While the invasion force was assembling and rehearsing, Army B-17's of the 26th Squadron of the 11th Bombardment Group, which were part of Task Force 63, had been executing daily bombardments of Guadalcanal and Tulagi to "soften" them before the invasion. The 26th Squadron was then based at Efate and Espiritu Santo. The air strips at both islands were each 5,000 feet long and 150 feet wide by the end of July,1 but facilities were primitive. The runways were soft and were frequently covered by water from the many rains. For night take-offs, the ends of the runways were marked by truck headlights, and the sides by rags stuck in bottles of gasoline and set ablaze.2 Beginning on 31 July, the B-17's bombed Guadalcanal and Tulagi for seven days. One B-117 was lost, but the 26th Squadron shot down three Japanese fighters. Since the airfield on Guadalcanal had no planes, the principal targets were the runways and suspected supply depots and antiaircraft positions on both Guadalcanal and Tulagi.3
The Amphibious Force, covered by the Air Support Force and by Task Force 63, had left Koro in the Fijis on a southwesterly course on 31 July. Four days later the Betelgeuse and Zeilin with their escorts joined Transport Groups X and Y, respectively, to bring the total number of ships in the Expeditionary Force to 82, and the number of men in the landing force to over 19,000. Sailing in three great concentric circles-the transports in the middle, the cruisers around them, and the screening destroyers in the outer circle-the Amphibious Force reached a point south of Rennell, then swung north and set its course for Savo Island, while the carriers sailed for a point southwest of Guadalcanal. On
1. Hist USAFISPA, Pt. I, I, 85.
2. 11th Bomb Gp (H) Hist, p. 6.
3. Rads, COMGENSOPAC to WDCSA, CM-IN-3200, 4 Aug, and CM-IN-5391, 14 Aug 42.
5 and 6 August, during the Amphibious Force's northward run west of Guadalcanal, overcast skies and a heavy haze reduced visibility to four miles and limited air operations! Intermittent rain squalls helped to cover the ships, which were maintaining radio silence. There were no contacts with the enemy.5
The weather cleared for the approaching American ships on the night of 6-7 August, and the Amphibious Force, still undetected, raised Savo Island at 0200.6 Clear skies and a moon in the last quarter provided good visibility as the force passed into the calm, narrow waters between Savo, Guadalcanal, and Florida. The transport groups separated at 0240, 7 August. (Map 1) The four transports and four destroyer-transports of one group sailed around Savo to enter Sealark Channel between Savo and Florida. The fifteen transports of the Guadalcanal Group entered the channel between Savo and Cape Esperance on
4. COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC War Diary, 6-7 Aug 42.
6. 1st Mar Div Rpt, I, 9.
Guadalcanal.7 As daylight broke, the islands lay quiet. The Japanese were taken by surprise; not one shot had been fired at the Amphibious Force.
The supporting warships took station, while their observation planes flew over the target areas. The three cruisers and four destroyers of the Guadalcanal Fire Support Group opened fire on their targets between Kukum and Koli Point on Guadalcanal at 0614. Two minutes later the cruiser and two destroyers comprising the Tulagi Fire Support Group opened fire on Tulagi.8 The minesweepers covered their assigned areas but found no mines. By 0651 the transport groups had reached their areas, 9,000 yards off the landing beaches, and lowered landing craft into the water. A calm sea permitted the troops to descend via cargo-net gangways on both sides of all transports into the landing craft. H Hour, the time for the Tulagi landing, was set for 0800. Zero Hour, the time for the landing on Guadalcanal, was finally set at 0910.9
Ships' gunfire and strafing by fighter planes quickly sank a small gasoline schooner, the only visible enemy vessel in Sealark Channel. Dive bombers and fighters from the carriers, then maneuvering seventy-five miles to the south in open waters, bombed and strafed the target areas, but encountered only feeble antiaircraft fire. Forty-four planes struck at Guadalcanal, and forty-one attacked Tulagi. Eighteen Japanese seaplanes were destroyed.10
The initial Allied landing in the Solomon Islands, which preceded those on Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo, was made by a covering force. (Map 2) Supported by fire from the cruiser and destroyers of the Tulagi Fire Support Group and the minesweepers, landing boats put B Company of the 2d Marines ashore near Haleta, a village adjoining a promontory on Florida Island which commands Beach Blue on Tulagi.11 The remainder of the 1st Battalion of the 2d Marines landed at Halavo on Florida to cover the landings. No enemy forces opposed either landing, and the battalion was later withdrawn.
