- Chapter XI:
Further Reconsideration of the Role of the ASF
General Somervell was not
disposed to treat lightly the gradual, continuing alteration of the role
of the Army Service Forces. As he understood it, the War Department
reorganization of 1942 was predicated upon two or three basic ideas. First
of all, the elaborate War Department General Staff system built up between
World War I and World War II was to be radically altered. Second, the many
special staff units subject only to general direction by the WDGS were to
be reduced. Third, the combat training work in the United States was to be
concentrated in two commands: the Army Air Forces and the Army Ground
Forces. The third command, the ASF, was to take over the supply and
service duties, including WDGS supervision of these activities. As far as
the ASF was concerned, the General Staff was to remain in full control of
strategic direction of the war.
As already noted, various
pressures resulted in a transfer of some ASF activities to new special
staff units under the direction of the Chief of Staff. Most of these
activities were of minor importance to the ASF and their transfer caused
little disturbance. It was the constant attack of the AAF upon the role of
the Army Service Forces which caused the greatest concern in ASF
headquarters. If these attacks continued and were as successful as
before (see Chapter VIII), it was reasonable to believe the very concept
of the ASF was threatened.
In the background of the conflict
was the long-standing ambition of the Air Forces to become a separate
service enjoying equal status with the Army and the Navy. General Marshall
and General Arnold had tacitly agreed that for the duration of World War
II, Air Forces aspirations for such a status were to be shelved. Because
of this agreement, General Somervell held that the ASF should perform
supply and service duties for the AAF just as it was doing for the AGF and
the overseas theaters of operations. To General Arnold and his colleagues
this kind of arrangement probably appeared too "compromising."
They did not desire to become too deeply tied in with War Department
organization because it might make eventual separation more difficult.
Conflict was more or less
inevitable under such circumstances. It was brought to a head when
Somervell in 1944 raised with General Marshall the whole question of the
proper role of the Army Service Forces in the War Department. In order to
understand better the whole review of ASF responsibilities that followed,
it is
[157]
necessary first to examine
briefly the relations that existed between the AGF and the ASF. It was to
these relations that the ASF constantly referred as the desirable model,
and it was just such relations that the Army Air Forces did not want.
The relations between the Army
Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces rested upon a basic principle
embodied in the War Department reorganization of 1942: namely that command
of combat troops in training, including the supply and service units
organic to combat commands, could and should be separated from the command
of service agencies which rendered supply and service support to the Army
as a whole. The relations between AGF and ASF as prescribed in Circular 59
differed on two essential points from those laid down for the AAF and the
ASF.1
The AAF was explicitly authorized to supply the mat6riel peculiar to
the Air Forces, and to control all Air Forces installations. No such
prerogatives had been granted to the Army Ground Forces. The AGF was
merely given the right to "review" the mat6riel requirements of
the combat forces. It was assigned no control over installations even when
used by ground force units. 2
Even had the opportunity to extend its
authority into the areas assigned to the ASF existed, it is doubtful that
it would have been done. Its commander, General McNair, held firmly to the
conviction that the mission of the AGF was to provide trained combat units
for the overseas theaters. He held with equal firmness the view that this
mission could be most effectively performed by a small operating
headquarters which would concentrate on the training and organization of
ground combat troops, leaving all other tasks to other War Department
agencies. General McNair's views continued throughout the war, at the
level of general policy, to control the relations between the AGF and ASF
Although the AGF and ASF did not
engage in any serious rivalry, there were occasional differences. These
were perhaps inevitable since the War Department reorganization of 1942,
while clear in general about the separation of functions between the two
commands, left certain marginal areas in which lines of authority were
ambiguous. The progress of the war, moreover, created problems which had
not been anticipated in the initial organization of the War Department.
Some adjustments of the original formula therefore had to follow.
Furthermore, co-operative effort by large organizations of markedly
different types, engaged in highly diverse activities, is naturally
subject to misunderstanding and confusion. And finally, the personal
attitudes and habits of the two commanders were responsible for at least
some of the difficulties that arose.
Certain agencies, subordinated to
ASF in the 1942 reorganization,
formulated policies and executed programs
affecting, in the name of the War
Department, all three commands alike. One such
agency was the Office of The Adjutant
General which, although under the ASF,
was the War Department agency for the
Army wide initial classification and
assignment of personnel. In this duty The
Adjutant General had the delicate task of
adjudicating, in the best interests of the
Army as a whole, the rival claims of the
three com-[158]
mands and eventually of the
theaters as well-on a precious and limited commodity wanted by all-men.
Provided the War Department General Staff was strong enough to enforce
impartiality in the operation of an agency like The Adjutant General's
office, this arrangement was not likely to produce insuperable difficulties.
