[8-3.4 AA Volume 7] 


[Note: This manuscript was prepared by the Historical Section of the G-4 of the Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations (COMZ, ETOUSA) as volume seven of its multi-volume manuscript organizational history. It was subsequently deposited at the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH; now US Army Center of Military History) for reference use by historians preparing the official history of the Army in World War II. It is typical of the kinds of detailed studies routinely acquired (as in this case) or carried out by the deployed historians during World War II. The original is on file in the Historical Manuscripts Collection (HMC) under file number 8-3.4 AA v.7, which should be cited in footnotes, along with the title. It is reproduced here with only those limited modifications required to adapt to the World Wide Web; spelling, punctuation, and slang usage have not been altered from the original. Where modern explanatory notes were required, they have been inserted as italicized text in square brackets.]




1. OBJECT—The ultimate mission of the Commanding General, ETOUSA, is the total defeat of Germany. The object of Operation OVERLORD is to mount and carry out an operation with forces and equipment established in the United Kingdom and with target date as designated, to secure a lodgement area on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be developed. This will be part of a concerted assault upon German occupied Europe from the United Kingdom, the Mediterranean and Russia.

2. GENERAL INFORMATION—The operation will be executed in two phases:

Phase I—The assault and capture of an initial lodgement area, including the development of airfield sites in the CAEN area and the capture of CHERBOURG.

Phase II—Enlargement of the area captured in Phase I, to include the Brittany peninsula, all ports south to the Loire (inclusive) and the area between the Loire and the Seine.

Phase I and some parts of Phase II will be executed by U.S., British and Canadian Forces assigned or attached to 21st Army Group.

At a time to be designated by the Supreme Commander, the First U.S. Army Group, as such, will take over certain areas, missions and U.S. Forces then under 21st Army Group.

3. ALLIED FORCES AVAILABLE—On the target date it is estimated that there will be available in United Kingdom:

Land Forces—2l U.S. divisions (13 Infantry, 6 Armored, and 2 Airborne), 17 British divisions (l0 Infantry, 5 Armored, and 2 Airborne) and supporting troops of both Forces.

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Air Forces—331 U.S. Squadrons (214 in Eighth [Strategic] Air Force, and 117 in Ninth [Tactical] Air Force) and 220 British Squadrons. Figures for each Air Force include squadrons of all types.*


An operation of the nature and. size of operation OVERLORD has never previously been attempted in history. It is fraught with hazards, both in nature and magnitude which to not obtain in any other theater of the present world war. In order that the operation may have a reasonable prospect of success, it is assumed that certain conditions must exist concerning the major obstacles. These conditions are:

German Fighter Strength—There will be an overall reduction in the German fighter force to ensure necessary air superiority. Recent figures on destruction of German fighter production capacity and of fighters themselves in aerial combat are encouraging; however, it must be remembered that the effort of the German Air Force on the target date need not be sustained as the battle for the lodgement area will be won or lost in the first few days.

Coast Defense—The German Coast Defense has been designed primarily to delay access to principal ports. Our landing will be made presumably in a lightly defended area as the Germans consider a landing there likely to be unsuccessful because of its distance from a major port.

German Land Forces—The German defense policy is to defeat any attempted invasion of France and the Low Countries on the coasts. Offensive reserves are accordingly located within striking distance of the most vulnerable parts. It is assumed that, on D Day, German divisions in reserve will be so located that the number of first-quality divisions which could be deployed in the CAEN area to support the divisions

PLANES: *Fighters - 2700; Hv Bombers - 1956; Med Bombers 456; Lt Bombers - 171; Photo Recon - 128; Plus Reserves.

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holding the coast should not exceed three divisions on D-Day, five divisions by D+2, or nine divisions by D+8.

Surprise—Though it should be possible to effect a considerable measure of tactical surprise, it will be impossible to achieve strategical surprise. Every effort must be made to draw the enemy's attention to our most favorable landing place, Pas de Calais, and away from our actual landing point, the CAEN area.