Covered by fire from the supporting cruiser and destroyers, the first wave
7. CTG 62.1 SOPACFOR: Rpt Action Guadalcanal-Tulagi Area,
Solomon Islands, Aug 7-8 and 9, 1942, Ser 0027, 23 Sep 43, P. 3. This report
is filed in the Office of Naval Records and Library.
8. COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC War Diary, 7 Aug 42.
9. 1st Mar Div Rpt, II, Annex N (1st Mar Div D-3 journal), I.
10. Landing in the Solomons, p. 10.
11. Hist Sec, Hq, USMC: The Guadalcanal Campaign: August 1942 to February 1943 (June 1945), p. 14
of landing craft carrying B and D Companies of the 1st Raider Battalion sailed to Beach Blue on Tulagi, a small, hilly island about three miles long. The enemy was not defending Beach Blue but had retired to caves and dugouts in the hills and ravines on the southeast part of the island. The only casualty in landing was one raider killed by rifle fire. The second wave, A and C Companies, quickly followed B and D Companies which then advanced north across the island. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, then came ashore and pushed north-
west to clear out the enemy in the northwest part of the island. The raider companies turned right and advanced to the southeast, supported by E Company, the raiders' heavy weapons company. There was no hard fighting until the afternoon when fire from Japanese caves and dugouts halted the raiders about one mile short of Tulagi's southeast tip. The marines discovered that the ships' gunfire and dive bombing had not destroyed the caves and dugouts, most of which would withstand everything but a direct hit. Machine-gun fire was rela-
tively ineffective against the tunnels and caves, which were not constructed along straight lines. The most efficient means for destroying the enemy positions were grenades and high explosive charges placed by hand.12
The Japanese sailors and laborers fought from foxholes, pillboxes, slit trenches, and caves. They refused to surrender and fought until they were shot or blown up. Machine gunners fired their weapons until they were killed. When one gunner fell, another would take his place, a process that continued until all in the position were dead.
By late afternoon it had become obvious that the raiders could not complete the capture of Tulagi on 7 August, and the battalion established a defensive line about 1000 yards from the southeast tip of the island. The five raider companies and G Company of the 5th Marines occupied these positions, which the enemy attacked repeatedly but unsuccessfully throughout the night of 7-8 August.
The first reports estimated that the raiders had suffered casualties amounting to 22 percent of their total strength on Tulagi; the 1st Parachute Battalion was reported to have lost from 50 to 60 percent on Gavutu. General Vandegrift requested Admiral Turner at 0135, 8 August, to release the remaining battalions of the 2d Marines from division reserve for the Tulagi-Gavutu operation. Admiral Turner assented.13
On the morning of 8 August F and E Companies of the 5th Marines, having cleared the northwest part of Tulagi, joined G Company and the five companies of the 1st Raider Battalion. The combined force pressed its attack, reduced the enemy positions, and by 1500 had completed the occupation of Tulagi. Only three of the original Japanese garrison surrendered; an estimated forty escaped to Florida by swimming. The remainder, about 200 men, were killed. The Marine casualties on Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo, which had been exaggerated in the first reports, were lighter than those of the Japanese. On Tulagi thirty-six were killed and fifty-four wounded.14 Captured materiel included trucks, motorcycles, ammunition, gasoline, radio supplies, two 13-mm. antiaircraft guns, one 3-inch gun, and ten machine guns.
Gavutu and Tanambogo
While the 1st Raider Battalion and the 2d Battalion of the 5th Marines were
12. Flame throwers were not then in use. General Vandegrift
wrote that they would have been "practical and effective," and recommended
dive bombing with depth charges. 1st Mar Div Rpt, II, 8.
13. COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC War Diary, 8 Aug 42.
14. 1st Mar Div Rpt, II, 4.
reducing Tulagi, the islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo, lying 3,000 yards to the east, also saw hard fighting. Gavutu is 250 by 500 yards in size and Tanambogo, a slightly smaller island, is joined to Gavutu by a 300-yard-long concrete causeway.
Dive bombers (SBD's) attacked Gavutu from 1145 to 1155 on 7 August. The Tulagi Fire Support Group shelled Gavutu from 1155 to 1200 to cover the 7-mile approach of the thirteen landing craft bearing the 1st Parachute Battalion to the seaplane slips and jetties on Gavutu's northeast corner. The bombardment had knocked several large concrete blocks from the ramps into the water, and the parachutists were forced to land at the docks and mount them in face of enemy small-arms fire. The first wave reached shore safely, but succeeding waves were hit hard, about one man in ten becoming a casualty. By 1400 the parachutists were advancing inland under fire from the Japanese emplaced on the island's single hill and on near-by Tanambogo. By 1800 the battalion had secured the hill and raised the national colors there. The Japanese retained possession of several dugouts until the afternoon of 8 August, when they were reduced by the parachutists and two companies of the 2d Marines.
In spite of air bombardment and naval shelling, the Japanese on Tanambogo continued active on 7 August. After being withdrawn from Haleta, B Company of the 2d Marines attempted to land on Tanambogo's north coast after a 5-minute naval bombardment, but the attack failed. About 1130 the next day, the 3d Battalion of the 2d Marines and two light tanks attacked Tanambogo from the beach and the causeway and secured most of the island by late afternoon. By nightfall all the Japanese were dead. Marine casualties in the Tanambogo-Gavutu attacks had been relatively heavy; 108 were dead or missing, 140 wounded. The marines later estimated that nearly 1,000 Japanese had held Gavutu and Tanambogo, but the actual figure was about 500.
On 8 and 9 August the 2d Marines completed the northern attack by seizing the adjacent islets of Mbangai, Makambo, and Kokomtambu.15
Beach Red, which lies about 6,000 yards east of Lunga Point, between the Tenaru and Tenavatu Rivers, had been selected for the Guadalcanal landings.
15. Rpt, Asst Div Comdr 1st Mar Div to CG 1st Mar Div, 1714, 8 Aug 42, in 1st Mar Div Rpt, II, Annex B; Ltr, Col John M. Arthur to Hist Sec, Hq, USMC, 11 Oct 45, in files of USMC Hist Sec.
(Map V) The transports of Group X initially anchored 9,000 yards off Beach Red on the morning of 7 August. The destroyers of the Guadalcanal Fire Support Group took their stations 5,000 yards north of the beach at 0840 to mark the line of departure for the landing craft. The assigned liaison planes made eight runs at low altitudes to mark the extremities of the beaches with smoke.16 The three cruisers and four destroyers of the Guadalcanal Fire Support Group began firing at 0900, to cover a 3,200-yard-long area from a point extending 800 yards on either side of Beach Red to a depth of 200 yards.
The first wave of landing craft, carrying troops of the reinforced 5th Marines (less the 2d Battalion), crossed the line of departure 5,000 yards off Beach Red. As the landing craft drew to within 1,300 yards of the beach, the warships ceased firing. There were no Japanese on the beach. The marines went ashore at 0910 on a 1,600-yard front, the reinforced 1st Battalion on the right (west), the reinforced 3d Battalion on the left. Regimental headquarters followed at 0938, and by 0940 heavy weapons troops had come ashore to act as regimental reserve.17 All boat formations had crossed the line of departure promptly and in good order, and had reached their assigned beach areas.18 The assault battalions of the 5th Marines then advanced inland about 600 yards to establish a beachhead perimeter bounded on the west by the Tenaru River, on the east by the Tenavatu River, on the south by an east-west branch of the Tenaru, and to cover the landings of successive units.
