Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, diamonds () are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

Chapter IV:

The Army Is Assigned Leadership in an Indefinite Initial Phase

What of the civilian agencies in the months when the War Department was preparing for a broader role in civil affairs? The question is very pertinent for, while preparation for civil affairs was an Army duty by tradition, this was a war in which many traditions were being upset, and the President could be expected to support the civilian agencies if they were still of a mind to contest the tradition of military control.

In February 1943 the Provost Marshal General complained to General Clay that the civilian agencies were "preparing to duplicate what we are doing." These agencies did not, to be sure, protest when, in ensuing months, the War Department not only planned for a purely military administration in the initial phase of the occupation of Sicily but also, in negotiations with the British over combined control machinery, enunciated a general principle of initial military control both of planning and of administration. But such acquiescence meant nothing as the necessity of military control at the outset had never been disputed. The real issues were whether such control should be brief or long, and whether it should be coextensive only with the duration of active hostilities in a restricted locale or with the continued predominance of tactical and logistical needs in a broad area. In the months when civilian control in French North Africa was being evaluated, the civilian agencies gave no indication that they had changed their dogmas on this issue except in one respect-the recognition that if early civilian control was to be instituted in enemy territory the departments of government would have to act less as contest ants with each other. In March 1943 the President defined the powers of Governor Lehman in civilian relief broadly enough to imply a co-ordinating authority in the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO), but three months later it seemed necessary to create in the Department of State a new organizational framework of interagency co-operation the Office of Foreign Economic Coordination (OFEC). In announcing the OFEC plan in early June the President made it clear that if anyone was guilty of duplication of effort it was the War Department, for his letters to the Secretaries of State and War constituted the fullest and strongest defense of early civilian control of military government that he or anyone had as yet made.

The plan, set forth in one of the documents to follow, was in respect to details rather complicated but its underlying principle was simple-the same, the President wrote to Mr. Hull, as he had had in mind with regard to French North Africa. At a presumably early date, as soon as conditions in the field allowed, civilian agencies would send to the theaters teams of experts whose functions, while characterized as economic, would in fact be coextensive


with all the nonmilitary responsibilities of civil affairs. The one notable deviation from the pattern in French North Africa was that the civilian agencies would be more closely co-ordinated than in that area; OFEC, headed by an Assistant Secretary of State, would be a kind of federal union into which they would be brought for purposes of co-operation in civil affairs. By the Area Director Plan, as the plan for operations was known, the civilian agencies would be integrated in the theaters under mission chiefs who reported to corresponding Area Directors of OFEC in Washington. Though the mission chiefs were ultimately to be given complete civilian authority, the plan included a recognition, just as in French North Africa, that during the military period the theater commander's authority must be paramount; when Assistant Secretary McCloy pressed the issue, OFEC acknowledged that this authority would include the right of the theater commander not only to decide the time when civilian agencies would begin operations but also to keep the chain of command and communications within the military framework. All this sounded very well but under any realistic calculation of probabilities no theater commander would be in a position, without the strongest cause, either to defer for very long the beginning of OFEC's operations or, once it had started, to exercise very much influence on its policies. His attempt to do so would be contrary to the spirit if not the letter of the President's pronouncement-in effect that the sooner and the more fully the Army got out of the civil affairs business the better it would be for all concerned. General Eisenhower was apprised of this attitude by General Marshall when the Allied Commander in Chief in August discouraged the belief that civilian agencies would soon be able to begin effective operations in Sicily. [See Chapter VIII.] Once having begun, their activities, according to probabilities, would tend to bring about not only early demilitarization of the soldier Civil Affairs Officers (CAO's) in the field but also a relatively speedy ending of military control of civilian supply procurement and of civil affairs planning in Washington.

As of the beginning of September 1943 the prospect, then, was one of early transition to civilian control both in Sicily and in other areas as they should be successively occupied. But three months after the trend toward civilian control was at its apex the entire situation changed to an almost incredible degree. In November the Army and not the civilian agencies was assigned the primary role in civil affairs one much greater than the War Department had either expected or wished. And this time the Army was in the saddle to stay.

To take the liberty of presenting a denouement before its background, on 10 November 1943 President Roosevelt, despite his previous dictum that occupation was in most aspects a civilian task, directed the Secretary of War to assume the major burden of civilian supply. The War Department was to undertake the planning and implementation of the civilian supply program not only in areas of military operations but also in the areas which might be occupied without fighting as the result of a German surrender or collapse which was then seen as relatively imminent. The Army was to have the mission of civilian supply until civilian agencies completed their preparations in other words, for an indefinite time. While the President said nothing explicitly about the Area Director plan for general civilian control, his reference to the unreadiness of civilian agencies for the supply task was a reminder of what was too well known to need saying-that the civilian agencies had failed not only to take


over civilian supply but also to put into effect the plan first enunciated in June for assumption of responsibility in civil affairs in general.

Something had gone wrong with the entire plan for civilian control, and the cause of the miscarriage, not being revealed in the President's brief pronouncement of 10 November, must be searched for in the three preceding months. The reader of this chapter will not find in the documents an entirely clarifying answer. This is due in part to the fact that the files of the War Department only partially reflect the developments among the civilian agencies. However, both in the War Department and in the civilian agencies informal high-level developments were not, of course, always recorded. Although a most important episode of organizational history must in part remain a mystery, the basic causes of the shift may be discerned from War Department records. At least these records permit one to dispose of the first hypothesis which may suggest itself namely that the War Department, adopting tactics of a jurisdictional battle, had deliberately made an aggressive comeback.

With regard first to the miscarriage of the plan for civilian agencies to enter the theaters, the documentary record does not show that the War Department did anything to bring this about beyond complaining to the civilian agencies themselves that they were not effecting the coordination with each other and with the military that was necessary in order to put the plan satisfactorily into operation. It was the British who dealt the first blow to OFEC's Area Director plan; though their own practice favored early assumption of responsibility by civilian agencies, they saw the matter in an entirely different light when the question was one of introducing American civilians who might be expected to be more sensitive than the U.S. Army to questionable tendencies in British political and economic policies. Mr. McCloy and General Hilldring, far from favoring abandonment of the OFEC plan when the British expressed opposition, proposed that high-level efforts be made to overcome the opposition. These efforts might possibly have succeeded had not a second blow been dealt to the plan by the civilian agencies themselves. While OFEC had been counted on to improve co-ordination among component agencies, several of these agencies felt that the required coordination with each other and with the military organization would mean an undue sacrifice of their freedom of action. As a result OFEC had to be replaced by the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), wherein several civilian organizations lost their legal individuality and were thus compelled to act as one. But, if the observations of the Civil Affairs Division were correct, FEA failed to achieve-partly because of uncertainties over the boundary line between its jurisdiction and that of the State Department-the co-ordination and stability which it was created to achieve. Moreover, by this time the civilian agencies had received reports from the representatives whom they had sent to the field to reconnoiter, and the reports were most discouraging. Innumerable conferences had been held in Washington on such abstruse issues as the relative merits of centralization and decentralization in foreign economic reconstruction; now the reports revealed that for all practical purposes it would have been better to consider such simple questions as how, under conditions of war devastation, it would be possible to obtain for civilians offices, jeeps, and lodging. At a certain point the civilian agencies themselves seem to have decided that the Area Director plan should be deferred; though never formally abandoned, it soon perished from inanition.

Meanwhile, in the more limited sphere


of civilian relief, OFRRO had been experiencing great difficulties in procuring supplies and had appealed to the War Department for a partnership which would have involved the Army in an expensive and precarious entanglement. When OFRRO personnel became the American component of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) the prospect for an early civilian relief program was scarcely improved; UNRRA would have to wait not only for funds but also for the creation of elaborate machinery for international collaboration. The Army thus did not need to press for the supply responsibility which the President assigned; it received the assignment, and indeed a much larger mission in other civil affairs matters, simply by default.

