Chapter VIII: 
The Army Air Forces and the ASF
The War Department reorganization of 9 March 1942 also produced numerous organizational difficulties between the Army Service Forces and the Army Air Forces. The air arm of the Army had finally achieved an autonomous position within the Department. But it still felt the need to gain "adequate" recognition of air power, and this effort brought about many conflicts over the respective responsibilities of the ASF and the AAF.
The reorganization gave the AAF a special position in the War Department. Not only was it left free to develop its own basic doctrine on combat employment of the air arm, but also its commanding general became the strategic and tactical adviser in the War Department on all Air Forces operations. Second, the AAF was made responsible for the procurement of all equipment "peculiar to the Army Air Forces." In the third place, it was given command of "Army Air Forces stations and bases not assigned to defense commands or theater commanders," though as a final exhortation, the AAF was told to minimize its administrative activities by utilizing the services of the ASK The exhortation was at best a pious wish.1
The difficulties between the ASF and the AAF arose mainly in the fields of procurement and of post management. This second difficulty stemmed from the fact that the AAF exercised command over all Air Forces installations located within the United States, while the Army Ground Forces used posts managed by the ASR The problem here was whether the AAF was to follow practices different from those developed by the ASF, or whether it was to utilize the supervisory services of the ASF to insure the proper management of post operations.
There were other irritations besides these two  major ones. The Army Air Forces objected to the budgetary authority of the ASF and repeatedly proposed that the War Department should have a budget division at the General Staff level .2 Then too the AAF desired to use its own communications system rather than the War Department system built up by the Signal Corps. Eventually the administrative as contrasted with the tactical communications system of the AAF was integrated with that for the War Department generally. Occasionally there were differences over accounting matters, although for the most part the Air Forces kept the type of records required by the Fiscal Director, ASF. These were only the pin pricks in ASF-AAF relations, how-

ever; the real difficulties, as already stated, arose over procurement and post management operations.
Procurement and Supply Relationships
The procurement relations of the Army Service Forces and the Army Air Forces were of two kinds. One relationship arose at the policy level; the other in the actual procurement of various types of materiel. Prior to 9 March 1942 the Air Corps, in a sense, had simply been another supply arm of the War Department, subject, like the others, to the procurement supervision of the Under Secretary of War. After 9 March 1942 the supervisory organization of the Under Secretary was transferred to the staff of the Commanding General, ASF.3 Most of the people who had previously been with the Office of the Under Secretary of War and the G-4 Division of the War Department General Staff were now with the headquarters staff of the Army Service Forces. The ASF was recognized as the principal procurement agency of the War Department. To what extent then was the AAF to follow procurement policies and procedures developed within the ASF? Actually, on a dollar volume basis, the seven technical services of the ASF spent about two thirds of the procurement funds of the War Department and the Army Air Forces about one third. The headquarters staff of the ASF was a supervisory agency setting the procurement policies for the technical services. Somervell thought it desirable that the AAF follow the same standard policies.
The parties concerned resorted to various devices so that the supervisory duties could be performed without lacerating corps consciousness too severely. For example, General Somervell's director of the Purchases Division acted as an ASF officer when dealing with the technical services, but became Director of Purchases for the Under Secretary of War when supervising the Army Air Forces.4 The purchasing policies and the contract provisions developed in the Purchases Division thus applied equally to the AAF and to the technical services of the ASK To facilitate co-operation, the Army Air Forces placed a liaison officer in the Purchases Division to keep in touch with purchasing policies and to clear them with the AAF.
The same type of relationship developed in the field of contract renegotiation. The director of the Renegotiation Division in ASF headquarters was also chairman of the War Department Price Adjustment Board. This officer assigned contract renegotiations to the AAF in the name of the Under Secretary. The AAF filled out the same reports as those filled out by the technical services. The Renegotiation Division kept a War Department-wide record of contract renegotiation. In this field too, then, the same standards, the same procedures, and the same policies, governed the technical services and the Army Air Forces.