Landing of the reinforced 1st Marines in column of battalions had begun at 0930. The 2d Battalion led, followed by the 3d and 1st Battalions. By 1100 the entire reinforced regiment had come ashore. Meanwhile, in the absence of enemy mines and shore defenses, the transports had moved 7,000 yards closer to the shore.19
To provide direct support, the 75-mm. pack howitzers of the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 11th Marines came ashore with the assault battalions of the 5th and 1st Marines. The 105-mm. howitzers of the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, had been assigned to general support but were not ready for action until the afternoon. The howitzers were landed separately from their prime movers, which had been held on board ship because there were not enough ramp boats
16. The 1st Marine Division had objected to this use for
liaison planes on the ground that they might easily have been shot down,
and because smoke is not good for marking beaches. 1st Mar Div Rpt, II,
15, and Avn Annex K.
17. 1st Mar Div Rpt, II, Annex L (5th Mar Record of Events, 7 Aug 42), I.
18. 1st Mar Div Rpt, II, 1.
19. CTG 62.1, Rpt Guadalcanal-Tulagi.
to bring them ashore promptly. When the 105's reached shore, there were no prime movers immediately available to pull them up the beach. Whenever amphibian tractors were available at the beach, they were used to pull the 105's until the prime movers (1-ton trucks, instead of the authorized 2½-ton 6-wheel-drive trucks) came ashore in the afternoon.20 The artillery battalions reverted to control of Headquarters, 11th Marines, when that headquarters landed. All battalions upon landing registered their fire by air observation.21
When the assaulting regiments and their supporting pack howitzers were ashore, the advance toward the airfield was ready to begin. The 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines was to advance west along the beach toward the Lunga River while the 1st Marines attacked southwest toward Mount Austen. The 3d Battalion of the 5th Marines, the artillery, engineer, pioneer, and special weapons and defense battalions were to hold the beach during the advance.
At 1115 the 1st Marines passed through the 5th Marines' lines. Engineers put a temporary bridge upstream on the Tenaru, using amphibian tractors as pontons. The 1st Marines crossed the river and turned southwest toward Mount Austen. On the beach the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines crossed the mouth of the Tenaru at 1330 and marched toward the Ilu. Neither regiment met any Japanese.
The 1st Marines, advancing inland with battalions echeloned to the left and rear, progressed slowly. The only map which the regiment had to guide it was vague; the angle of declination between grid and true north was not shown. The regimental historian stated later that, had commanders been able to study aerial photographs before the landing, they might have picked easy, natural routes instead of a straight compass course through the jungle.22
The troops were heavily loaded with ammunition, packs, mortars, and heavy machine guns as they struggled through the thick, fetid jungle. The humid heat exhausted the men, whose strength had already been sapped by weeks aboard crowded transports. Salt tablets were insufficient in number. Troops in the Solomons needed two canteens of water per day per man, but the number of canteens available had permitted the issue of but one to each man. All these factors served to slow the advance of both regiments.
20. 1st Mar Div Rpt, II, Arty Annex I, 1.
21. Interv, AGF Mil Obs, SWPA, with CG 11th Mar and ExO 11th Mar, 19 Dec 42, included as App to Rpt, Mil Obs, SWPA, to CG AGF, 20 Sep-Dec 42, 2 Jan 43. OPD 381 SWPA Sec. II Case 108.
22. 1st Mar Div Rpt, II, Annex M (1st Mar Hist), 2.
By dusk the regiments had each advanced about one mile. General Vandegrift, who had come ashore at 1601, ordered them to halt in order to reorient and establish contact. The 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines established a perimeter defense at the mouth of the Ilu River, while the three battalions of the 1st Marines dug in for the night in the jungle about 3,500 yards to the south.
