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Last updated 19 October 2004 |
Endnotes for Chapter XI
1 The President had no systematic staff work (in the Army sense of the term) done at his own level of authority except for the limited assistance offered by the Bureau of the Budget. See Chs. VI and XVI.
2 The problems of staff organization and procedure that came up and the solutions that were adopted during the later war years are discussed at some length in the following chapters insofar as they affected the internal workings or the external relations of OPD. For a treatment of these problems and their solutions from the point of view of the General Staff as a whole, see Nelson, National Security and The General Staff. He cites or quotes a great many documents, not readily available elsewhere, which mark important administrative changes.
3 Originally most Army officers assumed and at one point, in the autumn of 1943, it seemed certain that General. Marshall would become the Allied commander of the invasion of France, possibly of the whole European-Mediterranean area. The President finally decided to keep him in Washington rather than to bring General Eisenhower back to a new and exceedingly difficult job. See: (1) Stimson, On Active Service in Peace and War, pp. 437-42; (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 802-03; and (3) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 196-209.
4 See App. A.
5 Memo, Brig Gen G. A. Lincoln for author, 3 Dec 47, sub: Hist of OPD, OPD Hist Unit Comments file.
6 Pers ltr, Lt Gen Hull to Lt Gen Smith, 4 Dec 44, Paper 34, Item 9, Exec 2.
7 Colonel Maddocks had been named special assistant to the chief of S&P during several months in mid-1943 when he was primarily engaged in committee work on several basic War Department policies of interest to OPD.
8 For the main enterprises of Current Section and Current Group under General North, see Ch. VIII. For new duties in 1944 and 1945, see OPD Hist Unit Study Q.
9 Memo, Lt Col James Stack, Asst Exec OPD for Gps & Secs, OPD, 31 Mar 45, sub: Establishment of Pan-American Gp, OPD, OPD 321.19 OPD, 86. For the significance of the organization of American Section and Pan-American Group see Ch. XVI.
10 The volume of business handled by the Theater Group corresponded fairly closely with the development and degree of activity of the overseas commands. Theater Group officers in 1944, OPD calculated, spent an average of 62 hours a week on the job, while S&P officers reported an average of 66, that is, eleven hours a day, six days a week. Memo, Exec OPD for Maj Gen Handy, 21 May 44, sub: Offs on Dy in Washington, OPD 210.3, 279. The Logistics Group simply informed its officers in 1943: "Working Hours—This group will function seven days a week. Officers will be available for duty twenty four hours a day." Memo, Exec Logistics Gp for All Sec Chiefs, Logistics Gp, 28 Apr 43, sub: SOP No. 1, OPD 321.19 OPD, 5. Cf. memo, Chief Logistics Gp for Exec OPD, 14 May 43, sub: 24 Hr Dy, OPD 321.19 OPD, 7.
11 Detailed illustrations or evidence in support of generalizations about personnel and personnel policy are not included in this chapter. For such material, extensively documented, see OPD Hist Unit Study X.
12 Pers Authorization 5, Chief Pers & Adm, OCS for OPD, 25 Aug 45, OPD 210.3, 152/27.
13 OPD consistently had a larger staff than the other General Staff Divisions combined. For instance, in March 1944 OPD had an authorized strength of 179 commissioned officers while the combined G's (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4) had 100. See memo, Maj James Stack for Col Gailey, 20 Mar 44, sub: Allocation of Commissioned Grs to OPD, Paper 418, Book 16, Exec 9. As of January 1945 OPD had 190 officers authorized, while the four G's were allotted 159. See Summary Sheet, Chief Pers, & Adm, OCS for Col H. I. Hodes, 6 Jan 45, sub: Off Strength—Atzd & Actual, WDGS & WDSS, WDCSA 320.21, 66.
