leonard Wood explained a type of
housing-strength problem arising from this procedure:
-
- The schedule attached to the
basic letter includes 1.760 white trainees for the week of December
7-19, which number is apparently based on the assumption that one
battalion of white trainees could be
- [98]
- substituted for one of colored
trainees in order to fill this center to its limit of capacity,
inasmuch as the schedule provides for a total of 8 battalions of white
trainees and two of colored trainees. Such a substitution is not
practicable. There are barracks at this station for 7 battalions of
white trainees in one area, and for
- battalions (one battalion less
one company) of colored trainees in another area well separated from
the area for white trainees. Further, the enlisted cadres of 3
battalions (one battalion less one company) are colored troops.38
-
- Housing by race meant that if
Negro increments did not arrive in training centers according to
schedule the whole training process for Negro troops was delayed.
Delays in filling a training unit meant delays not only for that unit
but for the next unit to follow. The influx of Negro trainees into the
Camp Wheeler (Georgia) Infantry Replacement Training Center was so
slow in the summer of 1941 that the 16th Training Battalion,
consisting of Negro trainees, was not able to start training three of
its five rifle companies until September, though all companies had
been scheduled to start training in August. Housing for the October
load therefore was not available until November when the delayed
companies had completed their training. Eight hundred and eighty
trainees had to be deferred until housing became available for them.39
Similarly, at the Fort Bragg (North Carolina) Field Artillery
Replacement Training Center, the arrival of Negroes in small groups
produced an excess of trainees over housing capacity. Small groups for
specialist training had to wait until their numbers were built up to a
point where classes were of sufficient size to make training feasible.
The waiting men took up space which grew cumulatively more valuable as
successive increments arrived. "The shipment of colored trainees
in small groups results in unsatisfactory specialist training,"
the center reported.40
-
- The housing shortage slowed up or
postponed the training of many of the new Negro units. The 41st Engineer
General Service Regiment, activated in August 1 940, could not expect housing
accommodations for its full complement of 1,176 men until 15 January 1941.
In October 1 940 the unit requested Boo additional men as soon as possible
since by 15 February 1941 it was scheduled to furnish cadres totaling 562
men. The unit was told that housing difficulties precluded expansion beyond
a total of 835 men and that space had been allotted for only 140 new men.
Abandonment of unit training to the extent necessary to provide for cadre
training was authorized. By December the unit had 697 men, with 425 new
selectees due from the Fourth Corps Area in January. When the unit asked
for permission to enlist locally a maximum of 375 men to make up its deficiency,
the request was denied since the Third Corps Area (Pennsylvania, Maryland,
District of Columbia, and Virginia) had 375 passed-over selectees whom it
could and would send to the unit as soon as housing was available.41
The 54th Coast
- [99]
- Artillery, originally
scheduled for activation at Barrancas, Florida, was moved from that
station at the request of the Navy Department. Its activation was
subsequently delayed by slow construction of Camp Wallace, Texas, its
new station. The arrival of both the regiment's cadre and its
selectees was held up until construction could be completed. Lack of
housing was also the bottleneck holding up The Surgeon General's
entire program for the use of Negroes, for Negro Medical Department
personnel could not begin training until separate shelter and
housekeeping facilities were constructed.42
-
- A minor byproduct of the
housing shortage in 1941 was the effect upon training and discipline
in units already activated. Often, Negro units awaiting fillers, who
were, in turn, awaiting space in replacement training centers and
reception centers, shared vacant housing with other units. Later, the
fact that the sharing unit failed to receive adequate space of its own
left the host unit with crowded quarters. The 41st Engineer General
Service Regiment complained that "on a basis of neighborly
obligation" it had shared its infirmary and officers' quarters
with the 96th Engineers. This arrangement created friction through
division of responsibility, intermingling of soldiers, and crowding of
quarters. The 41st requested quarters for "our sister
organization" so that each unit could control all activities in
its own area. The 758th Tank Battalion and the 371st Infantry made
similar requests for housing for units which had to share their areas'
supply, mess, and infirmary facilities.43
-
-
- In addition to the
availability of housing at stations designated for the receipt of
Negro troops, the physical location of camps to which Negroes were to
be sent was itself a determining factor in procurement and assignment.