Considering the division's state of training and the inexperience of the junior officers and noncommissioned officers, tactical operations were satisfactory, but General Vandegrift criticized the "uniform and lamentable" failure of all units to patrol their fronts and flanks properly.23 Organization for landing and the ship-to-shore movement of troops had been very good. As the Japanese were not opposing the advance, the operation did not involve a thorough test of methods of controlling ships' gunfire by shore-based fire control parties, but nothing had indicated the need for fundamental changes in doctrine.24 Co-ordination between ground forces on the one hand, and naval and air units on the other, had been unsatisfactory, for the naval forces were not using the same map as the 1st Marine Division.25 In view of the relatively few air support missions requested by the ground troops, the centralized control of supporting aircraft had been satisfactory. Had the division met heavy resistance on Guadalcanal, a more direct means of air-to-ground communication would probably have been necessary. The problem had been recognized in advance, but there had not been time to organize and train air control groups for liaison duty with regiments and battalions. The liaison planes furnished little information to division headquarters, for the pilots were not able to observe very much in the jungle, and some of the messages they transmitted were vague.26
The Capture of the Airfield
At 2000, when 10,000 troops had come ashore,27 General Vandegrift ordered the 1st Marines to attack toward the Lunga the next morning instead of taking Mount Austen. He recognized that Mount Austen commanded Lunga Point, but because it was too large and too far away for his relatively small force to hold he decided not to take it immediately.
Supported by tanks, the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines crossed the Ilu at 0930 on 8 August. Progress was slow at first as the battalion advanced on a wide
23. 1st Mar Div Rpt, II, 10.
24. Ltr, CG 1st May Div to Comdt Mar Corps, 1 Jul 43, sub: Final Rpt Guadalcanal Opn.
25. 1st Mar Div Rpt, II, 18; Int Annex G, 2.
26. 1st Mar Div Rpt, II, Avn Annex K.
27. COMSOPAC to COMINCH, 1400 of 13 Aug 42. SOPAC War Diary.
front. General Vandegrift, then convinced that his division was not faced by a sizable organized force on Guadalcanal, ordered the battalion to contract its front, cross the Lunga River, and seize Kukum village before nightfall. By 1500 the advance guard had traveled almost 6,000 yards to overrun a small party of Japanese firing rifles and machine guns from knolls on the outskirts of Kukum. Kukum, containing one 3-inch antiaircraft gun, one i-inch antiaircraft gun, two 37-mm. antitank guns, and heavy machine guns, was otherwise undefended.
Meanwhile the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marines had covered 4,500 yards to capture the airfield by 1600. The enemy garrison, composed of 430 sailors and 1,700 laborers, had fled westward without attempting to defend or destroy their installations, including the nearly completed runway. General Vandegrift wrote:
About thirty-five of the Japanese trucks were serviceable. Lighter than American military transport, they proved less efficient. Without powered front axles, they stuck easily, but were a valuable addition to the 1st Marine Division's limited motor transport, and were used as long as they held together. The division engineers also used the Japanese rollers, mixers, surveying equipment, gasoline locomotives, and hopper cars in the subsequent completion of the airfield.
28. 1st Mar Div Rpt, II, 12.
29. Ibid., Int Annex G, 8.
Tactical operations had proceeded favorably. The Guadalcanal forces had landed unopposed and captured the airfield without casualties. In the Tulagi-Gavutu-Tanambogo area, all objectives had been taken at the cost of 144 killed and 194 wounded, while the defending garrisons had been destroyed. By 9 August, 10,900 troops had landed on Guadalcanal, and 6,075 on Tulagi.30 To support the infantry, 3 field artillery battalions, with 3 units of fire, plus special weapons, tanks, tank destroyers, and part of the 3d Defense Battalion, had landed on Guadalcanal, while the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines (75-mm. pack howitzers), and part of the 3d Defense Battalion had landed on Tulagi.
Logistical operations, in contrast with tactical developments, had seriously bogged down. The 1st Pioneer Battalion had been charged with the duty of unloading supplies from the landing craft as they touched at Beach Red, while a navy beachmaster and shore party directed the boat movements at the beach. Of the 596 men (including naval medical personnel) of the Pioneer Battalion, one platoon of 52 went to Tulagi with the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, and another remained on board one of the cargo ships. About 490 men on Beach Red were to handle supplies for the Guadalcanal force of the 1st Marine Division. By 1043 of 7 August the beachmaster's party was operating on Beach Red.31
Unloading the landing boats proved to be an exhausting and almost impossible job, for so many of them lacked movable bow ramps which could be let down to speed the removal of supplies from the boats. The pioneers had to lift the supplies up and over the gunwales to unload them. On the other hand, the unarmored amphibian tractors "demonstrated a usefulness exceeding all expectations."32 Used as an ambulance, a prime mover, and an ammunition carrier, the amphibian tractor, later to play such an important tactical role in the Pacific, was able to move directly from ship's side to inland dump, easily traversing the sea, reefs, beaches, and swamps without halting. But there were only a few amphibian tractors.