The default of the civilian agencies resulted in more than a deferment of their control. There is a tide in the affairs of organizations which if taken at the flood leads on to fortune, and the civilian agencies missed this tide in the fall of 1943, with the result that opportunity never beckoned again with the same degree of appeal. Operational conditions in Italy and other areas continued to be difficult much longer than had been expected, and, though the Army again and again invited the civilian agencies to assume varying degrees of responsibility, they appear to have lost full belief in their own destiny in civil affairs at least as far as concerned field operations.

It would be wrong to conclude-the later achievements of the UNRRA alone made this clear-that the civilian agencies could not have prepared themselves adequately to handle civil affairs in Italy and elsewhere if they had had the time and the resources. American organizational and administrative genius is known best in the accomplishments of civilians, and some of these accomplishments have been those of governmental civilian agencies in war as well as in peace. From the point of view of the nation, and even more that of the Army itself, it was not a matter for gratification that the plan for early transfer of civil affairs responsibilities to civilians did not materialize. The case for maximum civilian control of civil affairs is much stronger than many of the arguments advanced for it indicate. This case does not rest upon possible Army imperialism or other ambitions, and it is a pity that a number of underlings in civilian agencies, and even a few persons high enough in position to have known better, tended to discredit a sensible thesis by somewhat nonsensical arguments. The case for civilian control rests upon the advisability of a proper division of labor in wartime, as President Roosevelt pointed out in presenting the OFEC plan. His letter of 3 June 1943 to Secretary Stimson emphasized that modern war requires maximum utilization of the nation's civilian as well as military resources, that the assignment of the essentially political and economic functions of civil affairs to civilian agencies places the functions where there is presumably most aptitude for them, and that this division of labor leaves the Army free to concentrate upon its primary mission. The Army itself accepted these concepts subject only to the understanding that during the period of military operations the authority of the theater commander would remain paramount and civilian agencies would be integrated with military organization in such a manner as to ensure harmony of their activities. These provisos the responsible leaders of the civilian agencies came also to accept, and the plan for control in its final form was thus one which


gave appropriate recognition both to military and to civilian interests.

Had the plan been carried out, the history of American participation in civil affairs would have provided a most interesting test of a novel scheme of control peculiarly appropriate for a democracy. The failure to carry it out meant placing undue tax upon the Army's administrative energies. And, since the control of administration necessarily entails an involvement in problems of policy, the failure also placed upon soldiers the responsibility of political and economic judgments which often were outside their normal sphere and, though not necessarily beyond their competence, certainly beyond their inclination.


[Memo, State Dept, on a plan for MG in Sicily, Mar 43, CAD files, HUSKY, prior to 1 Jun 43]

1. There should be a joint United States-British military administration under the orders of General Eisenhower as the United Nations Commander in Chief in the area involved. Since these operations will involve military occupation of enemy territory, in contrast to the operations in North Africa and will be conducted under the unconditional surrender principle, the administration should be definitely military in character as a part of the progressive military operations.

2. b. Any appointments of specially qualified persons from agencies other than the military establishments of the two Governments should become part of, and under the direct orders of the military administration, and should not function as representatives of their respective agencies. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Haskell, Actg Dir, CAD, for the ACofS for Opns, 1 Apr 43, CAD files, 321 (12-21-42) (1)]

3.... War Department views as to the necessity of administering occupied areas under firm military command, and assuming full responsibility for all matters of civilian supply, public health, repair of utilities and economic measures, especially during the early stages of an operation, are gaining ground as a result of experience of these [civilian] agencies with practical operating difficulties even in North Africa. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Haskell, for McCloy, 16 Apr 43, CAD files, 300.01 (2-26-43)]

I am returning your note of April 13 with .. . memorandum for Mr. [McGeorge] Bundy regarding State Department's position in military occupation.

I know of no Executive Order or Presidential Directive setting forth the present position of the President which, as you know, represents a change from his views of last fall.

This altered viewpoint, at least for one area, has been expressed in security control cable to General Eisenhower, approving a military government for that area and in the President's recent memorandum outlining policy for military government and his approval for Colonel Holmes' plan... 1  The State Department would guide the War Department in determining policy in political matters for the military governor but will have no administrative responsibility in the occupied area as long as military occupation continues. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, WD to AFHQ, 7 May 43, OPD Msg files, CMOUT 3020]

... State Department in complete accord with our views that British proposal should not be accepted since it is directly opposed to United States Government's considered decision that Combined Chiefs of Staff be sole channel of com-


municating directives to Commander in Chief and that the views of British and American Governments should be reconciled here and not in Allied Headquarters....2


[Msg, JCS to CG, ETOUSA [European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army], 31 Aug 43, OPD Msg files, CMOUT 12905]

The President has approved the following message . . . : "The appointment of Political Advisers to COSSAC [Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command] Staff is believed to be inadvisable. The United States prefers pattern being followed in Italian campaign, where Allied Commander receives co-ordinated and agreed political decisions of the two governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Diplomatic representatives are present only as observers for respective governments."  3


[Paraphrase of Msg, Roosevelt to Hull, 26 Nov 43, CAD 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 2]

I am convinced that no final decisions or plans concerning Civil Affairs for France should be made at this time. Entire North African situation is complicated but the Lebanon affair illustrates the general attitude of the Committee and especially De Gaulle. The latter now claims the right to speak for all France and talks openly of plans to set up his government in France as soon as the Allies get in.

The thought that the occupation when it occurs should be wholly military is one to which I am increasingly inclined. [See Part Three Soldiers and Statesmen Plan for Liberated Countries of Western Europe.] ♦ ♦ ♦



[Memo, Eugene V. Rostow, OFT, Dept of State, for Paul Appleby, Dir, OFT, 22 Dec 42, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ Sup, N. Africa, vol. I]

1. . . . The great issue there [in French North Africa] is political, and its primary importance emphasizes, in my view, the greatest lack in our present organization, a mechanism for constant and advance planning with the War Department on the conduct of political affairs in the field. I do not regard an overall interdepartmental advisory committee as an appropriate mechanism for considering these issues. In my judgment a working group should exist-the North African Committee-consisting of you, Mr. McCloy, and, from time to time, one or two British delegates, with suitable assistants and advisers, to create recommendations for Messrs. Hull and Stimson, and the President, both on immediate and long range problems.... There are issues of political organization, personnel, security, education, information, the liberation of prisoners and refugees, communications, etc., which are of immense consequence to us, and to the conduct of the war....

2. . . . This proposal for a North African Committee to guide the conduct of political events during the period of warfare and occupation I regard as the first order of business for the broader job of the Office of Foreign Territories. These should be like working groups, with you and Mr. McCloy aided by different advisers, for Italy, Norway, France proper, Germany, and perhaps Burma. Such groups would not only lay down broad lines of policy, which might be followed or not during the battles; they would prepare instructions for the men in the field, recruit the Chief Civil Affairs Officer and his staff for the Commanding General in each case, and see to it that those men became a single combat team, adequately organized for the particular job in hand. In short, they would do what would compare in this field to the work of a general staff for a purely military operation. The job here is paramilitary, with strong political and military aspects. To make it an effective


combined operation there must be an effective and closely knit combined military and political staff.4


[Msg, CAD to AFHQ, 24 Apr 43, OPD Msg files, CM OUT 10097]

The War Department for security and other reasons has determined upon policy including only high State and Treasury Department officials in present advance planning stage for HUSKY Sicily].

Assume you are following some procedure of excluding NAEB and local representatives of Lend-Lease, BEW, OFRRO, OWI, etc. from all planning and administrative responsibility outside N.A. [North Africa].5


[Note by Lehman, Dir, OFRRO, 5 May 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 1]

... In the discussions which I held with Lieutenant General [Frank M.] Andrews and other representatives of our military forces in London, as well as in discussion with representatives of the War Department here, we have considered the advisability of joint planning of requirements by military authorities and this office, even for the initial military period, on the ground that no one can perceive the precise period of direct military administration or the precise areas which may fall immediately under civilian responsibility by virtue of the withdrawal of the enemy after a military operation is begun.. . .


