Endnotes for Chapter VIII
1 For Eisenhower's studies, see above, Ch. VII.
2 See provisions of JCS 23 discussed in Ch. VII, above.
3 See above, Ch. V.
4 CPS 2, 22 Jan 42, title: SUPER-GYMNAST.
5 (1) Min, 2d mtg CPS, 2 Feb 42. (2) CPS 2/1, 10 Feb 42, title:
SUPER-GYMNAST. (3) CPS 2; 2, 10 Feb 42, same title. (4) Min, 3d mtg CPS,
14 Feb 42. (5) CCS 5/2, 3 Mar 42, same title.
6 CCS 5/2, 3 Mar 42. At this time it became known that Vichy was furnishing war materials
for the use of Axis troops in Libya. The U. S. Government issued a
strong note threatening the recall of the American ambassador. For
accounts of this crisis in relations between the United States and the
Vichy government, see: (1) Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, pp. 233-37, and
(2) Leahy, I Was There, pp. 76-77.
7 The Army planners remained of the opinion that the "results
obtained from this effort, even if successful," were "not apt
to be decisive." (WPD brief, Notes on . . . 9th mtg CCS, 3 Mar 42,
with CCS 5/2 in ABC 381 GYMNAST (1-15-42).)
8 For the modified SUPER-GYMNAST plan, see: (1) CCS 5, 20 Jan 42,
title: SUPER-GYMNAST; (2) CCS 5/1 [22 Jan 42], same title; (3) min, 1st
mtg CCS, 23 Jan 42: and (4) min, 1st mtg CPS, 25 Jan 42. (By the time
the modified .SUPER GYMNAST would have been possible, the whale project
was virtually dead.)
9 Memo, G-4 for WPD, 14 Feb 42, sub: Shipping for SUPER-GYMNAST, WPD
4511-65, circulated as CPS 2!3. For General Gerow's original inquiry,
which led to the submission of the G-4 memo, see min cited n. 5(4).
10 CCS 5/2, 3 Mar 42.
11 Ibid.
12 Min, 9th mtg CCS, 3 Mar 42. The combined planners recommended,
however, that "the US and British commanders should continue their
plans as far as possible," and they did. The War Department plan was already finished, and the convoy schedules
for the combined British-American operation were completed in April. Cal. John E. Hull finished
the convoy program with a British staff officer, Brigadier G. K. Bourne,
before "putting the plan in cold storage." ( See (1) min,
12th mtg CPS, 26 Mar 42, and (2) ltr, Bourne to 1-lull, 6 Apr 42.
GYMNAST and SUPER-GYMNAST, Development File, G-3 Regd Docs.)
13 Ltr, Prime Minister to President, 4 Mar 42, CCS 56 in ABC 311.5
(1-30-42). This statement
about GYMNAST greatly relieved the minds of the CCS, who were at the moment deliberating on ways of informing the President and Prime Minister that
SUPER-GYM was not feasible. (See min, 9th mtg CCS, 3 Mar 42.)
14 Msg, President to Prime Minister, 9 Mar 42, filed with CCS 56/1
in ABC 311.5 (1-30 -42).
15 Msg, Prime minister to President, 18 Mar 42, filed with CCS 56/I
in ABC 311.5 (1-30-42).
16 Memo, WPD for CGs .4GF, AAF, and SOS, 22 Liar 42, sub: Opns
SUPER-GYM, OPD 320.2 Air Corps, 6. This memo carried out CPS
recommendations of 3 Mar 42 in CCS 5/2.
17 (1) Study by Lt Col Edwin E. Schwien [penciled date, August
1941], title: An Essential Strategic Diversion in Europe, WPD 4402-77.
(2) See also, memo, Cal Scobey (WPD) for Lt Col Ralph C. Smith (G-2), 24
Sep 41, sub: Strategical Diversion Paper by Col Schwien, WPD 4402-77.
