- Chapter IV:
Strategy and Supply: Early
Phases
The most important strategic decision
of World War II was that which made Germany and the Axis in Europe, rather than
Japan in the Pacific, the number one enemy. This decision was tentatively made
prior to Pearl Harbor and it is evident that supply considerations were less
important than other factors in the determination.1
The attack on Pearl Harbor and the
repeated setbacks of the Allied powers in the Pacific severely jolted this
tentative agreement between the United States and Great Britain. In addition to
the problem of how to get at Germany, the United States now had to reckon with
the difficulty of containing the Japanese. When the Army Service Forces came
into existence in March 1942, the War Department was already at work on studies
of strategy, utilizing the United Kingdom as a major base. President Roosevelt
and Prime Minister Churchill soon endorsed this idea as a basis of combined
planning.
As the war progressed, the wisdom of
the decision, from a logistic point of view, was shown again and again. General
Eisenhower, as head of the War Plans Division, reported to General Marshall that
"logistic reasons . . . substantiate the soundness of the decision to
concentrate against the European Axis." 2
Great Britain proved an ideal overseas base for the preparation of future military
operations. True, it was separated at the narrowest point by a mere twenty miles
of water from land dominated by the Germans. The ports and great cities of
England were ever subject to the menace of air attack. On the other hand, the
supremacy of the Royal Air Force over the Germans in the skies above Britain
itself had already been demonstrated. The American Army, in building up its own
military forces to participate in an offensive against the Axis, could look
forward with some assurance to the use of the British ports, the British rail
network, and the many other facilities of
[57]
a highly industrialized nation. Then
too, since the British Isles would have to be made secure in any case, the
troops assembled there would serve a double purpose: they would be a defense
force for the United Kingdom as well as an eventual offensive army for a
cross-Channel invasion.
The fact that the trip across the
Atlantic was so much shorter than that across the Pacific, and the fact that
most of our port and rail facilities were located on the east coast added even
more to the desirability of making Great Britain the major overseas base for our
military operations. It took only half as long in 1942 for a ship to carry a
load of supplies from the Atlantic seaboard to a British port and return to the
United States as it did to carry supplies from the Pacific coast to New Guinea
or Australia. Furthermore, not only were our most highly developed ports on the
Atlantic coast, but our industrial resources were concentrated in the
northeastern part of the United States; and our own rail network was oriented to
the movement of goods within this area. The bottlenecks on the transcontinental
railways and the congestion of Pacific ports, particularly in the first half of
1945 when supply attention began to concentrate upon the Pacific, helped
demonstrate the soundness of the original military plans.
As already noted, by March 1942 the
strategy of continental invasion from the British Isles was already taking
shape. As approved in mid-April by the two governments, this strategy envisaged
both the assembly of ground forces for an eventual cross-Channel operation and
the launching of an aerial offensive from United Kingdom bases sometime in 1942.
By contrast, the Pacific area, except for the Southwest Pacific, was a Navy
"show," and the Navy,
rather than the Army, ultimately assumed the basic responsibility.3
The Army Service Forces was a zone of
interior command. Its commander had no direct authority overseas. Yet the basic
aim of the ASF was the support of overseas operations. The final test of the
supply system was the theater of operations; the measure of ASF success was the
effectiveness of its supplies and services in helping combat troops win battles.
The need for close ties between the zone of interior and the overseas theaters
therefore was obvious. One of the means adopted to strengthen these ties was by
sending key people on his staff to overseas areas, and on occasion General
Somervell himself became a globetrotting troubleshooter.
As commanding general of a large and
complex organization, Somervell necessarily personified the supply activities of
the Army. He had to represent the command as a whole to the Chief of Staff and
to officials outside the War Department. He was the spokesman for his associates
in stating what was logistically feasible and what was not. Within his command,
General Somervell had to give his personal attention to the major difficulties
which arose. In both capacities, as representative of the Army Service Forces in
its external relationships and as a final arbiter of matters within the
organization, he naturally depended on numerous associates for assistance and
advice. To focus attention upon the commanding general's personal participation
in the activities of overseas
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supply, therefore, serves the useful
purpose of simplifying a consideration of the more important problems which
confronted the ASE
Support of BOLERO (the build-up of
troops and supplies in Great Britain for the cross-Channel operation) early
became the most important single supply job of the ASF. To look into
preparations for this operation, Somervell, accompanied by Lutes, his chief
planner, made his first overseas inspection trip. He was primarily interested in
the extent to which British port, rail, and storage facilities could be made
available for the build-up of American military strength. He also wanted
firsthand information on the numerous organizational problems involved in
setting up a new supply command in the United Kingdom and getting it under way.
