


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# Department of the Army Historical Summary

# Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991

by

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## Preface

Since 1969, the U.S. Army Center of Military History has produced the *Department of the Army Historical Summary (DAHSUM)* as an annual publication. The Center has combined fiscal years 1990 and 1991 into a single volume, however, for greater continuity and coherence in the coverage of the events surrounding Operation DESERT SHIELD/ DESERT STORM, which overlapped those two years. An overview of the successes and problems of major Army programs, the DAHSUM seeks to provide a record similar to, but more concise than, that published in the annual reports of the Secretary of War from 1822 to World War II and in the Army 's portion of the *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense* from 1949 through 1968.



# Contents

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


**Return to CMH Online**

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# 1

## Introduction

Fiscal years (FYs) 90 and 91 witnessed dramatic changes in the world order and the international security environment. While many nations became more politically independent, economic interdependence also increased. New centers of political and economic influence were evolving. America's North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies pursued their national interests more assertively, while Japan and other nations of the Pacific Rim advanced their positions in the world order. U.S. leaders maintained serious concerns about a series of international security issues. These issues included the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and missile technologies among many developing nations; state-sponsored terrorism; insurgency; the subversion of legitimate governments; and international drug trafficking. On a brighter note, positive changes occurred among many Communist nations during FY 90 and 91. The Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact took giant steps toward renouncing communism and adopting free elections and private enterprise.

In the late 1980s Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev had reinforced his perestroika ("restructuring of the Soviet economy") and glasnost ("openness") initiatives with several other strategies. Arms reduction agreements, demonstrated by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of June 1988, was one of them. Unilateral reductions in the Soviet armed forces was another. In December 1988 Gorbachev announced a Soviet troop withdrawal from central Europe. Gorbachev complemented this move with his plan to reduce Soviet armed forces by 500,000 men, along with a substantial cut in the number of deployed divisions, tanks, and artillery. U.S. national defense policymakers had reservations about these events and Gorbachev's advocacy of "reasonable sufficiency" for the Soviet defense establishment. They saw Gorbachev's proclaimed interest in paring Soviet military posture strongly influenced by an ulterior intent to modernize Soviet forces, especially with high-technology conventional weapons that the severely weakened Soviet economy could not produce.

Major political changes unfolded in the eastern European Warsaw Pact countries in 1989 and 1990. In Poland, candidates backed by the



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Solidarity movement won the June 1989 elections, which led to the popular election of Lech Walesa as prime minister the next year. Reacting to public pressure, Czechoslovakia established a cabinet with a non-Communist majority in December 1989 and held its first free elections in June 1990. The Hungarian Communist Party declared itself noncommunist in October 1989, and parliamentary elections in April 1990 yielded a noncommunist conservative majority. Bulgaria's Communist Party renounced its role as leader in national politics in December 1989, which resulted in the installation of a political independent as premier in December 1990. A bloody anti-Communist revolution in Romania culminated in the execution of Nicolae Ceausescu, the Romanian president and Communist Party chief, and creation of a noncommunist regime. In East Germany the Communist government of Erich Honecker was toppled in October 1989, and the opening of the Berlin Wall followed on 9 November. East Germany held its first free elections on 18 March 1990, and the reunification of Germany occurred on 3 October 1990.

The progressive dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the programmed withdrawal of Soviet troops from central Europe in 1990 accelerated the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), NATO and Warsaw Pact countries signed the CFE Treaty in Paris on 19 November 1990. Its major provisions allowed each side to retain 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters within the area from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU) . President George Bush declared that the CFE Treaty signaled the end of the Cold War. The Vienna Document 1990, an executive agreement reached by CSCE members coincident with CFE, established a yearly requirement for NATO and Warsaw Pact members to exchange information on personnel

and equipment within ATTU. The lessening of tensions between East and West were further illustrated by a November 1990 visit by Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono to the Soviet Union. General Vuono toured several Soviet military sites and had lengthy discussions with both the Soviet Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief and the Defense Minister.

The collapse of the Communist bloc did not alter the fundamental objectives of America's national security strategy — to deter or defeat aggression; to ensure global access and influence; to promote regional stability and cooperation; to stop the flow of illicit drugs; and to combat terrorism .

Although the United States continued to need sufficient conventional and nuclear capabilities to counterbalance potential armed threats, the end of the Cold War permitted some changes in America's defense posture. Forward defense in critical regions gave way to a reduced forward presence supported by the concept of projection of military power from the



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continental United States (CONUS) in times of crisis and the ability to reconstitute (mobilize, train, and equip) additional forces.

These developments hastened more specific formulation of the Army's AirLand Battle-Future concept by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) during FY 90 and 91. The shift in emphasis from high-intensity to low-intensity conflicts meant a change from linear, or a broad front line, to nonlinear combat operations of highly mobile and largely self-contained forces. The corps would remain the centerpiece of Army doctrine, but divisions would be lighter and employ combined arms brigades and a simplified logistics system.

Because of the declining threat posed by the Communist bloc and the growing federal budget deficit, in the summer of 1990 the White House announced a willingness to reduce substantially the U.S. defense establishment. Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney submitted a plan to Congress in June 1990 to cut the armed forces 25 percent during the next five years. He specified reductions for the Army active component — a drop in personnel strength from 770,000 to 520,000 and a cut in divisions from 18 to 14 by 1995. President Bush publicized his acceptance of a 25 percent reduction in the U.S. armed forces by 1995 during a speech to the Aspen Institute Symposium on 2 August 1990. But, the President also warned that the Iraqi invasion of Ku wait that very day underscored the fact that the world remained a dangerous place. He wanted the cuts to be accompanied by a careful and orderly restructuring of America's armed forces.

In early FY 90 the Army had an active component strength of 765,000 and 5 corps. Its combat units included 28 tactical divisions (18 active and 10 reserve components) and 28 separate combat brigades (5 active and 23 reserve components). The reserve components included more than half of the soldiers in the Total Army, and one-third of the active component divisions had reserve component roundout brigades. The FY 91 Defense Authorization Act directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct a formal study of the Total Force policy. The Pentagon's resultant Total Force Policy Report to the Congress, released at the end of 1991, confirmed the continued use of Army National Guard roundout brigades, but Army rapid deployment units would have active component support units to sustain combat operations for the first thirty days. Active component strength reductions continued during FY 90 and 91, but the Army deferred formal reserve component reductions pending the response of Congress to the Total Force Policy Report.

Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), during FY 90 and 91, established two major study groups that investigated ways to both restructure and reduce the Army. Project QUICKSILVER, chartered in the fall of 1989, evaluated the Army 's table of organization and equipment



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( TOE) structure. QUICKSILVER's recommendations included reduction of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) to a separate brigade, inactivation of the 2d Armored Division, and numerous reconfigurations and inactivations of brigades and smaller units. Created in the spring of 1990, Project VANGUARD assessed table of distribution and allowances (TDA ) organizations. VANGUARD's final report, published in December 1990, contained many initiatives. Broad areas of suggested change included realignment of HQDA with its field operating agencies and realignment of CONUS forces to streamline the chain of command. A more specific initiative was elimination of the Physical Fitness School at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana.

Base realignment and closure (BRAC) received renewed attention during the cutback climate of FY 90 and 91, but Congress slowed the DOD's accelerated action on this contentious issue. The Secretary of Defense's BRAC Commission of 1988 had identified more than 100 Army installations for realignment or closure. Public Law 100-526 of 1988 codified the commission's work. With the second phase, BRAC II of January 1990, the DOD identified 26 more Army installations for realignment or closure, while BRAC III of September 1990, the third phase, called for reduction or closure of 113 overseas Army installations. Congress, disturbed about the rapidity and scope of the Defense Department's BRAC actions, passed the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990, called BRAC 91, that established an independent commission to evaluate BRAC recommendations made by the DOD.

In response to a presidential mandate, the Secretary of Defense submitted a Defense Management Report (DMR) in July 1989 that outlined measures to save $39 billion in the Department of Defense during 1991-95. The Army submitted its proposals to the D M R, A r my Management Report I (AMR I), in October 1989 and later implemented thirty-five initiatives that focused upon restructuring the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and making improvements in the Army logistics system. Army officials estimated that AMR I would save about $650 million in FY 91. DOD appropriations have declined, in real terms, since FY 85.

The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act and the failure of Congress to reach a budget agreement for FY 90 resulted in sequestration, or automatic across-the-board budget cuts, in the fall of 1989. When President Bush signed the Defense Appropriations Act on 21 November, the sequestration was lifted and the Army received $77.7 billion of its $79 billion request, the fifth consecutive annual decline. Disagreements between the White House and Congress regarding the FY 91 Department of Defense budget culminated in the shut-down of the federal government on the Columbus Day weekend in October 1990. Several stopgap spending measures kept the government afloat, and Congress reached a budget



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settlement at the end of October. The Army's FY 91 budget was $73 billion, a 7 percent cut from FY 90.

The effectiveness of the Army's planning and programming was tested by two major combat operations during FY 90 and 91. The first, Operation JUST CAUSE, was the U.S. invasion of Panama and the ouster of the Manuel Noriega regime during December 1989 and January 1990. The second was Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, a U.S.-led international coalition that forcibly removed the occupying Iraqi Army from Kuwait during the period of August 1990 to February 1991.

A joint U.S. force of 25,750 was committed to JUST CAUSE, 13,000 being part of the regular Panamanian garrison. The Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) consisted of about 15,500 personnel. Major participating U.S. Army units included the 193d Infantry Brigade, brigades from the 82d Airborne and 7th Infantry Divisions, the 75th Ranger Regiment, and elements of the 5th Infantry Division. Launched on 20 December 1989, JUST CAUSE ended quickly. General Noriega took refuge in the Vatican consulate on 24 December and surrendered on 3 January 1990.

On 2 August 1990, more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers launched an attack that overwhelmed the small country of Kuwait. On 6 August the Saudi Arabian government requested assistance from the United States against a potential invasion of its territory by the Iraqis. A U.S.-led coalition began a buildup of personnel and equipment in the Persian Gulf called Operation DESERT SHIELD. During a seven-month period more than 500,000 members of the U.S. Armed forces assembled there under the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). In excess of 140,000 Army active component soldiers

from more than five divisions stationed in CONUS, plus their support units, went to the Persian Gulf. U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) activated some 145,000 reserve component personnel who served in CONUS, the Persian Gulf, and Europe, while U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), sent more than 87,000 personnel to assist the coalition. Operation DESERT STORM began on 17 January 1991 as coalition air power systematically destroyed critical Iraqi targets. The coalition ground campaign ensued on 24 February, and within a period of 100 hours, coalition forces completely routed the Iraqi Army.

Combat operations in Panama and the Persian Gulf did not alter the move toward substantial Army manpower reductions. The Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for 1992-97 prescribed reduction of the active component to 580,000 by the end of FY 97. Project QUICKSILVER recommended reducing the TOE Army by 160,000 and the T DA Army by 40,000 military personnel and 57,000 civilian man-years by FY 97. Active component strength stood at 765,000 at the beginning of FY 90 and fell to 728,000 by year's end because of both voluntary and involuntary reduction programs. These programs included a bar to reenlistment



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for enlisted personnel and the Probationary/Conditional Voluntary Indefinite Selection Board for officers. HQDA also planned to offer economic incentives to encourage voluntary separations. Reduced recruiting goals and higher standards for the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) also were employed to reduce the active component. The active component enlisted recruiting objective of 119,901 for FY 89 was reduced to 87,000 for FY 90. Army standards in FY 90 stipulated that at least 95 percent of new accessions have high school diplomas, while 67 percent must score in the upper half, and no more than 2 percent in Category IV of the AFQT.

In FY 90 about 307,000 members of the Army Reserve (USAR) and 444,000 Army National Guard (ARNG) personnel were assigned to the Selected Reserve. The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) consisted of 322,000 Army Reservists, and about 9,000 National Guardsmen were assigned to the Inactive National Guard (ING). In that year the USAR recruited 65,075, or 98.6 percent of its objective.

With an objective of 70,668 for FY 90, the ARNG recruited 77,853 or 110.2 percent of its goal. For FY 90 the Army set an active component recruiting objective for women with no prior service (NPS) at 12,600 and achieved a rate of 100.1 percent. In that year the USAR recruited 8,357 women for an achievement rate of 110.4, whereas the ARNG recruited only 4,855 NPs females for a rate of 69.4 percent. The Army employed 455,776 civilians in FY 90 and, as with military personnel, sought a 25 percent reduction of the civilian work force by FY 95.

Although funding was limited, quality of life programs continued to receive emphasis from both the Army leadership and Congress during FY 90 and 91. Budget constraints on new housing resulted in concentration upon maintenance and revitalization of existing structures as demonstrated by the Whole Neighborhood Revitalization Program. Passed in November 1989, the Military Child Care Act provided financial resources to assure minimum funding levels and also improvements in the staffs of Army child care facilities. The Army Medical Department (AMEDD) tried to increase the quality of medical services for Army families while controlling skyrocketing medical costs. Through the Civilian Health and Medical Program for Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) Management Improvement Program the Army looked to tighten review procedures for CHAMPUS services and to control doctors' fees. In October 1990 the Army Surgeon General introduced the Gateway to Care Program as an interim measure. The program authorized local military hospital commanders to utilize both military and civilian provider health care for their patients.

The Army Safety Program reported a continued downward trend in accidents, injuries, and fatalities during FY 90 and 91. Accidents declined



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by 24 percent, and the lowest number of aircraft accidents on record occurred in FY 90. The number and cost of civilian

on-the-job injuries increased that year, but declined in FY 91. Financial benefits, another quality-of-life service to soldiers, were adjusted during FY 90 and 91 because of JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Participants in JUST CAUSE received Imminent Danger Pay (IDP), and the Army also approved IDP for service in several countries affected by DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. After DESERT STORM began, Army enlisted personnel were not required to pay federal income tax on their military compensation for the period they served in the Persian Gulf. Legislation confirmed that reserve component soldiers, called to active duty for Persian Gulf service, would retain the medical insurance provided by their employers and also be eligible for the variable housing allowance. Active component soldiers being involuntarily separated were further assisted by establishment of the Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) in FY 90. With ACAP, the Army planned to create Transition Assistance Off ices (TAOs) at various installations to help soldiers convert to civilian life.

Army training strategy during FY 90 and 91 continued the trend toward more simulated and less live training. Initiated in FY 88, the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) anticipated that Army training will eventually be based on devices rather than supported by them. Reduced funding accelerated the development of training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS). The Combined Army Tactical Training System (CATT), which performs combined arms maneuvers on a simulated battlefield for crews through battalions, was networked to eight active component units by the end of 1990. Begun in late 1988, distributed training strategy (DTS) was intended to reduce resident training and improve instructional quality. DTs will rely heavily upon new technologies — computer-based instruction, interactive video disc, and video conferencing. The first major DTs pilot project was assigned to the Kentucky Army National Guard in 1990.

In FY 90 the Army 's Leadership Assessment and Development Program (LADP) was implemented in selected Army schools for both senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers. The Chief of Staff authorized the Self-Development Test (SDT) for enlisted personnel as an eve n t u a l replacement for the Skill Qualification Test (SQT). The SDT combines Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) questions with other questions on training and leadership. Military Qualification Standards (MQS) is the Army 's evolving officer leader development system, based on common tasks and professional knowledge. The manual for MQS I, on the subject of precommissioning training, was revised and distributed in 1990, while the manual for MQS II, regarding company-grade officers, was released in FY 91. Army officials expressed serious concern in 1991 that DESERT



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SHIELD/DESERT STORM created substantial backlogs in attendance at the leader development schools. Basic noncommissioned officer courses and advanced noncommissioned officer courses were all expected to underfill by 25 to 45 percent in FY 91, while officer advanced courses were also adversely affected. School officials anticipated a period of one to two years to eliminate attendance backlogs.

Army unit training was influenced during FY 90 and 91 by both budget constraints and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The Persian Gulf war reduced unit rotations at the National Training Center (NTC) from twelve in FY 90 to five in FY 91. The Battle Command Training Program, which trains division and corps staffs by a warfighter computer battle simulation exercise, reduced its CONUS program in FY 91, but provided special training to Army divisions and corps that served in the Persian Gulf. REFORGER, an annual joint/combined exercise, was postponed in 1989 to 1990; while REFORGER 91 relied heavily upon simulations and employed only 28,000 allied troops. Overseas deployment training (ODT) for the reserve components was reduced from 40,000 in FY 90 to 28,000 in FY 91. When DESERT SHIELD began in August 1990, Army training and combat developers considered the Total Army fundamentally ready for war. Three activated ARNG roundout brigades — 48th Infantry of Georgia, 155th Armored of Mississippi, and the 256th Infantry of Louisiana — revealed some deficiencies in combat readiness, but the Army leadership considered this normal for reserve component units that train only part-time.

The Army chose five major pieces of equipment as the main thrust of its modernization program during the 1970s and 1980s — a main battle tank, an attack helicopter, a utility helicopter, an infantry fighting vehicle, and an air defense system. When the U.S. Army deployed to Southwest Asia in 1990, its units possessed the fruits of that effort — the Abrams M1 and M1A1 tank, the AH-64 Apache helicopter, the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter, the Bradley M2/M3

fighting vehicle, and the Patriot air defense system. By FY 91, however, the Army faced tough modernization decisions as its procurement budget, which was $14.8 billion in FY 89, dropped to $9 billion.

The Army reassessed its modernization strategy and adopted several guiding principles — keep costs down by fielding equipment to units based on the priority of scheduled deployment times; future weapons systems must be lethal, but maximize soldier and weapon survivability; new technologies must have additional modernization possibilities and be acquired before potential enemies obtain them; new weapons systems must be reliable and simple to operate and maintain, and they must require minimal training.

Although some weapons systems already in production would continue, Army planners decided in FY 91 to focus on modernizing by acquir-



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ing technically advanced new weapons systems rather than upgrading existing ones. For example, the revised Armored Systems Modernization (ASM) plan curtailed M1A1 and M1A2 tank production in preference to the Block III. The ASM sought a heavy chassis for the Block III tank that would also be used by the Combat Mobility Vehicle (CMV), the Advanced Field Artillery System (AFAS), and the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV). Product development and procurement continued during FY 90 and 91 for a series of systems that included the Light Helicopter (LHX) Comanche, the Forward Area Air Defense System (FAADS), and the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). Reserve component modernization proceeded as USAR units received HMMWVs and M939 series 5- ton trucks. Pledges of equipment to the ARNG by HQDA included M1 or M60A3 thermal sight tanks for its armor units and Apache helicopters for twelve of its aviation attack battalions. Responsible for the ground-based, surface-to-air air defense of the United States, the Army contributed to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) during FY 90 and 91 by ongoing experiments with the free electron laser, with the neutral particle beam, and with artificial intelligence. In 1990 the Army Space Council approved research and development for tactical satellites that would perform intelligence and antijam communications functions for tactical commanders.

The ability to mobilize, deploy, and sustain its forces effectively for combat operations has long been a major concern of the Army. Evidence of this concern has been demonstrated by various programs in recent years — CAPSTONE; the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS); various mobilization and training exercises, such as OPTIMAL FOCUS and REFORGER; and annual screenings of IRRs. The brief duration and operational security needs of JUST CAUSE did not favor mobilization of reserve component units, while thorough rehearsing ensured almost flawless deployment. Mobilization, deployment, and sustainment for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM presented major challenges to the Army leadership for a number of reasons. These reasons included no stationing of U.S. troops or stockpiling of military materiel in the Middle East, an 8,700-mile supply line from CONUS, and the piecemeal activation of reserve component combat service support personnel. The demand for strategic lift saw the first activation of the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) by the president and expensive chartering of foreign-flag commercial ships because of deficiencies in the Ready Reserve Force (RRF).

Hard work by Army logisticians and transporters, and a fortuitous interlude between the beginning of DESERT SHIELD and the onset of DESERT STORM, helped the Army to perform its transportation and logistical tasks in Southwest Asia. Other factors eased the formidable effort. Pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets (POMCUS) in Europe,



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which consisted of company and battalion equipment packages, facilitated the equipping of units which deployed early for DESERT SHIELD. The Army's war reserve stocks, especially ammunition and preferred/smart munitions, proved useful. Several Persian Gulf states contributed valuable wartime host nation support (WHNS); a primary example was provision by Saudi Arabia of vast quantities of fuel.

The Army performed a variety of special functions for the civilian sector in both the United States and foreign countries during FY 90 and 91. These functions included civil works, water projects, the war against drugs, improvement and preservation of the environment, and relief for the local populace following both natural disasters and the destructive effects of war. As part of President Bush's new attack on the illegal drug traffic in FY 89, HQDA produced the Army Counter-Narcotics Plan in April 1990. The plan essentially reinforced existing Army assistance, which included intelligence, loan of equipment, and training of law enforcement personnel in combat and jungle operations. In November 1989 the Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Command (CINC-FORSCOM), formed Joint Task Force Six at Fort Bliss, Texas, to coordinate Army support to the war against illegal drugs along the Southwest border. By April 1991 U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) had e l even ant drug training teams in five Latin American countries. The ARNG had participated in the drug war for thirteen years, and in FY 90 it took a direct part in twenty-five counter-drug operations while under state control.

Growing concerns within the civilian sector about environmental protection and preservation affected the Army during FY 90 and 91. In the mid-1980s the Army had initiated a twenty-year program to clean up pollution on its properties. The FY 90 Defense Authorization Act directed the DOD to prepare a report by early FY 92 on its long-range environmental goals. One interim measure directed by HQDA created the Integrated Training Area Management Program in 1990 that emphasized avoiding, as well as repairing, damage to the environment. In FY 91 the Army allocated $350 million for environmental cleanup, and an Environmental Compliance Achievement Program was created to help commanders comply with federal and state environmental laws. Despite these increased efforts, the Army received 173 Notice of Violation statements that cited 418 separate violations at its various installations in FY 90. These violation charges resulted in a series of ongoing civil suits against the Army.

In summary, FY 90 and 91 witnessed monumental changes in the existing world order that dramatically affected American national security strategy. The dissolution of the Communist bloc and the growing federal budget deficit resulted in calls for sharp reductions in the DOD budget that directly affected people, programs, and installations. Although its



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roles and missions were not substantially altered, the Army began a series of changes and belt-tightening that had broad ramifications. These changes included a shift in AirLand Battle concepts from high- to low- intensity conflict, along with a reduced forward presence and the need for an enhanced ability to project military power from CONUS. Other major changes during this period were a planned reduction of active component strength from 765,000 troops in FY 90 to 580,000 by FY 97, and anticipated future budget cuts that would follow the Army's 7 percent cut in FY 91. Less money also meant difficulty in attracting and retaining high-quality personnel, slowed improvement in quality of life programs, a continued trend toward more simulated and less live training, and highly selective modernization that emphasized acquiring the most technically advanced new weapons systems.



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***Go to:***

**Next Chapter**

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**Return to Table of Contents**

---

**Return to CMH Online**


*Last updated 30 October 2003*

# 2

## Operational Forces

As the U.S. Army began the last decade of the twentieth century, it faced uncertain times and substantial downsizing, even though on two occasions during FY 90 and 91 it engaged in major military operations. The first was Operation JUST CAUSE, the U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989 that resulted in the ouster of dictator Manuel Noriega and the restoration of a popularly elected government. The second was Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, a U.S.-led international coalition assembled to turn back Iraq's blatant aggression against neighboring Ku wait. On both occasions the U.S. Army rose to the task, employing a force made up of the best trained personnel and most modern equipment ever assembled. These operations confirmed the trend enunciated in President George Bush's August 1990 speech at Aspen, Colorado. He spoke of the need to plan for regional conflicts, rather than emphasize a global strategy based on preparation for a Soviet attack in Western Europe. Coupled with this change was the need to reduce the number and complexity of operational plans by calling on each theater to refocus on the increasing threat from regional powers, such as Iraq. Only the operational plans in the Pacific theater remained unchanged during FY 90 and 91.

Despite these new challenges, the public mood continued to call for a smaller military establishment. The end of the Cold War heralded the beginning of a historical process that has traditionally resulted in the drastic downsizing of the military force structure, regardless of long-term policies. Rapidly changing foreign developments and new fiscal realities within the United States, however, have not altered the fact that the world remains a dangerous place. In the words of Secretary of the Army Michael P. W. Stone, "Our nation faces a significantly more complex and varied security environment than at any time in our history. The question we now face is whether our Army is properly structured and equipped to meet the emerging strategic requirements of the 1990s and beyond." The Army continued to maintain a presence throughout the world, although 1990 and 1991 saw the United States turn over more defense responsibilities to other nations.



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### Western Hemisphere

U.S. Army forces in the western hemisphere are divided into two commands, U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM), a specified command, and U.S. Army South (USARSO), the Army component of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), a unified command. Based in Panama , USARSO consists of the 193d Infantry Brigade, the 228th Aviation Brigade, the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade, the 106th Signal Brigade, the 41st Area Support Group, the 3d Special Operations Support Command, the Military Police Command, the 536th Engineer Battalion, and the U.S. Army Garrison, Panama. The remainder of Army forces in the western hemisphere are part of FORSCOM, which encompasses all combat, combat support, and combat service support units — active and reserve — in CONUS, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In FY 90 FORSCOM had an authorized strength of 1,008,692 and an operating strength of 984,216. In FY 91 the authorized total dropped to 995,138, with an actual operating strength of 966,064.

