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Frederick Douglas, c. 1870

ENEMY COMBATANTS



Black Soldiers in Confederate Prisons

BY THOMAS J. WARD JR.

In the final scene of the 1989 film *Glory!* the black enlisted men of the 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry and their white officers valiantly, but fruitlessly, storm Fort Wagner, the Confederate outpost defending Morris Island at the entrance to Charleston Harbor. While the film leaves the viewer with a powerful and historically accurate image of the sacrifice of African American soldiers and their white officers, it does not address the fate of those members of the 54th Massachusetts who were not killed but still did not return from the attack with their unit, having been captured on that South Carolina island in July 1863. The entrance of black troops—most but by no means all of whom were escaped slaves—into the Civil War following the Emancipation Proclamation created a dilemma for the Confederate authorities—what to do with black soldiers in Union blues taken prisoner on the battlefield?

In his almost two-year battle to convince the United States government to allow African Americans to fight for the Union, Frederick Douglass stated that “once let the black man get upon his person the brass letters

U.S., let him get an eagle on his button, and a musket on his shoulder, and bullets in his pocket, and there is no power on the earth or under the earth which can deny that he has earned the right of citizenship in the United States.”¹ Douglass’ assertion, equating military service with both manhood and citizenship, was not lost on Confederate authorities. If African Americans could serve as U.S. soldiers (as, of course, they had before), the ideological foundations of slavery and racial inequality would be flawed. The Confederacy could therefore not treat captured black soldiers in the same way that it treated white soldiers, for to do so would be to legitimize them as both soldiers and men and to implicitly accept the Emancipation Proclamation. Therefore, Confederate President Jefferson Davis included in an aggressive proclamation against perceived unlawful behavior by the Union Army that was issued on 24 December 1862, eight days before President Abraham Lincoln’s proclamation would take effect, a chilling warning to potential African American soldiers. He instructed the Confederate Army “that all negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered

over to the executive authorities of the respective States to which they belong, to be dealt with according to the law of said States.” A joint resolution adopted by the Confederate Congress and signed by Davis on 1 May 1863 adjusted this policy to provide that all “negroes or mulattoes,” slave or free, taken in arms should be turned over to the authorities in the state in which they are captured and that their officers should be tried by Confederate military tribunals for inciting servile insurrection and be subject, at the discretion of the court and the president, to the death penalty.²

Despite efforts by the Confederate government to articulate the status of captured black soldiers, the treatment of African Americans in Confederate custody varied tremendously throughout the war, depending on the time, the place, and the commander into whose hands they fell. Atrocities committed against black soldiers during the war, such as the infamous massacre of surrendering black troops at Fort Pillow, Tennessee, have been well documented. Indeed, some Confederate officers encouraged the killing of African American soldiers rather than taking them prisoner,

all blacks were assumed, by law, to be slaves unless they could prove otherwise

and there are numerous accounts of captured black soldiers being executed by Confederate forces. In Alabama, Col. John Tattnal reported in November 1862 that “I have given orders to shoot, wherever & whenever captured, all negroes found armed and acting in concert with the abolition troops.” In June 1863, Lt. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, commander of the Department of the Trans-Mississippi, wrote a subordinate that he had been “informed, that some of your troops have captured negroes in arms—I hope this may not be so, and that your subordinates . . . may have recognized the propriety of giving no quarter to armed negroes and their officers, in this way we may be relieved from a disagreeable dilemma.” Smith was uncertain about the Confederate government’s policy, however, and sought clarification. In response, the Confederate War Department advised the general to consider captured black troops as “deluded victims” who had been duped into serving the Yankee


cause and recommended that they be “received to Mercy & returned to their owners.”³ There is little way of knowing exactly how many black soldiers were executed after surrendering to Confederate forces, but, at least by the summer of 1863, official Confederate government policy disapproved of the practice of executing black prisoners.