Beach Maintenance—Maintenance over beaches is a paramount in this amphibious operation. It is calculated that making full use of every captured port, large and small, 18 divisions must be maintained over beaches during the first month of operations, 12 divisions during the second month, and a number rapidly diminishing to NIL during the third month. Therefore, it is imperative that adequate measures be taken to provide sheltered waterways by artificial means, facilities on captured beaches for landing of vehicles and for the repair of damage to the beaches themselves by continual grounding of craft.

4. THE ASSAULTThe plan for the initial landing is based on two main principles—concentration of force and tactical surprise. Three Regimental Combat Teams of the First U.S. Army on the right, and five Brigade Groups of the British Second Army on the left, along with supporting air and naval forces, will make the assault in the CAEN area. The assault will be supported by airborne divisions. This will be followed by the early capture and development of airfield sites and the capture of the port of CHERBOURG, which will complete Phase I of the Operation.

It is these early days of the operation that will spell success or failure. Here is the race between the build-up of forces and supplies by Allied Forces and the bringing up of reserves by the Germans.


First Army—After capturing CHERBOURG, and with its left flank protected by the British Second Army, the first U.S. Army will drive to the south and southeast to cut the

Brittany Peninsula and secure the ports of NANTES and ST. NAZAIRE. One Corps will turn west to clear up the peninsula.

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Then, First Army will advance the line of the Upper Seine prepared for further action to the northeast.

Third Army—Third Army will land on the continent as soon as possible after First Army, probably about D+35-D+45 and will capture the Brittany peninsula and open the Brittany ports, unless this has already been done by First Army. After clearing the Brittany peninsular Third Army will concentrate on the right of the First Army, prepared to operate to the east, either in close conjunction with First Army or by swinging south of the Loire if a wider envelopment is feasible.

Situation on D+90—By D+90, occupation of the lodgment area is complete. U.S. and British Forces are on the Seine River, First and Third Armies are abreast, and First Army Group has been established as has a Communications line. Our forces are prepared for further offensive operations.

Situation maps showing the various stages of the capture of the lodgement area are attached.

6. THE BUILD-UP OF US FORCES—The anticipated build-up of U.S. Forces on the Continent is:
F.F. & SOS
56, 640

7. As stated previously, this operation is fraught with hazards. Unless these hazards are squarely faced and adequately overcome, the operation cannot succeed. There is no reason why they should not be overcome, provided the energies of all concerned are bent to the problem.

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Development of Tactical Plan and Communications Zone, D+25

Map, Development of Tactical Plan and Communications Zone, D+40

Map, Development of Tactical Plan and Communications Zone, D+50/D+70

Development of Tactical Plan and Communications Zone D+70/D+90

TAB 2a: U.S. Artificial Harbor MULBERRY A

MULBERRY A is the code name for the United States project for the building of an artificial harbor. Plans call for the construction of this artificial harbor at a beach on the French coast "extending from L 0o 54' 15" W, to Oo 50' 30" W. The line of the beach runs 298° True. The towns of Vierville, St, Laurent-sur-Mer and Coleville are located in the rear of this area. (Port "MULBERRY'' - Information, p. 1.)

The object of MULBERRY A is to provide an all-weather harbor so that a minimum of 5,000 long tons of stores, plus 1,000 vehicles and equipment, may be discharged per day.

Since the approval of the Project, vast quantities of British civilian labor have been employed in the construction, and large numbers of Army and Navy personnel engaged in portions of the final assembly of the various units.

As the project now stands, 12 block ships of approximately 400 ft each in length will be sunk in a line on the east are of the beach forming a GOOSEBERRY or small sheltered anchorage. At the same time, the west breakwater, formed of 8 PHOENIXES in a line, will be sunk to form the beginning of the west side of MULBERRY. PHOENIXES are reinforced concrete caissons, the largest of which is 204 ft long, 60 ft high and 60 ft wide. The seaward side of MULBERRY will be formed by sinking 34 PHOENIXs in a line, which will complete the inner shelter of MULBERRY A. These gigantic structures have a draft of 19 ft. and have a total displacement of 6,000 tons. The PHOENIXs are built with scow ends and equipped with all necessary appurtenences [sic] for towing and valves for sinking.