FORSCOM commanded five armies within CONUS, the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth; the Third U.S. Army (TUSA), a field army which served as U.S. Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM; three corps — I Corps, III Corps, and XVIII Airborne Corps; 11 divisions; plus hundreds of attached units of battalion and company size. In FY 91 FORSCOM lost two divisions, the 2d Armored and the 9th (Motorized), although the 199th Infantry Brigade was taken from the 9th Division and restored as an independent unit. The FORSCOM mission included planning and conducting joint exercises, defending the land mass of the United States, planning for the common defense with Canadian authorities, and supporting civil defense. As a major Army

command (MACOM), FORSCOM provided trained Army forces ready for combat; commanded its assigned active and reserve components forces located in the United States; supplied training and readiness guidance for Army National Guard (ARNG) units; provided the Army headquarters element for the U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM); and planned for the mobilization and deployment of Army forces in times of crisis or war.

The invasion of Panama was the first major U.S. armed intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean since Operation URGENT FURY, the 1983 invasion of Grenada. Since May 1988 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had considered military intervention as a means of thwarting Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega's increasing involvement in drug trafficking. After the May 1989 elections, which Noriega illegally nullified, the United States planned Operation NIMROD DANCER as a means of inserting reinforcements into Panama during a crisis. SOUTHCOM was not satis-



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fied with NIMROD DANCER because it took one to two additional weeks to get supplies to the incoming troops. By that time, reasoned SOUTHCOM commander General Maxwell Thurman, the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) would be ready. Lt. Gen. Carl W. Stiner, commander of XVIII Airborne Corps, noted that NIMROD DANCER would "not produce the desired results. We were not satisfied with the existing plan because it just didn't fit the situation."

U.S. forces had a distinct advantage because more than half of the troops used in Operation JUST CAUSE were based in Panama. Of 25,750 men and women from all services who participated in Operation JUST CAUSE, 13,000 were part of the usual garrison. Yet only 3,027 personnel were on the ground in Panama. Army units already in Panama were the 193d Infantry Brigade and Company C, 3d Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group. The rest of the force deployed from four bases inside CONUS. These included the XVIII Airborne Corps Command Group and the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, from Fort Bragg, North Carolina; one infantry brigade and one infantry battalion of the 7th Infantry Division from Fort Ord, California; one battalion from the 5th Infantry Division out of Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the 75th Ranger Regiment from Fort Lewis, Washington, and Forts Stewart and Benning, Georgia. At no time during the deployment did Fort Bragg, home of the XVIII Airborne Corps, lose its Division Ready Brigade (DRB), the rapid reaction force used to respond to crises on a moment's notice. Opposing the Americans was the PDF, made up of 3,500 army troops, 11,000 police and national guardsmen, plus another 1,000 men in the air force and navy.

Operation JUST CAUSE was launched shortly after midnight on 20 December 1989. During the first phase of the attack, 3,360 airborne troops, plus the 193d Infantry Brigade, closed in on Noriega 's stronghold in the center of Panama City. Within sixty hours after President Bush's decision to commit troops, 12,000 reinforcements from CONUS had arrived in Panama. On 3 January 1990 General Noriega, who had take n refuge in the Vatican consulate, surrendered to U.S. troops. After a mopping-up period, President Bush declared Operation JUST CAUSE finished on 31 January, and most of FORSCOM's troops began going home. Casualty figures were 23 American dead (18 Army casualties) and 330 wounded (262 Army casualties). An estimated 314 Panamanian soldiers died and 129 were wounded. Two U.S. Army Rangers were report e d killed by friendly fire, and another 15 soldiers were wounded.

Following Operation JUST CAUSE, FORSCOM units supported SOUTHCOM's Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, a nation-building exercise designed to bolster the newly elected leadership in Panama. The missions of these units included protecting U.S. lives, property, and interests; defending the Panama Canal; and promoting Panamanian confidence in



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its popularly elected government. The FORSCOM contingent included a light infantry battalion from the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), an aviation team of fourteen UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters from the 7th Infantry Division (Light), an aviation battalion headquarters, and four military police companies. By mid-1990 the deployed strength was 1,185 personnel, though that number was reduced steadily throughout the remainder of the year.

In addition to operations in Panama, FORSCOM units participated in a number of civic actions and drug interdiction

operations. In the spring of 1990, personnel from the Second Army aided the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief following severe flooding in Alabama. In June aviation units from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, helped relieve citizens left homeless by tornados in southern Indiana. In northern California and eastern Oregon, Army personnel from Fort Ord, California , and Fort Lewis, Washington, supported firefighting efforts. Early in FY 90 FORSCOM supported 35 counternarcotic operations; in FY91 the figure jumped to 164. Two FORSCOM operations in support of LANTCOM, Operation BAHAMAS and TURKS CAICOS and Operation BLUEWATER, ran through 1991 and continued into the next fiscal year.

FORSCOM units had no sooner completed Operation JUST CAUSE and various civic action projects than they were alerted to bolster Operation DESERT SHIELD, the U.S. response to Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. Beginning 6 August 1990, FORSCOM formed a battle staff with 24-hour support to monitor deployment to the Persian Gulf. The battle staff remained in place throughout FY 90. According to FORSCOM commander General Edwin H. Burba, Jr., FORSCOM provided oversight for most of the Army's mobilization and deployment effort. General Burba further said that "CONUS Armies were clearly the workhorses of the operation." In excess of 140,000 active component soldiers from more than 5 divisions, along with their affiliated combat support and combat service support units, were sent from CONUS to the Persian Gulf. FORSCOM also called up more than 145,000 National Guardsmen and Army reservists who served either in CONUS, the Persian Gulf, or Europe.

On 1 October 1990, Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono directed the FORSCOM commander to establish the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) as a major subordinate command. On 31 January 1991, FORSCOM provided a USARC Concept Plan (CONPLAN) that HQDA approved on 14 March. The CONPLAN called for transition of operational functions from FORSCOM and Fourth U.S. Army to USARC from April through September 1991 that would culminate in assumption of command and control of the Fourth Army Reserve units by USARC on 1 October 1991. In addition, First and Second Armies would gradually transfer Reserve functions to USARC during the peri-



od of October 1991 through June 1992. Fifth and Sixth Armies would follow by 1 October 1992.

**Europe**

No area within the U.S. Army 's international scope of responsibilities has been more affected by the end of the Cold War than Europe. Post-World War II planning centered on the defense of Western Europe from a Soviet onslaught, with the United States contributing the major share of troops on the continent. During the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact began a program of enlargement, reorganization, and vigorous modernization of their armed forces and thereby posed a significant challenge to the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). By 1990 all of that had changed.

In FY 90 the American NATO contingent — USAREUR — consisted of V and VII Corps, the Berlin Brigade, and the 3d Brigade of the 2d Armored Division, which was situated on the northern edge of the defensive line. Each corps consisted of one infantry division, one armored division, and an armored cavalry regiment. In FY 91, following its deployment to the Persian Gulf and subsequent involvement in Operation DESERT STORM, VII Corps returned to Europe, packed up its equipment, and redeployed to the United States. Despite the reduction in U.S. Forces in NATO, General Crosbie E. Saint, USAREUR commander, regarded continued American commitment to Europe as essential: "USAREUR's forward edge became freedom's frontier," he wrote in October 1990, "and those who served became the guarantors of peace with an unblemished 45-year record."

Unlike in other regions of the world, the downsizing trend in Europe began early. In December 1987 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the INF Treaty, and beginning in June 1988, both short- and intermediate- range missiles were withdrawn from the European continent. In exchange for Soviet elimination of SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, SS-20, and SS-23 missiles, the United States removed the Pershing II system, as well as ground-launched cruise missiles. USAREUR removed the last Pershing II launcher on 17 April 1991, and inactivated the 56th Field Artillery Command, which operated all Pershing II missile sites in West Germany, on 31 May.

Other ongoing weapons removal projects also had their roots in the arms negotiation programs of the Reagan administration. In 1986 President Ronald Reagan and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl agreed to remove all chemical weapons from European soil by 1992. Called Operation STEEL BOX, the joint removal effort took 23,000 U.S. and German soldiers to implement. The chemical weapons were removed by



members of the 59th Ordnance Brigade, the 21st Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM), the 7th Medical Command, the 5th Signal Command, and the 56th Field Artillery Command. Extensive planning and preparations utilized support from all seven German Laender ("states") as well as local police, civil officials, fire fighters, and disaster and relief agencies. Operation STEEL BOX was completed between June and September 1990, more than a year ahead of schedule.

Events concerning the future of conventional forces in Europe were also under way beginning in the late 1980s. During 1989 the Bush administration reaffirmed the conventional wisdom that the capability of the Warsaw Pact to launch a surprise attack remained the greatest threat to peace in Europe. The Warsaw Pact felt similarly threatened by NATO. Both NATO and Warsaw Pact policymakers used a new negotiating tactic in agreeing to eliminate the Communist bloc's offensive advantage by establishing force parity between the rival alliances. In March 1989 CFE talks began in earnest. Both sides agreed that the Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority mandated that force reductions be asymmetrical, a concession that the Soviet Union had never made. The CFE talks went forward in good faith, but announced voluntary troop withdrawals from Europe by both the Soviet Union and the United States in 1990 shifted the emphasis of CFE to conventional arms reductions.

Despite developments on the arms negotiations front, USAREUR continued to maintain peak readiness in FY 90 and 91 and at the same time prepared for the drawdown. General Saint managed a delicate balance between readiness and drawdown by aiming for what he called "a single capable corps" to maintain the forward American presence in Europe. In August 1990 the Bush administration announced a 30,000-personnel cut, but Iraq's invasion of Kuwait shifted USAREUR's focus from drawdown planning to supporting the coalition in the Persian Gulf. USAREUR support for Operation DESERT SHIELD began immediately after the President's decision to commit forces. On 14 August 1990, V Corps' 12th Aviation Brigade was alerted for deployment, and on 28 August it began to move. Medical detachments, aviation support, and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) teams from both V and VII Corps were among the European Theater troops sent to support CENTCOM. In the face of Iraq's continued intransigence, USAREUR was ordered on 8 November to provide CENTCOM with a mobile armored corps . USAREUR selected VII Corps as the administrative unit, with armored divisions coming from V and VII Corps. USAREUR sent more than 87,000 personnel to support the war effort.

The 2d Armored Cavalry regiment led the deployment and arrived for transport within one hundred hours of notification. Over the next 42 days more than 31,000 vehicles, including 935 tanks, 829 Bradley fighting



vehicles, and 288 artillery pieces, were deployed by sea. Soldiers and additional materiel were flown in on 437 aircraft from five ports of embarkation. Total USAREUR contributions to Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM included 95 battalions of 87,800 soldiers, 4,600 tracked vehicles, 27,300 wheeled vehicles, and 197,000 tons of ammunition. The mass deployment from Europe to the Persian Gulf had a serious impact on USAREUR theater missions. As compensation, USAREUR received a backfill of forty-one reserve components units, as well as medical, transportation, and ammunition support. Protecting USAREUR facilities and dependent communities from terrorist attack became a primary mission for those troops in Europe. Key facilities and housing areas were guarded around the clock by 19,000 American soldiers, with additional support from German police units.

In the post-Operation DESERT STORM environment, USAREUR continued to execute the twin missions of

redeploying VII Corps to Germany while simultaneously drawing down the total force structure in Europe. According to General Saint, sound training provided the basis for USAREUR's success in both undertakings. USAREUR's comprehensive training program emphasized multiechelon exercises that stressed short-notice transitions from base areas to the front lines. Units were trained either to move to a designated theater, as during Operation DESERT SHIELD, or to march 200 or more kilometers, and then fight. During the past two years USAREUR has stressed training aids as a means of addressing modern concerns, such as host nation constraints, environmental issues, and excessive costs. This new emphasis on training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS) has gone a long way toward enhancing both individual and unit skills in a changing training environment.

In January 1990 USAREUR established CENTURION SHIELD, an integrated computer simulation, with REFORGER (return of forces to Germany) 90 exercises. Computers were used in a wide variety of scenarios to duplicate problems faced by division and corps commanders and their staffs. Compared to REFORGER 88, CENTURION SHIELD trained 40 percent more headquarters personnel through simulation and actual field exercises and reduced the amount of maneuver damage by 60 percent. In 1991 and 1992, simulation continued to be a key training device at echelons above brigade. Divisions and corps developed command and staff functions at simulation centers using scenarios that emphasized agility and synchronization on a nonlinear battlefield. TADSS strategy above brigade used Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) to duplicate tactical operations within the deployed headquarters and thereby eliminated the maneuver damage usually associated with large-scale exercises. REFORGER 92 used CBS and integrated a two-corps exercise as a replacement for maneuvering troops. Theater and NATO group exercises utilized simulations at the Warrior



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Preparation Center (WPC), a joint training facility that simulates scenarios involving a transition from peacetime to wartime logistics, and advanced multicorps AirLand Battle tactics.

Despite the emphasis on simulations, USAREUR continued to recognize the need for conventional training events. Live gunnery training remained a priority, and training evolved to stress realistic scenarios over range gunnery. The pinnacle of tank and Bradley gunnery skill was the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), which emphasized both unit fire and maneuver, with crews receiving tactical after-action reviews of gunnery performance. According to USAREUR trainers, ARTEP fired fewer live rounds per tube annually, yet achieved better training results by firing direct support missions. As part of additional training, Seventh Army Training Command sponsored tactical competitions, such as the Cavalry Cup, the Infantry Skills Competition, the Stinger Shootout, and the Sapper Stakes, all of which emphasized individual skills as well as the teamwork necessary for effective small-unit performance in wartime.

The combination of effective training and battle experience during Operation DESERT STORM prepared USAREUR for the difficult task of adjusting to changing realities in Europe. Although troop reductions were inevitable, the end of FY 91 saw USAREUR continue to strive for a balance between force reduction and battle readiness. The AirLand Battle-Future concept being developed by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) placed increased importance upon highly mobile and self-contained corps. In General Saint's words, "the Capable Corps . . . will be a mobile, lethal fighting machine capable of rapidly focusing combat power as part of a multinational task force or as a national European-based, forward-deployed contingency corps."

### The War in the Persian Gulf

Iraq attacked Kuwait in the early morning on 2 August 1990 with more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers spearheaded by three armored divisions of the Republican Guard. On 7 August, after receiving a request for assistance from the Saudi government, President Bush ordered deployment of U.S. Forces to the region. An advance team from the 82d Airborne Division arrived on the ground in Saudi Arabia within thirty-one hours of the initial alert order. Operation DESERT SHIELD had begun. During a seven-month period beginning in August 1990, more than 500,000 troops and their equipment were deployed to Saudi Arabia from the United States and U.S. bases overseas. Transporting these quantities of people and materiel involved building up a massive logistical system over an 8,700- mile supply line from CONUS,

as well as planning and orchestrating a



joint air, land, and sea campaign against the fourth largest army in the world. In addition, all of this was accomplished in one of the harshest environments on earth.

The Army had prepared for the crisis it faced. In July 1990 CENTCOM, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, completed Exercise INTERNAL LOOK 90, which presented a scenario similar to the one unfolding in Kuwait. In addition, the Third Army commander, Lt. Gen. John J. Yeosock, who had completed a tour as project manager for the Saudi Army National Guard in 1983 and had trained and equipped much of the Saudi ground force, recognized the complexities of an operation in Southwest Asia. Based partially on these experiences, CENTCOM commander General H. Norman Schwarzkopf chose to organize his forces as either a service component command, such as Army Forces, U.S. Central Command (ARCENT), or as a functional command, such as Special Operations Command, Central Command (SOCCENT). General Yeosock believed this would ensure that one Army commander was responsible for all Army missions in the theater, except for operational control of special operations forces.

CENTCOM decided to structure Third Army as a CENTCOM Army component command, a theater army in Southwest Asia, and a numbered field army. General Yeosock saw this as crucial for coordinated coalition combat operations and observed that the "key to successful operational command was the interaction of the two command posts, the main and the mobile, and the continuous interface with ARCENT liaison officers." If CENTCOM and Third Army managed the theater, tactical war fighting was left largely to the corps. The XVIII Airborne Corps and the VII Corps balanced the missions, cared for soldiers, and executed the commander's intent.

The key element between theater and corps was ARCENT. It developed the theater logistics concept and ensured that all Army operations were closely coordinated with operations in the other services. It is axiomatic that all military operations inevitably depend upon logistics for success. As Operation DESERT SHIELD progressed, the Army modernized its units as they arrived in theater and made a concerted effort to equip arriving soldiers with the best weapons systems available. As a result, many units received the most modern equipment in the U.S. arsenal before going into battle. For example, the Army replaced its older tanks with more than a thousand Abrams M1A1 tanks, enough to equip three divisions and one armored cavalry regiment. In addition, almost six hundred M2/M3A2 Bradley fighting vehicles and more than a hundred Armored Combat Earthmovers (Aces) and one thousand Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTTs) were added to the CENTCOM inventory. Without this infusion of new equipment, the sweeping



flanking movement executed by the XVIII Airborne and VII Corps to defeat the Republican Guard divisions in southern Iraq would have been far more difficult.

Operation DESERT STORM began early on 17 January 1991 when eight AH-64 Apache helicopters from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) destroyed two Iraqi radar facilities with Hellfire missiles. For the next thirty-eight days, 17 January through 23 February 1991, coalition air power took the initiative by destroying critical Iraqi targets and neutralizing Republican Guard units. As the air attack continued, allied ground forces completed battle preparations and positioned units at forward assembly areas. The Army moved two entire corps and approximately 65,000 armored and support vehicles from defensive positions in eastern Saudi Arabia to the forward assembly area west of Hafar al Batin. According to an Army after-action report, "The move continued twenty-four hours a day for two weeks and, with a vehicle passing checkpoints every fifteen seconds, traffic on the main supply routes (MSRs) required extremely careful management."

Throughout the buildup, Army elements engaged in a counter-reconnaissance battle with Iraqi forces in an attempt to

deny the enemy information on the disposition of allied forces. The Army made helicopter raids and conducted armored reconnaissance forays into Iraq and Kuwait on intelligence-gathering missions. OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and AH-64 Apache helicopters were used extensively to pinpoint and engage enemy observation posts. During this period, the 11th and 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigades used the Patriot air defense system, several times a day in some instances, to intercept Iraqi Scud missile attacks against Saudi Arabia and Israel.

On 24 February the final phase of Operation DESERT STORM began. The primary mission of this phase was to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, but in order to accomplish this, coalition forces had to defeat Republican Guard divisions inside southern Iraq. The plan called for a supporting attack along the Ku wait-Saudi Arabia border by the I Marine Expeditionary Force and Arab coalition forces, while two corps of about 200,000 coalition soldiers conducted the main attack by sweeping around the Iraqi flank to the west to isolate enemy forces in Ku wait from reinforcements. Once accomplished, the Army would turn its attention toward destroying the Republican Guard.

The thrust of the attack was on both flanks, with a feint in the center. On the west flank the XVIII Airborne Corps committed two divisions. The French 6th Light Armored Division (the "Dauget" Division), supported by the 2d Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, attacked and secured As Salman Airfield inside Iraq. This marked the westernmost point of the coalition attack. Just to the east, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) launched one of the largest air assault operations in history and secured a



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forward operating base deep inside Iraq. The division's success provided other coalition forces with a base for follow-on operations aimed at severing communications and supplies between Baghdad and Iraqi forces inside Kuwait.

On the eastern flank, the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, supported by the Tiger Brigade of the 2d Armored Division as well as elements of the Saudi Army National Guard, pushed north into Kuwait. In the center, the 1st Cavalry Division feinted toward the Wadi al Batin as part of a deception aimed at drawing Iraqi attention away from the main thrust to the west. This feint played an important role in keeping Iraqi forces off-balance in the crucial opening hours of the ground war. According to the Army's after-action analysis, "When coalition forces swept in on Iraqi defenses from the west, they found them oriented to the east and south, allowing the allies to attack from the flanks and rear."

Such early successes allowed the theater commander to accelerate the coalition timetable by fourteen hours. The XVIII Airborne Corps skirted Iraqi defenses with the 24th Infantry Division and the 3d Armored Cavalry regiment and quickly seized key objectives inside Iraq. To the east, in the VII Corps area of responsibility, the 2d Armored Cavalry regiment spearheaded a thrust by the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions deep into Iraq, while the 1st Infantry Division penetrated the Iraqi defenses and opened twenty-four lanes through enemy obstacles and minefields in eight hours. The penetration of Iraqi defenses allowed other coalition forces to attack through the breach, secure the corps eastern flank, and begin the attack into Kuwait. By early morning on 28 February the Republican Guard units were effectively routed, while the remnants of the Iraqi army inside Kuwait were fleeing or surrendering to coalition forces. At 0500 on 28 February, one hundred hours from the start of the ground campaign, the coalition halted all offensive operations.

### The Pacific and Far East

Despite the former Soviet Union's retreat from the Pacific Ocean area, the region continued to play an important role in American commitment overseas. In 1990, U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), commander, Lt. Gen. Claude M. Kicklighter, noted that Asia deserved as much attention as Europe and the Soviet Union. "Of the six power centers emerging in our new multipolar world (Europe, the United States, Japan, the USSR, the People's Republic of China, and India)," observed General Kicklighter, "all but Europe are in the Pacific-Asia-Indian Ocean region." The Pacific region is both vast and varied. USARPAC's area of responsibility extends from Alaska in the far north and from the western coasts of North, Central, and South America to the eastern shores of Africa, and south to Antarctica.



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In between lie Australia, Hawaii, Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan, and most of the Asian mainland. Eighth United States Army (EUSA) is the Army component responsible for the Korean peninsula. Climate varies from the snow-covered, sub-zero polar regions to the tropics of Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands. Three-fifths of the world's population and one-third of the earth's surface, along with much of its strategic resources, are encompassed within USARPAC. In addition, seven of the world's largest armies lie within the Pacific region.

On 30 August 1990, Department of the Army General Order No. 13 redesignated Western Command (WESTCOM) as USARPAC. The order combined current WESTCOM forces with U.S. Army, Japan, and IX Corps and its subordinate forces into a single entity. As a ready operational force, USARPAC includes the 25th Infantry Division, based in Hawaii; the 6th Infantry Division in Alaska; and U.S. Army, Japan. The 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, in Okinawa provides a special operations capability to the theater. USARPAC's mission is to ensure regional stability and the continued growth of Asia's developing democracies within the existing network of bilateral friendships and alliances. However, the region's diversity and lack of cultural homogeneity preclude an overarching alliance like NATO.

Joint training exercises provide USARPAC with its best tool for maintaining contact with regional armies. "Interoperability with allied and friendly armies throughout the Pacific-Asia-Indian Ocean region is a major USARPAC objective," observed General Kicklighter. In this spirit, USARPAC conducted several diverse exercises during 1990. In Alaska, Operation ARCTIC WARRIOR was conducted to evaluate Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), warfighting plans for the cold and hazardous northeast Pacific, Alaska, and the Aleutian Island chain. The 6th Infantry Division was the principal ground force in this exercise. In Southeast Asia, COBRA GOLD provided units of the 25th Infantry Division and the 45th Support Group with realistic training in the jungles of Thailand. Operation TEAM SPIRIT, a yearly exercise in South Korea, directed by the JCS, provided units outside of the Korean theater with an opportunity to deploy in an area of potential future conflict. Finally, during Exercise ORIENT SHIELD, USARPAC active and reserve units deployed from Hawaii and Alaska to the Japanese island of Hokkaido, where they conducted training with elements of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF).

In 1991 USARPAC found its mission largely unchanged. Incoming USARPAC commander Lt. Gen. Johnnie H. Corns continued past programs, though Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM added an opportunity to put years of training to good use. Pre-positioning (PREPO) ships, managed by USARPAC and based in Diego Garcia, were among the first



support vessels to arrive in Saudi Arabia. In addition, USARPAC provided CENTCOM with critical personnel and equipment, including CH-47 Chinook helicopters, and crews from Alaska and infantry platoons from Hawaii. As of April 1991 a USARPAC communications unit still manned a strategic satellite terminal in Riyadh. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the deemphasis of nuclear and chemical weapons, USARPAC found itself well-equipped to handle tons of weapons being deactivated as part of tactical arms agreements between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact nations. In November 1990 the Army Chemical Activity, Pacific, located on Johnston Atoll, received shipments of chemical munitions from Europe. Artillery shells filled with GB and VX nerve agents were stored safely in concrete bunkers for eventual destruction.

Despite the Persian Gulf war and changes in Eastern Europe, USARPAC continued to emphasize joint training exercises throughout the Pacific region. In addition to the large annual troop exercises such as COBRA GOLD and ORIENT SHIELD, USARPAC sponsored command post exercises (CPX) in Australia (TROPIC LIGHTNING CPX) and Singapore (TIGER BALM CPX). In May 1991 USARPAC turned its attention from combat support to disaster relief when a deadly cyclone struck the underdeveloped nation of Bangladesh. USARPAC was part of a joint task force deployed from Pacific bases to aid thousands of Bangladeshi refugees. In addition, USARPAC soldiers traveled to the Philippines in June 1991 in the wake of the Mount Pinatubo volcano eruption to aid in evacuation of American families and recovery operations.

Another facet of USARPAC's mission in FY 91 was an increased emphasis on counternarcotics operations. Designated as CINCPAC leader in ground-based counternarcotics operations, USARPAC coordinated closely with federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities in an attempt to stop the flow of drugs from centers in South and Southeast Asia. In the United States, USARPAC aided in the destruction of marijuana valued at $1.1 billion during Operation WIPEOUT in 1990 on the island of Hawaii. Federal and state agencies declared that the operation succeeded in eliminating 90 percent of Hawaii's marijuana crop.