[Memo, Miller for PMG, re Conf With Representatives of BEW, 21 May 43, PMGO files, 014.13, Relations Between Civ and Mil Auths]

The conferees explored and discussed the following general principles:

1. That the War Department has complete control and direction of all planning and administration in the field of military government and in all training in connection therewith. This was conceded by all.

2. That, upon certain economic matters and the techniques incident thereto, the Board may be in a position to make useful contributions to the activities of the School.♦ ♦ ♦


[Min, WD Gen Council, 31 May 43, OCMH files, WD 2-32]

General Hilldring stated that in the first weeks of the organization of the Civil Affairs Division the primary purpose had been to bring the State Department to a realization that they would have to take second place to the War Department in questions of military government. [See CAD notes below.] They have been brought in line on this view, and it has been agreed that the War Department will have the final word in such matters. Then it was necessary to bring other government agencies into agreement on this matter. Progress is being made on a general acceptance of this theory.♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, AG to Theater Comdrs, 29 Jul 43, CAD files, 321 (12-21-42) (1)]

a. In carrying out its mission for the broad civil affairs planning and the direction in Washington of civil affairs problems presented to it by theater commanders, the Civil Affairs Division will prepare broad plans for each enemy or enemy-held area occupied or to-be-occupied, and will co-ordinate these plans with the appropriate civilian agencies and where possible with our allies. Following agreement by all concerned in Washington, the Civil Affairs Division will transmit the plan in the form of a tentative directive to the theater commander concerned for his views and recommendations.

b. The Civil Affairs Division will reconsider the tentative directive in the light of the expressed views of the theater commander and will issue a directive as a basis upon which the theater commander will prepare a detailed plan for military government in enemy or enemy-held areas within his theater.

c. This detailed plan will then be forwarded to the War Department for submission to the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff for final approval.♦ ♦ ♦


[Rpt, Maj Sidney C. Sufrin, ASF Hq, on Mtg with Representatives of State Dept, 26 Jul 43, CAD files, 091.1, MG (10-6-42) (1)]

3. The question of the relation between the civilian (teams) and military government was discussed very briefly-no one knowing exactly the administrative plan which would be followed.

4. Mr. Stinebower [State] expressed the view that it would be wise if arrangements were made for the transfer of information and pooling of ideas by persons in the War Department and in the State Department who were doing the basic work. It was also suggested by Mr. Stinebower that it might be wise if War Department representatives in OFEC raised the question of the political preconceptions which would be demanded of military government. Were such a question raised, it would do much to force the State Department to answer questions which it finds difficult to answer. 6


[Undated CAD Notes Relating to a Conf Attended by Hull, James Dunn, Maj Gen Ray W. Barker, and Hilldring, Transmitted to CofS, 3 Sep 43, CofS files, 337, Staff Conf]

6. a. General Hilldring pointed out to Mr. Hull that time was pressing with respect to civil affairs planning for Europe. He suggested, in view of the fact that the pressure was largely upon the War Department, that the War Department initiate civil affairs directives for Axis-occupied areas of Europe, including political, economic, and financial sections, and that the War Department then submit them to the State Department for comment, and with respect to the political and economic sections, for approval. General Hilldring's suggestion followed a statement by Mr. Hull that for the time being the State Department would not reduce its political policy for Axis-occupied countries to specific terms for any single country.

b. Mr. Hull approved General Hilldring's suggestions. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, McCloy to Hilldring, 22 Nov 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 13754]

On way over suggestion was made that RANKIN C plan be completely reversed. 7  That is, that we take northwest area supplying through northern ports and our partners take southern area supplying through the ports that were allocated to U.S. in CCS 320/2. Thus far we have had no guidance from State Department on any of RANKIN subdivisions. As guide to planning here will you consult Dunn and wire summary of State Department views on all RANKIN proposals....



[Ltr, Roosevelt to Lehman, Dir, OFRRO, 19 Mar 43, CAD files, 334, OFRRO (2-5-43) (1) ]

Pending the working out of final plans with our allies, I should like to define the scope and duties of your work as director of Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.

You are authorized to plan, co-ordinate, and arrange for the administration of this government's activities for the relief of victims of the war in areas liberated from Nazi control through the provision of food, clothing, and other basic necessities, housing facilities, medical and essential services; and to facilitate in areas receiving relief the production and transportation of these articles and the furnishing of these services. ♦ ♦ ♦

Your operations in any specific area abroad will, of course, be subject to the approval of U.S. Military Commander in that area so long as military operations continue, and in matters of general foreign policies you will be guided by directives of the Secretary of State. 8


[Memo for Info No. 56, app. to Memo from Brig Gen William J. Donovan, Dir, OSS, for Secy, JCS, 12 Apr 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]

In defining its mission in military government, the War Department holds it to be mainly administrative and expects that underlying policy in matters political, economic, fiscal, etc. will be determined by other agencies of the government. (Synopsis, September 1, 1942) It invites these agencies to supply lists of personnel qualified to deal with such matters, but it reserves to itself the right of appointment and insists that in all departments military government will be under military direction and control.

It is not at all clear that other departments of the government have accepted the War Department's definition of their relation to military government. The State Department is taking an active interest not only in matters of policy but also in matters of administrative control. The Office of Relief and Rehabilitation (Governor Lehman) appears to be making its own plans quite outside the War Department's frame of reference. Both Lend-Lease and BEW are plan-making in the economic field. The Department of Interior is staking out a claim for participation in the occupation of the Philippines. And there are doubtless others.♦ ♦ ♦


[Incl  9  to Ltr, Lehman, Dir, OFRRO, to SW, 8 May 43, CAD files, 334, OFRRO (2-5-43) (1)]

II. With respect to operations in the field, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations must and does assume responsibility for the selection and direction of the Chief and members of the relief and rehabilitation mission in each liberated area. The mission chief will be answerable to me, as Director of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, and his charter of operations will come from me.

In matters of general foreign policy the mission chief will be guided by the directives of the Secretary of State and the chief political officer of this government assigned to the liberated area.

When relief and rehabilitation operations are being administered by the military authorities, he will function under the immediate direction and supervision of the commanding military officer in the field; and thereafter, so long as military occupation continues, his operation shall be subject to the approval of the military commander in that area.

Throughout the period of civilian administration of relief and rehabilitation, the mission chief will be directly responsible to this office for the preparation of requirements, the formulation of plans, and the control of the reception, transportation and distribution of goods imported under United States auspices for civilian use, and for all rehabilitation operations.10


[Ltr, Stimson to Lehman, 2 Jun 43, CAD files, 334, OFRRO (2-5-43) (1)]

... there were several statements in your memorandum in respect of matters in which the War Department has a primary interest that might be misinterpreted. Informal conversations between members of the War Department and your organization resulted in the conclusion that there were no differences of opinion in fact and seemingly obviated the possibility of future misunderstandings. The following two specific observations, however, would seem to be pertinent.

It is recognized that during the period of military government complete responsibility for all matters within the theater of operation is necessarily vested in the Commanding General of the theater. This does not, however, preclude delegation by the Commanding General, at any time in his discretion, of administrative authority to civilian agencies; it being understood that the civilian agencies would not be called upon to exercise that authority unless and until they are fully prepared to do so.

In regard to supply, transportation and distribution arrangements, there is full appreciation of the fact that these must come under the control of the military, and that all communications during the period of military government must pass through military channels.11 ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Roosevelt to Stimson, 3 Jun 43, CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) (1) ]

I am enclosing a "Plan for Co-ordinating the Economic Activities of U.S. Civilian Agencies in Liberated Areas" drawn up by the Bureau of the Budget after extensive discussion with various interested agencies. It has my approval as a positive approach to the establishment of adequate interdepartmental machinery, and I am sure I can count on your wholehearted assistance in its prompt and effective operation.12

In order to facilitate the functioning of the plan, I have written the Secretary of State asking him to undertake full leadership in the coordination here and abroad of the relevant civilian agency activities, and amplifying certain of the functions assigned to the agencies. A copy of that letter is enclosed for your guidance.13

I am making these arrangements so that we can plan for greater participation of the civilian agencies in the economic affairs of liberated areas than has heretofore been feasible. I am convinced that they should be brought into operations at the earliest stage of occupation consistent with military considerations and that maximum reliance should be placed in their work.

