- Chapter
XII:
-
- THE ELIMINATION OF THE
ALTERNATIVES
- July-August 1942
-
- On 8 July the War Department operations staff
estimated that a decision "on any emergency
operations in the European Theater in 1942"
could not be long postponed and that it must
come "not later than August 1."1
On the same day the British War Cabinet
made a move toward a decision, a move that
resulted almost automatically. from its action
four weeks before (11 June), when it had declared,
with reference to SLEDGEHAMMER:
-
- (a) We should not attempt any major landing
on the Continent this year unless we intended
to stay there;
- (b) All plans and preparations for "Sledgehammer"
should be pressed forward with the greatest
vigor, on the understanding that the operation
would not be launched, except in conditions
which held out a good prospect of success;
- (c) The Chiefs of Staff should have authority
to ask for the necessary shipping to be taken
up for "Sledgehammer" on the 1st
July, without further reference to the War
Cabinet.
-
- The Prime Minister in June had further defined
the conditions for launching SLEDGEHAMMER in
a statement of two principles, "generally
approved" by the War Cabinet:
-
- No substantial landing in France in 1942
unless we are going to stay; and no substantial
landing in France unless the Germans are demoralized
by failure against Russia.2
-
- In view of these declarations (the basis
of the Prime :Minister's eloquent appeal to
the President), the British Chiefs of Staff
found themselves, by 1 July, in the curious
position of having authority to mount an operation
that their government evidently did not intend
to launch. To prepare themselves against this
situation they had on 24 June asked the Minister
of War Transport to submit by 1 July an estimate
of the cost of withdrawing ships for use in
SLEDGEHAMMER. On 30 June they received the
report, which estimated that it would mean
tying up some 250,000 tons of shipping and
analyzed the consequences for the British shipping
program.3
At the same time the British Chiefs
received a report they had requested from Admiral
Mountbatten, who pointed out that to mount
SLEDGEHAMMER would tic up all landing craft
in the British Isles and all his instructors
trained in landing operations. It would thus
not only rule out large-scale raids on the
French coast but
- [266]
- also Suspend amphibious training for all
forces not assigned to SLEDGEHAMMER. The result
would be to slow down preparations for landings
in 1943. The one justification for mounting
the operation, in the judgment of Mountbatten,
would be a fixed intention of actually carrying
out
- SLEDGEHAMMER.4
-
- Against the disadvantages of mounting an
operation so very unlikely to be launched,
the British Chiefs of Staff weighed the advantages:
-
- In the first place, our preparations are
bound to keep the Germans guessing. They may
not force them to withdraw troops from their
Eastern Front, but they are unlikely to weaken
their Western Front, particularly in air forces.
Secondly, the mounting of "Sledgehammer"
will be a useful dress rehearsal for "Round-up,"
especially for Commanders and Staffs.
-
- But they concluded that beyond question the
disadvantages outweighed the advantages, and
declared: "If we were free agents, we
could not recommend that the operation should
be mounted." They ended by stating the
limitations on British freedom of action --the
cautious declaration on SLEDGEHAMMER given
in flay to Molotov, and the compromise directive
on future plans worked out in Washington in
June. They pointed out that if the War Cabinet
should decide not to mount SLEDGEHAMMER, the
Soviet Government would soon discover that
preparations were not going ahead, and that,
whatever the decision, it would he necessary
to reopen the question at once with the U.
S. Government.5
-
- The British Government soon acted on the
recommendation of its Chiefs of Staff. On 8
July the Joint Staff -Mission in Washington
received notification of the decision taken
not to mount SLEDGEHAMMER
and of the hope expressed by the War Cabinet
that the United States would agree to the invasion
of forth Africa.6
-
-
- The stated British objections to SLEDGEHAMMER
had a great deal of force. The heavy odds against
successful landings in France in 1942 and the
great cost of mounting a purely contingent
operation were indeed fundamental objections,
which could have been urged with telling effect
against it when Marshall first proposed it.
The risks and costs were obviously great. Had
the British in April refused, therefore, to
plan for a contingent operation, as part of
the whole scheme General Marshall proposed,
it would of course have been open to the War
Department to join the Army Department and
the Pacific commands in advising the President
that the United States should not assume the
risks involved in diverting available forces
from the Pacific. The War Department operations
staff had so recommended. In the words used
by General Eisenhower to conclude his exposition
of the manifold reasons for single-minded concentration
of Army forces in the British Isles:
-
- WPD further believes that, unless this plan
is adopted as the eventual aim of all our efforts,
we must turn our backs upon the Eastern
- [267]
- Atlantic and go, full out, as quickly as
possible, against Japan! 7
-
- In July the alternative to go "full
out, as quickly as possible" against Japan
still remained. It would greatly lessen the
dangers perpetuated and the tensions created
by Army deployment policy in the Pacific. On
10 July Marshall proposed this alternative.
When the JCS met that afternoon he read the
dispatch from the British War Cabinet announcing
the decision not to mount SLEDGEHAMMER. He
did not touch on the reasons given by the British
for the decision, but passed at once to the
two questions raised by the decision: (a) should
the United States agree to invade North Africa
(b) did the British really want to invade the
continent in 1943 Marshall repeated his objections
to GYMNAST as an operation "expensive
and ineffectual" and his conviction "that
it was impossible to carry out SLEDGEHAMMER
or ROUNDUP without full aggressive British
support." He then proposed a momentous
change in strategy, which would at once rule
out the North African operation and settle
the basis for future collaboration with the
British: "If the British position must
be accepted, he proposed that the U. S. should
turn to the Pacific for decisive action against
Japan." He went on to list the military
and political advantages that (as MacArthur
had already pointed out) would attend. this
course of action:
-
- He added that this would tend to concentrate
rather than to scatter U. S. forces; that it
would be highly popular throughout the U. S.,
particularly on the West Coast; that the Pacific
War Council, the Chinese, and the personnel
of the Pacific Fleet would all be in hearty
accord: and that, second only to BOLERO. it
would be the operation which would have the
greatest effect towards relieving the pressure
on Russia.8
-
- Admiral King, of course, was ready to make
common cause with Marshall. He repeated his
own objection to GYMNAST" that is was impossible
to fulfill naval commitments in other theaters
and at the same time to provide the shipping
and escort.-, which would be essential should
that operation be undertaken." Admiral
Towers supplemented the case against GYMNAST
by declaring that the transfer of aircraft
carriers from the Pacific to the Atlantic for
GYMNAST would result in a "most unfavorable"
disposition of forces. King also expressed
doubt of the British intentions, declaring
-
- . . . that, in his opinion. the British had
never been in wholehearted accord with operations
on the continent as proposed by the U. S. He
said that. in the European theater, we must
fight the Germans effectively to win, and that
any departure from full BOLERO plans would
result in failure to accomplish this purpose.