But McNair believed the General Staff lacked the necessary strength, and
he thought that The Adjutant General functioned too often not as an
impartial instrument of the War Department policy, but as an interested
element of the ASF. This belief undoubtedly underlay General McNair's
refusal to support Somervell's plan to combine the functions of ASF
commander and Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1 and G-4 and it continually
conditioned the approach of AGF to the problem of personnel . 3
Disagreements between the AGF and
ASF concerning the recruitment and assignment of personnel, although they
did not attain major proportions, began early in the mobilization period
and continued throughout the war. From the beginning of selective service,
AGF was convinced that it was not receiving a proportionate share of
high-quality men. Men of the highest intelligence, whose capacities for
leadership and combat effectiveness AGF believed would be high, tended to
be men having some identifiable civilian trade or profession. These fell
within the occupational specialties for which AGF units, by their nature;
provided few openings, but which abounded in the more technical units of
the ASF and AAF. 4
General McNair criticized the ASF
again and again for the Army's classification and assignment policy,
especially during 1942 and 1943. He complained that large numbers of men
originally assigned to the Ground Forces were
permitted to go to officer candidate and specialist schools of the
technical services, from which they often did not return to AGE. 5
The Army
Specialized Training Program was a major point of controversy. This
program, managed by the ASF, contemplated sending some 150,000 enlisted
men to college for special training in science, engineering, and
languages. The AGF opposed the project vigorously, largely on the grounds
that the training to be given was unnecessary to the prosecution of the
war and that it would withdraw from positions of leadership in the combat
forces a large number of the best inductees. Eventually the replacement
crisis in early 1944 forced the dissolution of the program and the
assignment of Army Specialized Training Program trainees to replacement
centers and units, chiefly of the ground arms. 6
The continuing struggle for
high-quality personnel culminated in 1943 and 1944 in the discussion of
the Physical Profile System, in which the AGF and ASF were again ranged on
opposite sides. The AGF, convinced after two years of mobilization
experience that assignment of inductees by specialty -especially when
classification and assignment procedures were under the control of the
ASF-could lead only to the receipt by the ASF and AAF of a
disproportionate share of high quality men, undertook to. obtain a radical
change in the basis for Army classification. It wished to substitute a
physical basis for the current mental and technical criteria for
classification.
Under such a scheme,
[159]
the Ground Forces would have no
difficulty demonstrating its superior need for men in prime physical
condition, and so would get a larger proportion of well qualified
individuals. The ASF repeatedly objected to the institution of a physical
basis for classification. But the demand for combat replacements became so
acute in late 1943 and 1944 that the Physical Profile Plan was adopted
over the objections of the ASF in the spring of 1944. 7
Closely related to these
controversies over the quality of personnel were certain problems of
utilization of personnel which disturbed the relations of ASF and AGF,
especially in 1942 and 1943. Throughout the mobilization period it was the
view of the AGF that too large a proportion of the national manpower was
being invested in service functions and too little in combat forces. The
rate of growth of service elements was dramatic: constituting but 26.3
percent of the strength of the Army at the end of 1941, they comprised
36.5 percent at the end of 1943. In the same period, the strength of the
combat arms declined from 52.4 percent to 32.8 percent of the total . 8
The
rapid expansion of the ASF was in large measure a result of the effort to
build up supply installations, both in the zone of interior and in
overseas theaters. The AGF, while conceding the necessity for some
reapportionment of Army strength for this and other purposes, nonetheless
believed the situation was getting out of hand and repeatedly urged the
need for the strongest possible combat force. 9
The Army Service Forces,
McNair told General Gasser, president of the War Department manpower
board, was "very, very fat, particularly in headquarters," and
he strongly affirmed his belief that "radical corrective action"
was required "to effect the assignment of a much greater proportion of the
manpower to units designed for offensive combat." 10
The AGF felt that the ASF was
wasting manpower and. thereby threatening not only the formation of a
powerful combat force, but also interfering with AGF's primary mission of
training. The relative decline in AGF strength and the rise in ASF
strength resulted only in part from the assignment of new inductees to ASF
in large numbers. It resulted also from the cancellation of planned AGF
units from the Troop Basis, and, far more serious in their effects on
orderly training, from the depletion of ground units already formed-as
well as the diversion of men from ground units in the process of
formation-to fill new service units. These policies had disastrous effects
on the training of ground units. Training either was interrupted, had to
be repeated, or had to be carried on at two or three levels
simultaneously. Until 1944 the most important influences on organization
and training in AGF were shortages of men and changes in Troop Basis
plans. AGF believed that unessential and overstaffed ASF units were in
large measure responsible for both of these circumstances. 11
Training problems presented other
difficulties for the AGF and ASK Initially the responsibility for training
service units was not clearly defined. The AGF and ASF were each
responsible for training service units-the AGF trained those service units
which became an integral part of a combat command and the ASF trained
units
[160]
to be used by the communications
zone of an overseas theater. But the ultimate use of a service unit was
not always clearly forecast. During 1942 and 1943 several schemes for
compromising the conflict between ASF and AGF were tried without success.