One of the difficulties for the Confederacy in establishing a policy for captured black soldiers was dealing with the distinction between Union soldiers who were runaway slaves and those who were freemen when the war began. Officially, neither Davis nor the Confederate Congress dealt with the question of free blacks, as in many Southern states, like South Carolina, all blacks were assumed, by law, to be slaves unless they could prove otherwise. As for the question of what to do with free blacks captured by Confederate troops, on 23 August 1863 Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon stated that “free negroes should be either promptly executed or

the determination arrived at that and announced not to execute them during the war.” However, Seddon asserted at this point that no black soldier should be treated as a prisoner of war.⁴

The black soldiers captured around Charleston during the summer of 1863 illustrate the difficulties Confederate authorities faced in determining the status of captured African American soldiers. The assault on Fort Wagner and related actions on the South Carolina coast that summer resulted in the capture by Confederates of between fifty and a hundred troops of the 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry; four black sailors were also captured and interned in Charleston. Confederate authorities had to scramble to figure out what to do with their black prisoners. On 16 July 1863, Brig. Gen. Johnson Hagood, who commanded Confederate forces on Morris Island, reported to his superior headquarters, “Thirteen prisoners Fifty-fourth Massachusetts, black. What shall I do with them?” Hagood also stated


Castle Pinckney



that all but two of the captured blacks were freemen, not escaped slaves. Also unsure what to do with the captured Massachusetts soldiers, General Pierre G. T. Beauregard, commander of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, ordered that, although they had been stripped of their uniforms, they would be held at the military prison at Castle Pinckney on an island in Charleston Harbor.⁵

The Union prisoners—both white and black—were marched through the streets of Charleston, where they were taunted by the citizenry, before the badly wounded were separated and taken to a hospital. The *Charleston Courier* reported, “A chief point of attraction in the city yesterday was the Yankee hospital in Queen Street, where the principal portion of the Federal wounded, negroes and whites, have been conveyed.” One of the members of the 54th Massachusetts captured at Fort Wagner, Pvt. Daniel States, was brought to the hospital where, he recalled, he received good treatment and food but the black prisoners were separated from the whites and received treatment last.⁶

Meanwhile, a debate raged between General Beauregard and South Carolina Governor Milledge L. Bonham, who wanted the captured black soldiers turned over to him. The general understood that Davis’ instruction that captured slaves should be turned over to the state in which “they belong” remained in effect and that this referred to the state in which they had been bondsmen, not where they had been captured. There was no evidence that any of the prisoners were South Carolina slaves. Beauregard, however, looked to Richmond for direction about the free black soldiers that had been seized, asking, “Shall they [the black prisoners who claim to be free] be turned over to State authorities with the other negroes?” Four days later, he



Governor Bonham

inquired again, “What shall be done with negro prisoners who say they are free?” Confederate Secretary of War James A. Seddon informed Beauregard that the Confederate Congress had ruled that all captured blacks should be “delivered to the authorities of the State or States in which they shall be captured, to be dealt with according to the present or future laws of such State or States.” Beauregard therefore turned twenty-four black prisoners over to the state of South Carolina, and they were transferred from Castle Pinckney to the Charleston jail.⁷

Governor Bonham, acting independently of the Richmond government, which on 1 September 1863 recommended that “the captured negroes

be not brought to trial” for fear of Union retaliation, made the decision to try the four captured Union soldiers who were alleged to have been slaves. The trial turned out to be an embarrassment for the governor, as the court ruled that, as a civil court, it lacked jurisdiction to try the cases of individuals alleged to have committed offenses as soldiers in the forces of the enemy, and it remanded the men back to Charleston jail. “About fifty of the colored troops are at the jail in Charleston,” wrote one black prisoner. “They are not confined in cells, but volunteering to work they are permitted to go into the yard. Most of the men have hardly enough clothing to cover them. Their food consists of one pint

“What shall be done with negro prisoners who say they are free?”

“They took me to . . . Rust, Tex., where they kept me at work for a long time.”

of meal each day. They receive nothing else from the Confederate authorities but this meal, and some of them say they never have enough to eat.” The prisoners remained in Charleston jail, under state control, until December 1864, when they were turned over to the Confederate military and placed in the prison camp at Florence, South Carolina. At least three of the more than forty imprisoned members of the 54th Massachusetts died during their year and a half in the Charleston jail,

and eight more died at Florence, which housed as many as fifteen thousand Union prisoners of war (POWs) at one time and where the poor conditions rivaled those of the notorious Confederate prison camp at Andersonville, Georgia.⁸

The confusion in Charleston over the status of black prisoners was emblematic of the lack of uniformity in treating black prisoners throughout the Confederacy. Unlike white POWs, a number of African American prison-

ers were put to forced labor on behalf of the Confederate military. Pvt. Robert Jones was captured at Milliken’s Bend, Louisiana; he later recalled that, “They took me to . . . Rust, Tex., where they kept me at work for a long time. . . . They had me at work doing every kind of work, loading steamboats, rebuilding breastworks, while I was in captivity.”⁹ One black prisoner at Mobile, Alabama, testified that he and other black prisoners “were placed at work on the fortifications there. . . .