48 BOMBARDONS, which are steel cruciform lilos, each 200 ft long, will be anchored to concrete blocks and located in two parallel lines about 800 ft apart to form a breakwater, 1,100 ft from the outer breakwater of PHOENIXES.

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Within the west breakwater four LOBNITZ PIERHEADS with three causeways, each 1 mile long, will be locates to discharge vehicles and equipment, The west causeway will have a capacity of 40 tons, and each of the other two 25 tons capacity. LOBNITZ PIERHEADS, or spud pierheads are all-steel, watertight compartmented barges, 200 ft long, 60 ft wide, and have a draft of 10 ft and displace about 1,000 tons. The spuds themselves are all steel, and raised by electrically controlled winches which are capable of lifting the pierheads off floatation. The spud pierheads can accommodate three LST's and one coaster, each 325 ft, and five LCT's 100 ft each, simultaneously for discharge.

Inside the shelter provided by the 34 PHOENIXES, anchorage is obtained for seven Liberty ships (450 ft), five large coasters (300 ft), five medium coasters (275 ft) and seven small coasters and craft (150 to 200 ft).

The protection afforded by the entire MULBERRY project covers 21 miles of beach. As added insurance in discharge, forty 1,000 tons capacity barges have been ordered, and are now being delivered to the UK, which will be beached at high water mark and allowed to remain until unloaded.

RHINO FERRIES will be used in large numbers to discharge from coasters to beaches directly. RHINO FERRIES are 500 ton capacity barges made by assembling pontoons into a craft 175 ft long and 43 ft wide, powered by two pontoon barges, one on either side of the stern of the RHINO FERRY, each having an outboard and inboard propulsion unit.

DUKWs, PEEPS, LCTs, LBVs, and other small craft will be used in unprecedented numbers to assist in the discharge of stores from larger craft.*

NOTE: * Unfavorable weather conditions on 19 June 1944 marked the beginning of a severe storm which prevented the discharge of cargo for three successive days. Damage to the artificial port of MULBERRY A prevented its use for future operations. (FUSA, Report of Operations, 20 October 1943-1 August 1944, Book I, p. 78)

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The Transportation Corps problem on the continent is principally one of adequate port capacity and of adequate motor transport facilities. The plans for build-up during the first 90 days call for a flow of 1,200,000. Tonnage requirements vary almost directly with the proposed build-up. For a maximum build-up basis, the planned activation and phasing of troops for ETOUSA will meet the problems with difficulty.

Tonnage requirements estimated depending upon the troop flow contemplated, can be accomodated by port and beach capacity by D plus 90. Sufficient port handling equipment, including barges, DUKWs and cranes should be on hand to meet the load with the exception of DUKWs, of which there is an apparent shortage of 5 companies. There is an apparent shortage of 16 port battalions, if each of the ports is to be used to its maximum estimated capacity, insofar as port stevedore labor is concerned, considering the mounting requirements in the UK.

Although port capacity may be adequate to receive tonnage requirements, the highway network will not in all cases permit the clearance and forwarding of the large tomnnages required. This pertains particularly in the Cotentin peninsula where the combined capacity of beaches, minor ports and major ports exceed the road capacity to the south. If reserve tonnages are largely held in storage until rail capacity is developed, the road limitations may not prove to be insurmontable difficulties.

For the period up to D plus 90 no material reliance has been placed on railroad operation. Supply along the L/C for this period is planned by motor truck, with the exception of the relief that may be afforded by POL pipelines. It is planned to equip two-thirds of the available SOS Truck Companies (151 companies) with heavy equipment (truck-tractors and semi-trailers and other heavy equipment ordered on Ordnance Projects). If all equipment were to materialize as requested, there would still be an apparent appreciable shortage of truck companies if a maximum troop flow were to be used. This obstacle may possibly be alleviated by SOS employment of truck companies of the second and third armies to enter the continent, provided adequate drivers could be obtained to permit 24 hour operation.

