

Courtesy of the Library of Congress

General Early



National Archives photo

General Wallace

“If Early had been but one day earlier he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements I had sent. Whether the delay caused by the battle amounted to a day or not, General Wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory.”

Ulysses S. Grant

Crossroads of Destiny:

Lew Wallace, the Battle of Monocacy, and the Outcome of Jubal Early's Drive on Washington, D.C.

By Peter L. Platteborze

Introduction

If judged by its impact rather than its size, the Battle of Monocacy ranks among the most significant battles of the American Civil War. The battle took place on 9 July 1864 on a checkerboard of fields of wheat and corn near the Monocacy River south of Frederick, Maryland, where the rail spur from that city joined the through line from Baltimore to Wheeling. A large Confederate force under Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early expended that entire day in a hard-fought effort to defeat a substantially smaller body of Union troops led by Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace that blocked their advance toward Washington, D.C. The time and energy lost in this engagement prevented Early from attacking Washington before the arrival there of Union reinforcements detached from the army of Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant that was besieging Petersburg and Richmond. The delay Wallace imposed on Early at the Monocacy thus denied the Confederate commander what might have been the most stunning Confederate triumph of the war, the capture of the Federal capital. Thwarted, Early returned to Virginia, ending the South's final combined-arms attack north of the Potomac.

Strategic Background

What were the factors that led the Confederate commander, General Robert E. Lee, to order another invasion of the North in 1864? After three bloody years of war, the cause of the Confederacy was in desperate straits. The South's economy was in a shambles, contact with the Confederacy's three western states had been severed, most of Tennessee had fallen into Union hands, and adequate numbers of fresh recruits to reinforce Lee's ever-dwindling army were unavailable. General Grant, who had recently been appointed general in chief of Union forces, was initiating a simple yet highly effective strategy that involved unrelenting offensive campaigns on all fronts to prevent the Confederates from shuttling troops from one sector to another.



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General Hunter

In the spring of 1864 Grant ordered Maj. Gen. David Hunter to move south up the Shenandoah Valley with his 15,000-man army in an effort to destroy the railroads and supply depots in this fertile region, which had become the indispensable breadbasket of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Grant meanwhile moved the Army of the Potomac southward and began to pin down Lee's army around Richmond and Petersburg. Grant's successes, however, were exacting a heavy cost in manpower, leading him to remove most of the forces that guarded Washington, D.C., to serve as replacements in his besieging army. Lee realized that although he could force Grant to mount a long and difficult siege, Federal forces would eventually erode his rebel army

and compel it to yield Richmond. The loss of its capital could destroy the will of the Confederacy to fight. Assessing this situation in toto, Lee recognized that to be passive would spell ultimate defeat.¹

Lee thus devised a daring counterstroke, the execution of which he entrusted to his boldest and most independent field commander, recently promoted Lt. Gen. Jubal Early, a fellow West Point graduate and seasoned veteran of three wars. On 12 June 1864 Lee ordered Early to take the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, which had earlier been commanded by Lt. Gen. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson, and combine it with the Confederate forces under Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge that had been opposing

Hunter. This consolidated force was to strike Hunter's army and, if possible, destroy it. Then Early was to lead this force down the Shenandoah Valley with limited provisions, cross the Potomac River where practicable, and threaten Washington. According to Lee's report on this campaign, written ten days after the Battle of Monocacy, "it was hoped that by threatening Washington and Baltimore Gen[era]l Grant would be compelled either to weaken himself so much for their protection as to afford us an opportunity to attack him, or that he might be induced to attack us."²

When Early assumed command, the corps Lee provided him consisted of three understrength infantry divisions with a total of roughly 8,000 men and two artillery battalions. Early quietly disengaged this corps from the Richmond defenses in the early morning of 13 June and raced west in an effort to beat Hunter to Lynchburg (*Map 1*). With a population of 7,000, Lynchburg was a vital transportation and logistics hub for the Army of Northern Virginia near the center of the state. Early beat Hunter to the city, arriving by rail on the seventeenth with approximately 3,600 of his men to augment the roughly 5,500 veteran soldiers commanded by General Breckinridge and nearly 2,000 militia, cadets, and walking wounded that had already established a haphazard defensive perimeter. The forces already in Lynchburg included General Breckinridge's small infantry division; the cavalry brigades of Brig. Gens. John McCausland and John Imboden; makeshift militia under Brig. Gen. Francis Nicholls, a double amputee; and some 250 Virginia Military Institute cadets.³

Early immediately reinforced the defensive perimeter beyond the western outskirts of Lynchburg and later that day forced Hunter to halt just west of the city. Correctly judging he was still outnumbered, Early pretended to acquire a substantial number of additional troops by repeatedly running an empty train into the city all night and receiving it with great fanfare. This ruse convinced Hunter that a


much larger force than his own Army of the Shenandoah would be defending Lynchburg the next morning. On the eighteenth, Union forces conducted an unsuccessful forced reconnaissance and threw back a forceful Confederate attack on the center of Hunter's lines. But having limited ammunition and believing he was greatly outnumbered, Hunter decided to leave the field, issuing orders for a quiet night withdrawal.⁴

Hunter hastily retreated westward through the mountains into central West Virginia, instead of retracing his original axis of advance through the Shenandoah Valley. This escape route effectively prevented the Army of the Shenandoah from interfering with the remainder of Early's campaign and for a time even denied Hunter the ability to communicate with higher headquarters. Not until he received Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton's direct inquiry as to his whereabouts on 5 July did Hunter inform the War Department that he was sending his forces to Martinsburg via Parkersburg on the Ohio River.⁵ Thus, Hunter had inadvertently provided Early with a golden opportunity to continue unopposed with his next mission.

