Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, diamonds (♦) are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

Chapter I:

Should Soldiers Be Governors ?

The story of civil affairs in World War II as it emerges from the documents reveals the effort to perform a mission unprecedented in complexity and size. The mission called for military, political, and economic activity on every level -from the job of rebuilding a village bakery to that of rooting out and replacing Fascist and Nazi ideology and institutions. The impact and interplay of these activities are highlighted in General Eisenhower's letter to General Marshall a few weeks after the opening of the North African campaign in 1942: "The sooner I can get rid of these questions that are outside the military in scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters." They are highlighted, on a lower plane, in an officer's problems on first entering a Sicilian town "And what a lot of headaches I found. Water supply damaged. No power. No food. No fuel, and corpses all over town to bury.^"  

The plight both of the theater commander and of the lower officer inevitably suggests the question of just why the U.S. Army in World War II had to take on civil affairs. That some agency, military or civilian, had to assume the heavy burden was dictated both by the laws of war and by common sense, but as a military mission civil affairs is unique among the Army's missions in that it seems to involve a radical disparity between its ends and the soldier's means. It is related to war only  insofar as it is the conduct of administration in foreign countries, enemy or friendly, which an army occupies either under the rules of war or by international agreement.

The civil affairs officer must so govern as to help the combat forces but his work is also judged by nonmilitary standards: ability to comply with the rules of international law; and, because military policy is but the instrument of national policy, by the ability to promote the nation's political interests. Civil affairs does not, like other phases of war, demand vast aggregations of men or (except for emergencies of civilian supply) of materials. But it does demand extraordinary intellectual and administrative skill in doing things, difficult enough in peacetime, under the conditions and special needs of wartime. The greatest difficulty is that most of the requisite skills of civil affairs are not those which the soldier acquires in his ordinary training and experience. They are political, economic, and technical skills-the skills of civilian more than of military life. Moreover, even though the civil affairs officer does not make basic policy, these skills are not, in practice, merely executory. Because policy directives are often not entirely clear or leave considerable discretion, because there are many unforeseen exigencies which they do not cover, and because officials issuing the directives generally feel dependent upon the recommendations and information of people on the spot, civil affairs requires more than mere ability to

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follow orders. It demands, at least at higher levels, an understanding and sensitivity with regard to political and economic interests and the ability to sense what policy makers would wish done about such interests under particular circumstances. In sum, when the soldier becomes governor he must transcend the limits of his knowledge, experience, and even values as a soldier; he must become, as best he can, something of a statesman.

Because soldiers ordinarily are not trained to perform duties of this sort, and also because of the American tradition against the military exercise of civil power under any but desperate circumstances, the civil affairs function of the U.S. Army evoked bitter debate in every major war from the war with Mexico to World War I. The qualms felt by so-called anti-imperialists against military government after the Spanish-American War and World War I led to what the Army regarded as unfortunately premature substitution of government by civilians. That the Army's record in civil affairs has on the whole been very creditable, that its errors appear greatly outweighed by its humane aspiration and its efficient performance, has not overcome strong convictions that the use of civilians would have been far better. If only because of this historical background, it was natural that in World War II the great debate should have flared up again. But the debate was the more natural because in that war military and political aims were so largely complementary and interdependent. Civil affairs authorities not only had to extirpate and replace Fascist and Nazi institutions. They also had to take charge of civilian relief on an unprecedented scale, to pave the way for an ambitious postwar reconstruction, and to do all these and other things with the knowledge that by their performance foe and friend alike would judge the sincerity and worthiness of Allied war aims. Never did the exercise of civil affairs authority call more strongly for wise statesmanship and never was it more important that such authority should be placed in the best hands.

The documents which follow, while concerned also with the early development of the Army's civil affairs training program, have been selected primarily to illustrate the causes, character, and consequences of the debate which raged over the Army's belief in its duty to assume initial leadership in the purely administrative preparations for civil affairs. Implications of the documents point up better than any abstractions the difficulties of a democracy's army in entering into such a sphere. It is true that, as soon as the War Department made its rather belated decision to place the responsibility for civil affairs in a specific agency-the Provost Marshal General's Office (PMGO)-the authorities immediately concerned quickly thought of measures calculated to make soldiers satisfactory civil administrators. This time, they resolved, they would not find themselves unprepared as in the past, and this time they would fashion personnel who while soldiers in garb would be civilians in knowledge and skill. They established a school for military government where, in the atmosphere of a university and under the tuition of civilians, this metamorphosis could take place. However, the documents also reveal the candid admission of these authorities that their initial measures were highly inadequate-not only in number of trainees but also in the failure to make sufficient use of civilian specialists and training institutions.

The Army quickly sought to repair these errors by an enlarged and revised training program. But as soon as these larger plans were announced, it found to its consternation that its training program, together with its entire role in civil affairs, was now

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threatened by the conviction of many, including the President, that military control of civil affairs was both inexpedient in practice and wrong in theory.

The documents do not reveal as clearly as one would like the precise grounds of this belief. Aside from certain allegations about the Charlottesville School, the criticisms were marked by vague generality and cliché but probably rested upon ideas put forward to the same effect many times in the past: first, that the Army is not qualified to conduct civil affairs efficiently; second, that though it may do so quite efficiently it cannot do so with sufficient humanity, democracy, or politico-economic enlightenment; third, that though the Army may on occasion govern foreign territory both efficiently and with enlightenment, the taste of civil power may give some military leader ambitions for political power at home; fourth, that even though Army administration may have had no bad effects at home or abroad, nevertheless it is irretrievably wrong in principle for a democracy to make soldiers governors in any place and at any time. On the other hand, it does not appear that, at least in their second thoughts, the critics of the Army denied the need for a very limited degree of military control. First, they recognized that the military commander must have at least formal paramount authority over all matters in a theater of war. Second, they admitted that members of the armed forces must carry out certain functions of civil affairs as long as bullets fly too thick for civilians. The real ground of the apprehensions was the assumption, suggested by the scope of the Army's plans, that the military did not intend to relinquish control as soon as possible; rather, they were plotting to retain it for the duration and even in the crucial post-hostilities period.

The records reveal that, in trying to allay such fears, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and others displayed a patience and forensic skill (including even humor) which had been developed in the Army by more than a century and a half of such tribulations. They did not contest any of the traditional canons on the superiority of the civil power, or even the desirability of using it as soon as possible in wartime. They adopted as their main defense the position that, whatever might be desirable in theory, it was impossible in practice to entrust civil affairs to anyone but soldiers while certain military conditions prevailed. They also pointed out that the precise duration of these conditions could not be predicted, that while it might in some cases be very brief it might in others be rather long because of the tactical and logistical relationships between an area where fighting has stopped and adjacent or even remote areas where it is still going on. They added that, in any case, civil affairs would be conducted for the most part by persons who but lately had been civilians, having been commissioned because of their skills in civilian life and so far as possible on the recommendation of the civilian agencies. This last argument was supposed to clinch the Army's case, but it did not do so. The civilian critics evidently felt that a uniform and discipline can quickly change a man's soul and that, by wiles alone, the Army has often taken intellectually into camp supposedly free spirits like scientists, journalists, and even historians.

However, a number, including the President, appeared to be reassured in part-at least as to the honesty of Army intentions. Both those who were somewhat reassured, and those who were not, had to suffer the continuation of the Army's training program. In this as in so many later issues, the decisive fact was that though the civilian agencies might be strong in theory they were weak in organization. They had waited too long to make preparations for a training program

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of their own, and it was now too late to start. Tacit acquiescence did not, indeed, signify any change in the plan of the President and civilian agencies for preponderant civilian control. The unfortunate stalemate in the training issue only strengthened their determination that those whom the Army had trained should as soon as possible be taken out of uniform, purged of military indoctrination, and placed under the control of civilians who would know better than soldiers how to govern foreign peoples in accordance with American democracy and the blueprints for a brave new world.

1. SHALL THE NATION AGAIN FIND ITSELF UNPREPARED?

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND; IN WORLD WAR I INADEQUATE ARMY PREPARATIONS AND EVENTUAL CIVILIAN CONTROL
Col. Irwin L. Hunt, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany, Rpt, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920, 4 Mar 20, pp. 56-57 (hereafter referred to as Hunt Rpt), OCMH files]

 ♦ ♦ ♦ All of the energy of the American army had been centered on an early decision in the field and there had been no opportunity to study the civil problems involved in an occupation of German territory. The American army therefore began its duties in occupied territory with only the scantiest information both of the particular situation confronting it and even of a broader nature, such as would permit it to intelligently frame an organization commensurate with its wide governmental powers. From the beginning therefore there was a crying need for personnel trained in civil administration and possessing knowledge of the German nation. ¹

It is extremely unfortunate that the qualifications necessary for a civil administration are not developed among officers in times of peace. The history of the United States offers an uninterrupted series of wars, which demanded as their aftermath, the exercise by its officers of civil governmental functions. Despite the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern States, Cuba, Porto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines and elsewhere, the lesson has seemingly not been learned. In none of the service-schools devoted to the higher training of officers, has a single course on the nature and scope of military government been established. The majority of the regular officers were, as a consequence, ill-equipped to perform tasks differing so widely from their accustomed duties. . . .

With the signing of the armistice, the prospective occupation became a real factor in the situation, and the problems to which it gave rise could no longer be evaded. On II November 1918, a month still ensued before our armies would reach German soil,-a period sufficient to at least lay a solid foundation for the future military government. The magnitude of the responsibilities assumed appear to have been greatly underestimated. There can be no doubt that the belief, felt in many quarters ... that the armies could occupy enemy soil and yet divest themselves of the responsibilities of government, was both prevalent and powerful. . . . The military situation, serious enough when we consider that General Headquarters was at this time faced with the problem of moving 300,000 men to the Rhine, and the uncertainty in regard to the nature of the occupation, was no doubt responsible for the American failure to prepare for the task at hand. The failure, however, laid a heavy burden on the shoulders of the Third Army Commander and his subordinate officers charged with the security of their several commands. In all this force, with the exception of perhaps a half-dozen men, there was probably no one who had the faintest conception of the German governmental system, of its functions, limitations or channels of communication. The Second Section of the General Staff at G. H. Q. had, it is true, in November, prepared a pamphlet dealing with this subject, but its material was antiquated and its treatment inaccurate. . . .