Within EUSA's area of responsibility, the Korean theater is by far the most volatile. Forty years of uneasy peace between the democratic Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south and the Communist Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north has been maintained largely because of the presence of U.S. Troops on the Korean peninsula. Beginning in 1990, the changes brought about by the breakup of the Soviet Union began to affect even the radical regime in North Korea. Even though it had failed to conquer South Korea during the 1950s, the Communist government in Pyongyang had not renounced the use of force to reunite the two Koreas. With a population of only twenty-two million,



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the DPRK boasts the world's fifth largest military establishment. Active units number in excess of one million men supported by an estimated reserve force of five million. In addition to more than 3,500 tanks, the DPRK maintains a 2:1 advantage over the ROK in artillery, and has twice as many aircraft, and a navy which is considerably larger than the ROK maritime forces. Most ominous, in the past ten years the DPRK has deployed more than 65 percent of its forces within one hundred kilometers of the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

A cornerstone of American strategy in the Pacific is its commitment to the defense of South Korea, and forward deployment of American forces there is a fundamental ingredient. Most ROK units and all U.S. 2d Infantry Division battalions rotate through a tour on the DMZ each year. DMZ training is supplemented by combined exercises designed to enhance cooperation between U.S. And ROK forces. TEAM SPIRIT 90 included more than 13,500 U.S. Air Force personnel with 160 aircraft, as well as units from the 25th Infantry Division, the 29th Separate Brigade from the Hawaii National Guard, a 7th Infantry Division battalion, elements of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade from Okinawa, and 26 ships from the Seventh Fleet. The ROK provided 3 corps-size elements, for a total participation of 191,000.

Modernization has provided another foundation for force readiness in Korea. Recent ROK ground forces modernization improvements that are in process include mechanization of infantry units, expansion and modernization of artillery and rocket forces, expansion of tank forces, formation of new armored brigades and mechanized divisions, fielding of new tactical intelligence systems, and expansion of a modernized helicopter fleet. During FY 89 and FY 90, the 2d Infantry Division received M109A2 and A3 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzers. Battlefield communications were also upgraded with the introduction of the single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS). Within the combined battle staffs, steps were taken to streamline the intelligence support system with new software and a theater automated command and control information management system (TACCIMS). In FY 91 the 2d Division fielded a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) battalion and continued to perfect SINCGARS.

In 1990 the White House and Congress established a series of national security objectives for Korea. Commonly called the Nunn-Warner Report, it directed a restructuring of the defense relationship between the United States and the ROK to tilt the balance of leadership and responsibility toward the ROK. As FY 91 ended, phase one of the Nunn-Warner Report was well under way. It mandated the appointment of ROK general officers to head both the Combined Forces Command (CFC) Ground Component Command and the United Nations Command Military



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Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) by the end of 1992. Nunn-Warner also called for disestablishment of the U.S.-ROK Combined Field Army and phasing out 5,000 U.S. Army and 2,000 U.S. Air Force personnel from U.S. Forces, Korea.

In March 1991 a ROK general officer became senior officer of UNCMAC, and the Combined Field Army was scheduled to disband by the end of FY 92. Continued North Korean intransigence on reunification and nuclear proliferation, however, forced postponement of the withdrawal of 5,000 Army personnel from South Korea.



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***Go to:***

**Previous Chapter** **Next Chapter**

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**Return to Table of Contents**

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


**Return to CMH Online**

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# 3

# Personnel

## Overview

The primary goal in personnel management set by HQDA, as the 1980s ended and the 1990s began, was a smaller but high-quality force. This goal originated in the realization that the level of funding that had facilitated the military buildup of the Reagan administration was not available by the late 1980s. The expectation of reduced funding was already evident in Army personnel planning when international events underlined the trend. In particular, the weakening of the Warsaw Pact, represented most dramatically by German reunification, and the fragmentation of the Soviet Union removed the major threats that had justified large military expenditures for more than four decades.

Faced with the virtual certainty of declining congressional appropriations, the Department of the Army undertook a series of force structure and personnel staffing studies that addressed several possible draw down scenarios. General guidance for the Army draw d own was provided by the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), an instrument of the Department of Defense program management system. For the Army, the POM prescribed deep budget cuts that translated to a reduction of approximately 200,000 soldiers and civilians during six fiscal years beginning in 1992. If all implicit milestones were met, active Army strength would reach 580,000 by the end of FY 97. This POM draw down target, though subject to revision, represented an organizational blueprint for the Army as it entered the last decade of the twentieth century.

To prepare for the severe personnel cuts laid out by the POM, the Secretary of the Army initiated Project QUICKSILVER in late 1989. The QUICKSILVER report, delivered in February 1990, recommended meeting the POM personnel goal by reducing the Table of Organization (T/O) Army by 160,000 Army personnel between FY 89 and 97. QUICKSILVER proposed meeting the balance of the POM goal by reducing Army table of distribution and allowances (TDA) organizations by 40,000 military personnel and 57,000 civilian man-years. Missing from the QUICKSILVER report were detailed recommendations for institutional realignments and



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consolidations of TDA organizations. To address these TDA details, HQDA convened Project VANGUARD in April 1990, and concept teams met at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to study possible TDA savings.

The VANGUARD Task Force compiled a list of thirty initiatives or recommendations for TDA savings for implementation beginning in FY 92. The concept teams estimated that the initiatives would save $191.96 million by the end of FY 92 and $1.5 billion by the end of FY 97. By November 1990 affected organizations had accepted twenty-three initiatives, which were grouped under the heading Band 1. Initiatives not yet concurred in were termed Band 2 proposals. On 21 November the Band 1 initiatives were submitted to the Select Committee (SELCOM) headed by the Army Under Secretary and the Vice Chief of Staff. The SELCOM approved Band 1, and the Under Secretary forwarded the list to the Defense Department Comptroller who, in turn, approved it as Program Budget Decision 945. Band 1 projected $106.8 million in savings by the end of FY 92 and $1.3 billion in cumulative savings by the end of FY 97.

The VANGUARD Band 2 initiatives were scheduled for submission to the SELCOM on 28 November, but DESERT SHIELD priorities prevented this second briefing. An even more dramatic event affected the personnel reduction process when Operation DESERT STORM began on 17 January 1991. Faced with the need to reinforce medical manpower in the wake of mobilization for Southwest Asia, the Secretary of the Army approved in March 1991 a blanket exception to the drawdown imperative in order to achieve continuous fill of 1,100 medical positions. Despite the onset of combat operations in Southwest Asia, implementation of VANGUARD Band 1 initiatives went forward.

The VANGUARD initiatives dealt with both uniformed and civilian personnel, but in different ways, because strength accounting was done differently in each group. For active component personnel, the Army monitored the number of soldiers in each rank and MOS monthly and could easily translate a dollar reduction into a personnel reduction. Army civilian personnel accounting, however, was based on a total expense unrelated to personnel strength. For example, the Army had no single personnel accounting system to determine whether a function was performed by ten GS-15 civilians or by one GS-15 and twenty or more lower-graded civilians. VANGUARD proposed adoption of a cost reduction approach to civilian personnel strength, Managing Civilians to Budget (MCB), a decentralized budgeting system then being tested by the Army. Implemented in CONUS in FY 91 and scheduled for implementation elsewhere the following fiscal year, MCB allowed MACOM commanders increased discretion to cut their operations and maintenance budgets. MCB allowed MACOMs to reduce expenses by either shifting the workloads of lower-graded employees to a smaller number of higher-



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graded career employees, or to private contractors. MACOMs achieved short-term civilian strength reductions by releasing temporary employees by the end of FY 90 and expected longer- term reductions when career status employees retired.

Another aspect of civilian reductions came into play through the BRAC Act, the law that mandated the realignment or closure of more than a hundred Army installations between 1 January 1990 and 30 September 1995. During the first stage of BRAC, a model, Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA), was developed to translate civilian employee responses to BRAC into expenses/savings. According to COBRA, if a hundred civilian positions were moved elsewhere as part of a base consolidation, only thirty-two affected employees would agree to relocate. If that experience held true as BRAC proceeded, the Army would achieve a significant reduction in civilian personnel strength. Cost savings, however, would not appear quickly, since the Army would pay permanent change-of-station costs for those who relocated and either reduction-in-force (RIF) or terminal leave pay for those who did not relocate.

### Active Component Drawdown

Army active component strength stood at 765,287 at the beginning of FY 90, and at 728,252 at the end of the same year, and at 706,160 by the end of FY 91. To achieve the goals of strength reduction and quality enhancement as well as acceleration of the FY 90 and 91 reduction, the Army addressed policies to two populations, personnel in uniform and recruit prospects. The VANGUARD Task Force had begun reducing personnel in uniform by identifying 12,750 military positions for conversion to civilian positions. To achieve a greater strength reduction, however, the Army confronted the major risk to morale posed by involuntary separations. To minimize involuntary separations, HQDA initiated the several programs discussed below during FY 90 and 91.

Enlisted force totaled 623,523 in FY 90, and the Army applied both voluntary and involuntary policies to reduce it. Among the involuntary policies was the bar to reenlistment, a measure whereby soldiers who lacked the requisite qualifications for reenlistment were placed on probation. These soldiers could opt for voluntary separation at any time during a six-month review period, or attempt to correct performance deficiencies. If a soldier had not made acceptable progress toward correcting an identified deficiency by the first six-month review, the soldier's commander had two options: initiate separation on grounds of unsatisfactory performance or misconduct, or grant a second six-month review period. If the soldier did not make acceptable progress during the second six-month review, the commander was required to initiate separation proceedings. Application



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of bars to reenlistment, in addition to other separation routes (resignation, retirement, and court-martial) reduced enlisted strength to 602,542 by the end of FY 91.

The active component officer corps, which totaled 104,735 in FY 90 and included 89,599 commissioned officers and 15,136 warrant officers, was also subjected to voluntary and involuntary strength reduction policies. To minimize the negative impact of a possible RIF and to eliminate 2,600 officers by the end of FY 90, the Army convened the first Regular Army (RA) Probationary/Conditional Voluntary Indefinite (CVI) Selection Board in March 1990. The CVI board considered first lieutenants of year groups 1986 and 1987, if not already on a promotion list for captain and for retention on active duty. These two year groups were selected primarily because losses from them would not cause severe undersizing among company-grade officers, and affected officers were young enough to convert to civilian occupations. From the two-year groups, the CVI board reviewed the files of approximately 4,950 officers, who had a choice to apply for voluntary early separation during the process, and selected approximately 85 percent for retention. The 15 percent not retained totaled 750 officers. RIF proceedings were planned for both company- and field- grade officers, but manpower needs for Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM forced their suspension. The cumulative result of officer accessions, separations, and operations in Southwest Asia, brought active component officer corps strength at the end of FY 91 to 103,611, or 88,665 commissioned officers and 14,946 warrant officers.

In an effort to minimize involuntary separations, HQDA planned to offer both officer and enlisted personnel a package of economic incentives. Two economic incentives were approved in FY 91-Voluntary Separation Incentives (VSI) and Special Separation Benefits (SSB). Officers and enlisted soldiers with more than six, but less than twenty years of service had the choice of either incentive. Different formulas determined the amount of each incentive. VSI provided for one payment a year equal to 2.5 percent of the separating member's final monthly basic pay multiplied by twelve and multiplied again by the member's years of active service. The once-a-year payment was to be made for twice the number of years of service. Partial years, measured in twelfths, also affected the annual payments. SSB provided a lump-sum payment upon separation equal to 15 percent of the separating member's final monthly basic pay multiplied by twelve and multiplied again by the member's years of active service. Partial years also affected SSB payments.

VSI and SSB also conveyed benefits in-kind and contained certain stipulations. Soldiers who elected VSI were eligible for all benefits, including preseparation counseling, job placement services, and transition health insurance, authorized for members who separated voluntarily.



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Soldiers who elected SSB were eligible for benefits provided for members involuntarily separated: preseparation counseling, job placement services, transition health care, two-year commissary and exchange privileges, relocation assistance, extended use of military family housing and overseas schools, permissive temporary duty (TDY) for relocation transition, and priority affiliation with U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) units. Soldiers who elected either VSI or SSB agreed to serve in the Ready Reserve of any armed service, the length of service determined by the option selected. VSI obligated the soldier to serve in a reserve component for the duration of the payment period, while SSB carried a minimum three-year reserve obligation. The VSI/SSB incentives would be offered initially only to soldiers in overstrength career fields, pay grades, or year groups. HQDA planned to offer the incentives to more than 90,000 enlisted soldiers and 42,400 officers in FY 92 and expected 27,000 enlisted and 4,300 officers to accept them.

## Recruitment

The companion policy to a reduction of active component strength was a down ward adjustment of recruiting goals, a policy that benefited from an already positive recruiting environment. Army recruiting personnel had achieved remarkable success in the 1980s and consistently met or exceeded their objectives in both numbers and quality of recruits. This success was due in large part to policies and attitudes following termination of the draft in 1973. The most significant among these were a compensation schedule closer to the private sector than at any time in half a century, and the most favorable image of military service among civilians in two decades. This positive recruiting environment enabled recruiters to obtain the most motivated soldiers since the early years of the Vietnam War.

Army recruiters achieved even greater success in securing high-quality personnel when draw down became an imperative. HQDA reduced the total active component enlisted recruiting objective from 119,901 in FY 89 to 87,000 for

FY 90 but raised its quality objective. New accessions had to meet several standards — at least 95 percent of them had to have high school diplomas, at least 67 percent had to score in the upper half of the AFQT, and no more than 2 percent could score in the lowest AFQT category, Category IV. In FY 91 the Army reduced its active component enlisted recruiting objective to 78,241 and retained the same quality objectives.

The Army's new recruiting objectives produced exceptionally high quality enlisted new accessions in FY 90 and 91. In FY 90 the active component recruited 89,617 men and women, which represented 103 percent



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of the objective. The quality of FY 90 enlisted personnel was the highest in more than a decade — 95.2 percent had high school diplomas; 66.9 percent scored in the top half (Category I through IIIA) of the AFQT; and only 1.8 percent scored in Category IV. In FY 91 the active component recruited its precise objective, 78,241 men and women. The quality of FY 91 enlisted new accessions was more impressive than the preceding year — 97.7 percent were high school graduates, while 74.5 percent scored in the top half of the AFQT, and only 0.9 percent scored in Category IV. Retention rates for enlisted personnel indicated a high level of satisfaction with uniformed service. In FY 90, 40.7 percent, who completed their initial term of service, chose to reenlist. The midcareer (personnel with at least one reenlistment but less than ten years of service) retention rate stood at 74.6 percent, and the career (personnel with more than ten years service) rate was 82.1 percent. In FY 91 the Army achieved an initial term enlisted retention rate of 41.4 percent, a midcareer rate of 72.0 percent, and a career rate of 70.6 percent. The career retention rate was abnormally high in FY 90 because the Army retained those career enlisted personnel who had intended not to reenlist for the manpower needs of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

Total officer recruiting fell in FY 90 and 91. Commissioned officer accessions in FY 90 totaled 6,915 and warrant officer accessions numbered 1,350, while the respective figures for FY 91 were 5,484 and 1,150. The Army obtained most of its officers from five sources: The Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) commissioned 3,797 officers in FY 90 and 3,125 in FY 91, while the figures for direct appointment commissions were 1,339 and 1,169. Other commissioning sources experienced modest increases. The United States Military Academy commissioned 928 and 977 officers in the two years; officer candidate schools produced 288 and 320; and the Health Services Command commissioned, through professional scholarship programs, 345 and 375 in the two fiscal years.

Army Nurse Corps (ANC) recruiting presented a special case during FY 90 and 91. Shortly after the Defense Department hiring freeze became effective on 11 January 1990, it became clear that the Army could not maintain an adequate pool of nurses and other medical personnel if their numbers were reduced in the same way as other Army personnel. Accordingly, medical specialists were exempted from draw down targets, and their numbers were based on projected mobilization needs. Despite competing against Civilian institutions with a higher compensation schedule and during a national shortage of nurses, ANC met most recruiting targets. Trained or aspiring nurses could take one of four routes to ANC commissions in FY 90 and 91. Persons having a nursing degree could receive direct commissions in either the active or reserve components through the Recruiting Command. In FY 90 the Recruiting Command exceeded its active compo-



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nent goal of 385 by making enlistment contracts with 402 men and women. Also that year, the Recruiting Command exceeded its reserve component goal of 1,750 by enlisting 2,001 persons. In FY 91 the Recruiting Command fell short of its active component target of 440 by enlisting 393 persons but exceeded its reserve component goal of 1,100 by signing up 1,129 persons.

Persons who had not begun or were in the process of nurse's training could take one of three other routes to an ANC commission-ROTC, an enlisted commissioning program, or the new nurse candidate program. In FY 90 ROTC fell short of its mission of 185 new nurses with a total of 163 accessions. In FY 91 ROTC fell short of the 310 it sought with

a total of 134 accessions. The Army Medical Department Enlisted Commissioning program (AMEDDECP), inaugurated in FY 90, made full scholarships at accredited institutions available to enlisted personnel in exchange for a specified period of Army service. Because AMEDDECP was an incentive program in which applicants could pace their progress within liberal time lines, annual progress reports were not applied as measures of effectiveness. In FY 90, 139 soldiers applied for the program, and the AMEDDECP board selected 87. In FY 91, 404 soldiers applied, and 100 were selected. In the last quarter of FY 91, the ANC initiated another incentive program, the Army Nurse Candidate Program, to civilians without nurse's training.

The active component in FY 90 was augmented by the Ready Reserve which consisted of the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and the Inactive National Guard. About 307,000 members of the USAR and 444,000 ARNG personnel were assigned to the Selected Reserve. The IRR contained 322,000 Army Reservists, and about 9,000 National Guardsmen were assigned to the Inactive National Guard. USAR recruiting in FY 90 and 91 fell slightly short of objectives. For FY 90 HQDA set a total USAR objective of 65,957 recruits, but accessions totaled 65,075, for an achievement rate of 98.6 percent. The next year the USAR objective was much lower — 52,500, but accessions reached only 50,847, an achievement rate of 96.9 percent. ARNG recruiting results varied even more. With an objective of 70,668 for FY 90, recruiters contracted 77,853 men and women, a rate of 110.2 percent. Results fell considerably the next year as recruiters contracted only 68,150 of an anticipated 86,370, for a rate of 78.9 percent. The USAR/ARNG recruiting effort, when balanced against other factors of accession and separation, actually increased the total Ready Reserve at the end of FY 91.

## Civilian Personnel

In FY 90 the Army employed 455,776 civilians in four categories: U.S. citizens, direct hire foreign nationals, indirect hire foreign nationals,



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and those hired with nonappropriated funds (NAF). Direct hire refers to foreign nationals employed and fully compensated by the Army at any location, while indirect hire denotes foreign nationals employed at overseas bases and compensated under one of several host nation agreements. These agreements called for reimbursement, in varying proportions, of host nation and U.S. funds rather than from the Army budget exclusively. In FY 90 indirect hires totaled 53,370, or about one-eighth of the Army's civilian work force.

In January 1990 the Office of the Secretary of Defense imposed a total hiring freeze. The freeze contributed to a reduction of more than 18,000 Army civilians by October 1990. Some 12,000 individual exception requests were received from the field, and more than half were approved. The Army reduced its civilian (military funded) strength by 22,500 during FY 90 and an additional 14,900 in FY 91. Reductions resulted from CFE drawdowns, CONUS forces downsizing, Defense Management Review initiatives, base consolidations or closures, and extension of the FY 90 hiring freeze into FY 92 and beyond. Projected separations were minimized by advance planning, comprehensive outplacement assistance programs, Voluntary Early Retirement Authority (VERA), and attrition due to pre-RIF hiring freezes. Notable outplacement efforts were conducted in many MACOMs. These included outplacement assistance teams, job fairs, and workshops for managers, personnelists, and employees. As a result of these efforts, only 521 employees were actually separated in FY 91.

A total of 6,236 Army civilians retired in FY 90 and 7,289 the next year. The 48,947 civilian separations in FY 90 and 73,413 in FY 91 from all sources — resignations, transfers, reductions-in-force, removals, deaths, retirements, and displacements — enabled the Army to achieve progress ahead of schedule toward its personnel reduction goals. By the end of FY 91 the civilian work force had a net reduction of more than 20,000 from the previous year to 435,195.

During FY 90 the Army deployed the Army Civilian Personnel System ( ACPERS) to 110 installations worldwide and activated Headquarters, ACPERS, on 1 October 1990. The implementation of ACPERS brought the Army closer to a single civilian personnel system by replacing several other similar systems: the Standard Civilian Management

Information System (SCIPMIS), the Corps of Engineers Management Information System (COEMIS-PA), the Civilian Personnel Accounting System (CPAS), and other MACOM systems used to account for appropriated funds, nonappropriated funds, and local and national civilian employees. ACPERS deployment was completed in FY 91, and the emphasis then shifted from bringing activities onto the system to assuring the accuracy of the data in the new system.



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Leadership by Army civilians had been a special concern of HQDA since a 1985 study revealed deficiencies in this area. To address this and other personnel issues, the Civilian Personnel Modernization Project (CPMP) was created. A major result of this project was the development of a standardized, sequential, and progressive system, Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System (ACTEDS), which provides leadership training and leader development. On 10 April 1990, the Chief of Staff, Army, approved the Army Civilian Leader Development Action Plan (CLDP), a cohesive plan to provide direction for leader development. Following the approval and implementation of CLDP, the officer, noncommissioned officer (NCO), and civilian leader development systems became parallel systems for America's Army. The centrally managed mandatory leader training courses are designed and delivered by the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) and the Army Management Staff College (AMSC). CAL delivers formal training at three career stages: intern, supervisor, and manager. The AMSC provides the Army's premier course for leader development.

In the Senior Executive Service (SES) newly appointed Executive s were required to attend the SES Orientation Conference (the civilian counterpart to the Brigadier General Orientation Conference) and the Force Integration for General Officers and Senior Executives Course. The Civilian Executive Resources Board approved one additional leadership program, the Leadership Development Program at the Center for Creative Leadership. This action achieved nearly parallel Executive training for newly appointed general officers and senior Executives. Senior Executive attendance at the CAPSTONE Program also was sought, but without success. The Army Center for Civilian Human Resource Management ( ACCHRM), established in FY 90, offered the Personnel Management for Executives course to 1,259 students, GS-13 through SES. During its early existence, ACTEDS primarily addressed career employees. The long-range ACTEDS plan, however, provided training opportunities for noncareer employees as well; to improve their skills, in FY 91 ACCHRM conducted 23 classes in civilian personnel administration and graduated 780 students.

To ensure access to ACTEDS by all Army civilian employees despite declining budgets, the ACTEDS Steering Committee, composed of civilian career program functional chiefs and the commanders of USAREUR and FORSCOM, reaffirmed their commitment in FY 91. The committee approved nine more ACTEDS plans, which brought the total number of plans to twenty-three by the end of FY 91. Tailored to each MACOM, the ACTEDS plan identifies formal training, operational assignments, and self-development opportunities to maximize declining resources. In FY 90, 1,580 interns, 2,478 supervisors, and 280 managers graduated from the first three ACTEDS training levels. Although SES training was not



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fully operational, 41 executives received some advanced management training. AMSC graduated 177 persons. In FY 91, 1,674 interns, 3,097 supervisors, and 1,640 managers completed ACTEDS. AMSC graduated 243 civilians and 31 military personnel.

Concurrent with its concerted efforts to improve training and education for civilians since the mid-1980s, the Army studied improvement of civilian personnel accounting and management. The Civilian Personnel Modernization Project recommended integration of the Army civilian workforce into the Army Personnel Proponent System used for uniformed personnel. Acting on this recommendation, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) directed establishment of the Civilian Personnel Proponent System (CIPPS) in 1987. CIPPS established comprehensive personnel management that included structure, accession of personnel, professional development, and personnel

separations. Implementation of CIPPS occurred in three phases. In Phase I, accomplished during FY 88, the Army grouped civilian occupations by career field and identified proponents for each. In Phase II, FY 89-90, the CIPPS pilot program began and was critiqued at a series of in-progress reviews. In Phase III, started in FY 91, civilian proponent off ices were established or existing personnel offices reconfigured to accommodate civilian responsibilities, and AR 600-3, *The Army Personnel Proponent System*, was revised.

The Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 (FEPCA), enacted 5 November 1990, brought about a significant change in the white-collar pay system. The legislation included several provisions that came out of the Army's Civilian Personnel Modernization Project. The FEPCA authorized advanced in-hire rates based on superior qualifications for all positions, as opposed to the previous limit of GS-11 and above. It allowed dual compensation restrictions waivers and the three Rs — recruiting bonus, relocation bonus, and retention allowance. All features would provide managers with pay flexibilities to improve recruitment and retention of high quality employees in diverse labor markets. Implementing Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations, and corresponding Army guidance, have been issued for most features of the act. The Army participated with the DOD and OPM in an effort to shape the design of those provisions.

Although there was a continuing decline in civilian employment during FY 90-91, progress was made in affirmative action. The percentage of women in grades GS-5 through SES level increased, and the percentage of minorities increased in every pay category except federal wage system and SES. A review of the representation of minorities and women in the SES and the feeder group positions of grades GS/GM-14 and -15 revealed a need to take more affirmative actions to develop and mentor Army employees effectively. Top Army management approved an action plan to



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support initiatives at all command and management levels to improve significantly the quality and representation in these important career paths. The accession rate for employment of individuals with disabilities continued to increase in FY 91, but there was no change in the rate of employment of individuals with severe disabilities. The DOD has established a 2 percent employment goal for civilians with severe disabilities by 1 December 1992. The FY 91 program performance suggested that commanders should continue to work toward building a balanced team, despite declining resources.