Finally, in January 1944 the War Department adopted the policy of
specifically designating in the Troop Basis those service units which were
to be activated and trained by each command. 12
The controversy over
responsibility for training service units was intensified by two
circumstances, both arising out of the differing conceptions in AGF and
ASF of their primary missions. During 1942 and most of 1943 the emphasis
in AGF was on the organization and training of large combat elements,
particularly divisions. While AGF recognized its responsibility for
training service units organic to ground combat forces, it was very slow
to provide plans for the organization and training of such units. Not
until May 1943 did it prepare a systematic activation schedule for
building service units and arrange for effective supervision of their
training. In part this neglect of AGF service units resulted from the
graver problems surrounding the training of divisions. In part it resulted
from the continued existence of the chiefs of technical services, which
had first directed the training programs. But the effect was to make these
service units the "forgotten men" of the AGF, and undoubtedly to
bolster the conviction in the ASF that it should seek control over the
training of as many service units as possible.
In their conception of the best
type of training to be given service units, moreover, the two commands
differed radically. In accordance with its mission of preparing ground
combat forces, the AGF insisted that each man, whether an
ordnance repairman or a rifleman, be trained primarily as a soldier and
secondarily as a specialist. In the ASF, on the other hand, primary
emphasis was given to technical and specialist training. It was believed,
both in the ASF and among the technical service staff officers of the AGF,
that the training of service units of the Ground Forces had suffered
because of an overemphasis on military training. The AGF, taking an
opposite view, was convinced that the ASF would concentrate too heavily on
technical duties, if it obtained wider authority over the training of
service units. This conviction doubtless stimulated it to insist on its
responsibility for training all service personnel who would function in
direct support of ground combat elements. 13
Training did not stop when a unit
or an individual replacement was ordered to a staging area or replacement
depot for shipment overseas. Troops were given physical examinations,
final training tests, and often a certain amount of training in these
installations. When units or individuals trained by the AGF passed through
staging areas and replacement depots, they came under the command of port
commanders. In 1943, as a result of criticisms of the state of training of
combat troops arriving in the theaters, the AGF sought to extend its
control over ground units and replacements up to the moment of
embarkation. Units, many of which arrived at staging areas inadequately
trained to begin with, often remained for extended periods, during which
their training deteriorated further. While under the control of ASF
staging area commanders,
[161]
these units could be given
suitable training by the AGF only with difficulty.
Training facilities in the
staging areas were practically nonexistent because no training activity
during the process of moving troops overseas had been contemplated when
training facilities were being constructed elsewhere. It was expected at
the time that only fully prepared troops would be ordered overseas. Since
this was not so, the AGF sought to continue training until the last
moment. That meant moving troops from staging areas to posts where
facilities existed, disrupting final processing for overseas shipment, and
causing no end of confusion in the staging areas. The AGF, more concerned
with its responsibilities for training than those of port commanders for
efficient final processing, attempted to obtain War Department permission
to retain command of ground units in staging areas and to conduct such
training and administrative preparations for overseas movement as seemed
necessary.
The ASF strongly opposed this move as impractical and
inconsistent with the principle of command. The War Department directed a
number of measures to permit the AGF to supervise training in staging
areas without depriving port commanders of command of units while in the
staging areas. None of the measures were completely successful. The
improvement in the shipping situation-in late 1943 and 1944 eased the
problem somewhat by making extended delays in staging areas unnecessary,
but a solution satisfactory to all concerned was never found.14
In like manner in 1943, when the
replacement crisis began, the processing of combat replacements through
replacement depots controlled by the ASF revealed grave deficiencies in
accounting, administration, and training.
Although in 1942 the AGF had been unwilling to seek authority over
personnel depots for ground arms replacements, in 1943 it changed its
position. Separate personnel depots were set up for AGF and ASF
replacements, under the separate control of the two commands.15
In addition to problems
pertaining to personnel and training, problems involving the supply of
equipment arose between the AGF and the ASF. During 1942 and 1943 combat
equipment for AGF units was severely limited, creating great training
difficulties. The AGF repeatedly attempted to obtain equipment allowances
from the ASF and the War Department, but world-wide requirements were so
enormous, that the ASF seldom found it possible to meet these demands.