Similarly, the Readjustment Division in ASF headquarters developed policies and procedures for contract termination. This division kept a record of the progress made in settlement of terminations and handled policies on the determination of excess property. The AAF followed the Readjustment Division's instructions in the same way that the technical services did.
Just as in the case of the Purchases Division, whenever the Renegotiation Division or the Readjustment Division were dealing with the AAF, the respective heads of

these divisions acted as "special representative" of the Under Secretary of War, thus preserving the fiction that the Under Secretary supervised the procurement operations of the AAF. But there was no duplication of staffs between the Office of the Under Secretary and the Commanding General, ASE On procurement policy matters the Air Technical Service Command (before 1944 the Air Service and the Air Materiel Commands) was simply an additional technical service. The AAF did not question the need for standard War Department policies on contract clauses, pricing policy, contract renegotiations, and contract termination. As long as the provisions were promulgated in the name of the Under Secretary of War and not in the name of the Commanding General, ASF, the AAF seemed to be satisfied.
The AAF was also favorably disposed toward the work of the Procurement Assignment Board in the Purchases Division. This board fixed procurement responsibility among the technical services for newly standardized items of equipment and reassigned responsibility when overlapping in procurement operations became evident. The board sometimes assigned items for procurement by the Army Air Forces, and in one or two instances took procurement from the AAF for assignment to a technical service.
The ASF provided similar leadership in handling labor and manpower problems. With the growing shortage of labor, and with the expansion of both War Production Board and War Manpower Commission (WMC) organizations to handle such shortages, the War Department saw the need of developing field machinery of its own. On 5 November 1943 the Under Secretary pointed out to the ASF and AAF commanding generals that labor relations and labor supply were an essential part of procurement. Accordingly, the AAF was to handle all intraplant labor problems in facilities under its jurisdiction, while the technical services would discharge a similar responsibility in plants under their authority. But the "general directing and supervising" of all War Department labor activities was to be exercised on behalf of the Under Secretary by the Industrial Personnel Division in ASF headquarters. Thus another staff division of the ASF became likewise a staff unit of the Under Secretary when dealing with the labor relations and manpower problems of the Army Air Forces.5
But except for labor matters, no such arrangement was worked out in arty other "production" field. The AAF developed its own methods of estimating raw material requirements and presented these separately to the WPB. It had its own procedures for controlling allotments of raw materials, and for maintaining, production records. The ASF Production Division was never used by the Under Secretary of War in following the progress of the AAF production program. Production statistics of the AAF were very different from those of the ASF. Even on matters such as packing and packaging and the conservation of materials, the Army Air Forces followed one program and the Army Service Forces another.
In addition, when the ASF was first set up, Somervell had hoped that the newly developed Army Supply Program would include requirements of the AAF. This hope was short-lived. The AAF followed its own practices in determining its procurement needs. Only after long argument was the ASF able to include in its supply

program the requirements of the Army Air Forces which were purchased by the technical services of the ASF. These included bombs procured by the Ordnance Department and the Chemical Warfare Service and other specified types of equipment. Items of air mat6riel "peculiar" to the Air Forces were consolidated in a separate section of the Army Supply Program. Accordingly, in determining supply requirements and directing production, the AAF and the ASF went their own separate ways. No serious disputes resulted from this arrangement, although occasionally there were conflicting points of view.
In specifying that the AAF would procure supplies "peculiar" to its activities, War Department Circular 59 presumably referred primarily to aircraft engines, aircraft frames, and certain equipment which went into aircraft. Other supplies, it was supposed, would be provided by the ASF, as in the case of the food, the hand weapons, the trucks, and the other equipment used by the AAF, even when some of these items were not entirely the same as those used by the Army Ground Forces and the service troops themselves. Actually, there was constant difficulty in drawing a line between items "peculiar" to the AAF and those which were not.