The rebels actively pursued Hunter's retreating army only as far as Salem, Virginia, pressing it closely enough to deny it time to cause any substantial damage to Roanoke. Early rested his expeditionary force in this vicinity on 22 June, and because nearly half his infantry was barefoot, he requested that they be supplied with shoes. At dawn on the twenty-third, Early began his famous northward trek along the macadamized Valley Turnpike. By the twenty-seventh his headquarters were located in Staunton, Virginia, where he reorganized his collective force and renamed it the Army of the Valley District, from which it has come to be known as the Valley Army.⁶

Having absorbed into his command the Confederate infantry division and cavalry brigades at Lynchburg, Early chose General Breckinridge, a Kentuckian who had been

Courtesy of the Monocacy National Battlefield, National Park Service



Map 1: Route of General Early's Campaign to Washington, 1864

James Buchanan's vice president, as his second in command and provided him a corps containing the divisions of Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon of Georgia and Brig. Gen. John Echols of Virginia. Two other divisions, commanded by Maj. Gens. Robert Rodes, another Virginian, and Stephen Ramseur of North Carolina, reported directly to Early. Gordon's division contained Brig. Gen. Clement Evans's seven Georgia regiments, Brig. Gen. Zebulon York's remnants of ten Louisiana regiments (once "Lee's Tigers"), and Brig. Gen. William Terry's fragments of fourteen Virginia regiments. General Echols's division included four Virginia regiments of Brig. Gen. Gabriel Wharton's brigade, a regiment and two battalions of Virginians led by Col. George Patton, and Col. Thomas Smith's brigade containing Virginia infantry alongside units from Tennessee and North Carolina. General Ramseur's division consisted of five Virginia regiments commanded by Brig. Gen. Robert Lilley, four North

National Archives photo



General Breckinridge



Civil War Hagerstown, Maryland

Carolina regiments led by Brig. Gen. Robert Johnston, and another five North Carolina regiments under Brig. Gen. William Lewis. The fourth and final division, commanded by General Rodes, contained five Alabama regiments under Brig. Gen. Cullen Battle, five North Carolina regiments led by Brig. Gen. Bryan Grimes, and four fractured Georgian regiments under Brig. Gen. Philip Cook. At the start of the campaign, the Army of the Valley District had a total strength of roughly 18,000 men.⁷

These Confederate infantry forces were supported by artillery and cavalry units. Brig. Gen. Armistead Long commanded approximately forty guns fielded in three artillery battalions. All of the batteries originated in Virginia with the exception of one from Georgia. The rebel cavalry was commanded by ex-infantryman Maj. Gen. Robert Ransom. It was composed of three brigades under the leadership of Brig. Gens. John McCausland, John Imboden, and Bradley Johnson, and each of these brigades also included artillery elements.⁸

By 2 July this expeditionary force had quietly entered Winchester, Virginia, still unthreatened by Federal forces. Early halted there briefly upon receiving a telegram from Lee request-

ing that he remain in the valley “until everything was in readiness to cross the Potomac and to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio [B&O] Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal.” Early responded by dispatching McCausland’s cavalymen west of Martinsburg to destroy B&O tracks and trestles and thereby prevent Hunter from making what for Early would be an untimely reentry into his theater of operations.⁹

Acutely aware of the Valley Army’s shortage of provisions and ever the opportunist, Early also decided to capture the Union Army’s depot at Martinsburg, West Virginia. Some 6,500 troops commanded by Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel guarded this facility, and its envelopment fit within the parameters of Lee’s directive not to cross the Potomac until Early was fully prepared. Sigel, however, became aware of his forces’ inferiority and quickly began to withdraw, successfully holding off the advancing Confederate cavalry long enough to permit the evacuation to Maryland of a majority of the provisions under his care. From the formidable defensive positions the Union had established on Maryland Heights overlooking Harpers Ferry from across the Potomac, Sigel then sought to protect the forward troops of Brig. Gen. Max Weber, commander of Federal

forces in that arsenal town where abolitionist John Brown had sought to start a slave rebellion five years earlier. Sigel and Weber were fellow graduates of the military academy in Karlsruhe in the German Duchy of Baden, but neither had established much of a reputation for military leadership in America. The majority of the soldiers under Sigel’s command at Maryland Heights were inexperienced, having enlisted for only 100 days, and the force posed little direct threat to the Valley Army. Nevertheless, their presence on the heights blocked the Confederates from using the most direct route to Washington.¹⁰

After capturing Martinsburg and driving Weber out of Harpers Ferry and across the Potomac, Early on 5 July began to funnel his forces across that river at Shepherdstown, and they soon reached the deserted battlefield at Antietam. Because shoes still hadn’t arrived and rations were scarce, Early allowed the majority of his tired army to rest and plunder Federal stores. He sent General McCausland’s cavalry to Hagerstown with instructions to levy from it a contribution of \$200,000. McCausland misunderstood Early’s directive, however, and acquired a mere \$20,000, together with substantial quantities of clothing. While the Valley Army accumulated supplies and

awaited truant shoes, Gordon's division occupied Yankee attention by probing the defensive perimeter of the heights. This permitted Confederate wrecking parties to begin destroying the aqueduct of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal across Antietam Creek, along with nearby locks and boats.¹¹

On the afternoon of the sixth, Early sat in the shade near Sharpsburg evaluating the best course of action to take. Every option revolved around the Union troops defending Maryland Heights. Early could attempt to sneak past the southern tip of the heights, using the sheer cliffs to shield his men from the Union's heavy artillery above; he could attack the enemy on the heights in an action that would probably result in substantial casualties on both sides; or he could send his forces further north through South Mountain Pass toward Frederick, thereby bypassing the heights altogether. Early's pugilistic nature might have inclined him to attack rather than ignore the smaller Federal force. But as he pondered his next move, a courier dashed into the camp with a dispatch from Lee. The messenger was none other than Capt. Robert E. Lee Jr., son of the Confederate general. He informed Early of an amorphous plan to orchestrate a breakout of the approximately 17,000 Confederate prisoners held at Point Lookout, Maryland, and transmitted an order to Early to assist in returning them to the Confederacy. Because these plans reemphasized the importance of invading Maryland, Early felt compelled to avoid directly assaulting Sigel's troops ensconced on Maryland Heights. Instead, he determined to proceed through South Mountain Pass. He promised Lee that once through the pass he would detach a cavalry brigade to threaten Baltimore and support any prisoners who might escape from Point Lookout.¹²

Early had Ramseur and Rodes demonstrate strongly against the Federal lines to hold them in place while the rest of the Valley Army slipped northeast through the passes, with Ramseur and Rodes then following.

