APPENDIX A
COMMAND AND CONTROL AT THE BRIGADE AND BELOW
Captain Brown has laced his narrative with references to command and control features that may not be familiar to the general reader. His journal begins while he is serving as an assistant brigade S-3 (operations officer) and concludes while he is a company commander. The leadership of soldiers and the means to carry it out dominate his daily life.
Within a Bradley company, a squad consists of nine soldiers who fight on foot and are equipped with a mix of small arms. The squad is led by a squad leader, ideally a staff sergeant (E-6). It can be divided further into two fire teams, each led by a sergeant (E-5) to facilitate overwatch and maneuver. Two squads and four Bradley Fighting Vehicles, each with a three-man crew, make up a platoon, led by a platoon leader (PL), a lieutenant assisted by a seasoned platoon sergeant, ideally a sergeant first class (E-7). When moving mounted, the squads are distributed throughout the passenger compartments of the Bradleys while the crews drive the vehicles and man the turrets. When the squads dismount for such infantry missions as close assault or clearing buildings or terrain, the Bradleys provide fire support and cover. The infantrymen on the ground are engaged in the close-quarters battle (CQB), and the nature of their opposition will dictate their individual movement techniques (IMT). By the virtue of after-action reviews (AARs) and lessons learned, units consistently refine their inventory of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
.A Bradley company consists of three Bradley platoons and a small headquarters and support element. Key leaders include the company commander (CO), ordinarily a captain; the executive officer (XO), a seasoned lieutenant; and the first sergeant, an E-8 and the most experienced man in the company. Customary but heavily overlapping divisions of labor are for the company commander to focus on mission, tactical disposition, and collective training; for the executive officer to focus on logistics and maintenance; and for the first sergeant to focus on sustaining individual standards and the welfare of the men. All three can and often do serve as alter egos for each other in each of these roles. The commander and the executive officer are Bradley vehicle commanders, and one normally accompanies the dismounted fight while the other sustains communications higher from his Bradley. The first sergeant rides in a Humvee in most circumstances and in an M113 personnel
carrier in combat. The company commander is ultimately responsible for all that happens or fails to happen in his company.
.Battlefield leaders can use voice commands and hand signals to control combat over short distances and pyrotechnics over longer distances when their meaning has been agreed upon in advance. Platoons and companies by and large coordinate their operations by radio. The frequency-hopping SINCGARS (Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System) is now in general use. Parties on the same "fill"-i.e., primed to frequency hop at precisely the same sequence-can talk to each other without fear of interruption or interception. In this they are greatly assisted by an evolved lexicon of terse, guttural nouns, verbs, and call signs most likely to be heard and understood amidst the din of battle. The First Platoon is "Red," the Second "White," and the Third "Blue." Red One is the First Platoon leader, White One the Second, and Blue One the Third. Captain Brown, the commander of Company B, 1-8 Infantry, was Machine Six, and Lieutenant Colonel Sassaman, the commander of 1-8 Infantry, Eagle Six. Other key players similarly had call signs consisting of a word and number. In his journal Captain Brown also speaks of Striker Six, his brigade commander, and Iron Horse Six, the division commander. Machine Five was his executive officer and Machine Seven his first sergeant.
A Bradley battalion consists of three line companies and a headquarters company. It might well have a tank company (three platoons of four tanks each, plus two tanks in the company headquarters) attached. If so, it might attach tank platoons to Bradley companies, and vice versa. It might also have one of its own Bradley companies attached to a sister tank battalion, as was the case with Captain Brown's company during his first tour in Samarra. Bradley platoons and companies have the flexibility to fight mounted or dismounted; tank platoons and companies have much more firepower and crew protection. A mix of tank and Bradley platoons under a company commander is a company team, and a mix of tank and Bradley companies under a battalion commander is a battalion task force. A heavy brigade consists of some mix of tanks and Bradley battalions, most often three all told. A heavy brigade combat team adds some mix of artillery, engineers, air defense,
and other combat and combat support troops in contingents of company or battalion size.