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Provided rail operation begins by D plus 60 rather than the conservative estimate of D plus 90, and provided heavy vehicular project equipment is made available in time for the critical period from D to D plus 90, it is estimated that the transportation system will be effective.

Present plans for railroad reconstruction and operation call for two general lines of communication, one running fron Cherbourg south through the Cotentin peninsula through Lison and terminating in the Rennes (main supply) area, and the other running north from St. Nazaire to the same area. These two lines are first US priority construction. Second priority, and to be accomplished by D plus 90 includes the link from St. Nazaire to Le Mans and from Rennes to Le Mans.*

NOTE: * During the period D+90 to D+360 plans provided for the development of four principal Lines of Communication:

(1) Quiberon - Rennes - Le Mans - Paris;
(2) St. Nazaire - Nantes - Tour - Orleans - Paris;
(3) Cherbourg - Laigle - Paris;
(4) Le Havre and Dieppe - Chauny.
Plans called for the extension of the rail lines which connect base ports with the forward areas. The extension of double track on the Le Mans-Paris line, double tracking the line from Surdon-Laigle to Paris, and the reconstruction of the double track line along the Loire Valley to Paris route, were among the important rail construction projects contemplated. When the British transferred the control of the Le Havre and Dieppe-Chauny line to the Americans, it was planned to extend the first three lines referred to above so that they would connect with this fourth line of communication. (Hq ETOUSA, AG 400.312, 8 June l944, Planning Directive Series "H" #3, Subject: Projects for Continental Operations (PROCO), D+91 to D+ 360, to Chiefs of Supply Serrices, ETOUSA, p. 5).

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Studies have been made by ETOUSA considering reconstruction and development of fifteen (15) ports which include Brest, Cherbourg, Granville, Concarneau, La Pallice, St. Brieue, Lorient, St. Nazaire, Nantes, La Rochelle, Morlaix, L'Abervrach, St. Malo, Les Sables D'Olenne and Bordeaux. In the ports under consideration tide range is excessive, amounting in some cases to as much as 45 feet. Large scale engineering works have been necessary in the construction of locked basins to overcome this physical draw-back, and to permit accommodation of large ships. In many ports constant dredging is required to maintain navigable channels. Port operations under normal conditions are not simple. After capture, operation will depend on such facilities as can be provided through rapid repair and improvised structures for the discharge of military cargoes, either from large vessels direct to reconstructed quays, or by use of coasters, lighters, and DUKWs.

From reconnaissance it is assumed that every effort will be made to destroy each port and its facilities by mining approaches, blocking approaches, destruction of facilities, destruction of railway roads and bridges, and destruction of locks. Allied air attacks have been heavy on all ports. For example, at St. Nazaire at the present time not a building of the entire Chantiers de Penhouet has escaped damage and the basin quays have suffered to the point where they are unusable by merchant ships. Dredging has almost ceased. It is estimated that, when the enemy has evacuated, the ports will be from 75% to 90% destroyed.

Plans call for the initial capture of Cherbourg which is designated as a U.S. Port with a British sub-area allocation. Operations are scheduled to begin by D+11. Clearance of British supplies from the decks to the British transit area near the port will be a U.S. responsibility with the use of U.S. transport and labor units as long as U.S. facilities suffice. When this is no longer possible, port authorities will notify 21st Army Group which will assign British transport and labor units necessary to supplement U.S. resources. The British transit area is to be staffed by British personnel. Other ports will be developed and operated by the Ally capturing them.*

* Fwd Ech Com Z Plan, Annex 13, Transportation Corps Plan, 10 May 1944, p. 1.

First U.S. Army plans to phase in personnel, supplies equipment and vehicles over the beaches of Quineville, St. Laurent

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and Madeleine on D-Day, through the port of Isigny on D+7, the artificial port of St. Laurent on D+12, Grandcamp on D+14 and St. Vaast on D+21. Barfleur is scheduled to open by D+20, Granville on D+24, St. Malo D+27, Brest and Rade de Brest D+53, Quiberon Bay D+54 and Lorient D+57.*

* Fwd Ech, ComZ Plan, Annex 13, Transportation Corps Plan, 10 May 1944, p. 2, 3, 5, 8.