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Guarded Entrance to Prisoner of War Camp at Point Lookout, Maryland
by John Jacob Omenhausser

Troop morale was the highest it had been since Jackson's Valley campaign of 1862. North Carolinians like Sgt. Maj. John G. Young later boasted that while in Maryland they had enjoyed cherries, apple butter, milk, and the "fat of the country." Rebel quartermasters meanwhile acquired some 1,000 horses and cattle in just one day's foraging. No one seemed concerned about the burden these war prizes might pose for the march to Washington. By the time that Early's army reached Frederick on the ninth, Young estimated that the army's wagon train alone stretched for nine miles.¹³

Meanwhile, the Union's reaction to this offensive was confused at best. Both Grant and the Union Army's chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, initially failed to believe that a sizeable Confederate force had moved north. Despite rumors, there had been

no confirmed reports of a rebel corps departing the Richmond-Petersburg front, nor had any news arrived from Hunter or his Army of the Shenandoah. Halleck forwarded to Grant the reports he received from Sigel of significant rebel activity along the Potomac River, but Grant thought that Hunter could contain the threat. Fortunately for the Union, John W. Garrett, the politically influential president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, had received similar reports from his employees, and he began to worry that his expensive iron trestle spanning the Monocacy River might be endangered. On 2 July, while the Confederates were still south of the Potomac, Garrett personally delivered this news to General Wallace, the commander since March 1864 of the Union Army's Middle Department and Eighth Corps, at the latter's Baltimore headquarters. The Monocacy

River was the western boundary of Wallace's department.¹⁴

Wallace vowed to protect the railroad bridge and dispatched to Monocacy Junction Brig. Gen. Erastus B. Tyler and the 3d Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Infantry. This regiment was one of four Potomac Home Brigade regiments that the War Department had authorized in 1861 to protect the property and persons of loyal citizens on both sides of the upper Potomac. Although this regiment had to be reconstituted after surrendering at Harper's Ferry in September 1862 during the Antietam campaign, Wallace had confidence in it. Wallace also realized that the capital's defenses were severely undermanned, and he was dubious about the troops responsible for the city's protection. Commenting later upon the forces guarding Washington, Wallace observed sarcastically that "eight or nine thousand inefficients were in the works proper, ready upon alarm to take to the guns and do the duty of forty thousand trained specialists, supported by a medley so half-pledged and shadowy as to be a delusion and snare to everybody not an enemy." Wallace was amazed to learn from an aide that newspapers reported Hunter to be far away in the Kanawha Valley in western West Virginia.¹⁵

Wallace subsequently ordered to the Monocacy four companies of the 1st Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Infantry, the 11th Maryland Infantry (a 100-day regiment organized the previous month), three companies of the 144th Ohio Infantry, seven companies of the 149th Ohio Infantry, and roughly 100 mounted troops of the 159th Ohio Infantry, along with the six-gun Baltimore Battery of Light Artillery. The Ohio regiments had just been organized in May, also for 100 days. All together Wallace sent approximately 2,300 men to guard the Monocacy, a substantial portion of his small command.¹⁶

Wallace's role in the approaching contest with Early represented a surprising opportunity for this Indiana lawyer and politician, who had been

“With no direction from his confused superiors, Wallace quietly began to move his ragtag army to the junction.”

one of the darlings of the Western army early in the war and had become the Union's youngest major general in March 1862. However, his inability the following month to engage his division at Grant's behest on the brutal first day of the Battle of Shiloh led Federal military authorities subsequently to post Wallace to assignments well removed from active theaters of operations—or so they thought.¹⁷

Tactical Situation

Uncertain whether the Confederate objective was Baltimore or Washington, Wallace concluded that Monocacy Junction provided the most logical point of defense. Near there the principal roads from Frederick to Washington and Baltimore crossed this broad river just two miles apart. To the north, the National Road from Frederick to Baltimore crossed a stone bridge, referred to by locals as the Jug

or Long Bridge. Further south were the iron B&O railroad bridge and another 300 yards beyond this a wooden, covered bridge on the Georgetown Pike connecting Frederick to Washington. Southwest of the pike and fronting the river were two farms, one belonging to the family of C. Keefer Thomas situated adjacent to the road and the other, that of John T. Worthington, located further south and west along the river. Wallace thought that by stretching his meager forces along the riverfront near the junction of the rail spur to Frederick he could force the Confederates to disclose their strength and primary objective, while delaying them sufficiently to buy time for Grant's veterans to arrive in Washington.¹⁸

With no direction from his confused superiors, Wallace quietly began to move his ragtag army to the junction. On 5 July he informed Halleck of his troop movements and then took a night locomotive to Frederick. The following day he positioned his second-line neophyte infantry, augmented with limited light field artillery, at the rail junction west of the Monocacy. Unknown to Wallace, Grant on 6 July dispatched Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts's Third Division, Sixth Corps, to bolster the defenses of Washington and nearby Maryland. These veterans, elated to leave the desolate, sandy killing fields of Southside Virginia, arrived by boat in Baltimore two to three days later. The first two brigades of this division would ultimately form the core of Wallace's defenses on the Monocacy.¹⁹

On 7 July Wallace acquired the 230 veteran troopers who comprised five companies of Lt. Col. Daniel Clendenin's 8th Illinois Cavalry. One of the more experienced and better mounted units in the Army of the Potomac, the regiment had been dispatched by Maj. Gen. Christopher Augur, commander of the Department of Washington, to investigate the loss of communication between Washington and Harper's Ferry. The forward elements of Ricketts's division began arriving aboard B&O Railroad cars the following day, and by the evening of 8 July the bulk



Camp of the Seventh Regiment, near Frederick, Maryland, in July 1863, by Sanford Gifford

of the First and Second Brigades of the division had either reached the Monocacy or advanced into Frederick, bolstering Wallace's army with nearly 3,400 battle-tested veterans.²⁰

The opposing cavalry forces, meanwhile, had clashed on 7 July near Middletown west of Frederick. After a day of skirmishing with superior Confederate forces, Clendenin, supported by the Baltimore light artillery battery, slowly withdrew to Frederick. Clendenin's cavalry harassed the Confederates in flying skirmishes the next day as well. Late in the afternoon of 8 July, however, an observer in the cupola of the Frederick County courthouse spotted three long gray lines of dust moving down from the mountain passes toward Frederick. Approaching the point of contention was the entire Army of the Valley District. Wallace retreated from Frederick that evening, resolved to forcefully confront his more powerful opponent along the east bank of the Monocacy River. After occupying Frederick, Early detached


General Johnson's cavalry brigade to harass Baltimore and collaborate in the anticipated Point Lookout Prison breakout.²¹