The conclusion from these facts is incontestable; the American army of occupation lacked both training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly 1,000,000 civilians whom

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the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty. ²

[Ltr, Pierrepont B. Noyes, American Delegate, Inter-Allied Rhineland Comm., to President Woodrow Wilson, 27 May 19, Hunt Rpt, pp. 313-14]

After a month spent in the Rhineland as American commissioner, I feel there is danger that a disastrous mistake will be made. The "Convention" for the government of these territories, as drafted by the military representatives of the Supreme War Council on May eleventh, is more brutal, I believe, than even its authors desire upon second thought. It provides for unendurable oppression of six million people during a period of years.

This "Convention" is not likely to be adopted without great modification. What alarms me, however, is that none of the revisions of this document which I have seen, recognizes that its basic principle is bad-that the quartering of an enemy army in a country as its master in time of peace and the billeting of troops on the civil population will insure hatred and ultimate disaster.

I have discussed this matter at length with the American commanders of the Army of Occupation; men who have seen military occupation at close range for six months. These officers emphatically indorse the above statements. They say that an occupying army, even one with the best intentions, is guilty of outrages and that mutual irritation, in spite of every effort to the contrary, grows apace. Force and more force must inevitably be the history of such occupation long continued.

Forgetting the apparent ambitions of the French and possibly overlooking political limitations, I have sketched below a plan which seems to me the maximum for military domination in the Rhineland after the signing of peace. Our Army Commanders and others who have studied the subject on the ground agree with this programme:

Skeleton Plan

I. As few troops as possible, concentrated in barracks or reserve areas, with no "billeting," excepting possibly for officers.
II. Complete self-government for the territory, with the exception below.
III. A Civil Commission with powers:

    a. To make regulations or change old ones whenever German law or actions
        (1) threaten the carrying out of treaty terms, or
        (2) threaten the comfort or security of troops.
    b. To authorize the army to take control under martial law, either in danger spots or throughout the territory, whenever conditions seem to the Commission to make this necessary. ³

UNTIL 1940 No Field Manual for Military Government
[Memo, Brig Gen William E. Shedd, ACofS, G-1, for ACofS, G-3, 18 Jan 40, G-1 files, 9985-01

1. Attached is an extract of a study, prepared by a student committee at the Army War College, pertaining to a proposed Basic Field Manual, entitled: Military Law, The Administration of Civil Affairs in Occupied Alien Territory. It is recommended that a Basic Field Manual be prepared and published by the War Department, using the attached study as a guide.
2. Under date of October 11, 1939, in a memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, the Judge Advocate General expressed the opinion that there was no necessity for publishing a separate field manual on this subject. The Personnel Division, based upon considerations discussed below, does not concur in this viewpoint. ⁴

THE FIELD MANUAL PLACES MG PLANNING AND TRAINING UNDER G-1
[WD Basic Fld Manual, Military Government (FM 275),1940]

6. Planning-The Personnel Division (G-1) of the War Department General Staff is respon-

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sible for the preparation of plans for and the determination of policies with respect to military government. The personnel section (G-1) of the staff of the commanding general, theater of operations, will, in advance of the necessity for the establishment of military government, make such further and more detailed plans therefore as may be necessary. ♦ ♦ ♦

8. Training-the Personnel Division (G-1) of the War Department General Staff plans and supervises the instruction and training of the personnel necessary for military government. In accordance with such plans and subject to such supervision, the personnel section (G-1) of the staff of the commanding general, theater of operations, makes such further and more detailed plans as may be necessary with respect to such instruction and training, so far as they may be carried on in that theater, and supervises them. . . . In advance of the need for its use, the Military Intelligence Division (G-2) of the War Department General Staff will furnish data on the subjects last mentioned which may be used for instructional purposes. . . . ⁵

THREE MONTHS BEFORE PEARL HARBOR JAG PROPOSES ADVANCE MG TRAINING
[Ltr, Col Harry A. Auer, JAGD, for Brig Gen Wade H. Haislip, ACofS, G-1, 5 Sep 41, G-1 files, 16308-125]

1. American forces are now serving in a number of bases in foreign countries, which service involves difficult and delicate questions arising from relations with the local government; and there is a possibility of future service involving the administration of military government by the United States Army. These facts indicate the need of competent personnel for such duties. Their detail from combatant units will deplete the officer strength of such units, and officers so detailed will in most cases be inexperienced and untrained in such duties. . . .
2. It is therefore recommended that commissioned personnel be selected and trained in a school or course of instruction for duty on the staff of the commander of any force which may have a mission involving military government or liaison with an existing government. . . . It is further recommended that personnel be selected with a view to their future detail as Officers in Charge of Civil Affairs or Chief Liaison Officers, and for heads of the departments mentioned in paragraph 13, FM 27-5, to-wit: Public Works and Utilities, Fiscal, Public Health, Education, Public Safety, Legal, Communications, Public Welfare, and Economics. ⁶

G-1 BEGINS TO STUDY THE TRAINING QUESTION
[Memo, ACofS, G-1, for ACofS (WPD), 10 Sep 41, G-1 files, 16308-125]

1. The Personnel Division has under study a plan to provide preliminary training for officers to fill key positions in Civil Affairs Sections on staffs of certain Task Force commanders. Such training will be confined to those staffs which may reasonably be expected to operate a military government.
2. In order to furnish a basis for the number of officers to receive such training it is requested that you submit a list of theaters based on present plans where such a contingency may arise.

PMGO RECOMMENDED FOR CONTROL OF ADVANCE TRAINING
[Memo, ACofS, G-1, for CofS, 3 Dec. 41, AF files, 352 (12-3-41) (1), School of Military Government (SMG), Est]

I. Discussion.

1. Possible future requirement involving administration of military government by the Army suggests advance training of officers for military government and liaison. . . .

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2. Operation of necessary school is properly a Zone of the Interior function and should be charged to an existing War Department agency.
3. The Provost Marshal General has offered to include the necessary instruction in military government in the curricula of a school which he is organizing for other purposes.

II. Action recommended.

1. That the Provost Marshal General be charged with the operating function of training officers for future detail in connection with military government and liaison.
2. That the Provost Marshal General be directed to confer with the Personnel Division relative to the preparation of detailed plans for initiating and operating the course of instruction under discussion. [Approved by Secretary of War, 7 January 1942.]

[Memo, Maj Gen Myron C. Cramer, JAG, for ACofS, G-1, 23 Dec 41, G-1 files, 16308-125, Tab C]

5. On September 5, 1941 . . . this office recommended that such [military government] training be given. All who have considered the question agree that such training should be given, but differ as to who should give it. It has been suggested at various times that the task should be imposed upon the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1; the Civil Affairs Section, G.H.Q., The Judge Advocate General; and The Provost Marshal General. The objectors to CT-1 being charged with the task is that a division of the General Staff is not an operating body; to General Headquarters, that it should be mobile and have no other than combatant duties; to this office, that its function is solely to give legal advice and military government is not primarily a legal but an administrative task. By first indorsement, dated November 19, 1941 . . . , Major General Allen W. Gullion, who was then both The Judge Advocate General and The Provost Marshal General, but who now occupies the latter position only, expressed a willingness to include instruction in military government in a school for military police and provost marshals which he is setting up. The Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1 and War Plans Division, have concurred in that plan, but the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, declines to do so, saying:

. . . The scope of Military Government (FM 27-5) is so broad and so different from Military Police matters that it is difficult to see any material advantage in combining the two types of instruction. ♦ ♦ ♦

6. The breadth of the instruction necessary will be seen from the following quotation from FM 27-5, paragraph 8:  

. . . So far as time and available facilities permit, the instruction will cover the laws and practice of military government, the history of such governments in the past, and the language, geography, history, economics, government, and politics of the country to be occupied. ♦ ♦ ♦

7. The above citations show that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, is entirely right in saying chat the scope of military government is much broader than and different from the work of military police. As a strict matter of logic, instruction in military government does not belong in a school whose primary object is the instruction of military police. But the question is a practical as well as a theoretical one. As has been shown, there are strong objections to the assignment of the task of instruction in military government to any one of the other agencies which have been suggested, but The Provost Marshal General is willing to undertake the task. The present Provost Marshal General, Major General Allen W. Gullion, who presumably will serve as such for the duration of the existing war, has had a wide and varied experience, both civil and military. . . . While he was the Judge Advocate General, the Field Manual on Military Government (FM 27-5) and -numerous opinions on that subject were prepared under his supervision. It would be difficult to find an officer better qualified to have charge of instruction in military government. . . . Moreover, this instruction can be given in addition to that normally given in the Military Police School without additional school facilities, whereas such facilities would have to be duplicated if the instruction were given elsewhere.

8. For the above reasons I am of opinion that, whatever theoretical objections may be raised to the assignment to The Provost Marshal General of the task of giving instruction in military government, as a practical matter that assignment will be a good working solution of the problem. I have therefore concurred in the memorandum for the Chief of Staff in reference as indicated by my initials thereon.

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2. A SCHOOL FOR SOLDIERS IS ESTABLISHED IN A CIVILIAN INSTITUTION

TEACHING CIVIL AFFAIRS WITHIN A MILITARY FRAMEWORK
[Memo, Jesse I. Miller, ⁷  PMGO, for PMG, 10 Jan 42, PMGO files, 352.01, SMG, Est]

 ♦ ♦ ♦ The Provost Marshal General has been been charged with the responsibility of training officers for future details in connection with military government and liaison incident thereto [see above ] . The execution of this assignment involves the establishment of a School of Military Government. The purpose of this preliminary memorandum is to outline the general nature, scope and personnel of such a school.

A. General:

The ideal type of military government is one which integrates the local laws, institutions, customs, psychology and economics of the occupied area and a superimposed military control with a minimum of change in the former and a maximum of control by the latter. ♦ ♦ ♦  

    1. The international conventions and the American regulations, procedure and experience relevant to the administration of military government, and
    2. The historical, political, social and economic backgrounds of the occupied regions in which they may be called upon to function.

    1. Basic Instruction

    2. Politico-Military Instruction

    1. Executive and Faculty.

The faculty would consist principally of lecturers drawn from the ranks of the best qualified persons in their respective fields. The permanent faculty would be small; at this stage it would be well to leave its composition to the Commandant and the Director.

