- Chapter V:
Strategy and Supply: Final Phases
As soon as the QUADRANT Conference was
concluded, General Somervell and a number of his staff officers departed on an
extended trip to the Pacific theater, returning to the United States by way of
India and the Mediterranean. He was eager for an on-the-spot survey of
conditions in the Pacific, and for another look at how things were progressing
in some of the theaters that he had visited earlier in the year. Both General
Marshall and Admiral King sent letters to Army and Navy commanders in the
Pacific informing them of General Somervell's trip and requesting full
assistance to the party in its effort to obtain information on supply problems.
Somervell took with him General Clay,
ASF director of materiel, General Gross, Chief of Transportation, General C. F.
Robinson, director of the Control Division, and two of General Lutes' principal
assistants. At the last minute Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Echols, the director of
materiel for the Army Air Forces, and two of his assistants were included in the
party. Careful preparations were made for the trip. Each technical service was
asked to submit questions about matters on which it would like to be informed.
On the basis of their responses and known problems, a detailed questionnaire was
prepared before the group left the United States, and each member
of the party was assigned certain questions to which he was to secure answers. 1
The group, left Washington on 7
September 1943, on a trip that was to cover 42,188 miles in 231 hours of flying
time.2
As on General Somervell's earlier trip in 1943, a list of immediate supply needs
uncovered during the course of the inspection was radioed to the United States
for prompt action. In informal letters to General Marshall, written from various
points throughout the journey, Somervell commented in a general way on some of
the more serious conditions that he had come across. In letters to the ASF chief
of staff, General Styer, he added more detailed information.
The first stop was Hawaii, where he met
Under Secretary of War Patterson, who, with General Lutes, was on his way back
to Washington after a visit to the Pacific theaters .3
Here Somervell was primarily
[73]
interested in learning about the
progress of joint Army-Navy supply planning for offensive operations. At the
moment, the Central Pacific theater was moving from defensive into offensive
operations. The attack on the Gilbert Islands was projected for November. The
change in mission meant new supply demands for which the ASF must be fully
prepared. This joint Army-Navy supply planning staff had finally been approved
and an Army officer placed in charge-Maj. Gen. Edmond H. Leavey, who had been
recommended for Admiral Nimitz' staff by Somervell. General Leavey's task was to
plan joint Army-Navy supply operations in the Central Pacific. There was a good
deal of disagreement about how this should be done. The eventual solution worked
out was that there should be a formal agreement in advance of each operation,
specifying just what supply and service activities would be provided
individually by the Army and the Navy for the use of both. Somervell spent a
good deal of time conferring with the Army commander, General Richardson, on
joint supply as well as other problems.
From Hawaii General Somervell and his
party traveled to the South Pacific theater, then commanded by Admiral Halsey.
At this time the campaign in the Solomons was moving toward an end. In July
landings had been made at New Georgia. Munda airfield had been captured on 5
August. The immediate problem for the theater was one of consolidating positions
and preparing for advances toward the North in conjunction with the Central
Pacific theater.
From Port Moresby, New Guinea, on 27
September, Somervell wrote General Marshall in detail about his observations. He
mentioned that he had talked with all of
the division commanders in the South Pacific. He expressed his belief that the
Army people had done an impressive job in spite of being low on the supply
priority list. His only criticism was a feeling that they had not been
sufficiently aggressive in making demands upon the resources of the War
Department. General Somervell expressed concern that nonessential construction
was being undertaken at many rear bases. He felt that forward bases should be
selected in advance and that construction in all rear areas should be limited to
essential requirements. He also urged that service units be moved in closely
upon the heels of the combat troops and that rear areas be cleaned out as soon
as they no longer were needed to support immediate and projected combat areas.
Indeed, the problem of "mopping up the rear" became a continuing
concern of General Somervell's from this time on. Many supplies were being
unnecessarily stock-piled and wasted in rear areas, and service troops were
needlessly spending much energy on the care of supplies for which there no
longer was a need in the area. This situation had arisen because those
responsible for logistical planning in the Pacific areas believed the local
buildup of supply was necessary for the conduct of military operations.
Somervell and his staff persuaded them that such operations could more
efficiently be supported by direct shipment from west coast ports in the United
States.
Much of Somervell's letter to General
Marshall dealt with the problem of rotation of troops and the incidence of
malaria. Better sanitation discipline had improved the situation, but General
Somervell nonetheless urged the War Department to review the problem of rotation
and to formulate some policy on it before
[74]
the spring of 1944. The remainder of
the letter dealt with lack of enough service troops in the South Pacific. Combat
troops were being extensively used to unload supplies and to perform other
service duties. General Somervell stated that division commanders were properly
concerned about the need for additional medical, engineer, quartermaster, and
transportation units. He recommended that the theater commander be given
authority to form provisional service units or to break up and reassign existing
service units. "It should be realized, in connection with the need for
service troops in this area, that the Army is really fighting two battles: one
against the enemy and the other against the jungle." The islands of the
South Pacific lacked roads, water supply, and docks. The Japanese had made no
particular effort to remedy these shortcomings, while the Americans were molding
the jungle to their own type of operation, an undertaking which was a major
factor in American success.4
From the Solomons and the Central
Pacific theater, General Somervell and his party moved to the Southwest Pacific.
The fighting here was on New Guinea, with Allied troops based on Australia. Just
before his arrival, Lae had been captured and the attack upon Finschhafen
launched by the U.S. Army, while Australian troops had succeeded in an overland
advance upon Salamaua. Preparations were going forward for a series of
"leap frog" operations along the New Guinea coast in preparation for
the attack on the Philippines nearly a year later. Here, too, commanders, with
an insufficient number of service troops for the job, were struggling both to
build bases for future operations and to move supplies forward for current
needs.
