UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The War in the Pacific
 
 
OKINAWA:
THE LAST BATTLE
 
Cover Photo: Okinawa: The Last Battle
 
by
Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns
Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens
 
 
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C., 2000
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 49-45742
First Printed 1948-CMH Pub 5-11
 
 

CMH Logo


UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
Kent Roberts Greenfield, General Editor
Advisory Committee

 

James P. Baxter

President, Williams College

William T. Hutchinson

University of Chicago

Henry S. Commager

Columbia University

S.L.A. Marshall

Detroit News

Douglas S. Freeman

Richmond News Leader

Col. Thomas D. Stamps

United States Military Academy

Pedleton Herring

Social Science Research Council

E. Dwigth Salmon

Amherst College

John D. Hicks

University of California

Charles H. Taylor

Harvard University

Walter L. Wright

Princeton University

 

Historical Division, SSUSA

Chief Historical Division Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony
Chief Historian Kent Roberts Greenfield
Chief, Editorial Branch Lt. Col. John M. Kemper
Chief Cartographer Wsevolod Aglaimoff

. . . to Those Who Served

v


Foreword

The conflict with the Axis Powers confronted the United States Army with problems on a scale never faced before-problems as great in administration, training, supply, and logistics as in strategy and tactics. THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II sets forth in detail the nature of the problems faced, the methods used to solve them, and the mistakes made as well as the success achieved. The object is to provide a work of reference for military and civilian students as well as a record of achievements which deserve an honorable place in the pages of history. Its value to the thoughtful citizen as an aid to his comprehension of basic problems of national security has been a major consideration. Its preparation has also been prompted by the thought that in a faithful and comprehensive record all who participated in the Army's vast effort would find a recognition merited by their service and sacrifice.
 
The advantage to the Army and the scholar has been the decisive factor in proceeding with the least possible delay to the publication of such a series.. No claim is made that it constitutes a final history. Many years will pass before the record of the war can be fully analyzed and appraised. In presenting an organized and documented narrative at this time, the Historical Division of the War Department has sought to furnish the War Department and the Army schools an early account of the experience acquired, and to stimulate further research by providing scholars with a guide to the mountainous accumulation of records produced by the war.
 
The decision to prepare a comprehensive account of military activities was made early in the war. Trained historians were assigned to the larger units of the Army and War Department to initiate the work of research, analysis, and writing. The results of their work, supplemented by additional research in records not readily available during the war, are presented in this series. The general plan provides for a division into subseries dealing with the War Department, the Army Air, Ground, and Service Forces, the technical services, and the theaters of operations. This division conforms to the organization of the Army during 
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World War II and, though involving some overlapping in subject matter, has the advantage of presenting a systematic account of developments in each major field of responsibility as well as the points of view of the particular commands. The plan also includes volumes on such topics as statistics, order of battle, military training, the Women's Army Corps, and other subjects that transcend the limits of studies focused on an agency or command. The whole project is oriented toward an eventual summary and synthesis.
 
The present volume concerns one of the most bitterly fought battles of the Pacific war, in which the Army, the Marine Corps, and the Navy all played a vital part. In order to make the Army's role and the campaign as a whole as intelligible as possible the historians have treated in detail the operations of the Marine Corps units attached to Tenth Army, and have also sketched the contribution of the Navy both in preliminary operations against Okinawa and in the campaign itself. Another characteristic of this as of other volumes on Pacific campaigns is that tactical action is treated on levels lower than those usually presented in the history of operations in the European theaters. The physical limitations of the terrain fought over in the Pacific restricted the number and size of the units which could be employed and brought into sharp focus the operations of regiments, battalions, and smaller units. A wealth of verified material on such operations is available for all theaters, but it is only that of the Pacific which can be used extensively, since in other theaters the actions of smaller units are lost in the broad sweep of great distances and large forces. The description of small-unit action has the merit of giving the nonprofessional reader a fuller record of the nature of the battlefield in modern war, and the professional reader a better insight into troop leading.
 