18 See above, Ch. III, pp. 45, 58-61.
19 Memo, Eisenhower for CofS, 28 Feb 42, sub: Strategic Conceptions
and their Application to SW Pacific, Env 35, Exec 4.
20 JPS 2/5, 6 Mar 42, title: Review of Strategic Sit in Japanese Theater of War.
21 JPS 2/6, 6 Mar 42, title: Strategic Deployment of the Land, Sea and Air Forces of U. S.
22 Ibid., and Annexes A-H thereto.
23 See JPS 2/6, Annex C-Forces Req for Offensive Action in European Theater. This paper contains a discussion of "projected offensive operations in Europe" in two parts: "Strategic Considerations" and "A Plan for Invasion of Europe."
24 JCS 23, App II, submitted to JCS, 14 Mar 42.
25 (1) Min, 6th mtg JCS, 16 mar 42. (2) See above, Ch VII.
26 Min, 7th mtg JCS, 23 mar 42.
27 (1) Br War Cabinet-Jt Plng Stf study, 9 Dec, 41, title: Opns on
Continent in Final Phase. 21 Ltr, Sir John Dill to Gen Marshall, 16 Mar
42. Dill simply turned this copy of the British study over to Marshall
personally "apropos of the offensive about which we spoke
today." (3) Ltr, Marshall to Dill, n.d. Copies of all three filed
in front of CPS 2Ei/D in ABC 381 BOLERO (3- 16-92), 1. This British
study, JP (41) 823 (0), was marked as the second revised draft. The CPS
used a later, almost identical draft, dated 24 December 1941, which bore
the code name Roundup, for their studies. (See CPS 26/1, 3 Apr 42. A
copy of 24 Dec study is in JCS rcds, CCS 381 (3 23-42), 1.)
28 (1) Min cited n. 26. (2) Min, 13th mtg CCS, 24 Mar 42. (3)
CPS 26/D, 25 Mar 42, title: Directive/Offensive Opns in Europe.
29 CPS 26/D, 25 Mar 42.
30 CPS 26/1, 3 Apr 42, title: Offensive Opns in Europe. The
subcommittee used a British study (Opn ROUNDUP, JP (41) 1028, 24 Dec
41) as a basis for determining the maximum effort possible in one day
in the landing area in northern France, and an American study (App I,
Annex (;, JCS 23) in reaching an estimate of the minimum number of
troops required for the operation.
31 Notes on 10th mtg JPS, 4 Apr 42, with CPS 26/1 in ABC 381 Bolero
(3-16-42), 1. These two provisos for a 1942 operation were
incorporated in the assumptions of the OPD modified plan for 1942,
contained in the outline plan for invasion of Western Europe which
General Marshall took to London in April. Not all the American planners
agreed with the flat statement in the conclusions of the draft reply of
CPS 26/1 that the operation was impossible in 1942. (See comments,
"Jessbe" [Col Jesmond D. Balmer] for Col Albert C. Wedemeyer,
on CPS 26/1, 3 Apr 42, title: Offensive Opns In Europe, ABC 381 Bolero (3-16-42), 2.)
32 Memo, Eisenhower for CofS, 25 Mar 12, sub: Critical Points in
Development of Coordinated Viewpoint as to Maj Tasks of the War, OPD 381
BOLERO, 6. Attached are tables of ground forces and landing craft and
on separate slip of paper, Marshall's penned note: "Hold for me.
GCM."
For reference to the "Pacific alternative" discussed in
JCS 23 in connection with deployment studies, see above, p. 161.
33 (1) Stimson and Bandy, On Active Service, pp. 416-17. (2)
Min cited n. 26. (3) Memo, Col John R. Drano for Cans Arnold and Eisenhower,
n.d., no sub, Tab Misc, Book 4, Exec 8.
34 Informal rnemo, Col Louis J. Compton, Chief, Br Empire Branch,
G-2, for WPD, 25 Mar 42, sub: Br Forces Available for an Invasion of
Continent, Book 1, ABC: 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4.