Build-up previously cited, requires 40,000 tons/day by D+90 which will have to be maintained in order to build up reserves and provide maintenance. 15,000 tons/day is maximum capacity for UK ports (outloading)—25,000 tons/day required ex US.*

NOTE: *Port Capacity on D+90 was estimated at 45,950 long tons in comparison to the estimated tonnage flow of 37,500 tons. Tonnages were expected to increase to the point where they exceeded port capacities between D+120 and D+150, unless Nantes and St. Nazaire were captured and placed in operation during the interval, and unless the capacities of the ports in operation were increased. Com Z expected an increase in port capacity with the anticipated transfer of the British Mulberry at Arromanches and the port of Caen to the U.S. Army by D+210. No additional increase was contemplated until D+300 when the British were expected to withdraw from Le Havre, Fecamp, and Dieppe. Invasion preplanning did not include plans for the opening and operation of any additional French ports south of Nantes. Facilities available at La Pallice, Rochefort and Bordeaux should not be developed unless future operations disclosed the necessity for such action. (Hq ETOUSA, AG 400.312, 8 June 1944, Planning Directive, Series H #3, Subj: Projects for Continental Operations (PROCO), D+91 to D+360, to Chiefs of Supply Services, ETOUSA, p,5.)

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By D+90 it will be necessary to construct 425 miles of main line railway. By D+240, construction of 1,325 miles will have to be completed. A detailed study has been made of all railway lines using Intelligence Reports from US and British sources, coordinated with aerial photographs. From these data, it is estimated that 40 lineal foot of bridging per mile of track and 5.6 lineal feet of culvert per mile of track trill be required. In view of enemy methods and technique in demolition, it is estimated that over 95% of track and bridges will be destroyed between D and D+90. About 30% of the track will be recoverable; none of the destroyed bridges will be recoverable before D+90; and only about 10% thereafter.

Based on this enemy demolition, a total of 1535 miles of main line track will have to be relaid and 67,300 lineal feet of bridging must be reconstructed. Accomplishment of this work will require over 42,000 effective man months of labor, exclusive of supervisory and administrative personnel. Weight of the materiel and equipment to accomplish railway reconstruction amounts to 333,000 long tons, of which 74,000 long tons must be supplied from the U.S.

Reconstruction of road nets, particularly bridging, also presents special problems. By aerial photographs, ETOUSA has established the average length of bridge gap per mile of roads, and various intelligence sources were consulted to determine existing road construction. It has been determined that on the average for every mile of road there will be 13.9 lineal feet of bridging. Bridges of various lengths will occur in these percentages: 24% will be 10 to 30 ft gap; 34% will be 30 to 80 ft gap; 14,% 80 to 180 ft gap; and 28% over 180 ft. Of all this bridging, 90% on main supply routes will be destroyed and 75% on routes of lesser importance. Approximately 134 miles of road, which will be destroyed, will require reconstruction. Aside from reconstruction, a total of 6,100 miles of road will have to be maintained.

The total labor requirement for the maintenance and reconstruction of roads and bridging amounts to 1,548,000 man days, of which 1,282,000 will be military and 260,000 will be civilian.

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15,800 long tons of asphalt will be required for road reconstruction and maintenance; 112,000 tons of road bridging will be required. This bridging will consist of 800 standard fixed Bailey sets (130 feet); 250 Standard Pontoon Bailey sets; 175 Heavy Increment Sets (Fixed) and 165 Heavy Pontoon Increment Sets. In addition to this material, 11,700 long tons of construction equipment will be needed. The total tonnage of all this material which must be transported to the Continent amounts to 139,500 long tons, of which 114,000 must be shipped from the U.S.