Having abandoned Frederick to the advancing Confederates, Wallace positioned his forces in strong defensive positions etched out along the banks of the Monocacy River. He ordered the militia under General Tyler to guard the Long Bridge and several nearby fords along his right flank from an easily defensible ridge line. To protect the covered bridge and iron trestle, he placed 350 skirmishers west of the river in a forward position at the railroad junction. This force consisted of soldiers from the 10th Vermont Infantry, two companies of the 9th New York Heavy Artillery, and a smattering of men from the 1st Maryland Potomac Home Brigade. The railroad tracks ran atop an earthen embankment that served as an excellent defensive position. The river trestle was already fortified with wooden blockhouses at either end and with rifle pits flanking the eastern side. At a bluff

just east of the trestle, Wallace stood surveying the scene from a position adjacent to the Federals' only 24-pound howitzer.²²

Anticipating that the main Confederate thrust would come from the south, Wallace positioned Ricketts's seasoned troops along his left flank. These men formed along a fence that divided the Thomas and Worthington farms and was south of and roughly parallel to the Georgetown Pike. Summarizing his approach in his autobiography, Wallace explained that he assigned "the raw men to Tyler; the veterans to Ricketts." The Baltimore battery, consisting of six 3-inch Parrott rifled cannon under the command of Capt. Frederick Alexander, was split to cover the bridges and Ricketts's division, where the main Confederate attack was anticipated. The terrain on the western bank of the river was almost entirely flat, open farmland.²³

Thus it was here at Monocacy Junction, on nearly optimal ground that Wallace had selected, that he and



Map 2: The Battle of Monocacy

Courtesy of the Monocacy National Battlefield, National Park Service

a frontal attack across the Monocacy River would be too costly, the Confederates sought instead to outflank the Union line. They were aided in this endeavor by the timely arrival from the southwest of McCausland's cavalry, which had spent the previous night west of Frederick. Obliging a local farmer to point out a shallow stretch of the river south of the Georgetown Pike, McCausland's troopers, roughly 1,000 strong, promptly splashed across the Worthington-McKinney Ford, before dismounting at about 1030 hours at the Worthington farm on the eastern bank.²⁴

Leaving behind about a quarter of his men to watch the horses, McCausland assembled his dismounted troops in a battle line and headed east toward a field of waist-high corn. The field sloped gradually upward toward the fence at its eastern end that marked the line between the Worthington and Thomas farms. There McCausland observed several Union officers, but he failed to see Ricketts's troops concealed in a prone position behind the fence. Anticipating at best a contingent of unseasoned Union militia, McCausland chose not to send skirmishers ahead and instead simply had his forces charge the fence on foot. As the cavalymen approached within 125 yards of the fence line, the hidden Union soldiers stood up, leveled their rifles on the rail fence, and fired. The entire rebel line collapsed; those not instantly killed or incapacitated retreated by crawling back to the Worthington farmhouse and then running back to the riverbank.²⁵

Early that afternoon, the frustrated McCausland regrouped his horsehandlers and launched another attack. This time, the rebel cavalymen shifted about 200 yards to their right in an effort to overlap the Union line. Because of a small hill that blocked the defenders' view, Ricketts's infantry did not observe their movement until it had almost reached the Thomas property boundary. Only then did they shift to their left in an attempt to extend their line. Firing as they advanced, the

his Federal forces, now totaling some 6,200 men, would make their stand. Opposing them were approximately 17,000 highly motivated and combat-hardened Confederates spearheaded by some of the best leadership remaining in the South. These troops, supported by superior field artillery and cavalry, were much better armed and equipped than Wallace's. In the face of these disparities, the outcome for Wallace was inevitable. He would lose the battle.

Fighting along the Monocacy

Saturday, 9 July, dawned with Wallace's army prepared for battle at the three bridges across the Monocacy River. Ramseur's rebels began probing around 0600 toward the covered bridge on the Georgetown Pike, while Rodes's division demonstrated at the Long Bridge on the National Road (Map 2). Over the course of the next three hours the Confederate artillery arrived and began lobbing shells into the Union positions. Believing that

Confederates drove back the Union flank as far as the Thomas farmhouse. Observing this from the bluff, Wallace rapidly shifted his limited artillery fire and snipers to cover the flank while directing two regiments held in reserve to charge with fixed bayonets. This started a hand-to-hand melee that lasted about twenty minutes before the Federal forces again pushed the rebels back to the Worthington farm. Stunned by another setback, McCausland withdrew to the ford and retired for the day.²⁶

Around this time the fog of war shifted from gray to blue, and Wallace was beset with problems. An inexperienced member of the 24-pound howitzer gun crew rammed a shell without first inserting a charge, rendering the weapon inoperable. This howitzer had a much longer killing range, from 1,300 to 1,400 yards, than did the 3-inch guns, so its loss was significant. In addition, as the rebels massed on the Georgetown Pike threatening to break through, Wallace ordered the covered bridge set on fire, leaving his valiant skirmishers stranded on the west bank. Upriver, General Tyler's men remained engaged in a spirited fight for the Long Bridge. Wallace was still hoping for reinforcement from an additional three regiments of the Second Brigade, Sixth Corps, that he had been told would arrive by rail from Baltimore early in the afternoon.²⁷

After McCausland's mistake at Hagerstown, Early developed a keen interest in seeing Frederick ransomed for a full \$200,000. This effort apparently diverted Early from the developing battle in the morning. Not surprisingly, Frederick's mayor stalled for time, creating an impasse that would not be resolved until Early's adjutant, Alexander Pendleton, a former Frederick resident, could inform Frederick representatives of the rebel victory on the Monocacy late in the day. Five local banks then advanced the money the Confederates demanded, imposing a financial burden the city would not completely repay until 1951.²⁸

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


General Ricketts

To ascertain why his forces were being delayed, Early rode out to the rail junction late in the morning. There he witnessed McCausland's second retreat from the Worthington farm and ordered Breckinridge to send Gordon's crack infantry division to the front to deliver a hammer blow to Wallace's flank. About 1430 Gordon began consolidating his forces on the east side of the river, again using the Worthington property as a staging area. Thereafter he deployed skirmishers and began implementing a plan to hit the Federals on their left and overlap them. Assaults would occur simultaneously at other positions to prevent the Fed-

erals from sending reinforcements to the left. Specifically, Gordon directed General Evans's brigade to move by the Union left flank and overlap it and ordered General York's brigade to support Evans. The *en echelon* attack stepped off.²⁹ (Map 2)

Wallace, anticipating this massive blow, ordered Ricketts to withdraw from the fence line to higher ground farther east. His right flank was now near the burning bridge and his left near the Thomas farmhouse. Wallace then shifted the bridge's defenders as well as his light artillery to cover the left flank and committed the last of his reserve to the exposed southern flank.