35 (1) Memo, Col Thomas D. Davis (OPD) for Col Hull, 27 Mar
42, sub: Availability of Certain Maj Units. (2) Memo, G-4 for OPD, 26 Mar 42, sub: Availability of Equip for
Certain Maj Units. Memo, G-4 for
OPD, 27 liar 42, sub: Est Dates by Which Certain
Divs will be Equipped. (4) Memo, G-3 for WPD, 26 Mar 42, sub:
Readiness for Combat of Units. All in Tab 13, Book 2, ABC 381 BOLERO
(3-16-42), 4.
36 Memo, Hq AGF for ACofS OPD (Attn: Col Arthur S. Nevins), 2
Apr 42, sub: Opns Plan W Europe, Book 1, ABC Bolero (3-16-42),
4.
37 (1) Draft study, n.d., title: Brief of Air Opns in Support of
Invasion of N France, Book 1, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4. (2)
Memo, Arnold for Marshall, 30 Mar 42, sub: Air Support of Continental
Invasion from Br Isles (to accompany WPD App, Sec V of
"Plan for Operations in North west Europe,(27 Mar 42), with JPS 26/D in ABC 381
BOLERO (3-16-42), 1.
38 (1) Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch.
XII, p. 20, MS. (2) Memo, Col Stokes, Chief, Plng Br, SOS, for Col
Hull, 27 Mar 42, sub: Shipping Est, Tab 14, Book 2, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-
42), 4. (3) Table, 1 Apr 42, title: Shipping Capabilities in 1942. (4) Draft table, n.d., title: Landing
Craft Available. Last two
in Book 1, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4.
39 This plan was prepared by Lt Cal Voris H. Connor under supervision
of Col Hull in Future Plans See, S&P Gp, OPD, title: Plan for Opns
in Europe, copy filed AAG 381 War Plans, Sec G. No copy retained in OPD
files. An appendix in six sections is attached: I, Topography and
Communications: II, Coast Line from the Seine to the Scheldt III,
Enemy Forces in West Europe; IV, 'Fable of Landing Craft Availability;
V, Brief of Air Operations in Support of Invasion of -Northern France:
and VI, Outline of Ground Operations.
40 The only documentary record dating the submission of the outline
plan to the Chief of Staff is in the OPD 1700 Report, 1 Apr 42, Current
Gp Files, DRB AGO.
41 For presidential approval, sec: (1) Stinson and Bundy, On
Active Service, pp. 418-19 (Stimson said the President accepted the
BOLERO Plan on 1 April) ; and (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, y.
521. A memorandum drafted by OPD referred to the "President's
tentative decision of April 2nd, respecting our major effort." (See memo, ACofS for King
[COMINCH and CNO], 6 Apr 42, sub: Strategic.
Deployment in Pacific against Japan, OPD 381 PTO, 10. ) The tentative
nature of the decision presumably derived front the fact that final
decision required British approval. Thus the date of approval may have
been either 1 or 2 April, or possibly both. (For the different versions
of the plan, sec Appendix .4 below, p. 383.)
42 See msg, President to Prime Minister, 9 Mar 42, . 115, with memo,
SW for CofS, 25 Mar 42, in ABC 371 (3-5-42). Very much the same view, emphasizing an air effort, had been taken by
Hopkins. On 14 March hr wrote a memorandum to the President on
"Matters of Immediate :Military Concern," stressing the
importance of "getting some sort of a front this summer against
Germany." (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 521. (2) See
also the President's loner to the Prime Minister on 18 March 1942, in
Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 299-301.
43 (1) Sec memo, Actg CofS for SW, 12 Apr 42, sub: Review of Current
Sit, OPD 381 BOLERO, 6, for reference to Marshall's position as
negotiator "in the name of the President." The memorandum was
drafted by Eisenhower. (2) See paper, n.d., title: Opn Modicum, ABC
381 BOLERO (3-16-42), for composition of delegation. In addition to Hopkins and Marshall,
the party included Col. Wedemeyer, OPD; Col. Howard A. Craig, Air
Farces planner: and Comdr. James R. Fulton, physician to Hopkins.