Somervell and Lutes returned to the
United States with a greater awareness of the tremendous job facing the supply
command in England, and with the strengthened conviction that not enough supply
troops were being made available to Maj. Gen. John C. H. Lee, an Engineer
officer who soon was to head the Services of Supply in the United Kingdom.
Somervell had first protested the inadequate number of supply troops in the Army
troop plans while still G-4. At the time, no service troops had been included
above the level of a field army. On the basis of his staff estimates, Somervell
urged the addition of 625,000 service troops in General Staff plans. Since the
size of the Army for 1942 had already been fixed by the President, General
Marshall was reluctant to press for such a large increase. Here the matter
rested until June 1942. Then Somervell and
Lutes, impelled by their observations in England, pressed their case with
renewed conviction. The War Department General Staff authorized about one third
of the ASF recommendation. The necessary training program was started at once,
but the time was too short to provide the fully trained troops needed to mount
and support the North African invasion of November.4
The problem of supply troops for
overseas military operations remained a perplexing issue throughout World War
II. The Army Ground Forces, naturally enough, pressed constantly for more combat
troops and pointedly criticized the large number of men needed for rear area
duties. The General Staff was inclined to agree with the Ground Forces. Yet if
Army commanders and their troops were to have all the supplies they needed,
someone had to discharge, sort, transport, and issue what they demanded. General
Somervell was convinced that overseas commanders seldom had enough service troop
units to do an efficient supply and distribution job. Events were to
substantiate this conviction on numerous occasions.5
In the spring of 1942, Somervell also
hack to begin worrying about the transportation capabilities of the United
States. With the assistance of Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross, his chief
transportation adviser, Somervell went to work on the problem. Its solution
involved many agencies. New ship construction was the province of the U.S.
Maritime Commission; utilization of American ship resources was the
responsibility of the War Shipping Administration; use of British vessels
involved lengthy negotiation with British officials in Wash-
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ington and London; the protection of
convoys was the concern of both the Navy and the Air Forces. With responsibility
thus divided and out of his hands, Somervell could only argue vehemently for
action and more action. This he seldom failed to do at any and every
opportunity. Frequently, shipping problems ended up with a White House
conference where Mr. Harry Hopkins helped to adjust the basic differences.6
In late summer of 1942, Somervell sent
General Lutes to the South and Southwest Pacific Areas with two purposes in
mind. The first was to investigate a shipping jam which had developed in the
harbor of Noumea, New Caledonia. This base was then supporting American
operations on Guadalcanal and a build-up on Espiritu Santo. The second purpose
was to inform General MacArthur in Australia of the secondary supply priority
given his theater and to encourage him to undertake long-range planning of his
supply needs. To MacArthur's fears of a Japanese invasion of the Australian east
coast, Lutes responded that he was certain the Japanese had overextended their
supply facilities and were incapable of mounting an invasion. Although alarmed
by what he felt was an undue lack of concern with his military position in the
Southwest Pacific, MacArthur had no alternative but to plan to make the best
possible use of whatever supply resources the ASF would be able to provide.
Somervell also had Lutes tackle another
problem-that of closer co-operation between the services in matters of-supply.
Lutes succeeded in getting a joint Army-Navy Logistical Staff started under
Admiral William E. Halsey. Also, Admiral Chester Nimitz, after discussing the
desirability of such a staff with Lutes, requested Navy
Department approval of a joint Army-Navy staff, with an Army officer in charge
of logistics. The necessary authority was delayed nearly eight months.7
The planned orderly build-up of a
military base in the British Isles for an assault on the Continent was
interrupted by several developments. Submarines took a large toll of ships and
supplies; the over-all lend-lease program involving the supply of Russia, China,
and other Allies, consumed a large part of American production; and the support
of American outposts became a serious matter. For example, as a result of the
Japanese occupation of the western tip of the Aleutian Islands, defense of
Alaska became urgent, and Somervell in August 1942 made a hasty trip to observe
progress of the Alaska Highway and to discuss the supply aspects of Alaska's
defense. But by far the greatest diversion from the cross-Channel build-up came
as a result of the invasion of North Africa (Operation TORCH.