A soldier in the 103d Infantry, U.S. Colored Troops, which served in South Carolina and Georgia in 1865 and 1866



Library of Congress

General Butler



National Archives

We were kept at hard labor and inhumanly treated; if we lagged or faltered, or misunderstood an order, we were whipped and abused; some of our men being detailed to whip others.”¹⁰ Near Fort Gilmer, Virginia, captured black troops were forced to work under enemy fire in the trenches. In retaliation, Union Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler placed an equal number of Confederate POWs on forward trenches as well. Within a week, the black prisoners were removed from the front lines, and Butler withdrew the Confederate POWs as well.¹¹

Slave owners were also encouraged to retrieve their former slaves or receive restitution for those in service to the Confederacy. In October 1864, the Mobile, Alabama, *Advertiser and Register* listed the names of 575 black prisoners of the 106th, 110th, and 111th U.S. Colored Troops (USCT) who “are employed by engineer corps at Mobile, Ala. The owners are notified in order to receive the pay due them.”¹² It is unknown if anyone actually answered the newspaper’s call, but there were instances where soldiers were returned to their former owners. Pvt. William Rann was captured at Athens, Alabama, in October 1864. “They started with us to Mobile,” he later recalled, but “at Tuscumbia my old master [John Rand, a physician] found me and took me away from the soldiers and took me home and kept me there. Whenever soldiers would come there they would run me out into the mountains. They kept me at home until the surrender.”¹³ Historian Walter Williams recounts a number of other instances where black prisoners were enslaved, stating that “One Confederate colonel reported . . . that with his general’s permission he ordered the sale of black captives, with the proceeds to be divided among the soldiers,” and that at Andersonville, “prison commander Henry Wirz allowed local planters to go inside the pen and inspect black prisoners, claiming any they thought to be theirs.”¹⁴


Confederates hoped that threats of enslavement or death to captured blacks (and their white officers) would serve as a deterrent to black troops.

Following the massacre of black troops at Fort Pillow, Confederate Maj. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest stated that the results of the battle there “will demonstrate to the Northern people that Negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners.” The opposite, however, seems to have been true. Historian Joseph T. Glatthaar asserts that the Confederate policies actually had a positive effect on the U.S. Colored Troops: “Black troops . . . realized that these white men were voluntarily placing their lives in grave jeopardy by serving in the U.S.C.T. And the white officers, realizing the perils of surrender, had to depend even more on the performance of their troops in battle, which forced them to work a little harder to improve the fighting ability of the men.” As the commander of one U.S. Colored

Troops regiment stated, “We all felt that we fought with ropes around our necks.” Believing that surrender would most likely bring death, numerous African American units fought under a black flag, warning rebels that they should expect no quarter from them, and would expect none in return. Indeed, there were incidents, such as one at Fort Blakely, Alabama, where black troops killed Confederate soldiers who were attempting to surrender.¹⁵

Despite the fact that many black soldiers vowed to fight under the black flag, hundreds of African American troops were taken prisoner during the course of the war and ended up in Confederate prisoner-of-war camps throughout the South. Ira Berlin argues that by 1864 Confederate policy toward captured blacks had softened

Secretary of War Seddon



considerably from the bombastic rhetoric of 1862, observing that “while never officially granted the rights of prisoners of war, black freemen seem to have been treated much as were captured white soldiers.” Records mention black soldiers being held in at least nine Confederate prison camps. In some cases, blacks were kept segregated from white prisoners. At Mobile, an old cotton warehouse was converted into a prison that held over five hundred black prisoners, where they were attended by a Confederate surgeon who treated the wounds of many of the men.¹⁶

The decision to effectively treat many captured black soldiers as POWs—while still denying them official POW status—came in part because of the U.S. government’s response to Confederate policies on black prisoners. President Lincoln was concerned about the fate of captured black soldiers, whom he planned to enlist in more substantial numbers beginning in 1863. The

Emancipation Proclamation thus stipulated specifically that former slaves “will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.” Lincoln included the limitations to the military service of these African Americans hoping to keep them from falling into enemy hands. As early as 10 January 1863, Lincoln summoned the secretaries of war and the Navy to the White House and instructed them to station black soldiers and sailors in areas where they would not likely be captured, such as Memphis. The officers commanding black soldiers, on the other hand, sought to get their units into the fight and pressed the issue of combat duty throughout the first half of 1863, resulting in the assault on Fort Wagner. While the men of the 54th Massachusetts were hailed as heroes for their courageous assault, the casualties and prisoners taken there confirmed Lincoln’s fears.¹⁷