Too few troops had been provided to unload boats and move materiel off the beach. While loaded landing craft hovered off Beach Red, which was
30. COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC War Diary, 9 Aug 42.
31. Ibid., 7 Aug 42.
32. 1st Mar Div Rpt, II, 16.
already cluttered with unsorted gear, hundreds of marines who were waiting to move forward were in the vicinity, but did not assist on the beach.33 General Vandegrift later stated that the unloading party had been too small; he pointed out that he had anticipated that his division would have to fight a major engagement before capturing the airfield and he had therefore expected to use most of his troops tactically. At that time, too, the 2d Marines (less one battalion) had not been released by Admiral Turner.34
When supplies began to pile up on the beach, sailors from the transports joined the shore party to try to get the boats unloaded and the supplies moved farther inland. Pioneers and sailors worked to the point of exhaustion; the extreme heat caused many to suffer from nausea and severe headaches. But the beach remained cluttered.
Enemy air attacks also delayed unloading operations. Twenty-five twin-engined Japanese bombers from Rabaul attacked the ships in the early afternoon of 7 August. Several planes were shot down by the covering fighters and gunfire from the transports and screening warships. The Bougainville coastwatcher had warned the Allied ships in time so that none were hit,35 but the transports had been obliged to cease unloading and get underway. About one hour later, a second wave of Japanese bombers drove the transports off again and damaged the destroyer Mugford. The Japanese aircraft fortunately did not attack the gear which crowded the beach, but three hours of unloading time had been lost.
By nightfall on 7 August 100 landing craft were beached, waiting to be unloaded, while an additional 50, unable to find landing room on the beach, stood offshore. Unloading was continued into the night, but the tired shore party could not cope with its task and operations broke down completely. At 2330 the shore party commander, stating that unloading was "entirely out of hand," requested that the ships cease discharging cargo until moo, 8 August, when he estimated the beach would be cleared. Admiral Turner and General Vandegrift assented.
To provide more room for incoming supplies, General Vandegrift doubled the length of the beach by extending Beach Red's boundary west to the Block Four River on 8 August. But the situation did not improve. Forty more enemy bombers flew over Florida about noon to disperse the ships again, this time setting the George F. Elliott afire and damaging the destroyer Jarvis. The El-
33. CTG 62.1, Rpt Guadalcanal-Tulagi.
34. 1st Mar Div Rpt, II, 11. General Vandergrift [sic] suggested using 1,500 in a division unloading party.
35. Feldt, op. cit., pp. 88-89.
liott burned until she was a total loss. The Jarvis left for Noumea but was never heard from again. A false air alarm later in the afternoon forced the ships to get underway once more.
The Japanese garrisons on Guadalcanal and in the Tulagi area had not been able to resist the American attack effectively, although an enemy report claimed that ten transports and the greater part of the escorting naval forces had been destroyed.36 The air attacks on 7-8 August had not seriously damaged the Amphibious Force, but they had caused serious delays in unloading.
These were only preliminaries, however, to the heavy blow the Japanese were preparing to deliver. Five heavy and two light cruisers and one destroyer assembled in St. George's Channel off Rabaul on the morning of 8 August with orders to attack the American transports in Sealark Channel.37 This force sailed south along the east coast of Bougainville until sighted by an Allied patrol plane from the Southwest Pacific Area, which radioed a warning to Melbourne. The Japanese ships then reversed their course for a time, but after the plane departed, turned west through Bougainville Strait and then south through the narrow waters (the "Slot") between the two chains of the Solomons.
At 1800 on 8 August, Admiral Turner received word that the Japanese force was approaching.38 The Screening Force, augmented by the fire support warships, was then covering the northern approaches to Sealark Channel. Two destroyers, the Ralph Talbot and the Blue, were posted northwest of Savo Island on either side of the channel to maintain watch by radar. Three cruisers, the Australia, Canberra, and Chicago, and the destroyers Bagley and Patterson, were patrolling the waters between Savo and Cape Esperance. The cruisers Vincennes, Astoria, and Quincy and the destroyers Helm and Wilson patrolled between Savo and Florida. Two cruisers, screened by destroyers, covered the transports.