-
- Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney in turn observed
that. "in his opinion, the R. A. F. was
not. enthusiastic over BOLERO."9
-
- Admiral King readily agreed to join Marshall
in submitting to the President (with minor
modifications) a memorandum that Marshall had
already drawn up expounding his case. It first
presented the argument against GYMNAST:
-
- Our view is that the execution of Gymnast,
even if found practicable, means definitely
no Bolero-Sledgehammer in 1942 and that it
will definitely curtail if not make impossible
the execution of Bolero-Roundup in the Spring
of 1943. We are strongly of the opinion that
Gymnast would be both indecisive
- [268]
- and a heavy drain on our resources, and that
if we undertake it, we would nowhere be acting
decisively against the enemy and would definitely
jeopardize our naval position in the Pacific.
-
- The memorandum passed to a recommendation
that the President should urge the Prime :Minister
"that we go through with full Bolero plans
and that we attempt no other operation which
would detract from this major effort."
The memorandum stated the consequences of British
unwillingness to go ahead with BOLERO:
-
- Neither Sledgehammer nor Roundup can be carried
out without full and whole-hearted British
support. They must of necessity furnish a large
part of the forces. Giving up all possibility
of Sledgehammer in 1942 not only voids our
commitments to Russia, but either of the proposed
diversions, namely Jupiter and Gymnast, will
definitely operate to delay and weaken readiness
for Roundup in 1943.
-
- Finally, the memorandum offered an alternative
course to be followed should the President
fail to persuade the Prime Minister:
-
- If the United States is to engage in any
other operation than forceful, unswerving adherence
to full Bolero plans, we are definitely of
the opinion that we should turn to the Pacific
and strike decisively against Japan; in other
words assume a defensive attitude against Germany,
except for air operations: and use all available
means in the Pacific. Such action would not
only be definite and decisive against one of
our principal enemies,
but would bring concrete aid to the Russians
in case Japan attacks them.10
-
- At the same time General Marshall independently
drew up a more informal summary of his reasoning,
which concluded with a plain statement of his
aim
-
- I believe that we should now put the proposition
tip to the British on a very definite basis
and leave the decision to them. It must be
made at once. My object is again to force the
British into acceptance of a concentrated effort
against Germany, and if this proves impossible,
to turn immediately to the Pacific with strong
forces and drive for a decision against Japan.11
-
- Marshall's reasoning was a consistent extension
of the very reasoning that had led the War
Department to propose the concentration of
Arm-forces in the British Isles. The War Department's
aim was to commit the bulk of L;. S. Army forces
to one main front at a time, and thereby to
realize the advantages of long-range planning
over a single main line of overseas communication.
The War Department had adopted this approach
on the assumption that in order to defeat either
Germany or Japan it would probably be necessary
to defeat very large German and Japanese forces
on their home soil. For the War Department,
the danger in opening an additional front was
to be measured, not in terms of the combat
units
- [269]
- initially committed, but in terms of the
ultimate effect on the employment of manpower,
and specifically on the Army troop basis. "Concentrating"
Army forces in the Pacific was in every way
an inferior line of play to concentrating them
in the British Isles (for all the reasons that
the staff had listed in February and March),
but the military staffs assumed it must be
done sooner or later, and it was hence a development
more desirable than the opening of a main offensive
front in the Mediterranean-a development that
the War Department (and the Navy Department)
hoped entirely to avoid.
-
- Upon receiving the proposal, the President,
who was then at Hyde Park, telephoned to ask
General Marshall and Admiral King to prepare
a full exposition of "your Pacific Ocean
alternative" and send it to him that afternoon
by plane. He wanted
- . . . a detailed comprehensive outline of
the plans, including estimated time and overall
totals of ships, planes, and ground forces.
Also, any proposed withdrawal of existing or
proposed use of ships, planes, and ground forces
in the Atlantic.
-
- Finally, he wanted to be advised of the probable
effect of the change on the defense of the
Soviet Union and the Middle East.12
-
- The answer, signed by all three members of
the JCS, began by acknowledging that there
was no plan to cover the case, adding that
though the staffs were at work, it would take
them some time to draw one up. After alluding
to the projected landings in the Solomons,
the hope of extending the operation into New
Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, and the
limitations that had affected these plans,
the memorandum traced the lines of advance
from the South and Southwest Pacific-either
"northward along the TRUK-GUAM-SAIPAN
line" or "northwestward through the
Malay barrier and Borneo to the Philippines"
or along both lines-and mentioned the possibility
of operations from China and (in case of war
between Japan and the USSR) from Siberia.
-
- The memorandum then explained, in simple
terms, the effect on the disposition of forces
and shipping. The effect on naval strength
in the Atlantic would be small, mainly to allow
for "some strengthening of anti-submarine
measures." The effect on Army deployment
would be great. The only ground forces to be
moved across the North Atlantic would be two
divisions to the British Isles and 15,000 troops
to Iceland, to fulfill commitments made at
the ARCADIA Conference. The air forces set
up for BOLERO would be cut back by two thirds,
leaving only eighteen out of fifty-two groups
due to be sent to the British Isles. There
would be a correspondingly great reduction
in service forces.
-
- The shift to the Pacific would cut the rate
of Army deployment. Even if all the shipping
allocated to BOLERO-half of which was British
shipping-were made available for use in the
Pacific, the number of troops that could be
transported (with equipment) each month would
be cut from 100,000 to about 40,000. The greater
distance, any withdrawal of British shipping,
and the lack of developed Pacific bases would
all limit the rate at which forces could be
put into action in the Pacific. Accordingly,
some air units would be held in the United
States and Alaska in readiness for operations
in Siberia. It was as yet too soon to plan
long-range ground force deployment. The short-term
plan was to
- [270]
- divert at once to the Pacific airborne and
parachute units and the three trained amphibious
divisions set up for BOLERO, and additional
troops as necessary to garrison positions seized
from the Japanese.
-
- The memorandum concluded with a statement
of the effect of the shift on the active fronts.
On the Eastern Front it would be unfavorable,
but might be counterbalanced by a favorable
effect on the tar Eastern Front, in case of
war between the USSR and Japan. The effect
of the shift on the position in the Diddle
East would he small, although the change was
likely to have some indirect effect by drawing
the attention of the Japanese away from India.
13
-
- Early in the morning of the next day (Monday,
13 July) General Marshall asked the War Department
for an analysis of what GYMNAST might cost
and what it might accomplish, and for the answer
to several questions concerning the Pacific
alternative:
-
- What is there in the outline of the Pacific
plan prepared on Sunday, July 12, that might
be compromised in favor of providing more means
to the United Kingdom?
- What would be the effect of the Pacific plan
on allocation of landing craft? What has already
gone to England? What can or should be sent
to the Pacific including Alaska?
- What was the effect of the cut in the estimated
production of landing craft for vehicles? 1s
that cut definite and final or could the situation
be improved?
- Is the landing craft already sent to England
sufficient for commando operations?
- If the British give us tonnage, can we afford
to send than more divisions If so, how many?