Following Fort Wagner and the adoption of the joint resolution of the Confederate Congress providing that captured black soldiers “be put to death or be otherwise punished at the discretion” of a military court rather than be held as prisoners of war, Lincoln was convinced that more had to be done to protect the Union’s black troops. On 30 July 1863, he issued an order, which was published the next day in War Department General Orders 252, declaring that “the law of nations . . . permit no distinction as to color in the treatment of prisoners of war. . . and if the enemy shall sell or enslave any one because of his color, the offense shall be punished by retaliation upon the enemy’s prisoners in our possession.” If the Confederacy executed a Union soldier, the Union would retaliate in kind; if the Confederacy enslaved a Union soldier, a Confederate prisoner would “be placed at hard labor.” While Jefferson Davis publicly denounced Lincoln’s order, it did, for the most part, have the desired effect, as most black prisoners were treated much the same as their

Charleston city jail, built in 1802, as it appeared c. 1888



South Carolina Historical Society



Many Union prisoners of war arrived at the Andersonville, Georgia, railroad station en route to the Confederate prisoner-of-war camp nearby.

Confederates tried to use the Union's refusal to exchange prisoners for their own propaganda purposes

white counterparts during the rest of the war, although the Confederacy never officially acknowledged African Americans as POWs.¹⁸

In 1864, following the Confederate victory at the Battle of Olustee, Florida, numerous black soldiers were taken prisoner and seventy or more of them were then confined at Andersonville. One white POW observed the presence in the stockade of “a dozen or more Negroes, all prisoners of war. . . . Nearly all are minus an arm or leg, and their wounds are yet unhealed. Many of them are gangrened and they will all surely die. They keep by themselves and are very quiet. The Rebels have removed every vestige of any uniform they once wore, and they have nothing on but old cast off jean trousers and cotton shirts. All are bareheaded, barefooted, and as thin as skeletons.”¹⁹ At the camp, the black prisoners—and their white officers—established their own, segregated area near the south gate—the “Negro Squad”—because they were discriminated against by both their rebel guards and white Union POWs. The guards at Andersonville were notoriously hard on the black prisoners. “Some of these [black prisoners] were wounded, and the rebels refused to do anything for them;

they received no medicine or medical treatment,” recalled one white POW. “They were compelled to load and unload the dead who died daily in the stockade. . . . They were treated worse than dumb brutes, and the language used toward them by the rebels was of the most opprobrious character.” Another white prisoner recalled that the guards “seemed to have a particular spite toward the colored soldiers, and they had to go without rations several days at a time on account of not daring to go forward and get them.”²⁰

Black prisoners also faced the scorn of most of their white compatriots. This animosity was rooted in both racial attitudes and the belief that African American prisoners were the reason for the Union's refusal to conduct prisoner exchanges, a belief that had merit and was continually propagated by their captors. During the first two years of the war, captured soldiers from both sides were paroled and exchanged regularly, and there was no POW crisis on either side of the line. However, because the Confederacy refused to acknowledge African Americans as prisoners of war, it would not exchange black prisoners for Confederate soldiers held by the Union. Confederate leaders argued

that the United States had no right to arm slaves against their masters and believed that the Confederate Army was under no more obligation to return slaves than captured cannons or mules.²¹ As General Robert E. Lee wrote Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant in 1864, “negroes belonging to our citizens are not considered subjects of exchange.”²² Indeed, to exchange a black prisoner for a white one would imply a racial equality that was anathema to Confederate leaders.

By the summer of 1863, Union leaders were becoming disenchanted by the strategic benefits the Confederacy was deriving from the paroling and exchanging of prisoners. The widely publicized Confederate unwillingness to exchange black prisoners thus played right into Union hands, allowing the Lincoln administration to suspend prisoner exchanges until the Confederacy agreed to exchange black prisoners equally with whites. As Richmond refused to negotiate on this basis, the numbers held in both Union and Confederate prison camps grew exponentially in the fall of 1863. By the autumn of 1864, Davis' government, realizing that it could neither adequately care for Union prisoners nor replace its depleted