Finding suitable camps for training Negro troops was to vex the War
Department and Negro soldiers-throughout the war. The answer was not
simply one of locating suitable barracks space and training facilities
within areas under Army jurisdiction. Purely military considerations
played but a small part in determining the location of Negro troops in
the early period of mobilization. The main considerations were:
availability of housing and facilities on the post concerned;
proportions of white and Negro troops at the post; proximity to
civilian centers of Negro population with good recreational facilities
that could absorb sizable numbers of Negroes on pass; and the attitude
of the nearby civilian community to the presence of Negro troops.
-
- Many communities objected to
the presence of any Negro troops at all. Others objected to the
presence of certain categories: military policemen, combat troops,
officers, Northern troops. Community attitudes also fluctuated from
time to time. It had long been one of the canons of War Department
- [100]
- policy, based on a past
history of riots and disturbances there, that no Negro units should be
mobilized in Texas.44 Although the order on which this policy was
based was rescinded in 1937,45 the prohibition still operated in fact.
The policy did not prevent citizens of less prosperous areas in Texas
from requesting camps near their towns. The postmaster of Calvert,
Texas, pointed out that there was a large Negro population in his
town, that the two races got along well together, and that plenty of
wood, good soil, and natural gas were available. "Our cotton crop
on our upland East of Calvert was a failure, we haven't had a C. C.
Camp in our county, our town, also our county population certainly
needs something to stimulate business and employment," lie added.46 On the other hand Arizona citizens, who had requested Negro troops
in 1940, were ready by 1943 to petition that Negro troops be withdrawn
and that no more be sent to the state .47
-
- A great many communities could
not be convinced that the exigencies of the situation demanded the
stationing of Negro troops in their vicinities. They often made their
views known through their congressmen. An early and typical protest came from
Representative Patrick H. Drewry of Virginia on behalf of the citizens
of Petersburg. In September 1940, before the opening of Camp Lee and
before the large expansion of Negro manpower, Representative Drewry
visited General Marshall and the chief of the War Plans Division to
ask that, in view of racial difficulties in Petersburg during World
War I, no Negro troops other than a small number of labor troops be
stationed at Camp Lee.48 One of the first "correctives" to
the fear of potential race riots was formulated in connection with
this request. As a supplement to plans already made to establish
quartermaster and medical replacement centers at Lee with a peak load
of 19,000 trainees, 3500 of whom would be Negroes, G-3 proposed that a
rifle company of the 12th Infantry be made available if necessary to
help prevent race riots. The Chief of Staff approved the G-3 proposal
and Negro troops were assigned to Camp Lee.49 The 12th Infantry's
rifle company was never needed.
-
- Another type of protest, based
on the inability of a camp town to provide recreational facilities for
Negroes on pass, came from Wyoming. Early in 1941, Senator Schwartz
asked that the number of Negroes stationed at Fort Warren be reduced
because of the small Negro population in Cheyenne. In April 1941, the
June quota Of 500 Negroes for Fort Warren was accordingly changed to
500 for Camp Lee.50 This
- [101]
- reduction produced a local
housing snag at Fort Warren. The Seventh Corps Area declared that the
reduction of Negroes and the substitution of white men could not be
accomplished if strict segregation was to be held to:
-
- Substitution can be made but
segregation can not repeat can not be accomplished stop no housing
available for
- any increased quota of white selectees except in
barracks adjacent to colored selectees stop strongly recommend that
white and colored selectees be segregated stop consider vacant space
in area for colored troops Ft Warren replacement center advisable
rather than quartering white and colored together repeat strongly
recommend no substitution . . . of white for colored selectees be made
at QMRC end.51
-
- In the meantime the city
provided local recreational facilities for Negroes and Cheyenne
protests were modified.52
-
- In 1942, protests about the
location of Negro troops continued to pour into the War Department
from all over the country. The state of Mississippi and Camp Wheeler,
Georgia, wanted no Negro officers.53 The citizens of Rapid City, South
Dakota, were afraid that their town could not offer the proper
entertainment facilities for Negro troops. A "thunder of
complaints" went up from all over the state when a Negro cavalry
regiment was ordered to Fort Clark, Texas.54 Albuquerque, New Mexico,
and Spokane, Washington, citizens objected to stationing Negro Air
Forces units at nearby fields, for they felt that their own Negro
populations were too small to provide social contacts for Negro men.