The outline of the plan was drawn up at
the end of July but the final pattern of a two-coast three-pronged invasion with
one Atlantic and two Mediterranean task forces was not fixed until September.8
The involved nature of the plan, and the shortness of time for preparation
placed a severe strain upon the Army Service Forces.9
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Providing equipment for both the
Western Task Force and the Mediterranean Task Forces was increasingly
troublesome. An added burden in the already complicated supply preparations for
North Africa at this time resulted from the fact that the American forces in
England were unable to provide for their requirements from quantities already
delivered or being delivered to the European Theater of Operations. Most of what
was needed was unquestionably on hand, but so scattered among various newly
set-up depots that its actual location was unknown. There were not enough
service troops on hand to go through all the equipment, find the necessary
items, and deliver them to combat troops within the available time period.
On 8 September 1942 the ASF was given a
long list of essential equipment required by the assault forces sailing for
North Africa from the United Kingdom.10
A total of 131,000 ship tons of cargo was delivered at United Kingdom ports
between 16 and 25 October to be placed on the assault convoys. Another eight
fully loaded cargo ships were sent from the United States to join the convoys as
they left England for the Mediterranean.11
All this meant extra shifts in American plants, express railway shipments on
American railways, and special handling in ports thus adding to the cost, and
waste, of war.
Further complications arose when the
Navy indicated that it could not provide escorts for all the convoys which were
intended to move the initial assault forces. On 27 September 1942, the ASF
informed the commanding general of the ETO that he would have to make a choice:
reduce the size of the Western Task Force from 167,000 men to 100,000 men and
provide the full equipment and reserve supplies for the
entire force, or land the original number of men with only about 50 percent of
their equipment. The second alternative was selected; the chief consequence was
a substantial cut in the number of trucks moved with the landing troops.12
Still another problem of the operation
was the responsibility placed upon the ASF to supply, load, and move the
so-called Western Task Force the assault force which was to land at Casablanca
and other sites on the Atlantic coast of North Africa: Hampton Roads was
selected as the embarkation port loading point. The combat troops had to be
equipped almost completely since such training items as they had were largely
worn out. This was the Army's first experience in large-scale "combat
loading" the loading of men and supplies so that both could be discharged
in the order in which they would be needed once the assault began. Maj. Gen.
George S. Patton's staff had to be initiated in the mysteries of code marking
for out loading, and the delay in completing assault plans prevented a
full-scale rehearsal of loading and disembarking. And at the same time the
loading of men and supplies had to be done in the greatest secrecy. But it was
done, and the troops made their landings on 8 November.13
During the preparations for loading the
Western Task Force, General Somervell invited General Patton to observe a dem-
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onstration of the latest ordnance
equipment, including the new "bazooka." Patton was so much impressed
by the defensive possibilities of the weapon in the hands of infantry troops
that he immediately asked for a large number to be provided his task force.
In fact, General Patton was pleased
with the whole North African supply effort. "The Services of Supply,"
he wrote to Somervell, "performed magnificently . . . . Without your help
this operation could never have started, nor could it have operated successfully
upon its arrival here." 14
The first overseas conference of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff with the President and Prime Minister was held at
Casablanca in January 1943. The President insisted on a small American
delegation. It included General Marshall; General Arnold of the AAF, a member of
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); three officers from the Operations
Division (OPD) of the War Department General Staff; and General Somervell as
supply adviser. Though Somervell lacked a staff to assist him with the
logistical problems which occupied an important place on the conference agenda,
he fortunately was able to press into service two of his former supply officers
then serving on General Eisenhower's staff.
At the conference the Combined Chiefs
of Staff again decided to defer a cross-Channel attack. The American
representatives reluctantly yielded to the British and substituted for a genuine
"second front" the invasion of Sicily, to take place at the conclusion
of the pending Tunisian campaign. The preparations for the operation, as well as
for the Battle of Tunisia, were left in the hand of the theater commander.15
The most important logistical problem
at Casablanca was that of shipping losses due to German submarine and air
action. The ability to support the North African theater and to continue the
preparation for an invasion of the European Continent now depended more than
ever upon the success of antisubmarine measures. Even though new vessels were
being constructed with unprecedented speed, continued loss at the existing rate
would cripple the entire overseas effort. Here was a problem over which supply
officers had no control. General Somervell could only point to the seriousness
of the situation and urge renewed efforts by both the Navy and the Air Forces to
reduce, if not eliminate, the submarine menace. Somervell found his chief
support on antisubmarine measures among the British.