Throughout the war, the Ordnance Department of the ASF provided armament for aircraft. The air-cooled .50-caliber machine gun, the 20-mm. gun, and the 75-mm. cannon were weapons that were used by the Air Forces. The Ordnance Department likewise produced ammunition for aircraft armament, and in co-operation with the AAF developed the high explosive bombs which were dropped by the medium and heavy bombardment groups. From time to time the AAF proposed that it should take over all procurement of ordnance equipment going into aircraft. The proposals were rejected, and until the end of the war, the Ordnance Department continued to be the procurement agency for AAF armament.
Extraordinary progress in the development and procurement of incendiary bombs was made by the Chemical Warfare Service working with the Army Air Forces. Apparently the AAF was satisfied with the arrangement. The only controversies were over the size of AAF requirements for incendiary bombs. The Chemical Warfare Service accepted AAF estimates of requirements, although it believed that the requirements at times were unduly high.
The Quartermaster General was the procurement agency of the Army for foodstuffs and for clothing. The early experience in long-range bomber attacks indicated that some method of special feeding was needed to help combat fatigue on return journeys. At the same time, the food had to be edible at high altitudes. The AAF sought the assistance of the Office of The Quartermaster General and the problem was successfully solved through their joint efforts. On the other hand, air-sea rescue boats and much other equipment carried in airplanes were similar to items purchased by both the Corps of Engineers and the Transportation Corps. But the AAF maintained that the items were "peculiar" to the AAF and insisted upon its own procurement.
Similarly, the Army Air Forces insisted upon procuring all photographic equipment used in aerial photography, even though other photographic equipment was for the most part purchased by the Signal Corps. In addition, AAF was assigned responsibility for procuring all photographic film, including that dis-

tributed by the Signal Corps for use by ground cameramen .6
The greatest expansion of Army Air Forces procurement during the war occurred in 1944-45 when responsibility for the development, purchase, and storage of all communications and radar equipment used in aircraft was transferred from the Signal Corps to the AAF. Early in 1944 the AAF had recommended to the Chief of Staff that Signal Corps procurement of aircraft communications equipment be transferred to it. The Signal Corps had established a procurement office for this activity at Wright Field, headquarters of the Air Technical Service Command. Eventually all procurement of communications equipment for the AAF was centralized in this office. The AAF maintained that since the office was located at Wright Field and was working with the Army Air Forces, its operations should be transferred to AAF control. The Signal Corps replied that while the office had been placed at Wright Field simply as a matter of convenience to the AAF, the research and development program of the entire Signal Corps was utilized in developing air communications equipment. Moreover, the Wright Field office depended upon other Signal Corps offices for expediting production and other contract services.
On 26 July 1944 General Marshall wrote a memorandum addressed jointly to Generals Arnold and Somervell expressing the opinion that the time had come when airborne radar and radio equipment, guided missiles, ground radar, and radio navigational aids should be considered items of equipment peculiar to the Air Forces. But he indicated his belief that the procurement of all these items should not be transferred at this time from the Signal Corps to the Army Air Forces. He suggested only that the AAF should now assume full responsibility for research and development, including procurement of experimental items. By implication, but not in so many words, the Chief of Staff invited comment upon this issue.7
General Somervell "strongly recommended" to the Chief of Staff that he consider certain factors before issuing the proposed directive. Such a directive would separate radio and radar research and development for aircraft from similar research and development of equipment for ground use. This step would also hamper the growing collaboration of the Signal Corps with the Navy. Moreover, the existing arrangement, with Signal Corps laboratories and procurement located at Wright Field, permitted the closest co-operation and association with the AAF while still retaining the advantage of centralized research and procurement. This was particularly important because about 75 percent of the component parts of Air Forces radio and radar equipment was the same kind as that in the equipment used by the AGF. Furthermore the Signal Corps was about to promote complete standardization of component parts and common types of equipment. Finally, the proposed separation of activities would probably result in competition for limited and essential facilities and equipment. In

conclusion, General Somervell remarked that the AAF, had not given any particulars about Signal Corps failure to provide satisfactory service. He suggested that General Arnold and he should examine the situation so that both could develop plans which would remedy any unsatisfactory performance and at the same time avoid the "real and extensive difficulties which the proposed action would entail."8