Total war, as our enemy has demonstrated, involves full use of military and civilian resources. The civilian agencies have considerable experience and talent that it would be difficult and undesirable for the Army to duplicate. The military operations of our Army should not be unnecessarily diluted or diverted by the questions affecting relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, restoration of trade, strategic procurement and development, repatriation, property rights, legal systems, political warfare, political organization, and other essentially civilian problems.

Accordingly, I want your Civil Affairs Division and other parts of the Service, to work with these agencies in closest co-operation and to use them to the maximum extent possible. This will leave you free to carry on the primary task which you are facing-the execution of military operations against the enemy.

Plan for Co-ordinating the Economic Activities of U.S. Civilian Agencies in Liberated Areas

The plan herein outlined for co-ordinating in this country and abroad, the activities of U.S. civilian agencies relative to economic affairs in liberated areas is based on the following premises:

1. Premises
a. There must be one central point in Washington for the co-ordination of interrelated activities of the several U.S. agencies operating abroad. Leadership in providing this co-ordination rests with the Department of State.
b. There must likewise be in each liberated area' a central point of leadership and co-ordination similar to that in Washington.
c. The attainment of unity in policy and operations requires the participation of all agencies concerned through interdepartmental machinery which provides a setting for close and continuous working relationships.
d. Such provision for co-ordination shall not remove the responsibility or authority of each agency for carrying out its own functions.
e. A major objective of the interdepartmental machinery should be that of relating the economic plans and operations of U.S. civilian agencies for liberated areas to those of officials responsible for foreign policies, and to those of the armed services and members of the United Nations.
f. Exempted from the scope of this memorandum are the territories and possessions of the United States now occupied by enemy forces, such as Guam and the Philippine Islands.
g. At all levels of interagency operations in Washington, the military and the political policy representatives of our government should work with the civilian operating agencies to afford proper guidance, to obviate excessive clearance, and to provide the information essential to effective planning and operations.

2. Interdepartmental Policy Committee
In order to develop a unified policy and to facilitate the co-ordination of agency activities, there is hereby established an Interdepartmental Committee for Economic Policy in Liberated Areas (Policy Committee). The Chairman of this


Committee shall be an Assistant Secretary of State whose designation is provided for in Section 3 of this plan. In addition to the Chairman, the Committee shall consist of the heads, or their deputies, of the following:

State Department (Political Policy)
Treasury Department
War Department
Navy Department
Board of Economic Warfare
Office of Lend-Lease Administration
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations

This Committee will provide a means for bringing together responsible officials of the agencies to consider policies, programs, and other matters of concern to such a group. The Committee will give final resolution, subject to the decisions of the President, to over-all policies and programs of interagency concern which have not been resolved in the Co-ordinating Committee (to be established).♦ ♦ ♦

3. Assistant Secretary for Foreign Economic Co-ordination

The Secretary of State shall designate an Assistant Secretary of State who shall co-ordinate our economic activities related to liberated areas and facilitate military-civilian co-operation.
In connection with these duties, he shall act as Chairman of the Policy Committee and of the Co-ordinating Committee to co-ordinate the activities of the interested agencies. To this end he shall provide a secretariat and necessary staff to serve the Policy Committee, the Co-ordinating Committee, and any subcommittees.

4. Co-ordinating and other Subordinate Committees

The Policy Committee shall establish as a working committee a Co-ordinating Committee composed of representatives of the same agencies as those in the former group.
Subject to appeal to the Policy Committee, the Co-ordinating Committee shall review and coordinate area plans, and take such steps as may be necessary to adjust policy and area operations to meet the changing needs of the military services and to comply with working arrangements set up with our allies.
Area subcommittees, covering territories to be liberated as well as territories already liberated, may be set up, based on administrative areas determined in consultation with military officials. ♦ ♦ ♦

5. Area Directors

For each of the areas liberated, the Secretary of State shall appoint with approval of the Policy Committee, an Area Director. These Directors will provide over-all direction and co-ordination to the economic activities of U.S. civilian agencies in their respective areas.
It is recognized that the emergency problems faced and delay of detailed Washington clearances make it necessary to give Area Directors wide latitude in operations and ample authority to act "on the spot." It is likewise evident that the pattern for each area must be modified according to the military theatre arrangements and agreements with our allies.

In general, however, the following pattern shall obtain where a major part of economic operations are under U.S. agencies:

The Area Director will be subject to orders of the Military commander of the area, and of the Assistant Secretary in accordance with policies established by the Policy or Co-ordinating Committees. In the field the Area Director will keep the political representative of the State Department advised of his activities and will be guided by him on matters of general political policy. That representative, however, shall intervene only when definite political policies are involved. Clearance "bottlenecks" in this respect shall be avoided throughout.

Within these limits, the Area Director shall have all the powers necessary to co-ordinate the field activities of the various U.S. civilian agencies concerned with the economic affairs of the area. In case of emergency, threatened breakdown of activities, or serious difficulties, these powers shall extend to directing specific operations and shifting functions and personnel, pending other arrangements in Washington to meet the situation.

The Area Director will act as the major channel of contact for the civilian economic agencies with the military and our allies in the field. He will likewise channel all communications of these agencies from the field to the Assistant Secretary in Washington for proper handling.♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, ID for Red, 5 Jun 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy Gen, Jun 43-Jul 43]

1. The proposed plan is of vital interest to the Army as well as to the State Department and other civilian agencies.

2. It is not believed that the State Department and the various civil agencies are in a proper position to evaluate or estimate the importance of this matter to the Army.


3. The plan has not been discussed with the Army.

4. In essence the plan appears to contemplate, although it is not clear, that during a period of military government there will be no final authority in any one department or agency in the military theater. Instead, there will be a theater commander whose responsibility will be "military," and who will report to the Combined or joint Chiefs of Staff as the case might be. There will be a State Department representative who will have authority as to "political" matters. He will report both to the Department of State and presumably to the President. There will also be an area director whose duties will be "economic matters." He will act under the direction of the State Department from Washington and will report to the theater commander, the State Department representative in the theater, and to the State Department in Washington.

5. It is clear that such a system can produce only confusion and cannot be productive of good results. It is fundamental that at any given time there is one source of authority in the area. Initially it must be the military commander... .

8. The danger is, of course, that the military will devote too much attention to military problems and too little attention to civil problems. Yet it is recognized that the primary task is that of military victory. It seemed safer to subordinate civil matters to military operations than to confuse both the civil matter and the military operations by a scheme which is neither fish, flesh, nor fowl.

[Ltr, Stimson to Roosevelt, 11 Jun 43, CAD files, 334 OFEC (5-29-43) (1)]

.... You can be sure that it will be the purpose of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department to do all that it can to make the plan effective and in this connection, of course, will seek closest assistance and co-operation of the civilian agencies.

I feel that the government of an occupied area should initially be entirely military and that there is real unwisdom, if not danger, in moving too promptly from military to civilian authority in a sensitive area. However, I can assure you that there will be the greatest disposition to call on the civilian agencies for all the help they can render as promptly as possible. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Min, 13th Mtg of OFEC Co-ordinating Comm., 10 Aug 43, CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) (1)]

II. Organization of Anglo-American Team in Sicily and other Liberated Areas.

1. The Chairman laid before the Committee for discussion and action the following resolution:

"The economic representatives of the United States and Great Britain in Sicily and other territory hereafter liberated shall be combined into a single integrated organization following the pattern of integration established by AMGOT [Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory], i.e.,-There shall be a single Area Director chosen by the U.S. and U.K. governments who shall have as his deputy a person of the opposite nationality; all other economic representatives in the area shall be responsible to the Area Director regardless of nationality and any sections of such divisions shall be organized in like manner from top to bottom so that each person reports to his superior in the organization regardless of nationality and not to the chief of mission; every effort shall be made to preserve an even balance between the U.S. and U.K. representatives.