Men of the 107th Infantry, U.S. Colored Troops, which served in Virginia in 1864 and in North Carolina in 1865

ranks, offered to acknowledge black soldiers who were freemen before the war began as POWs and make them eligible for trading. The Union would have none of it, as General Grant opposed all prisoner exchanges, realizing that the moratorium on exchanges was working greatly in his favor. Because of the Union's manpower advantage, Grant did not need POW swaps to replenish his ranks, but Lee did. Lincoln, of course, could not state that it was military policy to leave tens of thousands of Union soldiers starving at Andersonville, Belle Isle, and Salis-

bury, especially in an election year. By refusing to exchange all black prisoners, the Confederate government in effect gave Lincoln and Grant political cover to bleed the Confederate Army white, in the name of protecting black soldiers.²³

Confederates tried to use the Union's refusal to exchange prisoners for their own propaganda purposes, especially in the camps. According to Edward Roberts, the Confederacy "began a campaign of disinformation," where POWs "were routinely told by Confederate officers that it was Abraham Lincoln's concern for Black soldiers that was the reason for their misery." In his study of Andersonville, William Marvel reported that a Confederate surgeon there "found the Union prisoners damning their own government up and down for abandoning them in the name of racial equality." Diary en-

tries confirm the idea that many white POWs blamed Lincoln and black soldiers for their situation. William F. Keys, a prisoner at Andersonville, reflected these sentiments, stating "it appears that the federal government thinks more of a few hundred niggers than of the thirty thousand whites here in bondage."²⁴

The ostracism of their brothers in arms further contributed to the misery of black prisoners. One black Massachusetts soldier, imprisoned in Charleston, wrote, "The privations of the white soldiers are nothing in comparison to ours . . . being as it were, without friends, and in the enemy's hands, with an almost hopelessness of being released, and not having heard from our families or friends since we were captured." A white Union officer imprisoned at Danville, Virginia, concurred with this assessment, writing, "the negro soldiers suffered most. There were sixty-four of them living in prison when we reached Danville, October 20, '64. Fifty-seven of them were dead on the 12th of February, '65, when I saw and talked with the seven survivors."²⁵

Not until the spring of 1865 would the black prisoners' torment end. As Sherman's troops closed in and the Confederacy began to crumble, Union POWs, black and white, were put on the move as well. Pvt. Alfred Green, who had been captured in the assault at Fort Wagner, recalled, "We were taken to Florence Stockade [from Charleston] and remained over winter, and from there we were brought

Troops of the 1st South Carolina Infantry (African Descent) parade in Beaufort, South Carolina, 1863.



to Raleigh, N.C., and were then taken to Wilmington, N.C., and from there to Goldsboro. . . . We were there when our army came up.” After almost two years as a Confederate prisoner, Green was paroled at Goldsboro, North Carolina, in March 1865. With the demise of the Confederacy, black POWs were either paroled from the remaining Southern prison camps or simply walked away as their guards abandoned them. While it is unknown how many black troops may have been executed after they surrendered, according to a congressional committee report (which undoubtedly underestimates the number of captured black soldiers), 79 black Union soldiers died in Confederate prisons, 77 escaped, 384 were recaptured by Union forces, 236 were paroled at the end of the war, and “not one enlisted in the service of the enemy, or deserted the flag of the country.”²⁶



NOTES

This article is a revised version of a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association held in San Diego, California, in January 2010.

1. Frederick Douglass, “Address for the Promotion of Colored Enlistments,” 6 Jul 1863, quoted in Allen C. Guelzo, *Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 219.

2. Proclamation of Jefferson Davis, Dec 1862, printed in “Important from Richmond: Terrible Retaliatory Proclamation of Jeff. Davis,” *New York Herald*, 28 Dec 1862, and, as copied in Adj. and Insp. General’s Office, Richmond, Va., GO 111, 24 Dec 1862, reprinted in *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (hereinafter cited as *OR*), 128 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1880–1901), ser. 2, vol. 5, pp. 795–97, first quote, p. 797; Joint Resolution of the Confederate Congress, approved 1 May 1863, in *OR*, ser. 2, vol. 5, pp. 940–41, second quote, p. 940.

3. Ltr, Col John R. F. Tattall to Capt S. Croom, 8 Nov 1862, first quote; Ltr, Lt Gen E. Kirby Smith to Maj Gen Richard Taylor, 13

Jun 1863, second quote; portion of Ltr, H. L. Clay, Asst Adj Gen, to Smith, third and fourth quotes, all printed in Ira Berlin, ed., *The Black Military Experience*, Freedom, A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861–1867 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 571, 578–79.

4. Howard C. Westwood, “Captive Black Union Soldiers in Charleston—What to Do?” *Civil War History* 28 (1982): 28–44, quote, p. 37.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 28–29, 33, 39, quote, p. 28.

