When the United States and Britain decided in January 1943 that the first invasion of Axis-held Europe would be by way of Sicily they ordained that the first American experience in belligerent occupation would be a type for which Americans were least prepared. For civil affairs in Italy would inevitably entail complex problems of politics, and politics was the one phase of civil affairs which American military government officers had not been adequately taught.

Italy was a country (unlike enemy countries in general) where, whatever the seeming power of Americans as occupants, they would have in fact only such freedom of action as was permitted by political discretion. This would have been true even if Italy had not soon become a cobelligerent and thus a desirable subject for political rehabilitation. Numerous Americans and Italians had ties of blood; Americans had never come to look upon Italians, despite Fascism, as upon the grim and fanatical Nazis; and that Italians could again be made true allies of the West and its ideologies was one of the cardinal assumptions of American opinion. Italians, moreover, were a people whose strong political instincts would be irrepressible; unless properly canalized they would make trouble even for an occupying army. Finally, joint occupation of Italy with Great Britain meant that the United States would probably have almost as much of a political problem with its ally (always on a polite plane but still with potential exasperation) as with its enemy. For its strategic interests in the Mediterranean would inevitably lead Great Britain to expect paramount influence, while Americans, with a certain perversity, would take Italy as the first area in which to demonstrate that such outdated concepts as spheres of influence should not be allowed in the emergent new international order.

With regard to all such problems American civil affairs officers, as trained by the Army, were, if not exactly babes in the woods, certainly not highly sophisticated. This was basically the fault not of the Army, but rather of America's entire current and historical unrealism about the Army's employment in civil affairs. The implicit contract by which the Army was allowed to have initial control of civil affairs provided that it should leave policy making to others. This was altogether proper, but, in the atmosphere of suspicion surrounding its role in civil affairs, the Army felt obliged to interpret this obligation in an extreme sense. It appears to have felt it should not even encourage its officers to give systematic thought to the political problems they would have to deal with in implementing policy. At Charlottesville the faculty doubtless concluded that it could not teach politics the way it wanted

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to. It had to remain within the narrow limits of a legalistic and administrative approach to systems of government. Suffering from sufficient suspicion already, the School of Military Government could not risk incurring more; for fear that it be accused of training Gauleiters it had to assume the risk that in training administrators it would produce more of technical competence than of political understanding-much less political wisdom. The same inhibition apparently operated on higher levels. One can spend months of research in the files of the Civil Affairs Division and still not know whether it was inclined toward liberalism or toward conservatism. This is the more surprising because the division was not noted for lack of strong convictions or articulateness on the administrative problems of civil affairs. To be sure, the tremendous pressure of administrative responsibilities could lead anyone to a temporary preoccupation with means rather than ends; the real cause of a soldier's political neutralism, however, lies deeper. The division was quite aware of the tenuous nature of the Army's role in civil affairs, and it probably felt that the slightest betrayal of political predilection might destroy its own if not the Army's usefulness. To acknowledge conservative convictions in a New Deal Washington would almost certainly be fatal. To avow liberal attitudes could also be fatal-civilian agencies would probably not like soldiers to steal their thunder and in any case would not let them trespass upon their jurisdiction.

The difficulty was that civil affairs personnel in the field could not, if they were to carry out their mission successfully, ignore the political factor for a moment. Of the initial assumptions concerning civil affairs in World War II none was more fallacious than the idea that there is a distinct boundary line between the military and the political. The assumption would have been false even if the State Department, as it often did not do, had always sent promptly political directives that were clear and comprehensive. For in actual execution such directives involve political problems and political judgments which may be more difficult than any of the questions faced by those who draft the vague generalities of the directive themselves. The only hope for civil affairs officers abroad lay in quickly realizing the falsity of all the indoctrination about their nonpolitical role in Italy and in trying to lift themselves by their own bootstraps. Since they had not been taught the politics of civil affairs they would have to learn it themselves, the hard way.

This is precisely what they did-from the highest rank to the lowest. They had, to be sure, their own inner resources to fall back upon. They had had the political experience common to all citizens of a democracy. For the novel and unaccustomed problems at hand, however, this would not have been enough. It was an added help that the civil affairs officers who went into Italy were by and large an extraordinary group of people-politicians, financiers, lawyers, inventors, professors, philosophers, artists, and poets. Gifted with sensitivity, intuition, and the art of independent thinking, as a group they were peculiarly well qualified to profit from experience. While the Italian operation was still in the planning stage, Americans learned much of politics from their colleagues, the British. They learned even more about politics in Italy because there every major problem which confronted them in that land of excitable people, including the economic problems, had its political element. They learned politics in large measure from the people they governed, past masters at politics, inheritors of the political shrewdness of Machiavelli, still including statesmen from the pre-Fascist era who even after long retirement or hiding remembered

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enough of the game to be a match, and at times more than a match, for any Anglo-Saxon of the victorious army.

Of the planning for Sicily, little need here be said because the documents tell their story of the intermixture of the military and the political so clearly. One notes that it was not ' a civilian statesman but General Eisenhower who signed the first document to pose the basic political problems of Sicily-the question of benevolence versus severity and the problem of joint military government. With respect to the latter, the American component of Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) showed a keen political insight and at the same time a certain degree of naiveté. It was able to foresee that Great Britain might wish a senior partnership because of its strategic interests, and it was capable of recognizing that only a joint and equal military government could ensure harmony among the allies and an effective approach to the conquered. But the American planners were naive in assuming that it would probably be easy to obtain prompt intergovernmental agreement upon this principle merely because it was militarily and administratively sound. They prepared and sent to Washington a plan for joint military government from which, as was correct for soldiers, they excluded every political consideration. Months passed without the arrival of the combined politico-economic directive essential to more detailed planning. The delay was due to a situation which the theater had perhaps failed to foresee: its plan for joint military government was not being considered in Washington and London merely with reference to its efficiency but, even more, with reference to its bearing upon the political problem of the distribution of power between the two nations.

The very foundation of the plan came into question when, first the British, and later the Americans (their fighting spirit now stirred) desired for their respective countries a senior role. Nor, even after the President and the Prime Minister finally compromised on the AFHQ principle of no senior partnership, did the political misgivings and the diplomatic disagreements stop. Since the agreement amounted merely to the expression of a pious principle, both countries continued to scrutinize every element of the AFHQ plan to ensure that it did not give the partner an undue advantage. One cause for concern in Washington was the fact that the American planners at AFHQ, believing it a good idea to borrow from sound British practice, had proposed certain features of that practice which, as they evidently had failed to realize, were designed to give the British Foreign Office ultimate control of civil affairs in its later stages. In particular AFHQ's proposal to include both ministers as political advisers aroused misgivings. It might well have seemed that if soldiers were not to make political judgments themselves they needed the assistance of able diplomats, who, as intermediaries between the theater and the two governments, would be helpful in solving political issues not covered by the basic directives. But from the American point of view there was the danger that the British Resident Minister, a figure of considerable stature, would use his position in the theater to inject British political influence into its policies.

Considering that none of the issues could have been ignored if it is the duty of statesmen to take no chances with their country's interests, the remarkable thing is not so much the duration of the debates as the fact that all the issues were finally settled before the assault. One interesting feature of the CCS directive was that in several stipulations it upheld the principle of a purely military administration for the initial phase. That the President approved this feature of the directive at a time when

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he still believed in civilian control is not as strange as it may appear. During the course of negotiations with the British it became clear to all Americans concerned that only by adopting such a principle would it be possible to exclude political influence such as a British Resident Minister might exert as part of the administration.

Aside from its provisions for benevolence and defascistization, the directive suggested a deliberate effort toward avoidance of political issues. Even if judged only by the immediate background, this flight from the political did not, it would seem, have altogether bright prospects of success.

1. AFHQ BEGINS PLANNING ON THE ASSUMPTION BRITISH AND AMERICAN INTERESTS CAN BE POOLED

A RECOMMENDATION THAT POLICIES BE RECONCILED IN A JOINT MILITARY GOVERNMENT
[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 8 Feb 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 4174]

. . . This is the first United States operation involving the invasion and occupation of enemy territory. ¹ It is the first British operation involving the invasion and occupation of enemy territory other than colonial. It is as well the first joint operation against enemy territory. It will inevitably establish precedents far-reaching in scope and importance and will set the pattern for later operations in Europe. Policies now adopted will affect future operations throughout the war. We must therefore reconcile American and British policy toward Italy in order that there may be a joint and single attitude with respect to the civil and military authority and the civil population of the territory occupied. It must be decided whether a benevolent policy or one of strict military occupation in Sicily will contribute more to the rapid submission of the balance of the country. We must determine whether our attitude is to be a benevolent one from the outset or whether consideration of the establishment of a friendly liberal regime is to be postponed until the entire country is occupied. A firm understanding in these matters with Great Britain is necessary. Divergences of opinion, which for reasons of past history or future interest are certain to arise, must be definitely resolved well in advance. The British may feel that they should have primary responsibility in this area because of their vital interests in the Mediterranean. This would presumably involve the British form of Military Government and British administration thereof. The question of responsibility for relief and rehabilitation of the occupied territory then arises. I believe that we should take care that these matters of policy are settled and so clearly understood that opportunity for differences of interpretation be reduced to an absolute minimum and that this be done before the operational planning progresses too far. To permit policy to develop and be set by the progress of events would, in my opinion, be detrimental to the interests of the United States.

I recommend a firm policy of joint Anglo-American responsibility and joint conduct of military government under an agreed system, to function under the Allied Commander. This would include joint participation in, (1) its political aspects, that is, determining the general and special policies to govern the operation and, (2) the implementation of those policies by the preparation in detail of a simple and effective system of military government ready for immediate application on landing....

I hope I may have a directive on the major lines of United States Policy as soon as possible. Meanwhile I have designated two qualified American officers, who have begun to study these problems; one of these I am sending to Tripoli for a short visit to observe the operation of British Military Government first hand. ²

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BRITISH MILITARY GOVERNMENT PRACTICE FOUND BASICALLY LIKE AMERICAN
[Memo, Col Spofford, Liaison Sec, AFHQ, for Holmes, Chief Liaison Sec, AFHQ, 2 Mar 43, CAD files, 091.1, Tripolitania (3-2-43) (1)]

At your suggestion I have spent eleven days (14 to 25 February) in Tripoli, investigating the operation of British Military Government in Tripolitania. Herewith is a summary report to which I have added certain comments and recommendations. . . .

1. Basis of Military Administration. The basis of the military government administered by the British is that which we recognize, that is, the obligation of the occupying army to restore and to insure as far as possible, public order and safety. This obligation is stated in the Rules annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907 (Art. 43) to which both Great Britain and the United States are signatories.

British military administration, once occupation is established, is set up by proclamation in the usual manner, the practice being to make effective the proclamations of the Commanding General by posting them in principal places (Court House or Mayor's office) in each municipality as it is occupied....

There is nothing new in principle in the basic ordinances which cover the subject matter in generally the same manner as that prescribed in the U.S. Manual of Military Government (FM 27-5)....

2. Organization at GHQ-Development. The British Army had no developed organization for military government at the beginning of this war. Such regulations as existed were to be found in one chapter of the Manual of Military Law (Art. 8, Ch. XIV), in which were set forth general principles governing the occupation of enemy territory, based on the Rules annexed to the Hague Convention. Shortly before the invasion of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland, Major General P. E. Mitchell, GHQ, Middle East, organized the Enemy Occupied Territory Administration (EOTA).³  According to officers who served in these territories and to reports which I read, the administration encountered great difficulty, especially in its early stages, due to lack of preparation, inadequate and untrained staffs and more rapid progress of military operations than had been contemplated. For example, the Military Courts in Somalia were organized under a single officer which meant that serious offenses were tried by untrained personnel with little or no guidance. . . .

6. Recommendations: Assuming that Britain and the United States will be jointly responsible for the military government resulting from any future occupation of territory by the Allied Forces, the following is recommended:

1. That a plan of allied administration of occupied enemy territory be prepared, according to the following principles:

a. It should, so far as is practicable, follow the directive contained in the United States Manual of Military Government [FM 27-5], but should give effect to recent British experience as illustrated in EOTA [Enemy Occupied Territory Administration].⁴

b. It should provide for British and American administrative staff and field staff, roughly evenly divided;

c. The staff should be administratively responsible to AFHQ on all policy and political matters. . .

POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF DOING GOOD JOB
[Memo, Holmes for CofS, AFHQ, 4 Mar 43, CAD files, 091.1, Tripolitania (3-2-43) (1)]

There is submitted herewith a report compiled by Colonel Spofford after his visit, to study the operation of military government in Tripolitania. This is a good job which I commend to your careful attention. .. .

As this is our first occupation of enemy territory, it will fix policy and set the pattern for future operations. It is, therefore, essential that the job be done with care and efficiency, with its effect on the future well in mind.

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The political implications, both immediate and potential, of the administration of military government of occupied enemy territory cannot be overemphasized....

The period of the occupation will be much longer than the period of the assault. Final judgment with respect to the job as a whole will probably be determined more by the reaction of public opinion throughout the world to the occupation than to the assault. The average citizen has forgotten the German attack on Norway, but he is alert to the evils of German occupation.

This is going to be a hell of a job and we want a green light to get on with it. Spofford and I would like to outline our plans to you and the Commander in Chief orally before we put up anything to Force 141.⁵

AFHQ PLANS PROPOSES AN EQUAL PARTNERSHIP AND A NONZONAL SYSTEM
[AFHQ Appreciation and Outline Plan for Military Government of Sicily, 24 Mar 43, CAD files, HUSKY Plan, Exec Off file, Job 4814]

(2) This appreciation and outline plan is prepared on the assumption that responsibility of the respective governments will be joint. Joint responsibility is taken to mean equal sharing of political, legal, and financial responsibility for both planning and conduct of the military government, as well as participation by personnel on approximately an equal basis....

(4) It is clear that military government of Sicily must be conducted under a single over-all plan. The government will be based on one set of military laws applicable throughout the territory, whether occupied by British or American forces and administered under the same system, whether it be British or American personnel. . . . ⁶

MILITARY AND NOT CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN THE INITIAL PHASE
[AFHQ Appreciation and Outline Plan, 24 Mar 43]

(63) The plan must be one for effective military government, that is, actual administration by military personnel of the essential services of the territory. In this the situation will be entirely different from that which has existed in North Africa....

[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 1 May 43, OPD Msg file, CM-IN 411]

We are in full accord that military government for HUSKY will be staffed entirely by military personnel initially. . . .

THE PLAN BORROWS SOME ELEMENTS FROM BRITISH PRACTICE
[AFHQ Appreciation and Outline Plan, 24 Mar 43]

(8) The U.S. system contemplates that during the period of operations Civil Affairs Officers will, if present in the theater, act in a planning and advisory capacity only. Relations with the civil population will, in this phase, be conducted by the Provost Marshal and the military police. It is not until the phase of operations in which organized resistance has ceased that Civil Affairs Officers are directed to assume administrative functions....

(64) The military administration should be set up as soon as military operations will permit. This involves following the British practice rather than the procedure recommended in the American manual. The advantages of this course are that it will:

(a) Shorten or eliminate the period of disorganization of the essential services. . .

(b) Relieve combat troops of responsibility for civil matters during the period when it is most important to do so....

(c) Obviate confusion arising from changeover from combat to civil affairs personnel at some later stage.

(65) The Military Governor will, of course, be the Commanding General of the expeditionary forces. ⁷  The military administration should be

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headed by a Deputy Military Governor with functions comparable to the British D.C.P.O. or the American Civil Affairs Officer. He should be assisted by a staff of experts covering the major fields for which the military administration is responsible as under both American and British practice.

(66) Since the HUSKY operation is the first Allied assault on European territory, the manner in which the government of the territory is conducted will have far-reaching consequences. It will be followed closely by the respective governments who will undoubtedly have occasion to communicate directives through the CinC. In order to keep the CinC advised on political and policy matters there should be established at AFHQ a counterpart of the Headquarters organization of EOTA at Cairo. For this operation this should comprise one or more officers and a small executive and advisory staff. .. . Major directives should be communicated by the CinC to the military governor directly. For the most part, however, the political section should be the channel for political questions and decisions and should relieve the CinC of as much of this administrative burden as possible....

(78) The CinC will create a Political Section of his staff consisting of military personnel, both American and British. It will be the function of this staff to advise the CinC on questions affecting the administration of the territory and on political questions arising out of military occupation. It will be responsible for seeing that the directives of the CinC are communicated to the MG. ⁸

THE PLAN IS SUBMITTED TO WASHINGTON AS A COMBINATION OF TWO SYSTEMS
[Ltr, Gen Smith, CofS, AFHQ, to Marshall, 25 Mar 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

In compliance with the instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colonel Holmes has brought with him the outline plan for Allied military government of HORRIFIED [Sicily]. This plan represents adaptation of our principles of military government and those of the British, which are identical, and the British administrative system, which experience has proved to be successful in the Middle East. It is also adapted to joint responsibility by the United States and Great Britain, and fits into the framework of AFHQ....

AFHQ ENTERS UPON MORE DETAILED PLANNING WITH VERY FEW PLANNERS
[Brig Gen Charles M. Spofford, former Actg Deputy Chief, AMGOT, Rpt, Allied Military Government-Sicily and Southern Italy, 27 Sep 45  ⁹  [hereafter cited as Spofford Rpt], OCMH files]

The Appreciation and Outline Plan dated 24 March 1943 had included a proposed TO/WE calling for 400 officers, evenly divided as between British and American. This TO/WE indicated tentative assignments of the officers, that is, those with specialists qualifications desired and those for general civil affairs duty. .. .

The immediate requirement at that time was the assembly of a staff of specialists to carry forward the detailed planning. The assembling of this staff was long delayed due to difficulties of procurement and transportation, since virtually the entire staff had to be recruited from outside the theater. As a basis for determining the requirements from the U.S. a survey was first made of the probable personnel which could be obtained within the theater. This was estimated at approximately 30 officers and the balance was requested from the War Department. The same procedure was followed in the case of British personnel although the position there was somewhat more satisfactory since a pool had been established in Cairo from which a number of officers could be drawn. In order to obtain enlisted personnel with language qualifications a questionnaire was sent to all units in the theater, requiring returns of those speaking Italian. These returns were screened and several hundred men were interviewed by an Italian-speaking officer, as a result of which a number of early assignments were made.

In order to administer the American personnel, approval for a provisional TO for Headquarters and Headquarters Company was requested and granted, which TO was approved by the War Department. This organization was tentative only and was not a complete or satisfactory solution of the problem of personnel administration which was later made difficult by the extension of the operations beyond those initially contemplated, and subsequently by the division

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of authority over the military government personnel in the theater.

The key personnel for planning were not immediately available, which delayed the detailed planning considerably. By April 15 the planning staff consisted of Major General Lord Rennell ¹⁰  and Lt. Col. [A. Terrence] Maxwell on the British side, together with several administrative officers who had been summoned from the Middle East. On the American side the staff consisted of Spofford and two junior officers who had been secured but had not arrived for duty. Col. [A. P.] Grafftey Smith, Chief Finance Officer, and Lt. Col. Bernstein, Advisor on Currency and Exchange, arrived during the first week in May and during the same period Major [Henry T.] Rowell, who had been requested from AGWAR from the School of Military Government at Charlottesville to organize the Training Center called for by the plan, and Major [Robert N.] Gorman, Legal Officer, arrived from the U.S.

Brig. Gen. Frank J. McSherry (A)¹¹  arrived on 2 June to take up his duties as Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

The Training Center called for by the plan required facilities which were sought by Lord Rennell and Col. Spofford in April 1943. Administrative personnel to operate the center was secured and arrived in Algiers at the end of the first week in May. Approval was obtained at the time to establish the center at Chrea, near Blida, where this personnel and other administrative personnel called forward to arrive about 15 May assembled during May. The key personnel in supply, public safety, and public health did not arrive in the theater until the last week in May, when Lt. Col. [John F. R.] Seitz (A), Director of Civilian Supply and Resources; Col. [D. Gordon] Cheyne (B), Director of Public Health; and Col. Lemuel L. Bolles (A), Commissioner of Public Safety, reported at Chrea. In addition to the foregoing there arrived by air from the U.S. approximately ten officers to be assigned to the planning staff and an equal number of British officers largely from the Middle East. On 2 June the first large installment of 110 American officers arrived ex U.S. [sic]. During the month of June there was a steady arrival of small groups of both British and American personnel supplemented by a contingent of 94 British officers who arrived on 27 June and 38 American officers who arrived on 1 July.

Enlisted personnel was secured in part from the theater when approximately 8o EM and 6o British OR's were assigned early in June for Administration of the Training Center at Chrea. To these were added 169 EM [Enlisted Men] who had been sent forward from the U.S. and an additional complement of British personnel. At the time Chrea was vacated on 15 July there were 285 American EM and 276 British OR's assigned to AMG, the largest part of which were attached to the contingents going to Sicily with the exception of approximately 100 who were stationed at the military government holding center at Tizi-Ouzou....

AFHQ AGREES ON EXCLUSION OF CIVILIAN AGENCIES FROM PLANNING
[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 1 May 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 411]

We are entirely in agreement that matters affecting future operations in other areas are not the concern of the North African Economic Board. Neither the Board nor representatives of Lend-Lease, BEW or other civilian agencies as such have knowledge of operation HUSKY....¹²

MEANWHILE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOT REACHED SPEEDY AGREEMENT
[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 3 May 43, ACC files, 10000/100/604]

No further word has been received in regard to agreement with. British Government concerning the Military Government of Operation HUSKY since your Fortune 101 of 14 April in which it was stated that a reply was being made by the State Department to the proposal left by Mister Eden. An order has been issued creating AMGOT in order that planning may proceed [see below, sec. 7]. However, lack of a final agreement between the two governments impedes this work and an early agreement is urgently desirable. The over-all directive covering political, financial and economic matters is also needed at the earliest possible date. Major General Lord Rennell is now in London and it is hoped that steps may be taken to obtain the concurrence of the British Government to the plan as agreed on by United States authorities.

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2. EACH COUNTRY WANTS TO BE SENIOR PARTNER

CLAIMS AND COUNTERCLAIMS
[Memo for the President drafted by Haskell, Asst Dir, CAD, dated "Early March," CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43)] ¹³

Sir John Dill sent General Marshall the attached copy of a telegram from Mr. Eden to Mr. Macmillan in Algiers, which indicates that the British are inclined to the view that they should have prime responsibility for control of civil affairs in Sicily and should therefore institute a British administration of military government after this area is captured. This telegram attributes to General Eisenhower the feeling that, owing to vital British interests in the Mediterranean, there is something to be said for this view. Mr. Eden is apparently laboring under a misapprehension in attributing such a feeling to General Eisenhower himself. In his cable . . . of February 8, 1943, which was shown to the British, General Eisenhower anticipated that this point would be raised and expressed' his views on the far-reaching implications on the future conduct of the war involved in its determination. In this cable General Eisenhower stated: "The British may feel that they should have primary responsibility ...but he recommended a firm policy of joint Anglo-American responsibility and joint conduct of military government functioning under the Allied Commander. . . .

From the beginning of the occupation, the character and efficiency of the civil administration of this area will influence the will of the Italian people and armed forces to resist in subsequent operations. I believe that the assignment of prime responsibility of civil authority to the United States and a United States administration of Sicily as it is occupied would contribute most electively to the rapid submission of other Italian areas.

The United States cannot avoid this responsibility which stems from the appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander in the Theater.

I recommend that planning should be in the hands of a joint Anglo-American body and that actual administration of Sicily should likewise be joint, with prime responsibility assigned to the United States and exercised under General Eisenhower by a joint military government set up in  accordance with United States military law and administrative procedure.

I feel that this is a question your decision. Before either General Marshall or I discuss the matter further with the British, your instructions are requested.