Other differences between the two commands aggravated the supply
situation. Faced with the need to move combat forces overseas on limited
shipping, the ASF in 1943 adopted the policy of preshipping equipment. The
AGF was concerned lest this stock-piling produce even graver short-, ages
of equipment for training in the United States. But although temporary
shortages did develop, the net result in the long-run was beneficial in
conserving shipping space and in permitting the re-use of equipment left
behind in the zone of interior. 16
Difficulties with the AGF also
arose over the development and procurement of equipment for combat troops
and units. Under the March 1942 reorganization di-
[162]
rective, a Requirements Division
was set up in AGF to establish military characteristics of weapons and
equipment.
This division was responsible for co-ordinating the design and
procurement of materiel with the technical services under ASF command.
Through its Development Section, the Requirements Division attempted to
satisfy and balance the demands of the combat arms for materiel. The
technical services, for their part, had to translate requirement into
designs and into plans for industrial production, often in the face of
shortages of raw material, labor, and plant facilities. The elaborate
machinery for developing, testing, and purchasing equipment revealed
numerous small points of friction, but all were adjusted in one way or
another.
In comparison with the dispute
between the ASF and the Air Forces, these conflicts of the ASF with the
Army Ground Forces were unimportant. The fact that the AGF and the ASF
were in agreement on the economy and viability of the 1942 reorganization
enabled them to avoid serious rifts in their relationships. Actual
co-operation between the two organizations was. close, continuous, and on
the whole, effective throughout the war. The Ground and Service Forces
worked together with good results at camps, posts and stations. The
conflicts treated above did not raise basic questions of military
organization or of the responsibilities and authorities of the two
commands.
The problems were operational, involving specific issues, and
for the most part were handled successfully, unembarrassed by debates over
higher staff and command policy.
On the other hand, disputes over
seemingly technical matters between the Air Forces and the Service Forces
had a way of becoming vital issues which threatened to undermine the
organizational integrity of the ASF. 17
Every Air Forces gain provided a
fulcrum for more and more leverage in a jurisdictional offensive. Thus
General Somervell became convinced that the change in the method of
allotting War Department funds was a dangerous step toward stripping the
ASF of some of the authority necessary for carrying out its basic supply
and service responsibilities.
With this issue as a starting
point, Somervell decided to bring up again the whole question of ASF-AAF
relationships. In a memorandum for the Chief of Staff in September 1944 he
called attention to the broad implications of the action taken in changing
the method of allotting money. He listed six functions which had now been
transferred from Service Forces supervision at air bases to Air Forces
supervision and ten functions which still remained. He concluded that
"in short, the action removes, for all practical purposes, the
control of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, and the chiefs of
technical services over the major activities for which they are
responsible insofar as the Air Forces is concerned." This development
went a long way toward dividing the Army into two parts-the Air Forces and
the Ground Forces-with chiefs of technical services limited to Ground
Forces functions except as the AAF might request their assistance.
Somervell then turned to the basic issue. The relation of the ASF to the
Ground Forces was clear, he declared, but the relation to the Air Forces
had been uncertain ever
[163]
since the reorganization of March
1942, and was now made more complex by this recent action.18
Since the War Department
reorganization, Somervell asserted, the ASF had tried to carry out
"the letter and spirit of the orders by rendering all possible
service to the Army Air Forces and the Army Ground Forces." In
general, there had been no difficulty with the AGF, and, Somervell noted,
the AGF apparently did not feel any lack of adequate control over the
services rendered its troops. The AGF had never asked that the military
posts it used be transferred to its command. "On the other hand there
has been a continuous trend and agitation towards transferring to the Army
Air Forces the supply and service functions being performed by the Army
Service Forces at Air Forces stations." Somervell then explained that
the ASF had resisted these proposed changes in the belief "that they
were not in accordance with the concept of the reorganization plan; that
they would lead to a duplication of effort, to adoption of non-uniform
standards and procedures, and to an uneconomical utilization of manpower,
supplies, and facilities." He added that the ASF had usually been
supported in its -opposition by the War Department General Staff.
Next in his memorandum Somervell
was careful to insist that he had no wish to prejudice postwar military
organization. The form this organization would take was still unknown and
the organization for another war could not be predicted. "The extent
to which air and other developments may bring about an almost complete
change in the method of utilization of air and other arms may be far more
spectacular than the mingling of all arms in this war." But in any
event, service functions would always be
necessary. What was needed was "a clean-cut division of
responsibility but nevertheless one which will not unduly prejudice
freedom of action in the future."