14 Statements about officer authorizations are based on information in the
following table prepared from documents issued on the dates listed:
Percentages of Field Grades Allocated to OPD in Total Authorized
Commissioned Officer Strength
| General Officersa and Colonels | Lieu tenant Colonels | Majors | Total Authorized Strengthb | |
| Percent | Percent | Percent | ||
| (1) 1 Apr 42 | 24.3 | 37.3 | 30.8 | 107 |
| (2) 17 Aug 42 | 22.8 | 35.8 | 32.7 | 162 |
| (3) 21 Apr 43 | 24.0 | 35.1 | 37.0 | 162 |
| (4) 20 Sep 43 | 28.3 | 42.7 | 26.5 | 173 |
| (5) 15 Mar 44 | 28.4 | 43.0 | 26.2 | 179 |
| (6) 21 Sep 44 | 38.2 | 40.3 | 18.3 | 191 |
| (7) 5 Apr 45 | 38.9 | 39.4 | 18.9 | 190 |
| (8) 25 Aug 45 | 41.4 | 39.8 | 15.5 | 193 |
15 For a statement to this effect, see memo, OPD for G-1, 21 Apr 43, sub: Readjustment in Almt of Offs, OPD 210.3, 152;3.
16 After a promotion study made by G-1 in the summer of 1944, promotions in the AUS (Air Corps) under Public Law 455 were discontinued for all but exceptional cases, and officers holding rank in AUS (Air Corps) higher than Army of the United States were given equivalent AUS rank. To prevent a complete block in promotions for other than Army Air Forces officers, allocations were provided to the divisions to adjust these grades. This policy change gave OPD 17 colonel's positions in lieu of 8 lieutenant colonels, 8 majors, and 1 captain.
17 Memo, Lt Gen McNarney, DCofS for G-1, G-3, G-4, OPD, and three major commands, 1 Jan 44, sub: Changes in Supply Procedure & Supply Levels, WDCSA 400 (1 Jan 44), 1.
18 Memo, Col Gailey for Brig Gen Handy, 27 Dec 43, sub: Pers Matters, OPD 210.3, 224.
19 Draft memo, OPD for G-1, 10 Aug 44, sub: RA Fld Offs of Grd Arms Not Under AGF Jurisdiction, OPD 210.3, 315.
20 For a statement of officer shortages in field grades experienced by the Army Ground Forces, see Palmer et al, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, p. 133.
21 Memo, G-1 for CofS, 14 Aug 44, sub: Release of Offs to AGF, OPD 210.3, 315.
22 (1) Memo, Col Gailey, Exec OPD for Brig Gens C. A. Russell, P. H. Tansey, F. N. Roberts, and Thomas North, 16 Aug 44, no sub, Paper 12, Item 9, Exec 2. (2) List, Roster of Offs, OPD, on Dy Two Yrs to 31 Dec 44, Paper 3, Item 9, Exec 2.
23 Pers ltr, Maj Gen Handy to Lt Gen Devers, 30 Aug 44, Paper 22, Item 9, Exec 2.
24 For statistics and names of officers, see: (1) List, OPD Offs Who Have Been Permanently Assigned to O'Seas Ts (14 Mar 44), Paper 401, Book 16, Exec 9; (2) memo, unsigned, for Col Gailey, 15 May 44, no sub, Paper 707, Book 18, Exec 9; (3) draft memo, OPD for G-1, 10 Aug 44, sub: RA Fld Offs of Grd Arms Not Under AGF Jurisdiction, OPD 210.3, 315.
25 Civ Pers Br OCS, Civ Pers Instruction 5 A, 25 May 43, Compensatory Time Off in Lieu of O'time Pay for Civ Employees, OPD 230, 48.
26 The prospects of wartime appointees to clerical positions in the War Department and other "old line agencies" of the federal government were very limited since there was a tendency in these agencies to keep civil service grade ratings close to the familiar, prewar standards, whereas the shortage of good clerical personnel and recognition of the increasing cost of living in wartime Washington caused the newer war agencies to inflate job classifications in terms of permanent civil service grades to a level considerably higher than the prewar average.
27 (1) Memo, Lt Cen McNarney, DCofS for ACofS OPD, 40 Apr 43, sub: Enl Men on Dy in WD, 0PD 220.3 Hq Det, GHQ, 26. (2) Remarks of DCofS in min of Gen Council meetings, 29 Mar 43, DCofS rcds. Nineteen of these men were on duty in the Office of Chief of Staff but were supervised by OPD.