44 Tab A, Item 5a, Exec 1. This is the Chief of Staff's notebook.
See Appendix A below, p. 384.
45 The preparatory phase constituted what later became known by the
code name BOLERO. The contingency mentioned as part (3) of this
preparatory phase (a) became known as SLEDGEHAMMER. The actual
cross-Channel movement and the consolidation (b. and c.) became known
as Roundup
46 For detailed discussion of shipping and landing craft problems,
see Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII, pp.
29-37, 100-109, MS.
47 Ibid., Ch. XII, p. 27, MS.
48 Eisenhower had for some time been trying to get information on,
and awaken interest in, the production of landing craft. (Item 3, OPD
Hist Unit File.) He noted, on 24 January 1942: "Went to Bill Somervell
this a. m. to find out what he knows about this landing craft
business. He has known nothing of it to date-but is having the matter
looked up." Again, 28 February 1942, he noted: "I wonder when
we're going to get dope on landing craft!" A few days later, 9
March 1942, he noted: "Gen McNaughton (Comdg Canadians in Britain)
conic to see me . . . . He is over heir in an effort to speed up landing
craft production and cargo ships . . . . How I hope he can do something
on landing craft." (See below, pp. 192-94, for landing craft
developments.)
49 This was in line with the "middle-of-the-road" proposal
(C) of JCS 23, 14 March 1942. (See above, Ch.VII)
50 The issue was still being debated in Washington in the combined
staff during the time that the Marshall Memorandum was bring
presented to the American and British Governments.
51 (1), mtg, U. S. Reps-Br CsofS, London, 9 Apr 42, Tab D, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5. (2)
See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins,
p. 523, for Hopkins' notes on this first meeting.
52 (1) Min cited n. 51(1). (2) Min, mtg, BrAmer Plng Stfs, London,
11 Apr 42, Tab 1, ABC 381 BOLERO (.3-16-421), 5.
53 Min cited n. 51 (1).
54 Min, mtg, 10 Apr 42, no tab (left side of file), ABC. 381
BOLERO (3-16 42).
55 Min cited n. 52 (2).
56 Paper, Br CsofS, 13 Apr 42, title: Comments on Gen Marshall's Memo,
COS (42) 97 (O), Tab F, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5.
57 Min, mtg, U. S. Reps-Br CsofS, London, 14 Apr 42, Tab E, ABC 381
BOLERO (3-16-42), 5.
58 Tabs D and E, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16- 42) , 5.
59 (1) Min cited n. 57. (2) Paper cited n. 56.
60 (1) Min, mtg, U. S. Reps-Br War Cabinet Def Coin, 14 Apr 42, WDCSA
381, 1 (SS), atchd to ltr, Maj Gen Sir Hastings Ismay to Gen Marshall,
17 Apr 42, referring to "the historic erecting held at No. 10
Downing Street." (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 534-36.
(3) Churchill, Hinge of Fete, pp. 316--20. (4) The Prime Minister had
personally advised Marshall of his acceptance on 12 April .Msg,
Marshall to McNarney, 12 Apr 42, CM-IN 3210. (5) For announcement to the War
Department of the formal acceptance by the British Government, see msg,
Marshall to Stimson, 15 Apr 42, CM-IN 3939.
61 Msg, Marshall to McNarney, 13 Apr 42, CM-IN 3457.
62 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 323-24.
63 (1) Paper cited n. 56. (2) Msg, Prime Minister to President, 17
Apr 42, No. 70, Book 1, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4. (3) Churchill,
Hinge of Fate, pp. 181-85.
64 For establishment of the Truth Air Force in India, see above,
Ch. VI. For negotiations following on British requests for U. S.
reinforcements in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean area, see below,
Chs. IX, X.
65 Msg, President to Prime Minister, 22 Apr 42, No. 139, Book 1, ABC
381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4.
66 Notations by Eisenhower, 20 Apr 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit
File.