Somervell discussed several ways
of meeting the existing situation and pointed out advantages and
disadvantages of each possible course of action. A return to the pre-March
1942 organization, he felt, was impractical. One solution was to place the
AAF in the same relation to the Service Forces as the Ground Forces. This
meant that supply and service activities at air bases would be performed
by station complements under the command of the ASR If all airfields were
thus made comparable to installations used by the AGF, the Air Forces
could devote its time entirely to its tactical mission and a single
standard of supply and service activity would obtain in the zone of
interior. On the other hand, this action would place certain restrictions
on the freedom of the Air Forces, although the Ground Forces had not found
such restrictions a vital disadvantage.
Another alternative was to make
the Air Forces completely self-contained with its own separate service
force consisting of medical, engineer, ordnance, and other components
responsible only to the chief of the Air Forces. Such an arrangement would
provide the advantage of complete independence for the AAF which would
thereafter be only vaguely tied into the War Department at the top
echelon. The disadvantage would be the creation of two separate
organizations within the War Department with resulting waste of personnel,
equipment, and facilities. It would also mean the end of the conception of
the
[164]
ASF as a common supply and
service agency for the War Department as a whole and would place a larger
co-ordinating burden upon the Chief of Staff.
A fourth possibility was to
return to the original conception of the reorganization as defined by Army
Regulations 170-10, 10 August 1942, which made the post commander at Air
Forces installations responsible to the commanding general of the service
command for specified service and supply activities. This would avoid
duplication of organization and supervisory personnel in the War
Department but would mean that the Air Forces post commander would have
two channels of command and would probably lead to the same objections
which the Air Forces had raised ever since 1942. Finally, if the ASF were
abolished, the chiefs of technical services could supervise their
activities throughout the Air Forces, but the Chief of Staff would again
find himself with the large overhead organization which he had found so
burdensome before.
General Somervell pointed out
other possibilities, but thought they had too many drawbacks. The most
clean-cut decision, he believed, would be either to place the Air Forces
in the same relation to the Service Forces as the Ground Forces or to
establish a completely self-contained air force. The next best solution
was to revert to the original arrangement decided upon in 1942. He asked
General Marshall to settle the issue.
Somervell brought up this problem
at a time when the War Department was studying the idea of a single
department of national defense and when the General Staff wanted to avoid
jurisdictional flare-ups.19 On 26 October 1944 General Marshall took up
this perplexing problem by means of a memorandum to the commanding generals of the AAF, the
AGF, and the ASK The Chief of Staff doubted "the advisability of
initiating any substantial organizational changes at the present
time." The entire question of War Department and Army organization
would have to be considered at the end of the war when the comments of
overseas commanders would carry great weight. If the War Department was to
obtain acceptance of the idea of a single department of national defense
it would first have to demonstrate within the Army a satisfactory relation
of service agencies to the combat forces.
The Chief of Staff then asked
the commanding generals of the three commands to resolve among themselves
"the over-all question of service and supply functions and
responsibilities and their relation to command." He hoped that they
would be able to settle minor differences which might arise from time to
time without appealing to him for a decision. Where differences could not
be resolved, they should be presented to him as issues for decision. He
then requested a statement giving the combined views of the three generals
on how common supply, and service activities should operate.20
General Arnold of the AAF, Lt.
Gen. Ben Lear, commanding the AGF at the time, and General Somervell, held
a series of meetings in an effort to reach an agreement about the role of
the Service Forces. Toward the end of November 1944 they
[165]
sent General Marshall a
report.21 The three generals recognized that unity of purpose within
the Army and a satisfactory relation of service to combat forces were
indispensable prerequisites to obtaining a single department of national
defense. Nevertheless they found it impossible to reconcile their
differences.
General Arnold held that the
basic mission of his command was to dominate the air and that to
accomplish this overriding purpose, "administrative, supply, and
service functions related to maintenance of air superiority" had to
be integrated under his control. The intercession of a service command in
these fields created "fatal divided responsibility."
General Lear of the Ground Forces
and Somervell, on the other hand, looked at the War Department mission
from an Army-wide point of view rather than that of a single command. A
supply and service organization should "promote the maximum combat
effectiveness . . . of the Army as a whole, as distinguished from that of
an individual component," such as the Air Forces. A single agency to
provide supplies and render common services was in the interest of
economy. The relations between the Ground and Service Forces and between
the Air and Service Forces should be uniform. Combat forces ought to
devote themselves to training and combat and perform only those functions
which are organic to their combat mission. All other service and supply
responsibilities should be left to a common service agency.
The opposing views on details
were presented to the Chief of Staff in parallel columns, one column
stating the views of Ground and Service Forces, the other of the Air
Forces. 22
The case for the Air Forces seemed to lie in the oft repeated phrase "peculiar to the
AAF." Air warfare, according to this approach, had its own special
supply and service problems which were different from those of other
combat forces, and should therefore be administered by the Air Forces. The
ASF, while recognizing certain exceptions, believed that by and large the
supply, administrative, and other service functions of the Air Forces did
not possess inherent characteristics which distinguished them from the
same functions of the Ground Forces.
