- Chapter X:
The Transfer of ASF Activities to the War Department Staff
The place of the Army Service Forces in
the structure of the War Department was never clearly understood or defined
during the course of World War II. Was the ASF simply a new, consolidated
command with certain operating responsibilities but subordinate to the broad
planning duties of the War Department General Staff? Or was it a kind of
consolidated staff and central service agency for the War Department,
essentially different from the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces?
Within the structure of the War
Department, the position of the ASF had to be determined in practice by groups
other than General Somervell and his staff. The relations which were crucial in
this determination were those between the ASF and the WDGS, the Air Forces, and
the Army Ground Forces. The controversies with the Air Forces and G-4, WDGS,
have already been noted. The first resulted in some curtailment of the role of
the ASF. In its contest with OPD of the War Department General Staff, the ASF
fared somewhat better. To be sure, Somervell's position as logistical planner
for the Chief of Staff was never officially recognized, at least not in the
manner he desired, but on the other hand, the Operations Division of the WDGS
did not succeed in having the unction of the ASF limited to an
"operating" supply agency subordinate to its own logistical and
operational planning. Yet while the ASF remained throughout the war as the
"supply planner" of the Chief of Staff, some other staff functions
exercised by the ASF were transferred to units officially designated as War
Department General or Special Staff Divisions. Before reviewing further the
basic issues involving ASF status in the War Department it will be necessary to
enumerate the changes which were made in the duties of the ASF as a central
staff agency.
Public Relations
When the Army Service Forces was set up
in March 1942, General Somervell created a public relations unit in his
headquarters. The personnel and activities of this unit were brought into the
ASF from the Office of the Under Secretary of War, who had had an Industrial
Information Division primarily concerned with publicizing the procurement
problems of the War Department. Actually many of the employees of this unit had
been recruited by the Bureau of Public Relations (BPR) of the War Department and
were carried on the bureau's pay roll, although physi-
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cally located in the Under
Secretary's office.1
In the summer of 1942 Secretary Stimson
sponsored a study of public relations organization and activities in the War
Department. As a result, he directed that all public relations work was to be
concentrated in the BPR which reported directly to him. At the same time, the
Secretary indicated that the commanding generals of each of the three commands
within the United States, and other organizations such as those of the chiefs of
technical services, might maintain offices of technical information. Such
offices, however, would release no information directly to the press or to any
other medium of communication. They would simply assist the Bureau of Public
Relations by providing it with requested data and by submitting publicity
suggestions for bureau approval.2
In accord with Stimson's directive, the
Public Relations Division in ASF headquarters was abolished and a greatly
reduced Office of Technical Information was set up.3
Most of the personnel of the division were transferred to the BPR. Somervell
retained a single officer in his own office who helped him prepare speeches,
answer inquiries, and who kept a watchful eye over public relations matters
affecting the commanding general and the ASF as a whole.
In 1943 the procurement activities of
the War Department were so important and so pressing that special instructions
were issued defining public relations responsibilities in this field.4
Three different parts of the Department were vitally concerned: the Under
Secretary of War as the civilian chief supervising procurement, the BPR as the
official agency for handling the details of public relations, and the ASF as the
agency immediately concerned with actual
procurement. Accordingly, the Bureau of Public Relations created as part of its
organization an Industrial Services Division which was responsible for
formulating and executing a public relations program that would result in
favorable attitudes toward war output by management and labor alike. In carrying
out its mission, the division was to receive all policy direction from the Under
Secretary of War: In guiding its activities, Under Secretary Patterson in turn
depended upon the labor adviser to the Secretary of War, Mr. Edward F. McGrady
(whose office was actually adjacent to that of the Under Secretary), and upon
the Industrial personnel Division of ASF headquarters. A major activity of the
BPR was the awarding of the Army-Navy "E" to industrial plants
achieving outstanding war production records.5
The bureau also co-operated on specific projects with the Office of War
Information, the labor division of the War Production Board, the War Manpower
Commission, and other government agencies. An aggressive public relations
program was an important phase of War Department procurement efforts.