In Australia Somervell had a long talk
with General MacArthur. The general wished to have a more definite idea
regarding what supply resources he could expect in the next year to support his
advance toward the Philippines. Somervell did his best to provide at least some
satisfaction on this score.
From Australia, General Somervell and
his party flew across the Indian Ocean to Ceylon and then to New Delhi to confer
with Admiral Mountbatten, who had been appointed Supreme Commander of the
South-East Asia theater at the Quebec Conference. Lord Mountbatten requested
that General Wheeler, who had been supply commander under General Stilwell,
should now be made his deputy. This was done and General Somervell had to
recommend a new American supply commander.5
In India Somervell had two definite
tasks to accomplish; both were major reasons for his overseas trip at this time.
The first was to impress upon the supply organization in India the importance of
the Quebec decisions to increase the flow of supplies into Burma and India. The
second was to press personally his offer to the Indian Government of American
troops to operate the Assam railroad, an offer which the Indian Government
seemed hesitant to accept. Lord Mountbatten's intervention helped to persuade
the government to turn the railroad over to American operation. Somervell also
endeavored to encourage all commanders along the Assam line of communications to
new efforts, from the unloading zone in Calcutta to
[75]
the advanced depots in Assam. Both the
pipeline construction and the operation of the barge line on the
Brahmaputra also needed additional pushing. At the same time, Somervell
acquired further firsthand acquaintance with some of the problems of Army
operations in India: problems which he identified as difficult terrain, limited
transportation facilities, an Indian bureaucracy which feared change and blocked
efficiency, a clash of strong personalities, and a record of vacillation which
he suspected was unequaled in any other theater of operations.
In New Delhi General Somervell also
encountered an unexpected problem, one scarcely within the scope of his
responsibility.6
T. V Soong, then Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed Somervell that
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would have nothing more to do with General
Stilwell and would demand his relief when Somervell arrived in Chungking. The
news upset Somervell very much. Lord Mountbatten was likewise greatly disturbed
by this information. Having just assumed command in Southeast Asia, Mountbatten
was reluctant to have so drastic a change. On the other hand, he feared that if
he became a partisan of Stilwell, he would bring down the wrath of the
Generalissimo upon himself and jeopardize the position of his command. Also, if
the Generalissimo's attitude remained one of unalloyed hostility to General
Stilwell, he expressed himself as believing it would be better to have a change
immediately rather than in the middle of projected military operations. General
Somervell immediately sent a radio message, through British channels (the only
ones available), informing General Marshall about the situation.
General Somervell arrived in Chungking
on the afternoon of 15 October. He immediately arranged to see Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek the following morning. Officially, General Somervell was no more
than an American Army officer visiting the Chinese wartime capital to inquire
into supply matters for approved Burma operations. He had come with no letters
of introduction from either the President of the United States or the Chief of
Staff. Yet General Somervell was regarded as something more than a mere military
messenger or investigator. And he himself never doubted that, confronted with
top command bickering, he should do all he possibly could while on the scene to
adjust the difficulties. General Somervell was not the kind of person to plead
either non jurisdiction or embarrassment.
On the morning of 16 October, Somervell
paid a courtesy call on the Generalissimo during which he was informed that
Stilwell was no longer persona grata to him. General Somervell could do no more
than express astonishment and concern and ask to confer with the Generalissimo
at greater length later. Upon his return to his quarters, Somervell got in touch
with General Stilwell and informed him about what had taken place. He told
Stilwell that he planned to request Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to reconsider
his demand the following day and asked for arguments with which to arm himself.
In addition, General Somervell found unexpected support from within the Chinese
military
[76]
itself. Both the War Minister and the
officer who had been present at Somervell's conference with the Generalissimo
expressed their disagreement with Chiang Kai-shek's action and promised that
they would attempt to talk with him.
The next day Somervell officially
requested Chiang Kai-shek to reconsider his demand for General Stilwell's
relief. He pointed out the unfortunate effect which such action would have on
American public opinion. He emphasized America's determination to continue to
help the Chinese, but at the same time, implied that Chinese-American
differences might result in a reconsideration of American policy. He stressed
the importance of forthcoming operations intended to open a new land route to
China and hinted that General Stilwell's departure might delay the
re-establishment of land communication. He added that there was no senior
officer in the American Army with the personal background, the command of the
Chinese language, and the other qualifications which General Stilwell possessed
for his present assignment. Somervell left with at least the promise that the
Generalissimo would reconsider the matter. At noon this same day and far into
the afternoon, the Generalissimo conferred with Lord Mountbatten, who had
arrived to discuss his new. command.
In the meantime, Madame Chiang Kai-shek
sent for General Stilwell and arranged for the Generalissimo to see him. That
evening the Chinese War Minister, General Ho Ying-chin, gave a party for Lord
Mountbatten. In the middle of the evening General Ho departed for a conference
with Chiang Kai-shek. When he returned, he told Somervell that the Generalissimo
would reverse his position at another interview which he would grant
the following day. Somervell then
sought out General Stilwell and, told him what he had just learned. Stilwell
himself had just returned from seeing Chiang Kai-shek. He reported that the
Generalissimo had asked him if he had any complaint to make about Chinese
pledges and performances. To this General Stilwell had replied in the negative,
going on to say that he himself had probably made a great many mistakes and
that, if he had, they were not intentional but were the result of the fact that
he did not fully understand Chinese psychology. This had apparently mollified
the Chinese leader.
The next day, Chiang Kai-shek informed
Somervell that General Stilwell had fully satisfied him about his objections.