The Air Forces protested in
particular against a combination of command and staff functions in an
independent service agency. This was an important point of the conflict
and was expressed in Item 8 of the detailed list of differences:
AGF and ASF are of the opinion
that . . .
8. ASF should act as the staff
agency of the Chief of Staff and the Under Secretary of War for supply and
service activities throughout the entire Army; i.e., there should be only
one Surgeon General who should act as The Surgeon General of the Army.
AAF is of the opinion that
8. The AAF believes that all of
the activities of the ASF should be subject to general policies laid down
by the General Staff as now constituted, that the requirements of the
combat forces should be determined and adjudicated by a General Staff in
no respect subject to one of the major commands, and further that many staff
functions now performed for the Army by ASF should be restored to General
Staff level, ASF to retain necessary operating functions subject to
General Staff direction. The AAF disagrees with
[166]
the view that a service agency
under independent command should act as a staff agency for the Chief of
Staff and the Under Secretary of War for administrative, supply or service
activities.
General Arnold further maintained
that, if the position of the Ground Forces and Service Forces was adopted,
vital functions would be placed under the authority of a service agency
independent of a combat force. A service agency by definition was only a
means of assistance to a combat force. If a combat force did not include
"certain essential functions" under its own control, its
effectiveness would be crippled. Under the conception advanced by the ASF,
the AGF and the AAF would exist as "tenants of the service
agency" without any control of their stations and facilities. This
concept ignored "the obvious fact" that the direction of a great
combat force like the AAF was necessarily the management of a huge
business which could not be farmed out to "an independent
contractor." In the words of General Arnold: "Administrative
control is an essential of command control." He then outlined the
many different functions of the Air Forces and declared that these were
interrelated and indispensable to the tactical mission of the AAF.23
The position of the commanding
general of the Army Air Forces was obviously diametrically opposed to that
of the commanding generals of the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service
Forces. General Arnold saw the management of a combat force in terms of a
widespread control over all of the activities contributing to operational
effectiveness. The other two commanding generals saw the command of a
combat force in terms of maximum possible dependency upon a separate
service force operating behind the front lines overseas and
extensively throughout the United States. There was little hope of
reconciling these different conceptions of command responsibility within
the Army.
General T T. Handy, Deputy Chief
of Staff of the War Department, tried to find a solution to this seemingly
unsolvable conflict. Accompanied by Maj. Gen. C. F. Robinson, director of
the Control Division in Somervell's office, he visited both 'a large post
operated by the ASF where troops of the Army Ground Forces were in
training, and a large training base of the AAF. Upon their return,
Robinson wrote to Handy stating the conclusions which their inspection
trip seemed to justify. As far as internal post and base operations were
concerned, the system in use for supply and services at both seemed to be
functioning satisfactorily. The AAF base had received satisfactory
assistance from ASF agencies. Regardless of War Department organization,
in practice the air base was relying for many services upon service
commands. The AGF-ASF relationship could be applied, with minor
modifications, to an air base without much difficulty.
General Robinson argued that the
major difficulty in existing organization for supply and service
activities did not "lie at the post level but in higher
echelons." The AGF-ASF system provided for supervision of these
activities through a single geographical organization, which he believed
was the more effective and efficient method. Under the AAF system,
supervision of service activities was divided among a number of different
tactical commands, resulting in "unnecessary duplication" and
uneconomical "use of
[167]
personnel." Finally, under a
dual system of supervision as at present, the
chiefs of technical services could not adequately supervise the supply and
service activities for which they had technical responsibility. 24
On 28 December 1944 General Handy
transmitted a memorandum to all three commanding generals outlining the
principles which were to govern relationships between their
commands.25
First, the War Department General Staff was the
"overall policy and co-ordinating staff for the War Department and
the Army," while the three commands were primarily "operating
agencies." Second, military personnel of the three major commands
should receive "equal consideration and enjoy equivalent
facilities." Third, commanders should concentrate upon their
"primary responsibilities" and delegate "to a common supply
service such duties as are not essential to their exercise of the command
prerogative." The common supply service was to emphasize service, not
command. Fourth, a supply service organization was essential for
procurement and "wholesale" distribution of common articles of
Army supply and for common administrative service. The fifth principle
recognized a twilight zone in which the wishes of the commander would
govern. For example, there was no question but that procurement of common
articles of clothing was a responsibility of the Army Service Forces;
there was no question but that the procurement of aircraft was a function
of the Army Air Forces. But the procurement and distribution of high
altitude flying clothing was in the indeterminate area and therefore the
wishes of the Army Air Forces would
govern.
