The formulation of the 90-division troop basis marked the arrival of the
Army planners, by the summer of 1943, at a point at which mobilization,
production, and strategy programs for winning the war were converging.
Realistic estimates in quantitative terms of what the United States had and
would have at its disposal could at last be made. In partic-
ular, after June 1943 the Army planners knew more exactly the full extent of
the cutting edge the wartime Army could expect to reach. Ultimate troop
ceilings rather than current shortages henceforth became all-important in
planning, and plans had to be made to fit them. Such ceilings would become
vital factors in
planning the establishment of the last decisive fronts in Europe and in the
war against Japan. Henceforth, U.S. strategic planners would be more and
more insistent on precise agreements on magnitudes and timing and less and
less willing to accept "agreements in principle" of the 1942 variety.
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