**Women in the Army**

By the beginning of FY 90, the Department of the Army active component had consisted of 10 percent or more female soldiers for 5 years. For FY 90 the Army set an active component recruiting objective of 12,600 women with NPS; recruiters had an achievement rate of 100.1 percent. For FY 91 the objective was lowered to 11,062, and recruiters accessioned exactly that number. These recruiting results brought the female end-strength percentages of the active component for FY 90 and 91 to 11.4 and 11.3. Female recruiting for the USAR and ARNG yielded results more variable and below expectations. For the USAR in FY 90, HQDA set an objective of 7,567 NPs females; recruiters attracted 8,357 women for an impressive achievement rate of 110.4 percent. The next year, however, working toward a higher objective of 8,210, recruiters attracted only 6,658 for a rate of 81.1 percent. For the ARNG in FY 90, HQDA set an objective of 7,000 NPs females; recruiters contracted only 4,855 women, or a rate of 69.4 percent. The next year, with an objective of 6,999, recruiters contracted only 3,765 women, a rate of 53.8 percent.

The number of females in the Army had risen steadily since abolition of the Women's Army Corps (WAC) in 1978, an event regarded as a major turning point in the integration of women in the Army. Assignment policies, however, had continued to concentrate all but a few female soldiers in combat support and combat service support MOSs. During Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, 20 December 1989 through 31 January 1990, women in aviation, military police, transportation, and medical support Moss found themselves involved in combat in the streets of Panama City. This development attracted widespread attention in the public news media and in Congress, so the Army then reexamined its MOs policy for women.

The Army policy on female soldier assignment at the time of Operation JUST CAUSE excluded women from serving in

units whose mission was direct combat. Direct combat units were defined as those whose missions were to find, fix, and destroy the enemy by direct fire, and maneuver while being exposed to enemy fire, with a high probability of



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direct physical contact with the enemy and the substantial risk of capture. The policy was implemented through the Direct Combat Position Coding (DCPC) system, which evaluated each occupational specialty in terms of proximity to the battlefield according to AirLand Battle doctrine. While the exclusion policy limited high casualty risk for women, it neither insulated women from exposure to combat situations nor ensured that women would not become casualties.

In FY 90 and 91, 90 percent of military occupational skills (Moss) in the Army were open to women. Application of the exclusion policy and DCPC criteria in these two years resulted in the following rates of female soldier participation by occupational group-2 percent of all soldiers in the combat arms, 5 percent in combat support, and 10 percent in combat service support. During Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, 8.6 percent of all soldiers deployed to the Persian Gulf were women. The course of deployment and combat in Southwest Asia illustrated well the difficulties of limiting risk and preventing casualties among female soldiers. In each of the four major casualty categories-killed-in-action, nonbattle deaths, wounded-in-action, and nonbattle wounded-female soldiers accounted for 5 percent of Army totals. The experiences of female soldiers in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM did not cause HQDA to change its combat exclusion policy. The Defense Authorization Act for FY 92, however, established a presidential commission to study the assignment of women in the armed services and report to the president by November 1992.

### Ethnic Groups

During FY 90 and 91, the Army categorized its military personnel within six ethnic groups-white, black, Hispanic, American Indian/Alaska native, Asian/Pacific islander, and other-based on the volunteered responses of its soldiers. The "other" category consisted of those soldiers either who chose not to participate or who did not fit any of the other five categories. In FY 90 total active component ethnic group representation was as follows — white, 62.34 percent; black, 29.06 percent; Hispanic, 4.25 percent; American Indian/Alaska native, 0.42 percent; Asian/Pacific islander, 1.37 percent; and other, 2.57 percent. In FY 91 the percentages for the ethnic groups were white, 62.38 percent; black, 28.72 percent; Hispanic, 4.36 percent; American Indian/Alaska native, 0.43 percent; Asian/Pacific islander, 1.40 percent; and other, 2.71 percent.

### Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

The major implication of DESERT SHIELD for Army personnel was the introduction of new imperatives which, if diplomacy failed and the



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National Command Authority (NCA) resorted to combat in Southwest Asia, would freeze or even reverse the measures planned to achieve a smaller but high quality Army. The Army leadership decided to prepare for the military option while diplomacy ran its course. This meant that Army personnel strength would, for the duration of the crisis, be largely determined by the possibility of combat rather than the desirability of economy.

On 22 August 1990, President Bush authorized activation of the Selected Reserve under provisions of the 200,000 call-up rule (Section 673b, Title 10, U.S. Code). This action allowed the Army to activate 25,000 members of the Selected Reserve for ninety days, with a presidential option for a ninety-day extension. It became necessary to increase the Army authorization to 80,000 soldiers on 19 November and to 115,000 on 1 December, and to extend the period of the call-up for an additional ninety days as of 13 November. Also in November, the Army suspended retirements and resignations. On 19 January 1991, the president exercised his authority to order partial national mobilization of 1 million members of the reserve components for all armed services for as long as two years.

The Army contribution to the mobilization for Southwest Asia totaled 145,071 USAR and ARNG troops. Most of these soldiers were mobilized with one of 391 ARNG or 626 USAR units called to active duty; however, 20,540 served individually, and 5,990 of this number volunteered. Of the total reserve component mobilization, 36,800 ARNG troops and 38,733 USAR soldiers were deployed to Southwest Asia. Army support to military operations in Southwest Asia also included civilian specialists. In FY 90 the Army deployed 195 civilians from the AMC, FORSCOM, TRADOC, U.S. Army Information Systems Command (USAISC), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE). In FY 91 the Army civilian contingent deployed to Southwest Asia grew to more than 3,000. All of these individuals lived and worked under the same conditions as soldiers and were equipped and trained for wartime contingencies.

**Discipline Indicators**

A welcome reflection of improved personnel quality in the Army was the general reduction of disciplinary infractions during FY 90 and 91. In nine of ten discipline indicators, the recent trend of falling rates continued. Based on the rate per 1,000, the rate for crimes of violence fell only slightly, from 2.45 in FY 90 to 2.44 in FY 91. The rate for crimes against property dropped from 7.30 to 6.41. Marijuana possession or use fell from 3.63 to 2.34, and other drug offenses dropped from 3.08 to 2.18. The rate of courts-martial moved downward from 4.34 to 3.53, and for nonjudicial punishments from 96.04 to 78.05. Separations other than honorable was the only indicator that broke the pattern of consistent fall



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from the previous fiscal year. The FY 89 rate of 5.93 increased to 6.13 in FY 90, but then declined to 4.47 in FY 91. The absent-without-leave rate fell from 8.50 to 5.50, while desertion dropped from 4.80 to 3.50. Finally, the rate for driving under the influence of alcohol or other impairment fell from 13.50 to 10.69.

**Conclusion**

Army personnel experienced dramatic institutional developments during FY 90 and 91. New programs were implemented to enhance the management and quality of both the uniformed and the civilian populations. ACPERS, CIPPS, and ACTEDS, as well as the continuation of affirmative action, promised to shape the Total Army into a more efficient executor of national defense policy. Affecting, if not driving, these developments were the Army imperatives of personnel drawdown and quality enhancement. The continuation of drawdown planning during a period of mobilization differed from previous American military experience wherein military mobilization ended immediate consideration for economy in the nation's armed forces. As the mobilization for Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM continued, so too did planning for personnel drawdown and quality enhancement. As combat in Southwest Asia concluded, the prewar spectrum of personnel initiatives resumed.



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*Go to:*

**Previous Chapter** **Next Chapter**

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**Return to Table of Contents**

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**Return to CMH Online**

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# 4

## Support Services

Within the past ten years, "quality of life" and the welfare of the individual soldier and his family have become concerns of the Army leadership to a degree unprecedented in the Army's history. In its early attempts to make the all-volunteer force work, the Army faced a serious problem in retaining qualified personnel because of the relatively low pay, prestige, and standard of living of a military career in the late 1970s. Since then, the Army has worked hard to improve the quality of life — facilities, services, and programs — for its soldiers, civilians, retirees, and their spouses and children, operating on the philosophy that "The Army enlists soldiers but retains families." The Army has also remained alert to the wishes of Congress, which has shown a keen concern with these issues. These programs also can be expected to play an important role as the Army enters a period of major force reductions.

Central to the emphasis on quality of life during FY 90 and 91 was the Army Communities of Excellence (ACOE) program. Through evaluations and awards to outstanding Army posts, the Army sought to encourage discussion and innovative programs to improve facilities and services at its posts. ACOE especially focused on self-help projects to upgrade barracks, housing areas, and administrative space, as well as to improve courtesy and promptness in service to customers. An ACOE newsletter publicized creative solutions throughout the Army. The Off ice of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) established its own Community of Excellence award in 1990 to recognize exceptional performance in personnel management and community and family programs. Recipients of the first awards were Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (military personnel service); Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois (civilian personnel service); and Fort Lewis, Washington (soldier and family support services).

### Housing

One of the major problems that installation commanders faced in their efforts to improve their communities during FY 90 and 91 was the need for suitable family housing. Designed and constructed in the late 1950s and

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early 1960s, most Army housing consisted of older, repetitive tract units that lacked some of the updated appliances, fixtures, and other basic amenities provided in current designs. While most had retained their structural integrity, their internal components were often outmoded. Inadequate funding delayed badly needed maintenance and revitalization of most of these aging, often deteriorating units, and Army leaders warned of eve n higher costs in the future if larger appropriations were not forthcoming.

With about $1.5 billion available per year for FY 90 and 91, Army family housing adopted a three-pronged approach to the housing problem. While the Army provided some new construction, notably to meet the heavy demand on Oahu, Hawaii, it kept such construction to a minimum because the Secretary of Defense froze all but the most essential projects in November 1990. Instead, the Army concentrated on maintenance and revitalization of existing structures. It planned to begin its Whole Neighborhood Revitalization Program in FY 92 to bring aging family quarters, as well as utilities and recreational facilities, up to DOD construction standards during a ten-year period. The new program would eliminate backlogs in repair and upgrading, reduce annual operating costs, and extend the useful life of units. Even with revitalization, however, the Army would still face a housing shortage that only leasing would alleviate. Under the new Section 802 program, the Army encouraged private developers to build on federal land and lease directly to soldiers at affordable rates. The first projects developed under this program advertised in Hawaii in the fall of 1990.

For the large number of soldiers who lived off-post, the Army obtained some adjustments in housing allowances and rent and homeowners' protection. The Army had long sought an adjustment in the variable housing allowance (VHA), which had fallen far short of its goal to cover the difference between the basic quarters allowance and the actual cost of owning a home. The FY 91 Defense Authorization Act removed the congressional ceiling on the VHA and allowed it to increase 10.3 percent. The Army achieved another housing objective in March 1991, when the President signed a bill

amending the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 to increase the eviction protection ceiling from $150 to $1200 for renters. The Army had created the Homeowners' Assistance Program in 1967 to ensure that Army homeowners, forced to sell their homes because of a base closure, would receive the fair market value that predated the closing announcement. Beginning in August 1991, the program helped reimburse homeowners in the area of Fort Hood, Texas, for losses sustained through private sale or foreclosure resulting from inactivation of the 2d Armored Division in 1990.

Since the 1988 Family Action Plan pinpointed relocation assistance as a high priority, the Army has devoted considerable resources to helping



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soldiers move. Under a 15 June 1990 mandate from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, representatives of the Housing Referral Office and Army Community Services counseled soldiers about buying and selling a home. Beginning in the spring of 1990, Army Community Services installed at various bases the Relocation Assistance Information System (RAIS), a computer software package that provided soldiers with data on child care, housing, medical facilities, and other related subjects. The Housing Operations Management System (HOMES) likewise provided computer programs to help relocating soldiers. These programs included an assignments and terms module to keep track of available Army quarters, a billeting module for hotel reservations, and a furnishings module with inventories of government furniture. Meanwhile, ODCSPER recommended changes to the Sponsorship Program, which provided assistance to soldiers newly assigned to units, by the unit members they were replacing. ODCSPER wanted sponsoring soldiers to provide specific information about their units to their replacements. To match entitlements already in place for families, the Army increased overseas household goods shipment and weight allowances for single soldiers.

In FY 90 the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report highly critical of a long-standing policy regarding temporary duty (TDY) lodging and guesthouses, which were used primarily by permanent change of station (PCS) personnel. The GAO concluded that monies generated from TDY lodging could only be reinvested in that program, and not in morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) guesthouses as the existing policy permitted. Another recommendation by the GAO was that monies generated during the prior four-year period, which had been reinvested in guest-houses, had to be repaid to the U.S. Treasury. This was necessary even though the Army had been the beneficiary of additional real property and also improvements to existing facilities made possible by those funds.

The GAO further concluded that excessive rates had been charged TDY travelers who used the transient lodging facilities. The Vice Chief of Staff, Army, approved creation of an Army billeting fund and installation billeting funds to separate the proceeds generated by TDY lodging from the installation MWR fund. Each installation billeting fund is a separate account, with revenues used to support only TDY transient housing needs.

### Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM presented both a challenge and an opportunity for Army Morale, We l fare, and Recreation (MWR). The challenge was how to deliver recreation activities to half a million soldiers deployed in the desert. Working closely with FORSCOM and CENTCOM, the Army Community and Family Support Center (CFSC) had an



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opportunity to practice putting "combat recreation" in place. Movies, weights and exercise equipment, billiards, table tennis, and water sport s were soldiers' favorite recreation activities while stationed in Saudi Arabia, according to survey data obtained from soldiers in the Gulf. These and other MWR activities were provided by Department of the Army civilian employees who volunteered for duty in the Middle East at the request of General Schwarzkopf, under the auspices of CFSC. The first contingent of twenty-seven recreation specialists, twenty men and seven women, arrived on

22 January 1991 for the first rotation of 120 days. A total of sixty-three civilians served in the Middle East between January and September 1991.

CFSC's Community Recreation Directorate arranged for 45,000 copies of Stars and Stripes, 4,000 subscriptions to Army Times, and shipments of more than 700,000 paperback books, for a total of nearly $1 million in nonappropriated funds for recreation supplies shipped to the Persian Gulf. Items shipped ranged from sports equipment to playing cards, board games, and arts and crafts materials. Private businesses, citizens, celebrities, nonprofit agencies, and community groups donated hundreds of thousands of gifts and merchandise, which ranged from portable radios to weightlifting equipment.

CFSC also conducted a DESERT STORM Creative Writing Contest and an Army Humor Cartoon Contest as vehicles for soldiers to express their innermost feelings and to give healthy, creative vent to the homesickness, boredom, and loneliness they were experiencing in the desert. The contests, which were the only ones of their kind conducted by any U.S. armed service, generated more than 1,000 literary entries and more than 300 cartoons. CBS television journalist and World War II reporter for the Stars and Stripes, Andy Rooney, served as one of four Creative Writing Contest judges.

Back on the home front, issues that revolved around separating self-sufficiency and appropriated fund support for recreation programs, coupled with force reductions, generated congressional concern. According to authorization policies, programs such as sports and libraries were to receive a large percentage of appropriated funds similar to municipal programs financed by taxpayer dollars. On the other hand, business activities such as clubs, golf, and bowling were, of necessity, mandated to generate their own revenues from fees, retail sales, special events, and other entrepreneurial ventures. Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) dividends were, and continue to be, a critical source of revenue for MWR.

Under congressional mandate, the Army had sought to finance mission- sustaining activities, such as sports and libraries, with appropriated funds, while developing better marketing and management practices in the business activities so they could support themselves. In practice, the Army had not achieved this resource scenario. Congress, concerned about ade-



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quate support of MWR in a period of force reductions, then extended permission for the Army to use appropriated funds to reimburse nonappropriated monies through FY 91. Reduced resources and the emphasis on self-sufficiency caused commanders to restructure and, in some cases, close MWR programs. At Fort Riley, Kansas, for example, the post commander regrouped MWR programs according to financial performance, the presence of similar facilities in the civilian sector, and the anticipated availability of appropriated funds. In the process, he closed a number of standard MWR activities, including the NCO club, the arts and crafts center, music and theater programs, and the golf course.

In FY 90 the Army began aggressively tapping another potential source of revenue, thanks to a 1989 DOD pilot program which allowed the services to solicit corporate America for commercial sponsorship of MWR programs. Sponsorship fell under the purview of the newly established CFSC marketing division, which issued guidance and formulated commercial sponsorship policy. The program grew from a total of $2.6 million in cash, goods, and services in FY 90 to $7.1 million generated in FY 91. The large increase in FY 91 was due to corporate support of DESERT STORM reunion celebrations. To help generate corporate interest in reunion activities, CFSC published a commercial sponsorship booklet entitled Celebrate the Heroes, which listed reunion program ideas, as well as MACOM and specific Army installation points of contact for marketing. Corporate America rolled out the welcome mat as veterans returned from Southwest Asia. As an example, during May 1991 the Army CFSC served as executive agent for the distribution to service members of more than 100,000 Anheuser-Busch "Yellow Ribbon Summer" family theme park tickets, valued at $12 million.

Notwithstanding financial retrenchment, most MWR programs continued to serve soldiers and families well, both in quantity and quality. In responses to a 1990 sample survey of military personnel, 23 percent of officers and 25 percent of enlisted personnel said that the availability of nonathletic recreation programs (recreation centers, outdoor recreation,

arts and crafts, and music and theater) "definitely" or "probably" affected their decision to stay in the Army. Sports ranked high in usage as Army athletes continued their winning tradition by participating with distinction and bringing home medals and awards in many competitions, both inside and outside the armed services, including the Goodwill Games and the Pan American Games. Soldiers excelled in wrestling, cycling, marksmanship, boxing, and racquetball as they prepared for the 1992 summer Olympics in Seoul, Korea.

To meet the emerging needs of single soldiers aged 18-25 and to counterbalance the emphasis on family programs between 1978-88, the Army CFSC established the Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers



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(BOSS) program in 1989. The goal of BOSS was to meet the needs of this target population. To accomplish this, CFSC conducted a series of BOSS workshops and focus groups. By the end of 1989, the BOSS program was functioning at thirty-two Army posts, and by FY 91 the program had been implemented Armywide. Eventually, the scope of the BOSS program expanded to include all single-soldier issues, and the Sergeant Major of the Army played an active role in it.

**Family Support**

While BOSS addressed the needs of single soldiers, the Army Family Action Plan (AFAP) continued to address the concerns of the rest of the Total Army family: retirees, single parents, dual military career couples, youth, and reservists. In 1990 and 1991 AFAP delegates representing installations worldwide came to Washington, D.C., to review issues which surfaced from people at the grassroots to HQDA. Inadequate housing allowances, comprehensive dental care, and enhanced family programs for the Total Army were among top issues identified in 1990. Inequitable military pay, the need for increased marketing of CHAMPUS, and underutilized teen programs were issues identified in 1991.

To address these and other issues affecting youth in grades six through twelve, the Youth Services Program (YSP), formerly Youth Activities or Dependent Youth Activities, implemented the Youth Development Program (YDP) and established YDP positions at many installations. In 1990 the first Teen Discovery: World Teen Summit youth symposium was held at Pine Camp, Fort Gordon, Georgia. Thirty-six teenagers, selected locally by their peers, and thirty-four YSP/YDP staff representing thirty posts Armywide, participated in developmental and recreational activities that lasted a week. These activities were designed to heighten self-esteem as well as motivate teens to return to their communities and contribute positively as peer role models and leaders. This successful program was continued in 1991. The YSP became an especially critical element in helping youth deal with the difficult adjustments associated with the deployment of their parents to the Persian Gulf. In coordination with the Army, Boys and Girls Clubs of America began offering special programs directed at the children of reserve component families. These programs were funded by a special $3 million congressional grant.

For parents of infants, toddlers, and preschoolers, child care remained a critical issue. In November 1989 Congress passed the Military Child Care Act (MCCA). This legislation stipulated minimum appropriated funding and staff levels, higher wages, and better training for child care staffs; user fees based on family income; national accreditation of child development centers; and unannounced inspections of



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local child development services (CDS) programs and facilities. The MCCA came about as a result of incidents of child abuse reported in the media, including those at the U.S. Military Academy and the Presidio of San Francisco. To reduce the risk of future problems, the Army instituted the MCCA-mandated inspection program and established job applicant screening, training programs, and intervention requirements for suspected cases of child abuse.

The House Armed Services Committee commended the Army for responding with vigor to the MCCA. During FY 90 the Army met and exceeded by 5 percent the appropriated funding stipulated by the MCCA and filled 100 percent of the newly created child care positions. It also raised caregiver salaries as much as $2 an hour, which significantly reduced

staff turn over; conducted unannounced inspections at 171 locations; and provided child care services for more than 174,000 children. In 1990 Fort Leavenworth's child development center (CDC) was the first Army CDC to be accredited by the National Academy of Early Childhood Programs. By the end of FY 91, forty CDCs had received national accreditation. The Army family child care system in government-owned housing had also become firmly established and offered extended hours of care for single and dual military career parents. A new system, Supplemental Programs and Services, was already on the regulatory books and was in the process of being implemented, further expanding on-post child care options. Army family programs, particularly the Army Community Service (ACS), demonstrated their value during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. This was a period during which family members received intensive education about installation support services through their chain of command. At seven stateside posts from which large numbers of troops deployed, ACS established and operated 24-hour family assistance centers (FACs). Under one roof, FAC staff assembled chaplains, lawyers, relief workers, and other social service specialists to monitor possible trouble areas and provide information and counseling as well as training for unit support groups. In addition, ACS provided relocation information, consumer and financial advice, employment counseling, aid to exceptional family members, and other services. Unit support groups, supplemented with assistance from the United Services Organization (USO) , the American Legion, the Young Men's Christian Association, and the American Red Cross provided information to family members and helped with child care, housing, and financial problems. From August 1990 through January 1991, Army Emergency Relief (AER) helped 31,000 soldiers and their families with $17 million in grants and interest-free loans.

To support the reserve components and those families at installations without family assistance centers, the Army established a toll-free hotline in an operations center at the Alexandria, Virginia, CFSC in August 1990.



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As the level of conflict escalated, the operations center went to a 24-hour schedule, which continued through April 1991. Although the operating hours decreased as troops returned, the hotline remained operational through July 1991. The staff logged 80,000 calls during the nine-month period. During the Persian Gulf war and during and after homecomings, Army family support programs continued to help soldiers and their families through the difficult period of readjustment.

## Health Care

During FY 90 and 91 the Army Medical Department continued its efforts to increase access to medical services for Army families while controlling skyrocketing expenses. Through the CHAMPUS Management Improvement Program, the Army sought to limit the volume of CHAMPUS services and to control doctors' fees. The Department of Defense delayed expansion of outpatient program services, the Army 's Primary Care of the Uniformed Services (PRIMUS) Program, beyond the 10 existing clinics.

Through its Medical Enhancement Program, the Army expanded direct care at military facilities in such areas as family practice and obstetrics-gynecology. It also increased access to care through the community-based Mental Health Project for youth and the European After-Hours Test Project, which provided outpatient services for Army families in German medical facilities. The Army 's ongoing Health Promotion Program encouraged healthy lifestyles among soldiers and their families.

To improve the health care system and keep costs reasonable, the Army investigated the concept of having Army primary care area providers coordinate health services for individuals. Based on practices developed by the private health care industry, the concept required each Army medical treatment facility to develop a plan to supply primary care within its area of responsibility. This plan would automatically enroll all eligible beneficiaries and assign them to, or allow them to choose, a primary care "gatekeeper" clinic within their area as their conduit into the military health care system. Clinics would refer beneficiaries to appropriate specialized care in either the military or the private sector. Outlined for Congress in January 1990 by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the concept fit in well with the Coordinated Care Program being developed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health

Affairs. While the House Appropriations Committee was recommending expansion of the concept, the Army instituted trial programs at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Fort Carson, Colorado, referred to as catchment area management demonstrations.

Building on the lessons learned from these trials and other Army and DOD initiatives, the Army Surgeon General, in October 1990, intro-



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duced the Gateway to Care Program as an interim measure prior to adoption of the Coordinated Care Program. The new program used the concept of designated primary care clinics that would coordinate each beneficiary's health care needs and arrange, when necessary, for more specialized treatment or inpatient services elsewhere. Gateway to Care thereby shifted the responsibility for finding and coordinating care from the patient to a comprehensive health care delivery system under the control of the local military hospital commander. The commander would determine whether a service should be performed by a military or a civilian facility. When referral to a civilian facility proved necessary, the commander would negotiate the lowest possible rate. The Army planned to implement Gateway to Care at thirteen sites, including Forts Sill and Carson, during FY 91.

While the Army Surgeon General's Office searched for a more efficient health care program for Army families at an affordable cost, Army researchers were making advances in medical technology. Under the supervision of the Army Medical Research and Development Command, scientists at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research and eight other laboratories were developing nerve agent antidotes, vaccines for hepatitis and upper respiratory meningitis, and antibodies against infections following injuries and burns. Of all their work, the fight against AIDS earned the most attention. In October 1990 Army scientists from the Walter Reed Institute of Research reported to the International Conference on AIDS that their vaccine, gp160, had proved successful in stimulating the development of new antibodies and other immune responses critical to the body's fight against AIDS. In November 1990 the Army also began testing vaccine gp120 on fifty HIV-infected patients, hoping to develop a vaccine that would delay the acute period of the illness. Because of an intensive education program, the rate of new HIV infections in the Army had dropped from 0.49 per thousand soldiers during 1985-87 to 0.29 per thousand by February 1991.