Battalions and brigades are larger and more complex than companies, so their leadership cadre is more complex as well. Battalion and brigade
commanders are lieutenant colonels and colonels, respectively, assisted by a specialized staff. An executive officer supervises the staff, and a command sergeant major fulfills a role analogous to that of the company first sergeant but with more attention to the career progression of subordinate NCOs. Primary staff officers include an S-1, personnel officer; S-2, intelligence officer; S-3, operations and training officer; and S-4, logistics officer. There may also be a fire support officer (FSO) controlling indirect fires; a signal officer; a battalion maintenance officer (BMO); an air liaison officer (ALO); a civil affairs officer; and a public affairs officer. The brigade executive officer is ordinarily a lieutenant colonel and most of his immediate staff subordinates majors. The battalion executive officer is normally a major, his S-3 a major reporting directly to the battalion commander, and the majority of his immediate staff subordinates captains.
More complex organization at the battalion and the brigade levels dictates more elaborate command and control nodes. The lion's share of tactical design and coordination occurs at the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), normally the haunt of the XO, S-2, S-3, FSO, ALO, signal officer, and their subordinates and other staff. In a heavy brigade, the working area of the TOC consists of four to eight M577 Command Tracks pushed back to back with tent extensions from them integrated into a common cover. The S-1, S-4, and other logisticians man a similar but somewhat smaller Administration and Logistics Operation Center (ALOC). A much smaller and nimbler Bradley-mounted Tactical Actions Center (TAC) allows the commander himself to speed around the battlefield and quickly establish or reestablish communications as the fight progresses. Even more austere variations on this theme are the Assault Command Post (Assault CP) or the Air Assault Command and Control (A2C2) "bird." As Captain Brown's narrative begins, he is the officer responsible for the brigade TAC, sustaining its readiness to support the personal leadership of the brigade commander anywhere on the battlefield. When battles are echeloned, the TAC, Assault CP, or A2C2 bird will be well forward; the TOC will be comfortably out of direct-fire range, and the ALOC will be clear of most indirect fire.
The ALOC is generally located amid the aggregated cluster of all the units' logistical assets, collectively called the field trains. Within the area of the field trains there might well be a Field Trains Command Post (FTCP) to manage the area itself, a Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) to handle the organizational maintenance effort, a Forward Aid Station (FAS) to deal with medical emergencies, and a Civil-Military Operations Center
(CMOC) to handle relationships with the local population. The UMCP, FAS, or CMOC might be pushed forward to the combat trains, a smaller collection of logistical assets focused on fuel, ammunition, maintenance, and medical assets of immediate necessity in sustaining the fight. They also might be separately located to accommodate circumstances, but to do so requires an increase in the manpower committed to secure them.
Battalions and brigades do not operate alone, so their facilities may collocate with those of a higher headquarters. Battalions, brigades, and even larger units may gather in a Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) preliminary to a major operation. For much of its tour, Captain Brown's company was attempting to secure the sprawling corps' designated Logical Support Area (LSA) Anaconda, where many of the brigade facilities were situated at times. He also makes occasional reference to the 21st Corps Area Support Hospital (21st CASH), a destination of choice for the seriously injured. He lived at various Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), which headquarters designated as semipermanent facilities. FOBs were very useful when pushed close enough to support combat operations in such unpleasant areas as Samarra. All the facilities discussed thus far anticipate helicopter resupply and heliborne visitors and thus designate a helicopter landing zone (HLZ). When temporary, these were hastily marked in daylight with colorful, highly visible VS-17 panels.
Complex operations require elaborate procedures. Troop-leading procedures begin with the receipt of a mission, at which time a battalion or brigade staff undertakes an intense hour-time permitting-of mission analysis (MA) to assure the troops fully understand what will be required of them. At the same time the staff sends a warning order (WARNO) to subordinate units to alert them of the nature of the pending mission. When briefed on the results of the mission analysis, the commander gives guidance that shapes various courses of action that are developed, compared, and perhaps even war-gamed should time permit. Given the results of these deliberations, the commander decides on the course of action they will follow. The staff hastens to flesh out this decision in an operations plan (OPLAN) if the time-or even the likelihood-of execution is unknown or in an operations order (Op Order) if the time of execution is set. From time to time during this process, fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) are sent to subordinate headquarters to enable them to prepare in as parallel a fashion as possible.