"In as much as differences of opinion may arise between U.S. and U.K. representatives it is understood that such differences shall in the discretion of the Area Director and his deputy be referred for instructions to the Co-ordinating Committee in Washington...."

2. Mr. Taylor of the Treasury requested that the means of communication of the agency representatives in the field should be clarified. He said that it was the desire of the Treasury that it be made clear that Treasury representatives in the field could communicate to the Treasury in Washington....

3. General Hilldring agreed that the Army is strongly opposed to a repetition of the communications pattern as adopted by NAEB. He stated that for the sake of clarity and efficiency it was essential that all cables should come to a combined OFEC.14  This agency would then resolve


such differences of opinion as might exist. By so doing, opposing views would be settled in Washington and conflicts of policy would not exist to trouble the Area Commander. He pointed out that conflicting communications to London and Washington are exactly what the Army wishes to avoid.

5. Mr. Taylor said that the Treasury insisted on the right to ask Treasury representatives in the field for reports from the field. Governor Lehman agreed on this point. The Treasury also suggested that agency representatives report not to the Area Director but to the highest officer of his own nationality. General Hilldring pointed out that in the organization of AMGOT each man reported to his immediate superior regardless of nationality and that in fact the chain of command alternated between British and American.

6. The Chairman requested that the Committee come to a decision on the Resolution and OLLA, OFRRO, OEW [Office of Economic Warfare], and the Army agreed that it should be adopted as an expression of policy by the Committee. Mr. Taylor . . . said he would have to clear the Resolution with other members of his agency and agreed to notify the Chairman of the Treasury decision.


[Min, 16th Mtg OFEC Co-ordinating Comm., 20 Aug 43, CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) (1) ]

Governor Lehman explained, as the basis for OFRRO's unwillingness to accept the proposed pattern for the Sicilian Team, that in his judgment, the agencies have certain responsibilities placed on them by statute or Presidential order and that under the pattern of the Revised Resolution the agencies' authority is taken from them but the responsibility remains. The Chairman said that it was not the desire of the Co-ordinating Committee to shear the civilian agencies of authority but that an integrated team was necessary to fit into the existing pattern of AMG in Sicily, and, since the Army would not for military reasons change its pattern to fit plans of the civilian agencies, that it was necessary for the civilians to adapt themselves to the Army pattern. ♦ ♦ ♦

Governor Lehman said that as he visualized the pattern of the civilian agency teams for Sicily, the Area Director would act merely as coordinator, but that he feared that under the plan expressed in the Revised Resolution the Area Director will not only be a coordinator but also the man giving orders to the civilian agencies on what they are to do and how it is to be done.

The Chairman said that the issue was clear. It was whether the Area Director had general powers or whether he had powers only in an emergency. The Chairman expressed his opinion that mere emergency powers were not sufficient for proper supervision of civilian work and that he felt that it was essential that the Area Director must be in general charge of the field team. Of course, he explained, it is clear that the Area Director cannot on his own authority order a civilian agency to adopt a certain course without being subject to the agency's right to have the entire matter brought up to the Co-ordinating Committee.


[Memo, Col Samuel F. Clabaugh, Chief, Econ Branch, CAD, for Col David Marcus, ExecO, CAD, 25 Aug 43, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43) (1)]

2. The plan . . . is still not sufficiently definite, complete and articulate in its fundamentals to work out the details to any degree of exactness. For instance it is our understanding that the British do not have any comparable organization to the Office of Foreign Economic Co-ordination or the area teams. We are attempting to integrate two components when one component is not organized, or so far as we know, not proposed. ♦ ♦ ♦


[CAD Notes Relating to a Conf Attended by Hull, Dunn, Barker, and Hilldring, transmitted to CofS, 3 Sep 43, CofS, 337, Staff Conf, 1943]

I. a. Mr. Hull opened the conference by stating that Mr. James [F.] Byrnes in a. recent conference had expressed the fear that the Services and the United States civilian agencies had not reached a clear understanding as to what part each was to play in liberated and occupied areas, and that there was no firm understanding as to how the military and civilian agencies would be integrated in these foreign fields.

b. General Hilldring replied that there was no foundation for Mr. Byrnes' fears. The Army and the Navy are thoroughly integrated, and there is, so far as understanding of the military and civilian roles is concerned, complete agreement between the Services and OFEC. General


Hilldring agreed to present to Secretary Hull in the near future, convincing evidence that this agreement did exist. (There may be, on the part of Mr. Byrnes, some concern about the progress of OFEC in resolving difference between its member agencies and in preparing itself to function in the field. There is some justification for this concern.) ♦ ♦ ♦


[Min, 10th Mtg CCAC, 16 Sep 43, ABC files, CCAC files, 334 (8-9-43)]

General Hilldring . . . read the following from a paper prepared by the British members:

"London are [sic] of the opinion that, so far as ex-enemy territory is concerned, and at any rate for so long as military control is necessary, there is no place for a separate civilian agency. They consider that if the personnel of the OFEC team is to be employed in Italy, it must be merged in the personnel of the Control Commission. They consider that American civilian experts appointed to the economic and administrative section would, like their British colleagues, act as integral members of the Control Commission staff, and not as a civilian team or civilian teams under the Deputy Vice-President. It is their view that, if this is done, there would be grave risk of duplication between military and civilians, and of an "independent organization" acting in economic affairs without being properly responsible to the CinC as President of the Control Commission."

[Lt.] General [G. N.] Macready stated that the foregoing is a correct representation of the British views.

U.S. Views

Mr. Finletter stated his views as follows: That, during the strictly military period of occupation, economic problems would be handled by AMG personnel, and no civilians would be present at all; that, upon invitation from the CinC, civilians would gradually be brought into the area and given the task of handling economic problems; that the civilians would be fitted into the organizational pattern of AMG or the Control Commission, as the case might be, without in any way disrupting this organizational pattern, or in any way impinging upon the full control of the military authorities; that, on this basis, U.S. civilians would be integrated with either British civilians or British military personnel performing similar functions; that there should be a U.S. civilian director, or chief, of all U.S. civilian personnel, purely for internal administrative purposes, and not for the purpose of changing the organizational structure of either AMG or the Control Commission, or depriving the military personnel of control; that the time may come when instructions to sections of either AMG or the Control Commission, manned by civilians, will flow directly from a combined OFEC, rather than through military channels, even though the military will retain complete, though unexercised, control of all activities in the area, just as was the case in North Africa. In expressing these views, Mr. Finletter said that he assumed that the Control Commission would exercise control over as wide a field as was covered by OFEC.

General Hilldring stated that the position of OFEC, as outlined by Mr. Finletter, is satisfactory to the War Department.15


[Memo, Hilldring for Col Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Secy, CAD, 2t Sep 43, CAD files, 337, Conf, Hilldring and Finletter (5-14-43) (1)]

2. On the British side, the complete control of all British activity in Axis countries is going to be under the War Office until the termination of military control, the British War Office does not intend to relinquish any part of its control until military control in an area is completely terminated. For this reason, America's expectation for turning over the control of economic functions during the period of military control to OFEC could not be accomplished.16


[Exec Order 9380, 25 Sep 43, Dept of State Bull IX (13 Nov 43), 205]

1. There is established, in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the


President, the Foreign Economic Administration [FEA]. . . .

4. The powers and functions of the administration shall be exercised in conformity with the foreign policy of the United States as defined by the Secretary of State. As soon as military operations permit, the administration shall assume responsibility for the control of all activities of the United States Government in liberated areas with respect to supplying the requirements of and procuring materials in such areas.17


[Ltr, Hilldring to McCloy, 21 Oct 43, CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) (1)]

2. The establishment of respective jurisdiction in economic matters of the State Department and FEA is not making any progress....

3. All signs indicate to me that the new set up is even more hopelessly confused than the old one. Certainly no one is assuming leadership in the establishment of an orderly organization for handling of foreign economic questions.