Another important problem was that of
equipping French units for participation in future African and European
operations. General Somervell was asked how much materiel could be made
available to the French, and a program for equipping eleven French divisions was
agreed upon as a general objective. Because of the shipping shortage and
political and manpower uncertainties, this project was given a low priority. 16
At Casablanca the Combined Chiefs of
[62]
Staff also began to consider which of
several possible Allied operations in the Mediterranean area should follow the
occupation of Sicily. An operation in Greece could have been supported as long
as the objectives were strictly limited. Army Service Forces planners pointed
out, however, that only in southern France would the port capacities and the
inland lines of communication permit the buildup of a large force for a decisive
campaign against the Germans. At the same time they warned that as long as the
eventual major cross-Channel operation for which BOLERO was preparing remained
the primary operation against Germany, any other campaign must necessarily
interfere with its accomplishment. With supply factors in mind Somervell
recommended that all available resources after the occupation of Sicily be
devoted to preparation for the cross-Channel invasion, with southern France as
the only subsidiary operation. Against the advisability of an Italian campaign,
the ASF presented the argument that Italy could not be self-supporting in
supplies at any time under an Allied occupation. Large-scale shipments of coal,
food, clothing, and medical supplies would be required for the civilian
population. 17
All of these arguments illustrated the
bearing, of logistical factors upon the determination of strategic objectives.
Somervell did not propose that supply considerations alone should govern wartime
strategy; he did ask that the strategic planners give full and realistic
consideration to the logistical . factors in deciding on possible campaigns. It
was not easy to reconcile political objectives with the military objective of
engaging the enemy on terrain where his forces could be successfully overcome
with the least cost. Somervell constantly pressed for military objectives where
supply superiority could be effectively realized.
Despite such counsel, the Combined
Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of the President and Prime Minister, decided
that an invasion of Italy should follow quickly upon the conclusion of the
Sicilian operation."18
Immediately after the Casablanca
Conference, General Somervell inspected various ports and installations in North
Africa and the Near East. While thus engaged, he learned a dramatic lesson on
the importance of personal contact in determining the most urgent overseas
supply requirements. In Algiers on 25 January, he reported to General Eisenhower
at his headquarters at the Hotel St. George.19
At a meeting that afternoon, with Generals Marshall and Eisenhower attending,
Somervell was informed that the greatest single supply obstacle in the
forthcoming Tunisian campaign was the absence of adequate transportation in
North Africa. There was an urgent need for both truck and rail equipment. The
shortage had in part arisen from the fact that General Eisenhower's forces had
not yet received all the trucks left behind in November. In addition, the
Algerian railways were in a poor state of repair and were inefficiently
operated. Although knowledge of this, situation had been conveyed to them in
general
[63]
terms, few people in the War Department
had realized its seriousness.20
General Somervell at once began to see
what could be done to improve the situation. It developed that if some 5,000
additional 21/2-ton trucks, 100 locomotive engines, and other rolling stock for
the railways could be immediately provided, preparations for the Tunisian
campaign would be greatly accelerated. Somervell assured General Eisenhower that
these items could be shipped from the United States if the Navy would provide
the necessary protection for the cargo ships. At Somervell's suggestion,
Eisenhower asked Admiral Ernest J. King, who had not yet departed from North
Africa, for Navy protection. Admiral King promised the necessary convoy
assistance, whereupon General Somervell sent a direct radio message on 26
January to his own chief of staff in Washington to arrange for immediate
shipment of trucks and railway equipment. Within two and a half weeks, a special
convoy of 21 ships carrying over 200,000 measurement tons of material was on its
way to North Africa. The difficulties involved in making such emergency
shipments prompted General Styer to conclude his response to Somervell's message
with the words: "We will not let you down. However, if you want the
Pentagon Building shipped, please allow more time:" 21
From Algiers, General Somervell went to
Cairo.22
After the great British victory at El Alamein the preceding October, this area
was no longer close to the fighting front. The American supply operation here,
undertaken in the summer of 1942 to assist the British, was now largely
completed. Aside from the need of continued support of the Air Forces still
located in Egypt, the problem now rather was one of cleaning
out American supplies and service troops.
