Historical Study

Operations of Encircled Forces

German Experiences in Russia

Department of the Army

Pamphlet 20-234

Washington, DC 1952

CONTENTS

PREFACE

1. INTRODUCTION

2. THE POCKET OF KLIN—BREAKOUT OF A PANZER DIVISION

3. ENCIRCLEMENT AT VELIKIYE LUKI—FAILURE OF A RESCUE OPERATION

4. THE POCKET WEST OF CHERKASSY—THE INSIDE VIEW

I. Events Leading to the Formation of the Pocket 15
II. The Units Inside the German Pocket 19
III. Diary of the Commander of XLII Corps 20
IV. Breakout Order of XLII Corps
V. The Breakout

5. THE POCKET WEST OF CHERKASSY—THE OUTSIDE VIEW

I. The Encirclement
II. Plans for the Breakout
III. The Relief Operation
IV. The Breakout
V. Lessons

6. ENCIRCLEMENT OF A PANZER ARMY NEAR KAMENETS-PODOLSKIY

I. The Encirclement
II.The Breakout Plan
III. The Pocket Moves West
IV. The Escape
V. Evaluation

7. CONCLUSIONS

I. The Significance of a Pocket
II. Special Operating Procedures
III. The Breakout Decision
IV. Special Logistical Preparations
V. Tactical Preparations
VI. Supply and Evacuation
VII. Relief Operations
VIII. The Breakout
IX. Summary

APPENDIX. AIR SUPPORT OF ENCIRCLED FORCES

I. General Principles
II. Preparatory Measures
III. Air Reeonnaissanee
IV. Fighter Aviation
V. Close Support of Ground Actions
VI. Employment of Antiaircraft Units
VII. Evacuation by Air
VIII. Air Support During the Breakout

MAPS

General Reference Map
1. The Pocket of Klin
2. Encirclement at Velikiye Luki
3. Relief Thrust at Velikiye Luki
4. The Pocket West of Cherkassy
5. Breakout to Lisyanka
6. Double Envelopment West of Cherkassy
7. Relief Attempts
8. The Pocket of Kamenets-Podolskiy
9. Breakout to the West
10. The Pocket Moves West