The Army Service Forces was, of
necessity, vitally interested in the activities of the Industrial Services
Division of the War Department Bureau of Public Relations. The association
between the two agencies was very close and friendly. In 1944 the head of the
Industrial Services of BPR was transferred, becoming director of the Industrial
Personnel Division in ASF headquarters. BPR also assigned an officer to
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the staff of each service command to
carry on its work at industrial plants within the geographical area of the
service command. Direct communication was authorized between these service
command officers and the BPR.6
This organization of public relations
activities proved satisfactory in every way. General Somervell clearly
understood that public relations was a basic responsibility, for the War
Department as a whole and should be performed under the personal direction of
the Secretary of War. He had no occasion to protest the arrangement because it
never slighted or interfered with the ASF's role within the Department's
organization. In the specialized field of industrial public relations, for
example, the Secretary delegated his responsibility to the Under Secretary.
Since Somervell was the principal adviser to the Under Secretary on procurement
matters, he and his staff had ample opportunity to make such suggestions,
especially through the Industrial Personnel Division, which worked directly with
the BPR on details of procurement public relations.
Budgeting
War Department Circular 59 of 1942the
reorganization "bible"-specified that the Army Service Forces would be
responsible for preparing War Department budget estimates, for defending them
before the Bureau of the Budget and Congress, and for controlling fiscal policy.
There were several reasons for this arrangement. In the past, the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-4, had been designated as the aide to the Secretary of War and
the Chief of Staff on budget matters. As G-4 Somervell had performed this
function, and he continued to do so as commanding general of
the Army Service Forces. In addition, budgeting depended heavily upon the
accounting records of the Chief of Finance, who was now under the supervision of
the Commanding General, ASF. Then too, the peculiarities of War Department
appropriation practice resulted in most Congressional appropriations being made
formally to the chiefs of technical services and the Chief of Finance, all of
whom were under the ASF. The only important exceptions were the appropriation to
the Air Corps for the procurement and maintenance of aircraft, and to the
Department as a whole for expediting production. Finally, since the Army Service
Forces was created to be the administrative agency of the War Department as a
whole, budgeting was logically one of the tasks assigned to it.
Wartime budget practices did not
actually provide the occasion for review of or decision on fundamental military
policies. The basic plans of the War Department for the size, composition, and
deployment of the Army were determined within the General Staff. The limitations
to these plans were not a matter of finances but of resources: the manpower,
industrial, and technological strength of the nation. The Army Supply Program
was adjusted primarily to fit the natural resources and the industrial
facilities that the War Production Board decided were available to the Army. The
budget merely reflected these basic decisions. After Pearl Harbor the general
temper of the House Appropriations Committee and of the entire Congress was
simply that, in terms of money, the War Department could have whatever it asked
for. In the first seven months after Pearl Harbor, Congress appropriated 104[150]
billion dollars to the War Department 7
Thereafter, the War Department each year for the remainder of the war simply
requested sums as needed to supplement this overwhelming amount voted at the
beginning of the war.
At the conclusion of the budget hearing
before the House Appropriations Subcommittee in June 1943, the chairman of the
subcommittee passed along a word of advice to the Under Secretary of War. Mr. J.
Buell Snyder remarked that it had been his observation during the course of the
hearings that the War Department General Staff was "getting out of touch,
in a sense, with department administration." He noted that some branch
chiefs did not seem to be closely in touch with activities at home or in
theaters of operations. This was apparently a criticism of the ASF, and of the
subordination of chiefs of technical services. Mr. Snyder went on to say he
thought "that a mistake was made in taking the budget function out of the
War Department General Staff." While he acknowledged that the ASF was doing
a good - job, he expressed his belief that "money runs the Army and
controls every phase of its activity and that the control of the purse should be
a General Staff function . . . ." He felt that the ASF should continue in
an accounting capacity, but believed there would be greater co-ordination and
economy "if there were a budget desk re-established in the General Staff .