EISENHOWER OPPOSES ANY SENIOR PARTNERSHIP
[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 7 Mar 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 3718] ¹⁴

5. . . . I believe it to be essential that the military government for HUSKY be a joint Anglo-American responsibility. I believe that we should take this opportunity to emphasize Allied unity and that so doing will have political and even military advantages in dealing with the Italian population and later elsewhere. For either government to assume primary responsibility could invite undesirable speculation with regard to imperialistic intentions which could be exploited by enemy propaganda....

EISENHOWER'S VIEW ACCEPTED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS
[Msg, JCS to Eisenhower, 10 Mar 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 3636]

It is the opinion of the United States Government that the government of HUSKY should be a joint Anglo-American responsibility, under the control of the Commander in Chief Allied Forces, for both planning and administration, and that there should be no "senior partner" in the joint government. This is in response to your number 4962 [sic] of March 7....

BUT PRESIDENT WANTS THE ADMINISTRATION TO BE PREDOMINANTLY AMERICAN
[Memo, Dept of State as revised by Roosevelt,¹⁵  transmitted by Leahy to OPD on 9 Apr 43, CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43)]

(a) The administration should be so organized that in its relations with the local population the

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greatest emphasis possible is given to the American character of the undertaking. This is essential if full advantage is to be taken of certain valuable political and psychological factors which might prepare the way for substantial co-operation from the civilian population. There are, for example, the strong pro-American feeling in Sicily and southern Italy; the surety as to American long-range sympathy because of the several million American citizens of Italian origin, and the close contact, in normal times, of these elements with their families in Italy; and America's historical detachment from questions involving the relations of European states with each other. The propaganda campaign of the Fascist regime against the United States has not been as bitter or as effective, nor has it left its marks on so many elements of the Italian population, as has the abusive campaign against England, which has continued almost without interruption since 1935.

(b) It is suggested therefore that the Commander in Chief should appoint on his staff an American army officer who, with two administrative assistants qualified by previous experience in the foreign relations field, one American and one British, will be responsible for the administration of the occupied territory....

TWO CABINET MEMBERS INTIMATE PRESIDENT HAS CREATED A DIFFICULT ISSUE
[Jt Ltr, Stimson and Hull to Roosevelt, 13 Apr 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

At the meeting at Casablanca it was agreed that the British General Alexander was to be the Force Commander of HUSKY. From this fact it will be claimed that under international usage it necessarily follows that General Alexander will also be the Military Governor. If this is accepted, then the plan referred to below which has been drawn up in Allied Headquarters in North Africa and recently brought here is a logical result....

From discussions with one of Mr. Eden's assistants who accompanied him, Mr. William Strang, as well as from conversations had with Mr. Harold Macmillan in Algiers, it is apparent that the British Government feels that because of its interests in the Mediterranean in the past and future, the character of the administration of the HUSKY territory should be British.

It will be recalled that in February General Eisenhower sought guidance with respect to this matter, and that a telegram [sec. I, above] was dispatched stating that plans should be made for a joint military government under his responsibility as Allied Commander in Chief. General

Eisenhower has submitted a plan which calls for Allied responsibility.¹⁶ This plan is substantially as follows:

General Eisenhower, as Allied Commander in Chief, would be responsible to the two Governments for the administration of the enemy territory concerned in the operation HUSKY. He would be guided by a general policy directive covering political, financial, and economic matters and transmitted to General Eisenhower through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Later matters of broad policy would be agreed upon between the two Governments and sent to him in the same manner. It is believed important that in these matters the views of the two Governments should be reconciled and given to General Eisenhower as an agreed directive.

General Eisenhower would create at Allied Force Headquarters a military government section, which would be headed by a Deputy Chief of Staff, who would be the Commander in Chief's executive in all matters relating to the administration of the territory. This officer would be American. ¹⁷

As General Alexander has been selected as the Commander of the Expeditionary force, he would under this plan, by virtue of that command, become the Military Governor. The principal administrative officer under General Alexander would be British. He would have an American deputy. There would be a mixed staff of American and British officers, divided into administrative divisions as follows: legal, financial, public safety, enemy property custodian, civilian supply and resources, public welfare and public health, labor, and public information (press, radio, etc). The Administrative staff throughout the area would be mixed Anglo-American. This organization would be known as Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT) and would be similar to the administrative system developed in recent months by the British in enemy territory in Africa, but adapted to conditions obtaining in a metropolitan area and giving it an Allied character. This administrative organization would be Allied in the same sense as Allied Force Headquarters. The governing principles of both the American and British system are based on the Notes to the Hague Convention of 1907.

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Both the State and War Departments believe that this plan as outlined above, which places emphasis on an Allied military government, would be acceptable to the British.

This plan for Allied Government does not conform to that outlined in your memorandum transmitted by Admiral Leahy which would give a preponderant American character to the administration. In the event that you feel it is vital to insist on a military government of preponderant American character, it is recommended that steps should be taken to obtain the concurrence of the Prime Minister thereto. It is believed that any attempt to proceed on a lower level would consume time which can be ill afforded and that in any event a decision would ultimately have to be reached by agreement between you and Mr. Churchill.

PRESIDENT ACCEPTS AFHQ PLAN FOR COEQUAL PARTNERSHIP
[Ltr, Leahy to Hull and Stimson, 13 Apr 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

Referring to the joint letter dated 13 April 1943 in regard to the form of an allied military government to be imposed as a result of the HUSKY operation, signed by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War, I am directed by the President to inform you that he has this date approved the proposed allied military government for HUSKY-land as outlined therein ....¹⁸

BUT CHURCHILL WANTS HIS COUNTRY TO BE SENIOR PARTNER
[Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 13 Apr 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

2. I hope that you may feel in view of the fact that the Force Commander under the supreme direction of General Eisenhower will be British we should be senior partner in the military administration of enemy occupied territory in that area. Our proposal will be that under the supreme authority of General Eisenhower a British General Officer should be appointed as Military Governor of HUSKY-land and that he should be assisted by a Joint Anglo-American staff. Thus there would be no dualism in actual executive decisions on the spot.

3. Such a local arrangement would of course in no way affect decisions on major policy being taken as usual by agreement between our two Governments if convenient by personal correspondence between you and me.

ROOSEVELT WANTS AS MANY AMERICAN APPOINTMENTS AS PRACTICABLE
[Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 14 Apr 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

Replying to your telegram of April 13th, I have given my approval to appointment of General Alexander as the Allied Military Governor of HUSKY-land during occupation and under the Supreme Commander General Eisenhower. In view of the friendly feeling toward America entertained by a great number of the citizens of the United States who are of Italian descent it is my opinion that our military problem will he made less difficult by giving to the Allied Military Government as much of an American character as is practicable.

This can be accomplished at least to some extent by appointing to the offices of the Allied Military Government a large proportion of Americans.

I believe that this Military Government should be presented to the world as a definitely joint Allied control and that there should be no "senior partner."

CHURCHILL WITHDRAWS ANY IMPLICATION OF SENIOR PARTNERSHIP
[Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 15 Apr 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38) ]

I hoped paragraph 3 of my telegram of April 13th made it somehow clear that I contemplated HUSKY as our joint enterprise on terms of perfect equality, with our usual intimacy and confidence and with no question of a "senior partner.

This impression only applied to actual executive work to be done by Military Governor who would receive his directive from you and me in complete agreement. In executive and administrative sphere there ought to be two voices but only one voice which will say what you and I have agreed. General Alexander would be directing military operations under Supreme Commander and he would delegate powers of Military Governor to a British officer mutually agreeable to us both.

I entirely agree with you that utmost advantage should be taken of American ties with Italy and that at least half of the officers of Allied Military Government should be American and further if in any case or district it is found that American pre-eminence is more useful to the common cause this should at once be arranged. The two flags should always be displayed together and we should present a united and unbreakable front in all directions. All the above is

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of course without prejudice to United States be- North Africa and my continuing to be your lieutenant  Supreme throughout the whole of French tenant there. I hope I have given satisfaction....

3. THE PROBLEM OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-TACTICAL OR DUAL?

MISGIVINGS OVER POSSIBLE BRITISH PREDOMINANCE
[Memo, Haskell for ASW, 7 Apr 43, CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43) ]

4. Since the Expeditionary Force Commander should be the Military Governor for military reasons, the government of this particular area is already determined. If, in addition, the Military Governor's Deputy is also British and if any parallel chain of command is accepted which would permit the exercise of the authority of military government through other than tactical command channels, the British flavor of the government would be further reinforced and unity of command handicapped. ¹⁹

U.S. WOULD CHANGE AFHQ PLAN TO SAFEGUARD MILITARY SUPREMACY
[Ms;, WD to AFHQ, 7 Apr 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38), CM-OUT 2948]

The plan for military government has been approved by the United States authorities with the following modification:

Page 14, paragraph C to read as follows, quote:

"The CinC will establish a military government section of his Staff, consisting of military personnel, both American and British. This section will be headed by a Deputy Chief of Staff who will be the CinC's executive in all matters pertaining to military government of occupied enemy territory including political questions arising out of military occupation."

Appendix B-1 : political officer changed to Deputy Chief of Staff for military government and shown under CinC with line of authority running to latter. The resident minister shown on the right of C in C eliminated. These changes were made at the suggestion of OPD and accepted by all concerned.

Page 14 add to paragraph 81 the following, quote

"He [Deputy Military Governor] will communicate directly with Regional and Provincial Military Administrators with respect to the conduct of military government. These latter will work in close co-operation with the tactical commanders in the areas of their assignment with a view to giving the greatest possible assistance to the military operations. In the event that any conflict of opinion should arise between any administrator and a tactical commander, the decision of the tactical commander will obtain."

This was added in order to make it clear that a tactical commander in any area has final authority. Your comment or concurrence on the proposed changes requested.

Just before his departure Eden left with Secretary of State a proposal for military government HUSKY which is not entirely acceptable to American Government. State Department is being authorized to negotiate with British Government to obtain their agreement to our plan as modified above. It will be explained that this plan is predicated on the theory that in matters of policy the views of the two Governments will be reconciled and communicated as an agreed directive to the CinC by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Steps are being taken in Washington to create machinery to obtain agreed views on matters of policy....

WAR DEPARTMENT REINFORCES ITS INSTRUCTION ON TACTICAL SUPREMACY
[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 13 Apr 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 5442]

It should be clearly understood and set forth in the operational plan when it is completed that during the assault and initial phases of the operation, officers of the Military Government assigned to task forces of units will operate as staff officers of their commanders.

It should also be set forth that at all times the tactical commanders have final responsibility and authority. The establishment of an administrative line of communication directly from the Deputy Military Governor to Provincial or local administrations may be established and authority delegated to these subordinate administrators at the discretion of the General Officer Commanding Force 141....

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AFHQ POINTS OUT NEED FOR EVENTUAL CIVIL AFFAIRS CHAIN OF COMMAND
[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 May 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 4959]

Suggestion your Fortune 101 concurred in.... We assume however that words "at any time" do not exclude the possibility of centralization of authority for Military Administration at some future time. We have in mind that when operations have ceased and the territory is on a garrison basis, the general officer commanding Force 141, as Military Governor, with the approval of the Commander in Chief, should be free to establish lines of authority running directly to him and to his CCAO [Chief Civil Affairs Officer] to whom he might delegate certain of his functions.

TACTICAL SUPREMACY MUST PREVAIL THROUGHOUT
[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 8 May 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 3586]

BIGOT-HUSKY words "at all times the tactical commanders have final responsibility and authority" contemplated that even during garrison period and after authorization lines of staff communication from Chief Civil Affairs Officer to local administrators senior tactical commanders would nevertheless have final responsibility and authority over civilian population in their areas. ... We do not like plan which deprives General Patton and his subordinate tactical commanders from [sic] any authority and responsibility for civil affairs as long as their troops are present in the area. We do not favor separating command channels for military government from normal single channel of command. . . . ²⁰

EISENHOWER STILL WANTS To BE FREE To ESTABLISH EVENTUAL SEPARATE CHAIN OF AUTHORITY
[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 19 Apr 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 11778]

Agree entirely that final responsibility and authority over civilian population is inherent in the tactical command. However following factors must be borne in mind:

1. The organization for military administration of the territory is one that will remain after the capture of the island and the task force organization has changed to that of a garrison.

