DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA

and

US ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

 

 

JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH IN OPERATION JUST CAUSE

 

Oral History Interview
JCIT 031

 

COL Barry S. Baer

Commander
18th Finance Group

 

 

 

 

Interview Conducted 15 March 1990 in Building 2-1120, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

 

Interviewer: Dr. Robert K. Wright, Jr.

 

 

JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH IN OPERATION JUST CAUSE
20 December 1989 - 12 January 1990

Oral History Interview JCIT 031

 

DR. WRIGHT: This is an Operation JUST CAUSE interview being conducted on 15 March 1990 in the headquarters of the 18th Corps Finance Group, which is Building 2-1120 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The interviewing official is Dr. Robert K. Wright, Jr., the XVIII Corps Historian. And, sir, if I could get you to give me your full name, rank and serial number?

COL BAER: COL Barry S. Baer, Finance Corps, Commander of the 18th Corps Finance Group, Social Security number ***-**-****.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay, sir, just for purposes of the record, could you explain to me how the Corps Finance Group is configured and how in theory it would operate in support of combat operations?

COL BAER: The 18th Corps Finance Group is assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps to support finance and accounting operations for the Corps during both peace and war. That's our overall mission. This involves not only units at Fort Bragg, [North Carolina], which is the 18th Finance Group Headquarters, but the 82d Finance Support Unit that's in direct support of the 82d Airborne Division; the 107th Finance Support Unit, which is in support of all the non-divisional corps separate brigades such as COSCOM, such as 507th Transportation Group, the 20th Engineers, the 18th Aviation, Corps Artillery, etc.1 It includes the 33d Finance Support Unit at Fort Drum, [New York]; the 24th Finance Support Unit Fort Stewart, Georgia; the 101st Finance Support Unit at Fort Campbell, [Kentucky]; the 215th FSU at Fort Benning, [Georgia], at times (as assigned). And then any other FSUs, active FSUs, that may be assigned to the Corps by virtue of their parent organization being assigned to support the Corps--such as the 7th Finance Support Unit from the 7th Infantry Division.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay.

COL BAER: Those are the active units. We also have responsibility literally through CAPSTONE2 arrangements and directed training association with another fifteen [Army] Reserve and National Guard finance units that we ARTEP3 train and do all kinds of other things with.

DR. WRIGHT: In normal operations, then, you would basically have dedicated units that would support each of the major elements of the Corps. And the Group headquarters would provide the overall policy direction and coordination?

COL BAER: Well, that's close, and I'll just elaborate a touch on that. We are responsible to make sure that each of the FSUs that is assigned to the Corps is ready. We're responsible to make sure that their training is accomplished and that they're ready to perform their mission during wartime. That's our key role besides making sure they're doing their job and supporting their division. By finance doctrine all of the finance units have an area support role so if there's another major unit in the same area as the 10th Mountain [Division] at Fort Drum then they would also be supporting that unit. Okay?

DR. WRIGHT: And that's both peacetime and wartime then--the area responsibility works?

COL BAER: That's correct. We try to keep things in the DS/GS4 role just so that there is some relationships and support relationships that have been established. So that when we go to war the game plan is that as a major unit goes, that finance unit that has been supporting that major unit, whether it's a brigade, separate brigade, or division, then components of the finance unit that has been in direct support would also continue to at least be in that area of operation to support.

DR. WRIGHT: In contingency planning, how active has the Finance Group been as a player? Have you been troop-listed for the different contingency plans?

COL BAER: Yes and no. And I have to give a yes and no. As the planners have become more familiar with what we can do we've been called on to provide more input for the OPLANS5 and we have provided, literally, generic finance annexes for the OPLANS. But in the main we have not been really spending a lot of time with planners by virtue of kind of the old way of doing business where finance only handled the pay mission later, so we don't need you right now. By virtue of that. That's changing because there's becoming a recognition of all the finance battlefield missions that have to be performed.

DR. WRIGHT: Which is contracting, local purchase?

COL BAER: Yeah, there was about six or seven different missions now that has to do with support to the procurement process. As we learned during Operation JUST CAUSE there's things that have to do with accounting, cash. Programs such as the Weapons For Cash program, handling the disposition and pay related to EPWs,6 payment of local nationals for going out and say picking up parachutes, buying subsistence which goes back to procurement. In fact, when we went on Operation HAWKEYE7 at St. Croix, the first airplane included a Finance lieutenant who went with the Assault CP8 because there were up-front procurement support that was required.

DR. WRIGHT: So that's a learning curve for the Army in general, not just here at Fort Bragg?

COL BAER: That is absolutely correct.

DR. WRIGHT: In the case of the contingency plans for Panama that eventually become OPLAN 90-2, did the Finance Group have any chance to provide input to that plan, or were you even aware of it?

COL BAER: We provided only ... we really didn't provide any input to that plan. As far as we could tell there was really no, in fact, there was no finance annex in the plan. And that was a shortfall. There was--the only thing that was troop listed was the 180th FSU and that was the finance unit already located in Panama.

DR. WRIGHT: How big are most of these FSUs in terms of manpower?

COL BAER: The size in manpower--from 50 to 106.

DR. WRIGHT: And that is enough to sustain normal operations peacetime, or can they maintain a 24-hour?

COL BAER: Well, it gets more complicated than that because each FSU, other than the 82d [and] 107th here at Fort Bragg, not only do they have, say, 100 soldiers but they have as operational control, as a TDA9 portion, which could be from 100 to 250 additional civilians that help support operations. So it could be a 300-person operation. For deployment, with the soldier ... and we look at 18 soldiers per 6,000. That is kind of a rule of thumb where we look at how the spread should be.

DR. WRIGHT: And that will give you the capability to do a 24-hour operation or do you do a one long shift and then one guy stays awake to answer the phone?

COL BAER: I've never looked at it from that way. When we deployed to Panama what I did was create a task force that included myself and another officer and an NCO that would be my operations cell, like an S-2/S-3 or an S-3 operation, and then brought in three teams, finance support teams (FSTs). One team from the 7th Infantry Division; one team from the 82d; and one from the 107th Finance. So in effect, we brought into country to support all the number of troops that went down ... we ended up with 18. And then because we had a basis of support with the 180th FSU that had approximately 50 people there.

DR. WRIGHT: 50 soldiers?

COL BAER: 50 soldiers.

DR. WRIGHT: To what extent, jumping ahead just a little bit to pursue that point, to what extent was the 180th dependent on it's civilians?

COL BAER: To the extent that they literally were crippled for the first periods of time. The civilians were in military pay, the civilians did all the commercial payments, they were dispersing the civilian pay and all the accounting. So in effect, a lot of the functions that would be normally performed by a finance office, finance and accounting office, were not being performed because the local national civilians could not get on post and could not get there to do the job.

In fact, that was one of the things that has come out of this was, and I think the planners had assumed that since there was a resource management operation and a finance and accounting operation in country, they could carry the bulk of the operation or carry it. What we found is that it's not the case. You know, we assume it's a built up operation when the first gun or bullet goes off, the people that you're depending on if they don't live on post they're not going to show up for work. Not only that, for the first three or four days the 180th FSU soldiers for the most part were not doing finance work, they were pulling perimeter defense, guarding the hospital, guarding prisoners of war in the hospital, and guarding their own building, which was on the outskirts of Fort Clayton ... which was close to being possibly ... enemy soldiers could come on post and get to them. Okay? So in effect, the assumption that because there are units in place will they be available to carry on? Answer, we found so far, has been not the case.

DR. WRIGHT: So when you went down you assumed that there would be degradation of capability in the 180th?

COL BAER: Yes.

DR. WRIGHT: Did you assume it would be as bad as it was?

COL BAER: Well, by assuming ... we were already in telephonic contact and probably the reason that we came in was the 180th got hold of the Corps G-1/J-1 and said, "We need assistance." Ergo, send in help. And so we coordinated and that's where we were coming in to provide the assistance that was requested.

DR. WRIGHT: When do you get notified?

COL BAER: Well, when I was given permission to come in on a space-available basis probably at D+3 or [D+]4, and we went in on D+5.

DR. WRIGHT: So that would be the 24th?

COL BAER: I think I got there on the 25th.

DR. WRIGHT: 25th.

COL BAER: So like at D+3 I was starting to get packed.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay, how did you decide which people to take?

COL BAER: Okay, the first morning after the operation kicked off, like on D+1, I got my staff together and--S-1, S-2/-3, S-4, plus the commanders of the 82d, 107th, Sergeant Major--and we just had a what I would call an initial planning session where we went down the known requirements, what's the situation? You know, METT-T10 really, mission, enemy troops and every thing. And then decided that, okay, given air flow, this is ... and based on our contact already with the 180th, this is what we assess the situation to be and this is what we think we need. Which was, okay, we know that we're going to need some workers in (this is from different major units); we know that we're going to need cashier support and some people that know accounting and know what a procurement voucher is; I know I need an operation team or some people that can do all that; and then I've got to make sure I've got some NCOs11 that can be dispersing agents. And so that's what each of the units were tasked to have some people available and then on order they would proceed. And that's what we did.

DR. WRIGHT: So you had to make sure that you had a Class A agent paperwork and stuff like that cut ahead of time?

COL BAER: We are Class A agents.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay. You pay the Class A agents?

COL BAER: We give them the money but we have to account for the funds. And then we have to be able to explain to the Class A agents how they do their job. Okay, because agents ... in Panama there were a number of different Class A agents. There were Class A agents to go out and pay soldiers as required in that case. Or there were Class A agents to pay local nationals for labor performed. There were Class A agents who were to pay for procurement such as subsistence and other things that the ... ordering officer had bought. Okay, so we had to make sure that we knew how to take care of all those different things.

DR. WRIGHT: To what extent when you got down there did you find that you had Class A agents that were familiar with the duties? I know that's a low priority in the additional duty training program for most line units.

COL BAER: We found the entire spectrum. We had guys who knew exactly what to do and we had many that we literally had to spend an hour of time briefing and saying, okay, this is what you can do, this is what you can't do, this is your money, this is your account and this is how you do it. Okay? So we did that.

DR. WRIGHT: You expect that kind of a situation?

COL BAER: Most of the time. We hope to improve upon it as time goes, but that's not the first priority. So a lieutenant or captain who may be the S-1 or the XO12 of the company who all of a sudden besides taking care of the troops in combat and getting them fed and everything else all of a sudden has to take care of money. So what we are finding and doing is establishing a balance of when to use an A agent and when not to. And some of the things that we did with our finance soldiers is perform that type of mission and just get out there in the sticks with some money and do it. And that worked out pretty well.