67 SLEDGEHAMMER and Roundup were British code names. The name Roundup had been assigned to the 1941 British study for a cross-Channel
operation in 1943 mentioned earlier in the text. The retention of the
sane code name was doubtless intentional but altogether inappropriate,
given the very different strategic assumptions of the 1941 British study
and the 1942 American proposal.
68 For an account of this whole aspect of the London conference,
see Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII.
69 CMT, 5/3 8 May 42, title: Availability of UN Shipping for Mil
Transport.
70 Memo, Col Hull for ACofS OPD, 21 May 42, sub: Tr Mvmt Sheds for
BOLERO and NABOB, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 1. NABOB was the U. S. Navy
code name for Northern Ireland.
71 CPS 2614, 7 Jun 42, title: BOLERO Emb Sched. For accounts of the deployment programs as well as troop and cargo
movements to the United Kingdom in the summer of 1942 for BOLERO, see:
(1) Strategic Plans Unit Study 2, OCMH Files, and (2) Leighton and
Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII.
72 See Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII,
p. 100, MS.
73 Memo, Gen Eisenhower for Lt Gen Somervell, 10 Apr 42, sub:
Landing Craft to be Available Sep 15 for BOLERO, OPD 560, 5.
74 (1) Tab P, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5. (2) See also p. 187,
above.
75 (1) Min, 3d mtg, U. S.-Br Planners, London, 12 Apr 42, Tab P,
ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5. (2) Paper by Capt Hughes-Hallett, RN,
16 Apr 42, title: Landing Craft Req to Carry out Marshall's Plan, Book
2, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4. See also, min, mtg with Vice Adm Lord Louis Mountbatten and his stf,
28 May 42, in Eisenhower's account of the BOLERO trip, 23- ;i0 May 42,
with CCS 72 in ABC: 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 1.
76 Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII.
77 Memo, Marshall for Somervell and Eisenhower,16 May 42, no sub, Item
4, Exec 1. Admirals King and Land, Harry Hopkins, and Donald M. Nelson
were present.
78 See Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII.
79 Min, mtg, Sp Com on Landing Graft . . . , 6 May 42, Tab 28, Book
2, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16- 42), 4.
80 potations by Eisenhower, 6 May 42 entry, Item 3, OPD I-list Unit
File.
81 Memo, Gen Somervell and Admiral Horne for President, 14 May
42, sub: Landing Graft for BOLERO Opn, WDCSA 400 (S).
82 Memo, Marshall for Eisenhower and Somervell, 16 May 42, no sub,
OPD 381 BOLERO, 10.
83 See min, 17th mtg CPS, 14 May 42, and min, 24th rntg CCS, 10
Jun 42. The production of landing craft from mid-May into the summon was
greatly affected by strategic developernents discussed below, Chs.
X-XIII. For later debates on the program, see especially: (1) CCS 78, 7 Jun 42, title: Landing
Craft; (2) min, 24th mtg CCS, 10 June 42: (3)
memo, Eisenhower for Somervell, 13 Jun 42, sub: Landing Craft, Book
3, ABC 381 BOLERO (3 16-42), 4. For discussion, see Cordon A. Harrison, Cross
Channel Attack.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing
Office, 19;11), Ch. I: Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 554; and
George F. Mowry, Landing (:raft and the War Production Board
Historical Reports on War Administration: WPB Special Study . 11 (rev.
ed., Washington, 1946).
84 (1) JCS 30, 5 Ape 42, title: Priorities in Pdn of Mun Based
on Strategic Considerations. (2) Min, 9th mtg JCS, 6 Ape 42. (3)
Min, 13th mtg JCS, 4 May 42. (4) Pers ltr, President to Nelson, 4 May
42, with JCS 30 in ABC 400 (2-17-42), 1.
85 (1) Min, 12th mtg CCS, 17 Mar 42. (2) CCS 50/2, 23 Mar 42, title:
Directive for Asgmt of Mun.