These objections appeared to Somervell to consist primarily of alleged petty
slights to the Chinese and charges of arrogance. From his conversation,
Somervell understood the Generalissimo to desire certain conditions which
Stilwell should observe, but these were left for future adjustment. For the time
being the controversy about General Stilwell's position was settled.7
Part of the hostility to Stilwell
seemed to arise from inside the Chinese official family. Indeed it was General
Somervell's distinct impression that T V Soong himself had done much to stir up
difficulty and had probably urged Chiang Kai-shek to demand Stilwell's relief.
On the other hand, Stilwell was frequently less than diplomatic in his
expression of opinion about Chinese officials. But Somervell felt that General
Stilwell had by no means exhausted his usefulness in China. More
[77]
than this, Somervell received a radio
message from General Styer, while in Chungking, which suggested that if Stilwell
were relieved, he, Somervell, would be appointed to take his place. He was
ordered not to leave the area until he heard from General Marshall.8
Though Somervell had twice asked General Marshall for an overseas command, he
had no desire to relieve Stilwell. The mere prospect of such a change gave him
an added incentive to arrange an amicable settlement which would keep Stilwell
in his position. The result of his efforts was that the climax to irreconcilable
conflict between Chiang Kai-shek and General Stilwell was postponed until a year
later, when Stilwell was finally recalled.
While Somervell's mediation of the
Stilwell-Chiang Kai-shek controversy had little to do with supply problems
directly, this episode was to have far-reaching repercussions for the Army
Service Forces. Somervell had displayed again his characteristic initiative and
drive in handling a difficult situation. The controversy had been settled much
to General Marshall's satisfaction. At the very time when certain newspapers
were attacking Somervell because of his plans for internal reorganization of the
ASF, he himself succeeded in handling a delicate mission with finesse and
without the benefit of instructions from above. There is reason to believe that
the episode made a very favorable impression upon General Marshall, just as it
had on Secretary Stimson, and that from this time on Somervell's position in
Marshall's estimation was secure.9
This meant too that the Army Service Forces was to endure throughout World War
II, no matter what hostile criticism might gather around it.
A minor problem which confronted
General Somervell in Chungking was
disagreement about the boundaries of the Southeast Asia Command. Lord
Mountbatten wished to include Thailand and Indochina in the area of his military
operations. Chiang Kai-shek was opposed, saying in part that if such action was
taken it would be interpreted throughout Asia as a reassertion of British
imperialism. In joint discussions, Chiang Kai-shek, Lord Mountbatten, and
Somervell found a satisfactory solution. For the time being, no change would be
made in the boundaries of the China theater of which the Generalissimo was
supreme commander. When Lord Mountbatten was ready for active operations in the
area, the boundary lines would be adjusted.10
While in China, Somervell received a
radio message from General Marshall stating that President Roosevelt was
disturbed by the inefficiency of the airlift operation over the Hump. Evidently,
part of the trouble lay in the morale of the personnel.11
Somervell explored the situation as carefully as he could under the pressure of
time and discussed it with Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer and General Wheeler.
He reported to Marshall that the causes of inefficiency were weather.
conditions, lack of runways, the distrust
[78]
felt by the men for the untried C-46
planes, lack of spare parts, poor organization, inexperienced personnel, and bad
management. As a result of a shakeup in officer personnel, accompanied by
recommendations for demotions, and through the introduction of various measures
to improve conditions and morale, a marked increase in tonnages carried was soon
to take place.12
From India, Somervell flew on to the
Persian Gulf Service Command. There had been unfavorable reports about this
command-drunkenness among the troops, poor discipline as compared with the
Russians, an unhealthy attitude of men toward their officers, and other
discouraging information. Somervell on personal inspection found conditions more
satisfactory than these reports indicated. American operation of the Iranian
railroad to Tehran was proceeding well and road travel had been greatly
improved. New port facilities were largely installed and the command was pushing
supplies in steadily increasing volume up the Persian Corridor for delivery to
the Russians. Somervell was particularly pleased with the high tonnages moved
and with the excellent relations with the Russians. Very shortly after his
return to the United States, he passed on to Marshall a scribbled note from the
American Ambassador to the USSR, W. Averell Harriman, commending the "great
job in getting on a frank and friendly basis with Russians in Iran." 13
In November 1943 the Combined Chiefs of
Staff met in Cairo for their fifth conference since Pearl Harbor. A conference
so soon after the August meeting in Quebec
was unexpected and produced some suspicions among Americans that the
cross-Channel invasion was once more to be questioned by the British. "The
1ogistic problem was whether we could retain OVERLORD In all its integrity and,
at the same time, keep the Mediterranean ablaze." 14
But the build-up in England was now well under way, and the discussions at Cairo
once more affirmed OVERLORD.
The conference was interrupted by a
trip to Tehran where President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal
Stalin came together for the first time. At Tehran, General Marshall asked for a
plan for an attack on the south of France. Somervell had such a combined
strategic and logistics plan with him, one prepared by his own supply planners,
along with plans for other hypothetical operations. Generals Marshall and Handy
used Somervell's plan in the discussions with both the British and the Russians.
The strategy decided upon was to launch
OVERLORD in May 1944, in conjunction with a supporting operation in the south of
France on the largest scale permitted by the landing craft available at that
time. Projected operations in Southeast Asia were accordingly reduced
[79]
in scope. Marshal Stalin's insistence
on a second front, coupled with the hope that Russia would go to war against
Japan once Germany was defeated, were decisive factors in the formulation of
this plan.15
From Tehran, the Combined Chiefs of Staff returned to Cairo to resume their own
meeting.
As far as Somervell was concerned, the
high spot of the Cairo-Tehran Conferences was the decision to launch an invasion
of southern France timed to coincide with OVERLORD. Somervell had pressed for
such a commitment because he was convinced of its strategic soundness and
because he was very anxious to make the best available use of the supplies which
had been accumulated in the Mediterranean. At Tehran Somervell learned directly
from Marshal Stalin that he was generally satisfied with the work of the Persian
Gulf Service Command in delivering supplies to the Russians. This was of course
welcome news. When possible, during the Cairo Conference of the Combined Chiefs
of Staff, Somervell reminded the strategic planners of the supply needs of
MacArthur's theater.