Las Vegas, Nevada, and Battle Creek, Michigan, objected to military
police and field artillery units respectively. When the citizens of
Morehead City, North Carolina, heard that a white coast artillery
station at nearby Fort Mason was going overseas and would be replaced
by a Negro unit, they asked their senators and congressmen to
intervene.55
-
- In November 1941 General
Marshall directed his staff to resurvey the allocation of Negro units,
"with the idea of planning a proper proportion of Negro personnel
at locations adjacent to communities with a large colored
population." 56
The staff consulted army and corps area
commanders, and post, camp, and station commanders reported their
observations and recommendations through the corps area commanders.
These reports indicated that, aside from small station complement
detachments of service troops, few post or higher commanders felt that
additional Negro troops could be accommodated without causing protests
or resentment from nearby civilian communities. Negro troops,
according to the post commanders, would be resented at five out of six
Northern posts, over half of the Southern posts,
- [102]
- and practically all of the
southwestern and western posts. Nearly all commanders of Southern
posts indicated that Northern Negro troops would produce greater
resentment than Southern Negro troops. Post commanders felt that large
numbers of Negroes should not be stationed at any one post and that in
no case should more Negro than white troops be placed on a given post,
except that the commanding general of the Eighth Corps Area
recommended that an all-Negro post of 20,000 capacity be located in
eastern Texas near Italy, a town which was reasonably close to several
centers of Negro population. Some commanders felt that the attempt to
place Negroes near large centers of Negro population could produce new
problems. The commanding general of the Second Army felt that large
towns should be avoided because of the possible interaction of the
presence of Negro troops and large groups of Negro civilians. The
commanding general of the Second Corps Area felt that Negroes should
not be placed near big cities such as New York and Philadelphia.57
-
- In January 1942 G-3,
indicating that no military purpose would be served by further shifts
of Negro troops and that most permanent stations were "as
suitable as is practicable at this time," specifically
recommended that:
- 1. No changes be made in the
permanent stations of Negro troops, except for military reasons.
- 2. The size of nearby Negro
civilian communities be a determining factor in selecting stations of
newly activated or transferred units.
- 3. Insofar as practicable,
Negroes inducted in the North be
stationed in the North.
- 4. No Negro unit larger than a
brigade be stationed at any post within the continental limits of the
United States, except that one infantry division may be stationed at
Fort Huachuca, Arizona.58
-
- While these proposals were not
remedies for the conditions which made finding acceptable locations
for Negro troops so difficult, the first provision strengthened the
position of assigning agencies in their insistence that military needs
take precedence over local attitudes, the second would be likely to
reduce the strain on local community attitudes in areas where large
numbers of Negroes, in or out of uniform, were an unfamiliar sight,
and the fourth lessened the possibility of the establishment of a
group of all-Negro posts, isolated from the rest of the Army if not
from civilians.
-
- Only the third provision was
completely ineffective and unworkable. Yet this proposal, that
Northern Negro troops be kept in the North, was made frequently in
recommendations to the War Department, and was echoed in the Southern
press. The Dallas Morning News, for example, editorialized:
-
- The federal government apparently
has never learned that it cannot without unfortunate consequences billet
northern-trained Negro troops in the south. Until it does learn that axiomatic
fact, there will continue to be trouble.59
-
- Mobilization Regulations had
provided that Negroes in the zone of the interior should be assigned
to stations in the general areas where they were pro-
- [103]
- cured.60 Within the War
Department, the Morale Branch agreed that Northern Negroes should not
be sent to Southern camps.61 A meeting of Southern governors assembled
at Hot Springs, Arkansas, in the spring of 1942 made two requests:
that no Negro military police be used around Southern airports or
anywhere else that might make it necessary for them to direct or
control white soldiers and civilians and that Southern Negroes be kept
South and Northern Negroes, North. This last request, although
communicated to the Army in May 1942, was not practical .62 All major
replacement training centers and many camps were in the South.