- What changes in schedule of airplane deliveries
would be effected by a change in the Pacific
plan? Figure out on a time basis what the schedule
of delivery of airplanes would be to England
and to the Pacific area.14
-
- Marshall wanted the answers before Thursday,
16 July.15
The planning staff of SOS went to work
at once to prepare a statement of requirements
and resources for a major deployment against
Japan over the remaining nine months covered
by the BOLERO plan ( July 1942-March 1943 ).16
The statement, submitted by Somervell
on 14- July, was calculated on the diversion
from BOLERO to the war against Japan of all
but thirteen air groups (out of fifty-three),
all but two divisions (out of fourteen; and
most of the service troops:
-
|
Air Groups |
Divisions |
Service Troops |
Siberia and Alaska |
15 |
1 (Alaska) |
19,
500 |
Hawaii |
5 |
1 |
3,600 |
Fijis |
2 |
-- |
1,400 |
New Caledonia |
2 |
2 |
19,400 |
Australia |
14 |
5 |
74,400 |
India |
2 |
3 |
46,400 |
TOTALS |
40 |
12 |
164,
700 |
-
- Somervell measured roughly how far it would
be possible to carry out the shift to the Pacific
with the statement that the backlog of units
built up in the United States, for lack of
ships to move and supply them,
- [271]
- would require an additional construction
program for approximately 400,000 troops. Under
the Pacific alternative, as under the BOLERO
plan, the limiting factor was likely to be
the amount of cargo shipping available. He
estimated that the lack of cargo shipping during
the period might cut back, by perhaps 100,000
men, deployment for which troop shipping would
be available, although, as he remarked in closing,
no forecast of available cargo shipping for
so many months ahead could be very accurate.17
-
- As it turned out, General Marshall had no
occasion to go into the details of the Pacific
plan with the President, nor to reargue the
case against GYMNAST, of which the operations
staff, as instructed, prepared a new version.18
On 14 July the President sent word to
Marshall that he did not approve the Pacific
alternative, that he would confer with him
Wednesday morning (15 July) and probably with
all the members of the JCS in the afternoon,
and that he had "definitely" decided
to send him with Admiral King and Mr. Hopkins
to London "immediately" ( if possible
on Thursday, 16 July).19
At the meeting of the JCS on the afternoon
of 14 July Marshall read the message. General
Wedemeyer took notes on the discussion that
followed
-
- . . it was indicated that unquestionably
the President would require military operations
in Africa. The relative merits of operations
in Africa, in Northwest Africa, and in the
Middle East were discussed. All agreed to the
many arguments previously advanced among military
men in the Army and Navy that operations in
the Pacific would be the alternative if Sledgehammer
or Bolero were not accepted wholeheartedly
by the British. However, there was an acceptance
that apparently
our political system would require major operations
this year in Africa.20
-
- The President objected to the very idea of
delivering an ultimatum to the British. He
made this perfectly clear to Stimson and Marshall
upon his return to Washington on the 15th.21
He also held that it would be a mistake
to try to defeat Japan first. He thought it
would be impracticable until the U.S. Navy
had been greatly strengthened.22
He also held it would be uneconomical
to try to defeat Japan first, for much the
same reason that the War Department held a
Mediterranean offensive to be uneconomical-that
it would not contribute to the defeat of Germany
and would be unnecessary after the defeat of
Germany. On 16 July he stated this view formally
in his instructions to Hopkins, Marshall, and
King on their mission to London:
-
- 9. I am opposed to an American all-out effort
in the Pacific against Japan with the view
to her defeat as quickly as possible. It is
of the utmost importance that we appreciate
that defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany
and that American concentration against Japan
this year or in 1943 increases the chance of
complete German dom-
- [272]
- ination of Europe and Africa. On the other
hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany,
or the holding of Germany in 1942 or in 1943
means probable, eventual defeat of Germany
in the European and African theatres and in
the Near East. Defeat of Germany means the
defeat of Japan, probably without firing a
shot or losing a life.23
-
-
- The President, on his return to Washington
on 15 July, indicated that, as the JCS had
inferred, he would require operations of some
kind in Africa in case the British would not
agree to carry out SLEDGEHAMMER. Of the various
alternatives the JCS had discussed, he was
apparently rather inclined to favor the reinforcement
of the Middle Fast by several American divisions.
On 15 July he gave General Marshall a preliminary
statement of points to govern the negotiations
in London. The first page of the President's
outline read as follows:
- 1. Proceed with Sledgehammer & stay in
France if we can.
- 2. Get all U. S. Troops in action as quickly
as possible.
- 3. Proceed in all other theater., as now
planned.
- 4. Keep up aid to Russia but via Basra.
-
- The second page read
- 1. Abandon Sledgehammer 1942.
- 2. Slow up Bolero 1943 for the coming three
months.
- 3. Take all planes now headed from U. S.
to England & reroute them to (a) Middle
East & Egypt (majority) (b) S. W. Pacific
( minority) .
- 4. Send 5 divisions to England slowly.
- 5. Send 5 divisions to Middle East fast.
- 6. Speed up Bolero preparations by October--so
that Bolero Roundup will be ready April 1943.
- 7. Keep up aid to Russia, but via Basra.24
-
- Some of these points the War Department staff
incorporated in a draft of instructions for
the conference, which Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy
and General Marshall in turn revised. The draft
was addressed to Marshall and King (not Hopkins
).25
The effect of the instructions proposed
by the War Department, had the President adopted
them, would have been simply to rule out any
change in American commitments, or any action
by American ground forces (aside from raids)
across the Atlantic in 1942, except in case
a collapse of Soviet resistance seemed imminent.
The effect would also have been, in any event,
to rule out operations against French North
Africa. In short, the War Department proposed
to stand pat.
-
-
- The President was willing to give his representatives
in London one more chance to persuade the British
to undertake a cross Channel operation in 1942,
but not to put off a decision on an alternative
operation across the Atlantic in case the Prime
Minister held his ground. The President appreciated
the doubts of his military leaders that the
Prime '.Minister might not be any more willing
to undertake an American style cross-Channel
operation in 1943 than
- [273]
- ALTERNATE SETS OF SUGGESTIONS, IN PRESIDENT'S
HANDWRITING, given to General
Marshall on 15 July 1942 to govern the
negotiations at the London conference.
This was a rough
draft; the final instructions were given
to the American delegates the following
day.
-
- Click
here for Text Version
-
- [274]
- [275]
- in 1942, whatever his present professions.26
But he was not disposed to resolve these
doubts by means of an ultimatum, which would
indeed have been ill-adapted to the purpose
of securing the "full," "wholehearted"
collaboration of the proud leader of a great
people.27
Besides, he agreed with the Prime Minister
that a diversion to the Mediterranean would
not rule out a cross Channel operation in 1943.28
Finally, his willingness to take a chance
on future British intentions and on the consequences
of a diversion from BOLERO was reinforced by
his own determination to get "action"
across the Atlantic, which he asked for in
his instructions to Hopkins, Marshall, and
King: "It is of the highest importance
that U. S. ground troops be brought into action
against the enemy in 1942."29
-
- Even these instructions did not in so many
words "require military operations in
Africa." Instead, the President simply
required that his emissaries in London should
reach a decision. The inclusion of Mr. Hopkins
as a member of the mission itself indicated
that the mission had plenary powers, and the
President inserted after the formal opening
sentence a second paragraph, which explicitly
stated the theme of decision
- 2. The military and naval strategic changes
have been so great since Mr. Churchill's visit
to Washington that it becomes necessary to
reach immediate agreement on joint operational
plans between the British and ourselves along
two lines:
- (a) Definite plans for the balance of 1942.