Before returning to Cairo, Somervell
dispatched General Lutes to North Africa and India. Some complaints had been
voiced about supply support of the American Fifth Army in Italy. Lutes found
that the major shortages in Italy resulted from faulty manifesting of cargoes
shipped out of Oran. Thus the difficulty was not ASF performance in the United
States but supply work in the theater. It was vital for the ASF to know this. In
India Lutes followed up the arrangements made by Somervell for increasing the
supply capacity of the Assam line of communications. He recommended that one
supply officer be replaced, a move which was promptly carried out. He also found that the
absence of an adequate priority system over the Hump was creating supply
conflict between air and ground units in China. By the time he left this
situation had been corrected.
Throughout the first half of 1944,
General Somervell's main worry was the preparations for OVERLORD. There must be
no repetition of the unfortunate experience in England in the summer of 1942
when supplies could not be used for the North African invasion because they
could not be unearthed in British warehouses. The United States had long been
advocating the cross-Channel invasion. It would be the largest Allied military
operation of World War II and the first time in the war that the full might of
American manpower and mat6riel would be thrown against the enemy. None of the
preparations for North Africa, Sicily, Italy, or the Pacific was an adequate
guide to the present undertaking.
Early in April therefore, General Lutes
was sent to England to review the logistical preparations for the Normandy
invasion. General Lee, the SOS commander in the theater, quite naturally was not
happy about this apparent overseeing of his operations.16
While Lutes found the theater supply situation satisfactory in general, he also
noted that it contained grave weaknesses which boded ill for the future. He
advised General Lee to strengthen his staff organization, to establish a
definite program of advance plan-
[80]
ning, to improve the methods for
computing supply needs, to institute better stock control, to expedite the
delivery of critical supply items, and to develop better relations with General
Eisenhower's headquarters. Lutes explained to Somervell that he had not taken up
all these matters with General Eisenhower because Lee was Somervell's nominee;
in Lutes' eyes loyalty to Somervell demanded that he refrain from "exciting
Eisenhower on any deficiencies." 17
Moreover, General Lutes believed that
in spite of weaknesses, it was too late to make serious staff changes. He
contented himself with plugging loopholes. When he was ready to leave he
informed General Eisenhower that the assault forces were sufficiently equipped,
that plans for maintenance up to forty-one days after landing were satisfactory,
that new plans would probably insure supplies up to ninety days, and that while
Lee's staff was "not the tops," it was "learning" and there
was time to remedy weaknesses.18
In April 1944 Somervell invited the key
supply officers of the European theater to bring a statement of their
last-minute needs to the United States in person on 1 May. A series of
conferences was held in Somervell's office, in which technical service chiefs
met with their ETO counterparts and discussed both the existing supply situation
and the manner of meeting the inevitable problems that would arise. By 15 May
the European supply officers had returned to the United Kingdom, and the ASF was
sending the last-minute cargoes overseas. By the first of June, General
Somervell felt that he had done practically everything within his power to
insure against a . supply failure in the Army's greatest military operation in
American history.19
At the end of the first week in August
1944, General Somervell accompanied Under Secretary Patterson on a trip of more
than 14,000 miles to North Africa, Italy, and the French areas under Allied
control.
One of the early stops was at the port
of Naples which was found to be bristling with activity, and congested. Here
they met and talked to Marshal Tito, leader of the Yugoslav resistance movement.
The Germans in that area were pictured as being on a "front window"
basis-everything in front and almost nothing behind. After inspecting various
installations in the vicinity of Naples, the group went on to Rome, observing
battlefields along the way.
The Under Secretary had taken more than
a casual interest in the preparations for the invasion of southern France, now
scheduled for 15 August. Following a brief visit to the fighting front in Italy,
which had moved north of Rome to the valley of the Arno River, the Under
Secretary and the commanding general of the ASF crossed to Corsica to watch the
launching of the invasion of southern France. Prime Minister Churchill, who was
also on hand for the event, invited the two Americans to accompany him to watch
the actual landings. Then, a day or two later,
[81]
Mr. Patterson and General Somervell
sailed for the French coast in an American destroyer and landed on the
beachhead. Somervell took great pride in the way in which the supply operation
was being handled by Generals Larkin and Wilson and in the strategic success
which the entire campaign was achieving. Though the date of the operation had
been postponed because of a shortage of landing craft, the campaign when
launched was highly successful. Indeed throughout the whole winter of 1944-45,
the supply system up the Rhone Valley helped reduce the supply pressures in
western and northern France and the Low Countries. Once again, supply planning
had had a direct effect upon military operations.
The Under Secretary's party then flew
to England for a short stay. On 21 and 22 August they visited the U.S. forces in
France which had broken through enemy resistance at St. Lo and were racing for
the German border, putting General Eisenhower's supply organization to a supreme
test. While Somervell was gratified to see that the rear areas were not
seriously clogged, he saw great potential danger in relying long on the beaches
to handle all the supplies required to maintain the offensive. Only by getting
ports into full operation before the arrival of the autumnal storms could a
steady and sufficient flow of supplies be assured.20
On 27 August Somervell was once more
back in the United States, greatly concerned about two situations. The rapidity
with which the Germans were driven out of France had brought a great wave of
optimism in the United States and a conviction that the war in Europe would be
over within a month. Having just seen Allied forces stalled in northern Italy,
and suspecting that the Siegfried Line would prove
a greater barrier than popularly believed, General Somervell was worried about
the prevailing optimism. He feared that it might have the effect of slowing down
the output of munitions in the United States. 21
In the second place, Somervell was gravely concerned about supply in the
European theater. General Patton had been halted in front of Metz and Verdun by
enemy resistance and by overextended supply lines. There was still no port with
adequate facilities for unloading supplies from England and the United States.