    2. Student.

D. Recommendations:

At the present time, recommendations are limited to the following:

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SECRETARY STIMSON SEES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRAINING PROJECT
[Telecon, Gullion and SW Henry L. Stimson, 5 Feb 42, AG files, 352 (12-3-41) (1), SMG, Est]

Gullion: ... Wickersham would be the head of the whole thing. He would be the Commandant of the College. It's a big man's job, there's no doubt about that.
Stimson: I should think that would be a very important position.
Gullion: No doubt about it. If we're going to win this war, we're going to have to occupy some countries.

TWO MONTHS AFTER START OF WAR A SCHOOL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT IS AUTHORIZED
[AG Ltr to PMG, 9 Feb 42, AG files, 352 (12-3-41) (1), SMG, Est]

1. The Provost Marshal General is charged with the operating function of training officers for future detail in connection with military government and liaison at a school of military government to be established for that purpose.
2. The Provost Marshal General will confer with the Personnel Division, General Staff, relative to the preparation of detailed plans for initiating and operating the course of instructions.

PROPOSAL TO LOCATE THE SCHOOL AT A NEARBY UNIVERSITY
[Memo, Brig Gen Cornelius W. Wickersham, PMGO, for PMG, 21 Feb 42, PMGO files, 352.01, SMG, Est]

 ♦ ♦ ♦ It is believed that advantage should be taken of the offer of the University of Virginia and that the School of Military Government should be located there. The facilities are sufficient for a school of about 60 students, 10 executive officers and members of the faculty, and a clerical and stenographic force of about 15. When the new Naval Building is finished and additional space is thereby made available, there will be room for some expansion.⁸

A DRY DIRECTIVE INITIATES A RATHER EXCITING EXPERIMENT
[Ltr, AG to PMG, 13 Mar 42, PMGO files, 352.01, SMG, Est]

1. Supplementing directions contained in letter, this office . . . , February 9, 1942, subject, Training of Personnel for Military Government and Liaison, it is desired that the Provost Marshal General establish at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, a school to be known as The School of Military Government. This school will be under the direct supervision of The Provost Marshal General.
2. The course of instruction. will not exceed sixteen weeks in duration, the first course to begin on or about May 1, 1942. Subsequent courses will fallow, the second course to begin on or about September 1, 1942.
3. The School of Military Government is based upon instruction at one time of a student body consisting of not to exceed 100 officers. Permanent overhead for the school, exclusive of outside lecturers, will not exceed 12 officers and civilian instructors, 25 civilians, and one enlisted man, as arranged after consultation with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.
4. The School of Military Government at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, is designated as an exempted station, under the control of The Provost Marshal General, but is authorized to communicate directly with The Adjutant General and with other persons and agencies with reference to other than policy matters.⁹

THE CHARLOTTESVILLE CURRICULUM COMPRISES LARGELY CIVIL SUBJECTS
[Outline of Curriculum, First Course (May-Aug 42) submitted by Comdt, SMG to TAG [The Adjutant General], 13 May 42, AG files, 352 (12-3-41) (1), SMG, Est]

1. Introduction and orientation: text material and bibliography.
Distinguishing military law, martial law and military government; clarifying the nature, scope and general phases of the latter; outlining the general objectives of the course.

II. The organization and operation of the War Department and the Army.
A general outline of the organization of the War Department; military organization (tactical

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and territorial); relation of the War Department to the Army; official correspondence, etc.

III. The international law of military government.
The relevant conventions; the rules of land warfare; growth and general survey.

IV. The American regulations.
A survey and study of War Department regulations (FM 27-5), presenting the basic policies and mechanics of military government.

V. American experiences in military government.
Study of illustrative techniques in previous experiences. Application to objectives in: (1) liaison in friendly situations and (2) the Atlantic Charter.

VI. Other experiences.
The experiences and practices of other countries in military government.

VII. Public administration.
General principles of public administration, including local and state government; public finance; public health and sanitation; communications; utilities and public works; education; public safety; public welfare; economic problems.

VIII. Introduction to politico-military backgrounds.
Discussing American Constitutional Government, the Atlantic Charter, Nazi ideology and other political philosophies.

IX. Politico-military backgrounds-general.
Races and racial theories; general or comparative historical geography; geo-politics.

X. Politico-military backgrounds-special.
(Three selected political or geographical areas) Political histories; economic histories; systems of government; social psychology; geography; legal systems.

XI. Liaison.
Liaison functions; correlation of problems of military government and friendly liaison. Study of selected areas and special features relating thereto.

CHARLOTTESVILLE'S FIRST MAJOR FINDING: THE SCHOOL INADEQUATE UNLESS SUPPLEMENTED BY CO-OPERATION WITH CIVILIAN TRAINING AGENCIES
[Memo, Wickersham, Comdt, SMG, for PMG, 17 Jun 42, PMGO files, 321.19, MG]

3. Certain factors should be noted as follows:

(a). The obligation implicit in the Army's mission of military government is, perhaps, of as great importance as any connected with the war. As has heretofore been pointed out by General Lee in his report on the British School, the termination of hostilities will probably leave the American army as the sole agency capable of initiating the reconstruction process in wide areas scattered over the entire world.
(b). It will not be disputed (at this time) that the prime direction and administration of any military government belong wholly to the military command. . . . There are, however, two overriding aspects of military government, when conducted extensively and in widely scattered areas, which the Army should not attempt to deal with alone, viz., general political policy and general economic policy. Joint efforts by the Army and other agencies of the government will be needed. Consequently, it would seem desirable to inaugurate a program in the beginning which would anticipate the inevitable liaison and which would forestall the premature loss of military direction and control.¹⁰
(c). The only form of military government contemplated by the international Conventions arises upon the occupation of enemy territory. American forces, may, however, find themselves in the occupation of the territories of neutrals, quasi-neutrals, puppets, or even allies. An entirely unexplored field of international law is in prospect, with little precedent save the Japanese.
(d). The American occupation of the Rhineland during the last war involved at no time an excess of a 50,000 American troops. The number of military Civil Affairs personnel required there was 213, or approximately 1/10 of 1 percent of the armed forces. . . .
(e). In the 1918 German occupation, local German officials were extensively utilized in the

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functioning of local institutions. Under present conditions in Germany, it would doubtless be unwise to continue Nazi officials in office or in key positions. The demands upon American personnel, at least during the initial stages of any occupation, would therefore be substantially increased. A similar situation would probably exist in any occupation of Japanese territory. Consequently, any estimate based upon the Rhineland experience of the last war is subject to the necessity of supplementing the trained Civil Affairs officers with large numbers of operatives and specialists.

4. The total task confronting the Army is to have available at the proper time (a) a trained personnel sufficient for the key administrative positions, (b) an adequate number of subordinates and (c) to find a sufficient number of operatives and specialists to meet the conditions that are likely to exist in both Germany and Japan. The combined total might run to several thousand men capable of functioning under military control and direction, but with consistent political and economic policies in widely separated areas all over the world, and in some instances, under circumstances where there will be little, if any, international precedent.

7. The following agencies may be considered sources of personnel within their respective capacities:

(a). School of Military Government. This can be increased to 150 student officers for the next course as already recommended, and this would make possible the training of 450 officers per year available for detail to military government and liaison. Those assigned to military government would occupy the key positions as military governors, Civil Affairs officers, and members of Civil Affairs Sections of staffs of commanders of higher units. Some further expansion would also be feasible for later courses.
(b). Military Police Schools. Additional instruction in military government might be given in these schools so as to constitute a training ground for subordinate positions.
(c). Universities and Colleges. A number of these institutions have indicated an interest in the inauguration of courses in training for specialist and technical personnel. Columbia University has already begun the setting up of such a course which will begin this summer. . . . Princeton and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy have already indicated a desire to embark on projects relating to postwar problems. It is sufficient to say that the programs contemplated by these institutions would provide the sort of background training which might fit older students for services in specialized fields in particular areas, and younger students for later work in this field.
(d). Army Specialist Corps. This organization is indicated as a procurement agency for expert and advisory personnel.
(e). Board of Economic Warfare. This agency is believed to be in close touch with technical talent in the United States, particularly in the field of economics and would probably be willing to co-operate both in the selection and in specialized training of expert personnel for special tasks in the economic and sociological fields.
(f). Private or Semipublic Agencies. One or two private agencies have indicated an interest in the subject, but it is not deemed advisable to rely upon thetas for direct assistance.

9. Recommendations. In view of the foregoing, the following recommendations are submitted:
(a). That the necessary steps be taken in accordance with paragraphs 7a and 7b above.
(b). That arrangements be made with the Army Specialist Corps and the Board of Economic Warfare for procurement of specialist and operative personnel with particular reference to Germany and Japan so that they can be obtained, When the tinge comes, on short notice.
(c). That approved universities and colleges should be encouraged to conduct courses in specialist and technical training and should not be discouraged from conducting the courses which increase the knowledge of students that may be useful to them in connection with later training for military government or postwar needs provided that it is made clear that the course will in no way constitute a short cut to a commission.¹¹

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3. CIVILIAN-MILITARY JOCKEYING FOR CONTROL

A CIVILIAN AGENCY SEIZES THE INITIATIVE WITH THE PRESIDENT
[Copy of Memo, Arthur C. Ringland, War Relief Cond Bd, 20 Jun 42, forwarded to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, OUSW files, MG]