- (b) Tentative plans for the year 1943 . .
. .
- The President then proceeded to eliminate
the central idea of the draft instructions
that decisions should be left contingent on
the outcome of operations on the Eastern Front.
The first step in making the change was to
introduce at once ( as paragraph 3 ) the statement
of principles that had appeared in the draft
instructions as a basis for investigating the
courses of action open "in the event Russian
collapse becomes probable"
- 3. (a) The common aim of the United Nations
must be the defeat of the Axis Powers. There
cannot be compromise on this point.
- (b) We should concentrate our efforts and
avoid dispersion.
- [276]
- (c) Absolute coordinated use of British and
American forces is essential.
- (d) All available U. S. and British forces
should be brought into action as quickly as
they can be profitably used.
- (e) It is of the highest importance that
U. S. ground
troops be brought into action against the enemy
in 1942.30
-
- A second step was to rephrase the policy
to be followed in supplying the USSR. In place
of the bare reference to the continuation of
shipments via the Persian Gulf and the suspension
of the northern convoys, the President introduced
a statement of good hopes and good intentions:
-
- 4. British and American materiel promises
to Russia must be carried out in good faith.
If the Persian route of delivery is used, preference
must be given to combat material. This aid
must continue as long as delivery is possible
and Russia must be encouraged to continue resistance.
Only complete collapse, which seems unthinkable,
should alter this determination on our part.31
-
- A third step was to restate the draft provision
with reference to SLEDGEHAMMER, which the American
representatives were still to urge, but not
as a contingent operation; they were instead
directed (in paragraph 5) : "You should
strongly urge immediate all-out preparations
for it, that it be pushed with utmost vigor,
and that it be executed whether or not Russian
collapse becomes imminent."32
A fourth change was in the provision
for discussions in London in case the American
representatives should conclude (and inform
the President) that SLEDGEHAMMER was "impossible
of execution with reasonable chances of serving
its intended purposes." The President's
own statement of his views was not that the
two nations in that case should go ahead with
plans for Roundup so long as it looked as if
the Red Army could contain large German forces,
but instead
-
- 7. If SLEDGEHAMMER IS finally and definitely
out of the picture, I want you to consider
the world situation as it exists at that time,
and determine upon another place for U. S.
Troops to fight in 1942.33
-
- The passages that followed did not explicitly
limit the choice of "another place"
for an operation in 1942. Instead, the President
simply passed to the point that a cross-Channel
operation in 1943 would apparently depend on
the outcome of operations on the Eastern Front,
and thence to the declaration ( in paragraph
8 ) The Middle East should be held as strongly
as possible whether Russia collapses or not."
After calling attention to the numerous consequences
of the loss of the Middle East, he concluded:
- (8) You will determine the best methods of
holding the Middle East. These methods include
definitely either or both of the following:
- (a) Sending aid and ground forces to the
Persian Gulf, to Syria and to Egypt.
- (b) A new operation in Morocco and Algiers
intended to drive in against the backdoor of
Rommel's armies. The attitude of French Colonial
troops is still in doubt.
-
- The President then made his formal declaration
of opposition to the Pacific alter-
- [277]
- native, and closed with the following admonitions
- 10. Please remember three cardinal principles--speed
of decision on plans, unity of plans, attack
combined with defense but nest defense alone.
This affects the immediate objective of U.
S. ground forces fighting against Germans in
1942.
- 11. I hope for total agreement within one
week of your arrival.34
-
- The President's representatives arrived in
London on Saturday, 18 July. They first conferred
with the Americans stationed there-Admiral
Stark, Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, and General
Spaatz. During the first three days of their
meetings with the British in London (20-22
July) they tried to persuade the British Chiefs
of Staff of the merits of a revised version
of SLEDGEHAMMER that had been hurriedly worked
up by General Eisenhower's staff-an operation
to secure a foothold on the Cotentin (Cherbourg)
peninsula. They urged in its favor the good
effect at the very least of heartening the
Soviet Government by giving concrete evidence
of an intention to engage a part of the German
Army at the first moment, and the advantage
of having a starting point for operations in
1943. By accepting the objective of securing
a "permanent" lodgment on the Continent,
on which the British Government had insisted,
they evaded the chief political objection of
the Prime Minister only to run directly into
the most forcible objections of his Chiefs
of Staff. In short, they had at last to face
the fact that the British Government, in requiring
permanent landings, had set a condition that
the British Chiefs of Staff believed to be
impossible to satisfy. On 22 July, at a conference
attended by the Prime Minister and his principal
military leaders and advisers, the American
representatives acknowledged defeat.35
-
- They reported the impasse to the President,
who owned that he was not altogether surprised
and agreed that the matter might as well be
dropped. He directed them to settle with the
British on one of five alternatives, listing
them in order of preference: (1) a British-American
operation against French North Africa (either
Algeria or Morocco or both) ; ( 2 ) an entirely
American operation against French Morocco (GYMNAST)
; ( 3 ) combined operations against northern
Norway ( JUPITER) ; (4) the reinforcement of
Egypt; (5) the reinforcement of Iran.36
- [278]
-
- In view of the persistence with which General
Marshall had argued the case against GYMNAST,
and the readiness with which he had modified
his opposition to sending American forces to
Egypt, it would have been consistent for him
at this point to propose sending more American
forces to the Middle East. The latest instructions
he had from the President still listed it as
an acceptable course of action. It was also
the course that the War Department operations
staff had recommended. In the series of briefs
compiled on 15 July, the staff had compared
the advantages and disadvantages of the two
courses of action. The advantages of GYMNAST
were that it would have a "shorter and
more secure line of communication," would
remove the threat of German operations in the
South Atlantic, and would furnish bases for
air operations in the Mediterranean. The disadvantages
were that it involved opposed landings, without
adequate port facilities, and would have little
or no direct effect on any critical front of
the war. The staff's conclusion was that the
lesser of the two evils would be to reinforce
the Middle East.37
-
- But General Marshall and Admiral King turned
away from the Middle East alternative, toward
GYMNAST. They were undoubtedly influenced by
a desire to avoid the political and tactical
embarrassments that would unavoidably result
from employing American divisions in any capacity
in the Middle East.38
On this point, the Prime Minister was
apparently in agreement, for unlike his Chiefs
of Staff and in spite of the President's evident
interest, he had never shown any desire to
obtain American ground forces for the Middle
East. Presumably Marshall also took account
of the circumstance that a North African operation
was the one operation that would have the full
support of both the President and the Prime
Minister-a very important consideration when
it came to requisitioning ships, planes, and
naval escort to cam, out an operation-and of
the fact that the Allied assault forces and
the Allied commander would be American.