The Germans held the Breton ports and there was little prospect of using
Bordeaux. Drastic action of some sort was needed. The original plans for the
invasion of France had called for the prompt capture of the French western
ports, especially Cherbourg, and, if possible, Brest, in order to provide
unloading capacity for continued support of military operations. Thereafter,
additional troops and supplies were to be shipped to them directly from the
United States to strengthen the invasion operation. Estimates of the equipment
needed for reconstruction of the ports were submitted to the Army Service Forces
in the summer of 1943, and the supplies were in England before the actual
assault upon the Normandy beaches on 6 June 1944. But execution of these plans
was hampered by the delay of the Allied forces in breaking out of the Normandy
peninsula, the slowness in restoring the port of Cherbourg, and the failure of
our forces to capture any other Atlantic port on the coast of France.
The progress of the antisubmarine cam-
[82]
paign in the Atlantic by the end of
1943 had led the ASF to recommend a reduction in the supplies stored temporarily
in England for the use of the invasion forces in France. Thus, in the period
between 6 June and 30 September 1944, one million long tons of supplies and
equipment were discharged in France directly from the United States, while
another 1.7 million long tons were transshipped from the United Kingdom. But in
September when the Allied forces pushed all the way to the German border, more
than half of all supplies sent to France were still being discharged over the
Normandy beaches. Ships were crowded in the English Channel awaiting discharge.22
Shipping schedules were being disrupted by these delays, and military operations
were being stymied by the slowness with which supplies reached the front lines.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff met again
in September 1944 at Quebec. With the end of the war against the Nazis seemingly
so close at hand, the most important single issue confronting President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill was the occupation policy for Germany.
Somervell's interest still centered on shipping capacities, and on the
arrangements for shifting Allied military weight to the Pacific. Great Britain,
with the postwar world in mind, was deeply concerned about supply and
lend-lease, and Churchill was willing to make many concessions on other matters
in order to bolster Britain's future economic position. General Somervell, who
had always been opposed to the idea of letting England calculate future
political and economic advantages as part of its war plans, favored a policy by
which all lend-lease materials left after the defeat of Germany and not used
against Japan would be returned to the United
States. His point of view did not prevail .23
Disagreement between the British and
Americans about inventories of petroleum supplies in Europe was evident at
Quebec, but this difference was finally settled after some negotiations in
November. In essence, the problem was one of the amount of petroleum reserves to
be maintained in the United Kingdom. The British wanted to hold on to these
reserves and to supply operational needs in France from other sources, largely
American. On the other hand, there were few facilities on the Continent in which
to store petroleum reserves. In the end, a single inventory level was agreed
upon for both England and the Continent. As storage facilities were provided in
France, the share of the reserves carried there would go up. Even so, the
inventory level was high enough to permit maintenance of sizable petroleum
supplies in the United Kingdom.24
Shortly after the second Quebec
Conference, General Somervell again sent General Lutes to the European Theater
of Operations to see what could be done to improve the situation there. By this
time it was apparent that there would be no quick victory against the Germans in
western Europe. Enemy withdrawal to the German border had shortened their supply
lines and greatly extended our
[83]
own. The stiff defense of Aachen, which
was reduced only after a heavy siege, revealed the quality of opposition which
the Germans could still offer. To cope with the situation, General Eisenhower
now wanted more ammunition and more big guns.25
As General Lutes analyzed the supply
crisis in October and November, he came to the conclusion that the greatest
single difficulty arose from the absence of an adequate system of supporting
depots. From the time of the invasion until early August, the beaches and ports
in Normandy served both as base depots and as depots issuing directly to units
in the field. When the break-through came, the supply organization had no choice
but to haul supplies all the way from the Normandy dumps to the combat troops.
There was neither time nor personnel for moving supplies to intermediate or
advance depots where they could be sorted and then issued to the combat commands
only a short distance away. 26
The famous Red Ball Express and other devices simply hauled the most urgently
needed supplies, especially food, gasoline, and ammunition, all the way from
Normandy to the French border for immediate pickup by supply units of the combat
commands. Sometimes, when certain specific replacement supplies were needed,
combat supply troops went all the way back to Normandy to find what they wanted.
With the front lines stabilized in September, General Lutes joined with the
staff of the Communications Zone in arranging a program for building up advance
depots close to the combat zone. This meant that the combat commands would look
to the advance depots for all their supply needs, while the advance depots would
in turn be assured of a constant flow from Normandy.27
The inadequate depot situation on land
was matched by a serious breakdown in ship
discharge. The ASF earlier had consented to selective discharge, which resulted
in ships becoming "floating warehouses." This consent had been
reluctantly given to the theater and with the understanding that it was to be a
temporary expedient. But more and more throughout August and September, ships
remained tied up in Channel waters still fully or partially loaded, upsetting
the whole world-wide shipping program.
Another problem was direct shipment.
While the ASF was willing to ship supplies directly to France from the United
States to support the large numbers of additional troops which were sent to the
Continent after 15 August, it was not prepared to meet all Allied supply needs
solely from the United States. General Somervell was convinced, for instance,
that much of the ammunition which Eisenhower's headquarters was now
requisitioning was actually on hand in England.28
ETO supply officers were so harassed in trying to get mat6riel from the Normandy
peninsula to the German border that they had practically forgotten about the
supplies which remained in England.