Further, since Negro skills and educational qualifications were not
evenly distributed geographically, it would add to the difficulties of
building potentially useful Negro units. It would complicate the
problem of locating Negro units at posts that were suitable both from
the training and the social point of view. It would mean Northern
duplication of such facilities as the Army Flying School at Tuskegee,
Alabama, and it would interfere with maneuvers, for maneuver areas
were primarily in the South.63
-
- Once the War Department
determined that military needs must take precedence over local
attitudes, it billeted Negro troops at most
camps, stations, and airfields in the United States. After the
reorganization of the Army in March 1942 each major command controlled
the location of troops under its jurisdiction. The commands soon
determined that shifting troops not only interfered with the
continuity of training but that it did little more than transfer
objections from one community to another. For example, Army Ground
Forces pointed out that Little Rock had a sizable Negro population and
that the choice of Camp Robinson was therefore logical, and emphasized
that if Negroes were not stationed at Robinson they would have to go
elsewhere "where they will be resented as much, if not more, than
in Arkansas." Continuing, the Ground Forces stated: "We have
3,000 set up for Camp Swift, Texas, where the Mayor asked his
Congressman to inform the President that he would personally shoot the
first one who came into town." 64
-
- The headquarters of the major
commands became convinced that the problem of locations was one which
could be settled best by strong and wise local commanders whose
knowledge of their troops and of the nearby communities must be relied
upon to reduce areas of tension between white and Negro troops on
posts and between troops and civilians in nearby towns. Lt. Gen.
Lesley J. McNair, the commander of Army Ground Forces, summed up what
came to be a general War Department attitude when he held that the
only solution to the problem of locations for Negro
- [104]
- troops lay in competent
commanders "who can forestall racial difficulties by firm
discipline, just treatment, strenuous training, and wholesome
recreation." 65
He later expanded this to include advice against
shifting Negro troops as a result of community pressures:
-
- It is inadvisable to yield to
pressure to move colored troops elsewhere, since such action shows
weakness of command and fosters complaints from the civil population.
Colored troops are unavoidable under the law, their assignment to
station is made after careful consideration of the many factors
involved, and a community receiving such troops must accept the
situation created and handle it as they handle other social problems.
On the other hand, a civil community has every right to expect colored
units to be commanded effectively, and prevented from committing
outrages such as occur all too frequently.66
-
- To lessen the chance of racial
difficulties, the War Department recommended that an advance check be
made by the assigning agency to determine the adequacy of recreational
facilities at both the station and in nearby communities, for
"proper recreational facilities and opportunities for association
in nearby communities will assist to a great extent in lessening the
possibility of racial difficulties." Sufficient notice of the
arrival of Negroes was to be given commanders of the new station so
that adequate preparations for their reception and accommodation might
be made.67
-
- Though the principle that
pressure to move Negro troops would be resisted and that Negro troops
could be distributed generally throughout the Army's posts where
similar types of units were trained was held to, no definite
directives on the question of retaining Negro troops at posts in the
face of public opposition were issued. Cases were dealt with as they
arose. In most cases, the Army urged protesting communities to
consider the necessity of training Negro troops where facilities
existed, that is, in nearly every camp in the country. Appeals were
made to high community patriotism and to community leaders of both
races. After communities understood that they were sharing the
distribution of Negro troops with other areas all over the country,
most protests were withdrawn. Uncertainty, fear, and sometimes open
animosity reflected in troop-town relations continued to exist in some
towns. In others, local church, school, welfare, and recreation
groups, with the help of national bodies, especially the United
Service Organizations (USO) and the American Red Cross, combined to
provide troops with community services that reduced and relieved
tensions which could otherwise have been counted upon to produce
friction and open disturbances of one sort or another if allowed to
continue unchecked. Nevertheless, a few cases of shifting units for
other than military reasons occurred throughout the war. While
particular units were thus shifted, clearing a camp of all Negro units
for other than military reasons became a rarity. Sometimes these
shifts were to the advantage of the units themselves when they
involved movement from an area relatively unprepared for their pres-
- [105]
- ence to one which could
provide better facilities.
-
- No particular advantage, other
than a clearing of the administrative air, was gained by the decision
itself, for by the time it was decided that the location of Negro
troops was primarily a matter of military necessity that could be
justified as such, the possibility of further major shifts of Negro
troops was definitely limited by the available space. By 1942, most
camps which were to house Negro troops in sizable numbers throughout
the war were already doing so.68 Most ports of embarkation and
their subsidiary posts housed Negro troops. To illustrate further the
geographical range of camps with permanent concentrations of Negro
troops, once the Air Forces began to employ large numbers of Negro
units virtually every air station had at least one aviation squadron
and at least one quartermaster platoon (aviation) composed of Negro
troops.