(1) The Administration has announced from time to time that this Government and the United Nations collectively must undertake the responsibility for multiple tasks of administration in occupied and liberated areas.
(2) In preparation for these tasks, several Federal agencies-notably the State, War, Navy and Agriculture Departments, the Board of Economic Warfare, the War Production Board, the National Research Council, the League of Nations and the International Labor Office, and many other institutions and organizations, are engaged in the study of procedures and plans to be made effective upon the cessation of hostilities. These plans would be immediately effective and extend through phases of relief and reconstruction from the time of the armistice until the establishment of a stable pattern of administration in the affected areas.
(3) It is obvious that trained personnel of varied capacities and of a speculative number will be needed for these tasks. It is certainly reasonable to anticipate that Army and Navy personnel will be needed for military governments of liberated and occupied areas at the end of this war as it was at the end of the last. After the Armistice in 1918, it was necessary to set up a military government in the Rhineland and to carry out an enormous task of food administration, relief and public health work throughout the countries of central Europe, the Balkans, and the Baltic States, the Near East and Russia. It is anticipated that this time there will be a similar but vastly greater task in Europe and in other parts of the world. This time and in view of the circumstances of the war, the exigencies of the situation may well require much more work of an economic and social character.
(4) At present the only formalized training for international administration is provided at the Army School of Military Government at Charlottesville and by the training program of the School of International Administration to be launched at Columbia University on August 17 with a nucleus of students detailed by the Navy, and it is understood, by certain civilian agencies.
(5) Neither the Army School nor the Columbia program will be in any way adequate to meet the training program. It is understood that other educational agencies and certain of the Government departments are contemplating diverse aspects of the problem. There is to be considered too the use of the personnel and organizational resources of private agencies which have had experience in the foreign field.
(8) It is suggested that the President should request someone-or perhaps a small informal President's committee, to explore immediately the entire problem of the selection and training of personnel for international administration, including relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction; to evaluate what is now being done in these fields of training and education; and recommend what should be done in terms of an administrative setup. Co-ordinated action of this character will at once facilitate needed liaison, both within the several agencies of Government and between the Government and private institutions now interested in war and postwar tasks.¹²

IMMEDIATE ACTION NEEDED IF THE ARMY'S PLANS ARE NOT TO BE FORESTALLED
[Memo, Gullion for CG, SOS, 23 Jun 42, PMGO files, 321.19, MG]

5.... There are serious doubts that 150 men of desired ability and qualifications can be obtained from the Army at this time, in view of the demonstrated reluctance of commanders to release good men. This is, I take it, one of the reasons that General Wickersham has recommended that extraordinarily qualified persons be commissioned directly from civil life for the purpose of instructing them at the Charlottesville School. These men are to be chosen because of their experience in government or in public utilities or in sanitary or civil engineering.

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6. While I foresee that we shall need men of the experience indicated by General Wickersham [Memo 17 June, Section 2 above], I am not at present prepared to recommend that they be commissioned in the Army of the United States, because, following their completion of the four-month course at Charlottesville, their services would be limited to standing and waiting. I should approve General Wickersham's request if it is possible to have these men commissioned in the Specialist Corps with the understanding that upon completion of their course at Charlottesville they be returned to civil life subject to call under their specialist commission when needed. . . .
7. The military government which the United States must, of necessity, establish, will dwarf all of our previous efforts in that line.... It is imperative that this responsibility be clearly recognized from the beginning and that the efforts of the military be not blocked or impeded by other agencies of our government.

 ♦ ♦ ♦ Since the primary responsibility for the administration of any military government rests with the Army, it follows that the Army should take the initiative in the preparation of policies and plans, including the procurement and training of personnel, designed to assist the liberated areas and to govern conquered territory.
In my opinion, unless the Army acts immediately and decisively it will find any plan which it subsequently develops will become lost in the maze of plans which are now being formulated by civilian agencies, both governmental and private, notably the Board of Economic Warfare and Columbia University. ♦ ♦ ♦

I am strongly in favor of the proposal to increase the faculty and student body of the School of Military Government.
8. I intend to set up a Military Government Division in this Once, with a view to the Army's assuming leadership in enlisting the services of the Board of Economic Warfare and other agencies in preparing for Military Government. I request authority to take the necessary preliminary steps toward the integration of such agencies under War Department leadership. . . ¹³

A DISTURBING MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT
[Ltr, USW Robert P. Patterson to Roosevelt, 20 Jul 42, OUSW files, MG]

The memorandum which you sent me on July 17th on the training of personnel for postwar administration relates to a subject of much interest to the War Department. ¹⁴  The memorandum points out that while some steps have been taken on postwar planning, very little attention has been paid to the training of personnel.
I am in full accord with the suggestions contained in it that steps be taken to explore the problem of selection and training of personnel, evaluate what is now being done, and recommend an administrative setup. However, I strongly feel that it is most important there should be no public announcement about this at the present time and that the work be done informally and without any publicity whatsoever.
Any time that you wish to discuss this with me I will be available.

[Memo, Miller, Dir, Military Government Division (MGD), for PMG, 28 Oct 42, PMGO files, 321, PMG & MGD ]

 ♦ ♦ ♦ Last July a memorandum by Mr. Arthur C. Ringland raised an issue at the White House that threatened the War Department's leadership in the field of military government. As a result, a comprehensive program for military government was inaugurated by The Provost Marshal General at the direction of the Under Secretary of War. ¹⁵  ♦ ♦ ♦

UNWISDOM OF PREMATURE CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY
[Memo, Miller for Col Edward S. Greenbaum, OUSW, 23 Jul 42, PMGO files, 014.13, MG]

1. The prime direction and administration of military government belong wholly to the military command. If there is one outstanding lesson to be gained from prior American experiences in military government, it is the unwisdom of permitting any premature interference by civilian agencies with the Army's basic task of civil administration in occupied areas.
3. . . . In those important American experiences in military government-three in number-where civilian influence was permitted to be

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exercised, the results were, respectively, demoralizing, costly and ludicrous. . . .

(a) The Civil War. The grand strategy of the Union forces in the early days of the war was to drive a wedge into the Confederacy, which was accomplished by the partial occupations of Louisiana, Arkansas and Tennessee. The military commanders in these three states thus acquired the right to impose military government. However, in the spring and early summer 1862, President Lincoln appointed George F. Shepley and Andrew Johnson as military governors of Louisiana and Tennessee respectively. Johnson was then a United States Senator; Shepley was a civilian. Both were given the rank of Brigadier General and assumed their duties as "military" governors of the respective states.
There was . . . violent conflict between these civilian "military" governors and the commanders in Louisiana and Tennessee. . . .
(b) The Philippine Insurrection. General Gullion's communication of June 23, 1942, to the Commanding General, Services of Supply, refers briefly to the Philippine episode, His remarks may be quoted as follows:

"The early history of the American occupation of the Philippines demonstrates the dangers to be encountered when the military and civil branches of the government exercise functions in the same occupied area. William Howard Taft admitted that under such circumstances there was bound to be `inevitable friction!' The commanding officers in the Philippines, Generals Otis, [ Arthur ] MacArthur and [ Adna Romanza ] Chaffee, successively, were severely handicapped by the Schurman and Taft Commissions who were endeavoring to introduce civil government to the Islands prematurely. General Otis felt that the activities of the Schurman Commission cost the lives of many American soldiers and Generals MacArthur and Chaffee resented the injection of civilians into a situation which, in their judgment would be, and as events proved, was, of a purely military nature." ¹⁶  ♦ ♦ ♦

MILITARY GOVERNMENT DIVISION CREATED TO ASSERT WAR DEPARTMENT LEADERSHIP
[Memo, Gullion for the USW, 25 Jul 42, PMGO files, 321, PMG & MGD ]

I have been directed by the War Department (through the Chief of Administrative Services) to take immediate steps to integrate, under War Department leadership, the civilian agencies now or hereafter to be interested in problems of military government.
Pursuant to that directive, I have established a Division of Military Government in the Office of The Provost Marshal General and have placed Brig. Gen. Cornelius W. Wickersham in charge of that Division. General Wickersham will continue as Commandant of the School of Military Government at Charlottesville but will spend much of his time in Washington where he has fully equipped offices.
Subject to such instructions as he may receive from you, General Wickersham has been told to make contact first with the Board of Economic Warfare and later with other agencies. such as Columbia University.

NO CONSENSUS ON GENERAL GULLION'S AIM
[Memo, Harold H. Neff, Spec Asst to SW, for Greenbaum, OUSW, 29 Jul 42, OUSW Secret files, MG]

 ♦ ♦ ♦ I doubt, however, whether the draft of memorandum by General Gullion is correct, because I don't see how, except by superior authority, the War Department can take steps to integrate under its leadership the several civilian agencies. Without direction from above, is not that an assumption of authority? Or is the idea it can be done sub rosa, as it were?

THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL'S OFFICE TRIES TO SELL ITS OWN PROGRAM
[Memo, Col Joseph V. deP. Dillon, DPMG, for Chief Admin Servs, SOS, 31 Jul 42, PMGO files, 014.13, MG]

On the evening of July 29, 1942, at the invitation of Mr. Max Lowenthal [Board of Economic Warfare] and with the approval of the Provost Marshall General, Brigadier General C. W. Wickersham, Commandant, The School of Military Government, and his assistant, Mr. Jesse Miller, attended an informal conference to discuss the general program of military government. Five United States Senators and four or five members of the Board of Economic Warfare also attended.
General Wickersham outlined a program which included the integration of all interested agencies (Government and private) in matters of military government, under the leadership of the War Department. All present were highly

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pleased with what had been accomplished thus far and appeared to be extremely co-operative. Colonel Greenbaum, of the Office of the Under Secretary of War, was informed of the developments of that informal meeting. On the morning of July 30th, Colonel Greenbaum called General Wickersham and informed him that Mr. Wayne Coy, of the Office of the President, had called Secretary Patterson and requested the return of the President's memorandum, with the enclosure written by Mr. Ringdale [Ringland] to the President. It was inferentially indicated that the President was satisfied that the War Department had taken the proper steps to develop the program. With the return of that memorandum, Colonel Greenbaum attached the following memorandum:

Subject: Military Government.
The outstanding lessons gained from American experiences in military government, including the Civil War and the Philippine Insurrection, and from the experiences of other countries, is that the prime direction and administration of military government belongs wholly to the military command. In recognition of its important obligation to fulfill the mission of military government, the War Department has established, under the Provost Marshal General, a School of Military Government, at Charlottesville, Virginia; Military Police Schools at Chickamauga, Tennessee, and the Division of Military Government in the Office of The Provost Marshal General.
The School of Military Government is for training the personnel to fill the key positions in military government and the Military Police Schools will train personnel to perform subordinate and preliminary functions. The Division of Military Government is taking steps to integrate, under War Department leadership, civilian agencies, both public and private, now or hereafter to be interested in the problem of military government. Its duties include the activation of the program, to recruit, train and make available such reservoirs of additional personnel as may be deemed requisite for missions of military government, including technical experts and advisory personnel, both of whom will have to be recruited from persons presently in civil life.

Judge Patterson added to this memorandum to the President, this statement:
"Whenever you care to do so, I will be glad to arrange a meeting to give you further information about the matter."