[Memo, Maj Donald H. McLean, Jr., CAD, for the Chief, CAD, 8 Nov. 43, CAD files, 334, FEA (10-1 6-43) (1)]

1. As a result of a recent suggestion which you made to Mr. Yost of the State Department, I met on Friday with Mr. Herman Wells who has been designated by Mr. [Dean] Acheson as Advisor on Liberated Areas. . . . Mr. Wells and his staff were primarily interested in learning how we desired the Adviser on Liberated Areas to work with the War Department. In this connection, he also raised the specific question of the type of foreign economic policy directive the War Department desired the State Department to prepare.

2. I advised Mr. Wells, that our immediate problem was to have at our disposal a civilian machinery which would enable the War Department to obtain prompt answers to the increasing number of foreign economic problems which are presented by theater commanders and that in recent weeks we have had considerable difficulty in obtaining prompt coordinated answers to such questions. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Notes, ID on Mtg of WD Sup Authorities, 4 Jun ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (Jun 43-Jul 43)]

b. Conversations have been held with Governor Lehman. He is relieved to know that he will not be expected to support operations until they have become publicly known. His position is largely dependent on the Army. He has, in fact, no authority, save letter from President, and no funds.18  The Army, in short, must support his program of requirements, but it is doubtful whether the War Department can undertake to certify his needs while doubt remains as to ultimate responsibility....


[Ltr, Lehman, Dir, OFRRO, to Hilldring, Chief, CAD, 22 Jun 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 1]

In the various conversations there has been general agreement as to the necessity for continuity


of supply and administration during the periods of military and civilian administration. There has also been a recognition of the impossibility of defining precisely the period of original military administration, prior to the development of specific military operations. There has likewise been a recognition of the fact that military operations may result in the withdrawal of the enemy from certain areas without the waging of an active campaign by our forces, thus resulting in the necessity for immediate action by the civilian relief agency in areas which cannot be precisely planned for as a civilian agency responsibility prior to the occurrence of the event itself.

In view of the indivisibility of the supply problem as between the periods of military and civilian administration, I therefore suggest for your consideration the following as a basis for co-operation in meeting these problems:

(1) The Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, after appropriate clearance with the War Department, should submit total relief requirements for the military and civilian periods of administration of relief to the appropriate control agencies and seek one allocation for both such periods.

(2) The War Department should support the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations in its requests before the appropriate control agencies, and otherwise as may be necessary. As I have frequently pointed out, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain adequate supplies without such support.

(3) The Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations will immediately seek to procure a stockpile of basic necessities for use, by either military or civilian administrators as occasion may require, in any area that may be opened up.

(4) The War Department may requisition supplies held or acquired by the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations for relief purposes during the period of military administration. To the extent that security reasons require, such supplies will be called forward by them without notification to the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations of the destination of such supplies.

(5) The War Department will arrange for representatives of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations to enter reoccupied areas during the period of direct military administration for the purpose of making plans for the later period of civilian relief administration when the Army is ready to turn over the work wholly or in part to the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.19


[Ltr, Hilldring to Lehman, 7 Jul 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 1]

... I would like to establish as a general premise the thought that the War Department will provide the absolutely essential supplies to meet the urgent needs of an occupied area for the period which is necessary to permit the full exploitation of military operations and until you have sufficient time after the start of an operation to procure the supplies which will enable you to discharge your responsibilities.

Our reason for the adoption of this premise is that we regard supplies for the support of civilian population as an integral part of our troop equipment. Procurement and distribution plans and procedures have been developed accordingly. Military personnel in this country and overseas have been carefully trained and have had extensive experience in the handling of supplies pursuant to established standards of operating procedures. We feel that it would be unwise at this stage of military plans to adopt the machinery you suggest for the separate handling of this most important phase of our military supply problem. Accordingly, it is our view that we must continue to carry these supplies in our Army procurement program.

Your letter raises the question of stockpiling by the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations. We recognize that it is very difficult to determine with precision the time schedule of military operations, as the success of even a minor operation may lead to unexepected developments. However, going back to our general premise, with the acceptance of the above responsibility by the War Department for meeting minimum essential requirements until you have had sufficient time to procure such supplies, it would appear to be unnecessary for you to stockpile such supplies prior to the start of military operation except in those instances in which it can be shown that procurement in small quantities over a considerable period of time would prevent a drastic impingement on our own econ-


omy which might result from emergency large scale procurement.

We agree that the War Department should support the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations in its requests before appropriate control agencies for those supplies deemed a necessary part of any specific military occupation. In such instances, we believe that we should reach an agreement with you in advance of the presentation of your requirements. ♦ ♦ ♦

I might add that upon the cessation of hostilities, substantial stocks of military equipment should be available for other uses. It seems reasonable to expect that as the military requirements, which now severely tax our resources, are reduced, substantial supplies can be made available for your needs.

The War Department fully appreciates the necessity for a continuity of supply and administration in enemy-occupied areas and for the closest co-operation and the clearest understanding between our offices if we on our part are to meet our military responsibilities and you on your part to be prepared for the problems of civilian relief which will develop as a result of our military operations. Accordingly, I should be very glad to meet with you at your convenience to discuss these matters in further detail.20


[Ltr, Lehman to Hilldring, 9 July 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 1]

On first reading the policies outlined, if I understand them correctly, appear to me to make it impossible for this Office to be prepared to discharge the responsibilities placed on it by the President and will, I believe, lead to confusion and inadequate provision for the relief needs of liberated areas. ... 21


[Memo, Maj Maulsby Forrest, CAD, on a Mtg between Wright, Dir, ID, ASF, and Finletter, Spec Asst to Secy of State, 1 Jul 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 1]

It was Mr. Finletter's opinion that the proposed 90-day planning period was too short and that a period of six months (the British period) would be preferable. He based his opinion upon two considerations: 1. That go days would be insufficient for the civilian agencies to complete the necessary procurement and to make deliveries to the operational or base areas, and 2. That the typical military campaign would not have made sufficient progress to permit civilian agencies to take over....


[Min, 10th Mtg OFEC Co-ordinating Comm., 27 Jul 43, CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) (1) ]

V. I. The Chairman proposed and the committee agreed that for the purpose of programming supplies the Army should be responsible for civilian supply in each area for six months plus the period of confusion after invasion, which would vary, but was estimated at 42 days. It was understood, however, that the Army might call on the civilian agencies at an earlier time to take over the actual distribution of civilian supplies, and also that if the civilian agencies should find six months too short the Army would retain responsibility for a longer period.22


[Min, 5th Mtg OFEC Co-ordinating Comm., 15 Jul 43, CAD files, 33 4, OFEC (5-29-43) (1) ]

V. I. . . . Governor Lehman . . . stated, that the minutes should record it, that OFRRO "has not been able to secure the allocations or the goods." He attributed this to the lack of backing from the War Department. General Hilldring repeated his statement made at previous meetings that the Army never opposed allocations or


took any interest unless they interfered with an Army procurement program or with shipping.23


[Notes on a Conf of WD Sup Officers, 4 Nov 43, a revision of sec. VI Army Supply Program, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-114]

... [Major S. R. Waters] explained that .. . it was a program providing for the needs of 101 million people for a period of 180 days, as opposed to the former edition which provided for 70 millions for a period of 135 days after including a 45-day contingency reserve. ♦ ♦ ♦

Provision of civilian supply is in no sense intended to keep OFRRO out of the picture, but to back up the responsibility of the Theater Commander and to meet Theater requisitions until, on the one hand the civilian agencies are prepared to act and on the other hand are requested by the Theater Commander to act.24


[Preamble to the Agreement of the UNRRA, quoted in address by the President, upon signature of agreement, 9 Nov 43, Dept of State Bull IX (13 Nov 43), 317]

... Immediately upon the liberation of any area ... the population thereof shall receive aid and relief from their sufferings, food, clothing, and shelter, aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people. . .25


[Min, Mtg in McCloy's office, 23 Mar 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-114]

.. . Mr. Acheson [Assistant Secretary of State] stated that the difficulties with UNRRA were that the UNRRA resolution had just been approved by the Congress, that no appropriations would be forthcoming until June 1 at the earliest, that under the UNRRA charter an amendment by the Council would be necessary to go into Italy which is an enemy country and that this might not be possible for various political reasons, as indicated by the fact that the Senate had proposed an amendment prohibiting UNRRA from entering enemy countries and that even if these difficulties were overcome, UNRRA could not be ready to operate for several months after it had received its appropriations.