Arnold, in giving his reaction to General Marshall's proposed directive, remarked that the help the Air Forces had received from the ASF had been commendable. Nevertheless, the new policy would enable the Air Forces to synchronize development of vital radio and radar equipment with aircraft development.9
After weighing the arguments on both sides, the Chief of Staff decided to transfer development and development procurement of air communications equipment to the AAF10 A joint committee of the Signal Corps and the AAF was established to work out details of the transfer,11 which was effected on 1 April 1945.12 A total of 600 officers, 390 enlisted men, and 8,245 civilian employees of the Signal Corps were shifted to the Army Air Forces. The total dollar value of the procurement program thus transferred averaged a billion dollars a year during World War II.13
The Conflict Over Post and Base Management
More acrimonious than the foregoing dispute over procurement and supply was the controversy between the two commands resulting from divided responsibilities in the management of Army posts in the United States.14 As will be explained later, the nine service commands of the ASF provided the regional channels through which the ASF managed military posts where Army Ground Forces and ASF personnel were trained. Post management was a sizable task. Central management of all posts by the ASF would have permitted a single system of supervision as well as uniform methods of supply. But the AAF insisted upon the complete and separate management of its own posts, or air bases.
Originally the AAF argued that bases where its troops were trained were different from posts for ground troops, the more important difference centering mainly in the airfields themselves and the hangars. All characteristics common to post and base management were held to be subordinate to this differentiating feature. The Air Forces belittled the importance of hospital administration, post exchange business, the disbursement of funds, the management of motion picture theaters, the operation of supply warehouses, the provision of utilities, the storage of clothing and other items, and of other activities performed at both types of installations. The features peculiar to an air base, the AAF insisted, made it essentially different from an Army post and therefore justified exclusive management of the base by the Air Forces itself.
Army regulations in August 1942 placed

all AAF bases in a category labeled Class III, "installations under command of Army Air Forces." 15 At these installations the service commanders of the ASF were directed to supervise fourteen activities which ranged from general courts martial jurisdiction to the operation of laundries. The list was enlarged a little on 24 December 1942, but there were still glaring omissions, notably medical service and supply operations involving common Army items.
The ASF took the initiative in preparing the original Army regulation. The AAF agreed to the list of activities in the performance of which the commanding officer at a Class III installation would come under the supervision of the service command. Within this specified list, air bases and Army posts within the United States operated under a single set of instructions, with uniform standards of service, and subject to the same supervision. With respect to all other activities, however, the base commanding officer was responsible to his designated superior in the organizational hierarchy of the Army Air Forces.
This arrangement for dual supervision of Air Forces bases soon created trouble. Even though the regulations made it clear that the AAF would designate the air base commander and that this commander would report to the Air Forces on Air Forces matters and to the service commander on Service Forces matters, the AAF never liked the arrangement. The issues that arose were in themselves trivial. They became important because they involved the basic question of whether the ASF would provide services to the AAF in the same way as it did for the AGF, or whether the Army air arm would become completely self-contained and duplicate the organization of the ASE
One conflict developed over the method of supply distribution to air bases. The zone of interior supply distribution system established by the ASF was a relatively simple and direct one. Technical service depots or branches of ASF general depots were designated as distribution depots to fill requisitions from posts in their area: Post supply officers were given a list of the appropriate depots from which they might requisition various types of supplies needed by troops in training at the post. Requisitions flowed from the post to the depot and supplies from the depot to the post. The technical service depots were prepared to render a like service to all air bases.
In May 1943 the War Department issued a technical manual on stock control at posts, camps, and stations.16 This manual was prepared by the ASF, and the Army Air Forces concurred. But after it became necessary in 1944 to rewrite the manual to incorporate the lessons gained from a year's experience, the AAF proposed a series of changes which would have established supply procedures for air bases entirely different from those for other Army posts. When the ASF objected, the Air Forces proposed publication of its own technical manual governing supply procedures of the Air Forces. ASF headquarters objected to these proposals on the ground that the manual was intended to govern the distribution of ASF supplies wherever needed in the United States, and that a uniform procedure was indispensable in order to keep stocks at a minimum level and so reduce purchases.