DR. WRIGHT: As you deployed down, now you pull your team together starting on [D]+3, identify your people, and then coordinate with the EOC to find out when you're going down?

COL BAER: Yeah, everything was coordinated through the G/J-1 or the G-1 and the EOC, everything was tied directly to them and the G-3.

DR. WRIGHT: You get slots on the different aircraft then and you put your people down in a series of aircraft space was available?

COL BAER: Well, when we went everything was based on space available so we went in on the, I went on one day and then my op[eration]s guys came the second day, and the third day were the teams. So it was spread over three days.

DR. WRIGHT: Down on [C]-141 [Starlifter]s, the log[istical] birds, the ordinary log birds?

COL BAER: Well, whatever was coming; yeah, the log birds. That's how we worked on finance support teams into St. Croix over the payday periods. We coordinated, the request came in, we sent teams over and back out, used the log birds. That's how we handled [Operation] AHURAS TARAS right here.

DR. WRIGHT: Now as you explained about these other operations, Operation HAWKEYE to St. Croix, AHURAS TARAS down to Honduras--was that good experience in preparing the group for the type of role it found itself in Panama?

COL BAER: The answer is yes. We have gone through now basically five major exercises that we're starting to operate pretty much the same, including BRIGHT STAR yearly over in Southwest Asia, where we used finance support teams with an operation cell and ... so that there's command and control. And teams did the basic same business, the operators did their business. With St. Croix the same thing; with AHURAS TARAS the same thing. So that we have established a means of operating. It is basically a finance task force. It's just like if you would take a Task Force BLACK or a task force whatever--you've created a unit to accomplish the mission.

DR. WRIGHT: Is this kind of unique to this Corps' group or do the other groups operate that way?

COL BAER: I'm not sure. I can only speak to how we operate. I ... the 18th Corps Finance Group probably has the most deployed people in the Army. Most other FSUs don't deploy and go to as many major places as we do and so they aren't probably used to operating this way.

DR. WRIGHT: When you talk about having the standard package that pretty much is the one you've used now five, six times in the past, does this include having sort of the field desks configured 'good to go' and your equipment, or is this strictly a 'hey, you get on the airplane'?

COL BAER: No, we have SOPs13, we have (literally) foot lockers that have forms in them. And we have packages depending on what we can take with us we have teams of equipment, supplies, regulations that can be quickly assembled depending on who's in charge of the team. That, for example, the 82d FSU has five teams that could go. The 107th has, I think, five teams. My Headquarters and Headquarters Company has two teams that could go. And all them basically have the same stuff that could go in a package. We call it a D Package.

DR. WRIGHT: And it's basically a foot locker you can padlock and keep on the airplane?

COL BAER: Foot locker. And then fill tubes all the way to stoves, the tents and all those things but there's basically, sort of a basic foot locker that has forms and regulations. Nothing else, we can take our money bags, some forms and some regulations and set up shop.

DR. WRIGHT: Computer support. Do you use, were you able to bring computers down with you?

COL BAER: We used in Panama the 180th FSU's computers because they were operational and so we were tied in very easily, we could use them.

DR. WRIGHT: And then you brought data back on disk or?

COL BAER: Well, we brought the paper back but at the same time we were able to do reports and all kinds of other things using our own terminals.

DR. WRIGHT: And this is standardized Army finance package, software package pretty much?

COL BAER: Yes.

DR. WRIGHT: When you went down where did you report to?

COL BAER: Well, I reported in to the Corps commander.14

DR. WRIGHT: At Fort Clayton?

COL BAER: Right, the Joint Task Force SOUTH commander and that was basically it and I just set up shop. I set up our operations element, a cell with the 180th FSU's because they had the space instead of having to create some place or kind of drain ... that was my support base. And we just kind of notified units that we were there in country and we would handle all the finance requirements and just got deep in the middle and the Weapons For Cash program, the SJA15 had been handling, so that was turned over.

DR. WRIGHT: That's COL [John R.] Bozeman?16

COL BAER: COL Bozeman, that is correct. He had been working with the civilian from the DCSRM17 shop, okay, and basically we started taking care of that and just went to business. Got involved in the POW situation a little bit--handled questions. And so at the same time, when we think about actual things that take place, we started spending a lot of time on staff finance issues. Okay? Questions started coming in, okay, what about hostile fire pay or imminent danger pay; what is the entitlement, who gets paid, how do we do it.

DR. WRIGHT: How soon did these questions start?

COL BAER: From the first minute of the operation.

DR. WRIGHT: The troops hit the ground and ...

COL BAER: Well, as soon as the first, yes, literally immediately. For example, one of the key issues is did we have a mechanism in place to accumulate costs. That was the first question I was asked over here at the TOC.18 The answer was yes. They put the G-3, MAJ [Lynn] Ramey,19 had already an in-depth, an accounting process, established. Well, back to ... we had to make sure that as units started spending money all of those costs were captured. As requisitions went in all of those costs were coded.

DR. WRIGHT: They were coded, properly coded so that ...

COL BAER: That's right so we got quickly into that. Right after that's of course everybody said well, there are shots being fired what about--do I get my extra $110 a month, what about that? Well, fine what are the entitlements. Well, did you know, for example, there's a difference between hostile fire pay and imminent danger pay? Hostile fire pay means that if you're walking down a road down there in Honduras and somebody sticks a shot at you; in theory you're entitled because there is a hostile act committed against you and somebody in the chain of command certified that. That's hostile fire, you get it. So it just takes a one-time incident, basically. However, imminent danger pay has to be declared by higher authority like Sec[retary of] Def[ense], and for a specific area, and if you're in that for a specific period of time you're entitled.

Okay? Well, how do you make sure everybody gets taken care of? Well, we put out procedures as to what would be acceptable, which turned out to be if you had a SIDPERS20 list, a battle roster, or something that says who's in country and for how long in country, we process it into the finance system. Okay. Well, so you've got that question. Then immediately, okay, when does separate rations terminate, is it a field duty area? Let's see, we had questions that had to do with, you know, what about maintaining jump pay while in a combat zone, what about payment for per diem, foreign duty pay, family separation allowances, convalescent leave, travel, etc. We had about 12 or 15 of different issues and questions that came up that we had to get resolved and put out an information paper on.

DR. WRIGHT: And that, that's all questions that nobody thinks of before the shooting starts?

COL BAER: In many cases, yeah. Because they're normal business in some cases. Some kind of separation allowance that when you do something on this scale and somebody say what about this, what about that ... that's actions down there in Panama, but a lot of questions come through the family support groups because we participate as, literally, we have the info--we'll go where ever there's a family support group. And we'll talk. And that question says, "well, in Vietnam I understand that nobody had to pay taxes, do we have to pay our taxes?" Well, that's something that has to be declared by Congress and yes, it is taxable even though you ...

DR. WRIGHT: Yeah, that's a fairly common misperception caused by that one time incident with Vietnam.

COL BAER: That's right. Well, but see ... so we get, besides just the operation side, I'm also dual-hatted as the staff finance officer for the Corps. Okay? So as the staff finance and accounting officer that's where I get into all these issues. And so down in Panama I spent part of the time in operations but that's why I had an operating cell to handle who does what to whom; and I was able to spend the rest of my time working on the issues and making sure that there were questions answered and all that.

DR. WRIGHT: So some of those were issues that were surfaced in Panama, but the majority of them were issues surfaced back here and then forwarded down to you?

COL BAER: Well, I can't say that either way. A lot of them came there that were arising here at the same time.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay, so in other words, a lot of people suddenly decided that there's dollars involved and they suddenly get real interested?

COL BAER: Yeah, and so we created two focal points. Of course, my operations cell down in Panama and then my S-3 here. And so, for example, the finance center has my S-3 there. Well, immediately GEN Thurman21 stopped the mail. Well, we were coming to a payday. What do we do about retiree pay checks, what about allotment checks, what about check the units for those that are authorized to get checks to the unit other checks. Well, the [US Army Finance and Accounting] Center ... now this is the second time (St. Croix, that operation was the first time) coordinated with us and we made sure, you know, like back when I went down on D+4 or 5, whatever day it was, I carried with me a box of checks that had the retiree checks for those in Panama.

DR. WRIGHT: So then you could put the word out through S[CN], whatever the AF[R]TS22 and then whatever?

COL BAER: Yeah, so we put out the word that the checks were available in the finance office. And so we were able to take care of everybody.

DR. WRIGHT: And you did have the retirees showing up once it became safe enough to travel?

COL BAER: Yeah, what we did was they set up a couple of pay events for them and they got the checks and they were able to get checks cashed. A lot of people don't think about that.

DR. WRIGHT: Yeah, very interesting.

COL BAER: So there was a lot of things that can be done by Group. In fact, of our METL (Mission-Essential Task List) we have ten items; and we actually in Panama did eight of the ten. And we actually performed every one of the finance battlefield functions.

DR. WRIGHT: Let's go through a few of those, those issues then. I guess you kept your people at the 180th?

COL BAER: Right.

DR. WRIGHT: You worked out of Building 9523?

COL BAER: I worked out of Building 95 in an office with the Staff Judge Advocate. I also worked with the DCSRM people so I had, I worked out of the program budget office with a couple of people that were there. And I also worked out of the operations office, which was at the 180th FSU. The bulk of finance operations was out of the 180th FSU.

DR. WRIGHT: Simply because they had the space, they had the facilities, they had the phone lines, you didn't have to displace anybody?

COL BAER: Right and ... but my main operations were with the Corps headquarters at the staff highest level. At the same time most of my troops ... guys that ... missions built up--as the intensity built down the pay missions built up--and so we had teams of people always out on the road. In fact, during the period, let's see, one of the things we did was support for the financial needs of soldiers, airmen and marines, including CPs (casual pays), check cashing, inquiries, etc. We performed over 58 ... I think it came to 75 pay missions servicing 8,500 people in Panama from 26 December [1989] to 31 January [1990].

DR. WRIGHT: So you had, as JTF SOUTH, you then assumed responsibility for the other service personnel?

COL BAER: Well, those that needed support.

DR. WRIGHT: In other words, the Air Force could take of its own because at Howard [Air Base] it had its own operation?

COL BAER: Right, but if there was an Air Force guy out at David and he needed to be taken care of the answer is yes, sir. There was a company of Marines that we ended up having to take care of because their parents weren't around right there, okay. In Honduras, you know, one of the elements that we're taking care of is an entire Marine battalion right now. No problem, that's joint service.