General Somervell went on to visit the
Persian Gulf Service Command, which had begun large-scale unloading of supplies
for the Russians in December 1942. In that desolate area of seasonal torrential
rains, high humidifies, and summer temperatures which reached 125 degrees in the
shade, there was still much to do to prevent the supply lines to the Soviet from
choking up. Any one of more than a dozen factors could (and some temporarily
did) cause supplies to back up at various stations all the way from Soviet
receiving points to the original ports of shipment in North America. A partial
list of potential bottlenecks included inadequacy in any of the following:
ship's gear, dockside equipment such as cranes and fork lifts, berthing space,
labor supply, sorting sheds, dock storage space, trucks, barges, lighters,
railroad track and equipment, and highway facilities. General Somervell
inspected many key points in the area and spoke to a number of people in an
effort to learn at firsthand as much as possible about this complicated
situation.23
General Somervell found even more
difficult problems in the China-Burma-India theater. Upon arriving at Karachi,
he received an urgent message to go at
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once to Delhi to join General' Arnold
and Field Marshal Sir John Dill, both of whom bore messages for Field Marshal
Sir Archibald P. Wavell and Chiang Kai-shek about the decisions of the
Casablanca Conference. Arnold and Dill had flown to Chungking to get the
Generalissimo's consent for an operation in Burma during the 1943-44 dry season.
Somervell was told that increased operations by the Air Forces, accelerated road
building, and the provisioning of the Chinese troops who would participate in
the campaign to open a land route to China-all depended on an enlarged movement
of supplies from Calcutta to Assam. Somervell began to investigate the
transportation situation. at once. He learned that while port facilities at
Calcutta were adequate, the Bengal-Assam railway could not support the projected
needs. He decided that with efficient management, the Assam line of
communications could carry a far greater tonnage than it was then doing. Later,
on his return to the United States, Somervell urged, among other specific
improvements, U.S. Army operation of the heavily-congested meter-gauge portion
of the Bengal-Assam railway, the inauguration of an American barge line on the
Brahmaputra River, and the construction of pipelines from Calcutta to Assam.24
While in India, General Somervell also
visited Assam and rode with Field Marshal Wavell to inspect the construction of
the Ledo Road in northeast Assam. He then traveled south to Imphal on the
Indo-Burmese border and witnessed the launching of a unique type of warfare. The
initial success of this experiment in operating behind the Japanese lines on air
supply, under the leadership of the man who conceived it, Maj. Gen. O. Charles
Wingate of the British Army, helped assure Somervell that the Ledo Road could be
completed and protected from the Japanese and that land communication could be
reopened with China.25
Back in the United States, after a
trip of 32,000 miles, he called
together his principal staff officers to give them instructions based
on the information he had acquired abroad.
Two lengthy memoranda, dictated on 22 February 1943, reveal the problems
which loomed large in the mind of
the ASF at this time. One memorandum was directed to General Lutes, the
supply planner of the ASF, and the
other to Maj. Gen. Lucius D.
Clay, the staff head for all
procurement operations.
In his memorandum to General Lutes,
Somervell made a number of observations and recommendations on several matters.
He expressed the opinion that the Persian Gulf Service Command should be
separated from the Middle East Command, and that the latter's mission should be
redefined in the light of changed circumstances. Since there was some
possibility that if Turkey entered the war in 1943, Allied forces would be moved
into the northeast to support that government, . General Somervell wished to
obtain information from the Operations Division of the WDGS about intentions in
the Near East. He suggested that American service troops should be used to
support American combat units and should not be given a
[65]
general assignment of helping the
British Middle East Command. He asked for a study and recommendation on this
subject. Somervell also mentioned that it might be possible to use the Levant
ports for forwarding supplies to Russia and he asked that the ASF planners
explore this possibility. He called attention to the fact that the supply
officer of the Middle East Command was forming an engineer regiment from
contractors' personnel in the area and from such American citizens as he could
find in Palestine. This would mean necessary replacements and supplies from time
to time.
As a result of his observations in
Algiers, General Somervell expressed the belief that it was "essential that
we have a foolproof method of keeping in touch with developments in North Africa
and those connected with HUSKY." The ammunition situation for HUSKY, the
Sicilian invasion, was of particular concern: "As long as we insist on
reports from Eisenhower rather than his bases," Somervell wrote, "we
should be able to meet requirements." He had discussed the possibility of a
"proper G-4" report with General Eisenhower and asked what had or
should be done on this score. He added that reports alone would not do the job
and proposed that there should be one visit a month by ASF personnel to the
North African theater. Somervell then took up the complaints made to him about
the arrival of troops without individual and organizational equipment. He asked
that General Lutes and the Chief of Transportation, General Gross, iron this
out.
Somervell's next concern, as expressed
in the memorandum, was to make certain that equipment required for HUSKY should
be sent to North Africa as far in advance of the actual movement of troops as
possible. He asked General Lutes to obtain
troop requirements for the operation at once from the OPD of the WDGS, to
calculate the equipment required in tonnages, and to arrange a schedule of
movement with the Chief of Transportation. He did not want it to be said later
that a supply breakdown had interfered with the operation. Somervell also
directed that the automatic supply system for North Africa be checked and that
any imbalances in particular items be rectified.