Okinawa: The Last Battle is the work of combat historians of the 1st Information and Historical Service, Tenth Army. The practice of dispatching trained historians to accompany troops into combat grew out of earlier experience, both in World War I and in the early part of World War II, which demonstrated that the paper records produced by units in battle were rarely, if ever, adequate for the writing of military history. Lower units, such as the infantry company and very often the battalion, do not write as they fight; hence the details of combat are not in their records. Even at higher levels many significant orders and reports, because they are communicated orally and by telephone, are noted in the record only sketchily if at all. An equally serious gap arises
viii

from the fact that the "why" behind the decision is almost never discernible in the documents.
 
The records must be supplemented by interviewing key participants in the action at all levels if anything approaching complete understanding of what happened is to be attained. Unless such quick on-the-spot study is made, memories will grow dim or the man who knows the answer may become a casualty in a subsequent operation. Thus the historians who took the field were given the mission of noting the messages, reports, and orders as they came in, of spotting the gaps in the story as it was thus unfolded, and of taking prompt steps to fill those gaps by asking questions.
 
At first, historians were sent to the theaters as individuals or teams. Later they were organized into units called Information and Historical Services, one of which was assigned to each field army. Though the 1st Information and Historical Service was the first of these to be activated, all the others were called on to deal with operations earlier. As a consequence the ist Information and Historical Service not only benefited in some measure by the lessons they learned, but was the first which was fully organized and prepared to take the field at the very start of a major operation, with plans laid for a systematic coverage of the campaign.
 
In an organizational sense, therefore, the preparations for historical coverage of the Okinawa campaign were better than those for earlier operations. This explains why the history of the last operation has been issued first.

Washington, D. C. 
1 July 1947
HARRY J. MALONY 
Brigadier General, U. S. A. 
Chief Historical Division
War Department Special Staff

ix


Preface
Okinawa: The Last Battle was written by U. S. Army historians who participated in the Ryukyus campaign as members of a group organized to accompany the American forces to the Ryukyus and secure at first hand the materials for a history of their operations. This group was formed in Hawaii as a section of the 1st Information and Historical Service, which was attached to Tenth Army in January 1945.
 
Before the embarkation of troops for Okinawa, most of the Tenth Army's combat historians, as they were called, had joined at various points in the Pacific the units whose part in the coming battle they were to record. Similarly, Marine historians were already with III Amphibious Corps headquarters and the Marine divisions which were to take part in the action. Lt. Col. John Stevens was in command of the Army historians; his chief assistant was M/Sgt. James M. Burns, the author of Guam in the series AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION.* Colonel Stevens and Sergeant Burns accompanied Tenth Army headquarters. Capt. Donald L. Mulford came from Leyte with XXIV Corps and remained with it until late in May, when he was assigned to the 96th Division to replace its historian, Sgt. Bert Balmer, who had been wounded in action. At XXIV Corps headquarters Maj. Roy E. Appleman succeeded Captain Mulford. Capt. Edmund G. Love, an experienced historian of operations in the Central Pacific, was attached to the 27th Division. Capt. Russell A. Gugeler and Capt. Paul R.. Leach, who had served respectively with the 7th and 77th Divisions on Leyte, accompanied these divisions to Okinawa. Capt. Jesse L. Rogers, on his arrival at Okinawa in June, was assigned to the 96th Division to assist Captain Mulford. The Marine historians on Okinawa were Maj. Almet Jenks, III Amphibious Corps; Sgt. Kenneth Shutts and Sgt. Paul Trilling, 1st Marine Division; and Capt. Phillips D. Carleton, 6th Marine Division.
 
Army historians held frequent conferences during and after the campaign for the purpose of coordinating their work. Liaison with the Marine historians
 
* Published by the Historical Division, War Department Special Staff.
xi

was established soon after the initial landings at the target and was maintained throughout the operation. Further information and perspective were gained through conferences with Navy personnel at Okinawa and with Navy historians in Hawaii and Washington.
 