The essence of the position of
the Deputy Chief of Staff was summarized in his final point that "no
major change in present procedures and organization is contemplated."
The AAF retained command control over all but a relatively few
responsibilities performed at its air bases. The ASF, through its service
commands, still exercised supervision of Army exchanges, disbursement
offices, and hospitals at air bases. In effect the December 1944 decision
reaffirmed the status quo.
But the difficulties between the
AAF and the ASF continued even after they had been supposedly settled by a
War Department circular.26 When a change was ordered there were
controversies over interpretation and procedure. Agreements between the
two commands became increasingly difficult to achieve.
The attack of the Air Forces on
the so-called Somervell empire not only had the effect of removing some
supply, service, and administrative functions from the jurisdiction of the
ASF, but even more damaging, it threatened to undermine the internal
structure of the ASK The reorganization of 1942 brought many technical and
administrative services, previously almost autonomous units of the War
Department, under the command authority of General Somervell. These
technical and administrative services at best tended to be somewhat
restive under ASF juris-
[168]
diction. The AAF attack had the
effect of encouraging internal dissatisfaction. The ASF suffered damage
not only in that some of its functions were assigned elsewhere, but also
in that the chiefs of the technical services gained a greater independence
from ASF headquarters.
For example, in the dispute
between The Surgeon General of the Army and the Air Surgeon, the final
compromise provided that The Surgeon General would forward
"through" the ASF his communications to the Chief of Staff: This
meant that while the Commanding General, ASF, might comment, he could no
longer exercise command authority over all the activities of The Surgeon
General.27
The same type of situation
evolved from the controversy with the Air Forces over the maintenance of
real property and the operation of utilities. ASF internal organization
provided that division engineers, the head of geographic areas within the
United States under the Chief of Engineers, should also serve as a service
command engineer in supervising property repairs and utility operations.
In practice, most division engineers appointed a deputy who was in effect
the engineer in charge of repairs and utility operations of a service
command. While repair and utility funds to Air Forces installations no
longer went from service commands directly to the air base, the Army
Service Forces saw no reason to change its existing organization for
supervising repair and utilities activities. Accordingly, service command
engineers were directed to inspect repair and utility work at Air Forces
installations in the same manner as at other. installations under service
commands. After the change in methods of allotting funds went into effect,
the Army Air Forces objected to this arrangement.
It was opposed to inspection of
its air bases by an individual designated "service command
engineer." It was willing to recognize the authority of the Chief of
Engineers, but objected to service command engineers. On the other hand,
the ASF maintained that its internal inspection organization was something
it should determine for itself; its authority to inspect was specifically
stated in War Department Circular 388; and it already had a large
inspection staff which it proposed to use for inspection at Air Forces
installations.
The dispute went to the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-4, who stated that Circular 388 distinguished between
the command function of the AAF and the service function exercised
by the ASF at Air Forces installations. The service function was defined
to include technical assistance, review, inspection, and supply. G-4
declared: "It is not to the best interest of the War Department to
require a change in the ASF regional organization at this time for service
to Class III [Air Forces] installations."28
This rebuff did not prevent the
AAF from submitting a staff study arguing that War Department Circular 388
was intended to be only temporary in nature. The AAF therefore requested a
transfer of authority from the ASF to the AAF to make all technical
inspections at Class III installations. G-4 replied that it opposed the
"elimination of technical inspections at Class III installations . .
. . It is the policy of the War Department that the chiefs of technical
services, in addition to their other duties, will act as chief technical
advisers to the Chief of Staff and the
[169]
War Department." 29
Thus the
position of chiefs of technical services was reaffirmed, although nothing
was said about the authority of the Commanding General, ASF, as the
superior of these chiefs.
The Deputy Chief of Staff
reiterated this policy. He added that as technical advisers to the Chief
of Staff, chiefs of technical services or their designated representatives
were authorized to make technical inspections at Class I, II, III, and IV
installations,30 to establish budgetary standards for expenditure of
funds. Communications on all matters pertaining to technical activities of
the War Department would be forwarded to the Chief of Staff through the
Commanding General, ASE The statement further provided that the commanding
general might make such additional remarks and recommendations as he
deemed appropriate, but implied that he could not refuse to forward
recommendations of chiefs of technical services.31
The existing inspection system on
repairs and utilities operations was not disturbed. The effort of the Army
Air Forces to escape from supervision by chiefs of technical services or
from service commands was thus forestalled. But at the same time the
authority of the Commanding General, ASF, was weakened by the provision
that chiefs of technical services could prepare recommendations for the
War Department General Staff on which the commanding general could only
comment. Nothing was said about the authority of the Commanding General,
ASF, to prescribe such organizational arrangements as he deemed desirable.