-
- According to Mr. Hopkins, Marshall and King
turned toward GYMNAST for two reasons: "first,
because of the difficulty of mixing our troops
with the British in Egypt, and secondly because
if we go to Syria we may not do, any fighting
there." 39
Their own explanation, given to the
President as soon as they came back to Washington,
was that they chose the alternative of operations
in French North and Northwest Africa as the
best line of action open in the event the Allies
were compelled, by a dangerous weakening of
Soviet resistance, to abandon the build-up
for a strong cross-Channel attack in 1943.
In their own words
-
- Nothing developed [in the discussions through
22 July] which changed our considered opinion
that Great Britain is the only area from which
the combined strength of the United Nations
can be brought to bear against our principal
enemy-Germany. so that no avoidable reduction
in our preparation for ROUNDUP should be considered
as long as there remains any reasonable possibility
of its successful execution. A Russian
- [279]
- collapse this Fall or a termination of the
present campaign leaving Russia relatively
impotent and incapable of offensive action
would, however, make the objective of a continental
operation in 1943 impossible of attainment.
In this event the United Nations are forced
to a defensive, encircling. line of action
against Germany for the coming year unless
a crackup in German morale, of which there
is no present indication, should occur unexpectedly.
Combined operations against the West and Northwest
Coasts of Africa for the purpose indicated
above is the logical line of action in this
alternative. 40
-
- Thus, in effect, General Marshall and Admiral
King reverted to the characteristic feature
of Marshall's initial agreement with the British
Chiefs of Staff on their June visit to Washington,
a feature that the President had eliminated
from the draft instructions of 15 July- the
idea of waiting a while to see what happened
on the Eastern Front before deciding to divert
forces from BOLERO.
-
- On 24 July Marshall and King proposed this
approach to the British Chiefs of Staff. They
proposed in the first place to go on planning
a cross-Channel operation on a large scale
(ROUNDUP) to be executed by 1 July 1943. They
took note of the decision that SLEDGEHAMMER,
the cross-Channel operation for 1942, was "not
to be undertaken as a scheduled operation."
To satisfy the objections to it which had been
advanced by the British staff during the previous
month, they proposed that preparations for
it be continued only in so far as they did
not "seriously interfere with training
for ROUND-UP."
-
- In the second place, Marshall and King proposed
for 1942 "a combined operation against
the NORTH and NORTHWEST COAST of AFRICA,"
but not as a simple alternative to cross-Channel
operations for the year within the framework
of the accepted strategy of BOLERO. They proposed
instead
-
- That it be understood that a commitment to
this operation renders ROUNDUP, in all probability
impracticable of successful execution in 1943
and therefore that we have definitely accepted
a defensive, encircling line of action for
the CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN THEATER, except as
to air operation.
-
- They proposed that the decision whether to
abandon ROUNDUP and to accept the strategic
defensive be put off till 15 September, and
be made then on the basis of the probable course
of the war in Russia as it would affect the
prospects for successful invasion of the Continent
in the first half of 1943.41
-
- The memorandum of the American Chiefs was
discussed and adopted, with amendments, by
the American and British Chiefs of Staff, meeting
as the CCS. Admiral Pound tended to agree with
General Marshall and Admiral King that GYMNAST,
as the operation in North and Northwest Africa
.was still called, was inconsistent with ROUNDUP.
General Sir Alan Brooke and Air Marshal Portal
did not agree that the two operations were
inconsistent.
-
- In the memorandum as adopted, submitted to
the Prime Minister, and published as CCS 94,
the statement of implications was modified
so as to allow for the British view that an
operation in French North Africa meant no break
in the continuity of combined strategy. In
this version blockade was included with air
operations as an exception to the defensive
strat-
- [280]
- egy involved in undertaking operations in
North and Northwest Africa, and the qualifying
clause was added:
- . . . that the organization, planning, and
training, for eventual entry in the Continent
should continue so that this operation can
be staged should a marked deterioration in
German military strength become apparent, and
the resources of the United Nations, available
after meeting other commitments, so permit.42
-
- As corollaries of the defensive strategy,
if accepted, the American Chiefs proposed releasing
fifteen U.S. air groups committed to BOLERO
and, probably, shipping for the movement of
a division to the Southwest Pacific. The British
Chiefs of Staff agreed. Finally, the American
Chiefs proposed and the British agreed to fix
a pair of limiting dates-the latest practicable
dates for launching the operation and for beginning
to assemble shipping, escort, and troops. They
agreed that 1 December 1942 was the latest
practicable date for launching the operation;
the other date was to be determined after study.
Neither the memorandum as proposed, nor as
adopted, nor the recorded discussion by the
CCS dealt with the critical question whether
this undetermined date might be earlier than
15 September, the limiting date for the decision
not to undertake ROUNDUP.
-
- The memorandum, as proposed and as adopted,
specified that combined plans be worked up
at once. The CCS directed the British Joint
Planners to prepare an outline plan with all
haste. It was agreed, as proposed by the American
Chiefs, that U.S. heavy and medium bomber units
in the United Kingdom would be available for
the operation as needed, and that American
forces committed to the operation would require
British assistance. In the memorandum as proposed
nothing more specific was said about British
troops. In the discussion of the memorandum
General Marshall stated that though assault
troops should all be American, later military
operations to the eastward, inside the Mediterranean,
according to the American understanding, would
be carried out mainly by British forces.43
A provision to this effect was incorporated
by the CCS. Discussion also made it clear that
all were agreed on the need to name at once
a commander for the projected operation.44
-
- Reconvening the following day ( 25 July),
the CCS gave the code name TORCH to the operation
and took up arrangements for command and for
staff planning. They readily agreed on the
appointment of an American TORCH commander,
with headquarters in London, to be responsible
to the CCS for all training and planning for
TORCH and, until it should be decided to mount
TORCH, for SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP as well. On
his arrival, the nucleus of the commander's
staff would be formed in London by a group
of British and U. S. staff planners, but until
the decision should actually be made to mount
TORCH, he should not have operational command.45
- [281]
-
- The first report sent back by Hopkins, on
24 July, of the turn taken toward GYMNAST included
a request that the President should cypress
his own ideas by cable. The President at once
replied in favor of landing in North Africa
as soon as possible, "in order to forestall
air concentrations by the Germans." 46
On the same day General Marshall and
Admiral King sent to the President a message
transmitting the substance of their agreement
with the British Chiefs of Staff (CCS 94 ).