After the campaign, histories of the operations of the four Army divisions and of the 6th Marine Division were written by the respective division historians; a history of the XXIV Corps on Okinawa was written by Major Appleman; and a history of the 1st Marine Division on Okinawa was compiled by Capt. James R. Stockman, USMCR, from division records and from material supplied by the division historians.
 
In July 1945, after the battle of Okinawa ended, Colonel Stevens and Sergeant Burns were detached from the 1st Information and Historical Service and returned to Oahu to write the history of the Okinawa operation at Fort Shafter, where the records of all Amy units which had fought on Okinawa were subsequently brought together. Captain Love, who had completed his history of the operations of the 27th Division by July 1945, returned to Washington. The other Army historians remained with their units to complete their interrogations of the men who fought, write the division and corps histories for which they were responsible, and be available for prospective new assignments.
 
After the war ended, Captain Leach completed the history of 77th Division operations, and Captain Mulford and Captain Rogers the account of 96th Division operations; these three historians were then separated from the Army. Major Appleman and Captain Gugeler, who accompanied the XXIV Corps and the 7th Division to Korea, were ordered to Oahu late in the fall of 1945 to complete their respective corps and division histories at Fort Shafter. Sergeant Burns returned to the United States early in December and was separated from the Army.
 
By March 1946 Major Appleman had completed the narrative of XXIV Corps operations on Okinawa, and Captain Gugeler the history of the 7th Division in the campaign. At that time, although Colonel Stevens, Major Appleman, and Captain Gugeler were all eligible for separation, they returned with the Okinawa records to Washington to continue work in the Historical Division, WDSS, on the history of the Okinawa campaign. Together with Sergeant Burns, now a civilian, they completed the Okinawa manuscript by the end of June. Organization of the volume was developed at conferences of all the Army historians during and after the battle on the basis of studies by Sergeant Burns.
xii

The manuscript was turned over to the Pacific Section of the Historical Division, WDSS. Dr. Charles B. Hirschfeld, a member of the Section, added material on high-level planning and logistics, revised and condensed certain portions of the manuscript, and aided in the preparation of the maps. The authors are especially indebted to Dr. Louis Morton, Chief of the Pacific Section, who supervised the preparation of the final manuscript and represented the authors during the editing process. The editing was performed by Dr. Albert K. Weinberg of the Editorial Branch, assisted by Miss Edith M. Poole and Miss Grace T. Waibel. The maps were prepared under the direction of Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff. Col. Allison R. Hartman acted as military editor, Major Charles F. Byars prepared the list of Tenth Army units in Appendix A, and Mr. George R. Powell compiled the charts and tables in Appendix C. Mr. W. Brooks Phillips prepared the index.
 
Capt. Robert L. Bodell selected the illustrations in this volume from material in the possession of the Signal Corps, Army Air Forces, U. S. Navy, U. S. Marine Corps, U. S. Coast Guard, and Yank magazine. The sketches on pp. 244-45 and 292-93 were drawn by S/Sgt. T. King Smith of the XXIV Corps Historical Section.

 