Protracted direct negotiation followed between the two commands. On those

matters where agreement was not possible, the issues were presented to the War Department General Staff for decision. In the end, the manual was revised and applied to both the ASF and the AAF, but the commanding generals of the various Air Forces commands in the United States were made responsible for carrying out its provisions.17 Thus the ASF had its own supervisory organization for insuring that stock levels were fixed at posts in accordance with the provisions of the manual, while the AAF, through a number of different commands, had the same supervisory responsibility at all air bases. 18
The method of handling repairs and utility matters was another sore point with the AAF. From the time that Army regulations governing Air Forces bases were first put into effect in August 1942, the AAF began to recommend other arrangements for dealing with these responsibilities. The Army Service Forces wanted its service commands to handle funds, personnel allotments, and technical instructions for the operation of water, electrical, and sewage systems, and for the maintenance of buildings. Service commands then dealt directly with air bases on these activities. In July 1943 the commanding general of the Eighth Service Command reported that AAF headquarters was allotting personnel for repairs and utilities activities. These allotments not only differed in size from those made by the ASF, but were also subjected to different personnel policies. For example, ASF instructions prohibited the use of enlisted men for repairs and utilities duties at posts, while the AAF made it mandatory that a certain number be used for this activity.19 There was also disagreement about the position of the post engineer in post organization at air bases. The post engineer at ground posts reported directly to the post commander, while the Air Forces had introduced an intervening echelon which service commanders felt complicated their relationship with base engineers.
There was little that the ASF could do about these situations. Internal organization of air bases was entirely the responsibility of the AAF. At most, commanding generals of service commands could only press their repairs and utilities responsibilities as best they could at each air base.
On 14 April 1944 the commanding general of the Army Air Forces sent a memorandum to the Chief of Staff (attention: G-4), recommending that all the repairs and utilities responsibilities at air bases be delegated to the AAF. The ASF attitude toward this recommendation was expressed by General Styer who said, on 21 April 1944, that he was "strongly opposed" to such a proposal unless the Army Air Forces became independent of the rest of the Army. By law, the Chief of Engineers was responsible for repair and utility activities, and in the ASF this responsibility was performed through service command engineers. This arrangement provided a simple, direct method for performing the work on a geographic basis. throughout the zone of interior. To adopt General Arnold's proposal would mean two separate supervisory organizations for repair and utilities functions. General Styer remarked that there were no difficulties in the present organization which could not be solved by a co-operative relationship between the ASF and the AAF

similar to that which the ASF had worked out with the Army Ground Forces. He recommended that "the principle be adopted and put into effect that the Army Service Forces will supply and service all Air Forces installations in the same manner that the Army Service Forces now supplies and services all installations utilized by the Army Ground Forces." 20
The recommendation from the commanding general of the AAF was disapproved by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the War Department. But the counter recommendation of the ASF was also disapproved. The issue, therefore, remained very much alive.
Another controversy concerned hospital administration. To care for AAF personnel at air bases, the AAF had station hospitals which were supervised through various commands terminating in the headquarters of the AAF, where the Air Surgeon was the top medical officer. The Surgeon General of the Army, who was a part of the ASF, had almost no authority over AAF hospital facilities. On 30 April 1943 General Somervell requested the Chief of Staff to reaffirm that the Surgeon General was the chief medical officer of the entire Army.21 The Deputy Chief of Staff replied that existing regulations adequately prescribed the functions of The Surgeon General, who had "over-all responsibility of providing adequate medical service for the entire Army." At the same time, he advised, there must be "sufficient decentralization" to insure that "policies" in practice met the needs of overseas theaters and the three major commands within the United States.