In October General Somervell decided to
send General Clay to Europe to look into these vexing matters.29
In a memorandum to General Clay upon the eve of
[84]
his departure, Somervell specified two
subjects for his primary consideration. One was the ammunition situation,
particularly the possibility of unearthing an unused ammunition supply in
England. The second was the delay in discharging ships. In the first fifteen
days of October, the European theater had indicated that it would be able to
unload seventy-five ships, whereas actually it had discharged but fifteen .30
General Clay gave special attention to the reconstruction of the port of
Cherbourg in order to increase discharge capacity and speed the turnaround of
vessels. Somervell then sent his chief of transportation, General Gross, to
France in November to check on shipping problems.31
A big step toward the solution of the transportation logjam proved to be the
acquisition of the port of Antwerp, which fortunately had fallen almost intact
into Allied hands in September. The Germans had withdrawn so precipitately that
they had had no opportunity to destroy the extensive facilities of one of the
largest ports in northwestern Europe. The enemy still controlled the estuary of
the Scheidt, however, so no Allied shipping could gain access to the port. Not
until November, after General Eisenhower had brought the urgency of the
situation directly to Field Marshal Montgomery's attention, did the 21st Army
Group succeed in clearing the way to the port. But the opening of Antwerp alone
was not enough. Twenty-seven piers were of little use unless ships were
discharged promptly and the supplies quickly moved from portside to distribution
depots beyond the port area. At the end of November both General Lutes and
General Gross were pressing for prompt release of ships from Antwerp piers. Some
of the officers on General Lee's Communications Zone staff believed supplies
should be held in Antwerp until the
Rhine was crossed before the setting-up of sorting and distribution depots.
Lutes insisted upon immediate action.
In the middle of December General
Somervell himself once more went to France, this time upon the direct personal
insistence of Under Secretary Patterson, who was concerned about the capacity of
the supply organization to meet the needs of the winter offensive.32
General Somervell arrived just about
the time the Germans launched their big counteroffensive in the Ardennes. The
immediate problem of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, was to
halt it. With the passing of the initial crisis, attention once more was
directed to reorganizing the supply needs of the theater. After careful
consideration Somervell embodied his recommendations in a memorandum for General
Lee which was personally approved by Eisenhower. One proposal was to consolidate
the supply organization in northern France and southern France. Up to this time,
the southern line of communication, based upon Marseilles, had continued its
separate operation in support of the 6th Army Group under Lt. Gen. Jacob L.
Devers. Between the two ports of Antwerp and Marseilles, Somervell felt that the
combined supply needs of General Eisenhower could be adequately met. The
Communications Zone of the European theater now took over the southern France
supply organization, with Maj. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin, the commanding general of
the latter becoming chief of staff under Gen-
[85]
eral Lee. Somervell also recommended
several steps to strengthen the staff of the Communications Zone of the ETO. For
example, he urged the creation of a Control Division in the Communications Zone
headquarters, and sent General Robinson from Washington to organize the unit.
The confusion that had developed in the
supply system in the theater had led several field commanders to look upon the
system as at best mediocre. This led to a movement for the reorganization of the
Communications Zone command and staff which General Lutes seemed to favor.
General Eisenhower, although aware of the existing conditions, hesitated to
relieve a lieutenant general unless it became necessary to avoid a complete
breakdown. There was no such clear-cut breakdown the best way to put it,
according to General Lutes after he talked with Eisenhower, was "that the
machine does not move smoothly, but it does run." 33
In January 1945 General Somervell went
to Marseilles to join General Marshall. They spent a few days at Cap d'Antibes
reviewing the situation in the European theater. Somervell reported on his own
activities and gave assurances that the supply should now be adequate to meet
the needs of the planned operations.34
From southern France, General Somervell
accompanied the Chief of Staff to Malta for a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff: The main supply problems that came under consideration dealt with steps
necessary for the successful conclusion of the campaign in the Pacific.35
General Somervell was called upon to present the Combined Chiefs with timetables
and estimates of the volume of supplies
available for the war against Japan. Also an agreement was reached with the
British whereby the Americans would have Bremen as a port to supply our
occupation forces in Germany.36
From Malta, Somervell accompanied the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, the President, and the Prime Minister to Yalta for the
second conference with the Russians. Once again, political problems were of
primary importance, but also discussed as incidental matters were problems of
supply and of cargo shipping.37
In the meantime, events were proceeding
rapidly in the Pacific. By the summer of 1944 the Central Pacific forces under
Admiral Nimitz had reached Saipan and Guam. In the Southwest Pacific, General
MacArthur had reached the northwest tip of New Guinea and was poised for an
attack upon the island of Morotai in September.
One of the most interesting episodes in
ASF supply planning occurred about this time. Among the different Pacific
studies started by the ASF in 1942, there was one
[86]
which looked forward to the eventual
recapture of the Philippines. These studies were based on an assumption that the
island of Mindanao would be occupied first and used as a base of operations for
an assault on Luzon. 38
It was on this strategic concept that ASF procurement and distribution plans and
operations for the Pacific had been undertaken. All previous planning had to be
reconsidered when, at the SEXTANT Conference in November 1943, the Combined
Chiefs of Staff suggested dropping plans for an attack on Luzon alone in favor
of an operation against Luzon, Formosa, and the China coast. This they believed
would open the way for an earlier attack on the Japanese home islands.39
It soon became apparent however that a simultaneous operation of this sort
presented great difficulties and unjustified risks, and so no final decision was
made on strategy to be followed in defeating Japan.
In May 1944 the Joint Strategic Survey
Committee of the JCS considered a proposal for an operation against Formosa
alone. The ASF representative on the joint Logistics Committee (JLC), Maj. Gen.
