Historical Analysis Series

AN UNKNOWN FUTURE AND A DOUBTFUL PRESENT: WRITING THE VICTORY PLAN OF 1941

AN UNKNOWN FUTURE AND A DOUBTFUL PRESENT: WRITING THE VICTORY PLAN OF 1941

Charles E. Kirkpatrick

Historical Analysis Series
CMH Pub 93-10, Paper
1990, 2010; 157 pages, illustrations, appendix, bibliography, index

GPO S/N: 008-029-00208-6

An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941 covers the work of then Maj. Albert C. Wedemeyer, the principal author of the Victory Plan. In just forty-eight months America raised and equipped a modern army seemingly overnight, a feat that owed much to sound military planning. As Wedemeyer makes clear, mobilization transcends purely military matters and must be understood to embrace the capacity of nations. His work underscores the fact that even in 1941 warfare had become so vast in scope, so expensive, and so technologically complex that nations could never again afford to maintain in time of peace the armies needed in time of war. The conclusion seems inescapable: The United States Army must keep mobilization planning at the center of all its military planning. Military planners and all those studying mobilization and logistics will benefit from processes Wedemeyer and his colleagues used in reaching their decisions on the units and material needed. The Victory Plan provides a clear picture of how they approached the challenge of preparing for modern war.

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