86 The provision to give troops in training 100 percent equipment
was based on a recommendation of Colonel Handy, who feared that the
policy suggested earlier by the British of strictly limiting the use
of equipment and ammunition except in combat areas would destroy the U.
S. Army training program and relegate the United States to the role of
wartime arsenal. See (1) memo, Handy for Jt Secretariat 21 Mar 42, no
sub with CPS 17/1/D and (2) W PD notes on agenda, 9th mtg CCS, 3 Mar
42, with CCS 50, both in ABC 400 (2-17- 42), 1: (3) min, 9th mtg CPS, 19
Mar 42; and (4) memo, WPD far Marshall, n.d., sub: Points Raised by Sir
John Dill re CCS 55, with CCS 55 in ABC 400 (2-17 421, 1
87 Memo, JPS for Rear Adm Charles M. Cooke, Jr., Brie Gen
Thomas T. Handy, et al., 2 Jun 42, sub: Amendment of CCS 50/2,
Directive for Asgmt of Mun, ABC: 400 (2-17-42), 1. This amendment
was approved by the JPS, CPS, JCS, and CCS in early June. See (1)
ruin, 18th mtg CPS, 5 Jun 42, and (2) min, 24th mtg CCS, 10 Jun 42.
88 Memo, OPD for CofS [10] Ape 42, sub: Proposed Deployment of
AGF and AAF for 1942 as Basis for Asgmt of fun, with JCS 23 in ABC :170
(1-28-42). The three charts prepared by OPD were entitled: (a)
Tentative Deployment of AGF for 1942: (b) Tentative Deployment of
USAAF-1942 (Transport, Observation, and Training) ; and
tentative Deployment of USAAF Combat Units 1942. Together, these charts
comprised "The Tentative Deployment of United States Forces (TEDA).
(see AG Regd Docs File: TEDA )
89 The document, informally called TDUN and dated 27 April 1942,
consisted of appendices to the earlier report on munitions assignment
(GCS 50121, filed with CCS 50/2 in ABC; 400 (2 1742), 1.
90 Min, 17th mtg CCS, 28 Ape 42.
91 (1) Memo, CofS for President, 5 May 42, sub: Increase in
Strength of Army, WDCSA 320.2, I, 1942-43. (2) Memo, OCS, Washington,
for CGs, AGE, AAF, SOS, ACofS, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, and OPD, 19 May
42, no sub, OPD 320.2 Bolero (5-20-42) , 8.
92 Pers ltr, Col Hull, OPD, to Brig Gen Charles L. Bolte, Hq USAFBI,
19 May 42, Tab 57, Book 2, ABC: 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4.
93 Memo, Wedemeyer for Eisenhower, 4 May 42, sub: Reexamination of
Victory Program, Tab Misc, Book 5, Exec 8.
94 Eisenhower's account of the BOLERO trip, 23 30 May 42, with CCS 72
in ABC: 381 BOLERO (316-42), 1.
95 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 582. For Mountbatten's visit
to Washington, see below, Ch. XI.
96 Notations by Eisenhower, 4 Jun 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit
File.
97 Msg, Marshall to CG USAFBI, London, 8 Jun 42, CM-OUT 1697. This
directive was repeated in a message dispatched to Iceland on 22 June.
See (1) msg, OPD to INDIGO, 22 Jun 42, CM-OUT 5458 : (2) notations
by Eisenhower, 11 Jun 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File.
98 The ETO included Finland, Norway, Sweden, the British
Isles, and Iceland: a considerable portion of the Continent of Europe,
including the Iberian Peninsula, Italy, France, the Low Countries, and
Germany as then defined. ( See msg, Marshall to CG U. S. Forces,
London, INDIGO, and Iceland, 10 Jun 42, CM-OUT 3810 (6/16/42). This
message was dated 10 June but actually not sent until 16 June.)
99 Min, 24th mtg CCS, 10 Jun 42.
100 Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Chancy, London, 11 Jun 42,
CM-OUT 2543. Chancy served briefly as head of the newly designated
command until his departure on 20 June.
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