DR. WRIGHT: So finance is well-integrated into the notion of joint operations?

COL BAER: We like to think so. [LAUGHTER] See, we ... what I'm doing is going back to this list of some of the things that we did during Panama that should trigger some questions. One of the things we became involved in is currency control and cash distribution throughout the country. We worked with the 180th FSU and staff finance guys on obtaining ten million from the Federal Reserve in Miami when we were in country. Because, see, the finance unit down there had responsibility for providing cash to military banks, the Panama Canal Commission, and any other cash requirements. They were the funding source. Well, that started drying up and estimated needs came to like ten million that we needed so ...

DR. WRIGHT: You had to get couriers to escort the money?

COL BAER: We brought from the Federal Reserve for ten million, but there's a normal procedure that we couldn't do which had to do with--because of the timing--in terms of where the check goes and gets moved. So we had to work a deal on it and we did. The Federal Reserve provided us ten million in cash and it was flown in ... into country.

DR. WRIGHT: And then you had to arrange for escort to get it from Howard to ...

COL BAER: Oh, sure but that's normal business.

DR. WRIGHT: $10 million is normal business? [LAUGHTER]

COL BAER: Well, that's not really normal but and then over two million in cash we found cached was accumulated and counted for and stored in a secure vault.

DR. WRIGHT: That raises a very, very interesting issue because that is not something anybody normally thinks of, you know. Yeah, we find the stuff and there's a big hoopla and everybody loves to announce that we found so much in cash along with the drugs. And then there's sort of, I guess, an assumption on the part of everybody that oh, well, DEA24 takes care of it or something like that.

COL BAER: Well, dispersing of the finance guys, the ones who are supposed to end up with it in their vaults and then dispose of it. The normal procedure is the unit finds it, notifies CID,25 CID comes, they count it, and it gets turned over and signed for to the CID, and the CID brings it to the finance operation where it's recounted and signed for, and then it's put in the vaults, and then disposition is made either one or two ways or three but actually two. One, whoever's money it is, if it can be determined who's money it is, that money is given back to the individual or country or company or whatever. Or it is kept and turned into the Treasury of the United States and put in vaults.

DR. WRIGHT: So that is an added burden then in terms of ... considering the type of cash that was found, large numbers of small bills, I mean, you're eating up limited man-power going through all of that.

COL BAER: Well, we did two things that were unusual, not unusual. One, the counting, we just spent a difficult amount of time finally counting it when it all came in. But the other thing is one of my lieutenants I brought down spent 72 hours (that was straight) reviewing all the J-2 logs and all the J-3 logs [and] SITREPs26 for the period like 20 December or 19 December through about 5 January, about a 15-day period, and listed all the different sightings and reports of cash. We took those and we took the J-2 reports, tried marrying them against the J-3 reports and then marry those against the CID findings and then track those into Finance. And in the main, in the main there was a resemblance. What we did find though, somebody says, oh, in the report it looks like tons of money was found here. You know, who knows but it turned out to be 20,000, 5,000 ...

DR. WRIGHT: So the same problem, you had the same problem with dollars that we had with the weapons count then from the more traditional operations side of it.

COL BAER: Well, the reports ...

DR. WRIGHT: You eyeball a room full of weapons and then you tend to over-inflate what it is, or that line soldier over-inflates what it is.

COL BAER: Yeah. But the main lesson learned out of this: one, the units have to report as accurate as possible; and secondly, we created an audit trail. So five years from now some auditor says, well, I've heard on the news that grid coordinates XXX somebody found something or didn't find something, and then we can at least show what our disposition or non-disposition was. So we had an audit trail all the way into finance, which is kind of neat.

DR. WRIGHT: Yeah, and also a defensive maneuver for the Army to be able to prove that we didn't rape, pillage and loot our way across Panama.

COL BAER: Yeah, I've got that document now. It's been used already. So that's currency right there. We talked about finance and accounting policies. There's conduct and special command programs for the Weapons for Cash. Now, we ended up with over $5,000, 780,000 rounds and 10,500 weapons for the little over a million that we paid for.

DR. WRIGHT: And that's over a relative short period, too, correct?

COL BAER: That's correct. And so not only, this was literally the first time. The procedures had to be developed which were done by the JAG and the staff finance guy who was a civilian at USARSO and the dispersing officer--figure out, okay, how do we do it. And then putting money into the hands of [Class A] agents. At one time we had over thirty agents out with over $800,000 going out and paying. You follow procedures in getting the money in, not money but the documentation in; of being able to track that through weapons that were turned in. I personally went to a couple of weapons pickup/cash distribution points just to see if we were getting what we paid for, and I felt real comfortable with what I saw.

DR. WRIGHT: That program was working?

COL BAER: It worked, yeah, and people got money and a couple of times I had to negotiate with people as to how much they were getting.

DR. WRIGHT: How ... did you get the Mom and Pop operation that discovered the cache and tried to run them in in onesies?

COL BAER: Yeah, but some arrangements got pretty smart about that, okay. [LAUGHTER] And--plus--we had set it up so that they could get $5,000 if they took them to a cache. So, you know, we tried to take care of that part, too. And for the main we did. If you think about the fact that there was 780,000 rounds that came in and 10,000 weapons ... this included all the way from an M-60 that I saw to rocket launchers to AK-47s to Saturday Night Specials to .45s; everything.

DR. WRIGHT: I saw a photograph of an old flintlock blunderbuss that we got.

COL BAER: We paid $150 for that one.

DR. WRIGHT: What's ... do you know what the disposition of that weapon was?

COL BAER: I have no idea, but that was turned in to the weapons point and then I don't know what they did with it from there. But there was all kinds of stuff. We got involved in determination and computation of pay for POWs and detainees.

DR. WRIGHT: How does that work now? We are responsible under Geneva Conventions to pay a living wage?

COL BAER: Well, there is three things that have to happen. One, when a detainee come in if they have cash on hand we're supposed to take it from them and if they're detained we keep it in their account for them, okay? And then if they're released give it back to them, okay? So we had cases where a lot of people were interrogated for a couple of hours and then released, but we took their money. Some of them they had ..., $400, $200. Most of them had very little, under $10. So we kept it in an envelope and returned it when they left. Those that were kept we kept their money.

Okay, if they're being kept as a prisoner or a detainee, they're entitled to two things once it's determined that they are POWs or civilian internees. They are entitled to what is called an advance in pay, which is for every 15 days in prison or detained they are entitled to X amount of dollars as established by the Geneva Convention, Article 58 I believe. Or if they perform work that is not improving their area, okay--in other words, if I take a guy and say, okay, I want you to lay sandbags around your tent so the water doesn't come in, no pay.

DR. WRIGHT: You don't have to pay him.

COL BAER: But if it's take a gang of people out to go sweep some streets ...

DR. WRIGHT: Streets, which is what LTG Stiner, I guess, and GEN Thurman were rather adamant about getting them out to do.

COL BAER: Which did take place so the prevailing wage rate in coordination with the CMO, we decided that was $6 a day. So they got paid $6 a day. Now, you don't give them cash every day, you pump it to the pay representative you establish, which we did. And for those that were deemed ...

DR. WRIGHT: And we're talking about up to what, about 4,000 detainees?

COL BAER: Well, overall. But in terms of those that are hard core that had stayed it was much less than that. I don't have the figure in front of me.

DR. WRIGHT: But still substantial amount of paperwork.

COL BAER: We were working, we had teams working day and night.

DR. WRIGHT: Out there, did you put them out to Empire Range?

COL BAER: Empire Range, that's where they worked because they were part of the process. So we did that. Now, for those that were released, if they had been detained fifteen days or less we also gave them ... according to the Geneva Convention their U. S. equivalent in Swiss francs. In other words, the Convention actually specifies ...

DR. WRIGHT: You must pay in Swiss francs?

COL BAER: Yeah, but it's the U. S.--the equivalent of their currency we were going into or whatever so--but it specifies the amount of franks entitled. And so we converted that based on the latest rates that we had and gave them that money. We set up a pay table based on that. And then that was confirmed by the DCSPER27 and the Finance Center and all that kind of stuff. So we paid them. Those that were going to be turned over to the Panamanian authorities we did not pay. We transferred their pay records to the Panamanians.

DR. WRIGHT: And then we had to establish, I guess, an account and do a block transfer of funds to the Panamanians?

COL BAER: No. By the rule of law, once they picked them up they incurred responsibility for making the payment and then they could seek funding from the U. S. at a later time.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay.

COL BAER: Interesting, huh? And of course, the only thing I can tell you is that we also provided funds for intelligence operations on a case basis.

DR. WRIGHT: Correct, correct.

COL BAER: We did that, we worked the special operating forces. We provided lots of support for procurement, services supplies, subsistence, day laborers, equipment and transportation. In other words, our own files and paperwork and all that stuff.

DR. WRIGHT: To get into a couple of those things. The rental cars are ... both after operations had stabilized out of it but, I guess, also, or at least I'd like you to confirm stories I heard that we then negotiated ex post facto arrangements with the rental car companies to cover those vehicles that were at the airports that got hot-wired?

COL BAER: Okay, those are called combat requisitions. There is official terminology. If the owner of that vehicle, or owners of those vehicles, can establish that they were actually combat requisitions, hot-wire as an example, and if they had that car and it was moved or taken and used by U. S. forces they can submit a claim for that vehicle. In most cases that can be determined that they provided that requirement, etc., they were reimbursed for the services rendered.

DR. WRIGHT: But again, that ties up your manpower then in having to evaluate claims like that.

COL BAER: The JAG did the evaluation.

DR. WRIGHT: Oh, JAG did it?

COL BAER: Certifying officials were the JAG, but we provided assistance and then we went into FSU which is currently making payments.

DR. WRIGHT: And those, some of those things will be still dropping out over a fairly extended period of time?

COL BAER: Depending on the validity of the claim. That sounds bureaucratic but those are things that happen after the fact, so just like any other thing you have to evaluate. Some things actually did happen and some vehicles were requisitioned and those were paid for. But some kind of flaky when some guy says well, I owned three cars that day and all of them were at the airport and you know that he doesn't live--be 200 miles away and it looks like he doesn't own a car, okay? [LAUGHTER] How's that. And so it seems like it must have been every car in Panama was at the airport that night. That or at Rio Hato, which is strange. It's just like every refugee had a car burned also and a house burned.

DR. WRIGHT: Did you get involved in the funding for some of the urban redevelopment operations that were going on to ... say as we were redeploying back, they were talking about rebuilding El Chorrillo.