. . ." Mr. Snyder suggested, and Mr. Patterson agreed, that the subject
would be brought to the attention of the Secretary of War and the Chief of
Staff, 8
In making his observations Mr. Snyder gave no detailed argument to
support his views. He asked merely that the position of the budget officer in
War Department organization be reconsidered.
Since the suggestion of a chairman of a
House appropriations subcommittee is one to be taken seriously by the department
concerned, the Fiscal Director of the ASF, Maj. Gen. A. H. Carter, immediately
prepared a memorandum on the subject for judge Patterson. He recommended a
prompt reply by the Under Secretary to Chairman Snyder defending the existing
organization of the War Department. His action, General Carter thought, might
persuade the chairman to withdraw his comment before the hearings were finally
printed. Somervell approved of this recommendation, and a copy of it was sent to
General McNarney, the Deputy Chief of Staff. Under Secretary Patterson agreed
with General Carter and signed a letter drafted for him. But the letter was
withdrawn at McNarney's request before it reached the chairman of the House
subcommittee.
Somervell then wrote to General
Marshall and summarized this sequence of events. He noted that one way to carry
out Mr. Snyder's desire would be to re-establish general budget responsibility
along , the lines of the former Legislative and Planning Branch of the War
Department General Staff. He doubted whether this would be as effective as the
present arrangement and asserted that "the broad budgetary policy of the
War Department is now and should be under the complete control of the Chief of
Staff." General Somervell added that if the existing "organizational
set-up" implied otherwise, he would recommend that the Deputy Chief
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of Staff deal directly with the budget
officer on all matters of policy "without reference through the Army
Service Forces." General Somervell went on to point out that of the 120
billion dollars appropriated to the War Department from 1 July 1941 to 1 July
1943, about 104 billion dollars was for equipment and supplies whose procurement
was supervised by the Under Secretary. Furthermore, the ASF, under the War
Department reorganization, had "just completed the assembly of all
budgetary and fiscal functions under one head," the new organization was
"functioning efficiently," and it would be a "backward step to
dismember it by pulling from it the budget operations which are inextricably
tied in with the proper administration of the over-all fiscal operations of the
War Department." General Somervell presented three recommendations: one,
that the present organization be maintained; two, that the present budget
officer continue to act under the policy direction of the Under Secretary of War
and the Deputy Chief of Staff; and three, that the Chief of Staff concur in the
Under Secretary's letter for Mr. Snyder, signed on 15 June 1943. "These
recommendations would place in the General Staff satisfactory control of the War
Department budget policy, and, at the same time, preserve the present
well-integrated functions of budget and fiscal operations in one
organization."9
General Somervell's memorandum
apparently was unconvincing for in July 1943, the War Department issued orders
removing the War Department budget office "from the jurisdiction of the
Fiscal Division, Army Service Forces," and re-designating it the Budget
Division, War Department Special Staff:10 The immediate consequence was to
transfer an officer with a small staff from General
Carter's office in the ASF to the War Department Special Staff. This new Budget
Division necessarily had to rely upon the Fiscal Director of the ASF for
information and even advice. No fundamental change in either budgeting or
accounting practices followed. But at least the appearance was now created that
the War Department Special Staff, and not a subordinate command, was in charge
of budgeting.
The change provided some satisfaction
to the Army Air Forces, which as early as 27 June 1942 had suggested that the
War Department staff rather than the ASF should exercise the budget
function.11 In 1944 the Air Forces and the budget officer of the War
Department suggested that the Chief of Finance should be transferred from the
Army Service Forces to a separate status under the budget officer; the position
of Fiscal Director in the ASF would then be abolished. This proposal must have
been unacceptable to both the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War as well as
to the ASF, since no such order was issued.
One consequence of the transfer of the
budget function from the ASF to the War Department Special Staff was to
encourage the further growth of this part of War Department organization.
