Endnotes for Chapter I

1 Except in the case of documents with  numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, asterisks are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

2 The policies and procedures indicated in the Manual, Military Government (FM 27-5) prepared by the JAG in 1940 were promised almost entirely on the Rhineland experience, PMGO, History of Military Government Training, p. 4.

3 Mr. Noyes' proposal for civilian government of occupied Germany was accepted by the President. He prevailed upon America's allies to enter into a convention which, on 28 June 1919, set up the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission. But America's participation in the convention was contingent upon its acceptance of the peace treaty, and the failure of the Senate to ratify this treaty made it impossible for the United States, though sponsor of the arrangement for civilian government, to participate formally in the civilian high commission.

4 JAG's opinion was based largely upon the fact that a field manual was already in existence for the laws of warfare (FM 27-10) which included the legal questions of military government. But this manual did not enter into questions of policy and organization, with which specialists in military government had to be familiar. Although the nonlegal phases of military government were touched upon in a number of Army field manuals, at the beginning of 1940 no manual existed which dealt with them systematically and exclusively.

5 The manual does not seem to envisage the actual conduct of training, as distinguished from its supervision, by G-1. This is left to the theater commander insofar as it is carried on in the theater. Thus, as will be seen, it became necessary to consider the question of the appropriate authority to conduct advance training in the Zone of Interior.

6 This is the first formal War Department proposal for advance military government training but the nucleus of the idea appears to have arisen earlier. The PMGO History of Military Government Training points out: "A classified report from the United States Military Attaché in London, dated 2 May 1941, recommended that the United States take preliminary steps for the selection and training of Army officers and others for postwar activities abroad. (At this time, Great Britain had already constituted a politico-military course for training officers for reconstruction and other possible postwar missions in different sections of the world.) This report was referred by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, on 11 June 1941" (p. 4). The proposal of May 1941 had reference primarily to training for postwar liaison activities, such as was carried on in the British school.

7 Jesse I. Miller was a civilian consultant in the War Department, who had been in military service during World War I. After the Military Government Division was set up in the Provost Marshal's Office on 25 July 1942 (see below, p. 16), Mr. Miller was commissioned and made Associate Director, later Director.

8 The offer was informally made by President John Lloyd Newcomb to General Wickersham at a conference of 19 February, was confirmed by a letter of 23 February, and was shortly accepted by the Provost Marshal General. While some military installations in and around Washington had also been considered, the practical difficulties were immediately apparent. It is noteworthy that from the outset the inclination of the Provost Marshal General's Office was to establish the school at a university, which would afford use of a library and other facilities not obtainable in equal degree on military premises.

9 The school opened on 11 May 1942 with 49 student officers in attendance. The small enrollment was probably the result of the short interval between the announcement of the school and its opening.

10 General Wickersham could not foresee that primacy of the military establishment in the administration of occupied territory was very shortly to be denied by the President.

11 General Wickersham envisaged, of course, the commissioning or enlistment of qualified civilians, in accordance with par. 7 of FM 27-5.

12 Mr. Ringland's proposal would, of course, have reopened the whole question of the control of military government training, which the War Department, in accordance with tradition, had itself assumed. From this point of view the Ringland memorandum had, to the Provost Marshal General's Office, a different character from the numerous offers which other civilians and civilian agencies were making at the same time to establish cooperation in military government problems. Typical of many of these was the offer of Harold Weston, Secretary of the Reconstruction Services Committee, in a letter to the Provost Marshal General of 3 June 1942. Mr. Weston proposed that the committee should be authorized to consult confidentially with government agencies in its pursuit of studies regarding the rehabilitation of liberated areas. PMGO files, 014.13 Relations Between Civil and MG Authority.

13 There is no evidence that at the time of writing this memorandum General Gullion knew of the Ringland proposal, which was not brought formally to the attention of the War Department until a month later.

14 This was the 20 June memorandum of Mr. Ringland (above) which the President sent to the Under Secretary of War, asking "Will you please speak to me about this at your convenience?" OUSW files, MG.

15 This memorandum, though not written until October, is included here because it testifies not only to the concern entertained in July by the War Department but also to the influence of that concern in expediting action upon training plans.

16 The third issue discussed by Miller-the Rhineland occupation-is omitted in view of the reference to it in the second document of this chapter. It is noteworthy that the person citing this historical evidence against premature civilian interference in MG was no professional soldier. See also below, Miller's memorandum of 30 July 1942.

17 Transcript of conversation, with inaccuracies and omissions, is included to show the trend of thought which led to the preparation of the War Department Program of Military Government.

18 Jesse I. Miller was in Charlottesville where he also assisted General Wickersham.

19 This report was later brought to Mr. Stimson's attention to assist him in meeting the President's criticism of the School of Military Government. It is pertinent chiefly to the debate soon to arise over whether the school was selecting the wrong type of students or wasting the time of students in impractical studies.

20 See Under Secretary Patterson's letter to the President dated 20 July 1942 in Section 3, above, in which he states that he is available at any time to discuss the selection and training of personnel in connection with governing occupied territories. The President was no doubt referring to a later phase of occupation than the assault period. From observations which appear in subsequent chapters of this volume, it is clear that President Roosevelt not only objected to military administration in a postwar period but was anxious that the Army relinquish its control to civilian agencies as soon as possible in the middle phase when active hostilities were over in large areas though the war still continued elsewhere. The President's reference to "second string" men is difficult to understand. It seems probable that his distrust of the Charlottesville group rested on the strictures of Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes and other New Dealers. See below, Section 5.

21 With regard to the question of proper scope, a later observation (at the meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on Training, 16 March 1943, sec. 5, this chapter) seems to indicate that the President was concerned lest a large Army training program would lead to continuing and even postwar monopolization of foreign administration by the military.

22 General Gullion here overlooks a third type of attack which clearly, in certain circles, was predominant. This was that the school was not giving its students enough of the kind of philosophy which would have made them sympathetic to progressive and liberal ideas. In a memorandum of 27 November 1942 (see below, this section), General Gullion does note this type of criticism. It was the most difficult type for him to meet because the school operated on the premise that matters of social philosophy were outside its purview.

23 It seems clear from Miss Neary's memorandum that Mr. Stimson decided not to use the elaborate brief in defense of military government which Colonel Miller prepared for him. Copy of the brief will be found in PMGO files, 321.19, MG. On 23 November the program for commissioning and training 2500 civilian specialists was formally approved by the War Department (see below, Chapter III, Note 16).

24. Tab B is the directive referred to in par. 6 of above document. The Commanding General, SOS, recommended that it be published as a directive of the Secretary of War.

25 The further development of the training program is considered here only insofar as it raises the issue of military versus civilian control. For some of the administrative developments see below, Chapter III, Section 5.

26 For additional coverage of this subject, see Chapter II.

27 This memorandum reported the discussions of the first meeting of the new Interdepartmental Committee which was held on 16 March 1943. Although Secretary Ickes apparently envisaged the use of civilian personnel as soon as civil government could be restored, Assistant Secretary of State Shaw had a more limited expectation. He told Colonel Haskell it was his feeling that it was not the intention of the committee to set up any intervening civilian government between the time military government ceased and local civil authority was restored. Rather, he felt that the civilian personnel in question would be used largely to assist and advise local governmental agencies in occupied territories after military government had ended.

28 The civilian training project of the Interdepartmental Committee proved to be abortive.

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