This phase will continue until the peace treaty or recognition of some Italian government.

2. No central authority now exists in the territory, the provincial governments being separately responsible to the national capital. Uniformity and efficiency require that there be a central authority for military government.

3. As the existing administrative framework will not be replaced, the machinery for military government should be built on present administrative divisions and following provincial or territorial lines. This may or may not correspond to the disposition of the tactical commands in the area. Districts in the interior where no troops will be stationed will have to be administered.

For the foregoing reasons, even in the first phase, there should be an administrative line of communication on subjects with which the local commander would not wish to be distracted from the military governor or his deputy to the local military administrator, as proposed in your Fortune 101. In the later phase good administration and economy of effort and personnel may make it desirable to centralize lines of authority in a similar manner under the military governor. The question has no immediate application, but if and when it does arise I wish to be free to consider it in the light of conditions then existing. Any decision then made would, of course, have due regard to the accepted principle of final responsibility of the tactical commander.

A POLITICAL SECTION HELD INAPPROPRIATE WITHIN MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND
[Memo, Dunn for the Secy of State, 5 May 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

Sir Ronald [Campbell] asked for further elucidation with regard to the suggestion in paragraph (a) of his memorandum of today's date which suggests that a small political or liaison section composed of American and British military officers be appointed as preferable to the appointment of Deputy Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the theater.²¹  I said that the position of the War Department in this respect was that

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as the Commander in Chief of the theater had full responsibility and authority for the new operation, it seemed perfectly logical to the War Department that he should have a Deputy Chief of Staff appointed particularly for the purpose, that it must be remembered that the Commander in Chief of the Theater was an Allied Commander in Chief acting under instructions and authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and it would not seem advisable, therefore, to the War Department to have a political section on his staff as he, the theater commander, was acting under joint authority of the two governments and that the Force Commander, acting in the particular operation, was directly under his authority. There would not seem to the War Department to be any occasion for confusion in such a situation through the appointment of a Deputy Chief of Staff to the theater commander for the purpose of dealing under his direction with the military government phase of this particular operation as such a deputy commander would not be interposed in authority  between the Commander in Chief and the Force Commander but would be acting in the manner of an assistant without any authority of his own....²²

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 28 Dec 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 10337]

You will recall that the acceptance by the War Department of the Civil Affairs plan for Sicily, submitted by Allied Force Headquarters, was contingent upon the establishment at AFHQ of a Civil Affairs Section. . . . It was felt here that the successful execution of such a plan would be dependent upon a small, efficient group at your headquarters to co-ordinate and supervise this important and difficult operation.....²³

4. DIRECT OR INDIRECT RULE?

SHOULD ALLIED OFFICERS BE USED IN SOME ITALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS?
[AFHQ Appreciation and Outline Plan, 24 Mar 43]

(67) The question of how far down the scale of cities and towns it is necessary or advisable to go in providing military personnel for the top municipal posts is a matter on which the British and American systems differ in their emphasis. American planning (as evidenced by the dispositions for the TORCH operation) tends to rely more on local personnel. The British practice in colonial territory has been to rely very little on local personnel in the first phase and to replace municipal officials in all centers of importance from either a civilian or military standpoint. For the proposed operation, it is suggested that the line should be drawn at the level of towns with a population of 12,000 to 15,000 or in smaller towns where special conditions exist such as presence of combat troops or the existence of a port or airport in the vicinity.

The proper placing of local administrators is important not only for the actual operation of the municipal governments and services but for the effective enforcement of military law and regulations. Also, the following factors must be borne in mind

(a) In many towns the Podestas and other top officials will have left.
(b) In others they will be active fascists who will be removed. Replacement with satisfactory local personnel is a difficult matter without considerable intelligence as to the local situation.
(c) Communications will be very limited for some time; hence control from the provincial capitals will be difficult.
(d) In many cities there will be no garrison of combat troops; the military administrators and police officers will be the only evidence of Allied occupation and authority.

(68) The final establishment of the civil police is a matter which must be determined later. For

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the first stages of the occupation, though, and if the M.P.'s are to be relieved of the civil police burden, there seems to be no alternative to creating an allied civil police staff of considerable size, to supervise and reorganize the existing forces. It is therefore suggested that civil police personnel should be stationed in centers down to and possibly somewhat below the population level for which administrative officers will be provided, that is, as proposed, towns of around 12,000 to 15,000. Whether civil police functions should ultimately be administered by an independent Allied force with specially recruited personnel-in line with the British colonial practice-or should be based on the Carabinieri and the other existing forces, must be decided on the basis of further study or even on the basis of experience in the early stages of the occupation. If the Carabinieri organization remains substantially intact and lives up to its reputation for training and efficiency, the latter course is certainly preferable. ²⁴

PRESIDENT PROPOSES REPLACING TOP FASCISTS BY ALLIED MILITARY OFFICERS
[Undated Memo, Dept of State, as Revised by Roosevelt and Transmitted by Leahy, to OPD, 9 Apr 43, CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43)]

5. . . . All prefects (Provincial Governors), although they are primarily administrators, should be removed, and military officers of the occupying forces put in their places....

LORD RENNELL POINTS OUT ADVANTAGES IN INDIRECT SYSTEM
[Memo, Rennell, Br Member of Force 141 Plng Staff, for Spofford, American Member, 18 Apr 43, ACC files, 10000-100-604]

1. There appears to be some confusion of thought in such directives as have been received and in documents prepared in Washington on the form which the Military Government of HORRIFIED is to take.

2. There are broadly speaking two ways in which the Government can be conducted, which will be familiar to British Administrative personnel as "direct" and "indirect" rule. The broad distinction between the two systems for our purposes in HORRIFIED, is whether the Allied personnel in the Civil Administration is wholly executive, or undertakes the role of controlling and directing the local administrative machine.

3. This is perhaps best exemplified by taking the case of a provincial administration, which comes to a head in the person of a Prefect; and let us suppose that the Prefect is well disposed and wholly cooperative. For the "direct rule" system, the Prefect will be replaced by an Allied Administrator, who . . . will, himself, issue orders . . . to the . . . provincial administration, and will replace local personnel in the appointments of heads of branches and divisions, leaving only very subordinate local personnel to conduct non-confidential clerical work, bookkeeping, etc. In this system, the P.C. is in effective executive control, with his Allied Subordinates, of the whole machine. He gives orders to the local subordinate personnel himself and through his own officers.

4. Under the system of "indirect control", the local provincial administration continues as nearly intact as possible, and when a vacancy such as that of a Prefect or head of a branch occurs because the incumbent is unsatisfactory, or unwilling to continue in office, and has to be removed, his place is filled not by an Allied Civil Affairs Officer, but by another local Civil Servant. In this system, the Senior Allied Provincial Administrator . . . sits, not in the chair of the Prefect, but in a chair at his side and tells him what the Military Government wants done. The Prefect then issues his own orders, to his own subordinates, in his own name, at the direction of the Provincial Administrators. Allied personnel lower down the scale sit in with and supervise the functioning of branches and divisions to ensure that orders given by the Prefect at the instance of the Provincial Administrator are, in fact, properly carried out.

5. While there is a great deal to be said for and against the "indirect" system, I am obliged to recommend the second system and not that of "direct" rule. The principal reasons are given below:

(i) The indirect system of rule economises in Allied Civil Affairs personnel. Fewer Officers are required to control, supervise and give directions, than are necessary for their actual execution.

(ii) Local subordinate personnel is more likely to obey the orders of their own superior personnel, than those of Allied Officers, who have been put into the shoes of their former superiors.

(iii) Fewer language difficulties will arise. In "direct" rule officers will either have to be

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pretty fluent in the local language, or the subordinate personnel will have to learn English.

(iv) There is an incentive to local personnel to remain at work and work loyally if they have a fair chance of being permitted to fill the vacancies of their superiors who have been removed for political reasons, or left the territory altogether. If these vacancies are filled by Allied personnel, there is less incentive for the subordinate personnel to carry on, or carry on zealously.

(v) There is probably less danger of a general strike or sit down strike of local administrative personnel, if they feel that their own administrative machine is functioning and is responsible, under direction, of course, for the well being of their own general public.

(vi) Any Administration breakdown will tend to be attributed by the general public, under the indirect system, more immediately to their own Civil servants, than to the Allied Military Government.

(vii) The local administrative machine will be more readily educated and improved by being directed, than by being broken up before local substitute personnel can be collected in due course. I regard this process of education as particularly important and I am, by experience, acutely conscious of the difficulties of finding any reasonably good local civil service personnel to replace existing men, if wholesale dismissals or resignations take place under a direct rule system.

(viii) We do not wish to give the appearance of instituting a government which either looks like a colonial government, or gives the impression of being a prelude to annexation. We wish to build up local government on same democratic lines, so that eventually the local population will administer its own affairs. We do not wish to create a void when the time comes for the Allies to leave the territory, such as would be created if we walked out from a system of direct rule.

6. A decision on the system is of immediate importance, since the two alternatives have a direct bearing on the mechanics of administration. I will only give one instance, in the financial field.

7. Under the direct system, all taxes collected would be paid in to the Allied Military Government Treasury and disbursements would be made in respect, for instance, of works, relief, and wages, by the Allied Military Government Treasury. In other words, local personnel would come on the Allied Military Government payroll in its entirety. The budget would then become a single territorial budget covering all local receipts and expenditures as well as those of the Allied Military Government for personnel and special works expenditures. This system not only means remaking the whole budget structure, but provides the least incentive for the local population to pay or collect taxes.

8. Under the indirect system, there would continue in existence a local treasury and treasury system, in which revenues collected would be paid and from which disbursements would be made. The Allied Military Government would only be responsible, within the limit of what is decided, for any deficit in the local budget by way of grants in aid, appropriated to each department at the discretion of the Allied Administrators. I consider that this system would give more effective budgetary control, though perhaps less control of theft in tax collection, which however we would never have the personnel to undertake ourselves. A, to my mind, sufficient safeguard in this respect, is provided in access of the local administrative personnel and population to the Allied Civil Affairs Staff to file complaints of speculation [sic] and dishonesty. The innate characteristics of the population will ensure that such complaints are filed, and probably to a degree which will constitute a major nuisance. . . .

EXCHANGE OF IDEAS BETWEEN TWO PLANNERS ON INDIRECT RULE
[Memo, Spofford for Rennell, 19 Apr 43, ACC files, 10000/100/604]

2. There are several points which are not clear to me:

(a) I do not see why the factors of budget, financial control, etc., necessarily are dependent on the adoption of one system or the other. Books could be kept separately for the military component of the government in any event, and on our side will probably have to be.
(b) While the personnel requirements for direct rule will be greater, I don't see that there will be any very great difference....

3. The question is one for high level decision and may take some time for discussion here and in Washington and London....

[Memo, Rennell for Spofford, 19 Apr 43, ACC files, 10000/100/604]

I. Ref. Financial organization:-Under "direct" rule the AMGOT finance officers become personally accountable for all receipts and disbursements. Under "indirect rule" the local treasuries and paying in/out officers remain personally responsible. Books will be separate anyway, but the budget and account procedure would be quite different.

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2. Ref. personnel required:-There appear to be 64,000 employees in public administration in HORRIFIED at present. 380 Allied personnel including police cannot provide enough staff to command-but only to guide.

3. There is to be a fundamental difference in the instruction, as I see it, between commanding and directing-indeed the difference between staff officers' and a regimental officer's duties-according to the system adopted.

WASHINGTON FAVORS DIRECT AND LONDON INDIRECT CONTROL
[CCS Directive for Sicily Proposed by WD to the BJSM, 9 Apr 43, CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43) ]

5. All prefects and all mayors of important communities shall be removed and replaced by military officers of the occupying forces....

[Msg, War Cabinet Offices to Jt Staff Mission, 9 May 43, CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43)]

4B. We should prefer the first sentence of paragraph 5 [of proposed directive] to run as follows: When senior Italian officials, such as prefects and mayors of important communities are to be removed, they shall be replaced, at the discretion of the Commander in Chief, by Italians nominated by himself and under such supervision and such limitations of powers as he may prescribe. Since, in practice, the more senior officials will almost certainly be active members of the party the CinC will bear in mind the necessity of replacing them at the earliest possible moment...