COL BAER: That's SOUTHCOM and USARSO were handling those and their engineer was involved in that.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay. To what extent did you have an issue with casual pay because, remember, it had split over the end of one month and the start of another?

COL BAER: Zero.

DR. WRIGHT: Because everybody's on direct deposit?

COL BAER: Well, they're supposed to be; 99 percent were. The CPs are not an issue. It's very easy for us to do. The commander at my recommendation kept it at $50 because that's all they really needed.

DR. WRIGHT: I was going to say, what could you spend the money on?

COL BAER: Well, during combat operations we really don't require it because the troops now moving to a city-like environment where there is a PX available or they want to buy a hot dog or a Coke or a T-shirt or take something home and get a haircut, where they don't have the combat haircut set out there, that has to take care of.

DR. WRIGHT: So did you find it was much of an issue or small enough in terms of volume?

COL BAER: We made over 8,000 payments, I guess, around.

DR. WRIGHT: So it did become ...

COL BAER: Well, it was a constant volume, we took care of everybody. It was not overwhelming, if that's the question.

DR. WRIGHT: Yeah, and that was more a function of end of the month versus or just normal situation guys didn't have a lot of money in their wallets when the EDRE28 got called?

COL BAER: Most of them thought it was an EDRE. And an EDRE, to be honest, most people do not take checks and very little cash because they don't want to lose their wallet or what have you. And so it would show up, like I said, during the first few days no, it was, okay. But right after that, bang, then it happens. And then they say, well, wait a minute, I need to get a T-shirt, I can't go home without a T-shirt, right? Or they need a few dollars just to feel comfortable, because what if they want to go buy a Coke? Do you take it from the merchant or not? I'm tired and I want to have that Coke with their MRE if nothing else, or whatever.

DR. WRIGHT: To what extent did we get into the local procurement arena? What types of things did you get involved in bulk buying down there?

COL BAER: Well, we got involved in anything that was procured but needed somebody to go out and buy it. If there was a Standard Form 44, which is a small purchase, all the way from rental vehicles to film, don't forget a lot of the combat photographers left on short notice with very little film, so when we got down there we would buy film so we were able to help them get ... procure that. They did buy some newspapers, transportation, subsistence, fruit, vegetables, you know, anything really to keep an army running.

DR. WRIGHT: In terms of the local civilians and our payments to them for the casual labor, you mentioned the recovery of the parachutes, that's out as we were trying to find the missing air items out at Torrijos-Tocumen [Airport]?

COL BAER: Exactly. You got to look at the question of why did we do that. Why didn't we use soldiers? If you look at procurement and then finance when we try and do things we try to become a combat multiplier. For every soldier that doesn't have to get tied down looking for parachutes, that's a soldier that's free to go do a combat mission. Understand? That's why we're trying to become part of that.

DR. WRIGHT: What other types of things did we hire local labor for?

COL BAER: Well, there's cleanup missions, you know, there was, you know, the prisoners did some of the street sweeping. One of the main things though for local nationals was to pick up all the air items and I think they used some of them to help stack the weapons and do those kinds of things but I'm not sure. The main one I remember is just at Torrijos-Tocumen.

DR. WRIGHT: What time do you get to recover back here, what day?

COL BAER: I came back just before the Corps came back.

DR. WRIGHT: And your people pretty much phased out at the same time?

COL BAER: They phased all the way from right after the first of the year through ... my last guy came home with the MPs. When we left we left one guy with the 16th MP [Brigade]. They deployed so much, I left one guy attached to them just to give them some TLC29 for their pay inquiries and problems and all that kind of stuff.

DR. WRIGHT: So pretty much it was whatever the unit they were supporting--the team was supporting--came back the ... team came back?

COL BAER: Yes and no to that. No, because the 82d was still there but I sent some of the 82d guys back, it was time for them to go home. And the 7th went back when basically the 7th went and the 7th came back, they were the last ones out. We tried to keep a number of people there to meet our requirements.

DR. WRIGHT: Did you try for the 107th, which was the long stayers, did you try to get a rotation or you just left the one team down and in place?

COL BAER: Just left them.

DR. WRIGHT: I'm trying to think back. There was an item that you had mentioned that struck me as a little curious. In the EPW mode, when we're accounting for that fund, how is that done? Is that done on ledgers or is that done on a data base or something; that's paper transfer or do you actually have to go open a bank account somewhere?

COL BAER: No, it's on regular Army forms. There are three regulations that govern it. They already specified the forms and we just copy those out of the regulations and use those and we had to call the Finance Center to get the right accounting classification for the claims to do that.

[END OF SIDE ONE]

COL BAER: ... the largest operation around.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay, sir, I just, really quickly because the tape ran out, you had mentioned the three or the two regulations in the FM?

COL BAER: Right, for the EPWs there was [INAUDIBLE], so we double checked everyone there. AR 190-8 and FM 27-10 (Laws of Land Warfare). So then we had to make some decisions on what was the interpretation of the Geneva Convention articles to make sure that we were in compliance.

DR. WRIGHT: In terms of the overall cost of the operation, did it come in about as you expected?

COL BAER: Good question. We didn't know what it would cost other than the air flow would be extremely expensive and the air items and the requisitions would be expensive and plus MRE subsistence, but I don't think there had been any projections on the cost. However, one of the things that was really ... there was a concern as to how much the operation was costing from day one. And so there was adherence by the commanders on down to not just do anything or throw stuff away. There was an emphasis on not waste as opposed to waste.

DR. WRIGHT: In other words, a departure from the, at least popular image of well, you know, accountability goes out the window once the shooting starts?

COL BAER: There's a, let me just tell you, I'll say it on tape. The higher the intensity, the less the accountability. But only when that higher intensity is under way. But the minute that intensity starts sliding towards the low, the accountability increases exponentially. And that was true. So what we tried to do, what I tried to do, was keep that in mind as we worked through the process to the point that I literally had to chop off on any request for a rental car before you got it down there. Okay, and I reviewed the contracts to see if there were any questionable contracts. So that's ...

DR. WRIGHT: Yeah, that's a much tighter degree, I think. Did that surprise people, did that seem to frustrate people?

COL BAER: Surprise, yes. Frustrate, no, because they understood. You know, it's a different environment we're operating in and most people fairly well aligned with that.

DR. WRIGHT: In terms of the subsistence issue, just the one last question. How did you make a determination on separate rations and on going to the field rations cards and things like that?

COL BAER: Well, ...

DR. WRIGHT: Because I know we went briefly through a little glitch down there starting a cash payment for rations and that lasted about one day.

COL BAER: That was not done by the JTF. I will tell you that right now. That was USARSO trying to return to the norm even though ... and forgetting that we had troops in the field duty status down there. So we got that turned around. No, it was determined at FORSCOM30 levels that it was field duty and so that meant TDY31 pay stopped on the 20th of December and then back after 4 January. But we went back straight to the DOD (Department of Defense) Pay Manual, AR 37-104-3, I think, and AR 37-106. So we put out rules and we ended up ... up ... and drafted the regulation message that told people what the situation was after. And before they had put out guidance that after the 4th of January, depending on service status, and moving very quickly were reimbursed for certain things. There were all kinds of criteria and conditions. What we were trying to do was get everybody consistently taken care of.

DR. WRIGHT: In terms of the teams that went down, sir, who do you recommend that I do some follow-on interviews with?

COL BAER: Okay, there's one probably ... there's two people you really need to talk to. Okay, one is CPT (P) Jeff Kovac of the 107th Finance, he went with me, he was my operations guy so he could give you a real good perspective on the operations themselves and additional stories. And the other side of the coin, there was my S-3 here, MAJ Mulyca, M-U-L-Y-C-A, because while we were down there he had to be the central focal point for operations here and he'd be able to elaborate on all the issues and things that really went on and took place in the United States.

DR. WRIGHT: And then just a direct coordination with the commanders of the FSUs to find out who, you know, to get a chance to talk to some of the junior enlisteds?

COL BAER: Yeah, Kovac will lead you straight to their guys, for example, the 82d.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay, sir, just one final thing to ask you and then I'll get out of your hair. Any good anecdotes, anything that struck you from the finance side as just one of those great moments in the annals of war or really unusual things?

COL BAER: Yeah, there are lots of them but probably, I hate to say this, a lot of them ... I'll let Kovac tell you some of the war stories. But a lot of the stuff that we had to take care of I really don't want to put on tape because I am still subject to many audits because of this operation, okay? [LAUGHTER]

DR. WRIGHT: Understood, sir.

COL BAER: The only way I can say it is we had to fix some things to do some things to make everything legal. And everything IS legal; I'll say it twice, everything is legal but when it was ongoing .... . [LAUGHTER] Okay?

DR. WRIGHT: I appreciate it, sir, thank you for your time.

COL BAER: Now, turn it off.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

 

Endnotes
1. 1st Support Command (Corps); 507th Transportation Group (a subordinate element of the 1st Support Command); 20th Engineer Brigade; 18th Aviation Brigade; and XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery.

2. The formal program of peacetime alignment according to projected wartime task organization.

3. Army Training and Evaluation Program.

4. Direct Support; General Support.

5. Operations plans.

6. Enemy prisoners of war.

7. In October 1989 XVIII Airborne Corps conducted humanitarian relief operations on St. Croix in the U.S. Virgin Islands in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo under the code name Operation HAWKEYE.

8. Command Post.

9. Table of Distribution and Allowances.

10. Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Time, and Troops Available; a standard Army planning technique.

11. Noncommissioned officers.

12. Executive officer.

13. Standing operating procedures.

14. LTG Carl W. Stiner, Commanding General of both XVIII Airborne Corps and Joint Task Force (JTF) SOUTH.

15. Staff Judge Advocate.

16. See JCIT-090.

17. Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management. In this case, from that entity at United States Army, South (USARSO).

18. Tactical Operations Center. In this case, COL Baer is referring to the XVIII Airborne Corps Emergency Operations Center (EOC) located on the second floor of the Corps Headquarters building across the street from his office.

19. The G-3/Directorate of Plans and Training (DPT) Chief of Resource Management.

20. Standardized installation personnel system.

21. GEN Maxwell Thurman, Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM); commonly called CINCSOUTH.

22. Armed Forces Radio and Television DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA

and

US ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

 

 

JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH IN OPERATION JUST CAUSE

 

Oral History Interview
JCIT 031

 

COL Barry S. Baer

Commander
18th Finance Group

 

 

 

 

Interview Conducted 15 March 1990 in Building 2-1120, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

 

Interviewer: Dr. Robert K. Wright, Jr.