THE ARMY POINTS TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN ORDER TO FORESTALL CIVILIAN CONTROL
[Memo, Miller, Associate Dir, MGD, for Greenbaum, OUSW, 30 Jul 42, PMGO files, 014.13, MG]

I think you may find the inclosures [not attached] useful at this time in connection with any White House discussions. The program outlined in the accompanying papers now has the approval (with minor and immaterial variations) of both General Gullion and General Wickersham and has therefore been put into operation.
Specifically . . . the following affirmative action has already been taken in respect of the six recommendations there set out:

1. A Military Government Division has been set up in the Office of The Provost Marshal General with the personnel recommended in memorandum of July 25, 1942.
2. The School of Military Government has been directed to prepare appropriate recommendations relative to revised Tables of Organization covering Civil Affairs personnel and the School is already engaged in that task.
3. Arrangements have been formulated for post-graduate work to begin concurrently with the opening of the second session of the School of Military Government on or about September 9, 1942. It is hoped that portions of this postgraduate work can be conducted in co-operation with certain universities, principally (at the moment) Yale, Columbia and Johns Hopkins. Yale has already submitted definite and, I think, highly satisfactory proposals.
4. The Military Police Schools have indicated their willingness and capacity to train per year 400 to 500 subordinate officers and 1,200 enlisted military police for special duties in military government. The only obstacle to immediate action is a housing one to cost approximately $20,000.
5. The Army Specialist Corps has indicated its complete willingness to serve as a vehicle for the recruitment of technical and advisory personnel, and its staff is now studying the feasibility of creating an Army Specialist Corps Reserve in connection with this project.
6. Liaison has been established with the Board of Economic Warfare and the areas of presently acceptable co-operation with the War Department already delimited. . . .

As you will observe from the program outlined in the inclosures, the immediate over-all objective is to silence any claims by civilian agencies to leadership in the military government program by giving to all of them an active part in the program but in such a relation to it

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as to forestall their seizing its direction or control. In this connection, I inclose a copy of a letter dispatched today to the Board of Economic Warfare.

THE WAR DEPARTMENT GIVES QUALIFIED APPROVAL TO GENERAL GULLION'S PROPOSALS
[Memo, Asst Secy, GS, for PMG Through CG, SOS, 14 Aug 42, PMGO files, 321.19, MG]

The expansion of The School of Military Government, as proposed by The Provost Marshal General, is approved, with the following restrictions:

(1) That the increase in the number of students and the increase in the faculty of the School be provided from personnel of the Army Specialist Corps.
(2) That the Army Specialist Corps personnel detailed as students will be returned, at the completion of the course, to an inactive status without pay, if there are no vacancies for their services.

The Provost Marshal General is authorized to establish a Military Government Division in the Office of The Provost Marshal General, provided this can be done without any increase in the allotment of officers assigned to The Provost Marshal General. The Military Government Division in the Office of The Provost Marshal General will engage in broad planning activities, with detailed estimates to be undertaken by The School of Military Government.

HIGH-LEVEL DECISION: IT IS TIME TO ANNOUNCE A WAR DEPARTMENT PROGRAM
[Telecon, Gullion and Patterson, 4 Sep 42, ¹⁷  PMGO files, 321, PMGO & MGD]

 ♦ ♦ ♦ Judge P. General, I had a talk this morning at a meeting with [Henry] Morgenthau, Jr. I thought it was just on the currency proposition but it developed that he had . . . an agenda there that included a good many other things and it developed into a discussion of military government in general. He showed a good deal of awareness of what had been going on. I told him that we had the subject in hand and after some more discussion he said well if you have got the subject in hand I'll lay off with only a respond when you want our assistance. I said that's all right. The State Department and the Board of Economic Warfare were also there. [Frank] Knox was also there from the Navy and Knox showed that he didn't know anything at all about any developments being on. He said that he had discussed it recently with the President. The President thought that the joint Chiefs of Staff ought to do it. Well, I told him that the work was in hand in the War Department and we [if] thought best by all concerned to transfer it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that could be done too, although I didn't think it was necessary or feasible. That prompts me though to the thought that I think the time has probably arrived when we ought to put down on paper the outline of the policy in the War Department for planning and preparation so that it could be given to Treasury and Navy, etc. Don't you think so?

Gen. G. Yes, it wouldn't require much of an elaboration of what we already have on paper, as to the purposes of this School.
Judge P. Well, I thought the School, yes, but you've also set up your division. It seemed to me that if we could state on a couple of sheets of paper a brief outline of present War Department policies on the preparation of Military Government. Well, such a thing as this. I suppose the policy is eventually on any passport to have someone on Military Government on the staff of the commanding officer.
Gen. G. That's true.
Judge P. . . . and he would assemble the necessary people, military and civilian, with a view to the performance of the jobs that he would have right in the particular area in mind. The area itself having been studied and its problems having been given consideration. The assembly of the people having being planned with that in mind, and then I suppose we ought to give our concept quite briefly of the operation of Military Government, that I suppose that staff officer in the name of the commanding officer orders this not to be done. Knox was talking in a very vague about civil governor and working in collaboration and . . .
Gen. G. That's all wet. That's the very thing we don't want.
Judge P. Of course not. I said that. But I think that we have got to make kind of an affirmative statement. I think the time has come and I think ought probably be passed around to the other Government agencies so that a meeting such as Morgenthau called this morning might not be held at all. He called the meeting off and I told him, I thought it was a . . ., he said well that's all right; he said, putting it very bluntly, he'd rather

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that we didn't discuss these things and that they're in hand in the War Department, that you'll let us know when you'll need us. I said that is true. With that, we broke up. But there had been a good deal of rather feudal [futile] discussions before that. I think the memorandum might also cover in a rather concise way the progress that has been made and the planning that is being done, of course, this I take it that the School equips officers for general overall use in this job and that it is contemplated that the necessary civilian skills will be assembled, at least in a tentative way, the necessary governmental agencies gotten in touch with on any operation that comes up and see the currency man from the Treasury Department and someone from the Board of Economic Warfare and so forth.

Gen. G. That's exactly how I have planned.
♦ ♦ ♦
Judge P. Is this set down on paper anywhere in a brief way?
Gen. G. No, it has not been.
Judge P. Don't you think that you and Wickersham ought to?
Gen. G. Yes, I'll call Miller today and tell him to come up here.¹⁸
Judge P. It'll head off a lot of trouble, I'm sure, and that maybe we ought to send them to the White House as well, because. . . .
Gen. G. Oh, yes, he's [the President] very much interested in it, you know.
Judge P. He might then confine the discussion of it to people who know something about it rather than to talk to people who haven't thought of it at all and think there's nothing been going on. ♦ ♦ ♦

THE ARMY ANNOUNCES ITS PREPARATIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY IN THE INITIAL PHASE
[Synopsis of WD Program for MG, 4 Sep 42, PMGO files, 321, PMGO & MGD]

Any occupation of hostile or Axis-held territory may be divided into two phases: (a) a period of military necessity and (b) an ensuing period when military necessity will no longer exist. During the first phase, it is the obligation of the armed forces to establish and maintain military government; during the second phase, civilian authority of some type will probably assume the mission then to be surrendered by the Army. Until the second phase has begun, however, it develops upon the Army to administer the government of any occupied area.
In recognition of these basic principles, the War Department is now pursuing a program designed to accomplish two objectives: (I) the procurement and training of an adequate personnel to fulfill its mission of military government and (2) the development of a technique which will effect the transition from military to civilian control with a minimum impairment of efficiency.
The procurement and training program is designed to produce, with the necessary rapidity, the following categories of personnel for military government: (a) top administrative commissioned personnel, (b) junior commissioned personnel, (c) occupational (or military government) military police, and (d) technical and advisory personnel. Category (a) is now being produced at the School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia, which graduated its first class on August 29, 1942, and which began its second four-month course on September 9. Categories (b) and (c) will be produced at two new schools to be opened at the Provost Marshal General's School Center at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, about November 1, 1942. Category (d) will be developed in the manner presently to be indicated.
This last-mentioned group of technical and advisory personnel is to be selected from highly trained civilians. Since there will be no immediate need for their services, it would be inadvisable to withdraw them from their present nonmilitary pursuits at this time. However, it is necessary to compile a roster of these specialists, select those best-qualified, and make arrangements to have them available at call. Only a minimum amount of training in the special field of military government will be necessary for them as they will be already highly trained in their respective fields for the specialized functions which they will later perform. On them will fall the burden of performing the important duties hereafter referred to.
Many complicated technical problems will inevitably arise in any occupation. Among these will undoubtedly be fiscal matters of far-reaching economic importance. Control of local banking establishments must be undertaken. Disentanglement of monetary systems from Axis-imposed regulations must be accomplished and American occupational currency and rates of exchange established.
The economic problems that will arise will be of doubly difficult solution because of the prior Axis occupation and total disarrangement inci-

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dent thereto. Industries must be surveyed to determine those to be continued in operation or re-established. Raw materials, operating personnel, and funds must be allocated to obtain maximum efficiency of production.
Administrative problems arising from the care and feeding of liberated peoples will require special technique, tact, and skilled administration. Public health and sanitation will present other problems requiring specialized knowledge. The broad field of public utilities will demand trained technical administrators.
These problems, but a few of those that may be anticipated, prove the immediate need, at the beginning of an occupation, for skilled technicians and advisors in all fields of public endeavor.
The Army's mission of military government is primarily an administrative one. Many underlying policies will be determined by agencies other than the War Department or the Army. Thus, the political policy of an occupation will be determined by the State Department; the economic policy by the State Department or the Board of Economic Warfare, or both; the fiscal policy by the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board, and so forth. These general policies will be administered in great part by the technicians referred to above who will, however, during the period of military government, be under military control and direction. But since the functions to be performed by them will be largely the administration of those policies formulated by agencies other than the War Department, it is planned to recruit them from nominations supplied by the various agencies concerned, since such agencies are in a position to discover the best-qualified individuals for the tasks in which they have a peculiar interest.
In the light of the foregoing, the following immediate co-operative activities between the War Department and other agencies of the government are indicated:

a. The furnishing to the War Department of lists of persons qualified for missions in military government in the special field with which any agency is concerned. From such lists, the technical and advisory group referred to above will be principally recruited. The War Department has already requested such lists from certain agencies; a general request will be made shortly.
b. The study, by certain agencies, at the request of the War Department, of various special and technical problems arising in military government. The War Department has heretofore suggested to the State Department and the Board of Economic Warfare certain studies in the fields of international law and economics. A need for research in other fields exists, and studies concerning them are to be requested.
c. For the past five months, several departments and agencies have been co-operating with the School of Military Government in furnishing it with materials and lecturers in connection with its instructional work. These activities are continuing.