### The Army Safety Program

Safety statistics for FY 90 and 91 gave the Army as much satisfaction as the improved HIV figures. In both fiscal years, the Army continued its downward trend in the number of accidents, injuries, and fatalities. During FY 90 the total number of accidents declined by 24 percent, and the Army Safety Off ice reported the lowest number of aircraft accidents on record. The only increase in both number and costs came in the category of civilian injuries. Those statistics improved the following fiscal year, when the Safety Office reported the lowest level of civilian injuries since the Army began keeping records in 1984. The Persian Gulf war heavily influenced



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safety statistics for FY 91, but despite the impact of wartime training and operations, the number of accidents and fatalities still declined to an all-time low. Although aircraft accidents increased during FY 91, 25 of the 49 reported incidents occurred in Southwest Asia. In a collateral benefit, privately owned vehicle accidents decreased during the year because a large percentage of active component soldiers served in Saudi Arabia.

The Army Safety Office pointed to a number of reasons for the fine performance, including the integration of accident prevention techniques into training and work standards, the distribution of instructional videotapes and special checklists, on-site health hazard assessments, and the expansion of formal training in risk management for officers and senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in both CONUS and overseas. During the two fiscal years, the Army Safety Office and the Army Safety Center also completed installment of rollover protection on M151 quarter-ton trucks and

created a Technical Center for Explosives Safety to provide technical guidance to field commanders on the handling of explosives. The Army also published new regulations for nuclear safety programs, biochemical research, and toxic chemical agents, which were returning from Germany in large quantities. After a slow start, safety in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM improved, in part because of publication and distribution of the new Leader's Safety Guide.

## Pay and Travel

While safety matters during the period concerned some soldiers more than others, pay issues drew nearly everyone's attention. During FY 91 the Army increased military and civilian salaries by 3.5 percent and also instituted generous increases for certain specialties, medical specialties in particular. The FY 90 Defense Authorization Act helped the Army to counter the exodus of doctors from its ranks by increasing special pay for physicians and by extending the Medical Officer Retention Bonus for an additional year. These pay raises were implemented by a new payroll innovation, the Joint Service Software System (JSSS), that the Army developed in conjunction with the Air Force. The Army hoped that JSSS would reduce payroll operation and maintenance costs, standardize procedures, and ultimately improve response time to inquiries with current, online information. Beginning in August 1991, the Army began converting twelve to sixteen of its finance offices per month to JSSS, a process that would continue until the entire Army payroll reached online status.

Budgetary limitations did not prevent Congress from expanding some benefits available to soldiers and retirees. Congress was quick to extend the highly successful Montgomery GI Bill which, since its inception in 1985, had provided educational benefits to more than one million Army



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recruits. After the Persian Gulf war, Congress increased those benefits for active component soldiers to as much as $27,000 for tuition, when combined with the Army College Fund. Congress also used subsidies to reduce retiree premiums for the Survivor Benefit Plan, but it did not reform the program to permit adjustments after retirement. In late 1991 President Bush signed legislation that extended the eligibility period for applying for service-related disabled veteran's insurance from one to two years. The bill also extended to two years the period during which veterans declared mentally incompetent from a service-connected disability could apply for a gratuitous policy.

Those who served in Panama and Southwest Asia received a number of special benefits during FY 90 and 91. The Army authorized IDP for JUST CAUSE through January 1990. IDP was approved for service by Army personnel in several Middle East countries during the Persian Gulf war. In April 1991 President Bush increased IDP from $110 to $150 per month, to continue until 180 days after the Gulf war. He also approved increases in the Family Separation Allowance from $65 to $75 per month, the Death Gratuity from $3,000 to $6,000 for deaths from injury or illness in the Gulf conflict, and indemnities under Serviceman's Group Life Insurance (SGLI) from $50,000 to $100,000. Veterans of ninety days' active duty during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM also became eligible for Veterans Affairs (VA) home loan guarantees. With the start of DESERT STORM, troops in the Gulf region received a six-month hiatus on filing their income taxes; it was later extended to last as long as their deployment overseas. Effective 17 January 1991, enlisted personnel could exclude all military compensation for each month of combat service from their taxable revenues. Officers could exclude their first $500.

The Gulf war also reinforced the trend toward greater benefits for reserve components and intensified efforts in Congress to reduce inequities between the reserve and the active component. Public Law 102-12 confirmed that reserve component personnel called to active duty would keep the health insurance provided by their employers when they returned. Those persons mobilized for service in the Gulf also became eligible for the V H A at their monthly drill training station or at the location from which they were ordered to active duty. Beginning 1 December 1991, reserve component personnel activated in wartime or a national emergency were eligible for government-paid special storage of household goods for as long as ninety days. Congress increased benefits for reserve component personnel who were eligible for retirement pay but were not yet age sixty. They could now apply for SGLI, and, effective 1 October 1991, they would enjoy increased access to post exchanges (PXs) and MWR facilities. During the war, the Army National

Guard (ARNG) appointed a full-time coordinator in each state to work directly with commanders regarding family matters.

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After they returned home from the Persian Gulf, many officers and enlisted personnel in the active component faced involuntary separation as force reductions accelerated. To ease their transition to civilian life, the Army obtained provisions for separation pay and other benefits in the FY 91 Defense Authorization Act. Effective 5 November 1990, the Army made payments to soldiers on active duty who were being involuntarily separated through denial of reenlistment or denial of continuation on active duty, had completed at least six but fewer than twenty years of active service, were receiving an honorable or general discharge under honorable conditions, and agreed in writing to three years of service in the Ready Reserve. The act also provided for as much as thirty days of excess leave for job searches and relocation activities, priority placement with ARNG and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) units, extensions for as long as 180 days for military housing, commissary and PX privileges for two years, military health care for 60-120 days after separation, and another opportunity to participate in the Montgomery GI Bill.

As a further aid to departing soldiers and their families, the Army announced establishment of the Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) in 1990. Under ACAP, the Army planned to establish Transition Assistance Offices (TAO) at various posts to help soldiers return to civilian life and to refer them to appropriate agencies for available benefits. Job Assistance Centers (JAC) would teach job search skills; provide individual career counseling, workshops, and seminars; and direct soldiers to external job assistance agencies. Although not job placement agencies, ACAP facilities could provide job leads through the automated Army Employer Network, which listed by geographical region, employers who were interested in hiring Army alumni. For smaller installations that would not have a TAO or JAC, the Army planned to provide mobile services, and it also distributed transition guidebooks to individuals. The program began with seven pilot sites in January 1991 and was expected to expand to more than sixty sites by the end of the year.

Through negotiations, the Army obtained transportation cost reductions from the commercial travel industry, in addition to the favorable rates it already had achieved in past years. The Army reached an agreement with several airlines that waived restrictions on reservations and payment of reduced fares for military trainees and, through the Hotel Reservation Program, it secured discount rates from several major hotel chains for military personnel and their families. In 1990 the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) developed a five-year contracting plan to provide commercial travel offices at CONUS installations. The contractors would offer discounted official travel and pay concession fees on leisure (unofficial) travel. To serve the leisure and vacation-planning needs of the military community, information, ticketing, and registration (ITR) offices were estab-

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lished to provide tickets to local and regional events, as well as short recreational trips for soldiers and families. All revenues that were saved went into the installation MWR fund. In May 1990 the Army implemented a new policy that permitted personnel traveling on official business to use Frequent Flyer miles for accommodation upgrades. Military personnel on temporary duty (TDY) also benefited from the implementation of direct deposit of TDY reimbursements into their bank accounts.

### Clothing and Individual Equipment

During FY 90 and 91 the Army improved not only family services and pay and travel benefits for soldiers, but also their food, clothing, and personal equipment. After October 1990 the Project Manager for Clothing and Individual Equipment (PM-CIE) oversaw the research and development of more than four hundred items, down from eight hundred after the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) eliminated federal specifications for many CIE items. During FY 90 the Army approved implementation of the Central Funding and Fielding System (CFF) by the PM-CIE in FY 91. Under this system, the PM-CIE would develop a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for modernization of CIE. Based on the

POM data, the Army would allocate funds, and the PM-CIE would coordinate development of fielding plans with the Army Support Activity, using priorities established by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS). The Army would then fund requisitions to the DPSC to execute the fielding plans. The new procedure represented a major departure from the old "pull" system, whereby units requisitioned new items using Army Operations and Maintenance (OMA) funds.

As part of its Soldier Modernization Plan to improve production of critical items for soldiers, the Army viewed individual equipment not as a number of isolated items, but as part of a total fighting system. This approach was evident in the futuristic Soldier Integrated Protective Ensemble (SIPE), a head-to-toe system to improve the fighting ability of the individual soldier. The SIPE concept consisted of headgear capable of multiple functions, advanced clothing, and climatic conditioning. Through the SIPE program, the Army hoped to field, by the year 2000, a helmet that possessed an individual communications system, an infrared sight that would enable a soldier to aim his weapon by projecting a beam on the target, and an encapsulating suit that filtered chemically contaminated air for breathing and cooling the body. The Army anticipated a field demonstration of SIPE in FY 92.

For the short term, the Army turned to the Soldier Enhancement Program (SEP), a congressional initiative implemented by the Army during FY 90 to field nondevelopment items (NDI) using an accelerated approach.



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In coordination with HQDA and TRADOC, PM-CIE and the Natick Research, Development, and Engineering (RD&E) Center at Natick, Massachusetts, selected eleven CIE projects from their development efforts and off-the-shelf technology for special emphasis during FY 90 and 91. These projects ranged from new body armor and laser protection to improved battle dress uniforms (BDUs) for hot weather climates and alternate materials for cold weather clothing. From this list, the Army completed development of the Intermediate Cold-Wet Glove and Boot, the Combat Boot for Desert Environment, and the Lightweight Flashlight during FY 91.

Largely because of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the Army progressed in upgrading its desert BDUs and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protective we a r. To provide a desert uniform with enhanced camouflage, the Army, in October 1990, adopted a new three-color desert camouflage pattern BDU to replace the six-color pattern. A t the start of FY 90, the Army had made some progress in the production of antidotes for nerve agents, but critics claimed that its NBC equipment was obsolete compared to other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members. In June 1990 a CIE task force began to evaluate the research, development, and testing process for chemical CIE items. Meanwhile, the Army explored ways to provide lighter and more effective protection, including microclimate cooling systems, the Suit Contamination Avoidance and Liquid Protective (SCALP), and a new protective mask for helicopter crews. The Army also type-classified the Aircrew Uniform Integrated Battlefield (AUIB) and the Aircrew Battle Dress Uniform into the supply system, we a r-tested an Enhanced Hot Weather and Desert BDU, and refined components of the Extended Cold Weather Clothing System.

Several other CIE items made their debut during FY 90 and 91. The Army introduced a new helmet for aviators and continued research on new fibers to strengthen the steel for helmets and bullet proof vests as part of the Personal Armor System Ground Troops. Beginning in the summer of 1989, the Army issued the Combat Vehicle Crewman's Uniform System to protect armored crews, and in October 1990 it added the Laser Protective Visor, which provided improved laser protection for aviators. As part of the Integrated Infantry Fighting System project, the Army began to issue new types of sleeping bags, as well as vests and field packs, that distributed weight over the entire torso more effectively than earlier models.

The Persian Gulf war caused CIE agencies to accelerate development and fielding of CIE items for desert warfare. The PM-CIE directed the Natick RD&E Center to modify specifications quickly in order to expedite procurement of items with the desert camouflage design and recommended the immediate acquisition of a modified hot weather boot for a desert environment as an interim desert boot. Input from CENTCOM

aided modification of the boot, as well as the desert BDU, for rapid shipment to the Persian Gulf. Turning to many contractors and the DPSC, the Army authorized conversion of woodland and hot weather BDUs to ensure manufacture and delivery of 1.5 million desert BDUs to the theater by June 1991. In the process, the Army took the opportunity to improve and even expand its industrial base for important commodities such as the NBC suit. Industries that produced the NBC uniform barely existed before the war. Throughout the procurement process, HQDA, FORSCOM, AMC (PM Soldier and Army Support Activity), and the DPSC worked together to facilitate shipments the of uniforms.

**Food and Commissary Services**

While CIE agencies were improving the clothing and individual equipment of the soldier, Army food agencies were seeking ways to produce more edible and durable products. The focus of these efforts was the Army Field Feeding System (AFFS), which set a standard of three quality meals for each soldier per day. These meals could be any of three choices — T-rations, or tray rations; the Meal-Ready-to-Eat (MRE) (both the T and MRE were packaged meals that were heated); and the A-ration , which was a freshly cooked meal. To deliver T- and A- rations to the soldiers, the Army obtained sufficient funding through FY 91 to field mobile kitchen trailers and company-level kitchens with its divisions, separate brigades, and armored cavalry regiments. At the research level , the Natick RD&E Center was developing improved cold weather packaging, longer spoons, wet-packed fruit for MREs, and the Zestotherm heating pad used to heat the MRE entree when activated with two ounces of water. To help with the development of more adequate rations, the center also reached cooperative agreements with several colleges, food industries, and government laboratories for microwave thermoprocessing and for improved ration components.

Ration development drew interest from both the food industries and the soldiers. From 1986 through 1990, the Army had changed ration components for about 50 percent of its T-rations and 75 percent of its MREs. During FY 90 and 91 the Natick RD&E Center developed a long-life ration packet that could be stored for ten years at 80 F.; and it also experimented with such items as frankfurters, cheese pizza, beef burritos, and pork chow mein.

The most notable innovations were the introduction of pouch bread, T-ration hamburger patties, and the heat-resistant candy bar. Pouch bread contained sucrose ester emulsifier, a preservative that would keep the bread fresh for as long as three years. The heat-resistant candy bar was developed through an agreement between the Army and the Hershey



Corporation in response to Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. More than 890,000 bars were procured by the Army and sent to the Persian Gulf.

With the Army as the DOD's executive agent for supplying food to the Gulf, Army food agencies contributed much to the success of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. To coordinate the effort, the Food Engineering Directorate of Troop Support Command established a special management team of food/packaging technicians and dieticians. It also created a High Heat Environment Food Quality Task Force of experts from academia and industry to examine issues such as nutrition stability, ration storage, and food metabolism in the desert heat. Through extraordinary effort, the Army and cooperating industries managed a production surge from 4.2 million to 14.4 million MREs and a rise in the production of T-rations to about 4 million meals per month by March 1991. Despite these increases, the Army experienced short falls, especially in T-rations. The DPSC contracted with the Hormel Corporation for the delivery of 37.2 million commercial off-shelf dishes, known as Meals Operational Ready to Eat (MORE), by May 1991. AFFS shortcomings in Saudi Arabia prompted TRADOC to direct the U.S. Army Quartermaster Center and School to study the effectiveness of AFFS wartime doctrine and other issues relating to food services in combat.

Developments in Army feeding activities were not limited to the field. The Army Quartermaster Center and School, which had assumed responsibility for garrison food services at the start of FY 90, was upgrading troop dining facilities

on post to DOD standards and adopting new menus, contemporary decor, and separate serving stations to replace the old cafeteria style. It also upgraded its Troop Subsistence Activities with computerized inventory systems, modular construction, and improved climate control. Surcharges also drew considerable attention. For years, the Army had collected fees from officers and civilians who used appropriated fund dining facilities that were primarily meant to serve enlisted personnel. Responding to pressure from commanders who wanted more flexibility in the employment of surcharges, the DOD Comptroller, in March 1991, approved exemptions for officers in command and leadership positions but not for those on TDY or leave. He later waived the surcharge for legal dependents of personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf.

While Army dining facilities coped with new construction and surcharge exemptions, the commissary system was undergoing a major reorganization. On the recommendation of a DOD study group that examined the consolidation of service commissary operations, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved a single commissary organization under a new Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) in the spring of 1990. During the summer the head of DeCA, an Army major general, met with service com-



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missary heads to work out details of the consolidation. DeCA personnel carried out site inspections, developed an organizational structure, and visited distribution centers. Choosing Fort Lee, Virginia, as its headquarters, DeCA assumed provisional control of service commissary activities in October 1990 and full control in October 1991.

Meanwhile, Army commissaries and PXs were adopting a number of reforms to improve efficiency and service to customers. The prospect of reduced appropriated funds, base closures, and a smaller customer base created a need for the AAFES to reorganize and cut costs. Otherwise, they could not maintain their support for MWR funds, which relied on AAFES dividends for MWR programs and the modernization of facilities. To streamline the method by which the AAFES transferred earnings from Class Six stores, pay phones, and food operations to installations, the Army Community and Family Program Review Committee approved an Army Simplified Dividend Program. This program provided for payments based on a percentage of AAFES revenue unique to each installation. Using surcharges paid by commissary patrons, the Army continued its program to repair or modernize commissaries. Customers at Army commissaries benefited from price scanning at checkout counters, more convenient shopping hours, and, in the case of European stores, the opportunity to buy American beef for the first time. Army commissaries projected total sales of $2.1 billion in FY 91.

### Memorial Affairs

As it strived to provide a better quality of life during FY 90 and 91, the Army also honored its dead from both recent and earlier conflicts. Army personnel took part in memorial services around the nation for the fallen of JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. The Army added to its flag streamers for Panama and Southwest Asia and continued to collect records, artifacts, and memorabilia from inactivating units and closing bases. It also sponsored activities to commemorate the 50th anniversary of World War II. In July 1990 airborne veterans participated in ceremonies in Washington, DC, that marked the 50th anniversary of the Airborne Test Platoon, the unit from which American airborne forces of World War II and later wars evolved. The festivities included a parade down Pennsylvania Avenue, a memorial service at Robert F. Kennedy Stadium, and an airborne exhibition at the Smithsonian Institution. The U.S. Army Armored Force and the USO were two other organizations that marked 50-year anniversaries. In January 1991 the DOD 50th Anniversary of World War II Commemoration Committee met with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans to plan ceremonies for the 50th anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.



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The World War II commemoration that received the most attention during FY 90 and 91 recognized a 100-year anniversary, the birth of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower in October 1890. The Army worked with the

Eisenhower Centennial Commission and the federal government to issue an Eisenhower commemorative stamp and coin and also assisted symposia and other educational programs on Eisenhower, both as a general and as a president. The centerpiece of the commemoration was, "Journey to Victory," five days of ceremonies in London, Normandy, and Paris that celebrated Eisenhower's service as commander of allied forces in Europe during World War II.

**Conclusion**

Despite budget cuts, force reductions, and base closures, the Army substantially enhanced quality of life programs for its military personnel during FY 90 and 91. Sometimes backed by Congress, and sometimes pressured by Congress, the Army organization emphasized revitalizing housing, expanding MWR programs for soldiers and their families, developing child care and other family services, increasing pay and travel benefits, and providing more comfortable clothing, more palatable food, and other support services to its members. If the Army's performance in the Persian Gulf was any indication, these programs not only made the Army a more satisfying place to live and work, they also contributed to its successful performance on the battlefield.



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*Go to:*

**Previous Chapter** **Next Chapter**

---

**Return to Table of Contents**

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**Return to CMH Online**

*Last updated 30 October 2003*

# 5

## Training

The Army Long Range Training Plan (ALRTP), published in July 1989, provided Army planners with broad guidance for training the Total Army for the next thirty years. The ALRTP made educated assumptions regarding future doctrine, force structure, weapons systems, and the training environment. In response to the ALRTP, Army training developers considered a series of training strategies. One of these strategies, distributed training, would cut costs by using technology to export training from resident schools to units and individuals. Creation of future training sites would require evaluation of both firing range and maneuver area needs for new weapons systems and effective employment of training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS).

Late in FY 88 the Army leadership began development of a comprehensive training strategy called the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS). It will link near-term with long-term strategies for heavy, light, aviation, special operations, and support forces and the reserve components. The concept anticipates that Army training eventually will be based on devices rather than supported by them. Training will decrease at institutions and increase at home stations, while telecommunications technology will allow the linkage of institutions, combat training centers, and home stations. CATS envisions that commanders will readjust their available resources in order to bring their commands to required training standards. In FY 91 the Army continued development of the CATS concept and solicited comment from Army commanders.

Resources for CATS included training ammunition and operating tempo (OPTEMPO). In FY 86 the Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) produced Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-38, *Standards in Weapons Training*. This publication provided models for estimating training ammunition needs, but units continued to request more ammunition than they used. Planners then combined historical expenditure data with STRAC models to reduce overestimates. FY 90 and 91 training ammunition requests were computed at 110 percent of historical expenditures for tank, Bradley, artillery, and mortar systems and at 105 percent for all other systems. This resulted in a $200 million per year cost reduction.



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Despite pressures to reduce budgets, the Army leadership succeeded in maintaining the level of OPTEMPO it felt was necessary to maintain combat readiness. OPTEMPO refers to the number of operating miles per year for major ground equipment and flying hours per month for aircraft. Training OPTEMPOs for active and reserve component units were prioritized. This was based upon the *Department of the Army Master Priority List* to ensure that those units most likely to enter hostilities early would have attained a higher level of readiness. During FY 90 and 91 allowances for ground OPTEMPO for the active component, Army National Guard (ARNG), and the Army Reserve (USAR) averaged 800, 288, and 200 miles per year, respectively. Air OPTEMPO figures for each were 14.5, 9.0, and 8.1 hours per month.

Copies of Field Manual 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, which complements Field Manual 25-100, *Training the Force*, were distributed to divisions and TRADOC schools in FY 90. *Training the Force* defined the process for training management, while *Battle Focused Training* provided guidance for implementing training at battalion and lower echelons. Field Manual 25-101 emphasized the importance of identifying mission-essential tasks, the relationship of individual and unit tasks, and the need for realistic training for battle. The Chief of Staff urged all officers and NCOs to apply the principles of Field Manual 25-101 in their training programs.

### Individual Training

The Army has founded its leader development program upon three pillars-formal education or institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development. Its Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) consists of

the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), the Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course (BNCOC), the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC), the Sergeants Major Course, and various functional courses. Prior to FY 90, promotion to staff sergeant required attendance at PLDC; promotion to master sergeant required successful completion of ANCOC; and graduation from the sergeants major course was mandatory for promotion to command sergeant major. Effective 1 October 1989 soldiers had to complete PLDC for promotion to sergeant. After 1 October 1990, BNCOC was mandatory for promotion to sergeant first class.

In FY 90 the Army's Leadership Assessment and Development Program (LADP) was implemented in selected Army schools for both senior NCOs and officers. To assist individual self-development programs, LADP utilized observations by the soldier, classmates, and faculty regarding a soldier's leadership potential. The emphasis upon self-development has resulted in replacement of the Skill Qualification Test (SQT) for enlist-



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ed personnel by the Self-Development Test (SDT). The SQT concentrated upon military occupational specialities (MOSs), whereas the SDT combines MOS questions with others on training and leadership. The Chief of Staff authorized SDT in July 1990, and its initial use was scheduled to begin in the active component in October 1991. For the first two years, SDT results will be released only to the persons who take the test.

In recent years the Army has adopted a comprehensive physical fitness program. All Army personnel must meet body weight standards and pass the semiannual Army Physical Fitness Test. The Army Physical Fitness School, located at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, developed doctrine on physical fitness and performance. In 1990 the VANGUARD Task Force recommended elimination of the school and transfer of its functions to the Academy of Health Sciences at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. In FY 91 HQDA decided to reduce the school's functions and move it to Fort Benning, Georgia, in FY 92. The Master Fitness Trainer Course, an on campus program of the school that taught senior NCOs and officers to advise commanders on their units' physical training, will be discontinued in FY 92. It has been replaced by the institution of physical fitness courses in the Army's leadership schools and the use of mobile training teams that conduct on-site physical fitness instruction for both active and reserve components' units. The Army has a sequential institutional officer education system that consists of the Officer Basic Course, the Officer Advanced Course, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, the Command and General Staff Officer Course, the Advanced Military Studies Program, and the Army War College. It also participates in the Joint Professional Military Education program. Military Qualification Standards (MQSs) is the Army's evolving officer leader development system that is based on common tasks and professional knowledge. MQS I encompasses precommissioning training, MQS II applies to company grade, and MQS III covers field grade officers. MQS I and II are centered on common and branch manuals. The MQS I manual was revised and distributed in 1990, and the MQS II manual was released in FY 91. Officers will be tested periodically on MQS I and II subjects. A draft of the MQS III manual, which emphasized broad areas of knowledge and self-development, was circulated for review and comment in FY 91.

Army officials expressed serious concern in 1991 that Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM created substantial backlogs in attendance at the leader development schools. The Chief of Staff remarked that "there will be no constructive credit given for experience in DESERT STORM- by itself, combat cannot substitute for the comprehensive development achieved in the Army's educational system." BNCOC, ANCOC, and the Sergeants Major Course were expected to underfill by 35 to 45 percent, 25 to 35 percent, and 9 percent, respectively, in FY 91. A one-time exemption



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was granted for soldiers eligible for promotion to sergeant first class and master sergeant who were unable to attend BNCOC/ANCOC because of participation in the Persian Gulf war. Officer Basic Courses were not adversely affected by the war, but Officer Advanced Courses were. The Combined Arms and Services Staff School was running near minimum fill in early FY 91, but Command and General Staff College selectees who served in the Persian Gulf obtained priority status for the next academic yea r. School officials anticipated a period of one to two years to eliminate the attendance backlogs. During FY 90-91 the Army Continuing Education System (ACES) initiated two major self-

development programs targeted at the NCO. These programs were Read-to-Lead, designed to help NCOs achieve the Army's reading standards, and the NCO Leader Education and Development (NCO LEAD) initiative, intended to improve soldiers' academic competencies. Thousands of soldiers assigned to Saudi Arabia and Ku wait received ACES services. The ACES staff worked sixteen hours a day, seven days a week, and provided both traditional classroom instruction and nontraditional options. This instruction included language and cultural programs operated by the Defense Language Institute (DLI).