-
- The larger the unit, the more
difficult was the choice of a location. This situation lasted
throughout the war. It encouraged the organization of small Negro units and discouraged the
activation of large units. The first of the all-Negro divisions, the
gad Division, was located in the spring of 1942 at Fort Huachuca,
Arizona, a post which had housed Negro troops traditionally and which
was far enough away from civilian communities to minimize local
protests over sending so large a unit there. Even so, the commanding
general of the post's service command had not recommended it as a
division camp for Negro troops.69 When the second Negro infantry
division, the 92d, was to be activated in the fall of 1942, no single
post could be found for it. The division was therefore activated at
four widely separated posts in Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, and
Indiana. This division could not be assembled until the 93d left Fort
Huachuca. Several attempts were made to find other divisional camps
for Negroes, with Fort Meade, Maryland, Fort Dix, New Jersey, and Camp
Butner, North Carolina, favorably mentioned because of their location
near Negro centers of population.70 When the 2d Cavalry Division was
about to become all Negro, no single camp was available, though Fort
Clark, Texas, could have been adapted to the whole division if it had
not been Negro. The division was therefore divided between Fort Clark
and Camp Lockett, California, both of which had then to be expanded
with
- [106]
- housing and stables to take
care of this last of the horse cavalry divisions.71
-
-
- The vast and rapid increase in
the strength of the Army posed another problem that was much more
serious for new Negro units than for corresponding white units. New
units are built around cadres supplied by older "parent"
units of the same or similar types. Cadres are supposed to be made up
of experienced, trained men, properly balanced in numbers, skills, and
leadership abilities according to the needs of the new unit being
activated. New units then receive fillers from reception or
replacement centers to bring themselves to full strength. Among Negro
units there were neither enough older units nor enough units of
similar types to supply the cadre needs of new units. Only the four
Regular regiments and a few other detachments had existed long enough
before mobilization to be trained at all. From the beginning,
therefore, Negro units were hard put to furnish cadres in sufficient
numbers and of sufficient quality to provide for the proper
organization and training of new units of varying types in all arms
and services. Many a unit complained bitterly that cadres for younger
units were stripping it of all noncommissioned officer and specialist
material before the unit itself had got its own training well under
way. The new units, in turn, after receiving the best that the parent
units had to offer, often complained that their cadres could not meet
their needs.
-
- The problem of cadres was one
whose ultimate effect was far-reaching, for original units trained
with less than adequate cadres produced in turn new cadres for younger
units that were likely to be even more inadequate. The lifeblood of
cadres was well-trained, well-disciplined, well-informed personnel with
high leadership abilities. As activations of new units continued to
increase, the quality of the cadres deteriorated rapidly and the
lifeblood sapped from the older units grew so thin that many of the
newer units began their careers with cadres poor enough to constitute
a handicap from which some of them never recovered.
-
- The older Negro units,
composed primarily of career cavalrymen and infantrymen, could not,
all at once, provide the required cadres for new artillery, chemical
warfare, and engineer units. But because there was no other source
they had to provide cadres for most of the earlier units, with the
result that they themselves were weakened. It is questionable whether
the traditional Regular units were ever able to provide adequate
cadres for new units of even their own arms. Despite their reputation
of containing large numbers of well disciplined and responsible career
soldiers, the older units had long been in need of additional training
and men. They were brought to full strength relatively slowly and
their heavy losses through the production of cadres and through other
necessary transfers kept them from acquiring the finished training
which they were too often assumed to have had. The regiments had been
at reduced strength for several years before the beginning of
mobilization and, "although classed as combat regiments,
- [107]
- [the cavalry regiments]
actually were used as service troops at Forts Myer, Leavenworth and
Riley and at the United States Military Academy." 72
In May 1941,
Brig. Gen. Terry Allen explained that the Negro regiments of the 2d
Cavalry Division were "several months behind the Third Cavalry
Brigade, owing to delay in organization and because they had only a
small nucleus of trained men to start with."73
During the period 1940-42, nevertheless, these units and their infantry counterparts,
which were no better prepared for their tasks, were continuously
furnishing cadres to new Negro units in all arms and services.
-
- Because of the lack of adequate
Negro cadres, the early coast artillery regiments were activated with sufficient
white noncommissioned officers assigned to assist in training these units
to carry on "work connected with their specialities." The white
NCO's remained assigned to these regiments until July 1941, when they were
transferred to white units. They actually remained on detached service with
the Negro regiments for some time thereafter, or until Negroes became available
for promotion to the first three grades and until accommodations for Negro
enlisted men were made available at the Coast Artillery School.74
Negro coast and antiaircraft artillery regiments were unable to furnish
all the cadres needed for the Coast Artillery Replacement Training Center
at Fort Eustis, Virginia, and, despite the objections of the center, white
cadremen were used as instructors until Negroes could replace them.