[Ltr, SW Stimson to Heads of Govt Depts, 26 Sep 42, PMGO files, 321, PMGO & MGD]

From the enclosed copy of a "Synopsis of War Department Program for Military Government" you will observe that, among other objectives, it is planned to create groups of technical and advisory personnel for eventual duties in military government. It is hoped to recruit these groups principally from the agencies of the government having an interest in certain special fields that may be involved in future military occupation.
Since your Department may have now or may later develop a peculiar interest in certain aspects of military occupations, it is believed that you will desire to co-operate with the War Department in their indicated activity.
Accordingly, if you have not already done so, will you be good enough to designate some person in your Department to establish and maintain liaison for that purpose with Maj. Gen. Allen W. Gullion, the Provost Marshal General, who is directly in charge of the military government program?

THE WHITE HOUSE SEEMS TO BE SATISFIED
[Memo, Gullion for ASW John J. McCloy, 12 Sep 42, PMGO files, 321, PMGO & MGD]

Sorry to impose additional information on you, especially since Mr. Harry Hopkins says he is satisfied. However, herewith is General Wickersham's list of students in the first class with explanations as to their sponsors or other reasons for selection. ♦ ♦ ♦

CIVILIAN AGENCIES AND THE COLLEGES SEEM SATISFIED
[Memo, Miller, Dir, MGD, for Gullion, 28 Oct 42, PMGO files, 321, PMGO & MGD]

The most important phase of the program (from

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the point of view of establishing War Department leadership) related to the recruitment from among . . . governmental agencies of a large reservoir of technicians and professional personnel. By personnel contacts with all these agencies (except the State Department) they were advised that the War Department intended to commission 2500 persons, principally from nominations by government agencies, in the Army Specialist Corps under an arrangement which would continue such persons in their present civilian pursuits until they were required for military government missions. This phase of the War Department program met with immediate and enthusiastic response from practically every agency of the Government, including the President's War Relief Control Board, to which Mr. Ringland is attached, and from Mr. Ringland himself. All these agencies are now at work compiling lists of highly qualified persons for various functions in occupied areas. Included among the liaison agents now engaged in this work is Mr. Charles [S.] Hyneman, for the Bureau of the Budget, who is now making an investigation and preparing a report for the President on the Ringland memorandum.

While these matters were proceeding, an effort was being concurrently made to conciliate the American colleges and universities, which were, not without cause, complaining that the War Department was unwilling or unable to suggest to them some more useful participation in the war effort than had theretofore been made available. It was stated to the representatives of a number of universities-and thereby circulated rather generally throughout the university field that this office hoped to be able ultimately to establish a program somewhat as follows:

That when the reservoir of technicians already mentioned had been recruited to some substantial extent and commissioned in the Army Specialist Corps, these specialists would be earmarked for specific areas and then farmed out in groups of 50 to 100 among a number of colleges and universities for brief training periods in the background of the areas in which they would ultimately be utilized. This suggestion met with instant approval in university circles and has drawn their almost unanimous support to the War Department program. ♦ ♦ ♦

4. THE PRESIDENT SAYS OCCUPATION IS IN MOST CASES A CIVILIAN TASK

THE CHARLOTTESVILLE SCHOOL Is GIVEN A FAVORABLE IG REPORT ¹⁹
[Memo, Maj Gen Virgil L. Peterson, IG, for the DCofS (Summary of Report of Special Inspection of SMG), 12 Aug 42, PMGO files, 352.01, SMG, Est]

f. Conclusions:

    (1) Is the School developing officers who can be used efficiently as administrators in conquered areas?
Yes. The School superimposes upon the students' previous experience a familiarity with the problems of a theater commander, and these of the higher executives of military government. A habit of thinking is established which develops administrators by the solution of practical individual and group problems of research, judgment and decision.

    (2) Does the curriculum seek to develop statesmen instead of administrators?
No. There is a tendency so to do; the method of statement of some of the problems which require the student to make many assumptions of the decisions of higher authority upon organization and administration tends to encourage protracted discussion of statesmanship beyond the scope of executives of military government.

    (3) Is adequate emphasis placed on developing skilled administrators such as city engineers, sanitation officials, etc.?
The emphasis is adequate for the capability and purpose of the School. Emphasis is not placed upon developing skilled administrators of the kind mentioned; but rather upon developing executives who can direct such administrators. Emphasis is placed upon the necessity for the administrators of large areas (country, region, city) to consider every department of government and to have some familiarity with the problems of each. In the selection of students effort is made to secure a cross-section of all administrative

[21]

skills. In the short course, there is not sufficient time to specialize in any one of the subdivisions of governmental administration (city engineer, sanitary engineer, finance, etc.).

(4) Is there any overemphasis on legal phases, such as international law and political philosophy which, while useful, may not be essential for subordinate officials?
Yes, to some extent. It is considered that too many hours were devoted to legal subjects in the first class; they are being reduced in the second class. . . .

(5) Is the course practical?
(a) Yes. The applicatory method is stressed; students deal with real statistics, and with the actual value of all other factors in occupied countries as far as very extensive resources in data can disclose them.
(b) Considerable time is used in lectures in orientation upon the major enemy countries. This orientation is valuable and essential.
(c) Part of the course must be used to indoctrinate the students and to instruct them in fundamental military organization, policies and procedures; the demands of this period will increase as more students with limited or no military service are selected. ♦ ♦ ♦

(8) Are the officers selected for students suitable?
Yes. The first class consists of a very reasonable spread of skills and success in civilian pursuits.

(9) Are officers whose backgrounds include experience in the administrative phases of municipal government being selected to attend the course?
Yes. In the selection 'of students an effort is made to secure officers of this type. The present class includes a city manager, police chief, physician, two city attorneys, several utility specialists, public health officer, judges, and the Fiscal Director of the Port of Oregon.

10) Are individuals who have spent many years in areas in which military government is contemplated being selected?
No. This is not a factor of any appreciable weight in the selection. Although several members of the class have had periods of residence in foreign countries.

11) Are there too many officers whose background includes political experience only?
No. Although there are 17 lawyers in the class of 51 there are only 8 of the 51 who have "Political experience" only. ♦ ♦ ♦

A RATHER CRITICAL LETTER FROM A CIVILIAN SOURCE
[Ltr, Gardner Jackson, Spec Asst to Under Secy of Agriculture, to Miller, 13 Oct 42, PMGO files, 014.13, MG]

You may remember the question I asked General Wickersham the other evening during the discussion on government of occupied areas. You will recall that my question was whether General Wickersham's School of Military Government used any criteria in the selection of its candidates to test the social attitudes of those candidates, the degree of their devotion to democracy, their racial attitudes, etc.
You will recall that he replied by saying that the question had never arisen and that he saw no reason why it should arise, that since the candidates were picked by the Army they naturally had as deep a devotion to democracy as he or I.
The . . . address by Wayne Coy [Spec Asst to the President] on the problem of Government and democracies more fully explains why I asked the question I did. . . .

THE PRESIDENT REPROVES THE SECRETARY OF WAR
[Memo, Roosevelt for the SW, 29 Oct 42, PMGO files, 321.19, MG]

I understand that the Provost Marshal General is training a substantial number of men from civil life to assume the duties of Military Governor or civilian advisors to Military Governors of occupied territories. I should like to have from him a complete explanation of the project-a list of the personnel, officer and civilian, under such training, and a statement of their previous experience.
This whole matter is something which should have been taken up with me in the first instance. The governing of occupied territories may be of many kinds but in most instances it is a civilian task and requires absolutely first-class men and not second-string men.²⁰

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CHARLOTTESVILLE IS CRITICIZED AT A CABINET MEETING
[Memo, Col Robert N. Young, SGS, for CG, SOS, 30 Oct 43, PMGO files, 3 MG]

The following are notes which the Secretary of War dictated following the Cabinet Meeting, October 29, 1942- It is requested that a memorandum be submitted to this office on the questions which were raised and on which the Secretary should be furnished additional information.

"1. Charlottesville school for Army instruction as to occupied places:  This was discussed at Cabinet with evident suspicion on the part of Departments which may have liked to have had a hand in the matter. The President, however, said that he thought the idea was good within its proper scope but he had been a little impressed with the fact that the instructors did not seem to be the best that could have been collected. He thought they were rather second-rate. The matter was held to be important enough for me to think that I should like to get a pretty careful synopsis of what has been done, the staff of instructors, courses, and the men being trained.²¹
"Secretary Ickes had received a message from Gullion to the effect that he proposed to educate a thousand Specialist Corps men for use in occupied countries in which proposition he saw the germ of imperialism and was much alarmed."  ♦ ♦ ♦

THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL ANSWERS THE ATTACKS
[Memo, Gullion for SW, 9 Nov 42, PMGO files, 321.19, MG]

1. The attacks upon the School fall into two general classes: ( I ) that the faculty is second-rate, not containing names famous in scholastic and especially in international law circles; and (2) that ideology and pure theories consume time that should be devoted to practical studies.²²

2. Enclosure A contains a list of the names and qualifications of those responsible for the conduct of the School. Enclosure B contains the names and qualifications of outside lecturers. The men listed on Enclosure A (faculty) were chosen by General Wickersham and me from our personal knowledge or as a result of information received from authorities in whom we had great confidence. In choosing the faculty we wanted a working lot of practical men. The matters studied fall in the dirt farming category, as it were, not in the cultural realm. To an extent, men with big names are not the kind of workers we desire. We did not want men who think that the writing of a book is summum bonum, nor did we want professional delegates to international conferences. . . . The faculty works hard and makes the students work hard and the studies submitted herewith will show that the work is practical. Enclosure B (outside lecturers) indicates a combination of men with big names and men with practical knowledge of administration and of the backgrounds of areas of potential occupation.
The faculty consists of a judicious combination of lawyer-soldiers, soldier-administrators and civilian specialists. They have had the ad vantage of records many of which are confidential and to be found only in the War College, War Department, Strategic Services and B.E.W. files. No constellation of big names in a Cambridge orbit would have done as well.