General Gordon

These forces were arrayed into three defensible but separate ranks. Just as this was accomplished, the opposing forces converged. Evans's Confederates met fierce resistance, and their leader was severely wounded while leading the charge. York's soldiers, meanwhile, drove Ricketts's first line back upon his second. Observing this, Gordon regrouped his forces and ordered another charge. This drove back Ricketts's second line to his third and final line of battle, a line that overlapped his flanks and took advantage of deep cuts along the Georgetown Pike. Tapping what he would later describe as "an enthusi-

asm which amounted almost to a martial delirium," Gordon ordered General Terry's brigade to attack the portion of Ricketts's line anchored along the river. This assault pierced the Union line and drove the Federal forces back across the fields of the Thomas farm.³⁰

Meanwhile, the rest of Gordon's attack continued to meet sharp resistance, and Gordon's favorite battle horse was killed under him in the fierce combat. Hence, Gordon had Terry shift his line of attack. Terry's second assault, combined with a renewed attack on the center of Ricketts's line, resulted, Gordon later reported, in "the complete

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roust of the enemy's forces." Ricketts's troops retreated along farm lanes to the National Road, followed by the Union skirmishers who had held out at the railroad junction west of the river. By 1700 hours the main battlefield was clear of Union troops. Perhaps an hour later, General Tyler's forces, now facing renewed attack from Rodes's division at the Long Bridge and threatened by the Confederate advance east of the river, likewise retreated, having first successfully protected Wallace's withdrawal. Early now had an open road to Washington, for the Confederates had won the field.³¹

That evening as the Federals hastened in retreat toward Baltimore, few knew the magnitude of their losses. Eventually calculated at 123 killed in battle; 603 wounded, including some who would die of their wounds; and 568 missing or captured, Union casualties totaled 1,294. Of these all but 222 were among the Vermont, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Ohio regiments that formed the First and Second Brigades of Ricketts's Third Division, Sixth Corps. Those regiments had thus sustained an astounding 32 percent casualty rate. One of the wounded was Col. William H. Seward Jr., commander of the 9th New York Heavy Artillery and son of President Abraham Lincoln's secretary of state.³²


Early estimated his losses at 600 to 700, including 400 wounded who would fall into Federal hands when Union troops recaptured Frederick, but Confederate losses were undoubtedly higher than that as Gordon's division alone counted 698 casualties. A more realistic estimate places Confederate casualties around 1,300 to 1,500. Among the Confederates killed at the Monocacy were the colonel and lieutenant colonel of the 61st Georgia Infantry. Reporting to General Lee five days after the fight at the Monocacy, Early glossed over the battle, observing that "the enemy in a very short time was completely routed by Gordon, and left the field in great disorder and retreated in haste to Baltimore." He did not realize that the day's delay at

the Monocacy had vitiated his threat to the capital. After this prolonged and bloody battle in the intense summer heat, the exhausted rebel army bivouacked that night among the dead and dying.³³

That same evening Grant finally realized the seriousness of the threat to the capital and directed north the remainder of the Sixth Corps. Four brigades from the First and Second Divisions of this corps led by the corps commander, Maj. Gen. Horatio Wright, departed City Point, Virginia, around 1100 hours the next day. In addition, Grant ordered a brigade of the Nineteenth Corps, which had been traveling to Virginia by ship from New Orleans, diverted to the capital as it passed Fort Monroe. By noon on 11 July boats carrying the Sixth Corps were landing in Washington.³⁴

Late in the morning of the tenth, the fatigued Confederates began their forty-mile march to the capital as temperatures began to rise into the nineties. After bivouacking outside Rockville that night, they advanced under similar conditions the following day to the forts guarding the northernmost portion of the District of Columbia, with Early's main force directed toward Fort Stevens just east of Rock Creek. Some 200 men from an Ohio infantry regiment and a Michigan artillery battery manned this Union position. After calling up the District's militia, General Augur sent a mixed group of veterans, convalescents, and War Department clerks north of Fort Stevens, where they skirmished with troops from Rodes's division and kept the Confederates from approaching within 100 yards of the fort. Meanwhile the heavy guns from several forts on Washington's northern defense lines bombarded Confederate troop concentrations. As the clashes took place north of Fort Stevens, the troops of the Second Division, Sixth Corps, that Grant had sent to defend the city began to mass south of the line of forts, preparing to repel any possible breakthrough. The rebels, apparently intimidated by the artillery of the forts that

National Archives photo



General Augur

ringed the city, mounted no serious attack on any of them. Late in the day the Sixth Corps troops pushed forward the Union lines north of Fort Stevens, when they began to sag.³⁵

Early deliberated with his senior subordinate commanders that evening at "Silver Spring," the commandeered mansion of absent Francis Preston Blair Sr., father of Lincoln's postmaster general. The Confederate leaders had found the forts "to be very strong and constructed very scientifically." Recognizing the arrival of the Sixth Corps troops dispatched by Grant, Early concluded that an effort to capture one of the forts, even if successful, would deplete his strength so severely that it "would insure [*sic*] the destruction of my whole force." He thus decided to forego a determined assault on the

capital's defenses and chose instead to continue the desultory attacks at the edge of the District during the day in preparation for a withdrawal when darkness fell the following night.³⁶

President Lincoln provided much of the drama that the fighting on 12 July retained. Coming to Fort Stevens to observe the action, the president exposed himself to the fire of enemy sharpshooters. A Sixth Corps aide, Capt. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., later reported that he had shouted at Lincoln, whom he had failed to recognize, "Get down, you damn fool, before you get shot!" Concerned about their commander in chief's safety, senior Union officers dispatched a brigade of the Second Division, Sixth Corps, to clear the rebels from small-arms range of the fort. This engagement resulted in some

200 to 400 casualties on each side, with the Union forces succeeding in pushing back the Confederates. Elements of the First Division, Sixth Corps, the Second Brigade of which was commanded by Brig. Gen. Emory Upton, a prominent postwar Army theoretician, also arrived in Washington from Grant's army that day. Early withdrew his forces that evening, marching west through Poolesville to White's Ferry, where he recrossed the Potomac River into Virginia, and returned to the Shenandoah Valley.³⁷

Significance

The significance to the Confederates of their tactical victory at the Monocacy on 9 July evaporated quickly as their leaders began the following day to march the winded Army of the Valley District through the summer heat and dust southeast toward the Federal capital. When the exhausted rebel force arrived before the defenses of Washington on 11 July, it had failed by scant hours to reach the city ahead of the first of Grant's reinforcements. The lost hours which Wallace had forced Early to expend on the banks of the Monocacy had made a successful assault on the capital's defenses completely unachievable, making the Battle of Monocacy a strategic victory for the Union.