**Unit Training**

Readiness for the complexities of contemporary warfare requires frequent unit training under conditions similar to combat. Effective unit training employs both field maneuvers and deployment exercises supplemented by battlefield simulations. The increasing speed and lethality of weapons systems created in recent years called for large maneuver areas which home stations could not provide. By 1987 the Army formulated its Combat Training Centers (CTCs) program which consisted of three instrumented tactical field sites and a wargaming program. The four CTCs are the National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).

Opened at Fort Irwin, California, in 1981, the NTC has concentrated on training heavy battalion/brigade forces under mid- to high-intensity conditions. In FY 90 twelve of fourteen scheduled unit rotations were accomplished. This included three heavy/light rotations. Rotation 90-8 served as the NTC's first contingency operations (CONOPS) rotation involving elements of the 7th Infantry Division (Light), the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 75th Ranger Regiment, and the 5th Special Operations Forces Group. In FY 91 Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM reduced twelve scheduled rotations at the NTC to five.

The JRTC was established at Little Rock Air Force Base and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, in 1987 to conduct training in low- to mid-intensity



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CONOPS. Army special operations and armored forces and Air Force Military Airlift Command and Tactical Airlift Command elements contributed varied and joint training to rotating units. During FY 90 the JRTC conducted nine rotations; one of them involved the ARNG 47th Infantry Division. Nine brigade rotations, which included nine light and four special forces battalions, took place at the JRTC in FY 91. The BRAC 91 study determined that the JRTC will be relocated permanently to Fort Polk, Louisiana, in FY 93.

The CMTC began limited training operations in mid- to high-intensity combat for USAREUR heavy battalions at Hohenfels, Federal Republic of Germany, in FY 89. Recent acquisition of a permanent opposing force and an instrumented battlefield permitted realistic training and standardized feedback to rotating units. In FY 91 CMTC conducted eleven brigade rotations in which twenty-nine heavy and four light battalion task forces participated.

Begun in late 1987 and headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the BCTP trained division and corps commanders and their staffs in their wartime duties. BCTP consisted of a three-part program conducted at the unit's home station. The first part was a five-day AirLand Battle seminar followed several months later by a nine-day warfighter computer battle simulation exercise. The third part, a proficiency sustainment package, helped the unit staff retain the knowledge gained during the warfighter experience. In FY 90 BCTP performed eleven AirLand Battle seminars and six warfighter exercises; two National Guard units participated, the 28th and 40th Infantry Divisions. The Persian Gulf war reduced the BCTP's FY 91 schedule to five divisions.

The Army Exercise Program, organized into Army-only, joint, and combined exercises conducted both in CONUS and overseas, has provided valuable unit training in recent years. Army units have trained annually in about fifty JCS exercises that enhance their combat readiness to support unified commands. These exercises have ranged from small, unannounced interoperability exercises to planned worldwide command post or large overseas deployment exercises. Because of the lessened Soviet threat, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense ministers cut the NATO exercise package by about 50 percent for 1989-90. The Department of Defense scaled down American participation in

training exercises for FY 90 and 91, while the demands of the Persian Gulf war resulted in cancellation of some exercises. These cancellations included POSSE LEADER 90, WINTEX 91, and LOGEX 91.

REFORGER (return of forces to Germany) is an annual joint/combined exercise that tests rapid reinforcement of NATO from CONUS and the state of U.S. warfighting capabilities. The emphasis on curtailing large exercises postponed REFORGER 89 to 1990 and resulted in both a substan-



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tial reduction in people and equipment and heavy reliance on computer simulations for REFORGER 90. USAREUR developed a concept, the REFORGER Enhancement Program (REP), that allowed field training, command post, and command field exercises to run concurrently by the use of simulations. With 56,000 U.S. personnel, 15,000 of them from CONUS, REFORGER 90 took place from late December 1989 to late February 1990. The maneuver phase, named CENTURION SHIELD, pitted the V Corps against the VII Corps, and focused on training staffs, from battalion through corps, primarily by simulation. The Distributed War Game System (DWS) orchestrated operations, while the Joint Exercise Simulation System (JESS) did tactics. Two brigades of the 10th Mountain Division performed most of the actual field maneuvers of CENTURION SHIELD. In two other new developments used in REFORGER 90, U.S. forces employed no tanks and combined the use of umpires with computer calculations for adjudicating the outcome of battles.

REFORGER 91, like REFORGER 90, relied heavily upon simulations and employed only 28,000 allied troops, who included about 7,000 U.S. Personnel from CONUS. In the June 1990 London Declaration, NATO leaders proclaimed a new allied strategy based on a small, flexible multinational force. This decision endorsed creation of a rapid-reaction corps that led to the debut of a prototype multinational air assault division in REFORGER 91. Commanded by a British officer, the division consisted of 7,000 British, German, and Belgian troops. The live field training exercise, CERTAIN SHIELD, was limited mostly to the multinational air assault division and a battalion of the U.S. 10th Mountain Division, opposed by a Dutch armored brigade.

U.S. Army units engaged in other major deployment exercises during FY 90 and 91. TEAM SPIRIT 90, another annual exercise, was conducted in early 1990 in the Republic of Korea (ROK) by U.S. and Korean units. It involved a broad spectrum of training-joint/combined air, ground, sea, amphibious, and unconventional warfare operations. A large undertaking, the field training exercise included the headquarters of two field armies and four corps that commanded six active and two reserve divisions. BRIGHT STAR, a biennial exercise, deployed CONUS forces to Southwest Asia, CENTCOM's area of responsibility. BRIGHT STAR 90, which occurred in late 1989, deployed 6,000 CONUS soldiers to Egypt. American paratroopers airdropped into the desert, and U.S. Army personnel cross-trained with the Egyptians in both staff and ground maneuver operations. ROVING SANDS 90 assembled 8,000 U.S. soldiers, airmen, and marines for a joint air defense/air control exercise at the White Sands Missile Range and Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, and Fort Bliss, Texas, in the spring of 1990. The Army used virtually all of its air defense weapons and conducted live firing of the Hawk and Patriot missiles.



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## Reserve Components Training

The Army formalized a comprehensive reserve components training strategy in 1989 to improve readiness in the areas of individual, leader, and collective training, as well as improved training support and management. In order to attain reserve components combat readiness, it sought several major objectives that included a successful MOS skill level of at least 85 percent among battalion personnel and a C3 unit readiness rating. In May 1989 the Chief of Staff approved the Reserve Components Training Development Action Plan (RC TDAP), which identified thirty-eight problems in reserve components training that required resolution. The initial emphasis centered upon improved MOs qualification, leader development, and more productive inactive duty training.

Because of unacceptable MOs qualification levels among reserve components personnel and inadequate home station training facilities, the Army inaugurated a reserve components regional training sites program in the 1980s. Begun in

1985, a regional training sites maintenance program called for twenty-one facilities manned by Active Guard/Reserve instructors. Seventeen facilities, fifteen standard and two high-technology, were operational by the end of FY 91. With state-of-the-art diagnostic and treatment training devices and deployable medical systems, three regional training sites-medical were ready in FY 91 to train reserve components hospital units. As part of the Army's distributed training strategy, in 1990 the Army completed development of exportable training packages for use by regional training sites, ARNG academies, and reserve forces schools. A test video teletraining program that focused on the common leader portion of RC-BNCOC at various sites in Kentucky began in FY 91.

Reserve components leader development programs are based upon the same three pillars as are the active component programs-institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development. Institutional training for the reserve forces includes professional development and functional resident courses at active component schools and courses designed either for use in reserve components schools or individual study programs. The current version of RC-NCOES became effective in October 1987. RC-BNCOC and RC-ANCOC have two phases-common leader and MOs-specific Common leader courses were in place in 1987, but TRADOC had not formulated the majority of MOs-specific courses until FY 91. Because the ARNG has most reserve forces combat units, the Guard received responsibility for combat BNCOC and ANCOC courses for the ARNG and the USAR. Army Reserve forces schools, in conjunction with state military academies, will conduct most of the reserve components combat support and combat service support courses.



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In 1988 a training strategy task force studied the problems encountered by reserve components officers in accomplishing their required training. Limited time and conflicting family, civilian employment, and civilian education interests were the major issues. The Chief of Staff then directed a Command and General Staff College task force to devise a plan to reduce course length without seriously reducing content for the Reserve Components Officer Education System (RC-OES). Approved by the Chief of Staff in November 1989, the plan made several recommendations. The Officer Advanced Course, a prerequisite for attending the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3), should be reduced to two branch-specific phases and focus on company/battery command skills. The CAS3 Course should be shortened from the four-phase pilot course to three phases and be mandatory for promotion to major. Phase one would be taken by correspondence, the second phase would be taken during eight inactive duty training periods at reserve forces schools, and the third phase would be taken during a two-week active duty period. The task force recommended changing the Nonresident Command and General Staff Officer Course to two phases. The first phase would teach tactics and be required for promotion to lieutenant colonel, while the second phase would focus on operations and be a prerequisite to become colonel. The Army leadership approved the plan's fundamentals and proposed implementation in October 1991.

Overseas deployment training (ODT) is an important element of the Army's role in America's overseas defense commitments. Reserve components units sharpen their combat readiness by conducting mobilization deployment plans and strengthening associations with their assigned active components units in Army-only, joint, and combined exercises. Army officials seek an ODT program that permits early deploying units, between D and D+30, to participate in ODT every three years, and units that deploy after D+30, to undertake ODT every five years. In a recent survey, fourteen Commanders in Chief (CINCs) and Army component commanders strongly endorsed ODT and requested more personnel than authorized in the Army budget. In FY 90 these commanders asked for more than 60,000 reserve components soldiers but received only 40,000. Budget constraints and Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM cut the number of participants in ODT during FY 91 to 28,000.

In the 1980s several governors challenged the federal government's authority to conduct ODT. Before 1952, federal statutory authority to order ARNG units to active duty was limited to national emergencies. In 1952 Congress authorized active duty training for Guardsmen without emergencies if the respective governor agreed. Gubernatorial consent to training missions was routinely obtained until the mid-1980s, when eleven governors objected to the Reagan administration's sending their Guardsmen to



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Honduras for training. Then followed the Montgomery Amendment to the FY 86 Defense Authorization Act that prohibited any governor from withholding approval for active duty outside the continental United States (OCONUS) for that state's Guard units because the governor objected to the location, purpose, or type or schedule of such active duty. In the late 1980s Governors Rudy Perpich of Minnesota and Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts filed litigation asserting that the Militia Clause of the Constitution reserved to governors the authority to train the Guard; therefore, they could legally cancel ODT in Central America for their Guard units. A series of judicial processes ensued ending with an 11 June 1990 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. The court stated that governors cannot pr event Army National Guardsmen from participating in ODT because they object to the location, purpose, or type or schedule of such active duty.

Budget cuts canceled several ODT exercises in FY 89, including REFORGER and BRIGHT STAR. In FY 90 some of the canceled FY 89 ODT exercises resumed. About 6,800 reserve components soldiers participated in REFORGER, while another 4,500 built roads and provided medical aid for the native populace during FUERTES CAMINOS (North) in Honduras. Western Command (WESTCOM) continued ODT engineer and civil affairs projects in the Pacific Basin, including in FY 90 the Republic of Tonga, Vanatu, and the Fiji Islands. Humanitarian/civic assistance projects went forward in LANTCOM locations such as St. Lucia, Grenada, and in Jamaica, where Hurricanes Gilbert and Hugo caused serious property damage. Funding reductions and the Persian Gulf war resulted in renewed cutbacks in ODT during late FY 90 and in FY 91.

### Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations

Training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS) are not new to the Army's training methodology. Training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations not only enhance live training, but they also minimize such constraints as time, funding, insufficient land area, and environmental issues. The Combined Arms Training Strategy decision that Army training would be based more on devices, rather than simply supported by them, has accelerated TADSS development. The Army has planned to use simulators and simulation for a broad range of skills and knowledge, from equipment operations and technical proficiency to the conduct of combined arms training exercises currently obtainable only at the CTCs. Other instructional technologies under development include independent voice recognition, artificial intelligence, robotics, holographic projection systems, fiber optics, and sensor screens.

Continuing experimentation in simulation networking (SIMNET) by the Army created the Combined Army Tactical Training System (CATT),



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which performs combined arms maneuvers training on a simulated battlefield for crews through battalions. By the end of 1990 the CATT consisted of a network of eight active component company and battalion sites located in CONUS and Germany. Three additional CATT sites were planned for ARNG units. The Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) is the lead CATT program. Three other branch trainers, Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (AVCATT), Air Defense Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (ADCATT), and Engineer Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (ENCATT) were in the requirements development process stage by late FY 91.

In late 1989 the Army began formulating a major TADSS initiative, the Family of Simulators (FAMSIM) Master Plan. It charted a command and control training course for platoons through corps. FAMSIM contemplated linking battalions and brigades, whether training at home station or a CTC, to other battalions and brigades, and perhaps divisions and corps that were training at home station. As conceived, FAMSIM would link a number of simulations being designed for the various echelons. Janus-supported platoon and company training, while Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation (BBS) trained combat and combat support battalions and brigades. Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) supported division and corps staffs, and Joint Wars (JWARS) trained theater commanders and their staffs. Other programs were the Combat Service Support Training Simulation System (CSSTSS), to be located at the Army Logistics Center, and PANTHER, which instructed battalions through regional CINCs in low-intensity conflict.

Devices that simulate tactical engagement and weapons effects represent another element of TADSS. The Army's

principal device for this function is the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES). Development of the Air Ground Engagement System-Air Defense System (AGES/AD) received high priority in 1990 along with delivery of MILES to the UH-1, AH-1, and OH-58 helicopters, the A-10 aircraft, and the Stinger SA7 and SA14 air defense systems. Delivery of the Mobile Independent Target System (MITS), a MILES system designed for combat support and combat service support vehicles, began in January 1990. The CTCs have long sought a system that could simulate indirect fire. Work continued in 1990 on the Combined Arms Team Integrated Evaluation System (CATIES) project which, through integration with MILES, performs this function.

In late 1988 the Army began development of a distributed training strategy (DTS) intended to save resources, reduce resident training, and improve instructional quality and standardization. DTs will rely heavily upon new technologies-computer-based instruction, expert systems, interactive video disc, and video conferencing. A DTs implementation



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plan, the TRADOC Long Range Training Plan, was staffed in June 1990, and the first major DTs pilot project was assigned to the Kentucky ARNG. Among the systems being developed for DTs is the Electronic Information Delivery System (EIDS), which combines a personal computer with an interactive video disc to provide realistic individual and small group instruction. TRADOC facilities received their full shipment of EIDS in early 1990, but funding was unavailable for distribution of EIDS to active component units.

### Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM Training

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM presented the first major test of the Total Force Policy adopted in the early 1970s. This policy called for a DOD force structure that integrated the active and reserve components to provide maximum military capability within the fiscal restraints imposed by Congress and the White House. At the outset of the Persian Gulf war, Army training, doctrine, and combat development planners considered the Army fundamentally ready for war. The training system, which had evolved since the 1970s, had produced high quality performance by means such as intense individual training, the CTC program, and unit readiness testing through the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). By August 1990 AirLand Battle doctrine, a combined arms concept, was firmly embedded in most Army training literature and all resident courses.

Army active component units were alerted and began deployment to Southwest Asia on 7 August 1990. On 22 August the President invoked his authority to activate Selected Reserve units and individuals. HQDA issued a mobilization order on 27 August to forty-five reserve components units. USAR units began reporting to their mobilization stations on 30 August, and some of them deployed by 7 September. By early December some 400 reserve forces units had received activation orders. Mobilization assistance teams (MATs) of five to twenty people from Army Readiness Groups assessed the readiness of reserve components units at each installation and specified needed training prior to validation for deployment. This training concentrated on common tasks (map reading, weapons qualification, and basic survival skills), but it also included some specialized training. Personnel in activated reserve components units who had not completed initial entry training (IET), which included basic combat training and advanced individual training, were required to complete IET before deployment with their units.

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM presented challenges to the Army school system, such as unanticipated expansion in the training base and disruption of scheduled leader development courses. The Chief of



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Staff directed that all combat units deployed to Southwest Asia be at 100 percent strength, and he also insisted that the Army education system continue to operate as normally as possible. Substantial expansion of the training base never became an issue. As previously discussed in the *Individual Training* section, underfills occurred in several of the leadership development courses. Army schools experienced some shortages, although not serious ones, in staff and materiel. For example, Fort Benning, Georgia, compensated for staff losses by reducing the size of opposing forces assigned to its force-on-force training program. The Army Aviation Center recouped its instructor pilot losses to

Southwest Asia by borrowing pilots from FORSCOM, AMC, and SOUTHCOM and by utilizing activated reserve components pilots.

U.S. Army participation in the Persian Gulf war emphasized several types of specialized training. The decision to haul, rather than drive, heavy equipment overland in the Persian Gulf created a demand to train an additional 1,000 heavy equipment drivers quickly. The Transportation School reduced the normal training time of eight weeks to four for motor transport operators, MOs 88M, and successfully trained the additional drivers. Water purification specialists, MOs 77W, were in great demand. Fourth Army initiated an expedited program that trained 100 soldiers as water purification specialists in fourteen days. Also, 400 to 500 reserve components personnel were qualified on the 150,000 gallons per day Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU). The Defense Language Institute (DLI) at Monterey, California, and the DLI element in Washington, D.C., devised a number of special courses in Arabic and its Iraqi dialect. DLI put together a video teletraining capability and taught Arabic to deploying units at Forts Campbell, Hood, and Riley. From December 1990 to February 1991 the U.S. Army staged several one-week crash training courses in basic combat subjects for several hundred Kuwaitis who had been attending U.S. colleges. As members of Operation DESERT OW L, these young Kuwaitis were inducted into the Kuwaiti Army and served as linguists and intelligence analysts with U. S. Army units in the Persian Gulf.

President Bush authorized deployment of additional active and reserve components troops to Southwest Asia in November 1990, and in January 1991 he extended the reserve forces mobilization to the IRR. Individual reservists were called according to their MOs; 42 percent of the MOSs were in the combat arms, while mechanics and vehicle operators added another 20 percent. TRADOC mobilized elements of the 70th, 78th, 80th, 84th, 85th, 98th, 100th, and 108th Training Divisions and decided to utilize the annual training portion of the Reserve Component Course Configuration Program (RC3) courses for refresher training. This training, which lasted only eight days, was often perfunctory. Some indi-



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vidual weapons were fired just enough to zero them in, and in some cases the nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare refresher session was limited to donning masks. The expected numbers of activated IRR personnel initially ranged as high as 100,000, but the sudden end to active hostilities reduced that figure to about 15,000.

The expanded mobilization of reserve components units in November 1990 resulted in activation of three ARNG roundout brigades-the Georgia 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), the roundout brigade of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized); the Mississippi 155th Armored Brigade (Separate), a roundout unit for the 1st Cavalry Division; and the Louisiana 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), a roundout brigade of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). Activated in early December 1990, the 48th, 155th, and 256th moved to mobilization stations at Fort Stewart, Camp Shelby/Fort Hood, and Fort Polk, respectively. Initially, the brigades concentrated on crew training and tank gunnery tables, while their commanders and staffs underwent an abbreviated Tactical Commander's Development Course and a modified Staff Skills Enhancement Program at Fort Leavenworth.

During late December and early January the 48th moved to the National Training Center (NTC) at the same time that the other brigades rotated through maneuver and gunnery phases, primarily at Fort Hood. The 48th completed its NTC rotation on 28 February, the 155th finished its NTC rotation on 22 March, and the 256th remained at Fort Hood. The performance of the roundout brigades during the training period revealed some deficiencies in readiness. Many soldiers did not meet Army gunnery standards, and some Bradley crews lacked cohesion. The 256th, however, had just been issued its Bradleys and had received no training on these vehicles. Equipment was sometimes found to be the wrong kind, old, or in poor condition. Instances of inadequate leadership were discovered from squad leader through battalion commander.

On the other hand, it was never envisioned that the roundout brigades would deploy as part of an immediate response contingency. In addition, the initial reserve call-up specifically excluded combat units. When the call-up came, it was for only 180 days. Other problems were encountered because of the wholesale incompatibility of the active Army and the Guard's logistical and administrative equipment, management procedures, and automated information systems. In

the end, training the three roundout brigades to validation for deployment took considerably longer than originally estimated. For this reason and also because of the brief duration of the ground war, the 48th and the 155th Brigades did not join their parent divisions in Southwest Asia. Since the 5th Infantry Division never deployed to the Persian Gulf, the 256th Brigade likewise remained in CONUS.



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Reserve component mobilization demonstrated that many planning assumptions regarding the Cold War containment strategy-forward deployed forces, reinforcement, and national mobilization-were not valid for short-notice contingencies. Capitalizing upon lessons learned from the roundout brigade mobilization, the Army leadership launched the BOLD SHIFT initiative. Under the direction of FORSCOM, BOLD SHIFT consisted of battle-focused training and readiness programs designed to make reserve components units more accessible and deployable for executing national military strategy. In late 1991 the Army initiated the Total Army Training Study (TATS) to provide structure and resources for meeting reserve components pre- through post-mobilization training needs.

The Army leadership organized a training program in Southwest Asia soon after troops began arriving in theater. Army Forces, U.S. Central Command (ARCENT), had a training section in place by early September 1990. Units of XVIII Airborne Corps began training on breaching techniques and attacks on strong positions. The 82d Airborne Division built its own model of an Iraqi triangular defensive emplacement, and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) used an abandoned village to practice street fighting. Small arms and tank firing ranges were created, but training ammunition was in limited supply until December. Nevertheless, Army units conducted joint live-fire exercises with the U.S. Air Force, and most crew-served weapons were fired, except for air defense artillery. The XVIII Corps emphasized chemical warfare instruction, which involved detection, quick changes into protective suits, and the use of antidotes.

Concern about the reported Iraqi chemical warfare arsenal resulted in fielding the German Fuchs, or Fox, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance vehicle (NBCRS) to U.S. Forces in Southwest Asia. Before the Persian Gulf war, active component NBC reconnaissance platoons, equipped with M113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), provided NBC reconnaissance support to armored and mechanized infantry units. The German government donated sixty Fox NBCRSs to the United States for use in the Gulf. With a four-person crew, this six-wheeled, armored/amphibious vehicle, while in motion, used highly sophisticated sensors to detect all known chemical warfare agents and radiation. The German Army trained U.S. Army, Europe, NBC reconnaissance platoons to operate the Fox NBCRS during an intensive three-week course in Sonthofen, Germany, during August and September 1990. The U.S. Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama, began a similar, highly expedited course in November 1990. By mid-January 1991, seven Army and two Marine Corps NBC reconnaissance platoons were operational in Southwest Asia. Both the crews and the equipment performed well.

In November 1990 ARCENT solicited a training assessment team from CONUS to prepare a long-term training plan for Army units in



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Southwest Asia. Specialists from TRADOC, FORSCOM, and the office of the Program Manager for Training Devices went to Southwest Asia and prepared an extensive training plan for ARCENT. The plan included building improved firing ranges, distributing training devices and simulators, and assigning training advisers to units. The introduction of up graded and new equipment to units during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM prompted TRADOC to field Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) and New Equipment Training Teams (NETTs) who served in CONUS, in Southwest Asia, and with the VII Corps in Europe. In early November ARCENT requested mine rollers, plows for breaching minefields, and the Cleared Lane Marking System. Abrams M1 tank crews who received the Abrams M1A1 required familiarization, and soldiers schooled only on the older Bradley fighting vehicles (BFV) needed training when they were assigned the M2A1 and M3A1 models. At the inception of DESERT SHIELD in August 1990 the BCTP, headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, began collecting detailed information on the Iraqi armed forces. The BCTP staff ran several U.S. Army divisions deploying to Southwest Asia through a condensed three-day course on the Iraqi Army and

on Saudi Arabia. In September the BCTP staff published its findings on the Iraqis in *Iraq: How They Fight*. BCTP then wargamed a series of defensive scenarios for the XVIII Airborne Corps in CONUS. By November the BCTP staff had designed offensive scenarios and had sent a team to the VII Corps in Germany for exercise and intelligence updates. From December 1990 to January 1991 the BCTP deployed to Southwest Asia teams that served with the VII and XVIII Corps and also the Third Army and ARCENT. Assistance provided by BCTP teams in preparing for potential ground action in Southwest Asia included an XVIII Corps command post exercise and an ARCENT map exercise in late December and two VII Corps command post exercises in January 1991.

77

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78

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***Go to:***

**Previous Chapter** **Next Chapter**

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**Return to Table of Contents**

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


**Return to CMH Online**

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# 6

## Modernizing and Equipping the Army

### Modernization: Into the Post-Cold War Era

The Persian Gulf war in Southwest Asia served as both an end and a beginning for the Army's equipment and systems modernization programs. In one sense, the war was the ultimate proving ground for the equipment fielded during the Army's aggressive modernization program that began in the 1970s and reached fruition during the 1980s. The performance of the Army's equipment in the sands of Saudi Arabia was the test of the decisions that had been made when the Army, after emerging from the jungles of Southeast Asia, reconsidered the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact on the fields and in the forests of Central Europe. Even before all of the troops were withdrawn from Vietnam, the Army had initiated a wide-ranging re examination of its doctrine, force structure, and equipment. The demands of the Vietnam War had compelled the service to postpone its plans to modernize its forces. The Army's force structure was an amalgam of units, and most of its equipment was rooted in the 1950s.

As the Army reduced its size and began a reshaping process after Vietnam, the service's leadership realized that equipment and systems modernization needs could not be met all at once. Consequently, the Army projected its equipment needs for the next decade.