3. Accompanying this memorandum are problem solutions which will show you how the school works. General Eisenhower was furnished a number of these and cabled a request that he be supplied with others.

4. In addition to scheduled formal lectures and conferences, study and reading, the students engage in the highly practical work of solving concrete problems. For this purpose the class is divided into committees to make surveys of foreign countries or areas, formulate recommendations for the establishment of military gov-

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ernment, or for liaison work in an area and to submit a definite plan for the administration in that area of such matters as public safety, public sanitation, education and public welfare.  ♦ ♦ ♦

SECRETARY STIMSON DEFENDS CHARLOTTESVILLE
[Memo, Miss E. C. Neary, Personal Secy to the SW, 1 Dec 42, PMGO files, 321.19, MG]

The following notes on the subject of the School of Military Government were dictated by the Secretary of War on his return from Cabinet meeting on Friday,, November 6, 1942.
When Cabinet meeting came at 2 o'clock and I was called on, I brought the matter of the Military School at Charlottesville up myself and explained the objectives of the school and the manner in which it had been created, and showed how ridiculous was the proposition that we were trying to train Army officers for pro-consular duties after the war was over.
I kept the discussion on a light basis, not getting too serious but showing earnestly how important it was.
When Mr. Stimson was leaving for Cabinet meeting the following week and this subject was mentioned, I believe he stated that the President's questions about the School had been settled the previous week at Cabinet ²³

IT IS THOUGHT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN REASSURED
[Memo, Col George F Schulgen, Asst SGS, for CG, SOS, 1 Dec 42, PMGO files, 3 MG]

The attached note signed by Miss Neary, personal secretary to the Secretary of War, indicates that the questions raised on the subject matter were answered by the Secretary of War in a Cabinet meeting to the satisfaction of the President; and therefore eliminates the need of the Secretary of War's memorandum to the President in answer to the Presidential memorandum of October 29, 1942.

Mr. McCloy is of the opinion that these papers should be filed without any further action.

THE ATTACKS CONTINUE AND FIND ONE VULNERABLE TARGET
[Memo, Gullion for CofS Through CG, SOS, 27 Nov 42, G-1 files, Personnel, SMG, Misc Info]

1. Attacks upon the Charlottesville School of Military Government and upon Army's plans for military government continue. Several (Cabinet) departments of the government and independent agencies appear to be jealous of each other, though somewhat united in their attack upon us.

2. Chronologically, these attacks may be summarized:
(a) On The Provost Marshal General's personal ambition.
(b) On the political composition of the faculty and student body, it is being alleged that The Provost Marshal General packed the school with Republicans and anti-New Dealers who are not "socially minded."
(c) On the alleged second rate quality of the students and the consequent inadvisability of the Army's having anything to do with the government of occupied territory.

3. We believe that attack (a) has been defeated and that attack (b) has been stalled. The attack on the quality of the students and upon the Army's suitability to govern occupied territories continues. Within the last week Mr. William Bullitt, ex-Ambassador to France and Mr. Jonathan Daniels, son of Josephus Daniels, in separate personal interviews with me, stated that the President had told them individually to investigate and report to him upon the quality of the students, the work being done by them and on our plans for military government in general.

4. We are vulnerable in one particular, i.e. we are not getting enough high class students. Unless the quality of the student body improves materially and rapidly, there is real danger that the Commanding General in each theater will have a commissar by his side, or a civil governor with power deriving directly from the President, acting independently of the commanding general.

5. The next class reports January 8, 1943. Most of the officers recommended for it are distinctly below the average of students in former classes. One commanding general included six (6) colored captains in his list of seventeen (17) recommendations.

6. Herewith is a directive designed to improve the quality of the student body.

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MORE FORCEFUL ACTION TO OBTAIN SATISFACTORY MG PERSONNEL
[Memo, ACofS, G-1, for the CG, SOS, 4 Dec 42, G-1 files, 352, SMG]

1. Action recommended in your Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, above subject [Charlottesville School of Military Government], is approved in principle, except that Tab B is not believed sufficiently forceful to accomplish the necessary results.²⁴

2. In this connection, the Secretary of War directs that letters allotting quotas for the January 8th and subsequent classes at the School of Military Government include statements substantially as follows:
Selection of officers to fill the quotas allotted will be given the personal attention of the commanders to whom the quotas are allotted. Those commanders will be held responsible that the individuals selected under their quotas are the highest type, are genuinely possessed of the essential qualities listed in Memorandum No. W350-107-42, dated October 27, 1942, and have outstanding leadership qualities and unimpeachable character.
Students accepted for enrollment but who subsequently fail will be either reclassified or reported to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces or Services of Supply, whichever is appropriate, for reassignment.
Officers desiring to attend the School of Military Government are authorized to forward applications through channels to The Provost Marshal General for consideration. Direct correspondence is authorized between The Provost Marshal General and commanders concerned relative to applications received through channels by The Provost Marshal General.

THE PRESIDENT'S INVESTIGATOR FINDS THAT CHARLOTTESVILLE SHOULD EXPAND
[Memo, Wickersham, Comdt, SMG, for PMG, 10 Dec 42, PMGO files, 352.01, SMG, Est]

1. When he was here on December 3d, Honorable William C. Bullitt, who, as you know, was representing the President, made the point that in our training program we shall concentrate on the study of those areas of the world where civil affairs officers are most apt to, be needed in an order of priority, and that so far as possible we should train the individuals for the particular country to which they would ultimately be assigned. He made a further point that in doing so every effort should be made both in selection of students and in instruction so that they would be able to speak the language fluently. He regards this as a matter of major consequence. He made the further point that our efforts should be expanded and that more students should be trained here than under the present program. ♦ ♦ ♦

[Ltr, William C. Bullitt, Spec Asst to the SN, to USW Patterson, 30 Dec 42, OUSW files, Misc and Sub, MG]

 ♦ ♦ ♦ I have already reported to the President assuring him that the accusations against the School were without foundation. I told the President about different changes that General Wickersham was making and recommended that he should cease to worry about the School, but might, if he wanted, send down someone to look at it again during the latter part of February. ♦ ♦ ♦

5. A DEBATE CONTINUES WHICH WILL NEVER END ²⁵

MR. ICKES SEEKS A ROLE IN MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR HIS OWN DEPARTMENT
[Ltr, Ickes to Roosevelt, 28 Dec 42, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

Various members of my staff and I have had numerous conversations with Mr. Bullitt concerning the problem of civilian participation in the government of occupied and reoccupied territories. I believe that Mr. Bullitt shares my feeling that, because of this Department's unique experience with primitive people, we should participate actively in the administration of any island in the Pacific which may be occupied and governed by the United States.

Mr. Bullitt suggested that during the period of military government of these islands, it might be helpful if the Navy Department were to call upon

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the Secretary of the Interior to designate advisors on Native Affairs who would work with the Naval Commandant assigned to each group of islands. This would have the dual purpose of providing qualified assistance to the Naval Commandant in connection with civilian problems and of training civilians for eventual establishment of civilian government.
If you are in favor of a program of this sort, I should like to consult with Secretary Knox as to the details. It would be necessary for us to compile a roster of qualified people, and to spend a small amount of money which might have to be supplied from the President's Emergency Fund, training them and in compiling information which should be available for this sort of work. We would, of course, co-ordinate our studies with the work which is being done at the Navy school at Columbia University.

THE PRESIDENT SEEMS TO FAVOR MR. ICKES' PARTICIPATION
[Memo, Roosevelt for Ickes, 30 Dec 42, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

I wish you would talk with Frank Knox in regard to caring for Native Affairs in the Islands of the Southwest Pacific.

THE WAR DEPARTMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD IMPERIALISM IS STATED AT CHARLOTTESVILLE
[Address by USW Patterson, at Graduation Exercises of SMG, 29 Dec 42, ASF, International Division (ID) files, Basic Policy-Gen 1942-43)]

It is as good a time as any to clear away misconceptions that have grown up about military government and about "the Army moving in," as some people express it. I have recently heard people who ought to know better give expression to fears along this line. Whenever this nation has been engaged in a war of a critical character and has undertaken to protect itself by raising a strong Army, the timid would have raised the ghost of "rule by the sword." Washington's letters in the dark days of the Revolution are full of discussions of this groundless fear and of how damaging to the success of our arms were certain policies based in large part upon such fear.  ♦ ♦ ♦

We have no use for imperialism. That is no part of the Army's policy. But the Army is confronted with an essential administrative task. It will be called on to preserve order among a disaffected or confused people. It will be called on to operate a water supply system or an electric power system. It will be called on to attend to the distribution of the necessaries of life. For all of this we need to have officers trained to manage such matters, and we also need civilians with the appropriate technical experience. Many of the policies will be the concern of other agencies of the Government. But the execution of the policies will be the responsibility of the military commander, until the conflict will have moved far enough away or will have ceased altogether.  ♦ ♦ ♦

A CIVILIAN STUDIES CENTER IS PROPOSED TO PREVENT ARMY CONTROL OF POSTWAR WORLD
[Memo, Saul K. Padover, Dept of the Interior, for Ickes, 8 Jan 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

The civilians are in danger of losing the postwar world by default. They are in danger of losing out because they seem to lack a comprehensive plan and a unified purpose. The Army, on the other hand, has a plan and a purpose. The Army's plan is to train administrators for the postwar world and thereby to control it. Furthermore, this plan will monopolize all of the training and research facilities of the country by a process of total absorption. In other words, the present plan is to put the men skilled in social science, public law, administration, scientific management, etc., into uniform.
So far, the Army's plan and goals have not been successfully challenged by any civilian groups or agencies.
The truth is that civilian groups and agencies have offered no comprehensive plan or blueprint for the postwar world. The Army did. And so the Army is moving in by default.
From a democratic point of view-from the point of view of what the United Nations are fighting for-this situation is disturbing. We are fighting for a civilian, democratic, free world not for a world ruled by armed forces-even the best-intentioned armed forces. Moreover, by tradition, training, background, and outlook, the Army is not equipped for long-term administration of foreign areas, especially if those areas are to be given the essentials of a democratic, social-economic structure.
What, then, are the civilians in the Government doing about it?
What plans, if any, are they proposing to the President?
This is a proposal for the establishment of a civilian Center of Administrative Studies.
Such a center should be set up inter-Departmentally by those agencies of the Government

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that are concerned with the problems at issue. The most important of these agencies are the Department of the Interior, the State Department, and the Board of Economic Warfare.
Interior, State, and B.E.W. have the kind of specialized experience and skill needed for postwar world reconstruction.