47
-
- On 25 July, Hopkins again summoned the President's
aid, this time asking the President to name
a date for the invasion, not later than 30
October 1942. He explained
-
- Although I believe that the intention here
is to mount the operation aggressively, unless
the written language of the order is precise
them may he difficulties when it comes to carrying
out the orders by the secondary personnel.48
-
- The President at once adopted this cavalier
approach to the carefully qualified agreement
embodied in CCS 94. He sent word that the target
date for the landings should be not later than
30 October and asked Hopkins to tell the Prime
Minister he was "delighted" the decision
had been made and that orders were now "full
speed ahead." 49
The President called in Stimson, Admiral Leahy,
General Arnold, and General McNarney and read
them this message. As McNarney at once reported
to Marshall, the President's decision "had
been reached before we arrived and there was
no discussion as to the relative merits of
his decision and the plan recommended in your
625" (the message summarizing CCS 94)
. The President did say (as quoted by McNarney)
that "he desired action and that
he could see no reason why the withdrawal of
a few troops in 1942 would prevent BOLERO in
1943." 50
-
- By simply ignoring CCS 94, the President
created a curious situation, which the CCS
recognized at their meeting on 30 July, their
first meeting after the return of Marshall
and King from London. Admiral Leahy, who for
the first time';. sat as the senior American
representative, opened the discussion of CCS
94 by suggesting that the date of launching
TORCH should be advanced as far as possible.51
He gave it as his impression
-
- . . . that both the President and the Prim
Minister now firmly believe that the decision
to undertake TORCH has already been reached
and that all preliminary arrangements are proceeding
as rapidly as possible in order that the operation
may be undertaken at the earliest possible
date.
- Sir John Dill said that he, too, understood
that the decision had been made and would he
carried out as quickly as possible.52
General Marshall did not consider the
final de-
- [282]
- cision to have been made.53
He carefully brought the discussion
back to the thesis he and Admiral King had
posed-that a decision to mount TORCH would
be a decision to abandon ROUNDUP. He was now
trying simply to get the President and the
Prime Minister to acknowledge that this was
so, and not to evade or postpone a decision.
He stated that the staff was now at work on
a study "of all implications of TORCH
with a view toward recommending that the operation
be launched at the earliest possible moment."
He conceded that a decision between TORCH and
ROUNDUP should come "almost immediately
because of the logistic considerations involved"-specifically
the conversion of ships for combat loading,
which, according to a "flash estimate"
by the staff, would mean a lapse of over three
months ( ninety-six days) between a decision
and the landings in Africa. Since a decision
could not be postponed till mid-September,
it would not take the form of a decision to
abandon ROUNDUP and, as a corollary, to undertake
TORCH. Instead it would take the form of a
decision to undertake TORCH and, as a corollary,
to abandon ROUNDUP.54
-
- Admiral King adopted the same approach, saying
that it was "his impression that the President
and Prime Minister had not yet reached an agreement
to abandon ROUNDUP in favor of TORCH."
He, too, believed that the "whole case"
should be presented to the President and the
Prime Minister, including the problem-a corollary
to TORCH as it had been to GYMNAST, as he and
General Marshall both warned of maintaining
the security of the British Isles against invasion.55
-
- Admiral Leahy had little choice but to announce
"he would now tell the President that
a definite decision was vet to be made."
He believed it would be "acceptable"
to wait a week, as Marshall and King proposed,
for the results of the staff study under way,
so long as the result would be "a definite
decision, with the date of landing set."
The GCS agreed that they would then report
to the President and Prime Minister "recommending
any necessary change in the date for the decision
to mount TORCH.56
-
- The President promptly forestalled this last
move to bring to his attention the "implications"
of launching an invasion of North Africa. On
the evening of 30 July he concluded the series
of deliberations initiated by the Prime Minister
over two months before with the following announcement
-
- The PRESIDENT stated very definitely that
he, as Commander-in-Chief, had made the decision
that TORCH would be undertaken at the earliest
possible date. He considered that this operation
was now our principal objective and the assembling
of means to carry it out should take precedence
over other operations as, for instance, BOLERO.
He mentioned the desirability of sending a
message immediately to the Prime Minister advising
him that he ( the President), as Commandeer-in-Chief,
had made this decision and requesting his agreement
since we are now, as far as the record in [sic]
concerned, committed to the provisions of C.
C. S. 94. which calls for
- [283]
- the final decision to be made by September
15th.57
-
-
- The President's decision for TORCH did away
with the need for a report from the GCS "recommending
any necessary change in the date for the decision
to mount TORCH." But there remained the
question, then under study: What was the "earliest
possible date" for landing in North Africa'
Was it in fact sound, from a military point
of view, to plan on landings by 30 October
at the latest, according to the suggestion
sent back from London by Hopkins and adopted
by the President' Being told that the CCS were
going to report on this question, the President
agreed to await their recommendation before
communicating with the Prime Minister.59
On 2 August the War Department staff
confirmed the "flash estimate" to
which Marshall had referred in the CCS meeting
of 30 July, and gave the Navy's estimate that
7 November was "the earliest reasonable
date for landing of the force based on availability
of combat loaders." 60
On 4 August the British Chiefs of Staff
set a provisional target date of 7 October.61
On the same day Marshall and King put
the American estimate before the President,
tacitly conceding that the American and British
staffs were not in agreement nor likely to
agree.62
They recommended that he should ask
the Prime Minister to concur in an operation
for 7 November.63
The President took the matter under advisement.64
-
- The difference between the American and British
estimates went beyond a simple difference in
calculations of the time necessary to convert
and assemble troopships for the assault. Nine
of the transports being modified for combat
loading would be ready by 15 September, the
tenth by 1 October. One additional Navy combat
loader would be available by 10 October. But
the boat crews and the landing troops would
still be unprepared. The War Department staff
had allowed time not only to convert ships
but also to complete amphibious training with
rehearsals in which the boat crews and the
assault troops would use the ships as-
- [284]
- signed to them for the operation.65
General Marshall himself insisted on
such rehearsals, this being a point the British
were ready to sacrifice for the sake of speed.66
Still another factor was the time needed
to train the 2d Armored Division and the tank
battalions attached to the 3d and 9th Divisions.
These units were not due to be equipped with
the M4 tank, which they would use in battle,
until 17 September. In calling attention to
this point, the staff warned against the dangers
of improvised expeditions and alluded to the
"disasters" suffered "by the
British in Norway, France, the Balkans, and
in Crete." 67
-
- The disagreement over the target date for
TORCH was symptomatic of disagreement over
the scope of the operation, its objective,
and the risks to be taken. The British planners
envisaged initial landings on a wide front
in the Mediterranean, eastward at least as
far as Algiers, to be followed by forces strong
enough to advance into Tunisia.68
They estimated that the TORCH ground
forces would finally amount to between ten
and twelve divisions. 'the operation would
be timed and aimed to secure the coast of Algeria
and Tunisia before the coming of winter on
the Eastern Front should have eased German
needs for troops in Russia. According to this
plan, landings on the Atlantic coast would
not come at the same time as the landings inside
the Mediterranean, but about three weeks later.