Another result, at least, in the budget field, was to draw a sharp distinction
between the War Department General Staff proper as the top policy-determining
level and the Army Service Forces as an operating agency. The accounting work
remained in the
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ASF; top budget policy direction as a
staff activity did not. 12
The Civil Affairs Division
Shortly after the Army Service Forces
was created, the War Department began preparations for the military government
of occupied areas taken over from the Axis powers. Proposals for training
personnel were developed within the Provost Marshal General's office, and led to
the establishment of a School of Military Government at the University of
Virginia in May 1942.13 The Provost Marshal General also set up a small unit in
Washington to plan general policies for military government. Actual experience
in military government in World War II began in November 1942 with operations in
North Africa. One of the first questions that arose to complicate policy was
whether French Morocco and Algeria should be regarded as conquered enemy
territory or as that of an ally to be used as a base for further military
operations.14 But in preparing for the invasion of Sicily, there was no question
about the need for or the status of military government since the area was
unmistakably enemy territory.
Toward the end of 1942, President
Roosevelt had created an Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations
within the State Department under the direction of former governor Herbert H.
Lehman of New York. This office was assigned general responsibility for planning
relief in areas liberated from Axis control. Necessarily, its interests and
those of the ASF were closely related. In the spring of 1943 Lehman called upon
Stimson and pointed out that the Secretary's organization had failed to provide
him with adequate means and powers to carry out his assignment. Governor Lehman drew
attention to the fact that the operating agency in military government, the
Provost Marshal General's office, was many echelons removed from the Secretary
of War's office. This seemed to him to be too low an echelon to represent the
Secretary of War in negotiations with the Department of State on vital matters
pertaining to occupied and liberated areas.15
Shortly thereafter, the War Department
issued a memorandum creating the Civil Affairs Division in the War Department
Special Staff.16 While the Provost Marshal General continued to conduct
training programs for military government officials under policies prescribed by
the Civil Affairs Division, this division became the center of all War
Department planning on military government policies. The International Division
in ASF headquarters in time also played a major role in military government
planning, since its function was to supervise arrangements for War Department's
purchase and distribution of civilian supplies in occupied areas. The ASF
Industrial Personnel Division handled many personnel and labor matters for
overseas commanders of occupied areas, while the ASF Fiscal Director han-
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dled currency matters. The work of all
these units was performed under general policies officially emanating from the
Civil Affairs Division.
Research and Development
Within the Army Service Forces the
basic responsibility for research and development of new weapons remained with
the seven technical services. A small ASF headquarters unit kept itself informed
in a general way on research and development' matters, attempted to prevent
obvious duplication of effort, and helped the technical services whenever they
encountered difficulties in obtaining raw materials or facilities for research
purposes. The actual initiative in research matters, however, remained largely
in the hands or the technical services, working closely with the using arms.
Secretary Stimson was especially
interested in research and development matters, and one of his purposes, as he
himself has pointed out, was to make clear to the Department and to scientific
leaders that it was the policy of the War Department to make use of scientific
help in every part of the Army's work.17 Soon after assuming office he asked
one of his associates, Mr. Harvey H. Bundy, to follow scientific matters for
him. Mr. Bundy was aided by Dr. Edward L. Bowles.
A former Chief of Ordnance, Maj. Gen.
C. C. Williams, was recalled to active duty to handle ASF headquarters'
interests in research. This arrangement was not very satisfactory to Dr. Bowles.