[Ltr, Roosevelt to Stimson, 10 Nov 43, WDSCA files, 014 (1943)]

Although other agencies of the Government are preparing themselves for the work that must be done in connection with the relief and rehabilitation of liberated areas, it is quite apparent if prompt results are to be obtained the Army will have to assume the initial burden of shipping and distributing relief supplies. This will not only be the case in the event that active military operations are under way, but also in the event of a German collapse. I envisage that in the event of a German collapse, the need for the Army to undertake this work will be all the more apparent.

Therefore, I direct that you have the Army


undertake the planning necessary to enable it to carry out this task to the end that it shall be prepared to perform this function, pending such time as civilian agencies must be prepared to carry out the longer range program of relief.

You may take this letter as my authority to you to call upon all other agencies of the Government for such plans and assistance as you may need. For all matters of policy that have to be determined in connection with this work, you will consult with the State Department for any political advice; and upon the Treasury for such economic and fiscal direction as you may need.


[Rpt, ID, ASF, European Relief Report on Supply and Administration in Event of Unconditional Surrender, to CG, ASF, 13 Nov 43, CAD files, 014, Balkans (11-13-43), Bulky file]

1. The President by letter of 10 November, 1943, to the Secretary of War . . . directed that the Army assume the initial burden of shipping and distribution of relief supplies for liberated areas, and undertake the planning necessary to enable it to carry out this task....

4. The problem arising from gradual liberation of the Continent by military operations is covered by plans currently under preparation in Washington and in the European Theater. These plans are being prepared on a combined basis and provide, for planning purposes, that the military authorities will for the initial six months period of liberation supply the civilian populations with the minimum essential amounts of food, fuel, and medical and sanitary supplies necessary to prevent prejudice to military operations. Supplies of this nature are in fact being forwarded now to Sicily and Italy. Under present plans it is also contemplated that the military authorities will, when circumstances permit and the theater so requests, ship to the theater additional relief supplies procured by the civilian agencies of the government. It is not believed that the President's letter is designed to increase the responsibility of the Army for minimum relief in connection with military operations.

5. Responsibility in the Event of German Collapse. It is, however, believed that the President's letter now places upon the Army, in the event of German collapse, the added responsibility of organizing and commencing the shipping and distribution of relief supplies in liberated areas as promptly as possible after their liberation, whether or not the areas are occupied by military forces. The criterion is not to be the necessity of supporting a military operation, but is to be the initial implementation of relief and rehabilitation programs devised by civilian agencies. Therefore the relief supplies to be considered will not only include the basic essentials referred to in paragraph 4 above (food, fuel, and medical and sanitary supplies) but, in addition, those further relief supplies necessary for the re-establishment of agricultural production, manufacture of textiles and clothing, and the restoration and maintenance of essential utilities.

6. Responsibility for shipment and distribution of relief supplies clearly includes necessary provision for operation of essential transport facilities. Consequently, Army planning must provide for supplementing transportation equipment available in the area to the extent necessary to move traffic essential to the initial phase of the reestablishment of the area. This will be the case particularly where there are no occupying forces to make available the necessary transportation. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Draft of Memo for Rcd, OCS, 18 Dec 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43) (1), sec. 3]

3. The instability of the civilian organization for relief . . . made it most difficult for CAD to work in close co-operation as directed, and Mr. McCloy on 7 November 1943 had a showdown conference with Mr. Stettinius and Mr. [Leo T.] Crowley. As a result of this conference the President on 1o November 1943, in a letter to the Secretary of War, stated that the Army would have to assume the initial burden of shipping and distribution of relief supplies in liberated areas, particularly in event of a German collapse; directed the Army to undertake necessary plans to be prepared to perform this task until such time as civilian agencies were prepared to carry out the longer range program of relief; and authorized the War Department to call on other government agencies for any needed assistance.

4. On 15 November 1943, the Secretary of War held a conference with General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, General Hilldring, CAD, and General Clay, ASF, at which it was stated that the Secretary of War and Secretary of State had agreed that initial responsibility for civilian relief in occupied areas should rest with the Army, and that civilian agencies would concern themselves with the long-range program afterwards. This gave the War Department for the first time a firm definition of its responsibilities in connection with relief and rehabilitation of liberated areas.


[Min, Mtg in McCloy's office, 14 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-171]

Mr. McCloy stated that the genesis of the President's letter was that since in invasion or collapse, there would probably not be extant an organization with personnel, equipment or know-how which would be qualified to procure, lay down and distribute goods for relief purposes, the War Department had been charged with this responsibility.26  ♦ ♦ ♦

Mr. Acheson stated that the point of the President's letter was that insofar as the U.S. Government was called upon to furnish supplies for broad areas in which troops operate (not necessarily confined to the combat zone) this Government looked to the War Department to prepare, organize, and give direction for the whole civil relief job initially.


[Ltr, Hilldring to Col Karl R. Bendetsen, DACofS, G-5, COSSAC, 17 Nov 43, CAD files, 370.21, COSSAC (7-2243), sec. 1]

Our estimate of the situation . . . will probably have to be considerably revised. Under date of 13 November 1943, I sent you a copy of a letter dated 10 November 1943 from the President to the Secretary of War. This letter enlarges substantially the responsibility of the Army in shipping and distributing relief supplies in liberated areas in Europe.♦ ♦ ♦

The military commander will have the full responsibility and plenary power, in the early stages of liberation, and this now carries with it the direct supervision over relief and rehabilitation operations everywhere within the geographical boundaries of his command, even though this includes areas beyond "the width of our fronts and the depth of our rear" as you describe such areas in your letter. Consequently, all the European theater of operations outside the combat zone should be considered the communication zone for COSSAC civil affairs planning purposes, including the distribution of relief. ...27


[Ltr, Hilldring to Bendetsen, 8 Dec 43, CAD files, 370.21, COSSAC (7-22-43) (1)]

... It is my impression that you have oversimplified your civil affairs problem. For instance, in your words "the entire objective of our military operations in France under RANKIN C or OVERLORD is the entrance into and the deployment of our forces for an effective occupation of Germany." I, of course, can't and don't argue with that statement. It is entirely true. However, if you accept that military objective without reservation as a basis for your civil affairs policy, you will go astray, because the civil affairs mission of an Army is compounded of political, economic, fiscal, relief, and social considerations that do not enter into the determination of the military mission. It appears to me from this and from previous letters that you are attempting to confine your responsibilities to the zones through which our troops advance. The proper conception, in my opinion, of the civil affairs mission is to state simply that we civil affairs fellows are responsible for the wake of battle. Any other conception will lead us into trouble. It is, in my opinion, highly erroneous to feel that we are only responsible for those acres of ground on which a combat soldier has previously set foot. We are responsible for the areas liberated as a result of military operations or by the voluntary withdrawal of hostile forces under the threat of military operations. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Min, 1st Mtg of Ad Hoc Econ Comm., 14 Dec 43, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ Sup, vol. 4]

A meeting of the ad hoc Economic Committee was held in Mr. McCloy's office on 14 December 1943. General Hilidring presided. The following individuals were present: Messrs. Acheson and Wells, representing the Department of State; Messrs. [Lauchlin] Currie, [Francis M.] McGoldrick, McCamy, Coe, representing the Foreign Economic Administration; Captain Pence and Commanders Puck, Gluckstadt, representing the Navy Department; General Wright, Major Palmer and Major McLean.28

General Hilldring stated that the purpose of the meeting was to consider a list of questions which had been submitted to the Committee by the Foreign Economic Administration. He stated that he would conduct the meeting by first reading a question and then a proposed answer which had been prepared by the War Department....