Army doctrine elaborated by unit tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOPs) prescribes a host of control measures customarily applied to
maps or graphics shared by all participants. Captain Brown speaks of BPs (battle positions to defend, block, or delay from) and LDs (lines of departure from which units initiate tactical operations). LD is often used as a verb; one can speak of a unit as having "LDed." Observation posts (OPs) and listening posts (LPs) facilitate early warning and intelligence gathering. Checkpoints (CPs) were once points on a map or route that provided a frame of reference for friendly locations, much as target reference points (TRPs) do for enemy locations. Usage of the term in the Balkans and Iraq has increasingly gravitated toward the manned checkpoint, a small contingent of troops positioned to intercept and control traffic along a particular route. In the aftermath of an incident, a unit can hastily throw out spider-web checkpoints positioned to entrap perpetrators leaving the scene. A limit of advance (LOA) may be specified to control the forward progress of units, and unit boundaries can fill the same purpose laterally. The former extensive use of phase lines and other graphic measures to track movement has proved less necessary in an era of global positioning systems (GPS) and Blue Force Tracker (BFT), a system that automatically forwards vehicle locations through secure satellite communications to produce a shared picture of the battlefield on screens or consoles in command centers or aboard command vehicles.
Units prepare for pending operations in as comprehensive a manner as possible. The orders process occurs at every level, albeit with less complexity as one descends through the levels of command. Pre-combat checks (PCCs) of troops, vehicles, and equipment guarantee that all are committed to combat in the best possible condition. If time permits, a somewhat more elaborate pre-combat inspection (PCI) involves several layers of the chain of command at once. Rehearsals on comparable terrain are invaluable in coordinating efforts, particularly in the case of offensive operations. Ideally, these would involve all participants of all ranks in a comprehensive combined arms rehearsal (CAR). Of course, the ideal is not always achieved, time can be pressing, and squads can flow quickly from one urgent event to another. In such cases, troops fall back on their training and the tactics, techniques, and procedures that they have developed over time.
Conventional wisdom holds that no plan survives the first round fired by the enemy intact. Leaders at every level must demonstrate initiative and flexibility to deal with changing or unforeseen circumstances. Radios crackle, FRAGOs flow freely, and the "push to talk" phase of combat supersedes the deliberate orders process. Within each TOC, TAC, and ALOC, a single "battle captain" oversees all traffic in and out and guarantees that the staff
and branch particular cells are fully mindful of each other's activities. This may not be much of a problem if actions are brief and everyone is paying attention at the same time. In the case of prolonged operations it becomes necessary to pull shifts and pass responsibilities from one unit to another. The battle update brief (BUB) is a key mechanism in sustaining a collective picture as key players change out or become so absorbed in their own responsibilities that they lose visibility of those of others. The battle captain draws on all available communications, to include SINCGARS, BFT, tactical satellite (TACSAT), Small Extension Node (SEN), Secure Mobile Antijam Reliable Tactical Terminal (SMART-T), Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET); Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), and land lines. The radio-telephone operator (RTO) accompanying a platoon leader or company commander might well find himself out of range or in terrain defilade, both of which preclude effective communications. To work around such possibilities, the most critical frequencies can be received and retransmitted at retrans stations committed to that purpose.
TACSOPs specify an array of formatted reports to force the flow of information in a repeatable manner least likely to be misunderstood. The 1-8 Infantry relied most heavily on the Green 2 Report, which accounted for men, weapons, and equipment not less than twice a day. The steady flow of information is intended to sustain a common appreciation of what is going on and also to set up such key decisions as whether or when to commit the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) or where and when to send the logistical packages (LOGPACs) necessary to sustain troops in combat. Command and control has succeeded if the soldiers know what they are supposed to do and have the means to achieve it.