Aircraft from the American carrier force southwest of Guadalcanal had been supporting the Amphibious Force during daylight hours, but this protec-
36. ATIS, SWPA: Int Rpts, Yazawa Butai Hq and Oki
Shudan (17th Army) Gp Hq, 8 Mar-30 Sep 42: Enemy Publication No. 28,
21 Jul 43, p. 50.
37. USSBS, The Campaigns of the Pacific War (GPO, Washington, 1946), p. 106; Interrogations, I,255-56.
38. COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC War Diary, 8 Aug 42. The warning stated that three cruisers, two destroyers, and two gunboats or seaplane tenders were approaching.
tion was about to be withdrawn. Two days of enemy air action and operational losses had reduced fighter strength from ninety-nine to seventy-eight planes. Fuel was running low. Admiral Fletcher, commanding Task Force 61, was worried by the numbers of enemy bombers operating in the area. At 1807, 8 August, he asked Admiral Ghormley for permission to withdraw his carriers.39 Admiral Ghormley consented. The force would be withdrawn, he announced, until enough land-based aircraft to protect the line of communications to Guadalcanal could be assembled, and until sufficient stocks of aviation fuel could be maintained at Guadalcanal to support fighter and bomber operations.40 The carrier forces retired southward early the next morning.
When informed that the carrier forces were to be withdrawn, Admiral Turner called General Vandegrift and Admiral Crutchley aboard the flagship McCawley.41 General Vandegrift left his command post at the mouth of the Ilu River to board the McCawley about 2325, 8 August. Admiral Crutchley took the flagship Australia out of the Screening Force and sailed aboard her to the McCawley to attend the conference. Turner informed them that the imminent retirement of the carriers would leave the Amphibious Force without effective air protection and that he had decided to withdraw the ships of the Amphibious Force at 0600 the next morning.
General Vandegrift was seriously disturbed by this news. The retirement of the ships, he felt, would place his division in a "most alarming" position.42 Unloading of supplies at Tulagi had not even started at 7 August because the Japanese had held so much of the island.43 The 1st Marine Division's plans were based on the assumption that the transports would remain offshore until 11 August, and by the night of 8-9 August more than half the supplies embarked by the division still remained in the ships' holds.
Meanwhile the Japanese cruisers and destroyers which had earlier been discovered had now approached Savo Island undetected. Shortly before reaching Savo, the cruisers catapulted seaplanes which flew over Sealark Channel to
39. CTF 61 to COMSOPAC, 0707 of 8 Aug 42. SOPAC War Diary.
For fuller accounts of the naval aspects of these operations, see ONI,
USN, Combat Narratives: Solomon Islands Campaign. I, The landing in the
Solomons, and II, The Battle of Savo Island, 9 August 1942 (Washington,
1943) relate to the operations described in this chapter.
40. COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, 0834 of 9 Aug 42. SOPAC War Diary.
41. COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC War Diary, 8 Aug 42.
42. 1st Mar Div Rpt, II, 13.
43. CTF 62.6 (Rear Adm V. A. C. Crutchley), Rpt Battle Savo Island, 8-9 Aug 42, Ser 231, 6 Apr 43, 16. A photostatic copy of this report is in the Office of Naval Records and Library.
search for the American and Australian ships.44 About midnight of 8 August the Allied ships in the channel reported that unidentified aircraft were overhead. About 0145, 9 August, a seaplane from the Japanese cruiser Chokai dropped flares over the transports, while the Japanese warships slipped unobserved past the Ralph Talbot and the Blue.
After passing the destroyers, the Japanese sighted the Allied ships between Savo and Cape Esperance. Still undetected, they fired torpedoes which struck the Chicago and the Canberra. After this attack the Japanese left to strike the American ships between Savo and Florida. They illuminated their targets briefly with searchlights, then put heavy fire into the American cruisers. Unwilling to risk further action with the Allied cruisers and fearful that American aircraft might attack his ships at daylight, the Japanese commander then led his force northward away from Savo. On the morning of 9 August the Japanese force reached Rabaul. The next day, off New Ireland, the cruiser Kako was sunk by torpedoes from an American submarine.