General Somervell listed three needs of
the Persian Gulf Service Command: food rations for native laborers; accountants
to record the receipt of goods consigned to the Russians; and Military Police
(MP) battalions for traffic control and reduction of pilferage. Not only native
laborers, but some of the soldiers of the American port battalions as well, were
stealing supplies. While the British reluctantly accepted pilferage up to 5
percent of total supplies landed and forwarded, Somervell pointed out that such
a rate meant the loss of one ship out of every twenty. "This is higher than
our losses from the German submarines and cannot be tolerated." It seemed
ridiculous to ship goods. at great sacrifice 15,000 miles and then have them
stolen. Somervell asked Lutes to arrange to ship additional MP personnel to the
Persian Gulf. While some increase in strength was forthcoming, the Persian Gulf
Service Command was never satisfied with its MP allotment, and pilferage
remained to the end an unsolved problem.
Among other items in his memorandum to
General Lutes, Somervell mentioned special rations for flight crews and urged
that the experimental work in-this field be expedited. There was particular need
for smaller cans of fruit juices in hot climates. He also noted that the Air
Forces needed
[66]
additional landing mats in India and
asked that these be supplied.26
In his memorandum to General Clay,
Somervell made a number of observations about lend-lease. He insisted that there
must be "no confusion" about the handling of supplies for the French
troops in North Africa. The shipments should be made promptly and be clearly
indicated for French use. Pointing out that he had been told in North Africa
that the question of importing coal was still unsettled, he instructed General
Clay to make sure that it was clearly understood that all coal would be provided
by the British. Supplies for the Russians should be consigned directly to the
commanding general of the Persian Gulf Service Command, rather than to the
British, in order to prevent any delay in delivering supplies to the Russians.
Lend-lease supplies consigned to the British for distribution to a third party
might be diverted to the British Army, although -the British had promised to
inform the United States of any diversions. Somervell also pointed out that he
had seen large numbers of trucks still standing on the docks at Calcutta. This
led him to order that no supplies should be shipped overseas that were not
immediately needed.
Somervell observed that Brig. Gen.
Raymond A. Wheeler, handling supply operations for General Joseph W. Stilwell in
China-Burma-India, did not have a general purchasing agent and directed that the
officer who had just installed the purchasing system in Australia should now be
sent to India. The purchasing system in North Africa should also be checked.
Somervell recommended that the officer assigned to handle the shipment of
Russian lend-lease supplies should keep well informed about available routes, shipping schedules, stocks of supplies
in the United States, and all other aspects of the operation. He also noted that
American lend-lease representatives abroad seemed to be less well informed than
the British about shipments of lend-lease supplies and requested that this
situation be rectified.27
In May 1943 the TRIDENT Conference of
the Combined Chiefs of Staff was held in Washington. The decision with regard to
the cross-Channel invasion was reaffirmed with a target date of spring 1944, and
the command in the Mediterranean was directed to keep seven divisions available
for transfer to the British Isles. In addition, the cargo shipping requirements
for the build-up were discussed and tentative schedules drawn up. For General
Somervell, however, the most important problem of the conference was future
military operations in China, Burma, and India. The Army Air Forces, at the
urging of Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, desired to step up air operations in
China against Japanese forces. But any such effort meant more supplies from
Calcutta to Assam and over the Hump. At the same time, Somervell, in accord with
General Stilwell, was convinced that expanded air operations, with or without
corresponding ground operations, would be possible only if land communication
with China was restored. He believed that construction of the Ledo Road should
be pushed more vigorously,
[67]
which meant that it would be necessary
to clean the Japanese out of this part of Burma. The chief of the Imperial
General Staff of the British Government insisted that no campaigns could be
fought during the monsoon periods. Relying on his observations, Somervell
expressed doubt about this opinion. The discussion was inconclusive. However,
later experience was to demonstrate that the monsoon was no insuperable
hindrance to determined military operations.28
In the meantime the ASF was giving
current attention to the supply support of the forthcoming invasions of Sicily
and Italy. After the Battle of Tunisia, the North African theater found itself
unable to equip all the troops to be used in the Sicilian invasion. As a result,
one of the major units, the 45th Infantry Division, reinforced, was combat-loaded in the United States and transported directly, with a short stop
along the Algerian coast, to the point of attack on Sicily. In addition, the ASF
had to- provide all replacement equipment and expendable supplies for HUSKY
directly from the United States. Even before the operation began, the ASF
started to ship the supplies which it calculated would be needed to support the
troops in Sicily. The spectacular progress of this invasion without major loss
of equipment left large excess stocks of materiel on hand, both in North Africa
and Sicily. The ASF exerted unremitting pressure in the months following to have
these residual supplies sorted out, repaired where needed, and reissued for
later military campaigns in the Mediterranean.29
As the time for the invasion of Italy
grew nearer, the Army Service Forces was once again called upon to ship supplies
directly to the Salerno beachhead and later to Naples for the support of
military operations. It was easier to find the supplies in the United States and
ship them directly to Italy than it was to find the same supplies in Sicily or
North Africa and move them across the Mediterranean.
