Endnotes for Chapter X

1 Set Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, Ch. XXV, and Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 382.

2 (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 544, 600. (2) Rad ALUSNA, London to OpNav, 13122 CCR, 887-A Limited, Harriman to Hopkins, 13 Jul 42. Russia File (s) WDCSA. (3) Memo, Marshall and King for Hopkins, 15 Jul 42. Same file. (4) MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Vol. I, Bk. V, Aid to Russia, pp. 14-16, Item 62. (5) The Murmansk convoys were not wholly suspended. A September statement indicates their relation to Persian Gulf planning: "If our shipping losses continue at the present excessive rate along the Northern Russian route, it may become necessary to use the Persian Gulf route entirely." CCS 109/1, Rpt, CSP for CCS, approved 22 Sep 42, sub: Development of Persian Trans Facilities. 323.361 General Connolly's Letter of Instructions, SL 9008. (6) Page 16 of Item 62 cited in (4). The Index entry carries the erroneous date 18 June for 18 July.

3 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 602.

4 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 604-05.

5 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 31 and n. 106.

6 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 15.

7 See : (1) MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Vol. I, Bk. V, Aid to Russia, passim. (2) Prime Minister to President, Most Secret and Personal Msg 216, 2 Dec 42; and Msgs, Churchill to Roosevelt, Roosevelt to Churchill, and Roosevelt to Stalin, 30 Aug-9 Oct 42. OPD Exec 10, Item 63-a, OPD Hist Sec Coll, OCMH.

8 Research Draft MS, by Edwin M. Snell, 2 Apr 48, sub: The USSR in the U.S.-British Plans and Operations in 1942, p. 34. OCMH.

9 See P&P Records for August 1942. P&O, WDGS.

11 HOTI, Pt. IV, History of the Ports, by Ogden C. Reed, pp. 1-2. PGF.

12 (1) Memo, John J. MeCloy for Hopkins, 23 May 42, and Memo, Burns for Hopkins, 26 May 42. MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Vol. II, Bk. VII, Lend-Lease Aid to Russia (1942 ) , p. 3, Item 24. ( 2 ) Memo, Burns for Hopkins, 18 Jun 42. Same entry, Item 26.

13 Rad, Eugene Seaholm to WSA, 30 Jun 42, repeated in and indorsed by Rad, Gen Spalding to WD, 30 Jul 42. Abstract PGF 236.

14 Ltr, Lt Comdr Derwood W. Lockard to OpNav, via Dir, Naval Intelligence, 1 Aug 42. PGF 242.

15 Much of ,the material in this section draws upon: (1) Analysis, Persian Gulf Capacities for Period 10 Oct-10 Nov 42 (August Shipments ex-USA), Result of Conf, 29 Jul 42, Gens Spalding and Faymonville, Col Shingler, Comdr Lockard, Bosworth Monck; Memo, ACofS, Opns, for CofS, Hq, PGC, 12 Nov 44, giving estimated British tonnages for Russian-aid cargoes during 1942. PGF 122. (2) Rad, Spalding to Washington, 30 Jul 42, copy; Rad, Lock, Basra, to RepMinShip New York, repeat Shipminder London, 30 Jul 42, copy; Rpt, Lt Col Alden K. Sibley to CG, USAFIME, through CG, SOS, USAFIME, 18 Aug 43, sub: A Brief Assessment of Two Years' Activities of U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East, 11 Sep 41-11 Sep 43. PGF 236. (3) Rpt Serial 138-42, Lockard, Basra, to Intelligence Div, OpNav, 1 Aug 42, atchd to Ltr cited n. 14. (4) Rads 135, Churchill to Roosevelt, 22 Aug 42, Harriman to Roosevelt, 23 Aug 42, AMSME 857, Maxwell to WD, 22 Aug 42, all being Incl I, Summary of Basic Correspondence, of Plan for Operation of Certain Iranian Communications Facilities between Persian Gulf Ports and Tehran by U.S. Army Forces, 3 Sep 42 (the SOS Plan); Summary of Present and Projected Shipping Capacities, and Target Estimates Persian Gulf Supply Routes as of 22 Aug 42, prepared by Col Shingler in conference with British officials, both atchd to Incl III, Ports, Facilities, Capacities, and Inland Distribution, of SOS Plan. Copy PGF 235. (5) Documents dated 13-17 Aug 42 on Harriman-Maxwell trip to Moscow. OPD-99-H-42 (FIME-L). (6) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 627. (7) History: United States Military Iranian Mission, 20 Mar 43, prepared for Col Don G. Shingler, Chief of Mission, by 1st Lt Victor E. Dietze, Hist Off, pp. 32, 34. PGF 242. (8) Min of Stf Mtg attended by Gens Wilson, Maxwell, and Spalding, Cairo, 24 Aug 42. AG 334.8 Hq AMET. (9) Rads, U.S. MA, Tehran, to G-2, Washington, 17, 18 Jul 42, quoted in Memo, Maj Gen George V. Strong for CG, SOS, 24 Aug 42; Memo, Gen Somervell for Gen Lutes, 29 Aug 42; Memo, Gen Spalding for Gen Somervell, 4 Sep 42, sub: Target Estimate of Persian Gulf Supply Routes. Atchd to SOS Plan, Copy Contl Div, ASF, Sp Coll, HRS DRB AGO. This last file contains originals and copies of planning papers which have supplied incidental information.

