1 Harris, Allied Military Administration in Italy, p. 330.

2 Ibid.

1 It was believed possible that northern Italy might be reached much sooner than actually proved to be the case. High-level planning for the north began about the time of this memorandum.

2 The memorandum was presented at a meeting of Field Marshal Alexander with Tito at Caserta on 13 August. The representative of the Government-in-Exile was also present. Tito objected to AMG except in Trieste and along the lines of communication [L of C] to Austria. See below, AFHQ message to CCS, 2.3 November 1944.

3 The information given in the report was furnished by British secret missions in northern Italy.

4 The message begins by summarizing the conference with Tito, described in the preceding document.

5 In the ensuing paragraphs the CCS, among other things, call for the maintenance of AMG in Bolzano and its continuation in the islands of Pantelleria, Lampedusa, and Linosa.

6 That is, the areas which Tito was claiming were for the time being not to be seized unless, as in par. 5, Tito's forces were not there.

7 On 3 May Lt. Gen. Sir Bernard C. Freyburg's forces entered Trieste. The Allies controlled the port area of Trieste and Tito's forces the remainder of the city. ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-A, CCAC 148-5.

8 The plan for the combat phase envisaged Venezia Giulia as administratively a part of Venezie Region.

9 On 21 May the Yugoslav Government dispatched a note to the American and British Ambassadors in Belgrade stating that it would accept in principle the establishment of Allied military government on the basis of the demarcation line which SACMED's Chief of Staff had proposed in Belgrade, subject to certain minor modifications and to certain conditions. This line, known as the Morgan line, would divide the area between the Allies and the Yugoslavs. The above message of SACMED was designed to set forth his own basic requirements which were not to be compromised in the final negotiation.

10 The Italian semigovernmental organization which had charge of the distribution of petroleum in Italy.

11 Some in the theater felt that the use of the word "Administration" in the agreement made the Yugoslav legal position correct.

12 Eighth Army embraced XIII Corps, the organization directly responsible for administration of Venezia Giulia.

13 The Yugoslavs tended to call all non-Communist Italians "Fascists."

14 General Order No. 11 is an interesting example of the development of an important plan on the spot rather than at higher headquarters. Colonel Bowman found no precise solution to the problem of local government in the broad directives which had been issued, and he secured approval for a plan of his own evolved in the light of his investigation of the area and conferences with many persons therein. The "Area" was an artificial geographical unit which was superimposed on the territory in disregard of the "Region" on which the Yugoslavs had based their system of committees. It comprised more than the communes of Trieste and Gorizia proper. The Area was a counttrpart of the Italian province, with certain administrative modifications. Thus AMG did, as far as possible, conform to the directive calling for use of the essentials of the Italian system.

15 Section 10 was inserted in order to provide a legal basis for disregarding the "enactments" of the Slovene committees which had been set up before the occupation.

16 On 29 September G-5, AFHQ, disapproved the request on the ground that the Allies could not establish a higher ration in Venezia Giulia than elsewhere in Italy without incurring the charge of unfairness from Italians. However, G-5 directed AC to take measures to put an end to the interferences with the normal flow of supplies from metropolitan Italy to Yugoslavia. (Komer, op. cit., II, 309.) While the problem continued to be serious, in general the authorities in Northern Italy co-operated well, and economic incentives were sufficient to induce both Italians and Jugoslavs to provide much extra-ration food. Nor did the supply of imported rationed food ever completely fail during the occupation, although certain emergencies compelled AMG to appeal to AFHQ, and on occasion it was necessary to reroute a ship at the last critical moment or to borrow against future deliveries from Peninsular Base Section or from 88th Division, the American garrison. Serious poverty in the area, which might well have resulted from disruption of the normal channels of trade, was prevented by an extensive public works program financed in Italian lire through the Bank of Italy.

17 By and large, attempts to secure Slovene representatives for the communal councils proved unsuccessful, owing to the fear of retaliation against Slovenes guilty of "collaboration."

18 Annex VIII of the Peace Treaty provided for creation of the Free Port of Trieste, wherein all nations would enjoy freedom of transit and be exempt from customs charges.

19 The Free Territory of Trieste from the outset was a bone of contention in international politics and it did not even prove possible for the U.N. Security Council to agree upon a governor. The Allied Powers and Italy long found themselves at odds on every issue with Yugoslavia, which was supported, until the deterioration of relations between the two communist powers, by the Soviet Union. When it became clear that the original plan would not work, the United States and Great Britain sought unsuccessfully to obtain agreement for the return of the Free Territory to Italy. Finally, on 5 October 1954, Great Britain, the United States, Italy, and Yugoslavia signed an agreement whereby Zone B (garrisoned by the Yugoslav troops) and a small section of Zone A (the Anglo-American zone) were ceded to Yugoslavia, and the remainder of Zone A, including the city of Trieste, was given to Italy.