The British doubted that forces could land
against opposition on the Atlantic coast, where
there was usually a heavy surf. And they doubted
that the forces landed on the Atlantic coast
would be of much help to the "main"
operation for some time, since they would be
held back by limited port facilities and poor
land communications with the Mediterranean
coast.69
-
- During the second half of July, in response
to the negotiations in London, the American
staff in Washington had changed over from the
assumptions of GYMNAST ( an all American force
landing at Casablanca on the Atlantic coast
of French Morocco) to the assumptions of SUPER-GYMNAST
(which also involved British
- [285]
- troops and simultaneous landings inside the
Mediterranean at Oran and Algiers).70
They realized that the strategic aim
of the operation would be correspondingly more
ambitious-"Eventual establishment of bases
and additional forces for offensive operations
against LIBYA and ITALY.'" But they still
thought of Casablanca as the "principal
port of debarkation during the early stages
of the operation." 71
By relying on Casablanca, the American
staff hedged against the risk of heavy losses
in ships and escort vessels that might be incurred
in supplying the expedition entirely through
Mediterranean ports and against the risk of
a military debacle in case of rapidly developing
strong opposition. As a corollary, both the
speed and scale of operations in Algeria and
eastward into Tunisia would initially be sharply
restricted by the limited port facilities on
the Atlantic and the slender overland communications.
British staff members conceded that an operation
planned on these terms might be sounder given
a defensive purpose.72
-
- The 9 August Plan
-
- It fell to General Eisenhower to try to reconcile
the divergent views of the operation. Just
before he left London for Washington, General
Marshall, on the afternoon of 26 July, had
personally informed General Eisenhower that
he was to be the Allied commander of the expedition
to North Africa. General Marshall had added
that it would take a little while before the
appointment would be made official, but that,
in the meantime, Eisenhower was to proceed
promptly with the necessary planning.73
Eisenhower was formally designated Commander
in Chief,
- [286]
- Allied Expeditionary Force, in early August
1942.74
Even before his status as the Allied
commander of the North African expedition was
clarified, Eisenhower and his staff went to
work, in close collaboration with the British,
on an outline plan. The War Department reminded
him that landings on the Atlantic coast were
in the American view essential and should come
at the same time as the landings on the Mediterranean
coast. 75
-
- Eisenhower's first outline plan, finished
on 9 August, incorporated the principles of
simultaneous landings and of a landing date
early in November. The plan did take account
of the British warning against landings on
the Atlantic coast. It provided that should
the condition of the surf prevent landing there,
the Casablanca task force should land inside
the Mediterranean instead.76
-
- The British planners had already objected
to the plan, since it did not satisfy their
principal condition: "We must have occupied
the key points of Tunisia within 26 days of
passing Gibraltar and preferably within 14
days." For this purpose they were prepared
to assign one corps (with a high proportion
of armored units) and some fifteen squadrons
of planes (four to five groups) to the operation
against Tunisia. They- therefore believed that
the landings on the Atlantic coast should have
a lower priority than the landings in the Mediterranean.77
-
- General Eisenhower was disposed to agree
with the British planners, as he explained
to General Marshall in sending on their appreciation.
He had cut out the landings eastward of Algiers,
except for a landing by a regimental combat
team at Bone ( to seize the airfield), since
those landings would be exposed to attack by
planes based on Sicily and Sardinia. He had
also concluded that the landings on the Atlantic
coast must be postponed "a few days,"
for lack of air support. There were not enough
aircraft
- [287]
- carriers to cover landings both "inside"
and "outside" the Mediterranean,
nor could the lack be made up by using Gibraltar
as an advance base, since it would be a "dead
give-away" to concentrate planes there
before the invasion:
-
- The airfield there literally lies on the
Spanish border and there is no hope of concealing
activity from spies and agents. Because of
the limitations upon the Gibraltar airfield,
planes cannot be passed through at a sufficient
rate to meet minimum demands on both the north
and west coasts, assuming reasonable success
in seizing airdromes.78
-
- The British Chiefs, to whom the August outline
plan was presented informally, reiterated the
British objections to the American version
of the operation. They reasserted that the
British purpose was the invasion of Tunisia.
"Indeed it can be said," concluded
the British Chiefs, "that the whole conception
of `Torch' may stand or fall on this question
of early Allied occupation of Tunisia."
In order to advance quickly into Tunisia, it
was necessary to land as far east as Bone.
In order to land so far east, it was necessary
to postpone the landing at Casablanca as both
unfeasible and irrelevant. The ultimate success
of the whole operation would necessarily depend
rather on the unpreparedness of the Germans
than on the effectiveness of the expedition
itself. It was only consistent to attack as
soon as the expedition could be assembled,
sacrificing training for speed.79
-
- The 21 August Plan
-
- The criticism by the British Chiefs of Staff'
of the 9 August outline plan had two immediate
results. On 12 August the President directed
Marshall and King to have the project restudied,
stating that it might become desirable or necessary
to launch the operation on 7 October, as proposed
by the British Chiefs, even with only one third
the forces that could be used a month later.80
The second result of British criticism
was that on 13 August General Eisenhower informed
the War Department that the American members
of his staff were now convinced of the soundness
of the British reasoning. Therefore they were
drawing up a new plan in which they were eliminating
the landings at Casablanca and moving up the
date.81
On 14 August he asked what General Marshall
thought of this new version of TORCH.82
In reply, Marshall stated the Washington
view to be that the operation as it was now
proposed would have less than a fifty-fifty
chance of success.83
Eisenhower replied that he concurred
in the Washington estimate, in view of various
logistical and political factors. It was also
the estimate of his deputy, General Clark,
and of General
- [288]
- Patton, who was then in London to confer
on plans for the task force under his command
that would sail direct from the United States.
But they all believed that there was nevertheless
a better than fair chance of success if
Spain were to stay neutral and the French were
not to put up effective resistance.84
-
- Planning went ahead in London on the basis
of the British concept of TORCH, and a second
outline plan was worked out.85
The second outline plan was finished
on 21 August and circulated on 25 August. The
date of landings was moved to 15 October, this
being itself admittedly tentative. The objective
of the operation was in these plans defined
as follows:
-
- A Combined land, sea, and air Assault against
the Mediterranean Coast of ALGERIA, with a
view to the earliest possible occupation of
TUNISIA, and the establishment in FRENCH MOROCCO
of a striking force which can insure control
of the STRAITS of GIBRALTAR, by moving rapidly,
if necessary, into SPANISH MOROCCO.86
-
- The assault forces, with supporting troops
and air force ground elements, were to be brought
in two convoys: one from the United States,
to land forces at Oran; one from the United
Kingdom, which would split in the Mediterranean,
the main force landing at Algiers, and a small
force at Bone. Combat-loaded troops for the
three landings were to amount to about eight
regimental combat teams: four at Oran, three
at Algiers, and one at Bane. The plan called
for an initial Western Force of 39,400, all
elements included, and an estimated total Western
Force of about 250,000, including two armored
and five infantry divisions. As tentatively
estimated, four divisions, two American and
two British, with other troops in proportion,
would make up the Eastern Force, from the United
Kingdom.