Question 1. Is it advisable to consider the creation of a top committee of the U.S. government most directly concerned in relief and rehabilitation work in order to develop, present, and execute a uniform U.S. program in this field? If so, what agencies should be involved, what should be the functions of this committee and how should it organize its relation with Governor Lehman?

Answer. The ad hoc Economics Committee is the War Department answer to this question. Its function is to have one U.S. forum for the consideration and co-ordination of initial U.S. relief policy in enemy and enemy-occupied countries which may be the subject of military operations in which the U.S. Army will participate.
Discussion. The Committee agreed on this answer. Consideration was given to the desirability of adding additional agencies to the membership. It was agreed that this would not be necessary since other agencies, such as the Treasury, could be consulted on questions in which they had an interest.

Question 2. Specifically, how does the Army plan to co-ordinate its work with UNRRA with respect to the development of requirements, the procurement of materials and the distribution thereof for the period during which military authorities are in control?

Answer. War Department will be responsible among U.S. agencies for developing and having developed relief figures for all enemy and enemy-occupied countries of Europe for a period of six months immediately following liberation. These estimates will be developed in collaboration with the State Department and FEA to obtain the best U.S. view. In the case of countries to be the subject of combined operations, these figures will be used as a basis for discussion with the British military in reaching agreement on a combined relief program for proposed operational areas.

It is our present understanding that UNRRA will not be involved in the military period without invitation of the military-insofar as the planning of requirements, procurement and distribution are concerned. If UNRRA should desire to present its views for the military period to the War Department, it should do so through the ad hoc committee.29


[Incl to McCloy's Ltr to Sidney Stein, Jr., Asst Chief, Div of Admin Mgt, Budget Bur, 11 Feb 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 4]

In implementing the President's letter, the War Department has accepted responsibility among U.S. agencies for (a) developing initial relief requirements, in collaboration with the Foreign Economic Administration and the State Department for enemy-occupied and enemy countries, (b) the shipment and distribution during the initial period of relief supplies in such areas as may be designated, (c) presenting such requirements to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for agreement with the British and (d) procuring against such established requirements those items included in the categories of food, fuel, medical and sanitary supplies, transportation equipment and public utility repair equipment which are agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff through the Combined Civil Affairs Committee as being


a U.S. responsibility. The procurement of all other relief items to be furnished by the U.S. Is a responsibility of the Foreign Economic Administration.♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Wright, ASF, ID, for the Dir of Materiel, ASF, 16 Feb 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 5]

2. The War Department was directed by the President on 10 November 1943 to plan and prepare to administer a relief program.


3. On 13 November the War Department issued its first tentative plan for discharging this responsibility. This plan included an estimate of probable minimum requirements for all Axis held areas of Europe, and a proposed administrative organization and procedures for implementing the plan.30

4. This plan also included an analysis of certain basic problems requiring decision by other departments of the government which required an answer before further progress could be made. Action on certain of these problems required decisions by the State and Treasury Departments. These decisions have not yet been fully made. They include (a) a definition of the financial aspects of the problem and (b) policy with respect to the Balkans.

5. In the meanwhile the War Department has continued its planning and has obtained concurrence of State, FEA and the British to an estimate of relief needs for all of Europe under "unscorched" conditions. This plan was approved yesterday, 17 February, by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and may now be circulated to the interested governmental agencies. The War Department had also prepared for discussion with the British and with interested U.S. agencies an estimate of relief needs for all of Europe under "scorched" conditions and has completed several operational plans which are in process of being extended to cover all of Europe. . . .31

Procurement Responsibility

6. The relief program has presented the first truly combined supply program [see Chapter V ] that has been undertaken by the U.S. or U.K. governments. As such, it has required the establishment of new administrative procedures in the U.S. government to make possible the coordinated action which is necessary to determine supply responsibility as between the U.S. and the U.K. This requires co-ordination of the following governmental interests on both a U.S. and a combined basis: (a) Military, (b) Supply, (c) Shipping, (d) Political and (e) Financial.


16. All of the foregoing has required considerable work with the various interested U.S. governmental agencies and it now appears that no small part of the Army's task is to act as a coordinating or focal point to enable it to discharge the responsibilities which the President directed it to assume. No small part of the problem has been directly due to the shifting responsibilities and organization of the U.S. agencies, which has made it difficult and at times impossible to know which agency was, or considered itself, responsible on particular questions.


[Dir, CAD, for JCS, Rpt, Membership of Foreign Economic Administration on Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 14 Mar 44, CAD files, JCS 744/1]

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have heretofore designated the War Department as the agency responsible to them for the handling of civil affairs in territory about to be occupied and to coordinate the activities of the U.S. civilian agencies in administering civil affairs in hostile and liberated territory during the period of military occupation (JCS 250/2). . . . Since the War Department is primarily responsible for the development of an agreed American policy with regard to all civil affairs problems, including economic matters, it is vitally interested in the size and membership of CCAC [Combined Civil Affairs Committee] where combined policy is formulated with the British.

4. The War Department relies on the Department of State for guidance on all questions of U.S. foreign policy. The Executive Order which established the FEA provides that its powers and functions shall be exercised in conformity with the foreign policy of the United States as defined by the Secretary of State. The Department of


State has membership on the CCAC. FEA, on the other hand, is one of several civilian agencies which are called upon by the War Department in the discharge of one of the several phases of civil affairs activity. . . . All of these agencies, including the FEA, are consulted frequently in the development of an American position. However, if the War Department were required to obtain the formal concurrences of all of these agencies on every civil affairs question, it would be in the position of having been charged by the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with complete responsibility but with its power to act subject to the concurrence and possible veto by agencies which the President has designated as the assistants of the War Department. To grant formal membership on the Committee to the FEA would set a precedent for other agencies of the U.S. and British Governments, whose assistance to the military is no less important than the interest which has been expressed by the FEA....

5. The CCAC . . . consists of a small group of men with power to act promptly on any given subject. Its members are not authorities on every subject which is presented for decision. On the other hand, a committee of members of all U.S. and British agencies having an interest in the various aspects of civil affairs problems would be completely unwieldy....


[Incl to Ltr, Stein, Bur of Budget, 10 Apr 44, to FEA, on Agreement with WD in Conf in McCloy's Office, 4 Apr 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-196]

(I) The State Department, the War Department, and FEA will present to Congress jointly one over-all relief program. The State Department, the War Department, and FEA will defend this program jointly as a political-military necessity, related to general military objectives even where American troops are not directly engaged.32

As segments of the total program:

(2) The War Department will present the estimates for the basic essentials for Western Europe for a period of six months. This will include non-standard as well as standard items, and is to include provision for Norway. So-called nonstandard items will be procured by FEA on request of the War Department from allocation of funds by the War Department.


[Jt Statement of WD, State Dept, and FEA to Subcomm. of House Comm. on Appropriations, 9 May 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, 1, 219]

If the opening of the second front precipitates the collapse of Axis resistance, the armies may be able to turn over the control of large sections of Europe to the indigenous governments. In such event the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, in co-operation with those governments or, in certain appropriate cases those governments alone, should be able to shoulder the burden of civilian supply.

On the other hand, the Germans may withdraw from certain parts of Europe but continue fighting elsewhere. Military control may be necessary initially, and it will not be possible in practice for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to assume responsibility at the beginning, although it may be called upon at the outset by the military to assist in certain supply activities where the use of its trained personnel is advantageous. Furthermore, in certain areas the necessary military control authorities may not include any substantial body of United States troops. Where these conditions prevail, it is proposed to procure essential civilian supplies for such areas out of funds appropriated to the Foreign Economic Administration for lend-lease purposes. Under these conditions and upon the request of the War Department, these supplies will be turned over to the War Department, which will assume the responsibility of shipment, and the goods will be distributed under the direction of a responsible allied military authority. . . .


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