As early as November 1942, a special section on new weapons had been created
under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, of the War Department General Staff. In
September 1943 Mr. Bundy and Dr. Vannevar Bush of the Office of Scientific Research
and Development suggested to Secretary Stimson that a new weapons unit should be
set up as a separate part of the War Department Special Staff.18 A New
Developments Division was proposed and Somervell's opinion requested. Somervell
referred the matter to General Clay, ASF director of materiel, who protested
vigorously that there would be little purpose in adding a staff at War
Department level to supervise staff responsibilities already exercised at ASF
level. Stimson nevertheless decided in favor of the recommendations of Mr. Bundy
and Dr. Bush,19 and in October a War Department circular was issued setting
up the New Developments Division.20 This division, initially under the
direction of Maj. Gen. Stephen G. Henry, formerly head of the Armored Forces
School at Fort Knox, gave primary attention to the problem of demonstrating new
weapons and equipment to overseas commanders. In addition, it followed many
phases of research work within the United States. The New Developments Division
tended to duplicate some of the work of the Research and Development Division of
the ASF staff. In a special report submitted to General Somervell in January
1945 the ASF staff division pointed to much overlapping and duplication of
activities.21 But since
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it was at a higher level, the new
division was able to gain from other branches of the Military Establishment the
co-operation that an ASF agency probably could not have obtained. It did not
actually take any staff responsibility away from the Army Service Forces but
simply added a new agency in the War Department Special Staff to give greater
impetus to research and development activities.
The New Developments Division was
generally successful in the work it undertook. Because of the quality of its
leadership and personnel, the New Developments Division not only made important
contributions of its own but also probably stimulated ASF headquarters to
greater interest in research and development matters.
National Guard and Executive for
Reserve and
Reserve Officers' Training Corps
Affairs
In May 1945, just after V-E Day, the
War Department issued orders transferring the National Guard Bureau and the
Executive for Reserve and Reserve Officers' Training Corps Affairs from General
Somervell's staff to the War Department Special Staff.22 This action was
intended to suggest that concern for National Guard and Reserve matters would
now become especially important in War Department planning and that these
agencies could better deal with the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces
if they were parts of the War Department Special Staff. During the war neither
of these two offices was of great importance-there was no Army Reserve Corps in
wartime, and the National Guard had been incorporated into the Army of the
United States before Pearl Harbor. This transfer after V-E Day forecast that it
would be military policy to recreate
the Reserve Corps and the National Guard following the defeat of Japan.
Postwar Planning
In May 1943 General Somervell received
secret instructions from the Chief of Staff to set up a small unit in his office
to begin planning for demobilization of the Army. Personnel for this task was
quickly assembled and tentative planning programs laid out. In July 1943
Secretary Stimson and General Marshall decided that this activity should not be
left in the ASK Accordingly, a Special Planning Division was created as a new
unit in the War Department Special Staff.23
Counterintelligence
One activity transferred to the Army
Service Forces from the WDGS during the war was supervision of
counterintelligence functions within the United States. Before 9 March 1942 most
Army counterintelligence activity within the United States had been performed
through the corps area commands under the direction and supervision of the
Intelligence Division (G-2) of the WDGS. When the corps areas came under the ASF
and were transformed into service commands, counterintelligence personnel
remained attached to them but operated under the supervision of G-2. ASF
headquarters had no responsibility for this phase of service command work.
Finally in December 1943, this arrangement was terminated. In the meantime, the
ASF had created its own small intelligence office, and G-2 was now
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willing that it should take over such
security activity as the Army had to perform within the United States.24
There was a continuing, if not
extensive, trend during World War II to move certain activities performed by the
Army Service Forces headquarters into new units making up the War Department
Special Staff: When the ASF was created, it was Somervell's understanding that
the ASF was in itself a kind of consolidated "special staff" for the
War Department. On logistical matters he conceived of the ASF as part of the
WDGS. As noted earlier, this concept endured throughout the war, even if never
formally embodied in official instructions other than the original reorganization directive of 9 March 1942. But
the concept of the ASF as a special kind of "special staff" for the
War Department as a whole gradually changed. More and more policy-making
responsibilities were transferred from the ASF to direct War Department staff
status. It appeared that the original role of the ASF, at least as Somervell
understood it, was no longer binding in War Department organizational practice.
By the autumn of 1944 General Somervell felt that developments had gone so far
that it was time to raise formally the question with the Chief of Staff of the
future role of the Army Service Forces within the War Department.
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Page Created June 13th 2001
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