Despite being denied his ultimate objective, Early did relieve some of the pressure that Grant had been applying on Lee's army, and this may have gained some additional time for the Southern cause. Early's army marched home with an impressive train of plunder-laden wagons, a renewed spirit of audacity among its men, and well-shod infantry that had started north barefoot. With General Hunter removed from the area, the Confederates could again hope to harvest the produce of the fertile Shenandoah Valley and to provide its sustenance to Lee's beleaguered Army.

General Johnson's cavalry raid also achieved a degree of success. By 7 July, however, Federal authorities had learned of the Point Lookout mission.



National Archives photo

General Johnson

In response, they began to shuttle many prisoners north to a new prisoner-of-war facility in Elmira, New York, and stepped up naval patrols on the Potomac. As Johnson came to realize that he did not realistically have enough time or manpower to accomplish all of his missions, he chose to focus the efforts of his 1,500 cavalrymen in the environs of Baltimore, where he created tremendous mischief, destroying sections of several railroad and telegraph lines as well as critical bridges. As Early skirmished with the defenders of Washington on 12 July, the capital lacked direct rail or telegraph connections to the North owing to these cavalry actions. When Johnson's marauders clattered southward toward Washington that day, a courier from Early informed Johnson that Confederate President Jefferson Davis had cancelled the Point Lookout operation and instructed the cavalry leader to rejoin Early's main army north of Fort Stevens. Johnson's men continued destroying railroad ties and telegraph lines as they rode cross country, before rejoining Early's forces that evening.³⁸

But what if Early had taken Washington, D.C.? In the short term, the occupation of the Union capital would have put the Confederacy in a stronger position for negotiating peace or achieving recognition from the nations of Europe than it had ever previously enjoyed. Militarily, the city was home to a large naval yard and an extensive supply depot that contained substantial stores of ordnance, commissary, quartermaster, and medical materiel. In the civil sphere, the city housed all the departments and records of the Federal government, including the Treasury Department with its millions in currency and signed bonds ready for issuance. One may assume that whatever of military value the Army of the Valley District would be unable to carry back to Virginia would have been put to the torch, much as the Virginia Military Institute had been burned by General Hunter the month before. In the long term, this embarrassment to the Federal government would probably have forced President Lincoln to relieve Grant of command, denying the Union its best military leader. Further, the blow to national morale might well have swayed the 1864 presidential election toward Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and led to a compromise peace. Indeed, even without the loss of his capital, Lincoln's political prospects in July 1864 were uncertain. As the president issued a call for 500,000 more conscripts less than a week after Early's departure from the defenses of Washington, an opposition newspaper editor in Ohio wrote that "Lincoln is *deader* than dead."³⁹

Washington's relief, which had been facilitated by the stubborn defense of the Monocacy bridges undertaken by the much maligned Lew Wallace and his ragtag army, served as an abrupt wake-up call that revived the Union Army's efforts to safeguard the most threatening invasion route to the North. In the aftermath of Early's march on Washington, the Union began a new offensive in the Shenandoah Valley, which for years had been a critical battleground area. Maj. Gen. Philip

H. Sheridan, who was appointed to replace Hunter, thoroughly defeated Early's army there in a series of battles in September and October, destroying in the process much of the region's farm produce and denying Lee's army an essential source of its sustenance. Union arms also captured Atlanta, Georgia, and pressed forward against the defenses of Richmond and Petersburg, Virginia, in the late summer and early autumn of 1864, laying the groundwork for the reelection of President Lincoln and ensuring the defeat of the Confederacy.⁴⁰

Battle Analysis

The strategic delaying action achieved by the Union at the Battle of Monocacy can largely be attributed to the superb leadership of General Wallace. Despite a lack of military intelligence, he skillfully employed the principles of war and correctly assessed his opponent's strength and potential objectives. Wallace pursued a clear and simple plan: stall the enemy to buy time for Grant to send reinforcements. Wallace displayed uncanny wisdom in choosing Monocacy Junction to make his stand. In hindsight there was no better location. Putting aside his history of differences with the Union's senior commanders and heedless of the danger of losing his command for suffering an almost certain defeat, Wallace quietly seized the initiative. Without permission from superiors he transported his forces beyond his departmental jurisdiction, thereby violating Halleck's standing orders. Once positioned in Frederick, he established a line of communication with Washington, enabling him to provide his superiors an estimate of the situation and a desperate request for reinforcements.

Wallace accomplished his objectives at the Monocacy by maximizing his limited resources and employing the units under his command to their fullest tactical potential. Despite being significantly outnumbered, he took the offensive on 7 July by sending Clendenin's cavalry forward to conduct reconnaissance and harass the

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Lew Wallace

enemy. This movement significantly slowed Early's advance and masked the strength and disposition of Union forces. The Confederates' lack of intelligence about the Union forces that faced them along the Monocacy proved disastrous to McCausland at the onset of the battle, when he blindly attacked Ricketts's front expecting to encounter only untested militia. Wallace, anticipating Early's movements toward Washington, skillfully deployed Ricketts's battle-hardened veterans on the terrain that would form the Confederate axis of advance, while placing the militiamen upriver at positions the Confederates would not seriously contest. This alignment was a masterful application of the principle of economy of force and was strongly enhanced by Generals Tyler and Ricketts being provided independent commands with a simple mission—not to retreat until

directed.⁴¹ In retaining ultimate control of the battlefield and providing clear instructions to his subordinates, Wallace adhered to the principles of unity of command, simplicity, and objective. Wallace wisely positioned himself on the high ground adjacent to the main battle area, where he could monitor the battle and shift his troops to most effectively delay the inevitable defeat. He positioned his limited artillery nearby, providing them optimal fields of fire to support his defenses.

Neglecting other nearby fords where Confederate divisions not fully engaged in the fight might have crossed the Monocacy, Early restricted his attacks to Wallace's left flank at the Worthington and Thomas farms. This uni-dimensional approach permitted Wallace to retain his freedom of action and to react to the developing situation at pivotal moments. Orchestrating quick shifts in his artillery and infantry reserves, Wallace managed to halt successive Confederate attacks despite his forces' decidedly inferior numbers. These were skillful applications of the principles of mass and maneuver. Observing McCausland's second attack, Wallace recognized that Ricketts's position was in jeopardy and quickly responded by committing reserves to extend Ricketts's flank and there meet the main attack. Soon thereafter, seeing Confederates massing before the covered bridge, Wallace sensibly chose to destroy it, denying the enemy that avenue of approach. Knowing the final blow from an overwhelming force would soon follow, Wallace wisely committed his reserves and shifted his field artillery to support the left flank.

