1 See above, p. 125.
2 For a history of Navy procurement organization see Robert H. Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War 11 (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press 1951).
3 The historian of Navy procurement reports that there was little for the ANMB to do after Mr. Eberstadt became a vice-chairman of the WPB in September 1942. He then goes on to say that while Mr. Eberstadt wanted to merge the ANMB and the WPB, "it was General Somervell and not the Navy that defeated the plan to merge ANMB and WPB operations. He gradually withdrew the Army officers who had been assigned to ANMB and did not fill the billets left vacant." Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, p. 176. There is no record in the files of the commanding general of the ASF to justify this interpretation, nor does it coincide with this author's own recollection of the events. Somervell wanted ASF representation on industry requirements committees in the WPB and kept such representatives to the extent that the WPB was willing and the work of the WPB warranted. Somervell did not withdraw personnel from ANMB because there was no separate agency from which to remove them. The ANMB never had a staff of its own. Somervell in 1942 was not as interested in formal cooperation with the Navy on procurement as in 1944.
4 This practice is described in the Draper-Strauss Rpt: II, Functional Studies, pp. 196-97.
5 ASF Cir 441, 11 Dec 45.
6 WD Cir 80, 13 Mar 45.
7 Hearings before the Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy, H.R., 78th Cong, 2d Sess, on Proposal to Establish a Single Department of Armed Forces.
8 In private life, before World War II, Colonel Draper had been a partner in the New York banking firm of Dillon, Reed and Company. The new Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, had also been a member of that firm. Under Secretary Patterson persuaded Secretary Forrestal that Draper should be assigned to this project. The Secretary of the Navy designated Capt. L. L. Strauss of his office to work with Colonel Draper.
9 Draper-Strauss Rpt: I, Final and Interim Reports; II, Functional Studies; III, Materiel Studies.
10 Ibid., 111, 79, 84.
11 Ibid., 111, 100.
12 Ibid., III, 109.
13 Ibid., 111, 120-21.
14 Ibid., III, 80, 110.
15 Ibid., 111, 79.
16 Ibid., 111, 109.
17 Ibid., III, 119.
18 Ibid., 111, 17.
19 Ibid., III, 1.
20 Ibid., III, 17.
21 Ibid., 111, 42.
22 Ibid., 111, 57.
23 Ibid., 111, 99.
24 Ibid., II, 85.
25 Ibid., II, 36-49.
26 Ibid., II, 50.
27 Ibid. , II, 181.
28 Ibid., II, 69.
29 Interim Reports 9 and I1 merely transmitted detailed studies.
30 Draper-Strauss Rpt: I, contains all the interim reports and the final report.
31 Somervell purposely stayed out of all discussion about the Draper-Strauss report, for he did not want any charge of empire-building against him to arise and complicate the situation.
32 Memo, Dir of Purchases ASF for USW, 4 Jul 45, sub: Progress Rpt on joint Navy-Army Procurement Project, Hq ASF, Purchases Files, CG AST.
33 CD Rpt 34, Unified Supply Service and Unified Transportation Service for the Army and Navy, Dec 42, CD, ASE
34 For an account of these arrangements and the Navy point of view, see Duncan S. Ballantine, U. S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1947).
35 For fuller treatment, see Bykofsky and Larson, Activities in the Oversea Commands; Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, 1941-1943.
36 Hearings before the Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy, H. R., 78th Cong, 2d Sess, on Proposal to Establish a Single Department of Armed Forces, Pt. 1, pp. 96-111.
37 In a letter to the President on 10 August 1943, Somervell transmitted information about how the Army and Navy were then working together in the San Francisco area. The President expressed his appreciation on 16 August. This letter is filed in Hq ASE
38 Somervell's ideas on this score were briefly outlined in Hearings before the Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy, H. R., 78th Cong, 2d Sess, on Proposal to Establish a Single Department of Armed Forces, Pt. 1, p. 111. They were never developed in detail, although Somervell returned to this theme in 1948 when testifying before the Eberstadt task force of the (Hoover) Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government.