 

 

JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH IN OPERATION JUST CAUSE
20 December 1989 - 12 January 1990

Oral History Interview JCIT 031

 

DR. WRIGHT: This is an Operation JUST CAUSE interview being conducted on 15 March 1990 in the headquarters of the 18th Corps Finance Group, which is Building 2-1120 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The interviewing official is Dr. Robert K. Wright, Jr., the XVIII Corps Historian. And, sir, if I could get you to give me your full name, rank and serial number?

COL BAER: COL Barry S. Baer, Finance Corps, Commander of the 18th Corps Finance Group, Social Security number ***-**-****.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay, sir, just for purposes of the record, could you explain to me how the Corps Finance Group is configured and how in theory it would operate in support of combat operations?

COL BAER: The 18th Corps Finance Group is assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps to support finance and accounting operations for the Corps during both peace and war. That's our overall mission. This involves not only units at Fort Bragg, [North Carolina], which is the 18th Finance Group Headquarters, but the 82d Finance Support Unit that's in direct support of the 82d Airborne Division; the 107th Finance Support Unit, which is in support of all the non-divisional corps separate brigades such as COSCOM, such as 507th Transportation Group, the 20th Engineers, the 18th Aviation, Corps Artillery, etc.1 It includes the 33d Finance Support Unit at Fort Drum, [New York]; the 24th Finance Support Unit Fort Stewart, Georgia; the 101st Finance Support Unit at Fort Campbell, [Kentucky]; the 215th FSU at Fort Benning, [Georgia], at times (as assigned). And then any other FSUs, active FSUs, that may be assigned to the Corps by virtue of their parent organization being assigned to support the Corps--such as the 7th Finance Support Unit from the 7th Infantry Division.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay.

COL BAER: Those are the active units. We also have responsibility literally through CAPSTONE2 arrangements and directed training association with another fifteen [Army] Reserve and National Guard finance units that we ARTEP3 train and do all kinds of other things with.

DR. WRIGHT: In normal operations, then, you would basically have dedicated units that would support each of the major elements of the Corps. And the Group headquarters would provide the overall policy direction and coordination?

COL BAER: Well, that's close, and I'll just elaborate a touch on that. We are responsible to make sure that each of the FSUs that is assigned to the Corps is ready. We're responsible to make sure that their training is accomplished and that they're ready to perform their mission during wartime. That's our key role besides making sure they're doing their job and supporting their division. By finance doctrine all of the finance units have an area support role so if there's another major unit in the same area as the 10th Mountain [Division] at Fort Drum then they would also be supporting that unit. Okay?

DR. WRIGHT: And that's both peacetime and wartime then--the area responsibility works?

COL BAER: That's correct. We try to keep things in the DS/GS4 role just so that there is some relationships and support relationships that have been established. So that when we go to war the game plan is that as a major unit goes, that finance unit that has been supporting that major unit, whether it's a brigade, separate brigade, or division, then components of the finance unit that has been in direct support would also continue to at least be in that area of operation to support.

DR. WRIGHT: In contingency planning, how active has the Finance Group been as a player? Have you been troop-listed for the different contingency plans?

COL BAER: Yes and no. And I have to give a yes and no. As the planners have become more familiar with what we can do we've been called on to provide more input for the OPLANS5 and we have provided, literally, generic finance annexes for the OPLANS. But in the main we have not been really spending a lot of time with planners by virtue of kind of the old way of doing business where finance only handled the pay mission later, so we don't need you right now. By virtue of that. That's changing because there's becoming a recognition of all the finance battlefield missions that have to be performed.

DR. WRIGHT: Which is contracting, local purchase?

COL BAER: Yeah, there was about six or seven different missions now that has to do with support to the procurement process. As we learned during Operation JUST CAUSE there's things that have to do with accounting, cash. Programs such as the Weapons For Cash program, handling the disposition and pay related to EPWs,6 payment of local nationals for going out and say picking up parachutes, buying subsistence which goes back to procurement. In fact, when we went on Operation HAWKEYE7 at St. Croix, the first airplane included a Finance lieutenant who went with the Assault CP8 because there were up-front procurement support that was required.

DR. WRIGHT: So that's a learning curve for the Army in general, not just here at Fort Bragg?

COL BAER: That is absolutely correct.

DR. WRIGHT: In the case of the contingency plans for Panama that eventually become OPLAN 90-2, did the Finance Group have any chance to provide input to that plan, or were you even aware of it?

COL BAER: We provided only ... we really didn't provide any input to that plan. As far as we could tell there was really no, in fact, there was no finance annex in the plan. And that was a shortfall. There was--the only thing that was troop listed was the 180th FSU and that was the finance unit already located in Panama.

DR. WRIGHT: How big are most of these FSUs in terms of manpower?

COL BAER: The size in manpower--from 50 to 106.

DR. WRIGHT: And that is enough to sustain normal operations peacetime, or can they maintain a 24-hour?

COL BAER: Well, it gets more complicated than that because each FSU, other than the 82d [and] 107th here at Fort Bragg, not only do they have, say, 100 soldiers but they have as operational control, as a TDA9 portion, which could be from 100 to 250 additional civilians that help support operations. So it could be a 300-person operation. For deployment, with the soldier ... and we look at 18 soldiers per 6,000. That is kind of a rule of thumb where we look at how the spread should be.

DR. WRIGHT: And that will give you the capability to do a 24-hour operation or do you do a one long shift and then one guy stays awake to answer the phone?

COL BAER: I've never looked at it from that way. When we deployed to Panama what I did was create a task force that included myself and another officer and an NCO that would be my operations cell, like an S-2/S-3 or an S-3 operation, and then brought in three teams, finance support teams (FSTs). One team from the 7th Infantry Division; one team from the 82d; and one from the 107th Finance. So in effect, we brought into country to support all the number of troops that went down ... we ended up with 18. And then because we had a basis of support with the 180th FSU that had approximately 50 people there.

DR. WRIGHT: 50 soldiers?

COL BAER: 50 soldiers.

DR. WRIGHT: To what extent, jumping ahead just a little bit to pursue that point, to what extent was the 180th dependent on it's civilians?

COL BAER: To the extent that they literally were crippled for the first periods of time. The civilians were in military pay, the civilians did all the commercial payments, they were dispersing the civilian pay and all the accounting. So in effect, a lot of the functions that would be normally performed by a finance office, finance and accounting office, were not being performed because the local national civilians could not get on post and could not get there to do the job.

In fact, that was one of the things that has come out of this was, and I think the planners had assumed that since there was a resource management operation and a finance and accounting operation in country, they could carry the bulk of the operation or carry it. What we found is that it's not the case. You know, we assume it's a built up operation when the first gun or bullet goes off, the people that you're depending on if they don't live on post they're not going to show up for work. Not only that, for the first three or four days the 180th FSU soldiers for the most part were not doing finance work, they were pulling perimeter defense, guarding the hospital, guarding prisoners of war in the hospital, and guarding their own building, which was on the outskirts of Fort Clayton ... which was close to being possibly ... enemy soldiers could come on post and get to them. Okay? So in effect, the assumption that because there are units in place will they be available to carry on? Answer, we found so far, has been not the case.

DR. WRIGHT: So when you went down you assumed that there would be degradation of capability in the 180th?

COL BAER: Yes.

DR. WRIGHT: Did you assume it would be as bad as it was?

COL BAER: Well, by assuming ... we were already in telephonic contact and probably the reason that we came in was the 180th got hold of the Corps G-1/J-1 and said, "We need assistance." Ergo, send in help. And so we coordinated and that's where we were coming in to provide the assistance that was requested.

DR. WRIGHT: When do you get notified?

COL BAER: Well, when I was given permission to come in on a space-available basis probably at D+3 or [D+]4, and we went in on D+5.

DR. WRIGHT: So that would be the 24th?

COL BAER: I think I got there on the 25th.

DR. WRIGHT: 25th.

COL BAER: So like at D+3 I was starting to get packed.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay, how did you decide which people to take?

COL BAER: Okay, the first morning after the operation kicked off, like on D+1, I got my staff together and--S-1, S-2/-3, S-4, plus the commanders of the 82d, 107th, Sergeant Major--and we just had a what I would call an initial planning session where we went down the known requirements, what's the situation? You know, METT-T10 really, mission, enemy troops and every thing. And then decided that, okay, given air flow, this is ... and based on our contact already with the 180th, this is what we assess the situation to be and this is what we think we need. Which was, okay, we know that we're going to need some workers in (this is from different major units); we know that we're going to need cashier support and some people that know accounting and know what a procurement voucher is; I know I need an operation team or some people that can do all that; and then I've got to make sure I've got some NCOs11 that can be dispersing agents. And so that's what each of the units were tasked to have some people available and then on order they would proceed. And that's what we did.

DR. WRIGHT: So you had to make sure that you had a Class A agent paperwork and stuff like that cut ahead of time?

COL BAER: We are Class A agents.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay. You pay the Class A agents?

COL BAER: We give them the money but we have to account for the funds. And then we have to be able to explain to the Class A agents how they do their job. Okay, because agents ... in Panama there were a number of different Class A agents. There were Class A agents to go out and pay soldiers as required in that case. Or there were Class A agents to pay local nationals for labor performed. There were Class A agents who were to pay for procurement such as subsistence and other things that the ... ordering officer had bought. Okay, so we had to make sure that we knew how to take care of all those different things.

DR. WRIGHT: To what extent when you got down there did you find that you had Class A agents that were familiar with the duties? I know that's a low priority in the additional duty training program for most line units.

COL BAER: We found the entire spectrum. We had guys who knew exactly what to do and we had many that we literally had to spend an hour of time briefing and saying, okay, this is what you can do, this is what you can't do, this is your money, this is your account and this is how you do it. Okay? So we did that.

DR. WRIGHT: You expect that kind of a situation?

COL BAER: Most of the time. We hope to improve upon it as time goes, but that's not the first priority. So a lieutenant or captain who may be the S-1 or the XO12 of the company who all of a sudden besides taking care of the troops in combat and getting them fed and everything else all of a sudden has to take care of money. So what we are finding and doing is establishing a balance of when to use an A agent and when not to. And some of the things that we did with our finance soldiers is perform that type of mission and just get out there in the sticks with some money and do it. And that worked out pretty well.

DR. WRIGHT: As you deployed down, now you pull your team together starting on [D]+3, identify your people, and then coordinate with the EOC to find out when you're going down?