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The significant points in the POL supply plans are:

a. All supplies for the first 15 days will be packaged.

b. Bulk supplies of 80 Octane gasoline and Diesel fuel will be available by D+15.

c. Levels of supply and operating levels will be carried 40% in packages and 60% in bulk.

d. All daily consumption after D+15 will be supplied in bulk.

e. Storage of the level of supply will be 50% at ports and 50% at inland depots.


POL supplies in packages for motor transportation are stored in 14 QM POL depots in the UK. Approximately 250,000 gross tons of POL are in storage in reserve. During the first 41 days of the operation 165,000 gross tons will be required; of this total approximately 91,000 tons will be required in packages. It is expect d that bulk POL Will be available by D+15.

The peak movement to ports occurs during the first 14 days when all replacement and build up of levels will be entirely in packages. The peak is estimated to represent 1350 wagon trains (total 392 tons per train). All 14 QM POL depots will participate in the movement of POL supplies until about D+41, and after that movement will be confined to 4 depots at a time. Until D+41, 14 Gasoline Supply Companies will be retained in UK. The number will decrease progressively until only 4 will required by D+90. It is believed that all transportation between depots and railheads can be furnished by the organic transportation of Gasoline Supply Companies.

Preloading of coasters with packages will be required for assault and follow-up requirements, a portion to be skid-loaded.

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Bulk shipments will bc made in small tankers from a south coast port to one major and one minor port on the Continent, and possibly to one additional minor port.

During the period D to D+41, 9 QM POL depots will be established on the Continent, located with due regard to ports, pipeline, and distribution requirements. These depots will be in the hands of Gasoline Supply Companies. Three QM Petroleum Testing Laboratories will be in operation at this time.

Regardless of availability of bulk POL, a supply of packages will flow continuously to the Continent to build up the can population and to replace lost cans. Lubricants will be continuously handled in packages. By D+41, approximately 1,500,000 cans, in addition to T/E cans on vehicles, will be in depots. 11,500,000 cans will have been stockpiled in QM POL depots in UK on D-Day.


Gasoline consumption during the period from D to D+90 is estimated to require approximately 5,000 tons per day at D+20, rising to a requirement for approximately 10,500 tons per day by D+90. By D+14, seven days of supply for Field Forces and 14 days of supply for Air Forces will have been established. By D+41, the figures are 14 and 21 days, respectively. Consumption is expected to be 10% in and around port areas, 30% along the lines of communication, and 60% in the forward areas. Aviation gasoline will be delivered to within 40 miles of Air Force installations.

Pipeline and storage tanks will be placed at or near QM depots, or in locations accepted and coordinated with the Quartermaster. Tanks up to D+41 will not exceed 800 tons. 850 miles of 6" pipeline, 460 miles of 4" pipeline, and 100,000 tons capacity of bolted steel will be required.

The program will require 10 Engineer Petroleum Distribution Companies and 1 General Service Regiment for assistance in pipeline construction, in addition to the QM Gasoline Supply Companies previously mentioned. Approximately 37,400 long tons of equipment will be consumed in installing the bulk POL system.

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The primary objective of Civil Affairs operations is the effective control of the civilian population to prevent its interference with military operations and to make the maximum use of local resources for the benefit of these operations. A corollary of this objective is the maintenance of certain minimum supplies to the civilian population, to establish adequate standards of public health and to prevent the civil population from becoming a burden upon the military. The standard established by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for foodstuffs is an average ration of 2000 calories per person per day, plus such medical, sanitary and clothing supplies as may be necessary. Of these supplies, the maximum amounts are to be obtained from indigenous resources, and only the deficiency is to be provided from stocks under military control.

While it is considered that army participation in rehabilitation work or in handling Civil Affairs supplies will not normally extent [sic] beyond the area of military operations, the attainment of the objective given above, however, may necessitate an extension of army responsibilities.

This is possible under conditions of forced invasion, as the lateral limits of the military area may have to be extended to take over ports, or other rail or communication facilities, in order to provide necessary additional means for supply movements to support the operation. This contingency seems particularly applicable in the case of a collapse condition on the Continent. The President in his letter to the Secretary of War, dated 10 November 1943, raised this point and stated in effect that the plans of the military for the provision of relief under collapse conditions should embrace the entire civilian population for the area of N. W. Europe.