Washington, D. C. 
1 July 1947
ROY E. APPLEMAN
JAMES M. BURNS
RUSSELL A. GUGELER
JOHN STEVENS
 

Contents

Chapter
Page
I. OPERATION ICEBERG 1
The Strategic Decision 1
Nature of the Target 7
The Plan of Attack 17
Mounting the Attack 36
II. INVASION OF THE RYUKYUS 44
Preliminary Neutralization of Enemy Strength 44
Seizure of the Kerama Islands 51
Softening Up the Target 63
III. WINNING THE OKINAWA BEACHHEAD 68
The Landing 69
Moving Island 74
Organizing the Beachhead 79
IV. WHERE IS THE ENEMY? 84
The Japanese Forces 84
The Japanese Plan of Defense 92
Enemy Counterattack by Air and Sea 96
V. COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE ENEMY 103
Through the Outposts, 4-8 April 104
Assaulting the Shuri Defenses, 9-12 April 113
The Enemy Takes the Offensive 130
VI. THE CONQUEST OF NORTHERN OKINAWA 138
Drive up the Ishikawa Isthmus, 4-7 April 138
Probing the Motobu Defenses, 7-13 April 141
Closing In on Yae-Take, 14-15 April 144
Conquest of Motobu Peninsula, 16-18 April 146
VII. THE CAPTURE OF IE SHIMA 149
Plans and Preparations of the Enemy 150
American Plans and Preparations 153
Invasion of Ie Shima, 16-17 April 156
Stalemate at Bloody Ridge, 18-19 April 163
Capture of Iegusugu, 20-21 April 173
Last Phase 181
VIII. THE ATTACK OF 19 APRIL ON THE SHURI DEFENSES 184
Plans and Preparations 184
Preliminary Attack of the 27th Division, 18 April 190
The General Attack 194
IX. FALL OF THE FIRST SHURI DEFENSE RING 208
Item Pocket 208
Assaulting the Outer Shuri Defense Ring 219
X. TACTICS AND TACTICAL DECISIONS 249
Tactics and Weapons on Okinawa 249
Tactical Decisions 258
XI. ASSAULTING THE SECOND SHURI DEFENSE RING 265
Stalemate on the West Coast 267
The 7th Division at Kochi Ridge 269
The Maeda Escarpment Barrier 274
XII. THE JAPANESE OFFENSIVE AND ITS AFTERMATH 283
Planning the Offensive 283
The Offensive Under Way 286
Japanese Penetration to Tanabaru, 5 May 294
The Americans Resume Offensive 302
XIII. THE MAY ATTACK ON THE SHURI DEFENSES 311
The Attack in the West 313
The Attack in the Center 332
Opening the East Coast Corridor 351
XIV. BATTLE IN THE RAIN 360
Enemy Air Attacks 360
Stalemate in the Center 364
The 6th Marine Division Occupies Naha 372
The 7th Division Bids for Envelopment 377
XV. THE FALL OF SHURI 383
Exodus From Shuri 387
American Occupation of Shuri 394
XVI. BEHIND THE FRONT 403
Supply Operations 405
Hospitalization and Evacuation 412
Military Government 415
Base Development 419
XVII. THE ENEMY'S LAST STAND 422
The Push South to the Yaeju-Dake-Yuza-Dake Barrier 422
The Capture of Oroku Peninsula 427
Assaulting the Last Defense Line 434
XVIII. THE BATTLE ENDS 455
End of Organized Resistance 455
Surrender and Suicide 462
Final Mop-up 471
Victory: Cost and Value 473
APPENDIX A. MAJOR TACTICAL UNITS OF TENTH ARMY IN THE RYUKYUS CAMPAIGN 475
APPENDIX B. JAPANESE 32d ARMY UNITS IN THE RYUKYUS CAMPAIGN 483
APPENDIX C. STATISTICS OF THE RYUKYUS CAMPAIGN 487
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 503

Tables

1.Strength of Army, Marine, and Naval Forces of Tenth Army in the Ryukyus Campaign,30 AApril-30 June 1945  488
2.Comparative American and Enemy Major Losses in the Ryukyus Campaign, 1 April-30June 1945 489
3.Casualties Sustained by Tenth Army, 1 April-30 June 1945 490
4.Troops and Supplies loaded for the Initial Assault on the Ryukyus 492
5.Personnel and Supplies Loaded for Assault and for First Echelon Garrison in the Ryukyus Campaign, by point of Embarkation 493
6.Comparison Of Estimated Capacities for Unloading at Okinawa Beaches and Quantities   Actually Unloaded, 1 April-30 June 1945 494
7.Cargo Unloaded at Okinawa Beaches, 1 April-30 June 1945 496
8.Ammunition Expended by Tenth Army Field Artillery, 1 April-30 June 1945 498
9.Ammunition Expended by the U. S. Navy in the Ryukyus Campaign, March-June 1945 500
10.Ammunition Expended by XXIV Corps, by Type of Weapon, 4 April-21 June 1945 501