Both manpower and supply limitations
prevented the concentration of a decisive force on the Italian peninsula, even
had the terrain permitted military operations on a large scale. In the meantime,
heavy shipments continued to be necessary in preparation for the cross-Channel
operation which had not been abandoned. There were still minimum supply needs to
be met in the Pacific. By the spring of 1944, some troops had to be removed from
the Mediterranean theater in preparation for the cross-Channel operation.
BOLERO had envisaged the massing of
over a million troops in Great Britain by the spring of 1943. ASF logistical
planners from the outset were doubtful whether so large a force, with all its
necessary supplies, could be transported and discharged in such a short period
of time. British ports did not have sufficient reserve capacity to handle a
sudden influx of large proportion, and the British manpower situation was too
tight to permit any large diversion of labor to construct depots and camps in a
two or three months period. Moreover, there was some British and American
shipping capacity which would be underutilized during the summer and autumn of
1942 if BOLERO were concentrated in the early months of 1943.
[68]
Accordingly, ASF planners suggested
that at least the supply build-up should proceed steadily throughout 1942, thus
avoiding the prospect of so large a shipping peak in 1943. The major drawback to
this plan was the inadequate number and poor training of American service troops
in Britain who were to care for supplies shipped well in advance of their actual
need.30
The ASF pressed its plan nonetheless, although it was behind schedule by August
1942 when the North African campaign intervened. But it was not long before the
build-up for the cross-Channel operation had to be suspended temporarily while
supply attention was focused on the new theater.
In the spring of 1943 the BOLERO
program was revived, looking to a European invasion in 1944. The ASF suggested
once more that the port capacity of the United Kingdom might be utilized more
efficiently by the shipment of military material in advance of troops. The
situation in brief was this: the combat troops to be provided by the United
States for the cross-Channel invasion; because of their training schedules,
could not be moved from the United States until late in 1943 and early in 1944.
Up to this time it had been customary to move troop units and their equipment at
approximately the same time from the United States to an overseas base. If this
practice were continued throughout 1943 and early 1944, the port capacity of the
United Kingdom would not be fully utilized during most of the summer and autumn
of 1943; after that time the pressure of discharging men and supplies in the
United Kingdom would create unmanageable congestion. Accordingly, the ASF wanted
to begin to ship supplies to England in advance of troops. The commanding
general of American forces in England at this time, Lt. Gen. Frank W. Andrews,
seconded this recommendation, observing that under existing arrangements,
equipment was arriving as much as 80 to 100 days after the troops for whom
intended.
The War Department General Staff gave
approval in principle to the "pre-shipment" recommendations of the ASF
in March 1943. Detailed plans and procedures were drawn up in May. Of the total
supplies shipped to the United Kingdom between January 1943 and September 1944,
about 26 percent represented material thus shipped in advance of troops. In the
month of November 1943 alone, 54 percent of the cargo unloaded in the United
Kingdom was equipment for troops scheduled for later arrival.31
The Japanese march southward in the
Pacific was not halted until the summer of 1942 when, after the naval victories
of the Coral Sea and Midway, Allied forces were able to undertake
limited offensives against the Japanese in the lower Solomon Islands and New
Guinea. These critical and bitterly contested campaigns came to a successful
conclusion in the early months of 1943 when the Japanese advance was stopped.
Thereafter, one by one, different operations in the Central Pacific, the South
Pacific, and the Southwest Pacific began to drive the Japanese steadily back
toward their home lands.32
[69]
The supply problems of tie Pacific were
tremendous. The whole area was dependent on shipping not only for delivery of
supplies from the United States but also for their distribution within the three
Pacific theaters. Since there was an acute shortage of shipping, with first
priority given to operations in North Africa and Europe, a relatively small
amount of cargo lift was available to the Pacific. Even these ships could not be
used effectively in the South and Southwest Pacific because of the almost
complete absence of adequate base and ports facilities, and because the average
turnaround time that had to be allowed for shipments to these two theaters was
half again as long as that for European cargo movements. The lack of storage
facilities at terminal points in the Pacific contributed to serious port
congestion at a number of key bases.33
During the summer of 1942 the ASF began
long-range planning for the support of the Pacific campaigns. Equipment for
amphibious warfare and operations in difficult jungle terrain had to be produced
and delivered in great quantities. Special methods of packaging had to be
devised to protect supplies from the effects of the tropical climate.