[Memo, Hilldring, Chief, CAD, for BJSM, 11 May 43, CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43) ]

3. We feel strongly that your paragraph 4B is very inadvisable. Imposing on the Commander in Chief the responsibility of selecting new Italian officials for high positions will subject the military government to political dangers. It is preferable to have military officers in positions of authority and their using, in any way desired, any Italian officials....

DRAFT MESSAGE ON ISSUE PREPARED FOR THE PRESIDENT
[Draft Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 10 Jun 43, Prepared by McCloy, CAD files, HUSKY (after 1 Jun 43)]

Understand we have worked out with your people here directive satisfactory to Eisenhower for military government of HUSKY. Only difference of view remaining relates to possible use of Italians in high positions such as mayors of large towns and prefectures. I feel that in the initial stages we should avoid all risk of implications arising from attempted selection of suitable Italians for these important positions. Believe much preferable remove any Italians from these positions as they are all prominent Fascists and replace them with Army officers for time being thus avoiding stirring up factions on the ground and repercussions at home. Less important jobs can continue without adverse effect to be filled by Italians or Italian replacements on good behavior. Hope you will agree. Wording can be arranged promptly and plans made accordingly....

CHURCHILL PREFERS INDIRECT CONTROL TO EVEN GOOD GAULEITERS
[Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 10 Jun 43, CAD files, HUSKY (after 1 Jun 43)]

... The second point is the degree of American and British administration and control which should be imposed on newly conquered regions. It seems wise to make them run themselves as much as possible. Malignant or prominent Fascists must be removed and we should be prepared to replace them with trustworthy administrators to the extent that these cannot be found for our purposes from the local population. I am sure that it would be a mistake to flood all these places with hundreds of British and American gauleiters, however well meaning and well trained they may be.

Of course, it is impossible to foresee in advance the nature of local conditions or the temper of the people in the conquered regions. It should be left to the Supreme Commander to propose to our Governments what British and American officers he wants and the degree of infusion into local life. My personal feelings are that he should wish to interfere as little as possible and allow things to run themselves, subject always to the paramount interests of armies and operations.

THE PRESIDENT WILL LEAVE ISSUE TO SUPREME COMMANDER'S DISCRETION
[Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 14 Jun 43, CAD files, HUSKY (after 1 Jun 43) ]

. . I agree that in the territory which is occupied in the future by our combined forces, the Supreme Commander should during the period of occupation inform our two Governments what American and British officials he desires and the purposes for which he wants to use these officials in the local administration, and that no other civil officials should be sent to his areas except those requested by the Supreme Commander.

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5. POLITICAL ADVISERS OR AN EXCLUSIVELY MILITARY ADMINISTRATION?

BRITISH EXCEPTION TO PRINCIPLE OF A MILITARY ADMINISTRATION
[Memo, Campbell for Dunn, Dept of State, 5 May 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

His Majesty's Government feel that it would be reasonable to provide that Mr. Macmillan as British Resident Minister at Allied Headquarters should be kept currently informed by the Commander in Chief of all political matters pertaining to the military administration of the territory involved in the operation of HUSKY and that he should be recognized as the channel between General Eisenhower and His Majesty's Government on all political matters, in which capacity he would whenever necessary be called into consultation and entitled to offer advice.

WAR AND STATE DEPARTMENTS OPPOSE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES IN CHAIN OF COMMUNICATIONS
[Ltr, Dunn to Hull, 5 May 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

Sir Ronald Campbell, Minister Counselor of the British Embassy, today handed me the attached paper [above] which he said was to be considered as a memorandum of our oral conversation on the subject of the organization of the military government for HUSKY.

The War Department had been anxious to receive this reply from the British on the subject, and I had already arranged to see Mr. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, in his office this afternoon at 3:30. I took this matter up with the War Department at that time. Mr. McCloy had with him when I arrived General Hilldring, Colonel Haskell and Lieutenant Colonel [Charles] Poletti. After discussing the British memorandum, Mr. McCloy stated that the position of the War Department with regard to the organization of the military government for HUSKY was as follows:

That there was to be no civilian participation in the organization of the military government; that after agreement between the two governments the directives as to policy and operation of the military government were to be conveyed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Allied forces in North Africa; that the Commander in Chief of the Allied forces was the officer who was responsible for and who exercised authority with regard to the military government of HUSKY under the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; that the Force Commander was to exercise the authority in the particular area concerned under the direction and authority of the Commander in Chief of the theater; that any questions which arose in the political field with regard to the operation or with regard to the military government were to be matters of discussion between the two governments and that the channel of communication to and from the Commander in Chief of the theater with regard to such matters was to be through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. There is to be no civilian participation in the military government aspects of the operation from the time the questions were discussed as [sic] between the joint Chiefs of Staff of each government and their respective governments.

Immediately upon returning to my office at 5:30 today, I telephoned Sir Ronald Campbell and gave him the position of this Government as stated above after consultation with the War Department in the premises. Sir Ronald said that his Government was quite clear on the point that the directive to the Commander in Chief of the theater would be sent to him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff here after agreement had been reached with regard to its terms by the two governments, but he inquired what the procedure would be in the event of political questions arising during the operation which had not been foreseen in the directive. I told him that it was the position of the War Department that if such political questions arose in the field they would, if not susceptible of decision by the Commander in Chief under his general instructions, be transmitted by him to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for further instructions. The Combined Chiefs of Staff could in such an instance, if they saw the necessity therefor, consult with the respective governments with a view to arriving at a settlement of such questions.... ²⁵

[Memo, McCloy for Hopkins, 25 May 43, CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43)]

We have about come to rest in our discussions with the British on policies and procedures to guide the combined military government authorities in HUSKY. There have been a number of

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tough questions, but all seems now to be settled between us except one-and that is the presence of a high political representative on the ground to represent and counsel the British Government on political matters which may arise from the occupation.

We have taken the position that this is to be a military government, that it cannot be part political and part military government if we are to avoid the difficulties of our African set-up. The presence of Macmillan or a similar figure close to Headquarters muddies the picture badly and is totally unnecessary in any event because the British have appointed a political figure to be their Chief Civil Affairs Officer (Lord Rennell) with the rank of Major General.

Our plan contemplates no political figure at all with all questions raised and determined with and by the Combined Chiefs of Staff through which the respective governments may express their views. Macmillan, like Casey, is a member of the Cabinet. He is not on Eisenhower's staff. The Military Governor is British, his Chief Civil Affairs Officer is British, and if in addition there is a British Cabinet member on the ground to `advise on political questions' the whole character of the operation is such as to give the thing such a strongly British flavor as to destroy the President's directive for a joint rather than a senior partner arrangement.

The State Department opposes the introduction of Macmillan in the HUSKY scene. They are not using Murphy for anything except North Africa and do not wish or intend to place any political representative in the field. They want to deal in the initial stages entirely through the Combined Chiefs of Staff....

The English counter with the statement that Macmillan has no official position, is merely on the ground so that his Government may get the benefit of his first-hand impressions which they would want to get in any case by reason of his ability and experience. They say that all they ask is that he should be able to look at all the cables as they come and go and communicate his thoughts to his Government or to Eisenhower as may seem desirable. While this is all they ask, it is a great deal, because you simply cannot have a Cabinet Minister on the ground, particularly one of Macmillan's character and ability, without his taking part in the play....

Since I feel that the introduction of political representatives will prematurely introduce political questions and thus destroy just what we are seeking to accomplish, I wish you would see what can be done leading to an agreement on the part of the British with our position....

PRESIDENT TO BE REQUESTED TO TAKE UP THE ISSUE WITH CHURCHILL
[Draft Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 10 Jun 43]

... Also think it inadvisable have any political officers not in uniform connected with HUSKY operation as it tends to confusion of authority and counsels. We can better maintain all decisions made purely on military basis if no diplomatic or political figures are involved. Understand urgent necessity keeping Macmillan in North Africa but feel that neither of us should have representatives in HUSKY operation in initial stages. Agreeable have Macmillan kept informed by Eisenhower of matters relating to administration of HUSKY but sole chain of communication during military government should be from military governor to Eisenhower to Combined Chiefs of Staff and all instructions from respective governments should move solely through Combined Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower.

WHY ALL THE DITHER OVER MACMILLAN?
[Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 10 Jun 43]

The first point is about Macmillan. He is my personal representative just as Murphy is yours. They get on well with each other and with General Eisenhower in all subjects relating to the "Torch" area. I see no reason why precisely the same relationship should not continue in the HUSKY period nor why it should not apply to the larger areas which might come under our joint control. Formal correspondence and orders would go through the Combined Staffs, but it is essential that the heads of governments have immediate and intimate information about events in the civil and political sphere. All this is working easily and smoothly now and all that is necessary is a statement from you and me that the present relationship of our representatives to the Supreme Commander will not be altered by new acquisitions of territory and will cover that territory. I have the definite impression that this will be agreeable to Eisenhower. . . .

THE TWO MINISTERS MAY REMAIN BUT FOR PURELY INFORMATIONAL FUNCTIONS
[Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 14 Jun 431

.. I agree that the equal status of Murphy and Macmillan should continue without change during the HUSKY and post-HUSKY periods, and also that they should continue to communicate early and intimate information regarding the political and civil sphere to the heads of their respective governments, in each case of course informing the Supreme Commander. . . .

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6. THE CCS DIRECTS A MILITARY ADMINISTRATION AND AS MUCH BENEVOLENCE AS PRACTICABLE

BRITISH URGE THAT POLITICAL REFORM IN WARTIME BE TEMPERED BY REALISM
[Msg, War Cabinet Office to BJSM, 9 May 43, Regarding 29 Apr American Draft of proposed CCS Directive on Sicily, ²⁶ CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43)

4. As regards Section I, we have the following comments:

A. . . . we suggest that an additional paragraph might be inserted after paragraph 6, or in whatever other place in the draft is thought appropriate, on the following lines:-The ideal would be to get rid of present office holders . . . and set up a complete new local administration, definitely anti-Fascist in character while using the old framework of machinery and local government. But it would obviously be difficult in practice to find and keep a local government working smoothly so as to relieve the Commander in Chief of all trouble and anxiety as regards civil population.²⁷ ....

C. Paragraph 6. For the last sentence we should prefer the following to be substituted:- No political activity whatsoever shall be countenanced.²⁸ ...

E. Paragraph 8. We think the last sentence should be omitted. It is dangerous at so early a stage in the occupation of hostile territory to lay down as a principle that the enemy is to have freedom of speech and press.²⁹

DIVERGENT VIEWS ON THE EXCHANGE RATE
[Memo, Poletti, CAD, for the Chief, CAD, 10 May 43, CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43) ]

The British contend that the rate should be 480 lire per pound sterling or 120 per dollar.

1. The rate should be realistic-one that can be maintained for a substantial period without the necessity of having the local currency insulated from the currency on the mainland.

2. Black market quotations range from 526 to 789 per pound. London believes lire will fall below 10000 in case of our invasion.

3. While the official prices of staple commodities show a rise of 50 to 100% over 1939, these have limited significance because a black market exists, although to what extent is not known.

4. It would be unfair to the friendly Arab population in Tripolitania to maintain the present 48o rate while giving a more favorable rate to enemy territory.

5. If the rate is too favorable, the local population will jump to the conclusion the rate cannot be maintained and it will hoard dollar and sterling currency thereby bringing about a fall in the rate.

The United States contends the rate should be 240 lire per pound or 6o per dollar or on the outside 300 per pound and 75 per dollar.

1. We believe the decision of the President that the military administration of the area be predicated upon a reasonable benevolent attitude toward the people dictates the rate we propose. Such a benevolent attitude will facilitate military operations and save lives of soldiers.

2. The rate in HUSKY-land can be a different rate from the one eventually fixed by us for the mainland. . . .

3. The lire in the eyes of the local population is still considered as worth more than five cents (official rate is $.0526). Hence 60 or 75 lire per dollar will be a tremendous jolt as it is. . . .