Charts

I. Organization of Allied forces for the Ryukyus Campaign, January 1945  20
II. Organization of Central Pacific Task Forces for the Ryukyus Campaign, January 1945 22
III. Organization of Expeditionary Troops for the Ryukyus Campaign, January 1945 24
IV. XXIV Corps Assignment of Shipping for the Assault on Okinawa 43
V. Organization of the Japanese 62d Division in Okinawa 88
1.Tenth Army Weekly Battle Casualties, 1 April-30 June 1945 491
2.Comparison of Estimated Capacities for Unloading at Okinawa Beaches and Quantities Actually Unloaded, 1 April-20 June 1945 495
3.Average Daily Volume of Supplies Unloaded in the Ryukyus, 1 April-16 May 1945 497
4.Ammunition Expended by Tenth Army Field Artillery, 1 April-30 June 1945 499

Maps

1.Ryukyu Islands 5
2.Okinawa Island Group 6
3.The plan of Attack 30
4.Advance in the North: 6th Marine, 4-8 April 1945 140
5.Kakazu Pocket, 21 April 1945 240
Map I: Strategic Situation in the Pacific  
Map II: Island of Okinawa  
Map III: Southern Okinawa  
Map IV: Kerama Islands 77th Division 26-29 March 1945  
Map V: Tenth Army Advance 1-3 April 1945  
Map VI: Japanese Defense Positions 1 April 1945  
Map VII: Through the Outposts XXIV Corps 4-8 April 1945  
Map VIII: The Pinnacle 1st Battalion 184th Infantry 6 April 1945  
Map IX: Kakazu Ridge Attack of 9 April 1945  
Map X: Kakazu Ridge Attack of 10 April 1945  
Map XI: XXIV Corps Advance, 9-12 April 1945  
Map XII: Japanese Plan of Attack, 12 April 1945  
Map XIII: Japanese Attack, 12-14 April 1945  
Map XIV: Yae-Take: 6th Marine Division, 8-20 April 1945  
Map XV: Landings on Ie Shima: 77th Division, 16 April 1945  
Map XVI: Ie Shima, 18 April 1945  
Map XVII: Ie Shima 19 April 1945  
Map XVIII: Ie Shima, 20-21 April 1945  
Map XIX: XXIV Corps Attack, 19 45  
Map XX: Fire Plan of  272d Independent Infantry Battalion: Kakazu Area, 19 April 1945  
Map XXI: Item Pocket: 165th Infantry,20 April 1945  
Map XXII: Item Pocket, 21 April 1945  
Map XXIII: Item Pocket, 22-25 April 1945  
Map XXIV: Skyline Ridge: 7th Division, 19 April 1945  
Map XXV: Skyline Ridge: 32d Infantry, 21 April 1945  
Map XXVI: 96th Division,20-24 April 1945  
Map XXVII: Fight for the Pinnacles, 20 April 1945  
Map XXVIII: Through the Outer Shuri Defenses, 19-24 April 1945  
Map XXIX: Stalemate at Kochi: 7th Division, 25 April-3 May 1945  
Map XXX: Maeda Escarpment, 25-29 April 1945  
Map XXXI: Attack on Shuri Defenses, 25 April-3 May 1945  
Map XXXII: Japanese Plan of Attack, 4 May 1945  
Map XXXIII: Japanese Attack, 4-5 May  1945  
Map XXXIV: American Advance, 3-10 May 1945  
Map XXXV: Tenth Army Advance, 11-21 May 1945  
Map XXXVI: Sugar Loaf Hill: 6th Marine Division, 14-15 May 1945  
Map XXXVII: Sugar Loaf Hill: 6th Marine Division, 16-17 May 1945  
Map XXXVIII: Sugar Loaf Hill: 6th Marine Division, 18 May 1945  
Map XXXIX: Flattop and Dick Hills, 11-12 May 1945  
Map XL: Flattop and Dick Hills, 13-14 May 1945  
Map XLI: Flattop and Dick Hills, 15 May 1945  
Map XLII: Conical Hill, 11-16 May 1945  