6. Luis F. Emilio, *A Brave Black Regiment: The History of the Fifty-Fourth Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, 1863–1865*, 2d ed. (1894; New York: Da Capo Press, 1995), pp. 399–401.

7. Westwood, “Captive Black Union Soldiers,” pp. 29–32; *OR*, ser. 2, vol. 6, pp. 125 (first quote), 134 (second quote), 159 (third quote), 169.

8. Westwood, “Captive Black Union Soldiers,” pp. 35–36, 38–40, 43–44, first quote, p. 38; Emilio, *Brave Black Regiment*, pp. 398–99, 411, 418–19, second quote, pp. 418–19.

9. File XC–2,536,702, Pension for Robert Jones, Civil War Pension Application Files, Record Group (RG) 15, Records of the Department of Veterans Affairs, National Archives (NA).

10. Leon F. Litwack, *Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of Slavery* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 88.

11. Dudley Taylor Cornish, *The Sable Arm: Black Troops in the Union Army, 1861–1865* (1956; Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987), p. 178.

12. *Ibid.*; *OR*, ser. 2, vol. 8, pp. 26–27, 109, quote, p. 27.

13. File XC–2,460,295, Pension for William Rann, Civil War Pension Application Files, RG 15, NA.

14. Walter L. Williams, “Again in Chains: Black Soldiers Suffering in Captivity,” *Civil War Times Illustrated* 20 (May 1981): 36–41, quotes, p. 40.

15. Joseph T. Glatthaar, *Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers* (New York: Free Press, 1990), pp. 157 (first quote), 158, 203 (second quote), 204 (third quote); *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 49, pt. 1, pp. 288–90; Thomas Wentworth Higginson, *Army Life in a Black Regiment* (Boston: Fields, Osgood, 1870); Ms, William A. Dobak, Freedom by the Sword: The U.S. Colored Troops, 1862–67, chapter 5, Historians files, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.; James M. McPherson, *The Negro’s Civil War:*

How American Negroes Felt and Acted during the War for the Union (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965), p. 225.

16. Berlin, *Black Military Experience*, p. 568, quote; Williams, “Again in Chains,” p. 41; File 404,448, Pension for Henry Everly, Civil War Pension Application Files, RG 15, NA.

17. Cornish, *Sable Arm*, pp. 161–62; Benjamin Quarles, *Lincoln and the Negro* (1962; New York: Da Capo Press, 1990), p. 174; Proclamation by President Abraham Lincoln, 1 Jan 1863, published in War Dept GO 1, 2 Jan 1863, and printed in *OR*, ser. 3, vol. 3, pp. 2–3, quote, p. 3; final draft of the proclamation, 29–31 Dec 1862, printed in Guelzo, *Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation*, pp. 257–58.

18. Quarles, *Lincoln and the Negro*, p. 175; Berlin, *Black Military Experience*, p. 583, quotes.

19. Robert Knox Sneden, *Eye of the Storm: A Civil War Odyssey*, ed. Charles F. Bryan Jr. and Nelson D. Lankford (New York: Free Press, 2000), p. 225, quote; John David Smith, “Let Us All Be Grateful That We Have Colored Troops That Will Fight,” in *Black Soldiers in Blue: African American Troops in the Civil War Era*, ed. John David Smith (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), p. 49.

20. Arthur W. Bergeron Jr., “The Battle of Olustee,” in Smith, *Black Soldiers in Blue*, p. 145; Emilio, *Brave Black Regiment*, p. 429, quotes.

21. Litwack, *Been in the Storm So Long*, p. 89.

22. Ltr, General Robert E. Lee to Lt Gen Ulysses S. Grant, 3 Oct 1864, printed in *OR*, ser. 2, vol. 7, p. 914.

23. *Ibid.*; Quarles, *Lincoln and the Negro*, pp. 175–76; Charles W. Sanders Jr., *While in the Hands of the Enemy: Military Prisons of the Civil War* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005), pp. 133–62.

24. Edward F. Roberts, *Andersonville Journey* (Shippensburg, Pa.: Burd Street Press, 1998), p. 16, first and second quotes; William Marvel, *Andersonville: The Last Depot* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), p. 148, third and fourth quotes.

25. Emilio, *Brave Black Regiment*, p. 412, first quote; Williams, “Again in Chains,” p. 43, second quote.

26. Westwood, “Captive Black Union Soldiers,” p. 44; Emilio, *Brave Black Regiment*, pp. 398, 412, 422–23, 431, first quote, p. 423, second quote, p. 431.