THE "AMBITIOUS" GENERAL GULLION STILL DISTURBS SECRETARY ICKES
[Ltr, Ickes to Roosevelt, 9 Jan 43, enclosing Padover's 8 Jan Memo, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

 ♦ ♦ ♦  The present plans of the ambitious General Gullion as they are reported to me, fill me with grave misgivings. If a stop is not put to them, I think we are headed into the worst kind of trouble, notwithstanding who may win the war ♦ ♦ ♦

THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL TRIES TO CONCILIATE THE NEW DEALERS
[Memo, Gullion for Col Reuben Jenkins, Chief, Officers Branch, SOS, 6 Feb 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

♦ ♦ ♦  I took up directly with the Secretary of War the matter of having an advisory board composed partly of civilians which would screen the thousands of applicants for commission for military government duty, and suggested to the Secretary that Oscar Chapman, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, and John J. Corson, who had been with the Social Security Board almost from the beginning, be the civilians on the advisory board. Mr. Stimson wanted to be sure that the civilians named would not be "appointing Army officers." When he understood that the advisory board was merely the first screen and that thereafter the usual appointive and selective processes of the War Department were to be applied, he signed letters to Secretary of Interior Ickes and to Chairman [Arthur J.] Altmeyer of the Social Security Board, asking respectively for the services of Messrs. Chapman and Corson. . . .

The basis for an advisory board composed partly of civilians was: At a Cabinet meeting, Secretary Ickes had denounced our military government plans as "imperialistic" and the President told the Secretary of War by memorandum that he thought the government of occupied territories was a civilian rather than a military matter. Mr. Harry Hopkins called upon Mr. McCloy to obtain a breakdown of the faculty and students showing former occupations and reasons for their selection and said to Mr. McCloy, "Gullion is packing the school with Republicans and men who are anti-socially minded." (Gullion happens to be a Democrat and a former Administrator of the NRA in Honolulu.)

Mr. Isadore Lubin, a close advisor of the President with offices in the White House and an intimate friend of Colonel Miller (head of the Military Government Division, PMGO, and for nine months Executive Secretary of the National Labor Board) suggested to me through Colonel Miller that the White House suspicions and misunderstandings would be largely dispelled if two well-known liberal civilian members of the administration of character and ability be utilized as advisors in the screening of candidates.  ♦ ♦ ♦

THE CIVILIAN ADVISORY BOARD FAILS TO CONCILIATE
[Memo, Jonathan Daniels for Roosevelt, 8 Feb 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

I was very much interested in the note from Secretary Ickes and its attached memorandum which you asked me to read. However, since the Secretary sent you this memorandum early in January, the Department of the Interior, through Assistant Secretary Oscar Chapman, has been leading in some interdepartmental planning in this field.
Some time ago Mr. Chapman became chairman of a committee which is engaged in creating the roster from which all civilians accepted by the army for training at the School of Military Government in Charlottesville will be drawn. . . .
While Mr. Chapman took the chairmanship of this committee with the agreement of Mr. Ickes, I do not take that to mean that the Secretary has changed his mind about the Charlottesville school. Indeed, both he and Mr. Chapman, I think, are acting to improve a situation which fills them both with the grave misgivings the Secretary spoke of in his note to you. As you know, I have shared those misgivings. I doubt that this committee can, by improving the quality of its student personnel, cure the serious defect in the Charlottesville School of Military Government or eliminate the dangers which Secretary Ickes and others have seen in that School. None of its nominees will enter the School before May.
In addition to his work in assisting in the selection of civilians, Mr. Chapman has interested himself in the creation of an interdepartmental board which, I understand, would supervise the

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training of personnel to be used in the occupation of all enemy or Axis-held territory. Some of the advocates of this plan think that from it might grow a nonmilitary Occupational Authority which would supervise any American occupation and co-ordinate the responsibilities of various Federal Departments and agencies in such an occupation. This plan, of course, would not preclude such a Center of Administrative Studies as the Secretary of the Interior's memorandum proposed. It might insure the proper democratic attitude in the selection, training and use of men who, as our representatives, will be responsible for the American impression of important parts of the postwar world. ♦ ♦ ♦

GENERAL GULLION ON THE DEFENSIVE STILL
[Memo, Gullion for Brig Gen Edwin M. Watson, Secy to the President, 6 Feb 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

Our military government plans have been attacked as unprecedented, un-American, imperialistic, grandiose and personally ambitious. What follows may be illuminating.

1. Every victorious army invading hostile territory has had to set up a military government. Belisarius, under Justinian, erected one in North Africa fourteen hundred years ago.... General [ Winfield ] Scott's splendid military government in Mexico in 1847-48 was bitterly attacked but historians of his period praised it.
2. So long as there is danger of the enemy continuing or resuming the fight, the person in control of the occupied territory must be immediately responsible to the will of the commanding general who is the military governor. . . .
3. When the President decides that military government is no longer necessary, it may be replaced by civil government or returned to control of the former enemy. . . .
4. For years the Germans and the Japanese have been training for military government. The Germans have seven thousand occupational personnel-as distinguished from combat personnel-in Poland alone. After two years of training, including those junior officers at the Fort Custer schools, we shall have only six thousand to spread over possibly a dozen occupied countries.

THE PRESIDENT THINKS THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL NEEDS "ELASTICITY"
[Memo, Roosevelt for Watson, 16 Feb 43, in re Gen Gullion's Memo to Watson, 6 Feb 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

I want to see Gullion sometime and talk to him about this. He evidently has no elasticity of mind and he needs some!

A COMMITTEE IS CREATED TO STUDY TRAINING OF CIVILIANS FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS
[Ltr, Actg Secy of State Sumner Welles to the SW, 8 Mar 43, CAD files, 353 (3-8-43), sec. 1]

The President has directed the Secretary of State to establish and assume the Chairmanship of an Interdepartmental Committee to study the need for civilian personnel for nonmilitary overseas service. The Committee is to be composed of a representative and alternate of each of the several Departments and Agencies of the Government herein specified: Treasury Department, War Department, Navy Department, Department of Justice, Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, Civil Service Commission, Board of Economic Warfare, Office of Lend Lease Administration, War Manpower Commission, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, and War Shipping Administration.²⁶  ♦ ♦ ♦

The Secretary of State has designated Mr. G. Howland Shaw, Assistant Secretary of State, to serve as his alternate . . . and it is proposed that the first meeting be held on Tuesday, March 16, at 10:30 a.m., in Mr. Shaw's office.

[Memo, Col John H. F. Haskell, Actg Dir, Civil Affairs Division (CAD), for the ASW, 17 Mar 43, CAD files, 353 (3-8-43), sec. 1]

2. . . . Mr. Ickes said that the matter has been discussed in the Cabinet and that his understanding of the President's position is that the military will be in complete control in recovered territories until civil government can be restored, at which latter time civilian personnel would be used.²⁷

THE WAR DEPARTMENT PROPOSES TO DEFEND ITS JURISDICTION OVER MG TRAINING
[Min of Remarks of Haskell, Actg Dir, CAD, 1 Apr 43, at Mtg Called in WD to Consider Its Attitude Toward the Interdepartmental Comm., OPD files, 230 Civ Employment, sec. 1]

4. Colonel Haskell summarized the views expressed at this meeting with the concurrence of all present as follows:

a. That the War Department should maintain the concept of military control of the administration of areas occupied as a result of military operations for as long a period as military necessity makes it essential.
b. That it is considered best that training of specialists in the Army, be they government, finance, engineer, medical, etc., be conducted by the Provost Marshall General under staff supervision of G-I and interested War Department agencies.
c. That it is not the present understanding of the War Department that there will be a U.S. colonial or other type of civilian administration of occupied foreign countries prior to the time of the restoration of control in the local population; therefore, the need of training governmental administrators, mayors, governors, etc., on the part of civilian agencies is not apparent.
d. That from the beginning, and in fact in advance of operations, the War Department will require the assistance, advice, guidance and instructions of certain specific governmental agencies such as the State, Treasury, etc., Departments for policy and direction of the theater commander and military governor. It is recognized that at the earliest practicable date certain governmental agencies such as Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, Lend Lease, Board of Economic Warfare, etc., will require a limited amount of trained personnel on the call of the theater commander to supervise certain activities in occupied areas.

5. It was agreed that the above-stated views would be used as the basis for discussion with the Assistant Secretary of War and the Secretary of War with a view to formulating War Department policy.²⁸

DOES THE CHARLOTTESVILLE FACULTY INCLUDE IMPERIALISTS?
[Ltr, Hyneman, Chief, Trig Sec, MGD, to S. Harrison Thomson, Univ of Colorado, 6 Jul 43, PMGO files, 330.14, Criticisms]

Your letter of June 28 to the Provost Marshal General came to my attention and I asked to be permitted to write you a personal letter about the matters you discussed. I did this because all of my own adult life (until after the declaration of war) has been spent in university teaching and I believe that I have some appreciation of the considerations which cause you to write frankly about the things which disturb you. ♦ ♦ ♦

Your characterization of the faculty as containing "American imperialists" . . . presents a question on which I can write you with some confidence.
Whether some members of the faculty are imperialists, I do not know. I believe it is irrelevant. My inquiries (and I have checked on this since reading your letter) indicate that only one of the resident faculty touches more than casually upon a subject matter that lends itself to attitude building for or against imperialism, and I find no evidence that he prejudices or attempts to prejudice minds on this matter in either direction. I am told that very few of the lectures by visiting lecturers (probably not snore than a dozen of approximately 80 delivered to the third class) discussed questions of policy in which a question of imperialism is involved. I would say that if a preponderance of predilection was revealed in these lectures, it was in favor of a Good Samaritan internationalism. The offense, if there was any, I dare say was one of failure to present adequately the alternatives-policies of American imperialism or American isolation. I presume these are legitimate possible policies, even though reprehensible to you or me.
But the point I must press is not one of whether internationalism, imperialism and isolation are entitled to equal consideration as possible future policies for America; the point is that our military government training now proceeds on the assumption that these issues are none of the military government officer's business.

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