The Battle of Savo Island was one of the worst defeats ever suffered by ships of the U. S. Navy. The enemy had taken them by surprise and defeated in detail the two forces on either side of Savo. The only enemy ship damaged was the Chokai, whose operations room was destroyed. The Vincennes and Quincy sank within one hour after being attacked. The badly hit Canberra burned all night and was torpedoed by American destroyers the next morning to sink her prior to the departure of the Amphibious Force. The severely battered cruiser Astoria sank about midday on 9 August. The Chicago and the Ralph Talbot had both been damaged. Fortunately the Japanese commander had lacked sufficient daring to execute his orders to attack the weakly defended transports in Sealark Channel.45 Had he done so, he could have effectively halted Allied operations in the South Pacific and completely cut off the 1st Marine Division from reinforcement and supply, for all the transports and cargo ships of the South Pacific Force were present in Sealark Channel.
The damage which the Japanese inflicted upon the warships delayed the departure of Admiral Turner's ships, which remained in Sealark Channel until the afternoon of 9 August. But at 1500 ten transports, one cruiser, four destroyers and the minesweepers sailed toward Noumea, followed at 1830 by the remaining ships. Admiral Turner accompanied the latter force.46
44. USSBS, Interrogations, II, 472.
45. Ibid., pp. 361-62.
46. CTF 62 to CTF 61, COMSOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC, 0508 and 0725 of 9 Aug 42. SOPAC War Diary.
Of the original marine landing force of over 19,000 men, nearly all were ashore before the departure of the ships, but a few detachments of the 1st Marine Division remained on board. Most of the men of the 2d Marines, Reinforced, had landed, but 1,390 men of the regiment, including regimental headquarters, companies from the 2nd Amphibian Tractor and 2d Service Battalions, and part of the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines (75-mm. pack howitzers), were subsequently landed at Espiritu Santo by the retiring Amphibious Force.47 Almost 17,000 marines and naval personnel had landed on Guadalcanal and Tulagi.48
Supplies for these men were limited. Of the sixty days' supplies and ten units of fire with which the division had embarked, less than half had been unloaded. There were about four units of fire available on Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Guadalcanal had 6,000,000 rounds of .30-caliber ammunition, and 800 90-mm. shells.49 Food stocks were low. When an inventory was completed about 15 August, it was found that food for only thirty days was on handóB rations for seventeen days, C rations for three days, and Japanese rations for ten days. Troop rations were reduced to two daily meals.
None of the 3d Defense Battalion's 5-inch coast defense guns, nor any long-range warning or fire control radar sets had been landed. Only eighteen spools of barbed wire had been brought ashore. Heavy construction equipment was still in the ships' holds. Since the liaison planes assigned to the division had been destroyed on board their cruisers in the Battle of Savo Island, air reconnaissance of Guadalcanal would not be possible.50
The departure of the Air Support and Amphibious Forces left the 1st Marine Division alone in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area exposed to Japanese attacks, without air cover or naval surface support. The nearest Allied outpost was the primitive base at Espiritu Santo. The enemy posts at Buka and the Shortlands were only 363 and 285 nautical miles away, respectively, and Rabaul itself lay only 565 nautical miles to the northwest. The 1st Marine Division was virtually a besieged garrison.51
47. CO 2d Mar to COMSOPAC, CINCPAC, CTF 62, and COMSOWESPAC,
1400 of 12 Aug 42. SOPAC War Diary.
48. COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC War Diary, 9 Aug 42; 1st Marine Division Report does not give exact figures.
49. Rad Noumea to rad Tulagi, 0640 of 14 Aug 42. SOPAC War Diary.
50. 1st Mar Div Rpt, II, Annex K, 1.
51. Messages from commanding general of the 1st Marine Division in SOPAC War Diary in August, September, and October 1942 report enemy air raids and naval bombardments almost daily.
page updated 16 November 2000
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