16 According to Commander Lockard, W. H. Lock, Director of the Ministry of War Transport at Basra, who had gone to Washington to discuss port problems, was believed to have considered recommending a decrease in Soviet loads for Persian Gulf ports. Ltr cited n. 14.

17 Notes supplied the author by General Shingler, 16 May 1950.

18 Basra (Margil and Tanuma), Ahwaz, Khorramshahr, Bandar Shahpur, Bushire, and Karachi.

19 The Summary of Present and Projected Shipping Capacities, cited note 15(4), which eliminated the Basra-area port of Margil, estimated September capacity of Bushire, Bandar Shahpur, and Khorramshahr at between 99,000 and 129,000 long tons and rail clearance at 60,000. The same document estimated ultimate attainable target capacity for those ports plus the lighter basin later called Cheybassi at 261,000 long tons, with rail clearance of 180,000 tons and road clearance (not estimated for September) at 61,500 tons. Both estimates left a considerable gap which meant accumulation of backlogs; but the document noted that water and road routes in the Tigris valley, not included in the estimates, could be developed or utilized to close the gap.

20 (1) Spalding discussed the employment of American Negro troops with Ministry of War Transport officials at Basra and the matter was referred to London. In recommending their use in a message of 30 July 1942 Spalding noted that the British had not specifically approved the idea. A condition of British approval of the importation of American Negro troops into Iran and Iraq was that they would be kept apart from the natives. Some Americans thought this was out of fear of the consequences of the disparity in rates of pay. Maxwell envisaged use of Negro troops in supervisory capacities. The SOS planners in Washington in September decided to refer the problem to General Connolly as commanding general, leaving him to dispose his troops as he saw fit. Memos of Sep dates in SOS Plan file cited n. 15(9). (2) The estimated strength figure was made up of 3 port battalions and a headquarters, totaling 2,667; 2 railway operating battalions and 1 engineer battalion totaling 2,363; and 3,018 for 2 truck regiments. Estimates of equipment called for 75 locomotives and 1,200 "wagons" of 20-ton capacity for the railway; and 7,200 trucks of an average capacity of 7 tons for the motor transport service.

22 Detailed plans were presented him by the Corps of Engineers on 29 August, and by the Signal and Medical Corps on 30 August.

23 The basic documents for this and the following sections are: (1) SOS Plan copy cited n. 15(4). (2) SOS Plan copy cited n. 15(9). (3) CCS 109/1, cited n. 2(5), and Tab "A", draft telg to General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, PAI Force. (4) Another copy of CCS 109/1, with American and British drafts atchd. Registered Documents Room, OPD.

24 British estimate of distance in Ltr, British Off in charge of highway construction by the contractor, Kampsax, to Gen Spaulding, 31 Jul 42, sub: Road Carrying Capacity. Contl Div, ASF, Sp Coll, FIRS DRB AGO.

25 8,969 out of 23,876.

26

There was also a 50-bed station hospital staffed by 54 civilians who would have to be replaced. Incl VII, Troop Movements to Persian Gulf Serv Comd, SOS Plan copy cited n. 15(4).

27 Memo, Maj Gen C. P. Gross, CofTrans, for Somervell, 30 Aug 42, sub: Trans Serv for Persian Gulf. SPTSA/3'70.5 A.

28 From Incl V-a, SOS Plan copy cited n. 15(4).

29 A minority opinion about the SOS Plan as a whole was voiced by General Greely when asked his views by the Strategic Logistics Division, SOS. He felt, as did others in the War Department earlier in 1942, that U.S. service troops should not be used to support the operations of non-American forces. Therefore, he recommended that the midsummer crisis of 1942 should be met by the dispatch of U.S. combat troops to Egypt before any service troops should go to Iran. Such troops, if sent to Iran, should be limited to the task of moving supplies to the USSR, and only in such types and quantities as required for the Caucasus campaign. Greely recommended that Shingler be asked to estimate needs for such limited aid to Russia and that "he should be protected in his recommendations." Greely also thought that Iranian and Iraqi troops should be used to defend the oil fields. Memo, Dir, Strategic Logistics Div, SOS, for Gen Lutes, transmitting information from intervs with Gens Aurand and Greely and Col Hauler, 30 Aug 42. Contl Div, ASF, Sp Coll, HRS DRB AGO.

30 This word is omitted from the draft telegram recommended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to be sent as basic instructions to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, PAI Force (cited n. 23(3) ). Paragraph 2 (a) of that draft includes the sentence, "Therefore, after meeting the requirements for British forces and essential civilian needs, Russian supplies must have highest priority." This is considerably less rigid than CCS 109/1 itself and is illustrative of the devices by which the Combined Chiefs attained harmony and agreement.