28 (1) Pers charts, 1944-45, Paper 2, Item 2B, OPD Hist Unit file. (2) Cf. Civ Pers directory, 10 Jul 43, OPD 230, 54.
29 The replacement of combat qualified enlisted men in OPD was not actually completed until July 1944. See memo, Maj James Stack, Asst Exec OPD for Maj H. H. Kidwell, 2 Jul 44, no sub, OPD 321.19 OPD, 52.
30 (1) Handwritten memo, Maj James Stack for Exec OPD, 30 Jul 43, sub: WAC Det OPD, WDGS, OPD 220.3 WAC Det OPD, 1. (2) Memo, Col W. T. Sexton for Lt Gen McNarney, 2 Aug 43, no sub, WDCSA 291.9 (31 Jul 43).
31 As of 31 August 1945, OPD's secretariat was made up of 109 enlisted women, 105 civilian employees, 123 enlisted men, and 17 warrant officers, a total of 354. See pers chart, 30 Aug 45, Paper 2, Item 2B, OPD Hist Unit file.
32 These statements about the secretariat are approximate since no systematic reporting of strength for enlisted men, enlisted women, and civilians was made before June 1944.
33 For developments in joint strategic planning, see Ch. XIII.
34 WDGS Cir 5-5, 4 Oct 44.
35 Ibid. In May 1945 the S&P executive office became responsible for implementation, and in August the responsibilities for policy matters within S&P were divided between two sections, the Policy Section and a new politico-military section, the Strategic Policy Section. See Ch. XVI.
36 This subcommittee might be ad hoc but usually was the Joint War Plans Committee, which replaced the old Joint Strategic Committee in April 1943. See Ch. XIII.
37 ABC 381 Strategy Sec Papers (7 Jan 43). Besides the Strategy Section studies, S&P assembled "books" for ready reference during the international military conferences convened by the President and the Prime Minister. See Ch. XII.
38 For joint study of postwar problems, see Ch. XVI.
39 Memo, Brig Gen G. A. Lincoln for author, 3 Dec 47, sub: Hist of OPD, OPD Hist Unit Comments file. General Lincoln's careful generalizations on S&P have been extremely helpful in describing the work of this group, of which he was chief during the later part of the war. In every case they have been substantiated by research in the appropriate records.
40 See Ch. XVI.
41 WD Cir 134, 8 Apr 44, sub: WDGS OPD, Responsibility for Strategic and
Operational Plans. The circular read:
1. In accordance with AR 10-15, the Operations Division, War Department General
Staff, is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General
Staff which relate to formulation of plans and strategic direction of the
military forces in the theater(s) of war. It is specifically charged with the
strategic employment of the Army of the United States.
2. In extension of these regulations, the Operations Division, War Department
General Staff, will be the custodian of future strategic and operational plans
involving the Army of the United States. It will be the responsibility of the
Operations Division to develop and keep current these plans, when appropriate,
in conjunction with the proper joint and combined agencies, and also to furnish
the necessary guidance to all other agencies of the War Department, including
other divisions of the General and Special Staff and the Army Ground Forces,
Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces, to enable them to conduct their
future planning on the same common basis.
3. No agency of the War Department other than the Operations Division, War
Department General Staff, is authorized to give official guidance or interpretations
on future strategic or operational plans.
4. In order that a steady flow of essential operational planning information
may be maintained between the Operations Division, War Department General
Staff, and other major agencies of the War Department, these other agencies
will maintain liaison with the Operations Division. Requests for information
involving strategic guidance or interpretation, however, will be forwarded
through channels. Such requests will be forwarded to the Operations Division by
the heads of the staff divisions and of Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces,
and Army Service Forces only, who will be responsible for transmitting this
guidance to their subordinate agencies.