Five major pieces of equipment were identified as top priority-a main battle tank, an attack helicopter, a utility helicopter, an air defense missile, and an infantry fighting vehicle. This group of equipment, which became identified collectively as the "Big Five," constituted the centerpiece of Army modernization throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Guided by the specific need to develop, test, and field weapons and technologies to offset the threat from the Warsaw Pact, the Army in the 1980s underwent the largest peacetime modernization in its history; fielding a vast array of equipment, in addition to the Big Five. This equipment ranged from tanks to mobile kitchen trailers to helmets, and modernization occurred in both the active and the reserve components.

When the President directed the deployment of Army active and reserve forces to Southwest Asia in August 1990, these forces were armed



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with the weapons and equipment developed during the last decade and a half. The lead brigade of the 82d Airborne Division deployed with AH-64 Apache helicopters, and Abrams M1 tanks and M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicles were on board the ships that carried the 24th Infantry Division's equipment to Southwest Asia. Following in the wake were Patriot air defense system launchers from Fort Bliss, Texas, and the UH-60 Black Hawks of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). In Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq the plans, policies, and procedures that guided the development and fielding of this equipment and many other types were tested in combat. The Persian Gulf war validated-some in part, others more fully-the ideas, concepts, and hardware that had modernized the Army during the 1970s and 1980s.

The performance of Army equipment in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM also established a foundation for the future. Like the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Persian Gulf war did much to define the lethality and dynamics of the future battlefield. The Gulf war provided the Army with a performance baseline from which it could delineate further its future requirements and develop and field equipment to meet them. This baseline would be of critical importance for the Army's development of its modeling, designs, and simulations in the 1990s and beyond.

By the late 1980s the Army had begun adapting to budget reductions, with significant implications for the service's future modernization objectives. The rapid disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union removed a main pillar of the rationale that had supported large-scale defense spending. Lack of a specific "threat" and the desire for a

"peace dividend" accelerated cuts in the Army's budget, which had been decreasing both in absolute terms and as a percentage of defense appropriations. Army decisionmakers were faced with difficult choices to ensure the most efficient use of the money appropriated. In addition, the Army's general modernization program was nearing completion. The Army would enter the twenty-first century armed largely with the equipment developed and fielded during the last quarter of the twentieth century.

In FY 89 the Army received $14.8 billion for procurement, but by FY 91 the service's procurement had been cut to $9.0 billion. (Offsetting somewhat the decrease in procurement funds, the amounts for research and development increased slightly.) By the end of FY 91 the situation had reached the point at which Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition Steven K. Conver warned that "Army modernization efforts are severely curtailed by constrained resources" and that "our procurement funding is dangerously low." Because of the lack of funds, he declared, the Army was "at a crossroads.... Time and technology do not stand still. Tomorrow's battlefield will see increased firepower, better armor protection, and more advanced target acquisition sys-



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tems." In Mr. Conver's opinion, the key to success on the future battlefield would be "the tough modernization decisions we make today."

To adapt to the austere budgets, the Army developed a new modernization strategy. Recognizing that the total force could not be modernized all at the same time, the Army, in the late 1980s, embraced a strategy of modernizing by thirds. In practice, this meant that initial procurement of the most modern equipment would be fielded in the Army's forward-deployed and early deploying CONUS units, which included both the active and reserve components. The equipment displaced from the first group of units would be fielded to the second group, and displaced equipment of the second group would be assigned to the third. The Army believed that adoption of this strategy would allow a reasonably efficient stream of modernization within the force in view of limited procurement funds that would likely become even more restricted in the 1990s.

The major modernization programs of the 1970s and 1980s and fielding of the Big Five were nearing completion. By the end of 1991 the Army contained over 100 battalion/squadron sets of Abrams M1 tanks, 69 battalion sets of Bradley fighting vehicles, 13 battalion equivalents of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), 26 AH-64 attack helicopter battalions, and 12 Patriot air defense system battalions. In FY 91 the Army concluded that it was necessary to accept some risk over the near term and midterm to protect future modernization and the technology base, which meant modernizing only the most essential warfighting capabilities in the near term. To guide its modernization strategy, the Army established six principles:

-The most modern equipment must be put in the hands of those first to fight.

-Future weapon systems must possess the lethality to defeat the enemy while maximizing soldier and system survivability.

-New or enhanced capabilities must be fielded faster than those of potential opponents.

-Systems must be designed with future modernization potential.

-Modernization must be affordable, and to ensure affordability, the force will modernize by one-third increments.

-New systems should require minimal new equipment training for soldiers, should be reliable, and should be simple to operate and maintain in combat.

To guide its modernization efforts, the Army developed a coordinated series of plans for a twenty- to thirty-year period. These plans looked at both the Army's broad needs and specific functional mission areas. The mission areas addressed the general technology base, heavy and light forces, and all aspects of the operational environment (close, deep, rear). The Army used the mission area plans to produce documents that guided

and coordinated modernization between and within functional areas. Specific mission areas for which plans were developed or planning was initiated included the Army's technology base, armored systems, armor-antiarmor, aviation, air defense, close air support, command and control, intelligence and electronic warfare, fire support, tactical wheeled vehicles, ammunition, material-handling equipment, and soldier support.

The Army had published the first version of its technology base plan-the Army Technology Base Master Plan (ATBMP)-in early 1989. This initial version reflected the Cold War mentality and projected the needs of the Army's technological base in terms of the Soviet threat. An updated ATBMP provided a comprehensive blueprint that outlined the Army's technology base investment strategy. The investment strategy was designed to meet the Army's future requirements in an era with an unspecified threat and constrained budgets. The technology base program included research, exploratory development, and nonsystem-specific advanced development. In the process, the Army intended to exploit mature and emerging technologies to meet the service's future equipment needs.

An important aspect of the ATBMP was a new initiative called Advanced Technology Transition Demonstrations (ATTDs). ATTDs were designed to shorten the developmental cycle by identifying promising, high payoff products produced by the technology base, and moving these products expeditiously into demonstration/validation phases, full-scale development, and/or product improvement programs. ATTDs received special management attention within HQDA. This oversight was provided by the ATTD Senior Advisory Group (SAG), cochaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition (OASA[RDA]) and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Force Development. By March 1991 thirteen ATTDs had been approved. Some of the approved ATTDs and the applicable mission areas included AirLand Battle management (command and control), common chassis (armor/antiarmor), multirole survivable radar (air defense), soldier integrated protective ensemble (soldier support), and standoff mine detection (engineer and mine warfare). Modernization initiatives continued within each of the mission areas during FY 90 and 91, although budget constraints and shifting priorities slowed their pace and scope.

**Armored Systems**

Production of the Abrams M1 tank for the Army began in 1980, and by early 1991 almost 7,000 of the M1 and its upgrades, the M1A1 models, had been fielded. In support of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM more than 1,000 M1A1 tanks were fielded to those Army heavy



units previously deployed to Saudi Arabia without the M1A1. These units included the 1st and 24th Infantry Divisions (Mechanized), the 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st Armored Division, and the 3d Armored Cavalry regiment. In FY 90 the Army prepared to acquire material needed to produce the next variant of the Abrams, the M1A2. The M1A2 was originally scheduled to begin full-scale production in FY 92; however, a changing world situation and a diminished defense budget necessitated changes in the M1A2 program. The Army decided to limit the number of M1A2s to that which would prove the production line's ability to produce the tank efficiently, in case of future need. Once production capability was proven, no more M1 series tanks would be produced.

Rather than spend increasingly limited dollars on evolutionary improvements of the Abrams tank, the Army opted to take the limited short-term risk of not having enough M1s in the event of war. Instead, funds would be used to develop a more technologically advanced armored vehicle for the long term through the Armored Systems Modernization (ASM) plan. In the near term and midterm, the ASM plan outlined product improvements for application to the current fleet of combat vehicles. The ASM plan's second phase focused on modernizing all armored systems to maximize operational capabilities and interoperability. The key to this phase was the procurement of several vehicles developed to be built on similar chassis. For example, the ASM plan called for a common heavy chassis for the Block III tank, the Combat Mobility Vehicle (CMV), the Advanced Field Artillery System (AFAS), and the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV). In a

similar case, the Armored Resupply Vehicle (ARV)- ammunition, and the Line-Of-Sight Antitank (LOSAT) vehicle would share a medium protection chassis.

During FY 90 and 91, production and fielding of infantry and cavalry fighting vehicles also continued. By March 1991 Bradley mechanized infantry and cavalry fighting vehicles had been fielded to forty-seven battalion- size units. Production and fielding also continued on the Army's older armored personnel carrier, the M113. Deliveries of the latest version, the M113A3, were scheduled for completion in FY 91. Because of the changing threat and a realignment of budget priorities, the Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Army to restructure the ASM program with AFAS and ARV as the lead systems. Block III, CMV, and IFV were deferred indefinitely; LOSAT was returned to the tech base.

### Aviation

The AH-64 Apache helicopter became the Army's primary attack helicopter in the 1980s. Production in quantity was initiated in 1982, and



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fielding of the Apache to the active component began in 1986. By November 1990 the Army had received 629 of its planned 807 helicopters to equip 40 battalions. The autumn 1990 budget agreement between the Congress and the President, however, precipitated the Army's decision to terminate the Apache procurement program at the end of FY 91.

Another of the Army's major modernization initiatives was its next generation light helicopter (LH). The Army intended the LH to replace its aging fleet of observation helicopters, OH-6 and OH-58 A/C's, and the AH-1 attack helicopter. Army leadership claimed that, along with the ASM plan, the LH was a critical element in the Army's long-term modernization effort. In 1988 the LH was approved for competitive demonstration/ validation development phase. At the end of this phase, a single contractor would be selected to produce the LH. Two contractor teams, Boeing/Sikorsky and McDonnell Douglas/Bell, submitted proposals for a preliminary LH design. In April 1991 the Department of Defense awarded the contract to the Boeing/Sikorsky team for the production of a prototype LH for the demonstration/validation phase. This phase was projected to last fifty-two months. Its objectives included completion of aircraft design, production of a prototype, and execution of a flight test program. The new LH was named the Comanche.

### Air and Missile Defense

Another important part of Army modernization is the Forward Area Air Defense System (FAADS) for the division area. The Sergeant York air defense gun system (DIVAD) was canceled in 1985 because the Army concluded that neither single nor multiple weapons acting independently could defeat the forward area air threat. FAADS has five components, and integrates complementary weapons, sensors, and a command and control architecture to provide maximum protection to divisions in combat. Line-of- sight-forward-heavy (LOS-F-H) is provided by an air defense antitank system (ADATS) that integrates electro-optic sensors, a search radar, and eight laser-beam-riding missiles on an armored tracked vehicle. The non-line-of-sight system consists of a Fiber-Optic-Guided Missile (FOG-M) mounted on a tactical wheeled vehicle. The Avenger missile system serves as the line-of-sight-rear (LOS-R) element. The Avenger has multiple Stinger missiles and a heavy machine gun mounted on a tactical wheeled vehicle. The command, control, and intelligence (C2I) module integrates, processes, and distributes aerial target information gathered from sensors. The final component of FAADS is the combined arms initiatives (CAI), which includes installation of air-to-air Stingers on the OH-58C/D helicopter, improved air defense sights for the Bradley fighting vehicle, and antihelicopter ammunition for tanks.



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In developing FAADS, the Army decided to rely heavily on nondevelopment items (NDIs), which is the application of commercially developed products and product improvements. The strategy for acquiring FAADS included obtaining

and distributing FAADS components as soon as they became available. Because of this approach, the development and distribution of FAADS components has not followed one schedule. The Martin Marietta ADATS, selected in 1987, was expected to enter full-scale production in FY 90, but reliability problems deferred a procurement decision until at least FY 92. In December 1988 Boeing Aerospace and Hughes Aircraft Missile Systems began full-scale development of the FOG-M, but the Army terminated this contract in January 1991 because of cost overruns. The Secretary of the Army approved Boeing Aerospace's Avenger as the standard item for the LOS-R component in February 1990. The Avenger went into full-scale production in April 1990 with a planned procurement of 1,779 units.

The Hawk and Patriot air and missile defense systems provide other forms of protection to Army units. Originally fielded in 1960, the Hawk is designed to provide air defense missile protection against low- to medium- altitude air attack. A product improvement program (PIP) for the Hawk that started in FY 89 and continued into FY 90 will give the Hawk a low-altitude, simultaneous engagement capability and enhanced electronic counter-countermeasures. A cooperative program between the Army, the Marine Corps, and the government of the Netherlands was initiated to enhance the system's mobility. The Army's Patriot air defense system is a medium- to high-altitude ballistic missile defense system. A mobile, all-weather system, the Patriot provides air and missile defense for the field army and vital military bases. By October 1991 the Army had deployed ten Patriot battalions-seven to Europe and three within CONUS. During FY 90 and 91 the Patriot's software was further upgraded to enhance its antitactical missile capability. The initial upgrade (PAC I) was completed in 1988, and the second (PAC II) was accelerated during the deployment for DESERT SHIELD. Thirty-five separate and additional software changes were also introduced for the Patriot system during the Persian Gulf war.

## Fire Support

In the 1980s the Army investigated the implications of the massive numbers of Warsaw Pact artillery and the significantly smaller number possessed by the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in the event of a land war in Europe. Analysis revealed that artillery would provide 75 to 80 percent of the combat power of a Warsaw Pact main attack. Consequently, improvement



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of the Army's artillery systems, especially those assigned to the heavy (armored and mechanized infantry) divisions that would fight in Europe, became of paramount concern. A 1988 Defense Science Board study, *Countering Soviet Fire Support Systems*, agreed with this analysis. The study recommended accelerated development and fielding of fire support systems and significant increases in the allocation of Department of Defense funds to boost research, development, and acquisition.

The Army's primary field artillery weapons system for its heavy divisions is the M109 howitzer, a self-propelled, 155-mm. howitzer first introduced in the 1960s. Although the M109 howitzer had been upgraded several times by the mid-1980s, after more than two decades of service, the Army decided to conduct another major upgrade. The howitzer improvement program (HIP) was initiated to incorporate new technology and an improved capability to counter the Warsaw Pact artillery threat. In February 1990 the HIP howitzer was designated the M109A6 and approved for low-rate production. Five months later it was officially named the Paladin. The Paladin's improvements included a new cannon with a 25 percent increase in maximum range to 30 kilometers, improved crew protection against artillery fragmentation and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) hazards, automatic fire control, a position-locating device, SINCGARS radios, driver's night vision capability, and built-in test equipment. The Army planned to procure 824 Paladins, and production began in October 1991.

Another significant improvement in field artillery capabilities was provided by the Army tactical missile system (ATACMS). The ATACMS gives the operational (corps, army, and theater) commander a responsive, reliable, and survivable tool to fight the deep battle. Fired from the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launcher, the ATACMS is a conventional, surface-to-surface, semiguided missile. It has a dual capability warhead carrying either antipersonnel or antimaterial munitions. Low-rate initial production (LRIP) began in FY 89 and continued in FY 90. Production of 276 missiles was planned for FY 90 and 452 in FY 91. During FY 90 and 91 the Army completed fielding the AN/TPQ-

36 and AN/TPQ-37 radars. These radars are the Army's counterbattery and countermortar detection systems that identify the location of enemy artillery, mortars, and rockets. In FY 90 modifications of the AN/TPQ-36 were made so that HMMWVs could move it. A self-survey capability was also added. Equipping of the first Army field unit with the modified radars was expected by the last quarter of FY 91.

The M119 is a lightweight 105-mm. howitzer developed by the United Kingdom and procured by the U.S. Army to replace M101A1 and M102 105-mm. howitzers in the Army's light divisions. The M119 uses standard 105-mm. ammunition and has a range of 14,300 meters. This range can be



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extended to 19,500 meters with rocket-assisted projectiles. The 7th Infantry Division received the first M119s in December 1989. Completion of fielding of the M119 to U.S. Army light units was expected by late 1995.

### Combat Support/Combat Service Support

The battlefield capabilities of heavy engineer units were modernized with fielding of the M9 Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE). The ACE is a tracked, lightly armored, earthmoving vehicle designed to move on the battlefield and withstand hostile fire. Its design allows it to accomplish a myriad of engineering tasks such as digging, dozing, hauling, scraping, and grading. ACE fielding began in late 1989 and was accelerated for units in Southwest Asia during November-December 1990. The Army's research and development community responded rapidly to another major need identified in Saudi Arabia. Three months after being asked to develop a mine rake that could clear a lane the width of a vehicle through a minefield without exploding the mines, AMC produced and tested a prototype. Models were fabricated at Letterkenney Army Depot and shipped to the Middle East in January 1991. Army units successfully used the rakes to penetrate Iraqi defenses in February 1991. The German government donated sixty M93 Fox NBC detector vehicles to the U.S. government for use in the Persian Gulf, fifty for Army units and ten for the Marine Corps. The M93 Fox is 6-wheeled, armored, NBC reconnaissance vehicle that performs sophisticated NBC detection tasks while in motion.

A vital component of the Army's peacetime and wartime sustainment capability is its fleet of tactical wheeled vehicles. The fleet is divided into three classes-light (less than 2½ tons), medium (2½ to 5 tons), and heavy (greater than 5 tons). Modernization of each of the three classes continued during FY 90 and 91. In August 1989 a new five-year contract was awarded for 33,000 HMMWVs, a light vehicle that is replacing the quarter-ton truck. Production of the HMMWVs began in March 1990. The workhorse of the Army's tactical mobility fleet is the medium truck. Increased operating costs and age, however, significantly affected the reliability and performance of the Army's fleet of medium trucks, especially the 2½-ton models. In 1988 three contracts were let to manufacturers for prototypes of 2½-ton trucks for competitive evaluation and testing.

A centerpiece of the Army's efforts to develop its family of heavy vehicles is the palletized loading system (PLS). The PLS is a 16½-ton tactical vehicle composed of a prime mover equipped with an onboard load/unload capability and a 16½-ton trailer. It is designed to perform line haul, local haul, unit resupply, and other logistical missions in support of mobile combat operations. After approval by the Defense Acquisition Board, a contract was signed in September 1990 with Oshkosh Truck for



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2,700 of these vehicles and associated equipment under a LRIP schedule beginning in September 1991.

### Reserve Components Modernization

The integration of the active and reserve components required by the Total Force policy extended to modernization activities. By FY 91 the Army aviation modernization plan had equipped two Army Reserve (USAR) aviation battalions with UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. In July 1990 the Army approved the attack helicopter Company E concept for

testing. Under this concept USAR attack helicopter companies would be augmented with an additional package of staff and sustainment personnel. The Reserve company would be collocated with an active component unit and use active component equipment for training. Other types of USAR units also received modern equipment during FY 90 and 91. The 100th Training Division acquired some M1 tanks during FY 90 and anticipated others because of active force reductions at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Medical units were issued the Minimum Essential Equipment for Training (MEET) sets as part of the Deployable Medical System (DEPMEDS). It was anticipated that forty-three MEET sets and one regional training set would be fielded to the Reserve by FY 91. Other systems fielded to USAR units included HMMWVs, M939 series 5-ton trucks, 9-mm. pistols, position azimuth determining systems (PADS), and mortar ballistic computers.

A key program that influenced Army National Guard (ARNG) modernization efforts was the equipment readiness program initiated in 1985. This program identified unit equipment needs and guided modernization activities to fill unit shortages. In FY 90 the Army planned to equip four ARNG tank units with Abrams M1 tanks. By the end of FY 91 Army officials anticipated that all Guard armor units would be equipped with either M1 or M60A3 thermal sight tanks, instead of M48A5s or M60/M60A1 tanks. The Army aviation modernization plan also included portions dedicated to the ARNG. Initial plans called for fielding of AH-64 Apache helicopters to fifteen Guard attack battalions and early fielding of the light helicopter, Comanche. These objectives were subsequently changed to fielding Apaches to twelve battalions and outfitting ten lift units with upgraded CH-47D Chinook medium lift helicopters. Among the efforts to modernize the Army's tactical wheeled vehicles was a program to replace the Guard's 212-ton and 5-ton gasoline truck engines with multifuel engines.

A continuing success story of reserve component modernization was the Dedicated Procurement Program (DPP). Congress established the DPP in 1981 to assist the reserve components in reaching their readiness goals. By 1991 the ARNG had committed over $1.6 billion of DPP funds



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to correct unit equipment shortages. Similar actions were taken by the USAR. From FY 81 through FY 90 the Reserve's DPP was used to purchase more than 38,000 pieces of equipment at a cost of approximately $980 million. This equipment included 3,053 5-ton trucks, 2,656 semi-trailers, 649 VRC 12-series radios, 9,815 night vision devices, 22 improved TOW vehicles, and 785 other pieces of equipment.

### The Army's Role in the Strategic Defense Initiative

The Army has the mission of providing the ground-based surface-to-air, air defense of the United States. Under this mandate, the Army has been conducting research into defense against ballistic missiles for more than thirty years. During FY 90 and 91 the Army's research and experimentation continued, but in January 1991 President Bush announced a plan to redefine and limit the scope of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The new plan, christened the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), was intended to provide a highly effective defense against limited strategic missile attacks.

Toward this end the Army planned and conducted experiments on free electron lasers, neutral particle beams, artificial intelligence, and neural networks. In January 1990 the Army conducted a test of the High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor Kinetic Integrated Technology Experiment (HEDI-KITE-1). The test was an initial examination of state-of-the-art ballistic missile defense technologies intended to provide the last layer of a defense system through the use of kinetic energy weapons to intercept missiles. In January 1991 the Exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle Interceptor Subsystem (ERIS) successfully intercepted an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This event was particularly notable because the interceptor discerned the ICBM as the correct target even though the missile was accompanied by decoy s.

### The Army in Space

The U.S. Army Space Command (ARSPACE) is the Army component of the U.S. Space Command. ARSPACE has responsibility for the ground portion of designated space systems and provides space systems support to operational

forces in combat. In the Cold War's waning days ARSPACE initiated an intense program to develop an antisatellite system to counter Soviet capabilities and protect U.S. systems. In December 1989 the Defense Acquisition Board selected a ground-based antisatellite concept promoted by the Army, and the Army became the lead service for its development. The concept envisioned a ground-based kinetic antisatellite system capable of intercepting and destroying low earth-orbiting satellites.

89

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In July 1990 the Army Space Council approved a research and development program for two tactical satellites intended to provide space capabilities to the tactical commander. One satellite was an all-weather, day and night intelligence system. The second satellite would provide the Army with an all-weather, 24-hour, antijam communications capability. This program was the first attempt by the Army since the early 1960s to provide Army-owned and Army-operated space systems to its commanders. During DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, ARSPACE provided Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation, weather, and terrain support to commanders and units on the ground.

90

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***Go to:***

**Previous Chapter** **Next Chapter**

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**Return to Table of Contents**

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


**Return to CMH Online**

*Last updated 30 October 2003*

# 7

## Mobilizing, Deploying, and Sustaining the Army

The Army's ability to mobilize, deploy, and sustain itself is crucial to its success on the battlefield. Planning for these functions by HQDA has been strongly emphasized and closely coordinated with the warfighting commands since the late 1970s. Although planners have concerned themselves with potential contingencies around the world, most planning efforts have been directed toward Europe. Repelling a potential Warsaw Pact attack from the east has represented the primary concern of the national and Army leadership. The actions and programs that flowed from this concern included REFORGER exercises, AMOPS, and various other mobilization exercises, annual screenings of IRRs, the CAPSTONE program, and the upgrading of Army National Guard (ARNG) combat units.

FY 90 and 91, however, saw the Army mobilize, deploy, and sustain itself in operations quite different from those foreseen for Central Europe. Army forces continued their participation in U.S. government operations to pressure the government of Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega. These operations culminated in Operation JUST CAUSE in December 1989 as Army and Air Force units, acting with the Navy and Marine Corps, struck by night fast and hard into Panama. U.S. forces rapidly neutralized Panamanian resistance, liberated Panama, and captured Noriega. Seven and one-half months later, in response to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's seizure of neighboring Kuwait, Army forces of the CONUS-based XVIII Airborne Corps, along with elements of the other armed services, deployed to Saudi Arabia. These forces formed America's initial defensive force during the early stages of Operation DESERT SHIELD. President Bush's decision in October 1990 to augment U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf resulted in the deployment of the VII Corps from Europe. By January 1991 preparations were complete, and the coalition unleashed Operation DESERT STORM.

These combat operations, in addition to civilian relief operations (Hurricane Hugo) and exercise contingencies during the period, severely tested the Army's mobilization, deployment, and sustainment systems. In



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nearly every case, the concepts underlying the systems proved valid, but the systems had to stretch and evolve further to satisfy unexpected requirements and asset shortfalls.

### Mobilization

The Army's portion of the FY 90 JCS exercise program included two major mobilization exercises. Exercise OPTIMAL FOCUS 90 continued a series begun in 1989. OPTIMAL FOCUS was designed primarily to test the ability of selected units from the Army reserve components' presidential call-up of Selected Reserve, the initial mobilization increment defined in law, to mobilize and complete home station activities. OPTIMAL FOCUS 90 took place during late January and early February 1990 and involved fifty-four ARNG and Army Reserve (USAR) units consisting of more than 10,000 soldiers. An important aspect of the exercise tested the Army's ability to transmit alert and execution messages from HQDA to individual units through the appropriate chains of command. Some message transmission problems were noted and plans to retrieve unit equipment from remote storage sites needed further examination and refinement. However, the high morale and professional competence of the participating troops were evident to evaluators because most units met schedules for assembly and home station processing.