The Deputy Chief of Staff set forth three "principles" for the guidance of The Surgeon General and the Air Surgeon. First, the procurement of all medical personnel was a responsibility of The Surgeon General. Second, station hospitals at Air Forces bases were under the command of the AAF. Third, aviation medicine and medical treatment of combat crews were responsibilities of the AAF, under the direction of the Air Surgeon. General hospitals to meet this need would be assigned to the AAF by the Chief of Staff. 22
This statement of responsibilities was by no means satisfactory to The Surgeon General. On 30 June 1943 General Somervell wrote to the Chief of Staff, forwarding a memorandum which he had received from The Surgeon General. At the outset, Somervell expressed his belief that it was not the intention of the Chief of Staff to have two medical departments in the Army, one for the Air Forces and one for ground troops. It was true that airmen were subject to certain maladies and injuries which would require specialized treatment. The same was true of tank crews. Yet this did not justify a separate medical service for the armored forces. The Surgeon General desired to develop in his office a group of specialists in diseases and ailments peculiar to aviation and also to have these specialists in general hospitals. General Somervell particularly objected to the assertion that the Air Corps medical service operated more efficiently and more economically and therefore the Air Corps ought not be deprived of superior medical care. Such an assertion, Somervell said, rested on "no foundation in fact." The "intransigent at-

titude of the Air Surgeon must be overcome," he added, and proposed that the Air Surgeon should be made a Deputy Surgeon General for Aviation Medicine and placed in The Surgeon General's office. General Somervell objected that the instructions of the Deputy Chief of Staff were not conducive to the development of a unified medical service for the Army as a whole. 23 But Somervell's recommendation was not accepted, and for the time being the situation remained as first outlined by the Deputy Chief of Staff:
As a result of the growing shortage of doctors in 1944, a study was made of ASF and AAF hospital facilities in the zone of interior and recommendations made for conserving medical facilities and personnel. The Deputy Chief of Staff approved these recommendations and directed the commanding generals of the ASF and the AAF to work out a mutually satisfactory hospital system, whereby facilities would be utilized by military personnel on a basis other than that of command jurisdiction. In a conference on 30 March 1944, substantial agreement was reached by the two commands. As a result, an arrangement was put into effect in April which provided that military personnel would be treated at the nearest adequately staffed and equipped Army dispensary or Army hospital regardless of command jurisdiction. A station hospital was ordinarily expected to serve an area within a radius of approximately twenty-five miles. In addition, the circular provided for a new type of hospital, the regional station hospital. Regional station hospitals for all practical purposes replaced the general hospitals as the medical facility providing definitive surgical and hospital care within the United States. The War Department was to determine the location of regional station hospitals upon the recommendation of the Commanding General, ASF and the Commanding General, AAF. The Surgeon General was to be professionally responsible for medical service throughout the zone of interior. One of his responsibilities was to inspect the quality of medical treatment in the Army. 24 The Surgeon General and the Air Surgeon agreed upon the designation of regional station hospitals to provide area coverage throughout the United States. These were to be adjusted from time to time when necessary. 25
Thus the problem of hospital jurisdiction was solved for the remainder of the war. Service command medical consultants inspected AAF hospital facilities and reported on them through AAF channels to The Surgeon General of the Army. Service commands and the field commands of the AAF arranged the geographical structure whereby regional station hospitals were designated and duplication of medical facilities and personnel was avoided. The AAF retained control over its post hospitals and its regional station hospitals. But some degree of co-operative relationship had been achieved. The solution was not entirely satisfactory to either party but it was at least a working arrangement which prevented a flagrant duplication of medical facilities and personnel.

The Controversy Over Allotment of Funds
In the spring of 1944 the Army Air Forces charged the ASF with "interference" in the management of air bases. Service commands were violating command channels, it complained, by allotting funds to Class III installations for repairs and utilities and a number of other activities. The AAF argued that these funds should be allotted directly to the Commanding General, AAF, who in turn would allot them to various air bases and other installations. Furthermore, the AAF refused to acknowledge that the chain of command on these particular responsibilities could be from the Commanding General, ASF, to the commanding general of a service command, to the commanding officer of an air base.