COL BAER: Yeah, everything was coordinated through the G/J-1 or the G-1 and the EOC, everything was tied directly to them and the G-3.

DR. WRIGHT: You get slots on the different aircraft then and you put your people down in a series of aircraft space was available?

COL BAER: Well, when we went everything was based on space available so we went in on the, I went on one day and then my op[eration]s guys came the second day, and the third day were the teams. So it was spread over three days.

DR. WRIGHT: Down on [C]-141 [Starlifter]s, the log[istical] birds, the ordinary log birds?

COL BAER: Well, whatever was coming; yeah, the log birds. That's how we worked on finance support teams into St. Croix over the payday periods. We coordinated, the request came in, we sent teams over and back out, used the log birds. That's how we handled [Operation] AHURAS TARAS right here.

DR. WRIGHT: Now as you explained about these other operations, Operation HAWKEYE to St. Croix, AHURAS TARAS down to Honduras--was that good experience in preparing the group for the type of role it found itself in Panama?

COL BAER: The answer is yes. We have gone through now basically five major exercises that we're starting to operate pretty much the same, including BRIGHT STAR yearly over in Southwest Asia, where we used finance support teams with an operation cell and ... so that there's command and control. And teams did the basic same business, the operators did their business. With St. Croix the same thing; with AHURAS TARAS the same thing. So that we have established a means of operating. It is basically a finance task force. It's just like if you would take a Task Force BLACK or a task force whatever--you've created a unit to accomplish the mission.

DR. WRIGHT: Is this kind of unique to this Corps' group or do the other groups operate that way?

COL BAER: I'm not sure. I can only speak to how we operate. I ... the 18th Corps Finance Group probably has the most deployed people in the Army. Most other FSUs don't deploy and go to as many major places as we do and so they aren't probably used to operating this way.

DR. WRIGHT: When you talk about having the standard package that pretty much is the one you've used now five, six times in the past, does this include having sort of the field desks configured 'good to go' and your equipment, or is this strictly a 'hey, you get on the airplane'?

COL BAER: No, we have SOPs13, we have (literally) foot lockers that have forms in them. And we have packages depending on what we can take with us we have teams of equipment, supplies, regulations that can be quickly assembled depending on who's in charge of the team. That, for example, the 82d FSU has five teams that could go. The 107th has, I think, five teams. My Headquarters and Headquarters Company has two teams that could go. And all them basically have the same stuff that could go in a package. We call it a D Package.

DR. WRIGHT: And it's basically a foot locker you can padlock and keep on the airplane?

COL BAER: Foot locker. And then fill tubes all the way to stoves, the tents and all those things but there's basically, sort of a basic foot locker that has forms and regulations. Nothing else, we can take our money bags, some forms and some regulations and set up shop.

DR. WRIGHT: Computer support. Do you use, were you able to bring computers down with you?

COL BAER: We used in Panama the 180th FSU's computers because they were operational and so we were tied in very easily, we could use them.

DR. WRIGHT: And then you brought data back on disk or?

COL BAER: Well, we brought the paper back but at the same time we were able to do reports and all kinds of other things using our own terminals.

DR. WRIGHT: And this is standardized Army finance package, software package pretty much?

COL BAER: Yes.

DR. WRIGHT: When you went down where did you report to?

COL BAER: Well, I reported in to the Corps commander.14

DR. WRIGHT: At Fort Clayton?

COL BAER: Right, the Joint Task Force SOUTH commander and that was basically it and I just set up shop. I set up our operations element, a cell with the 180th FSU's because they had the space instead of having to create some place or kind of drain ... that was my support base. And we just kind of notified units that we were there in country and we would handle all the finance requirements and just got deep in the middle and the Weapons For Cash program, the SJA15 had been handling, so that was turned over.

DR. WRIGHT: That's COL [John R.] Bozeman?16

COL BAER: COL Bozeman, that is correct. He had been working with the civilian from the DCSRM17 shop, okay, and basically we started taking care of that and just went to business. Got involved in the POW situation a little bit--handled questions. And so at the same time, when we think about actual things that take place, we started spending a lot of time on staff finance issues. Okay? Questions started coming in, okay, what about hostile fire pay or imminent danger pay; what is the entitlement, who gets paid, how do we do it.

DR. WRIGHT: How soon did these questions start?

COL BAER: From the first minute of the operation.

DR. WRIGHT: The troops hit the ground and ...

COL BAER: Well, as soon as the first, yes, literally immediately. For example, one of the key issues is did we have a mechanism in place to accumulate costs. That was the first question I was asked over here at the TOC.18 The answer was yes. They put the G-3, MAJ [Lynn] Ramey,19 had already an in-depth, an accounting process, established. Well, back to ... we had to make sure that as units started spending money all of those costs were captured. As requisitions went in all of those costs were coded.

DR. WRIGHT: They were coded, properly coded so that ...

COL BAER: That's right so we got quickly into that. Right after that's of course everybody said well, there are shots being fired what about--do I get my extra $110 a month, what about that? Well, fine what are the entitlements. Well, did you know, for example, there's a difference between hostile fire pay and imminent danger pay? Hostile fire pay means that if you're walking down a road down there in Honduras and somebody sticks a shot at you; in theory you're entitled because there is a hostile act committed against you and somebody in the chain of command certified that. That's hostile fire, you get it. So it just takes a one-time incident, basically. However, imminent danger pay has to be declared by higher authority like Sec[retary of] Def[ense], and for a specific area, and if you're in that for a specific period of time you're entitled.

Okay? Well, how do you make sure everybody gets taken care of? Well, we put out procedures as to what would be acceptable, which turned out to be if you had a SIDPERS20 list, a battle roster, or something that says who's in country and for how long in country, we process it into the finance system. Okay. Well, so you've got that question. Then immediately, okay, when does separate rations terminate, is it a field duty area? Let's see, we had questions that had to do with, you know, what about maintaining jump pay while in a combat zone, what about payment for per diem, foreign duty pay, family separation allowances, convalescent leave, travel, etc. We had about 12 or 15 of different issues and questions that came up that we had to get resolved and put out an information paper on.

DR. WRIGHT: And that, that's all questions that nobody thinks of before the shooting starts?

COL BAER: In many cases, yeah. Because they're normal business in some cases. Some kind of separation allowance that when you do something on this scale and somebody say what about this, what about that ... that's actions down there in Panama, but a lot of questions come through the family support groups because we participate as, literally, we have the info--we'll go where ever there's a family support group. And we'll talk. And that question says, "well, in Vietnam I understand that nobody had to pay taxes, do we have to pay our taxes?" Well, that's something that has to be declared by Congress and yes, it is taxable even though you ...

DR. WRIGHT: Yeah, that's a fairly common misperception caused by that one time incident with Vietnam.

COL BAER: That's right. Well, but see ... so we get, besides just the operation side, I'm also dual-hatted as the staff finance officer for the Corps. Okay? So as the staff finance and accounting officer that's where I get into all these issues. And so down in Panama I spent part of the time in operations but that's why I had an operating cell to handle who does what to whom; and I was able to spend the rest of my time working on the issues and making sure that there were questions answered and all that.

DR. WRIGHT: So some of those were issues that were surfaced in Panama, but the majority of them were issues surfaced back here and then forwarded down to you?

COL BAER: Well, I can't say that either way. A lot of them came there that were arising here at the same time.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay, so in other words, a lot of people suddenly decided that there's dollars involved and they suddenly get real interested?

COL BAER: Yeah, and so we created two focal points. Of course, my operations cell down in Panama and then my S-3 here. And so, for example, the finance center has my S-3 there. Well, immediately GEN Thurman21 stopped the mail. Well, we were coming to a payday. What do we do about retiree pay checks, what about allotment checks, what about check the units for those that are authorized to get checks to the unit other checks. Well, the [US Army Finance and Accounting] Center ... now this is the second time (St. Croix, that operation was the first time) coordinated with us and we made sure, you know, like back when I went down on D+4 or 5, whatever day it was, I carried with me a box of checks that had the retiree checks for those in Panama.

DR. WRIGHT: So then you could put the word out through S[CN], whatever the AF[R]TS22 and then whatever?

COL BAER: Yeah, so we put out the word that the checks were available in the finance office. And so we were able to take care of everybody.

DR. WRIGHT: And you did have the retirees showing up once it became safe enough to travel?

COL BAER: Yeah, what we did was they set up a couple of pay events for them and they got the checks and they were able to get checks cashed. A lot of people don't think about that.

DR. WRIGHT: Yeah, very interesting.

COL BAER: So there was a lot of things that can be done by Group. In fact, of our METL (Mission-Essential Task List) we have ten items; and we actually in Panama did eight of the ten. And we actually performed every one of the finance battlefield functions.

DR. WRIGHT: Let's go through a few of those, those issues then. I guess you kept your people at the 180th?

COL BAER: Right.

DR. WRIGHT: You worked out of Building 9523?

COL BAER: I worked out of Building 95 in an office with the Staff Judge Advocate. I also worked with the DCSRM people so I had, I worked out of the program budget office with a couple of people that were there. And I also worked out of the operations office, which was at the 180th FSU. The bulk of finance operations was out of the 180th FSU.

DR. WRIGHT: Simply because they had the space, they had the facilities, they had the phone lines, you didn't have to displace anybody?

COL BAER: Right and ... but my main operations were with the Corps headquarters at the staff highest level. At the same time most of my troops ... guys that ... missions built up--as the intensity built down the pay missions built up--and so we had teams of people always out on the road. In fact, during the period, let's see, one of the things we did was support for the financial needs of soldiers, airmen and marines, including CPs (casual pays), check cashing, inquiries, etc. We performed over 58 ... I think it came to 75 pay missions servicing 8,500 people in Panama from 26 December [1989] to 31 January [1990].

DR. WRIGHT: So you had, as JTF SOUTH, you then assumed responsibility for the other service personnel?

COL BAER: Well, those that needed support.

DR. WRIGHT: In other words, the Air Force could take of its own because at Howard [Air Base] it had its own operation?

COL BAER: Right, but if there was an Air Force guy out at David and he needed to be taken care of the answer is yes, sir. There was a company of Marines that we ended up having to take care of because their parents weren't around right there, okay. In Honduras, you know, one of the elements that we're taking care of is an entire Marine battalion right now. No problem, that's joint service.

DR. WRIGHT: So finance is well-integrated into the notion of joint operations?