-
- As early as January 1941, The
Quartermaster General reported that all Negro quartermaster units in
all corps areas were depleted by cadre calls to such an extent that
they could supply no further cadres to units. He suggested that
commanders requiring cadres for new Negro quartermaster detachments
for station use should organize, supervise, and train their
detachments with whatever personnel was available. If none was
available, key personnel should be enlisted locally.75 Fort Knox
reported in December 1940 that Company K, 48th Quartermaster Regiment,
stationed there, had already trained two cadres and was to furnish
another in January. It therefore could not take care of more selectees
due to arrive at Knox in January 1941. The post needed twenty-two
enlisted men from another source at once to provide a cadre for the
new quartermaster service company into which the January selectees
were to be put. Fort Knox was informed that, if necessary, white
personnel might be utilized temporarily to organize the Negro company.76
-
- Medical units faced similar
difficulties in attempting to provide cadres from an insufficiency of
properly trained men.
- [108]
- Cadres for the medical
detachments of Negro regiments and battalions, including the Regular
Army units, were furnished by the Colored Medical Detachment at West
Point and by medical personnel at Fort Huachuca.77 These sources could
furnish "necessarily small" cadres only. As a result, the
fourteen-man cadre sent to Fort Bragg in March 1941 had to be shared by
medical detachments of three regiments, and the eleven-man cadre sent
to Camp Livingston was shared by the detachments of three regiments
and one separate battalion. Within a month these new detachments were
being called upon to furnish cadres for other units.78
-
- The cadre problem persisted,
sometimes taking other forms. As late as the summer of 1942, staff
officers at Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, were still pondering the
wisdom of requiring one type of unit to furnish a cadre for a
different type of unit, though this measure had been resorted to many
times before. They pointed to the example of a truck company which,
although it had no such technicians, was called upon to furnish a
cadre, including shop foremen, for a light maintenance company. Ground
Forces G-3 explained that the sole Negro light maintenance companies
then active had only their original cadres. Neither of the
Quartermaster Replacement Training Centers could furnish further
technicians from their limited instructor and overhead personnel
without seriously affecting training at the centers. The only Negro units left with a
certain amount of mechanical training were the truck companies. Ground
Forces G-4 suggested the use of graduates of the Hampton Quartermaster
School, but these men lacked the military and leadership training
necessary for good cadremen.79 In another case, half of the men sent
to two new signal construction companies by an antiaircraft regiment
were rated so poor in ability by the receiving unit that it felt that
it would be impossible to train and use them as cadremen. No
investigation was ordered because, after fifteen indorsements and
several weeks of effort, Army Ground Forces had been unable to fix the
responsibility for the equally poor quality of the cadre previously
sent out by the same regiment.80
-
- Cadre problems in Negro units
lasted up to the end of the war. In the late fall of 1944, for
example, the Engineer Training Center at Fort Lewis, Washington, was
using white cadres to train Negro troops. As fast as Negroes completed
training and qualified for occupational specialties, they replaced
the white cadremen. Nevertheless, in May of the following year, some
cadres there were still all white, some were mixed, and only one was
all Negro. While the white cadremen could be employed in the training
center, and while the use of mixed cadres was proceeding without
difficulty, the white cadremen could not be assigned to the organized
units themselves. It was therefore necessary to devise all possible
means to develop
- [109]
- Negroes to replace white
cadremen when units left the center.81
-
- The initial problems in the
expansion of Negro strength, with the exception of cadre difficulties,
were relatively minor when compared with later questions involving the
use of Negro troops and when compared with the larger questions of
full-scale mobilization involving the Army as a whole. They affected
the administrative processes of the Army more than they affected the
troops themselves. They did serve to delay and at times to confuse the
orderly process of establishing and training Negro units. They had as well a nuisance
value that affected the views of higher headquarters on the entire
question of the employment of Negro troops. The larger questions
affecting directly the planned employment of Negro troops and the
training, morale, and efficiency of these troops were yet to come.
These were primarily internal Army problems which could not be settled
by adjusted quotas, expanded construction, or by appeals to civilian
communities urging them to remember their higher obligations to the
nation in time of war. They could be solved only by a rigorous
examination of Army organization, practice, and policy as they
affected the employment of Negro manpower.
- [110]
Endnotes
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