4. We desire to impress on the people in HUSKY-land, as well as those on the Italian mainland and in the occupied countries that the United Nations do not intend to destroy property values. . . .

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5. When the British fixed a 480 rate in Tripolitania, they advised us that it was not to be taken as a precedent. We desire a rate which is not as favorable as the French rate in North Africa and yet not too far away from it. . . . We think the friendly Arabs will not be too greatly upset by our proposed rate.

6. We do not believe British reason #5 is sound. Whatever dollar and sterling currency gets into the hands of the people, it will be hoarded regardless of the rate. Of course, there will be only a limited use of yellow seal dollars spearhead currency and no sterling at all.

CCS FINALLY ENDS DEBATES WITH A DIRECTIVE FOR SICILY
[CCS Directive, Organization and Operation of Military Government for HUSKY, CCS 24, 7/5/D, 28 Jun 43,³⁰  CAD files, CCS Papers, Opn HUSKY]

This directive has been agreed upon by the governments of the United States and Great Britain and is transmitted for your guidance in the organization and operation of military government in the territory involved in operation HUSKY. You will be guided in all matters of general policy, such as those of a political, fiscal or economic nature, solely by the directives you will receive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Consistent with military necessity, you will conform to the guides herein set forth.

SECTION I
Political Guides

1. There shall be a military administration which will show every characteristic of an Allied undertaking. Both the American and British flags shall be displayed at headquarters and posts of the military government. The administration shall be identical throughout the area.

2. The military administration of HORRIFIED shall contain no political agencies or political representatives of either government.

3. Other representatives of civilian agencies of either government shall not participate in the initial stages. Their later participation will be subject, as to time and extent, to decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. The administration shall be benevolent with respect to the civilian population so far as consistent with strict military requirements. The civilian population is tired of war, resentful of German overlordship, and demoralized by the Fascist regime, and will therefore be responsive to a just and efficient administration. It should be made clear to the local population that military occupation is intended: (1) to deliver the people from the Fascist regime which led them into the war; and (2) to restore Italy as a free nation.

5. The replacement of any prefects and mayors of important communities who may be removed will rest with the military commander. He will decide whether the functioning of the military government is better serviced by the appointment of officers of the occupation forces or by the use of the services of Italian officials. No actual appointment of Italians to important posts, as distinct from their temporary use, will be made until it has been approved by the two governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

It shall be made clear to any Italians who may eventually be appointed to important posts and to all other governmental officials and employees that their continued employment is solely on the basis of satisfactory co-operation, performance and behavior.

6. The Fascist Party organization shall be immediately dissolved. The entire Fascist Party leadership (the "hierarchy") from the top down to the local secretaries shall be removed from any post of authority. The Fascist militia and all Fascist youth organizations shall be abolished. Fascist leaders and pro-Nazi partisans shall be arrested. Fascist doctrine and propaganda in any form shall be prohibited. No political activity whatsoever shall be countenanced.

a. The first objective must be to get and keep a local government working smoothly so as to relieve the Commander in Chief of all trouble and anxiety as regards civil population. The following may serve as guidance:

A distinction should be drawn between (a) such organizations as do not exist for the benefit and security of the people, e.g., the party organization itself and all purely Fascist accretions which have been grafted onto the local government system, and (b) those organizations which are of direct benefit to the people and whose removal would adversely affect the efficiency of the administration. The former should be suppressed, while

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there is a prima facie case for maintaining the latter.

7. War criminals charged by the United Nations (names will appear on list to be furnished by you shall be imprisoned and held subject to further directive.

8. All laws which discriminate on the basis of race, color or creed shall be forthwith annulled. Freedom of religious worship shall be promulgated. To the extent that military interests are not prejudiced, freedom of speech and press shall be instituted.

9. Measures shall be taken for the prompt release of political prisoners. Upon their release, they shall be cautioned that political activity on their part, during that period of military government, will not be tolerated. The Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State shall be abolished.

10. Neither local political personalities nor organized political groups, however sound in sentiment, shall have any part in determining the policies of the administration. It is essential to avoid any commitments to, or negotiations with, any local political elements. Italian political leaders in exile shall have no part in the administration.

11. The exercise of the powers of the Crown shall be suspended during the period of military occupation.

12. Consistent with military necessity, the position of the Church and of all religious institutions shall be respected and all efforts made to preserve the local Archives, Historical and Classical Monuments and objects of Art.

13. A plan shall be prepared by you to prevent transfer of title of valuable real and personal property which are intended to defeat, evade or avoid the responsibilities, fines or punishments imposed or to be imposed on present owners or the national government.

14- Propaganda will be in accordance with directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

SECTION II
Monetary and Fiscal Guides

1. During the initial period of operations, the United States task force will use yellow seal dollars and regular United States coins. The British military forces will use British Military Authority [B.M.A.] notes and British coins, as well as local currency in their possession. Yellow seal dollars and B.M.A. notes are available in NATOUSA and additional shipments can be procured when desired from the United States Treasury and the British Treasury. Records shall be kept of the amount of currencies used by the United and British forces.

2. The use of yellow seal dollars and B.M.A. notes for army payments to troops and for local procurement shall cease and Allied military [A.M.] lire shall be used in their place as soon as available, unless the military government decides that the time is not propitious for such change. The United States Treasury will have this A.M. lire currency ready for shipment to any point desired within four days after zero hour. Records shall be kept of the amount of A.M. lire issued.

3. A.M. lire currency is not intended to replace local lire currency already in circulation, but is designed to supplement it.

4. The rate of exchange between the U.S. dollar and the B.M.A. note shall be four dollars to one pound and both currencies shall be made interchangeable at that rate. The United States Treasury will make the necessary arrangements with the British Treasury.

5. The U.S. yellow seal currency and the B.M.A. notes shall be withdrawn from circulation as soon as it can be satisfactorily accomplished. The date for this withdrawal shall be determined by the military government after the operation has begun.

6. The rate of exchange to be decreed on D Day shall be 100 lire to the dollar and 400 lire to the pound sterling. A proclamation shall be issued requiring all persons to accept the U.S. yellow seal dollars and B.M.A. notes at the decreed rate. Transactions at any other rate shall be prohibited. Holders of local and A.M. lire notes or deposits are not entitled to obtain dollar or pound notes without special permission. They shall obtain dollars or pound notes or any other foreign currency or foreign exchange credits only in accordance with exchange regulations issued by the military government.

7. All foreign financial and foreign trade transactions and all exports and imports of currency shall be prohibited except as permitted under regulations to be issued by the military government.

8. Under the military government there shall be established within the area an A.M. Financial Agency. It may establish sub-agencies where deemed desirable.

Insofar as its operations relate to the provision of currencies for the pay and other cash requirements of military formations of either Army, it shall draw the necessary resources from the military government currency reserve and will record the debit against the Army concerned

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in the currency of issue. It is authorized to accept deposits from finance officers and from military personnel of the Allied Armies. Insofar as its operations relate to civil administration, it shall draw on the currency reserve and debit against the military government.

If found practicable, and desirable, the Bank of Sicily under the direct control of the Military Governor will be designated as agent for the A.M. Financial Agency. The Military Governor and other Allied Military Authorities, when satisfied that the Bank of Sicily is under adequate control, may use that bank for official business, and by making credits available to it by providing it with A.M. lire notes, place that bank in a position to finance other banks and branches for the conduct of their business as approved by the military government. When other effective banking facilities are not available, the A.M. Financial Agency shall be empowered to make loans. Those shall be restricted to lire loans except in very special circumstances.

The military government will control and direct all receipts and disbursements for civil administration purposes, whether by U.S. or British civil affairs officers, and through the A.M. Financial Agency, will provide all funds of whatever currency and receive all revenues and cash receipts. Thus all civil affairs officers will draw funds only from the A.M. Financial Agency.

The records of the A.M. Financial Agency shall indicate in all cases in what currency receipts were obtained or disbursement made.

9. Upon taking over an area the military authorities shall proceed immediately to:

a. Close all banks and financial institutions and place them under military custody.
b. Declare a general moratorium.
c. Impound or block for future disposal the funds of enemy government agencies, including government banks.
d. Seal all vaults and safety deposit boxes.
e. Obtain an inventory of the assets of the banks as quickly as practicable.

10. Holdings of gold, foreign currencies and foreign securities, all national funds and the funds of Fascist political organizations shall be taken into custody as quickly as possible, and shall be deposited with the A.M. Financial Agency or banks designated by the military government.

11. Banks should be encouraged to reopen for business under the military government if and when it deems such action desirable. No government or private bank or agency shall be authorized to issue bank notes or lire currency.

Access to safety deposit boxes or vaults will be allowed only when a proper system of supervision has been instituted. Gold, foreign currencies and foreign securities, and valuable papers, shall be withheld from the owner against accredited receipt.

12. Before banks are reopened, it should be made possible for them to arrange loans from banks or agencies designated by the military government. The lending bank may require as collateral any or all of the assets of the borrowing bank or of the directors thereof, and may accept, as collateral, obligations of the national government or of its subdivisions.

13. Except where special permission is granted, local banks shall be permitted only lire accounts, but may accept, at the decreed rate of exchange, yellow seal dollars and B.M.A. notes which they shall turn in as directed in exchange for local or A.M. lire at the decreed rate of exchange.

14. The military government shall have authority to maintain the existing tax laws and to raise such contributions for the administration of the country as are consistent with international custom and usage. All national tax receipts shall be deposited in the A.M. Financial Agency or in banks designated by the military government.

15. All branches of the National Insurance Institute shall be placed under military control and its revenues made available to the military government.

16. The railways, postal, telegraph and telephone services, radio and all government monopolies shall be placed under military control and their revenues made available to the military government.

17. None of the tax or other revenues shall be used for the payment of principal or interest on national government obligations.

Section III
Economic Guides

1. Measures shall promptly be undertaken to enable the country's own services of production and supply to assure as far as possible the provisioning of the local population. You are authorized to furnish from all stocks available to you such supplies to the civilian population as military requirements may permit. These supplies, in so far as feasible, shall be introduced for sale through existing commercial channels under rigid military control. Direct relief shall be employed only where necessary.

2. You will have the responsibility for the procurement of materials deemed essential to re

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establish the various utilities and maintain agricultural production. You will also have the responsibility for the procurement of such strategic materials as may be needed for export for the use of the United Nations. No provisions for such materials will be made except on requisitions from AFHQ.

3. Maximum prices and rationing of important staple commodities shall be quickly established. Black market practices and hoarding shall be severely punished.

4. If found necessary by the military authorities in order to avoid the sudden disruption of internal economy, provincial and interprovincial associations of employers and employees may be temporarily continued, except that Fascist or otherwise objectionable officers thereof shall be removed, and except that objectionable features thereof shall be abolished. The Fascist corporations and their councils shall be abolished. The military government should give careful attention to the matter of sound, fair and voluntary labor relations and shall, if necessary, fix hours and wages of labor.

5. A system of control shall immediately be established for the import and export of goods by local business concerns and a license required for such shipments. In determining what exports shall be permitted, paramount consideration shall be granted to the needs of the military forces and the local population. Exports shall be permitted only to friendly countries.

7. AFHQ CREATES JOINT AGENCIES AND ISSUES FINAL INSTRUCTIONS

DETAILED PLANNING AND FURTHER PROBLEMS OF RECONCILING TWO SYSTEMS
[Spofford Rpt]

Approval of the basic plan had been obtained, subject to . . . reservations . . . , by April 15 and the nucleus planning staff, consisting of Lord Rennell, Lt. Col. Maxwell and Lt. Col. Spofford, commenced amplification of the detailed plan. The first step consisted in adapting the plan (excluding the Appreciation) to the form of an instrument which could be promulgated as an order from Force 141 to the two task forces. This involved conferences with the other sections of the planning staff at 141 Force, in the course of which the division of functions between military government and the service units was discussed, elaborated and agreed upon. For example, it was agreed at conference with Gen. McClure, INC [Information and Censorship Section], that press, propaganda and censorship, would be handled by INC in close liaison, however, with AMG. It was also agreed that signal communications would be the sole responsibility of the signal units until a date to be determined after the invasion. Similar decisions were reached in the case of electric utilities, engineering, railways and transportation and like services.