On 10 May 1944 the Secretary of War intervened and suggested a survey of the problems causing dispute.26 About a month later, the Deputy Chief of Staff, General McNarney, submitted a formal proposal for a study, and shortly thereafter the Secretary appointed Under Secretary Robert P. Patterson; Assistant Secretary for Air Robert A. Lovett; Mr. George L. Harrison, Special Consultant to the Secretary of War; Maj. Gen. Lorenzo D. Gasser; and Brig. Gen. O. L. Nelson as an ad hoc committee to survey the War Department fiscal and budgetary organization and to submit recommendations for improvement. This committee in turn, appointed a working group which eventually was made up of four persons, one each from the Office of The Inspector General, the Budget Division of the War Department Special Staff, the Army Air Forces, and the Army Service Forces.27
The ad hoc committee had before it various suggestions, including one by the AAF that the Chief of Finance be separated from the ASF Fiscal Director and be set up parallel to The Adjutant General and the Judge Advocate General.28 Somervell replied that such confusion about fiscal organization as existed could be attributed primarily to the transfer of War Department budget activity from the Army Service Forces to the War Department Special Staff. The original concept of the ASF set forth in the reorganization of March 1942 was "sound." Three alternatives were now available. Each major command might have its separate fiscal organization; responsibility for fiscal policy and procedure might be returned to the Army Service Forces; or the existing arrangement which gave central budgetary duties to the War Department Special Staff and central accounting to the ASF might remain unchanged. General Somervell recommended either the second or third alternative .29
The real issue before the ad hoc committee was the fiscal position of the AAF. Under existing arrangements, the bulk of War Department appropriations was given to the technical services and the

Chief of Finance, Army Service Forces. Part of these funds was being allotted to AAF fields and bases through the field organization of the ASF. This was the aspect of fiscal organization which the ad hoc committee proposed to change at this time.
On 7 September 1944 the Deputy Chief of Staff of the War Department informed General Somervell that the Secretary of War had approved the recommendation of the ad hoc committee:
That Arm Service Forces funds for the operation of lass III installations be allotted . in a lump sum by operation and project direct to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, for his distribution to Class III installations, with full responsibility placed on him for furnishing appropriate reports on the use and status of such funds .30
This recommendation was to go into effect on 1 October 1944.
This recommendation represented a victory for the Army Air Forces. Shortly before it took effect, General Styer asked that the matter be reconsidered. He said that the working group of the ad hoc committee was revising Army regulations in a way which, in effect, would remove many ASF supervisory responsibilities at Air Forces posts. This was a major organizational change in the structure of the War Department rather than a mere shift in the system of allotting funds. General Styer questioned whether the steering group in making this recommendation was aware of the organizational implications. In reply, the Deputy Chief of Staff stated that by direct appeal to the Under Secretary of War the ASF had already obtained a reconsideration. Both the Under Secretary of War and the steering group of the ad hoc committee had declined to alter their previous recommendations. Accordingly, the request for new action was not "favorably considered." 31
Army regulations were shortly, afterward modified in accordance with the recommendation.32 The statement of mission of service commands was revised so that their responsibilities were enumerated as in force "except at Class III installations." The responsibilities of ASF service commands at Air Forces installations were specifically limited. The supervisory duties removed from ASF jurisdiction were fixed signal communications, ordnance maintenance, special service (recreational) activities, repairs and utilities, operation of laundries, and salvage activities.
The changes in jurisdiction produced considerable confusion throughout the Army Service Forces. The Chief Signal Officer pointed out that about 30 percent of fixed signal installations in the continental United States were located at approximately six hundred Class III installations previously receiving allotments from service commands. With the change in allotment of funds, he declared; the whole existing system for co-ordination and integration of fixed signal communications would be "seriously impaired."