COL BAER: We like to think so. [LAUGHTER] See, we ... what I'm doing is going back to this list of some of the things that we did during Panama that should trigger some questions. One of the things we became involved in is currency control and cash distribution throughout the country. We worked with the 180th FSU and staff finance guys on obtaining ten million from the Federal Reserve in Miami when we were in country. Because, see, the finance unit down there had responsibility for providing cash to military banks, the Panama Canal Commission, and any other cash requirements. They were the funding source. Well, that started drying up and estimated needs came to like ten million that we needed so ...

DR. WRIGHT: You had to get couriers to escort the money?

COL BAER: We brought from the Federal Reserve for ten million, but there's a normal procedure that we couldn't do which had to do with--because of the timing--in terms of where the check goes and gets moved. So we had to work a deal on it and we did. The Federal Reserve provided us ten million in cash and it was flown in ... into country.

DR. WRIGHT: And then you had to arrange for escort to get it from Howard to ...

COL BAER: Oh, sure but that's normal business.

DR. WRIGHT: $10 million is normal business? [LAUGHTER]

COL BAER: Well, that's not really normal but and then over two million in cash we found cached was accumulated and counted for and stored in a secure vault.

DR. WRIGHT: That raises a very, very interesting issue because that is not something anybody normally thinks of, you know. Yeah, we find the stuff and there's a big hoopla and everybody loves to announce that we found so much in cash along with the drugs. And then there's sort of, I guess, an assumption on the part of everybody that oh, well, DEA24 takes care of it or something like that.

COL BAER: Well, dispersing of the finance guys, the ones who are supposed to end up with it in their vaults and then dispose of it. The normal procedure is the unit finds it, notifies CID,25 CID comes, they count it, and it gets turned over and signed for to the CID, and the CID brings it to the finance operation where it's recounted and signed for, and then it's put in the vaults, and then disposition is made either one or two ways or three but actually two. One, whoever's money it is, if it can be determined who's money it is, that money is given back to the individual or country or company or whatever. Or it is kept and turned into the Treasury of the United States and put in vaults.

DR. WRIGHT: So that is an added burden then in terms of ... considering the type of cash that was found, large numbers of small bills, I mean, you're eating up limited man-power going through all of that.

COL BAER: Well, we did two things that were unusual, not unusual. One, the counting, we just spent a difficult amount of time finally counting it when it all came in. But the other thing is one of my lieutenants I brought down spent 72 hours (that was straight) reviewing all the J-2 logs and all the J-3 logs [and] SITREPs26 for the period like 20 December or 19 December through about 5 January, about a 15-day period, and listed all the different sightings and reports of cash. We took those and we took the J-2 reports, tried marrying them against the J-3 reports and then marry those against the CID findings and then track those into Finance. And in the main, in the main there was a resemblance. What we did find though, somebody says, oh, in the report it looks like tons of money was found here. You know, who knows but it turned out to be 20,000, 5,000 ...

DR. WRIGHT: So the same problem, you had the same problem with dollars that we had with the weapons count then from the more traditional operations side of it.

COL BAER: Well, the reports ...

DR. WRIGHT: You eyeball a room full of weapons and then you tend to over-inflate what it is, or that line soldier over-inflates what it is.

COL BAER: Yeah. But the main lesson learned out of this: one, the units have to report as accurate as possible; and secondly, we created an audit trail. So five years from now some auditor says, well, I've heard on the news that grid coordinates XXX somebody found something or didn't find something, and then we can at least show what our disposition or non-disposition was. So we had an audit trail all the way into finance, which is kind of neat.

DR. WRIGHT: Yeah, and also a defensive maneuver for the Army to be able to prove that we didn't rape, pillage and loot our way across Panama.

COL BAER: Yeah, I've got that document now. It's been used already. So that's currency right there. We talked about finance and accounting policies. There's conduct and special command programs for the Weapons for Cash. Now, we ended up with over $5,000, 780,000 rounds and 10,500 weapons for the little over a million that we paid for.

DR. WRIGHT: And that's over a relative short period, too, correct?

COL BAER: That's correct. And so not only, this was literally the first time. The procedures had to be developed which were done by the JAG and the staff finance guy who was a civilian at USARSO and the dispersing officer--figure out, okay, how do we do it. And then putting money into the hands of [Class A] agents. At one time we had over thirty agents out with over $800,000 going out and paying. You follow procedures in getting the money in, not money but the documentation in; of being able to track that through weapons that were turned in. I personally went to a couple of weapons pickup/cash distribution points just to see if we were getting what we paid for, and I felt real comfortable with what I saw.

DR. WRIGHT: That program was working?

COL BAER: It worked, yeah, and people got money and a couple of times I had to negotiate with people as to how much they were getting.

DR. WRIGHT: How ... did you get the Mom and Pop operation that discovered the cache and tried to run them in in onesies?

COL BAER: Yeah, but some arrangements got pretty smart about that, okay. [LAUGHTER] And--plus--we had set it up so that they could get $5,000 if they took them to a cache. So, you know, we tried to take care of that part, too. And for the main we did. If you think about the fact that there was 780,000 rounds that came in and 10,000 weapons ... this included all the way from an M-60 that I saw to rocket launchers to AK-47s to Saturday Night Specials to .45s; everything.

DR. WRIGHT: I saw a photograph of an old flintlock blunderbuss that we got.

COL BAER: We paid $150 for that one.

DR. WRIGHT: What's ... do you know what the disposition of that weapon was?

COL BAER: I have no idea, but that was turned in to the weapons point and then I don't know what they did with it from there. But there was all kinds of stuff. We got involved in determination and computation of pay for POWs and detainees.

DR. WRIGHT: How does that work now? We are responsible under Geneva Conventions to pay a living wage?

COL BAER: Well, there is three things that have to happen. One, when a detainee come in if they have cash on hand we're supposed to take it from them and if they're detained we keep it in their account for them, okay? And then if they're released give it back to them, okay? So we had cases where a lot of people were interrogated for a couple of hours and then released, but we took their money. Some of them they had ..., $400, $200. Most of them had very little, under $10. So we kept it in an envelope and returned it when they left. Those that were kept we kept their money.

Okay, if they're being kept as a prisoner or a detainee, they're entitled to two things once it's determined that they are POWs or civilian internees. They are entitled to what is called an advance in pay, which is for every 15 days in prison or detained they are entitled to X amount of dollars as established by the Geneva Convention, Article 58 I believe. Or if they perform work that is not improving their area, okay--in other words, if I take a guy and say, okay, I want you to lay sandbags around your tent so the water doesn't come in, no pay.

DR. WRIGHT: You don't have to pay him.

COL BAER: But if it's take a gang of people out to go sweep some streets ...

DR. WRIGHT: Streets, which is what LTG Stiner, I guess, and GEN Thurman were rather adamant about getting them out to do.

COL BAER: Which did take place so the prevailing wage rate in coordination with the CMO, we decided that was $6 a day. So they got paid $6 a day. Now, you don't give them cash every day, you pump it to the pay representative you establish, which we did. And for those that were deemed ...

DR. WRIGHT: And we're talking about up to what, about 4,000 detainees?

COL BAER: Well, overall. But in terms of those that are hard core that had stayed it was much less than that. I don't have the figure in front of me.

DR. WRIGHT: But still substantial amount of paperwork.

COL BAER: We were working, we had teams working day and night.

DR. WRIGHT: Out there, did you put them out to Empire Range?

COL BAER: Empire Range, that's where they worked because they were part of the process. So we did that. Now, for those that were released, if they had been detained fifteen days or less we also gave them ... according to the Geneva Convention their U. S. equivalent in Swiss francs. In other words, the Convention actually specifies ...

DR. WRIGHT: You must pay in Swiss francs?

COL BAER: Yeah, but it's the U. S.--the equivalent of their currency we were going into or whatever so--but it specifies the amount of franks entitled. And so we converted that based on the latest rates that we had and gave them that money. We set up a pay table based on that. And then that was confirmed by the DCSPER27 and the Finance Center and all that kind of stuff. So we paid them. Those that were going to be turned over to the Panamanian authorities we did not pay. We transferred their pay records to the Panamanians.

DR. WRIGHT: And then we had to establish, I guess, an account and do a block transfer of funds to the Panamanians?

COL BAER: No. By the rule of law, once they picked them up they incurred responsibility for making the payment and then they could seek funding from the U. S. at a later time.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay.

COL BAER: Interesting, huh? And of course, the only thing I can tell you is that we also provided funds for intelligence operations on a case basis.

DR. WRIGHT: Correct, correct.

COL BAER: We did that, we worked the special operating forces. We provided lots of support for procurement, services supplies, subsistence, day laborers, equipment and transportation. In other words, our own files and paperwork and all that stuff.

DR. WRIGHT: To get into a couple of those things. The rental cars are ... both after operations had stabilized out of it but, I guess, also, or at least I'd like you to confirm stories I heard that we then negotiated ex post facto arrangements with the rental car companies to cover those vehicles that were at the airports that got hot-wired?

COL BAER: Okay, those are called combat requisitions. There is official terminology. If the owner of that vehicle, or owners of those vehicles, can establish that they were actually combat requisitions, hot-wire as an example, and if they had that car and it was moved or taken and used by U. S. forces they can submit a claim for that vehicle. In most cases that can be determined that they provided that requirement, etc., they were reimbursed for the services rendered.

DR. WRIGHT: But again, that ties up your manpower then in having to evaluate claims like that.

COL BAER: The JAG did the evaluation.

DR. WRIGHT: Oh, JAG did it?

COL BAER: Certifying officials were the JAG, but we provided assistance and then we went into FSU which is currently making payments.

DR. WRIGHT: And those, some of those things will be still dropping out over a fairly extended period of time?

COL BAER: Depending on the validity of the claim. That sounds bureaucratic but those are things that happen after the fact, so just like any other thing you have to evaluate. Some things actually did happen and some vehicles were requisitioned and those were paid for. But some kind of flaky when some guy says well, I owned three cars that day and all of them were at the airport and you know that he doesn't live--be 200 miles away and it looks like he doesn't own a car, okay? [LAUGHTER] How's that. And so it seems like it must have been every car in Panama was at the airport that night. That or at Rio Hato, which is strange. It's just like every refugee had a car burned also and a house burned.

DR. WRIGHT: Did you get involved in the funding for some of the urban redevelopment operations that were going on to ... say as we were redeploying back, they were talking about rebuilding El Chorrillo.

COL BAER: That's SOUTHCOM and USARSO were handling those and their engineer was involved in that.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay. To what extent did you have an issue with casual pay because, remember, it had split over the end of one month and the start of another?