With the removal of the planning staff from Ecole Normale at Bouzarea to Chrea, liaison officers were left at 141 Force to continue the necessary close contacts with the planning staff at 141 Force. It was found necessary for members of the planning staff, particularly on the supply side, to maintain offices at Bouzarea in order to be present at the planning conferences.

As a result of these discussions a plan was drafted and approved by the various branches at 141 Force and was published as an order of General Alexander on 1 May 1943. . .³¹

The two task forces, known as 343 Force (A) and 545 Force (B), had established headquarters at Mostaganem and Cairo. In order to acquaint their planning and operating staffs with the proposed military government plans Col. Thorne Thorne (B) went to Cairo early in May where he discussed the plan and Lt. Col. Maxwell and Lt. Col. Spofford went to Mostaganem with the draft plan at the same time. These discussions were, of course, preliminary since the SCAO's [Senior Civil Affairs Officers] and staffs attached to the task forces went to the task force headquarters as soon as possible and developed task force plans within the framework of the basic plan in consultation with the task force staffs. Lt. Col. Charles Poletti, designated as SCAO 7th Army [U.S. Seventh Army, Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., Comdg], arrived in Mostaganem on approximately 15 June and immediately undertook the job of task force planning while Group Capt. [C. E.] Benson, designated as SCAO 8th Army, undertook the same function at 545 Force Headquarters in Cairo.

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Concerning the detailed planning which was conducted largely at Chrea several important generalizations can be made:

(a) Every effort was made so that the instructions issued would be as simple as possible and would involve a workable compromise between British and American practice in those cases where the practice was different.
(b) Only so much of the detailed plans could be disclosed, for security reasons, to the officers intended to carry them out as was absolutely essential.
(c) Each division developed its plans and then prepared detailed and specific instructions for the guidance of its staff and the CAO's who, at least in the first instance, would have to carry those instructions out. All of these instructions together with the proclamations were then incorporated in a so-called AMG Manual, a copy of which was issued to each CAO. . . . Subsequently the AMG plan, the proclamations issued by the Military Governor, general orders issued by the CCAO, and the instructions to field personnel as amended were printed and incorporated in an AMG Manual....

....During the planning stage a very large share of the work fell to the Legal Division under the very able leadership of Lt. Col. William C. Chanler. The divisions dealing with economic, financial, police, medical and other problems of government were on solid ground because of the more or less international and universally recognized means for dealing with these problems. However, in the field of international law and the procedures relating to military government, there could be considerable difference of opinion as to the proper or desirable course to follow. It was for the Legal Division to assure unified planning, unified action and satisfactory results in these matters. The Legal Division commenced its work at the end of April. It first explored the legal procedures in use in England and the United States and compared them with a view to the preparation of the proclamations and general orders which were required to legislate in Sicily. It was found, particularly in connection with the Anglo-Saxon system of justice, that the fundamental concepts were the same in each country. Since this was the first time in history that a single administration formed of officers of separate armies belonging to separate powers was attempting to conduct military government it was most important that all points of view should be considered before the proclamations were drafted and that thorough training should be given to officers of both nationalities in the directives that they were to administer and follow because of the possibility that these might vary from ideas with which they were familiar. It was also found at the outset that British and American practice was very similar concerning problems of international law and the rights and obligations of an occupying power.

It was found by all divisions, including the Legal Division, that the amount of intelligence available about the country to be occupied was extremely meager and inaccurate and that much of that which was available could not readily be passed on to the officers who were going to administer military government for security reasons. However, as a result of continuous deliberations during the months of May and June by D Day 12 proclamations had been prepared and printed ³²

Owing to the limited amount of equipment which officers attached to the combat troops could carry, it was decided that only three proclamations would be taken ashore by them in the first instance; i.e., the announcement of occupation, the definition of crimes against the Allied Military Government and the creation of the currency carried by the troops as legal tender. The remainder of the proclamations were issued and posted after the assault wave had passed each area.

While the proclamations were being written by some officers, others set up a system of military courts together with simple but comprehensive rules of procedure. These rules of procedure formed a compromise between American and British practice. After they had been agreed upon a period of training was given to the legal officers at Chrea in the newly established procedure so that the operation of the courts would be uniform and would not only do justice to those coming before them but would give the public the impression that justice was being done....

THE FIRST ORGANIZATION FOR ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
[AFHQ Admin Memo 35, I May 43, CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43), Bk. 2]

I Establishment of Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT)

Announcement is made of the establishment of an organization for Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT). Functions of

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AMGOT are placed under the direct supervision of the Commanding General, Force 141.

II Functions and Objectives

The purpose of AMGOT will be to administer the Allied Military Government of HORRIFIED under the Military Governor of the territory in accordance with rules and usage of international law.

The objectives of AMGOT will be:

a. To insure the security of the occupying forces and their lines of communication; and to facilitate this operation.
b. To restore law and order and normal conditions among the civil population as soon as possible, procure the necessary food. supplies for them and where necessary provide relief and maintenance for destitutes within available resources.
c. To relieve combat troops of the necessity of providing for civil administration.
d. To assist in making available to the occupying forces the economic resources of the occupied territory.
e. Through efficient government of the territory and the application of the policies toward the civil population laid down by the Commander in Chief, to promote political and military objectives of the Allied Forces in connection with future operations.

III Military Governor

General Sir Harold Alexander, as Commanding General, Force 141, is hereby designated Military Governor of HORRIFIED. He will be responsible to the Commander in Chief for the conduct of the military government of the territory which will be administered through AMGOT.

IV Am got Organization

a. Chief Civil Affairs Officer ³³  and Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer. Chief Civil Affairs Officer will advise the Military Governor on questions relating to the military government of HORRIFIED. He will be Chief of AMGOT, and as such will be responsible to the Military Governor for the military administration of the territory.
There will be a Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (DCCAO) who will be Deputy Chief of AMGOT.

b. Special Divisions. There will be initially six special divisions as follows:

Legal Division
Financial Division
Civilian Supply Division
Public Health Division
Public Safety Division
Enemy Property Division

The general functions of these divisions will be to give advice to the Chief Civil Affairs Officer on questions in their respective fields; to furnish special personnel for the existing administrative organizations in the territory; to provide advisers and assistants to local Civil Affairs Officers as directed by the Chief Civil Affairs Officer; and, as far as they are called on to do sc, by the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, to execute the functions pertaining to their subjects. The particular functions of the special divisions and the organization thereof will be as determined by the Military Governor and included in the detailed operational plan hereinafter referred to.

c. Advisers. Advisers on special subjects will be appointed as required by the Military Governor.

d. Civil Affairs Officers. The local military administration of the territory will be conducted through Civil Affairs Officers who will be stationed in important cities and towns in the territory. The general functions of the Civil Affairs Officers will be: to continue in operation provincial and municipal administration and essential local services, utilizing existing personnel wherever possible; to publish proclamations and ordinances, and in conjunction with Civil Police Officers to enforce proclamations, orders, etc., of military authority and to ensure that civil laws are respected; to issue local regulations to ensure security and local order; to organize and hold military courts; to co-ordinate with combat units in requisitioning, procurement, and billeting in the local area; and to assist local unit commanders in any other matters involving the civil population.
For purposes of administration, there may be created regions and provinces, the boundaries of which shall be according to the existing territorial subdivisions or otherwise, as may be determined.

e. Civil Police. All civil police functions in the territory shall be exercised by the Civil Police Officers (C.P.O.'s) who will be stationed in important cities and towns in the territory. The general functions of the C.P.O.'s will be: to take over and supervise the administration and control of the existing police forces; to set up patrols for security in conjunction with combat units where necessary; to co-ordinate with military in-

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telligence and military police officers; and to assist the Civil Affairs Officers in enforcing military law locally.

V Relation of AMGOT Personnel to Commanders, Combat Units, or Formations

During the assault and initial phases of any operations in which AMGOT is concerned, AMGOT personnel assigned to Task Forces will operate as staff officers of their commanders. Tactical commanders shall have final responsibility and authority; provided however, that an administrative line of communication directly from the Chief Civil Affairs Officer to local military administrators may be established and authority delegated to such administrators at the discretion of the G.O.C. [General Officer Commanding], Force 141.

VI Plan of Operations

Subject to the provisions of this Memorandum, the organization of AMGOT and its method of operation shall be as determined by the Military Governor who shall cause to be prepared an operational plan for submission to the Commander in Chief for approval.

VII Assignment of Chief and Deputy Chief of AMGOT

Announcement is made of the assignment of Major General Lord Rennell to be Chief Civil Affairs Officer of HORRIFIED and Chief of AMGOT: and Lt. Col. Charles M. Spofford to be Acting Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer of HORRIFIED and Acting Deputy Chief of AMGOT.

A QUESTION OF SEMANTICS
[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 27 May 43, OPD files, 311.23, Security, sec. 1 ]

... U.S. Authorities object to use of word "AMGOT" for psychological reasons. U.S. and British Army Staff here suggest some other abbreviation such as "AMG" be used in future orders correspondence and markings of supplies. . . ³⁴

[Memo, Rennell, Chief, AMGOT, for Liaison Sec, AFHQ, 31 May 43, ACC files, 50000/500/593]

I. I refer to the objection ... which has been raised to the term AMGOT which is an abbreviation of "Allied Military Government of the Occupied Territory of ." This description is accurate and the organization cannot as well be described by any other title. I dislike abbreviations myself anyhow, and propose to give instructions to use the full description which will so far as possible obviate the use of the abbreviation....

6. . . . I feel obliged to oppose strongly any change and ask you to make my views known in the right quarters.

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 3 Jun 43, AFHQ Msg files, CM-IN 873]

Withdraw objection to use of name AMGOT.

ORGANIZATION OF MG PERSONNEL FOR INITIAL PHASE
[Force rot Opn Instr 3, 22 May 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (5-38) ]

5. At the outset there will be two AMGOT (Civil Affairs) headquarters organizations, one with each Task Force headquarters, as well as the main AMGOT headquarters, which will remain with Headquarters Force 141. As soon as circumstances permit the two AMGOT Task Force Civil Affairs Headquarters will merge and when the whole of HORRIFIED, or a substantial part of it, has been occupied there will be only one Civil Administration Headquarters, under the C.C.A.O., for the whole territory.

The Civil Affairs administration in the provinces will then function directly under the central administration.

6. A small number of Civil Affairs officers will be attached to the Headquarters of the formation or unit commander of each assault force. Subject to the discretion of the formation (unit) commander, these officers will be sent ashore as soon as possible after the assault has consolidated any territory containing inhabited centres. These Civil Affairs officers will be in touch with the local administrative authorities, and relations with them should thereafter be conducted, whenever practicable, through these officers by formation (unit) and unit (.organization) commanders....

7. The Civil Affairs officers with the assault forces are destined as soon as feasible to form the provincial administrations of the areas in which the assault troops deploy....

8. The Civil Affairs officers of the assault parties, as well as those with Task Force Headquarters will be attached to, form part of, and be under the direct orders of the formation (unit) commanders concerned. Subject only to directives which they and the formation (unit) com-

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manders will receive on the policy to be followed during the initial phase, these Civil Affairs officers will not receive direct instructions from their superior Civil Affairs officers until such time as they can make proper contact with the latter, and the task force commander determines that the Civil Affairs (Task Force) headquarters can properly take charge of them.

During the assault and initial phases of the operation the officers of the Civil Administration assigned to task forces or assaulting units will operate as Staff Officers to the commanders. The formation (unit) and assaulting unit (organization) Commanders will have final responsibility and authority.

9. It is anticipated that the Civil Affairs officers with the assault formations will only be provided with a nominal scale of transport. The balance of transport will arrive in the follow-up convoys. These officers will therefore have to depend in the initial phase on locally requisitioned MT [Military Transport] and the use of the combat units' MT. The object of landing with few vehicles is to avoid encumbering the assaulting troops with any MT which is not strictly necessary.

Assault commanders will be made aware of this and be given instructions to assist Civil Affairs officers in the execution of their duties....