Walter A. Wood, Jr., supported instead the plan for a Philippine campaign as
more feasible than a direct attack on Formosa. Although Formosa was farther to
the north than the Island of Luzon and somewhat closer to Japan itself, it was a
great distance from any of the existing or planned supply bases in the Pacific.
In addition, Formosa as a base would place U.S. forces in constant danger of
both aerial and naval attack, particularly if the Philippines remained in
Japanese hands. Formosan ports were small and might easily be blocked. Luzon, on
the other hand, not only was a much larger island which might more easily be
defended, but it had larger
airfield capacity, a better road network, and the great harbor of Manila Bay.
Moreover, the friendly Philippine population could be counted upon to do much of
the work in developing airfields and supply facilities for the later assault
upon the home islands of Japan itself.40
Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs of Staff
asked MacArthur to plan for an invasion of Luzon with a target date of 15
February 1945, while Admiral Nimitz was to prepare a plan for the attack on
Formosa with the same target date. Neither plan was definitely approved at the
time.41
The ASF representative on the JLC continued to press his argument that the
supply aspects of a Formosa operation made it definitely inferior to the
Philippines as an objective. While a decision was pending, the ASF pushed its
own supply preparations for an operation based on the seizure of the
Philippines.
A decision was eventually forced by
circumstances. The sequence of dramatic events has been told by General Marshall
in his final report. The JCS on 13 September 1944, were meeting with the British
at the OCTAGON Conference in Quebec when they received a copy of a communication
from Admiral Halsey to Admiral Nimitz. As a result of his naval operations in
and around the Philippines, Admiral Halsey recommended that projected operations
against Mindanao and other islands to the south should be canceled, and that
American forces occupy Leyte in the central
[87]
Philippines as rapidly as possible. On
this same day, Admiral Nimitz informed the JCS that he could place certain
forces, then loading in Hawaii, at General MacArthur's disposal. MacArthur's
views were requested by the JCS. Two days later he advised them that he would be
able to land on Leyte on 20 October. This message from General MacArthur arrived
at Quebec when the four members of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were
being entertained at a formal dinner. Within ninety minutes of the time that the
message was received, orders were issued to Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur
to abandon the previously approved intermediary landings, and to carry out the
Leyte operation on 20 October. MacArthur's acknowledgement of his new
instructions reached General Marshall while tie was returning to his quarters
from the dinner. 42
After the successful occupation of
Leyte, the JCS, in October 1944, ordered the seizure of Luzon, an operation
which began in January 1945. The continued support of General MacArthur's
operations by the new overwhelming naval power in the Pacific made his land
achievements possible. In the meantime, the Navy, with the Tenth Army under its
command, began the Okinawa campaign on 1 April 1945.
After his return from Yalta, General
Somervell was preoccupied with a twofold problem: the demobilization of part of
the Army after the defeat of Germany, and the transfer of another part of the
Army and its supplies from Europe to the Pacific. Even though Luzon was not
entirely in American hands until April 1945, plans had already been made to use
the island as the principal base for the attack on the Japanese home islands.
Added to Somervell's concern over the immediate ASF performance of redeployment
and demobilization were his apprehensions regarding the quality of the supply
job to be done in the Philippines.
Tentative supply plans for the
operations against Japan were proposed as early as December 1944. These plans in
turn were used by General MacArthur's command as a guide in its own planning.
The target date for the first operation, an attack on the southernmost island of
Kyushu, depended upon the redeployment of troops from Europe and the assembly of
the necessary shipping. The main island of Honshu was to be attacked four months
later.43
In April 1945, Somervell sent General
Styer to the Philippines to observe the preparations that were being made in
building up the great base for future military operations.44
General Styer, shortly after his arrival, sent word back that MacArthur wished
him to become the supply commander for future operations. Somervell was happy to
release General Styer, believing that he would bring to the task an intimate
knowledge of the difficulties which had been encountered in Europe as well as a
complete understanding of ASF thinking about supply organization and operation.
Here seemed to be the solution to the problem of maintaining close working
relationships between an overseas supply command and the ASF in the United
States.
General Styer returned to the United
[88]
States in May and made arrangements to
take back with him many of the key officers of the ASE But when he got back to
the Pacific, the command which awaited him was not the one he had originally
accepted. Instead of becoming supply commander for all of the Army in the
Pacific, he was appointed Commanding General, Army Forces, Western Pacific, with
headquarters in Manila. Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., commanding at Hawaii
since 1943, had become the commander of Army Forces, Middle Pacific in mid1944.
Both were subordinate to General MacArthur as Commander in Chief. Styer's
responsibilities included supply installations in the Philippine Islands. But
all combat troops in the area were also under .his command until their departure
for the scene of the actual invasion. The basic planning and control of supply
operations as a whole remained in MacArthur's own headquarters. Thus General
Somervell's hopes for a unified supply command of high efficiency throughout the
entire Pacific area were not realized.45
When the war ended in Europe in May,
transportation within the United States became, the redeployment bottleneck
which the ASF had anticipated. At first General Somervell and General Gross; the
Chief of Transportation, had opposed the idea of- returning to the United States
troop units destined for use in the Pacific. Their opposition was based upon the
logistical factors in the situation. It would take more ships to move men across
the Atlantic to the United States and then from the west coast across the
Pacific, than to move them directly from Europe to Pacific bases by way of
either the Suez or the Panama Canals. Moreover, railroad transportation within
the United States was scarcely adequate to handle the load.