-
- General Eisenhower's comment on the 21 August
plan was that in several ways it must be regarded
as tentative: the date was probably too early;
planning for the task force of General Patton,
which was to land at Oran, was not far advanced;
too little was known to be at all sure of the
schedules for United States convoys and for
building up the U. S. air force in the American
sector. Besides, Eisenhower observed, more
thorough study of available naval support was
requiring the reduction of the forces contemplated
to the point where they were no longer strong
enough to deal with resistance that could be
offered, and would at the same time do less
to discourage resistance. Furthermore, the
expedition would be badly exposed on the flank.
It was, he declared, his personal opinion that
simultaneous landings inside the Mediterranean
and at Casablanca would make a great difference,
supposing the two governments could find any
way to cut their commitments elsewhere so as
to provide the additional naval cover to make
the landings possible.87
- [289]
- Objective of Torch
-
- During the week that preceded the issuance
of this second outline plan, no one in Washington
had had an exact idea what form the plan was
taking.88
General Handy had therefore been sent to London
when the second plan was nearly ready,
and there represented the views of General
Marshall and his staff in the discussions that
followed.89
On 22 August he sent a full report to
Washington. Handy, like Eisenhower, emphasized
the weakness of the operation and the threat
to its flank. He concluded that the 21 August
outline plan was too risky, and that TORCH
should either be given up or he replanned with
modest, limited ends. He continued that with
continental or Pacific operations out of the
question, there were still three courses of
action preferable to the plans as they stood.
The best, if naval forces could somehow be
found, would be to carry out TORCH, as Eisenhower
had recommended, with simultaneous landings
inside and outside the Mediterranean. The next
best would be to send General Patton's task
force to the Middle East. This course of action
would formally satisfy the President's condition
that American troops go into action against
the Germans. Should neither of these courses
of action be feasible, there was still a third:
to limit the purpose of TORCH.
-
- If the operation were replanned with limited
ends, Handy observed, TORCH would still provide
for landings inside and outside the Mediterranean,
though not in enough force to give much chance
of occupying the north coast of Africa and
finally of opening the Mediterranean. Plans
should still be based on the date of 7 November
rather than of 15 October, mainly so that the
United States could furnish more of the troops
to be used, and those troops better trained.
Even such an operation was to be preferred
to that currently proposed in London and set
forth in the second outline plan
- such an operation did not run the risk of
a "major debacle." Handy's final
sentence summed up the view of the War Department
staff : it was better to take a chance on the
surf at Casablanca than on the closing of the
Strait of Gibraltar. General Eisenhower and
General Clark agreed with Handy, with the important
reservation that they still thought it better
to go ahead with the operation as currently
planned if the French and Spanish could be
expected to acquiesce. In London, as in Washington,
the operation was regarded as very risky. Handy
reported, as Eisenhower had the week before,
that while the American officers were energetic,
they were nonetheless pessimistic; they were
giving the operation a less than even chance
of succeeding.90
- [290]
- The American staff officers in Washington
were not part of the combined staff charged
with TORCH planning, and therefore were not
inhibited by the existing directive issued
to Eisenhower from taking a position of their
own. The directive had provided for a decisive
move against the German and Italian forces
in North Africa. The opening sentence read:
-
- The President and the Prime Minister have
agreed that combined military operations be
directed against Africa, as early as practicable,
with a view to gaining, in conjunction with
Allied Forces in the Middle East, complete
control of North Africa from the Atlantic to
the Red Sea.
-
- The directive provided for the initial establishment
- ... of firm and mutually supported lodgments
in the Oran-Algiers-Tunis area on the north
coast, and in the Casablanca area on the northwest
coast, in order that appropriate bases for
continued and intensified air, ground and sea
operations will be readily available.91
-
- The operational plans being made in terms
of available resources were no longer in keeping
with the objectives thus defined. The British
had already moved to eliminate the contemplated
landings in the area of Casablanca, or, properly
speaking, to postpone them and leave them contingent,
in order to provide the necessary naval support
for landings inside the Mediterranean, on the
ground that the latter could not be abandoned
without abandoning the objective itself. According
to the War Department, the step they had taken
was illogical.92
The circumstance that had led to taking
it--that less was available than had been assumed
at first-required that the objective itself
be redefined. The chance of reaching the objective
originally set was altered quite as much by
eliminating one phase as by eliminating the
other. The War Department staff therefore proposed
limiting the objective to "the early and
complete military domination of Northwest Africa
from Rio de Oro, exclusive, to Oran, inclusive."
Within these limits, the operation would initially
establish "firm and mutually supporting
lodgments in the Agidir [sic] Marrakech-Casablanca-Rabat-Fez
area in French Morocco and in the Oran-Mostaganem-Mascara
area in Algeria." 93
On 25 August the JCS proposed such a
directive, which became the starting point
for a new series of discussions.94
As Handy pointed out, this was in effect
the third course of action that he had proposed.95
- [291]
- The British Chiefs of Staff' now declared
themselves willing to put off the operation
till November so as to be able to land in three
places, with additional naval escort, as Eisenhower
had recommended on 23 August to the CCS and
as Handy had recommended on 22 August to Marshall.
Eisenhower reported that he had not encouraged
them to expect that the additional naval escort
could be obtained.96
Marshall
replied that it could not be provided.97
-
- The British staff's in London and Washington
were as strongly opposed to the modified directive
of the JCS is they had been to the first outline
plan (of 9 August) and as the War Department
had been to the second outline plan (of 21
August). The British position was that the
limited operation, even though it at first
risked less, ran in the end the same risks,
without any prospect of gain. The JCS reiterated
that it did not run the two risks that must
not be run-prolonged attrition at a high rate
to shipping and escort vessels, and a
disaster involving American arms, which would
have the most serious effects all over the
world.98
-
- At this point the President and the Prime
Minister intervened and within a week agreed
on a definite version of the operation. On
30 August, replying to a message from the Prime
Minister, the President confirmed the demand
for a landing on the Atlantic coast, and recognized
that currently only one other initial landing
seemed possible. The President proposed,
however, that the two governments reconsider
economies in use of naval escort so as to provide
for a third landing. If it still could not
be made, the President expected to be able
to arrange for an unopposed landing at Algiers
within a week after the other landings. The
President was still hoping for an early date.99
-
- The Prime Minister and his staff remained
full of misgivings and very reluctant to abandon
the landings at Algiers.100
In view of this response the President, on
the recommendation of the JCS, proposed a reduction
in the Oran force in order to
- [292]
- provide one
regimental combat team as part of a force to
land at Algiers.101
The Prime Minister and his staff finding this
still inadequate, the JCS on 3 September recommended,
and the President on 4 September proposed,
a similar reduction in the force for Casablanca.102
On 5 September the Prime Minister agreed,
and on the same day Allied Force Headquarters
( AFHQ ) in London issued a third outline plan
incorporating these modifications.103
The fifth of September marked the end of the
debating phase of TORCH planning.
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- Page created 10 January 2002
Endnotes
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