Civil Affairs supplies fall into four general classes, as follows:

a. Items necessary for immediate relief, consisting of: Food, clothing, medical and sanitary supplies.

Map/Diagram, Special Problem: POL Distribution

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b. Items necessary for distribution of relief, consisting of: Emergency feeding equipment, fuel and initial repairs to public utility, communication, and transportation systems.

c. Items required to re-establish production of natural resources, such as coal, oil, etc., for military or civilian use.

d. Items which will have the effect of reducing the direct relief burden at the earliest possible date, consisting of: agriculture implements and seeds, raw material for rehabilitation of the textile industry.

In general, items under a. b. and c. will be included within military responsibility under conditions of either forced invasion or collapse conditions. Items under d. may only be included under collapse conditions, as military responsibility has been generally limited to a "yardstick" period of six months from the opening of operations in any area; and the handling of this class of supplies in a strictly forced operational condition, has to be further considered in the light of what the military can bring into any given area with existing shipping and transportation limitations. 3. ESTIMATED TONNAGES REQUIRED (US ZONE) BY GENERAL CLASSIFICATION, FOR FORCED (a) OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS, OR FOR (b) COLLAPSE CONDITIONS. a. Forced occupational operations, from date of invasion to date; plus 120 days:
116,260 long tons
Clothing and blankets
5,224 long tons
3,489 long tons
Medical and sanitary supplies
1,257 long tons
Ethel and lubricants
15,114 long tons
Emergency feeding equipment
337 long tons
141,681 long tons

The above are only estimated civilian requirements compiled by SHAEF for the first four months of the operation. They include consideration of the population within the area within time limits given that will require assistance, and that will be uncovered as the operation progresses. Further requirements will be compiled upon the basis of estimates from the field, taking into consideration bulk civilian supplies found available, the capacity of any given area to feed its people, and other rehabilitation requirements, as dictated by military necessity and local conditions.

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b. Estimated requirements - collapse conditions (US Zone) for six months:

520,665 long tons
Medical and sanitary supplies
2,599 long tons
18,741 long tons
Fuel and lubricants
375,995 long tons
Clothing and blankets
13,263 long tons
Clothing for military labor
317 long tons
Industrial first aid equipment
7,650 long tons
Emergency feeding equipment.
408 long tons
939,638 long tons

The tonnages and items given above may have to be further increased as the scope of military supply responsibility may be increased.

4. It is desired to emphasize that the above are estimates only, and that in either event the figures given may be materially altered by conditions effected by enemy armies. That is as to whether the area remains "unscorched", or is progressively destroyed (''scorched'') as the enemy retreats.

5. As indicted it the tonnage figures stated above, which have to supplement normal military supply requirements, the responsibility of civilian supply is the major problem presented in carrying out the given objective of Civil Affairs Operations.

6. The carrying out of the objective may be further complicated or increased by a considerable refugee problem. From recent available information on the number of displaced persons in Western Europe, it is estimated that there are:

displaced persons in France
displaced persons in Belgium
displaced persons in Holland
displaced persons in Germany

These consist of European Nationals, including Todt Workers, Civil Prisoners, Evacuees, Refugees, Enemy Armed Forces, and Prisoners of War. These my start a vast homeward movement that in order

NOTE: * Estimates by COSSAC, 5 November 1943.

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to control, to keep our military lines of communication open and prevent interference with military operations, may involve Civil Affairs provision of additional refugee shelter inclosures and enlarged emergency feeding centers.*

NOTE: * It is desired to add one additional statement to the above memorandum, i.e. that practically the entire Civil Affairs supply requirements for US Zone under forced occupational operations have been made available in the UK, and that approximately 250,000 tons of civilian supplies under collapse conditions have been made available in the UK for the US Zone.