While accomplishing his objectives, Wallace exhibited high moral courage by continuing to contest the ground rather than retreat. As Wallace later recalled, one thought in particular hardened his resolve, “an apparition of President Lincoln, cloaked and hooded, stealing like a malefactor from the back door of the White House just as some gray-garbed Confederate brigadier burst in the front door.”⁴² Wallace arrayed all available forces into three

supporting lines directly in front of the Confederate attack; because of this, the fighting there was brutal and Gordon's division suffered heavy losses. Not until all three brigades of Gordon's division were committed was Wallace finally forced to concede the ground. Both he and Ricketts maintained a strong presence in the Federal forces' retrograde action, thereby preventing the army from being completely routed. The high casualty rates on both sides were indicative of the superior morale and courage of both sets of combatants.

No battle analyzed in hindsight ever meets tactical perfection. Because of poor communication, three regiments of Ricketts's Second Brigade remained eight miles from the front and never engaged in the fight. Wallace also had the covered bridge burned without ensuring that the forward skirmishers were notified. Despite losing their preferred avenue of retreat, the skirmishers continued to fight valiantly, and only after they observed the main Federal force being dislodged did they re-cross the river on the iron trestle. This steadfast effort won the Medal of Honor for 1st Lt. George E. Davis of Company D, 10th Vermont Infantry, who commanded the skirmishers during most of the fight. Another Vermonter, Cpl. Alexander Scott, similarly received the Medal of Honor for his services as color bearer during the battle. General Tyler, who held his position at the Long Bridge until 1800 hours, only escaped because the tired Confederate forces chose not to pursue him.⁴³ Arguably, Wallace could have more effectively contested the Worthington-McKinney Ford and have destroyed all the bridges across the Monocacy River. Regardless of these shortcomings, Lew Wallace proved himself a capable match for the formidable Jubal Early and a boon to the military bureaucrats in the capital who held him in low regard.

Early, on the other hand, can be rebuked for ineffective leadership both before and during the battle. After invading Maryland, his army spent critical time foraging rather than focusing on reaching Washington. The costly

battle at the Monocacy might have been completely avoided and Wallace's forces outflanked or routed had General Johnson's cavalry brigade not been detached that day to threaten Baltimore and Point Lookout. Johnson, a Frederick native, and his cavalymen could have led the Valley Army unopposed around Wallace's troops via the Buckeystown Road and fords nearer the mouth of the Monocacy.⁴⁴ Failing this, Early still might have defeated Wallace much earlier had he taken a more active role in the battle. During the initial phase of the battle Early's insistence on ransoming Frederick for \$200,000 seemed to take priority over his role as field commander. The result was a poor Confederate analysis of the terrain and a slow development of the attack from a vastly inferior tactical position. By sending their forces across the Monocacy piecemeal at a single ford, the Confederates allowed the Federal defenders to concentrate their efforts in a single direction and substantially reduced the ratio of attackers to defenders at the critical point of engagement. Early's inadequate intelligence-gathering operation significantly hurt General McCausland in the first engagement. Then, by not augmenting McCausland with veteran infantry, Early allowed the dismounted cavalymen to conduct a second unsuccessful attack that wasted precious time and resources. Only in the early afternoon did Early finally take an active role and employ the principle of mass to eventually win the field. Even then, General Gordon's division bore the brunt of the attack, while the divisions of Generals Echols, Rodes, and Ramseur made little direct contribution to the outcome of the battle.

The superior quantity and range of Early's field artillery proved significant in this victory, but it is noteworthy that not a single piece of Union artillery was damaged by Confederate fire.⁴⁵ The silencing of the exposed Union artillery should indeed have been a high priority for General Early. The old warrior had earlier caused Lee great concern over some of the same problems that arose in his contest with Wallace—poor em-

ployment of his cavalry, lack of timely action, failure to seek the opinions of his subordinates, and placing personal goals over military gains. However Lee found these faults more than offset by Early's independent thinking and his willingness to engage the enemy to the death.⁴⁶

The impact of the battle at the Monocacy was succinctly summarized by General Grant in his memoirs. "If Early had been but one day earlier he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements I had sent. Whether the delay caused by the battle amounted to a day or not, General Wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory."⁴⁷ The annals of American history should record Lew Wallace not only as the eloquent author of *Ben-Hur* but also as the savior of Washington.⁴⁸

The Author

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NOTES

1. William B. Feis, "A Union Military Intelligence Failure: Jubal Early's Raid, June 12–July 14, 1864," *Civil War History* 36 (1990): 213; Benjamin Franklin Cooling, *Symbol, Sword, and Shield: Defending Washington during the Civil War* (2d ed., Shippensburg, Pa., 1991), pp. 182–83; Joseph Judge, *Season of Fire: The Confederate Strike on Washington* (Berryville, Va. 1994), p. 14; James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York, 1988), pp. 737–43.

2. Jubal Anderson Early, *War Memoirs: Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War between the States* (1912, New York, 1989), p. 371; General R. E. Lee to James A. Seddon,

Confederate Secretary of War, 19 Jul 1864, printed in Clifford Dowdey, ed., *The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee* (Boston, 1961), p. 822 (quotation).

3. Millard Kessler Bushong, *Old Jube: A Biography of General Jubal A. Early* (1955, Shippensburg, Pa., 1985), pp. 186–88; U.S. War Department, *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1880–1901), ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 99–100 (hereafter cited as *OR* with series and volume numbers); L. VanLoan Naisawald, "Old Jubilee Saves Lynchburg," *America's Civil War* 16 (May 2003): 30–38, 72. Nicholls would later serve as governor of Louisiana and chief justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

4. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 100, 103–06; Naisawald, "Old Jubilee Saves Lynchburg," pp. 30–38, 72. The Union casualty figures covered the period 10–23 June 1864.

5. B. Franklin Cooling, *Monocacy: The Battle That Saved Washington* (Shippensburg, Pa., 1997), pp. 48–49; Judge, *Season of Fire*, p. 111.

6. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 160; Judge, *Season of Fire*, pp. 115–16; Bushong, *Old Jube*, p. 194; Frank E. Vandiver, *Jubal's Raid: General Early's Famous Attack on Washington in 1864* (New York, 1960), p. 61.

7. Judge, *Season of Fire*, p. 122; B. Franklin Cooling, *Jubal Early's Raid on Washington* (Baltimore, 1989), pp. 17–23. Gordon would later serve as governor of Georgia and for thirteen years as United States senator from that state. Colonel Patton was the grandfather of World War II Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.

8. Judge, *Season of Fire*, p. 122.

9. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 12–13 (quote, p. 13); Bushong, *Old Jube*, p. 195; Vandiver, *Jubal's Raid*, p. 76–77.

10. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 175–76, 179; Bushong, *Old Jube*, p. 195–96; Ezra J. Warner, *Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders* (Baton Rouge, 1964), pp. 447–48, 545–46. Sigel claimed that over two-thirds of his troops were 100-days men.

11. Vandiver, *Jubal's Raid*, p. 77–92; Cooling, *Monocacy*, p. 13; Early, *War Memoirs*, pp. 384–85; Bushong, *Old Jube*, p. 197.

12. Early, *War Memoirs*, pp. 385–86; Vandiver, *Jubal's Raid*, pp. 92–93; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 767; Cooling, *Monocacy*, p. 86; Charles C. Osborne, *Jubal: The Life and Times of General Jubal A. Early, CSA, Defender of the Lost Cause* (Chapel Hill, 1992), p. 267.

13. Judge, *Season of Fire*, p. 141–42; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 79–80 (quote, p. 80).

14. Feis, "A Union Military Intelligence Failure" pp. 211, 220–21; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 31, 38, 40; Cooling, *Jubal Early's Raid*, pp. 34–36.

15. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 38–39; J. Thomas Scharf, *History of Western Maryland*, 2 vols. (1882, reprint ed., Baltimore, 1968), 1: 316–18; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 19, pt. 1, pp. 548–49; Lew Wallace, *Smoke, Sound & Fury: The Civil War Memoirs of Major-General Lew Wallace, U.S. Volunteers*, ed. Jim Leeke (Portland, Oreg., 1998), pp. 212–13 (quote). The Potomac Home Brigade regiments were organized by

Congressman Francis Thomas of Frederick, Maryland, but their field-grade officers were appointed by the president,

16. Cooling, *Monocacy*, p. 39; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 573–74.

17. Gloria Baker Swift and Gail Stephens, "Honor Redeemed: Lew Wallace's Military Career and the Battle of Monocacy," *North and South* 4 (January 2001): 34–41.

18. Glenn H. Worthington, *Fighting for Time: The Battle That Saved Washington* (1932, rev. ed., Shippensburg, Pa., 1985), pp. 55–62; Wallace, *Smoke, Sound & Fury*, pp. 218–19; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 41–42, 109.

19. Judge, *Season of Fire*, p. 146; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 23, 56–57, 74, 76; Cooling, *Jubal Early's Raid*, p. 38; Alfred S. Roe, *Monocacy, Co. A, 9th New York Heavy Artillery* (1894, reprint ed., Baltimore, 1996).

20. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 43, 64, 76–81; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 194–96.

21. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 213–14, 219–220, 223; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 67–82, 86.

22. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 191–92, 215; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 112–14; Worthington, *Fighting for Time*, pp. 108–10.

23. Wallace, *Smoke, Sound & Fury*, p. 248 (quote), 252; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 196, 223–24; Osborne, *Jubal*, p. 271.

24. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 191, 215, 217; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 112, 116–17; Worthington, *Fighting for Time*, p. 107.

25. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 118–19; Judge, *Season of Fire*, pp. 181–85.

26. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 140–42; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 205.

27. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 111, 114, 120, 140; Judge, *Season of Fire*, pp. 178–81.

28. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 97–99; Edward S. Delaplaine, "General Early's Levy on Frederick," in Frederick County Civil War Centennial, Inc., *To Commemorate the 100th Anniversary of the Battle of Monocacy, "The Battle That Saved Washington"* (n.p., 1964), pp. 42–55; Mary Fitzhugh Hitselberger and John Philip Dern, *Bridge in Time: The Complete 1850 Census of Frederick County, Maryland* (Redwood City, Calif., 1978), p. 31.

29. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 115, 139, 143; Judge, *Season of Fire*, pp. 179–80, 187; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 350–51.

30. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 144, 146; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 351–52; John B. Gordon, *Reminiscences of the Civil War* (New York, 1903), pp. 312–13 (quote, p. 312).

31. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 351–52 (quote, p. 352); Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 157–58; Cooling, *Jubal Early's Raid*, pp. 74–76; Judge, *Season of Fire*, p. 202.

32. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 198, 201–02; pt. 2, p. 145.

33. *Ibid.*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 348 (quote), 352; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 180–81; Eric J. Wittenberg, "Roadblock En Route to Washington," *America's Civil War*, November 1993, p. 56.

34. Cooling, *Jubal Early's Raid*, pp. 87, 89, 122; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 190–91.

35. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 181–89; Cooling, *Jubal Early's Raid*, pp. 109–25.

36. Cooling, *Jubal Early's Raid*, pp. 136–37; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 348 (quotations).

37. Cooling, *Jubal Early's Raid*, pp. 138–50, 178–88; Margaret Leech, *Reveille in Washington* (New York, 1941), p. 343; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 194, 196–98; McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, p. 757 (quote).

38. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 50, 55, 177–78, 195.

39. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 97; McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, pp. 757–58, 771; Frank L. Klement, *The Copperheads in the Middle West* (Chicago, 1960), p. 233 (quote).

40. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, pp. 758, 774, 777–80.

41. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 217.

42. Wallace, *Smoke, Sound & Fury*, p. 230.

43. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 155–58; U.S. Senate, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, *Medal of Honor Recipients, 1863–1978* (Washington, D.C., 1979), pp. 69, 212. While Davis and Scott had become residents of Vermont by the time of the Civil War, Davis had been born in Massachusetts and Scott in Canada.

44. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 115–116; Early, *War Memoirs*, pp. 386–87.


45. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 224.

46. Vandiver, *Jubal's Raid*, p. 23.

47. Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant*, 2 vols. (New York, 1885–86), 2: 306.

48. Wallace's book *Ben-Hur: A Tale of the Christ* was published in New York in 1880.

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