Warehousing, harbor, and other equipment for the establishment of bases at key
forward points, had to be assembled and shipped. The need for an extensive
communications network covering thousands of miles had to be met. Above all,
logistical plans had to be carefully co-ordinated with the Navy and a program of
joint supply to the Pacific theaters developed.34
The build-up of supplies in the Pacific
continued slowly, while preparations were being made for a new kind of strategy.
The occupation of key points, the construction of
airfields for defense and eventual assault, the build-up of port facilities for
later operations to seize other key points, domination of the seas, and steady
advance toward the Philippines and to Japan itself, where the enemy might be
decisively engaged-these became the key elements of Pacific strategy. Supply
support was crucial to these efforts. In the last half of 1943, the offensive in
the Pacific began to get under way. The ASF worked continually with the Navy in
the preparation of arrangements for logistical support.
In August 1943 the Combined Chiefs of
Staff met once more, this time in Quebec. The most important single supply issue
discussed was the division of shipping resources between the Atlantic and
Pacific theaters. The British were eager to obtain more tanks in North Africa
for use in the forthcoming invasion of Italy. Since United States Army and Navy
officials usually agreed among themselves before such a conference on the
allocation of shipping for the two theaters, there was little disposition to
accede to British requests.
At the conference General Somervell
[70]
pushed his recommendation for American
operation of the Bengal Assam railway. At the same time, the two governments
decided to enlarge the airlift of supplies across the Hump as well as to hasten
the construction of the Ledo Road. Somervell had sent General Styer to the area
in July 1943, and Styer's report on Ledo Road progress strengthened Somervell's
disposition to push construction of the overland route to China .35
Along with Gen. Sir Thomas
Riddell-Webster, his counterpart in the British War Office, Somervell submitted
to the QUADRANT Conference a joint memorandum on supply routes in northeast
India. This paper emphasized the urgent need for opening an overland route to
China at the earliest possible date. The Assam line of communications as then
set up was expected to haul no more than 102,000 tons a month, including
petroleum products by 1 November 1943. This quantity would be sufficient only to
provide minimum maintenance of essential ground and air forces in the area and
about 10,000 tons a month for delivery to China. An additional 118; 000 tons a
month could be realized when . the overland route was opened. Accordingly, the
memorandum recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve in principle
the use of a ground supply route to China from Assam through Burma and that a
directive be issued with the target dates as set forth in the memorandum for
increasing the capacity of the Assam line of communications. The memorandum said
further that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed to provide the
special personnel, equipment, and supplies to construct and operate the road
from Ledo to Kunming, and also, to make available the personnel to achieve
the increased tonnage for the Assam line
of communications. 36
The Combined Chiefs of Staff referred
the question of rehabilitation of occupied and liberated territories to an ad
hoc committee made up of General Riddell-Webster, General Somervell, and Rear
Adm. O. C. Badger. The committee's problem was to determine the basic policy
with regard to such territories, and to agree on a division of responsibility
between the United Kingdom and the United States in providing supplies for
initial phases of relief and rehabilitation of reoccupied countries. The
committee's report recognized that minimum economic relief would be necessary
during the period of military operations and for some time thereafter until
civilian administration could be restored. The paper also pointed out that since
the War Department used military priorities for securing civilian supplies, it
was necessary that this procurement be limited to basic food, medical supplies,
fuel, and other items essential for the preservation of civilian well-being
during military operations. It was not the Army's task to provide a more
generous standard of assistance or to promote rehabilitation.37
The Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted
the recommendations of Somervell and Riddell-Webster. But the increased supply
operations of the Assam line of communications depended upon steps taken in
India, and some of the recommendations, such as American Army operation of part
[71]
of the Bengal-Assam railroad, had to
have the prior approval of the Indian Government. Somervell planned to go
personally to India in an effort to speed up the supply program approved at
Quebec.
When the QUADRANT Conference of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff came to an end,
Allied forces were ready to increase the tempo of military operations all over
the world. American production was now providing the means on an increasingly
large scale.
[72]
Page Created June 13th 2001
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