The director of the Special Services Division asked whether the commanding general of the Army Air Forces would now take over responsibility for selecting entertainers for soldier shows and for films to be sent overseas. Would the Army Motion Picture Service be barred from relations with the Air Forces and would service commanders be permitted to inspect athletic and recreation programs at

Class III installations? The Quartermaster General noted that there would now be a duplication of technical staffs inspecting laundry operations and that the AAF would have to acquire its own technical supervisory personnel. He also pointed out that of thirty-three laundries then located at Class III installations, fifteen were performing laundry service for nearby ASF installations. Another sixty located at ASF installations in turn provided laundry service to Class III installations. Were these arrangements to be abolished in favor of a self-sufficient laundry service for Class III installations? Similarly the Chief of Engineers pointed out that Public Law 326 of the 77th Congress would have to be amended in order to remove from the Chief of Engineers his responsibility for direction of repairs and utilities work at Class III installations. Furthermore, he added, the Army Air Forces would find it difficult to acquire proper supervisory personnel, since only 12 percent of the personnel engaged in the supervision of repairs and utilities operations could be released by the Engineers with the transfer of Class III responsibility. 33
These questions were brought to the attention of the Deputy Chief of Staff. He directed the AAF and the ASF to agree upon clarifying instructions which would remove the confusion and prevent any expansion of existing facilities for post operations. Intensive negotiation resulted in a new agreement, embodied in a War Department directive in September 1944.34 This circular enumerated the activities at Class III installations which were no longer under the supervision of generals heading ASF service commands. The list concluded with a clause, which while uncertain in meaning, suggested that where ever funds for activity at an Air Forces base no longer came through an ASF service command, service command supervision was to cease.
The circular drew a new jurisdictional boundary line between the ASF and the AAF. While it increased the authority of the Air Forces, it made it clear that the principal change involved was one in the flow of funds. Technical supervision by the ASF was reaffirmed and a duplication of facilities was prohibited. Close working relations between the ASF and the AAF therefore remained necessary. If the Army Air Forces had hoped for a complete escape from ASF supervision under the new arrangement, its expectations were not realized.
These and other controversies between the AAF and the ASF during World War II grew out of opposing views of the mission of the two commands as well as from clashes of personality and an aggressive esprit de Corps.35 In each dispute all these elements were inextricably mingled.
General Arnold and his associates had some justification for their attitude. The airmen of the Army still suffered from the psychological consequences of twenty years of what they considered "suppression" at the hands of unimaginative "ground" officers. General Somervell in World War II just happened to be in the spot where he could reap some of the harvest of distrust sowed for him by the top officials of the War Department from 1919 to 1939. Army air officers would not be

satisfied until their corps had become an autonomous air force, and they were suspicious of all arrangements which tended to make them merely a part of a larger entity, the Army of the United States.
There were considerations of prestige at stake, too, something not easy to measure but always important. On the one hand, the AAF disliked the suggestion that its status as a "command" did not confer complete control over every phase of its work. Since the commanding officer of an air base was an Air Forces officer, it seemed inconsistent that he should receive some of his instructions from a headquarters outside the Army Air Forces. On the other hand, the ASF, while seeking a uniform standard of service throughout the Army and a single supervisory arrangement for identical activities on the grounds of efficient, economical administration, was also concerned about its own prestige and preservation.
Personalities and attitudes of mind came into play, as well. General Arnold was determined to be both "staff and line" on Air Forces matters within the War Department. On the other hand he seemed unwilling for General Somervell to be "staff and line" on supply and service matters. Arnold's closest wartime associate told General Somervell in 1945 that the AAF might have turned aircraft procurement over to the Army Service Forces in 1942, but decided "he has enough to do" and that "he just shouldn't have this too." Whether the statement was made jokingly or seriously, it indicated an attitude that played a part in determining organizational decisions. The War Department in the middle of a war was still an organization of men.
In any event, the controversy helped precipitate the reconsideration of the role of the ASF in the War Department, to be dealt with in a later chapter.

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