Not only was the supervisory authority of the ASF undermined with respect
to the Engineers; the WDGS took a similar position on the responsibilities
of the Chief Signal Officer.
In fact, on 23 July 1945 the War
Department General Council provided that all the chiefs of technical
services would act as "chief technical advisers to the Chief of Staff
and the War Department." 32
The War Department position was
based on a distinction it drew between technical and service
responsibilities of the chiefs of technical services. Under this
interpretation the technical services would deal directly with the War
Department General Staff on technical matters, while on other matters they
would still be under General Somervell's jurisdiction.
Somervell protested against these
developments vehemently and at length. The distinction between technical
and service activities, he said, was meaningless in practical application.
The changes threatened the stability of the ASF because they challenged
its authority both over its Army-wide supply and service activities and
over its own subordinate units. This tendency, General Somervell charged,
"can only result in three independent self-sufficient commands-each
with its own supply and service functions, each duplicating the
overhead of the other." 33
Somervell then drew up a
statement which clarified the organizational position of the ASE He sought
his authority in the principles of the War Department reorganization of
March 1942, which among other things had affirmed that "the mission
of the Services of Supply is to provide services and supplies to meet
military requirements except those peculiar to the
[170]
AAF," and that "supply
arms and services and War Department offices and agencies will come under
the direct command of the Commanding General, SOS . . . ." Somervell
spelled out specifically what in his mind seemed the proper way in which
these principles ought to be applied to the problems that had since
arisen. He recommended that this statement be sent to the three major
commands, and that it be inserted in the minutes of the War Department
General Council.34
This memorandum and statement by
General Somervell was to prove a final statement of his organizational
thinking about the Army Service Forces. One week after it was sent to the
Chief of Staff, the Japanese Government announced its surrender. World War
II was over. Somervell's proposals were not considered.
The basic problem of the role of
the Army Service Forces in the War Department thus remained unsolved. At
most, Somervell's effort to bring about a solution served only as an
opportunity for a restatement of the opposing points of view.
The ASF insisted on its position
as an Army-wide service agency. Throughout, it adhered to the view that it
was not a coordinate command, but an administrative arm of the War
Department. More than this, it considered itself a planning agency for the
Chief of Staff in the logistics field as well as in various technical
operations.
In support of this broad
conception of its role, the Army Service Forces could point, among other
things, to the fact that it was often called upon to defend decisions on
behalf of the War Department as a whole. For example, in early 1943 it
bore the brunt of the defense for the Army decision, in the face of
manpower stringencies, to raise a force of 8.2 million men.
Again when the Army argued for
national universal service, the ASF carried the burden of the case.
National universal service was intended to provide manpower for industry
and agriculture rather than manpower for the Army itself. Since the ASF
was concerned with the procurement of military supplies, it was perfectly
natural that it should be the best prepared of all War Department agencies
to present the Army argument for such legislation. The ASF also performed
the bulk of the work in preparing the War Department's advocacy of
universal training and for similar matters which transcended the fields of
individual organizations within the War Department.
The basic doctrine of the Army
Ground Forces was defined at the time of the reorganization of the War
Department in 1942. Though occasionally objecting to Somervell's
jurisdictional claims, the AGF was a consistent supporter of the need for
an Army Service Forces as a common War Department supply and
administrative agency.
The Army Air Forces did not share
this view. Its hostility to the ASF position transcended specific issues,
but stemmed rather from its basic desire for complete separation from the
other major components of the Army. In view of this attitude, efforts
toward a better understanding were well-nigh hopeless. At one time,
Somervell and his immediate advisers thought relations might improve if
the AAF would place a high-ranking officer in ASF headquarters to serve as
liaison on post management, which would be an arrangement similar to that
in force on purchasing matters. General Arnold agreed and on 19 August
1943 named a liaison officer with
[171]
Headquarters, ASF 35
Other AAF
liaison officers were stationed in the headquarters of each service
commander. But this arrangement brought no real improvement in relations
between the .ASF and the AAF.
It was necessary for the ASF to
reaffirm its role constantly in order to maintain its position in the War
Department as originally intended. The alternative was to devise some new
type of organization. The wartime solution to problems were
compromises which outwardly preserved most of the original structure and
functions of the ASK But the opposition encountered by the ASF in the
effort to meet its responsibilities reflected subsurface currents of
thinking within the Army which, if allowed to develop to their logical
conclusion, threatened to undermine the whole theory of an Army-wide
service agency.
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Page Created June 13th 2001
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