Map XLIII: Conical Hill, 17-21 May 1945

 
Map XLIV: Closing in on Shuri, 22-29 May 1945  
Map XLV: Fall of Shuri, 30-31 May 1945  
Map XLVI: The Push South, 1-3 June 1945  
Map XLVII: Oroku and Yaeju-Dake, 4-11 June 1945  
Map XLVIII: Breaching Yaeju-Dake, 12-17 June 1945  
Map XLIX: End of Organized Resistance, 18-21 June 1945  

Illustrations

Okinawans and Okinawan Customs 8
Okinawa's Landscape 11
Village on Okinawa 12
American Commanders 18
Loading Supplies for Okinawa 42
Preliminary Bombardment 47
Japanese Kamikaze Attacks 48
Terrain in the Kerama Retto 53
Landings in the Keramas 59
" Suicide Boats" 61
Softening Up the Target  62
Bombarding the Beaches 71
The Landings 73
Moving Inland 78
Supplying and Developing the Beachhead 82
Japanese Commanders 86
Japanese Weapons 90
Kamikaze Attacks 98
Sinking of the Yamato 100
XXIV Corps Turns South 106
East Coast Battles 109
Kakazu West 114
Kakazu Gorge 122
Tombstone Ridge Area 128
Saddle Between Kakazu West and Kakazu Ridge 136
Fire Bombing 142
Pushing to Yae-Take 145
Ie Shima 151
Rockets Over Ie Shima 155
Invasion of Ie Shima 158
Fighting Toward Ie            161
Death of Ernie Pyle              165
Ie and the Southern Beaches 166
Typical Defense System    168-69
Attack on Bloody Ridge 174
Government House Hill    179
Strategic Area of Southern Okinawa 186
Ouki Hill-Skyline Area and Machinato Inlet 188
Opening Action, 19 April 195
Battle for Tombstone Ridge 199
Death of a Tank  201
West End of Urasoe-Mura Escarpment 206
Item Pocket Area 212
Heart of Item Pocket 216
Skyline Ridge         221
Rocky Crags                   229
Nishibaru Escarpment Area 233
The Pinnacles 239
Urasoe-Mura Escarpment 244-45
Kakazu Village and Kakazu Pocket 246
Japanese Fortifications 251
Naval Fire and Air Support 252
Blowtorch and Corkscrew             254
Southern Coast Line        261
Asa River Area 266
Kochi Area                270
Maeda Escarpment and Tank-Infantry Attacks 277
Maeda Escarpment Strong Points 278
Japanese Sea and Air Attack 288
Japanese Position at Tanabaru Escarpment, 4-7 May 292-93
Japanese Land Offensive 294
Tanabaru Escarpment                298
Attacks on Hill 60            305
American Advance Down the Center 308
West Flank Zone 315
Sugar Loaf and Horseshoe Hills 316
Fighting at Sugar Loaf and Crescent Hills 324
Dakeshi Ridge 327
Reverse Slope of Wana Ridge 331
Ishimmi Ridge 335
Chocolate Drop Hill 340
Dick Hills and Flattop                345
Advance Around Dick Hills and Flattop 350
Conical Hill and East Coast Flatlands   354
Japanese Air Raids on Okinawa 363
Wana Draw 367
Mud and Flood 368
"Three Sisters" and Oboe 371
Crossing the Asato River and Entering Naha 374
East Coast Corridor and Yonabaru-Naha Valley 380
Casualties 385
Secret Retreat 390
Shuri Heights 395
Shuri  399
Shuri Castle Bell 401
Supply and Communications Installations 404
Moving Supplies 408
Movement of Wounded 413
Military Government 416
Development of Airfield and Rehabilitation of Port 418
Mud and Supply               426
Advancing to Yaeju-Dake 429
Last Point of Resistance 430
Base of Oroku Peninsula             435
Yaeju-Dake and Hill 95 437
Flame Through a Hose            444
Night Attack on Yaeju-Dake 448
Yuza Peak and Kunishi Ridge 453
Fighting Toward Hill 89           457
Lt Gen Simon B Buckner  460
Overcoming the Last Resistance 464
Surrender 466
Last Japanese Command Post 469
Raising the American Flag      472
 

 
page updated 3 February 2009
 

 
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