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1. The Communications Zone will develop from the beach areas initially assaulted and will be enlarged with the forward movement of the Field Forces. The beach areas will be under the command, initially, of the Commanding General, First Army. The personnel and equipment needed for the operation of beach areas will be provided by the First Army, with such additional SOS units attached as may be necessary. It is expected that when operation over beaches ceases, the beach units, less SOS units attached, will be assigned to Army Group Reserve for similar use elsewhere, or to US Armies for general use. The attached SOS units will be available to the Advance Section for duty.

During the initial period, the Army Service Area will include the beaches. SOS personnel allotted to the First Army for operation of rear installations will eventually be under the control of the Advance Section. Such SOS personnel will revert to control of Advance Section upon establishment of any Army rear boundary.

The boundary between U.S. and British forces will be the line Port-en-Bessin, River Drome from Escures, thence road Age - St. Paul du Vernay, Livry, Cahagnes, Jurques (all inclusive to British forces).

When an army rear boundary is designated, a Communication Zone will be established which will include all ports and beaches in operation at that time. The Communications Zone will be established about D+20 and will be under command of C-in-C, 21st Army Group, until such time as the First U.S. Army Group is designed to command in the U.S. Sector.

There has already been activated in England, a Hq Advance Section which will operate the Advance Section throughout OVERLORD. After reorganization and absorbing SOS units, which from D to about D+20 will be with First Army, the Advance Base Section will be assigned maintenance areas directly supporting the Combat Zone as long as lateral limits or other circumstances permit. Troops of the Advance Section operating fixed installations in the Communication Zone will not move forward with Advance Section, but will be replaced by new units as the need arises in forward areas.

The maintenance of necessary records, stock control of supplies and equipment, port development and operation, signal communications, construction and operation of railroads, control

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and operation of motor transport, and command of all Communications Zone troops is the responsibility of Hq Advance Section until Hq Communications Zone becomes operational.

In addition to the Advance Section, the Communication Zone will be comprised of two Base Sections, to be called Base Sections One and Two. Coincident with the capture of the Loire ports soon after D+40, Hq Base Section One, which will have been organized and held in readiness in UK until called forward, will undertake the rehabilitation and operation of these ports. Shortly thereafter, it will develop the Brittany peninsula as a principal supply base in support of offensive operations in northeast France.

On arrival of Base Section One, Hq Forward Echelon, Communications Zone will become operational and will assume command of the entire Communications Zone. Forward Echelon, Communications Zone will be responsible for maintenance of stock records of supplies and equipment, construction, operation and control of lines of communication..

In the progress of the operation, displacement of the Advance Section will be necessitated to enable it to continue direct support of the advancing combat elements. So that, soon after D+50, Hq Base Section Two, organized and held in readiness in the United Kingdom, will be called forward and will undertake command and operation of the Continental area relinquished by Advance Section.

The development of lines of communication in OVERLORD is interesting, in that their direction will change on about D+40 from North-South along the axis Cherbourg-Virte to a general East-West direction along the axis Brest-Laval. The reason for this change is threefold; primarily to fit into the tactical plan; also, the progressive development of beaches and ports; and finally, storage considerations.

Initially and until about D+40, the flow of supplies will come over the beaches and through the ports of the Cherbourg peninsula South to using combat units. A general storage area located East of Granville and North of St. Hilaire will be organized during this period to accomodate reserve supply build-up.

After D+40, the Brittany ports will be opened up during the

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period when the perimeter of the Brittany peninsula is allocated to the Communications Zone. The flow of supplies then will be generally East to the using units.

During the period D+70 to D+90, and beyond, a general storage area roughly bounded by Rennes-Virte-Laval-Secre-Chateaubriand will be organized to accommodate reserve build-up.

By D+90, there will be over 1,200,000 US troops and about 250,000 US vehicles on the Continent of Europe. The problem of providing all that will be needed by the forward Air Force, Infantry, Tank, Artillery and other combat elements will be staggering even under the best conceivable conditions for OVERLORD. The only way to simplify these problems and to support adequately the operation is to lay down in the Theater everything that can now with reason be expected to be required.

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Map. Adminstrative Development on Continent

Map, Administrative Development on Continent

page updated 4 February 2002

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