CREATION OF A MILITARY GOVERNMENT SECTION DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO CHIEF OF STAFF
[AFHQ Staff Memo 50, 18 Jun 43, MTO, HS files]

I. Establishment of Military Government Section.

Announcement is made of the establishment of a MG Section, this Headquarters, responsible directly to the Chief of Staff.

II. Responsibilities and Functions of the Military Government Section.

a. This will be the executive section for the CinC and CofS in matters pertaining to Military Government of occupied territory, including political questions arising out of military occupation.
b. This Section will be the channel of communication in matters of Military Government for Force 141 and other task forces which may become concerned in Military Government in enemy territory.

III. Composition of Section.

This section will be composed of a Chief and deputy chief and a mixed British and American staff.

IV. . . . Announcement is made of the assignment of Col. Julius C. Holmes, GSC, as Chief, Military Government Section. V. . . . Announcement is made of the assignment of Lt. Col. A. Terrence Maxwell, King's Royal Rifle Corps, as Deputy Chief, Military Government Section.

ALLIED MILITARY FINANCIAL AGENCY CREATED
[AMGOT GAI No. 15, ³⁵  AGO files, AMGOT Plan]

1. In pursuance of a Directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, there has been created an organ of AMGOT known as the Allied Military Financial Agency (AMFA). AMFA forms part of the Finance Division of AMGOT and is under the command of the Chief Financial Officer.

2. AMFA has been established for the following purposes:

(a) To provide a depository, clearing house and chief office of financial transactions for the convenience of the Allied Military Forces.
(b) To provide a depository, where necessary, for funds which may be impounded.
(c) To facilitate control by AMGOT of financial and property transactions in the occupied territory.
(d) To provide a source of funds from which to make loans to and through local banks, municipalities, public utilities, private businesses, and individual persons.
(e) To, maintain a complete accounting of all financial transactions entered into by AMGOT.

3. In view of the need to control the volume of currency so as to prevent inflation (which might have serious consequences for AMGOT as a whole) loans will be restricted to the minimum necessary for achieving their purpose. They will be made only in cases where they will assist in the restoration of order and rehabilitation of essential activities and are desirable from the point of view of the military effort and where local banks are not in a position to provide such financial assistance. AMFA is not intended to function as a competing agency to existing commercial banks. AMGOT officers should use every opportunity to discourage any impression (which will be only too likely to arise) that AMFA is to be regarded as an unlimited source of funds for all and sundry (see 7 below).

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4. AMGOT officers, whether with the Task Forces or at Headquarters, will draw funds from AMGOT Finance Officers, who may be obliged in the early stages of occupation, to draw the. money needed to carry out their official duties from Army Finance Officers or paymasters in the form of Yellow Seal Dollars or B.M.A. Pounds. However, it is planned to provide currency in terms of the local monetary unit as early as possible, preferably before the first phase of any operation.

5. The procedure described in paragraph 4 need only be employed in cases where, through lack of communications or for any other reason, AMFA cannot provide all the currency needed by AMGOT and the Army. As soon as AMFA can provide such currency, both Army paymasters and AMGOT Officers will draw funds from AMFA.

6. All moneys drawn by AMGOT Officers must be accounted for in the way described in General Administrative Instructions No. 12, dated 10 September 1943.

7- One of the major tasks of AMFA (subject to the C.F.O. [Chief Finance Officer]) is that of planning and assisting in the maintaining of controls over the credit and price structures of the occupied territory in an effort to hold inflationary forces in check. This danger of an excessive circulation of currency should be in the minds of all AMGOT Officers who are under the necessity of spending or advancing sums of money in the course of their official duties.

With a view to preventing any such inflation all AMGOT Officers should restrict issues of cash to the minimum required to serve Allied Military needs.

8. It is intended that in general all revenues and expenditures of AMGOT, as distinct from those of the local governmental authorities, shall pass through AMFA. This may make it necessary for certain AMGOT Officers to maintain current accounts with AMFA, while others may maintain accounts in local banks, through which remittances can be made to and from AMFA.

Any instructions which may be necessary in this connection will be issued in due course to all concerned.

9. As need arises, it is hoped that AMFA will establish sub-agencies possibly to the extent of placing one in the principal city of each occupied province.

VINDICTIVENESS VERSUS BENEVOLENCE
[Ltr, Rennell, Chief, AMGOT, to Col. A. Terrence Maxwell, Deputy Chief, MGS, AFHQ, 3 Jul 43, ACC files, 10000/100/604]

I think we seem likely to be headed for a considerable amount of trouble in the application of the administrative policy in HORRIFIED of which I think Holmes and you should perhaps be warned.

You will remember that in General Administrative Instruction No. I the general attitude of Civil Affairs officers towards the local population was laid down. Paragraph 3 lays down certain general maxims of conduct and starts with the sentence "You will be guided in your attitude towards the local population by the memory of years of war in which the Italians fought against your people and your Allies." As a result of representations made to me by Spofford that the general sense of G.A.I. No. 1 was not wholly consistent with the C.C.S. directive, notably paragraph 4, I agreed to an amending G.A.I. saying that G.A.I. No. 1, paragraph 3, was to be read in conjunction with directive.

I discussed this matter with Col. Haskell of the Civil Affairs Division in Washington who took the line that the first sentence of paragraph 3 of G.A.I. No. 1 might indeed be held to be at variance with the C.C.S. directive that the administration was to be benevolent inasmuch as the sentence in question might be interpreted as vindictive. I did not as a matter of fact agree and I explained to him, as I have to others, that my experience is not of having to restrain the troops, at any rate British troops, from being vindictive and brutal, but rather of trying to prevent immediate fraternisation and treatment of the local population as domestic pets. Furthermore, I held, and hold, that an invitation to the troops to be benevolent would encourage them in these habits....

I only refer to these matters to warn you of the different points of view which are now held. It is not always appreciated in London and Washington that it is difficult to create a fighting spirit among the troops in the general atmosphere of benevolence.³⁶

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CAO's ENJOINED TO ADAPT THEMSELVES TO A JOINT ENTERPRISE
[AMGOT GAI No. 1, AGO files, AMGOT Plan]

2. The formation commander to which you, as a British or American officer are attached, may at any time be either an American or British officer. Your superior Civil Affairs Officer may equally be either American or British. You must understand that there are differences in procedure, custom and outlook between the two Armies of which you form a part. It will be for you to see that these differences do not affect the efficiency of your work and in no circumstances form the subject of complaints or gossiping. A serious view will be taken by your superior officers of any idle chatter or criticism of any member of the other Forces. This Administration constitutes the first attempt at a Joint Allied Administration and it is your work, your efficiency, and your attitude of mind which will make the Administration a success or a failure and will serve as a model or a warning for the other administrations which will have to be built up in other parts of the world....

THE FIRST THING IS TO HELP THE COMBAT UNITS
[AMGOT GAI No. 1, p. 83]

It is . . . important for Civil Affairs Officers to remember that the available Civil Affairs personnel in the immediately post assault phase, will be very limited, and that they must preserve a sense of proportion about what is important. The most important thing is to assist the troops in their operations. It may, therefore, be less important to formally take over a center which has been bypassed than to go forward with the combat troops to help them in procuring food and maintaining order in their immediate rear. The rule of "first things first" must be remembered and "first thing" is to clear the enemy out of the territory. The "first thing" therefore is to help the combat units, even if this is at the expense of efficient administration....

THE PRINCIPLES OF GOOD ADMINISTRATION
[AMGOT GAI No. I]

4. . . . You must learn to disregard the nationality of the people whom you are administering, if you are going to be a good administrator. The principles of good administration are the same in all Countries and for all people. They are the preservation of law, order and justice, the prevention of disease and distress, the removal of fear and the creation of economic well-being.' To these, for a military government, is added as the first duty, to assist in the prosecution of the war by enabling the high Command to reduce garrison troops for use elsewhere and to provide, within the resources of the country, whatever materials are available which will assist in the prosecution of the war....

KEEP EXISTING ADMINISTRATION AND TEMPER DEFASCISTIZATION WITH DISCRETION
[AMGOT GAI No. 1, p. 80]

5. In order to economize in manpower, it will be the policy of the military government to secure the maintenance of the Italian administrative machine, subject to the elimination of the Fascist Party and its influence. The Fascist Party machine will be broken up from the earliest possible moment and in every way in which it is open for us to do so, but the machine cannot be broken up or Fascist influence eliminated in a day. Since also nearly all Italian administrative officials are, at any rate nominally, members of the Party, it will not he possible to remove or intern all members of the Party. This would merely cause a breakdown, not only of the whole of the Italian administrative machine, but also of all technical services, such as transportation, etc. The manner in which the policy of the two governments toward the Fascist Party and its officials is to be carried out will be the subject of joint directives from the governments to the Commander in Chief. Specific instructions based on these directives, will be communicated to you. In any event, you should forthwith seek out information as to the identity of officials of the Fascist Party in the territory in which you are serving, as well as the identity of Fascist leaders and Pro-Nazi partisans. You will also collect information on the Fascist Secret Police (OVRA), its personnel and its operation in your region....

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Is ASSIGNED A SECONDARY AND LIMITED PLACE
[AMGOT GAI No. 1, pp. 80-81]

4. . . . For obvious reasons economic development must take a second place and can only occur within the limits of transport and of military requirements....

7. As soon as the storm of war has swept away from your area, you will take steps to restore economic exchanges and the normal life of the inhabitants. It is particularly important that markets and shops should be re-opened and that access to them should be permitted, since without this, the civilian population will starve. . . . Cir-

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culation of trucks, etc., to carry farm produce must be permitted as soon as military security allows....

AMGOT PROCLAMATIONS ARE BASED ON INITIAL NEED TO SUBORDINATE LIBERTY TO MILITARY SECURITY
[Chanler, Chief Legal Officer, AMGOT Hq, Rpt, Functions and Operations of the Legal Division, AMGOT, 28 April-1 November 1943, 15 NOV 43, [hereafter cited as Chanler Rpt], CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43) (2)]

As a result of all these deliberations and considerations, 12 proclamations were drafted by the Legal Division. . . . They covered the following subjects:

Proclamation # 1. Announcement of occupation.
Proclamation #2. Definition of offenses against law and order and against the Allied Forces, which the inhabitants of the occupied territory must not commit.
Proclamation #3. Devalidation of legal currency of U.S. gold seal dollars and British military administration notes and the settlement of the rates of exchange between the same and between them and Italian lire.
Proclamation #4. The establishment of Allied Military Courts, and the definition of the jurisdiction and constitution of such Courts and of their powers of punishment.
Proclamation #5. The closing of certain financial institutions in the occupied territory and the establishment of a moratorium.
Proclamation # 6. The creation of a Controller of Property with the definition of his powers to safeguard Allied property in the occupied territory and to take into his custody certain enemy State property and properties belonging to certain citizens of enemy States.
Proclamation #7. The dissolution of the Fascist Party and its subsidiary organizations and the establishment of provisions to deal with the properties of the Party and of such organizations.
Proclamation #8. To provide for rationing of food, fixing of prices and the stabilization of agricultural conditions.
Proclamation #9. To provide for the publication to be known as the "Sicily Gazette" which would contain copies of all proclamations and general orders and the production of which would be proof of its contents in all Courts.
Proclamation # 10. To make financial regulations regarding restrictions on exchange and commerce and to regulate prices.
Proclamation # 11. To establish certain general police and security regulations for the purposes of regulating means of communication, controlling photography, requiring identity cards to be carried by civilian inhabitants, regulating newspapers, and controlling meetings and assemblies.
Proclamation # 12. To establish Allied Military lire as legal tender in occupied territory.

The two main principles which were borne in mind in preparing these proclamations were that they should be directed first to provide for the safety and security of the combat forces and secondly to promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the territory, to continue peacefully to go about their respective occupations. It had to be borne in mind that the interests of the combat forces who were prosecuting the war were of paramount importance and that the inhabitants must undergo, at least in the early stages, some restrictions of normal liberty to make the safety of the forces certain. At the same time it was planned that these unavoidable restrictions of liberty should be gradually raised as the combat forces moved forward and as the situation and attitude of the inhabitants allowed....

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