Transcontinental rail facilities were
limited, as was the capacity of west coast ports. But ASF objections were
overruled by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War on the grounds of
soldier morale. They decided that the men who had served in Europe were entitled
to a brief visit in the United States before being shipped to the Pacific.46
In compliance with this decision,
Somervell pressed the Office of Defense Transportation (ODT) for more and more
restrictions on civilian travel by rail. Many Pullman cars previously had been
made available to the Army, but were now, for the first time during the war,
removed from all civilian passenger runs of less than four hundred miles. Other
restrictions on civilian traffic were under consideration but never had to be
introduced.47
In July 1945 General Somervell returned
to Europe to attend the Potsdam Conference. The problems under discussion
involved only a few matters of direct concern to him. He was deeply worried
about the disposition of the vast stores of military supplies in Europe, but a
large part of these was scheduled for shipment
[89]
directly to the Pacific area or to the
United States for repair before subsequent military use.48
While the Potsdam Conference was in
session, word came that the atomic bomb had been successfully tested in New
Mexico. The development of this new weapon had been one of the tasks of the ASE
Somervell shared the general satisfaction brought about by the knowledge that
this great effort had not been in vain. It seemed likely that the war in the
Pacific might be over earlier than expected.
After the Potsdam Conference, General
Somervell began an extensive tour of the facilities being used for sending
American soldiers back home. He was especially concerned that the unfortunate
experience at the end of World War I should not be repeated. At that time
American soldiers had been moved rapidly into the vicinity of Brest only to camp
under tents in the mud for weeks, and even months, awaiting transportation home.
This time troops were to be moved into the port area only as ships were
available to return them to the United States. Great recreational and
educational programs were already under way to keep soldiers occupied.49 The
American troops, scattered all over France, the Low Countries, and western
Germany, were gradually being concentrated in a few locations. The vast amount
of supplies to be inventoried, cared for, and either shipped to the United
States or moved into Germany for the occupation forces, gave American soldiers a
good deal to do. It looked as if redeployment and demobilization would proceed
on an orderly basis.
General Somervell returned to the
United States the first week in August. The first atomic bomb was dropped upon
Hiroshima on 5 August and the second was dropped upon Nagasaki three days
later. On the morning of 14 August the Japanese decided to surrender. The war
was over. But the job of the ASF was far from finished. There were contracts to
cancel, surplus property to be identified and disposed of, troops to be brought
home and discharged, and the transition from a wartime to a peacetime military
command to be arranged. Many of the problems accompanying demobilization had
been anticipated and detailed plans had been prepared. The job now was to carry
them out.
The Persian Gulf Command was altogether
a supply operation. Until September 1942, American responsibilities in the area
were in the field of construction and assembly of motor vehicles and aircraft.
By directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in that month, the mission was
extended to the field of transport. Soon thereafter; American troops began to
arrive in Iran to take over the operation of port facilities and the state
railway, and to establish an auxiliary motor transport system. New docks and
warehouses and new plane and truck assembly plants had to be constructed. Rail
transport was augmented by improving the highways and organizing a motor
transport service.
Eventually, nearly 30,000 supply troops of various kinds were
located in the command. During the period of active Anglo-American transport
operations (1942-45) more than 5.1 million long tons of cargo
[90]
moved through the Persian Corridor en
route to Russia.50
Except for the activities of the Air
Forces, including the later operations of the Twentieth Bomber Command from
Chinese bases, Army duties in China, Burma, and India also were largely of a
supply nature. In order to keep China actively engaged in the war, it was
essential to keep up a steady flow of military supply to her armies. The only
available avenue of communication after .the summer of 1942 was by air over the
Himalaya Mountains from Assam in northeast India. But airlift could scarcely
deliver heavy construction equipment, machinery, tanks, and artillery in sizable
quantities for Chinese troops. Therefore the opening of an overland line of
communications was indispensable to success. The primary task assigned to the
China-Burma-India theater in 1942 and 1943 was to increase the airlift over the
Hump and to begin the construction of a new land route into China, the so-called
Ledo Road. This could be completed only with the successful elimination of the
Japanese from North Burma. But military operations largely depended upon the
rate of construction of the road. In the autumn of 1943, when the airlift
operation was being expanded, the American Army organized a combat team,
popularly known as Merrill's Marauders, to assist Chinese, British and Indian
forces opening the way for the construction of the road. Air operations in
support of ground attack also played a major role. Eventually, the combined Ledo
and Burma Roads, renamed the Stilwell Road, were reopened in January 1945. A
pipeline to Kunming, China, was completed by July.
Necessarily the ASF maintained close
contact at all times with the military activity in India, Burma, and China.
Although it was never possible to undertake large-scale efforts here when the
main military force was employed against Germany, almost no part of the world
presented more challenging supply difficulties than Southeast Asia.
Immediately after the American naval
victory of Midway in 1942, Japanese troops landed and occupied three westerly
islands at the end of the Aleutian chain of Alaska. The elimination of these
Japanese forces was entrusted to the Western Defense Command in the United
States supported by the Alaskan Department. Only a few military supplies of a
special kind could be provided by the ASF for this undertaking. American forces
landed at Attu Island on 11 May 1943, and annihilated the Japanese by 31 May.
When forces landed on Kiska on 15 August, they found that the Japanese had
evacuated the island. For the ASF, this campaign demonstrated two lessons: the
importance of protective clothing and materials in harsh climates, and the
importance of service troops in bringing an amphibious campaign to a successful
conclusion.
The variety of matters which directly
or indirectly affected supply factors in World War II are evident from this
cursory review of military events. Yet at the time, because of the pressure of
circumstances, the importance of these factors was sometimes overlooked. The
Army Service Forces constantly reminded operational planners of the vital
interrelationship between strategy and supply. And it was this interrelationship
which defined the role of the Army Service Forces in the strategic planning of
World War II.
[91]
On 9 March 1945 General Somervell told
a group of some three hundred key officers of the ASF that this war, more than
any other, had demonstrated the importance of supply. "The difference in
supply superiority and in mobility between the Germans and the Americans is the
contribution that we in the Army Service Forces are making to this war." 51
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Page Created June 13th 2001
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