42 Memo, Maj Gen Handy for Gp Chiefs, 21 Apr 44, sub: WD Cir 134, Sec VII, dated 8 Apr 44, Paper 13, Item 2B, OPD Hist Unit file. This memorandum established the basic policy that "data relating to approved operational plans may be furnished orally and informally to designated liaison officers of other agencies in the War Department, whereas requests involving the opinion of the Operations Division on other than approved operations must be reduced to writing."
43 (1) See Chart No. 4, p. 193. (2) For sectional reorganization within Theater Group, 1943-45, see OPD Hist Unit Study R.
44 (1) WDGS Cir 5-5, 4 Oct 44. (2) For liaison activities, see Ch. XVI.
45 Ibid.
46 OPD Theater Gp roster, 16 Mar 44, Paper 16, Item 2B, OPD Hist Unit file.
47 Security consciousness in OPD was so well established by the end of the war that the author and associate historians, though explicitly authorized by the Chief of Staff and the OPD chief to see all War Department files, had many administrative battles with the executive office and the record room before officers in charge became convinced that the chief of OPD had really meant that anyone, particularly a civilian, should see everything in Division files. While the historians found most of the staff members extremely co-operative, the policy of tight security was very strong.
48 (1) WD Cir 37, 20 Feb 43. (2) WD Cir 91, 29 Feb 44. The effective date for the new classifications was 15 March 1944. (3) The message center had established a separate file, later incorporated in the Top Secret OPD Message File, as early as May 1942 (19 April 1942 for CM-IN and 12 May 1942 for CM-OUT).
49 For establishment of "Eyes Only" procedure, see book msg, Gen Marshall for comdrs, 24 Jul 42, CM-OUT 7028-7068.
50 (1) Memo Joint Security Contl for WD ACsofS, et al., 12 Mar 43, sub: Security Contl on "BIGOT" Correspondence From and to CG, North African T of Opns, Case 32, Item 1A, Exec 3. (2) BIGOT msg (originator OPD), Gen Marshall for Gen Eisenhower 8 Mar 43, CM-OUT 2786, Item 12, Exec 3. (3) BIGOT msg, Gen Eisenhower for AGWAR, 10 Mar 43, CM-IN 5209.
51 (1) Memo, Lt Col L. E. Smith, Chief OPD Msg Cen for Exec OPD, 16 Jun 44, no
sub, OPD 210.3, 302. Colonel Smith was requesting an increase in personnel. (2)
Cf. OPD Msg file. (3) Cf. Sp Rpt on Msg Cen, 48, Item 14, OPD Hist Unit file.
For OPD action cases as a whole, including messages as well as other
correspondence, see table compiled by the P&O record room, Paper 4, Item
2B, OPD Hist Unit file.
52 The assault phase of the 1944 operation was finally called NEPTUNE, but the general plan remained under the name OVERLORD.
53 Palmer, et al, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, p. 580. The study here cited was written by Maj. B. I. Wiley.
54 (1) Informal memo, Maj Gen Handy for Brig Gen Hull, 7 Apr 43, Paper 52, Book 8, Exec 8. (2) Cf. memo, Maj Gen Handy, no addressee, 7 Apr 43, sub: Instructions From Gen Marshall Prior to Departure, Paper 51, Book 8, Exec 8.
55 Memo, Brig Gen Hull for Col Roberts, 3 Jun 43 no sub Paper 21, Book 10,
Exec 9. General Hull remarked of the BOLERO Combined Committee: "It is
somewhat different from a planning committee in that it spends all of its time
on implementing things, finding out how to get more shipping and whether or not
a British ACV [Auxiliary Aircraft Carrier] could be made available to transport
some aircraft, and countless things of this nature." He further noted:
The European Theater Section itself will implement many of the agreed
decisions. The British shipping member will implement many of them. A U.S.
Navy member will also implement many of them. In some cases, and this is the
exception to the rule in my opinion, the Combined Subjects Section will
implement them; but if all of its business is transmitted through the Combined
Subjects Section, it unnecessarily loads that section down with work which can
be informally handled by the Chief of the European Theater Section. We must get
away from the idea that this Committee is a high-level, formal-type committee.
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Last updated 19 October 2004 |