31 General Greely's former chief of staff of the USSR Mission, Colonel Hauser, when consulted by the Strategic Logistics Division, SOS, voiced "the definite opinion that a U.S. organization subject to British control of traffic will not be successful." Memo cited n. 29.

32 (1) While the Combined Staff Planners were meeting, Colonel Shingler was holding informal conversations with his British opposite numbers in the field about many problems that would arise when large numbers of American troops would come. It was unofficially agreed that "some form of Anglo-U.S. unified command" was called for to deal with the co-ordination of Iranian native manpower to prevent uneconomic and inefficient competition for services, inequalities in pay rates, and similar disparities between un-co-ordinated British and American agencies. It was also unofficially agreed that, after the disposition of the new American service troops, "Administrative command should be British where such machinery exists at present, and American in any future station where American units only will be functioning." British Summary of "Talk with Col. Shingler, U. S. P. G. S. C. on 13 September 42." PGF 131. (2) Shingler held similar talks in April 1942 to prepare for the then expected arrival of troops in August under the militarization program; and Maxwell in October reached informal agreements in Cairo as to relationships between American and British forces. Neither of these tentative explorations was connected with the implementation of the SOS Plan.

33 Security as an administrative problem is discussed in Chapter XI and as an operating problem in Chapters XVI, XVII and XVIII below.

34 Maj. George L. Morton inspected Bushire in November 1942 and reported to Col. Donald P. Booth that improvements in discharge and clearance there without an increase in ship arrivals would be pointless. A subcommittee of the War Transport Executive Committee considered Bushire to January 1943 and concluded that the port's shallow offshore roadstead the execrable highway inland, the distance of the port from Tehran, and the lack of truckable cargoes for inland carriage by vehicles assembled at the UKCC plant made improvement of Bushire less desirable than expenditure of equal effort at more promising locations. Pages 4-5 of history cited n. 11.

35 See Memo cited n. 29.

36 Incl V-b, SOS Plan copy cited n. 15(4). 

37 The relations between WSA and the American command are touched upon in Chapter XVIII below.

38 (1) Intervs with Scott, Pentagon, 7 8 Jan 48, and Connolly, Pentagon, 18 Aug 50; biographical information in PGF and AGO; and WD SO 249, 14 Sep 42. (2) GO 6, Hq, PGSC, USAFIME, 20 Nov 42, in accordance with Ltr Orders TAG, 15 Oct 42. (3 ) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 83, 85, 100

39 (1) Scott became a brigadier general 28 October 1942. (2) By GO 13, Hq, PGSC, 21 December 1942, Shingler became District Commander, Basra District, serving until 3 March 1943. He served as Director, Motor Transport Service, from 13 March to 22 September 1943, and was promoted to brigadier general on 18 March 1943. He departed for the United States on 4 September 1943. An inquiry from Wheeler to Connolly in January 1943 as to whether Connolly would release Shingler for service with Wheeler in CBI drew the reply that Shingler's work was "very important" to the command and that Shingler was willing to remain with PGSC. Rad TIGAR TTA 63, Wheeler to Connolly, 3 Jan 43, and abstract of reply. PGF 262.

40 (1) All Washington functions completed, Rear Echelon, Headquarters 1616, ASF, was dissolved 22 March 1943. Home Office Rpt to Hq, PGSC, 23 Mar 43. 336.01 International Agreements, SL 9012. (2) Memo, President for Secy War et al., 2 Oct 42. 092.2 Tripartite Pact, SL 9012.

41 Memos, Scott for Somervell, 5, 6 Oct 42, sub: Movement of Troops, Equipment, and Supplies to PGSC. Abstracts PGF 262.

42 (1) Interv with Scott cited n. 38 (1) . ( 2 ) Ltr, Gen Connolly to Gen Somervell, 1 Dee 42. OCofTrans, Hist Br-Overseas Comd, Pentagon.

43 Memo, Shingler for Spalding, 12 Sep 42. PGF 259.

44 Ltr, Shingler to Dreyfus, 18 Sep 42. PGF 259.

45 (1) See Ch. XVI, p. 323, below. (2) An indication of how closely guarded from those in the field were Washington's plans is furnished by a personal letter written before Connolly's arrival by Philip C. Kidd, civilian representative of tend-lease in Iran. Kidd wrote that it was not known what relation Connolly's new command would bear to USAFIME, or whether Shingler would be reassigned or would continue as administrative head of the command white Connolly would "run the railroad." Abstract PGF 262. (3) Spalding reported on his return to Washington that both Maxwell and Shingler felt the need of a liaison officer in Washington familiar with specific area problems. Although Somervell proposed to Maxwell an arrangement to meet the need, nothing significant developed. Ltr, Somervell to Maxwell, 22 Sep 42. AG 210.31 (9-22-42) (40).