COL BAER: Zero.

DR. WRIGHT: Because everybody's on direct deposit?

COL BAER: Well, they're supposed to be; 99 percent were. The CPs are not an issue. It's very easy for us to do. The commander at my recommendation kept it at $50 because that's all they really needed.

DR. WRIGHT: I was going to say, what could you spend the money on?

COL BAER: Well, during combat operations we really don't require it because the troops now moving to a city-like environment where there is a PX available or they want to buy a hot dog or a Coke or a T-shirt or take something home and get a haircut, where they don't have the combat haircut set out there, that has to take care of.

DR. WRIGHT: So did you find it was much of an issue or small enough in terms of volume?

COL BAER: We made over 8,000 payments, I guess, around.

DR. WRIGHT: So it did become ...

COL BAER: Well, it was a constant volume, we took care of everybody. It was not overwhelming, if that's the question.

DR. WRIGHT: Yeah, and that was more a function of end of the month versus or just normal situation guys didn't have a lot of money in their wallets when the EDRE28 got called?

COL BAER: Most of them thought it was an EDRE. And an EDRE, to be honest, most people do not take checks and very little cash because they don't want to lose their wallet or what have you. And so it would show up, like I said, during the first few days no, it was, okay. But right after that, bang, then it happens. And then they say, well, wait a minute, I need to get a T-shirt, I can't go home without a T-shirt, right? Or they need a few dollars just to feel comfortable, because what if they want to go buy a Coke? Do you take it from the merchant or not? I'm tired and I want to have that Coke with their MRE if nothing else, or whatever.

DR. WRIGHT: To what extent did we get into the local procurement arena? What types of things did you get involved in bulk buying down there?

COL BAER: Well, we got involved in anything that was procured but needed somebody to go out and buy it. If there was a Standard Form 44, which is a small purchase, all the way from rental vehicles to film, don't forget a lot of the combat photographers left on short notice with very little film, so when we got down there we would buy film so we were able to help them get ... procure that. They did buy some newspapers, transportation, subsistence, fruit, vegetables, you know, anything really to keep an army running.

DR. WRIGHT: In terms of the local civilians and our payments to them for the casual labor, you mentioned the recovery of the parachutes, that's out as we were trying to find the missing air items out at Torrijos-Tocumen [Airport]?

COL BAER: Exactly. You got to look at the question of why did we do that. Why didn't we use soldiers? If you look at procurement and then finance when we try and do things we try to become a combat multiplier. For every soldier that doesn't have to get tied down looking for parachutes, that's a soldier that's free to go do a combat mission. Understand? That's why we're trying to become part of that.

DR. WRIGHT: What other types of things did we hire local labor for?

COL BAER: Well, there's cleanup missions, you know, there was, you know, the prisoners did some of the street sweeping. One of the main things though for local nationals was to pick up all the air items and I think they used some of them to help stack the weapons and do those kinds of things but I'm not sure. The main one I remember is just at Torrijos-Tocumen.

DR. WRIGHT: What time do you get to recover back here, what day?

COL BAER: I came back just before the Corps came back.

DR. WRIGHT: And your people pretty much phased out at the same time?

COL BAER: They phased all the way from right after the first of the year through ... my last guy came home with the MPs. When we left we left one guy with the 16th MP [Brigade]. They deployed so much, I left one guy attached to them just to give them some TLC29 for their pay inquiries and problems and all that kind of stuff.

DR. WRIGHT: So pretty much it was whatever the unit they were supporting--the team was supporting--came back the ... team came back?

COL BAER: Yes and no to that. No, because the 82d was still there but I sent some of the 82d guys back, it was time for them to go home. And the 7th went back when basically the 7th went and the 7th came back, they were the last ones out. We tried to keep a number of people there to meet our requirements.

DR. WRIGHT: Did you try for the 107th, which was the long stayers, did you try to get a rotation or you just left the one team down and in place?

COL BAER: Just left them.

DR. WRIGHT: I'm trying to think back. There was an item that you had mentioned that struck me as a little curious. In the EPW mode, when we're accounting for that fund, how is that done? Is that done on ledgers or is that done on a data base or something; that's paper transfer or do you actually have to go open a bank account somewhere?

COL BAER: No, it's on regular Army forms. There are three regulations that govern it. They already specified the forms and we just copy those out of the regulations and use those and we had to call the Finance Center to get the right accounting classification for the claims to do that.

[END OF SIDE ONE]

COL BAER: ... the largest operation around.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay, sir, I just, really quickly because the tape ran out, you had mentioned the three or the two regulations in the FM?

COL BAER: Right, for the EPWs there was [INAUDIBLE], so we double checked everyone there. AR 190-8 and FM 27-10 (Laws of Land Warfare). So then we had to make some decisions on what was the interpretation of the Geneva Convention articles to make sure that we were in compliance.

DR. WRIGHT: In terms of the overall cost of the operation, did it come in about as you expected?

COL BAER: Good question. We didn't know what it would cost other than the air flow would be extremely expensive and the air items and the requisitions would be expensive and plus MRE subsistence, but I don't think there had been any projections on the cost. However, one of the things that was really ... there was a concern as to how much the operation was costing from day one. And so there was adherence by the commanders on down to not just do anything or throw stuff away. There was an emphasis on not waste as opposed to waste.

DR. WRIGHT: In other words, a departure from the, at least popular image of well, you know, accountability goes out the window once the shooting starts?

COL BAER: There's a, let me just tell you, I'll say it on tape. The higher the intensity, the less the accountability. But only when that higher intensity is under way. But the minute that intensity starts sliding towards the low, the accountability increases exponentially. And that was true. So what we tried to do, what I tried to do, was keep that in mind as we worked through the process to the point that I literally had to chop off on any request for a rental car before you got it down there. Okay, and I reviewed the contracts to see if there were any questionable contracts. So that's ...

DR. WRIGHT: Yeah, that's a much tighter degree, I think. Did that surprise people, did that seem to frustrate people?

COL BAER: Surprise, yes. Frustrate, no, because they understood. You know, it's a different environment we're operating in and most people fairly well aligned with that.

DR. WRIGHT: In terms of the subsistence issue, just the one last question. How did you make a determination on separate rations and on going to the field rations cards and things like that?

COL BAER: Well, ...

DR. WRIGHT: Because I know we went briefly through a little glitch down there starting a cash payment for rations and that lasted about one day.

COL BAER: That was not done by the JTF. I will tell you that right now. That was USARSO trying to return to the norm even though ... and forgetting that we had troops in the field duty status down there. So we got that turned around. No, it was determined at FORSCOM30 levels that it was field duty and so that meant TDY31 pay stopped on the 20th of December and then back after 4 January. But we went back straight to the DOD (Department of Defense) Pay Manual, AR 37-104-3, I think, and AR 37-106. So we put out rules and we ended up ... up ... and drafted the regulation message that told people what the situation was after. And before they had put out guidance that after the 4th of January, depending on service status, and moving very quickly were reimbursed for certain things. There were all kinds of criteria and conditions. What we were trying to do was get everybody consistently taken care of.

DR. WRIGHT: In terms of the teams that went down, sir, who do you recommend that I do some follow-on interviews with?

COL BAER: Okay, there's one probably ... there's two people you really need to talk to. Okay, one is CPT (P) Jeff Kovac of the 107th Finance, he went with me, he was my operations guy so he could give you a real good perspective on the operations themselves and additional stories. And the other side of the coin, there was my S-3 here, MAJ Mulyca, M-U-L-Y-C-A, because while we were down there he had to be the central focal point for operations here and he'd be able to elaborate on all the issues and things that really went on and took place in the United States.

DR. WRIGHT: And then just a direct coordination with the commanders of the FSUs to find out who, you know, to get a chance to talk to some of the junior enlisteds?

COL BAER: Yeah, Kovac will lead you straight to their guys, for example, the 82d.

DR. WRIGHT: Okay, sir, just one final thing to ask you and then I'll get out of your hair. Any good anecdotes, anything that struck you from the finance side as just one of those great moments in the annals of war or really unusual things?

COL BAER: Yeah, there are lots of them but probably, I hate to say this, a lot of them ... I'll let Kovac tell you some of the war stories. But a lot of the stuff that we had to take care of I really don't want to put on tape because I am still subject to many audits because of this operation, okay? [LAUGHTER]

DR. WRIGHT: Understood, sir.

COL BAER: The only way I can say it is we had to fix some things to do some things to make everything legal. And everything IS legal; I'll say it twice, everything is legal but when it was ongoing .... . [LAUGHTER] Okay?

DR. WRIGHT: I appreciate it, sir, thank you for your time.

COL BAER: Now, turn it off.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

 

Endnotes
1. 1st Support Command (Corps); 507th Transportation Group (a subordinate element of the 1st Support Command); 20th Engineer Brigade; 18th Aviation Brigade; and XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery.

2. The formal program of peacetime alignment according to projected wartime task organization.

3. Army Training and Evaluation Program.

4. Direct Support; General Support.

5. Operations plans.

6. Enemy prisoners of war.

7. In October 1989 XVIII Airborne Corps conducted humanitarian relief operations on St. Croix in the U.S. Virgin Islands in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo under the code name Operation HAWKEYE.

8. Command Post.

9. Table of Distribution and Allowances.

10. Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Time, and Troops Available; a standard Army planning technique.

11. Noncommissioned officers.

12. Executive officer.

13. Standing operating procedures.

14. LTG Carl W. Stiner, Commanding General of both XVIII Airborne Corps and Joint Task Force (JTF) SOUTH.

15. Staff Judge Advocate.

16. See JCIT-090.

17. Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management. In this case, from that entity at United States Army, South (USARSO).

18. Tactical Operations Center. In this case, COL Baer is referring to the XVIII Airborne Corps Emergency Operations Center (EOC) located on the second floor of the Corps Headquarters building across the street from his office.

19. The G-3/Directorate of Plans and Training (DPT) Chief of Resource Management.

20. Standardized installation personnel system.

21. GEN Maxwell Thurman, Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM); commonly called CINCSOUTH.

22. Armed Forces Radio and Television Service; in Panama it was the Southern Command Network (SCN).

23. The USARSO headquarters building at Fort Clayton that served as JTF SOUTH's headquarters.

24. Drug Enforcement Administration.

25. Criminal Investigation Division.

26. Situation Reports.

27. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; at the Department of the Army (DA) level.

28. Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise.

29. Tender loving care.

30. US Army Forces Command.

31. Temporary duty.