The Army initiated another mobilization exercise program in the spring of 1990, complementary to the OPTIMAL FOCUS series, with the first iteration of a planned annual series entitled CALL FORWARD. CALL FORWARD was intended to test the ability of selected mobilization stations to accession a large number of reserve components units into active service under surge conditions. CALL FORWARD 90 was conducted at Camp Blanding, Florida, where all units scheduled to mobilize at that installation were sent for annual training. The exercise validated the Army's basic methodology to mobilize large numbers of personnel and also provided useful lessons to HQDA, FORSCOM, and the

mobilization station staff on personnel logistics and communications requirements. The FY 91 versions of OPTIMAL FOCUS and CALL FORWARD were canceled because of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

President Bush did not activate reserve components units for Operation JUST CAUSE. Because of his concern for operational security, he required that the operation be mounted by active Army forces. However, many RC volunteers with area and civil affairs skills and other appropriate specialties were activated as individuals to assist in the aftermath of JUST CAUSE and its successor operation, PROMOTE LIBERTY. These soldiers performed primarily nation-building functions and helped the newly installed government gain control of Panama and rebuild the country's



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damaged infrastructure. Thus, the brief duration of JUST CAUSE and the small force required to seize and rebuild Panama permitted the President to defer activation of reserve components units.

DESERT SHIELD was a different story. Prospective host governments in the Middle East had permitted no stationing of U.S. troops and only limited preparation of a few sites to accommodate American forces. Those governments generally had proven even less willing to permit stockpiling of materiel on their soil. BRIGHT STAR and associated exercises, however, had begun to prepare the governments for the magnitude of a potential U. S. deployment. Moreover, many installations in Saudi Arabia had been built to support the operations of Saudi units equipped with U.S. systems. Other positive factors included Saudi Arabia's modern port facilities, excellent airfields, and good roads near major towns. Nevertheless, deploying into an essentially austere inland environment presented a challenging task to maintaining a heavily armored U.S. force. CENTCOM plans had long been based on the assumption that its CAPSTONE combat support and combat service support units would be activated and deployed to the area of operational responsibility (AOR) early in any contingency. As it frequently happened, the reserve component combat service support structure originally designated to facilitate CENTCOM's deployment and subsequent employment was called late, if at all, and then usually in a piecemeal fashion.

This occurred because the National Command Authority (NCA) decided to call up reserve components later than DOD planners had assumed, to deploy large forces in two separate increments, and to call up and deploy the leanest possible force. All of the major units of ARCENT initially deployed belonged to the XVIII Airborne Corps and anticipated combat operations right away. Several support units, such as the 7th Transportation Group and the 593d Support Group, arrived prior to much of the XVIII Corps and were echelon above corps. The logistics support structure for ARCENT, which was constituted ad hoc, in-theater, and ultimately became the 22d Support Command (SUPCOM), resulted from these decisions and the thinking behind them. The 22d SUPCOM, which formed initially to support one corps, ultimately became a *de facto* theater army area command (TAACOM). As such, the 22d SUPCOM included many of the units that would have been subordinate to the 377th TAACOM, had it been mobilized.

In part, the unwillingness to call the 377th TAACOM to active duty stemmed from the initial deployment of only one corps and the President's desire to keep the number of activated reserve component troops as low as possible. Thus, each unit called had to provide a capability that was demonstrably necessary to the success of the operation. Unit identification codes (UIC) are the means by which the Joint Operations and Planning Execution System (JOPES) and the Army Mobilization and



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Operations Planning System (AMOPS) identified the units with those necessary capabilities. One way in which Army mobilization operators were able to acquire special capabilities for the force was to activate only the needed portion of a larger unit's UIC. This solution caused many cells, or small groups of personnel, to be called up without their units' command structures or internal support organizations.

The decision not to mobilize and use reserve components units which were CAPSTONE to CENTCOM, such as the 377th TAACOM, resulted in part from the fact that a revision of CENTCOM's contingency plan was in progress when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The Soviet Union's dissolution had led, earlier that summer, to

CENTCOM's Exercise INTERNAL LOOK, based on a contingency similar to the one that U.S. forces faced. The revision process, however, had not reached the point of a completed force list and a Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL). Therefore, the identification of force structure, particularly the individual combat support and combat service support companies and detachments needed to support CENTCOM's major units, was incomplete. HQDA worked closely with CENTCOM,ARCENT, and FORSCOM to build the TPFDL as requirements and priorities for different kinds of units fluctuated. This process resulted in the mobilization and deployment of the minimum essential force considered adequate to defend against further Iraqi attacks. The minimum essential force justified, in the Army's view, the creation of 22d SUPCOM's precursor, but not necessarily the activation of the 377th TAACOM.

The role of the Mobilization Division of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS) during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was crucial as HQDA worked to facilitate the mobilization of U.S. Army units and personnel to resource ARCENT. The Mobilization Division oversaw the call-up, validation, and deployment of reserve component units from across the nation. Unit readiness was a major factor in determining which units were alerted and activated. Unit Status Report (USR) data for active component units was sometimes 60 days old, whereas for ARNG units it might be 90 days old, and for USAR units, as old as 180 days. The inconsistency of the USR data required HQDA to work closely with FORSCOM to obtain accurate unit readiness data. Once requirements for particular types of units were defined and candidate units identified, the Army Staff then justified to the Secretary of the Army (later to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs) ARCENT's need for a particular unit.

During the crisis, ODCSOPS and the rest of the Army Staff supported several cells that worked on various parts of the Army's effort to resource ARCENT. The Crisis Action Team, established by the staff at the outset of DESERT SHIELD, took up quarters in the Army Operations Center



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(AOC), where representatives from each staff agency monitored and integrated details of their roles in the immediate action. The Crisis Planning Cell concerned itself with near term planning. The Strategic Planning Cell took a long range look at various scenarios that included war termination. The Logistics Cell, which functioned as the Logistics Operations Center (LOC), focused on deployment and sustainment matters. The Personnel Cell investigated personnel matters that ranged from the call-up of IRR soldiers and retirees, to the creation of the CONUS replacement centers, to dealing with a wide variety of family problems that arose. The Special Operations Forces (SOF) Cell dealt with requirements and responses to matters concerning SOF.

Once the Persian Gulf war ended, the Army Staff as a whole, ODCSOPS, and the Mobilization Division changed their focus from mobilizing and sending units overseas to returning and demobilizing U.S. Army forces deployed to the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. Activity within many of the special cells turned from DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the effort to succor the Kurds in northern Iraq and to protect them from Saddam Hussein's retribution. Although the intensity of these efforts was lower than it had been at the height of the DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM build-up, both tasks occupied the Army beyond the end of FY 91.

Throughout DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, Army Inspector General teams periodically assessed the activities of mobilization stations and made several observations:

-The absence of a standardized FORSCOM training validation plan led to unit training validation efforts that varied significantly among the mobilization installations.

-Operational guidance in both AMOPS and the FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System was insufficient for mobilization scenarios like DESERT SHIELD that do not proceed quickly to full mobilization.

-Generally, preparation-of-overseas-replacements processing successfully expedited the movement of troops, and civilian and military personnel support to mobilization stations was proficient. Installation family assistance centers and legal services provided adequate and timely support to deploying soldiers and their families.

Before the end of FY 91, the Army began to act on shortcomings in its mobilization system revealed during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM including the following areas:

-A need for AMOPS to address more fully the potential range of scenarios under a presidential Selected Reserve call-up (200,000 reservists).

-A need to revise Section 673b, Title 10, *U.S. Code*, to increase the call-up period from a maximum of six months to a year and to access a



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portion of the IRR for qualified fillers and augmentees during a 200,000-reservist call-up, a procedure not permitted prior to partial national mobilization.

-A need for a policy and authority to identify and mobilize units needed early in a mobilization, such as transportation terminal units that operate ports of embarkation.

-Absence of a program to federalize selected ARNG facilities early in a contingency to handle large numbers of mobilizing units.

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Environment tasked the Army Staff early in 1991 to assess the adequacy of the industrial base to meet future Army mobilization needs. The report that responded to this request was integrated into the broader *Integrated Army Mobilization Study* and a study plan approved by the General Officer Steering Committee on 15 February 1991 to analyze mobilization issues across a wide spectrum of scenarios for the period 1991-99.

**Deployment**

Deployment means transporting personnel and materiel to sites, usually overseas, for employment in military operations. The period of FY 90 and 91 began with the Army continuing to make its forces readier to deploy through refinement of doctrine and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), deployment readiness exercises for both active and reserve components units, and more stringent enforcement of required deployment criteria for individual soldiers. The Achilles' heel of all contingency planning that required significant strategic lift for troops and materiel, however, remained the nation's lack of sufficient lift assets. The Army proposed various solutions to these short falls, but the onset of JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM found little progress or interservice concord on such programs as the C-17 Airlifter or the procurement of additional roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels for military use.

Training exercises which required deployments from CONUS, such as the REFORGER, TEAM SPIRIT, and BRIGHT STAR series, have been planned well in advance. Thus, available air and sealift assets were programmed ahead of time, and DOD planners simply worked around known deficiencies. JUST CAUSE to some degree, and DESERT SHIELD to a considerable extent, underscored the real-world challenges inherent in depending upon a limited number of aircraft and ships for contingencies. The orchestration of loading and departures, and the simultaneous timing of air drops, with assaulting ground troops already in Panama during JUST CAUSE, were conducted almost flawlessly. JUST CAUSE, however, was a small-scale operation and was thoroughly planned and rehearsed for several months prior to its execution.



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Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, on the other hand, forced the U.S. armed forces to react quickly to the perceived Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states. Deployment planners and coordinators at the Joint Staff and HQDA were graphically reminded that sick ships and aircraft cannot be healed overnight. Nor, they found, did ships summoned from the Ready Reserve Fleet or distant ports always arrive on schedule and mechanically sound. HQDA was a resourcing agency for ARCENT, the Army component of CENTCOM, as well as the DOD executive agent for

logistics, prisoner-of-war processing, and other functions. Thus, HQDA expended considerable effort to identify and coordinate ARCENT and CENTCOM requirements and to ensure that Army forces and agencies responded promptly and efficiently. Much of HQDA's efforts in deployment dealt with ascertaining how well the rest of the Army was able to respond to FORSCOM and U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) requirements.

The LOC served as the focal point for the HQDA effort to track movements of troops, equipment, and supplies. The LOC maintained contact with TRANSCOM, the Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) to ensure that it had the latest information on ship and air movements. LOC officers briefed the Chief of Staff and the Army Staff daily on air and sea movements of units, equipment, and vital supplies and parts. The LOC and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG) also ensured that necessary adjustments were made whenever delays occurred. JOPES was the Department of Defense's automated system that tracked deploying units and equipment. Although JOPES had proven an effective tool in training exercises, the fast pace of DESERT SHIELD deployments demonstrated JOPES' inability to locate a particular unit's loads until the final ships' manifests were put into the JOPES data banks. The JOPES input and publication process sometimes took several days.

The deployment system functioned well enough, however, so that by the end of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the United States had transported to Southwest Asia the following items:

| Item | Quantity |
|---|---|
| Tracked Vehicles | 12,400 |
| Wheeled Vehicles | 117,100 |
| Helicopters | 1,830 |
| Ship Containers | 33,000 |
| Ammunition (short tons) | 350,000 |

Among the major deployment problems experienced by the Army during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM were



-The lack of joint deployment training, especially for heavy units, caused disruption and delays in the troop movement process

-The paucity of RO/RO ships maintained by the MSC and the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) made the DOD too dependent upon the expensive chartering of RO/ROs from foreign flag commercial carriers

-The poor condition of many RRF vessels delayed shipment of some equipment and supplies that might have been crucial had combat operations begun earlier.

Military aircraft only partially met the airlift requirements for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. For the first time since its inception, the Civili an Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) was activated by the President, and specially outfitted commercial aircraft provided personnel and cargo lift to Southwest Asia. The fact that the Army, as well as the other service s, depended upon a political decision to activate the CRAF reemphasized the need for more and better equipped military airlift aircraft. Thus, the Army renewed its support for the C-17 Airlifter. By late FY 91 the Army had re fined its support for the C-17 program by including a service life extension program for C-5B aircraft currently in the fleet. Regarding sealift, the Army leadership emphasized that deployment readiness required the capability to move two armored divisions and their support elements to a theater of operations any where in the world in thirty days. The remainder of an entire corps must follow in seventy-five days. Therefore, the Army supported expanding the current fleet of Fast Sealift Ships operated by MSC and adding modern RO/RO ships to the RRF. *The Department of Defense Mobility Requirements Study*, conducted throughout 1991, was the driving force behind the air/sealift enhancements intended to benefit the Army.

**Sustainment**

Sustainment means the ability to assemble the correct numbers and types of personnel and materiel in the proper place and at the right time to generate decisive combat power. Adequate sustainment requires organic support forces, pre-positioned equipment, war reserves, transportation capabilities, and a firm industrial base. HQDA is charged with providing to the CINCs Army units that are manned, equipped, organized, and fully trained with sufficient sustainment capabilities in personnel, equipment, and supplies to perform their missions. Without adequate sustainment, the warfighting CINCs cannot accomplish their wartime missions. Weaknesses in logistics also can subvert deterrence, because potential enemies may interpret these weaknesses as irresolute will.

Many Army sustainment programs continued throughout FY 90 and 91. Among these ongoing programs were strategic mobility, pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets (POMCUS) in Europe, wartime host



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nation support, medical sustainment systems, tactical water support, industrial preparedness, war reserve stocks, and computerization of logistics control systems. These programs were greatly affected by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, subsequent calls for accelerated downsizing of the Army, and Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. As discussed previously, the Army sought throughout the FY 90 and 91 period to enhance strategic mobility by supporting procurement of the C-17 and up grading the numbers and quality of vessels in the RRF. This concern related to attainment of the congressionally mandated sixty-six million ton-miles (MTM) per day of airlift capacity and the Army's need to transport about 95 percent of its equipment and supplies by sea. Projections as early as 1989 indicated that fifty-four MTM per day would be attained by 1994 with the advent of the C-17 fleet. Efforts to attain sixty-six MTM per day airlift capacity would require activation of the CRAF.

Another program designed for European scenarios that continued throughout the period and supported Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was the POMCUS program. The Army had built and modernized these sets of unit equipment since 1961. By 1989 POMCUS stocks stored in Europe had grown to nearly six complete division sets. They proved a significant asset when the Army Chief of Staff decided to use them to modernize the equipment of early deploying DESERT SHIELD forces in Southwest Asia. Another example of a continuing program influenced by Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was wartime host nation support (WHNS). WHNS had existed in the civil affairs community for a long period as a concept with global application. However, published Army statements usually had characterized it as a program in Germany. Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states provided massive in-kind and monetary support to U.S. forces assigned in Southwest Asia. This support decreased the logistics requirements, the air and sealift requirements, and the dollars spent.

Several Army medical sustainment programs were either altered or accelerated as a result of changing world conditions. The program to stock as many as six warmbased 1,000-bed general hospitals (partially established hospitals located at the intended site of wartime use) in Europe was laid aside as the Soviet threat dissipated. Nevertheless, medical readiness remained important as concern heightened about potential opponents capable of employing chemical and biological weapons. In another medical matter, the Army pushed development of the Field Medical Oxygen Generation and Distribution System to obviate a requirement to airlift bottled medical grade oxygen. Similarly, development and fielding of the Resuscitative Fluids Production System was reemphasized because it would dramatically reduce airlift requirements for these fluids and also provide better service to the soldier in the field.



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Even though it had political and military significance, Operation JUST CAUSE did not place heavy sustainment demands upon HQDA. Sustaining the force in Panama required only marginally increased efforts from most of the Army Staff. Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command's (CINCSOUTH's) requirements for volunteer Spanish linguists and civil affairs specialists, however, presented an unusual situation. Because the reserve components were not activated and tasking channels were changed by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, CINCSOUTH's personnel requests went directly to FORSCOM, the specified command that provided forces to

the CINCs. Since HQDA controlled individual soldiers, however, FORSCOM passed the CINCSOUTH personnel requirements along to HQDA in order to solicit volunteers and bring them on active duty. The volunteers were called, proving that the system worked.

Sustainment of forces deployed to Southwest Asia entailed a massive planning and coordination effort. Simultaneously with DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, HQDA responded to Army needs worldwide. The Army Chief of Staff captured the scope of the Army's multiple responsibilities with the formulation of three vectors. First, the Army would provide all necessary support to DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Second, the Army must maintain a trained and ready force to meet ongoing commitments worldwide. Finally, the Army must continue to shape the Total Force for the future. The austere environment into which ARCENT deployed and the Army's executive agent responsibilities for all U.S. armed forces in theater presented major challenges. Ammunition, water, food, chemical equipment, bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL), and transportation terminal support required intensive effort by Army sustainers. As a result, HQDA was heavily involved in sustainment planning and execution for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. This involvement included close and continuous coordination with ARCENT, the MACOMs, and the Army components of other unified commands that supported CENTCOM, along with the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and private industry.

Many ongoing sustainment programs proved their worth during the Persian Gulf war. The tactical water support program fielded 600-gallon-per- hour Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPU) to each division that deployed to Southwest Asia. These water purification units had proven their worth when Hurricane Hugo damaged public water supplies in Charleston, South Carolina, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands in the fall of 1989. In addition, higher capacity water purification systems were included in the materiel stored aboard ship at Diego Garcia as part of the Army's Afloat Pre-positioned Stocks (APS). The APS program provided a much needed store of ammunition, selected support equipment,



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and supply items to early deploying units and more than justified its costs. As FY 91 closed, the Army had discussed, but initially rejected, an expanded APS program that would include an afloat POMCUS.

The Army's war reserve stocks likewise paid dividends by giving the nation's industrial base the time it needed to gear up production of commodities needed in Southwest Asia. Nevertheless, establishing stocks in theater at levels defined by Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT) forced the Army to take many war reserve stocks from CONUS and other theaters, especially ammunition and preferred/ smart munitions. Automating data handling in many logistics functional areas also proved useful for the Army in Southwest Asia. In order to handle repair parts ordering and supply in ARCENT more efficiently, HQDA issued large numbers of computers, software, and other equipment needed to emplace the Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS). Other Army automation efforts during FY 90 and 91 were directed toward standardization and compatibility of logistics data systems. The Army Strategic Logistics Agency has undertaken a project for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), the Army Strategic Logistics Program. It has a near term goal of modernizing and synchronizing existing Army wholesale and retail systems into a single system that ties factory and foxhole together. For the long term, the Strategic Logistics Agency will explore and define functional logistics concepts necessary to adapt Army logistics to the changing requirements of AirLand Battle.

The Air Line of Communication (ALOC) Program began as an effort to provide air delivery of routine priority equipment, repair parts, and maintenance-related items to selected overseas Army combat service support units. One primary objective, which has been achieved, was to reduce the time elapsed between ordering and shipping. During DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the ODCSLOG used the concept to establish ALOCs from Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, and Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina, to ship priority repair parts and material to Southwest Asia. As a result, when ODCSLOG had to orchestrate the aerial shipment of fuel tanker versions of the High Mobility Tactical Truck to the Persian Gulf for the ground offensive, ALOC provided the service.

Programs oriented toward the soldier in the field assumed added importance after JUST CAUSE, and especially during and after DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Spurred on by the chemical warfare threat and the austere environment

in Southwest Asia, the Army pushed enhancements to the Field Service Support Systems. The objective of these systems is to improve the personal care and, hence, the combat readiness of the soldier in the field through better laundry service, mobile showers, clothing repair and exchange, field bakeries, and delousing facilities. The Laundry and Decontamination Dry-cleaning System, a laundry system that virtually



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eliminates water requirements and decontaminates individual clothing and equipment, is under development. An interim laundry system that has a water recycling capability was fielded to forces in the Persian Gulf and provided significant water savings.



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***Go to:***

**Previous Chapter** **Next Chapter**

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


**Return to CMH Online**

*Last updated 30 October 2003*

# 8

## Structuring the Force

FY 90 and 91 witnessed substantial changes in U.S. Army force structure. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's programs of *perestroika* and *glasnost* continued to reduce tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. During the period, the Berlin Wall came down, the Warsaw Pact disbanded, Germany was reunified, and the Cold War ended. The United States began adapting its defense establishment to a national strategy that was shifting from preoccupation with the Soviet Union in Europe to unanticipated but lower scale threats worldwide. During this tumultuous period the Army began changing to a smaller force, based primarily in CONUS, and focused on regional conflicts. In FY 89 the Army had 770,000 active component personnel and twenty- eight tactical divisions-eighteen active component and ten reserve component Army National Guard (ARNG). At the end of FY 91, active component strength had fallen to 725,445 soldiers, or 6 percent less. The Army had reduced the number of its divisions to sixteen active component and ten ARNG, and steps continued to reduce the force to twelve active and eight ARNG divisions. Six of the eight ARNG divisions would be fully manned, and two of them cadre.

### The Army and the Total Force Policy

In 1973 the United States formalized the DOD's Total Force policy. Essentially, the policy required integration of all available armed forces and relied upon reserve components units to augment active component units. The Army established a total force that placed about half the combat forces in the active component and two-thirds of the combat support/ combat service support forces in the reserve components. It also identified reserve component roundout battalions and brigades to train and fight as part of parent active duty units. In FY 90 the Total Army contained twenty-eight combat divisions (eighteen active component and ten reserve component) and twenty-eight separate combat brigades (five active component and twenty-three reserve component). The active components provided forward-deployed, contingency, and rapid reinforcement



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forces. The reserve components included more than half the soldiers in the Total Army and 60 percent of all support units. One-third of the active component divisions included reserve component roundout brigades. In FY 91 the Army inactivated two active component divisions.

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM largely validated the Total Force concept. The service of two reserve component field artillery brigades-the 142d of Arkansas and the 196th of Tennessee-and the successful sustainment support provided by reserve component combat support and combat service support units in the Persian Gulf war exemplified this point. Yet, controversy arose regarding the decision not to send three designated ARNG roundout brigades-the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of Georgia, the 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of Louisiana, and the 155th Armored Brigade of Mississippi-to Saudi Arabia with their parent active component divisions. The FY 91 Defense Authorization Act directed the Department of Defense to conduct a form al study of its Total Force policy. The Secretary of Defense established a Total Force study group to analyze the topic. Released on 31 December 1990, the Pentagon's *Total Force Policy Report to Congress* concluded that, in the future, U.S. active component forces should be able to deploy rapidly to trouble spots and to sustain themselves for the first thirty days with virtually no support from the reserve components. Under the plan, the active component would continue to use ARNG roundout brigades.

At the end of FY 91, the Army saw several trends that necessitated adjustments to the Total Force policy. These trends included a reduction in the requirement to maintain sizable ready forces for rapid deployment to Europe, and the effect of potential demands for immediate deployment anywhere in the world upon the state of Army training. A smaller Army meant continued reliance on the reserve component to reinforce extended contingency operations, to deal concurrently with a second major contingency, and to be prepared for large scale threats. Finally, the reduced Soviet threat permitted

longer timeframes to generate additional U.S. forces. The Army planned to reduce both the active and the reserve components to a smaller but equally capable Total Force during a period of several years. Active component reductions began in FY 90, but the Army planned no reserve component strength reductions for that year pending congressional response to the *Total Force Policy Report*.

In an effort to optimize the performance of the reserve components in fulfilling the Army's strategic roles, on 1 October 1990 the Army implemented a plan that transferred the Army Reserve (USAR) budget process from the FORSCOM commander to the Chief of the Army Reserve. On the same date, the Army provisionally established the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) as a major subordinate command of FORSCOM. The Chief of the Army Reserve became both its commander and the



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FORSCOM Deputy Commanding General for Reserve Affairs. USARC obtained command and control over all CONUS-based reserve units, except those that report to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). USARC was scheduled to become fully operational by October 1992.

### Force Structure Reductions

The Army entered FY 90 with five corps and twenty-eight combat divisions. Some of these units were based in Europe and the Pacific, a contingency corps and a reinforcing corps were located in CONUS, and all of them were reinforced by support units. When FY 91 ended, the Army had eliminated two active component divisions (the 2d Armored and the 9th [Motorized] Infantry Divisions) and anticipated reducing to a 4-corps, 20-division force by 1995. Planners envisioned twelve active component divisions (two armored, five mechanized, two light, one airborne, one air assault, and one infantry); six ARNG divisions (two armored, three mechanized, one light); and two heavy reserve component cadre divisions.

Active component forces would accomplish forward presence and rapid deployment missions with four divisions forward-deployed (two in Europe and two in the Pacific) for immediate response, and five divisions (two heavy, one airborne, one air assault, and one light) as a contingency corps easily reconfigured to fight with special operations forces for response to crises worldwide. The Army would also maintain a reinforcing corps in CONUS capable of deploying after activation of the reserve components, completing varying degrees of post-mobilization training, and making special preparations for the particular contingency. These forces would consist of three active component divisions, rounded out by ARNG brigades for early reinforcing, and a follow-on force of six ARNG divisions. Two reserve component cadre divisions, designed to bridge the gap between activation of the ARNG divisions and total mobilization, would complete the twenty-division Total Army of 1995.

### Armies and Corps

There were eight numbered armies in FY 90, but they were reduced to seven in FY 91 with elimination of the Fourth U.S. Army at Fort Sheridan, Illinois. The seven armies were First U.S. Army, Fort Meade, Maryland; Second U.S. Army, Fort Gillem, Georgia; Third U.S. Army, Fort McPherson, Georgia; Fifth U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas; Sixth U.S. Army, San Francisco, California; Seventh U.S. Army, Heidelberg, Germany; and Eighth U.S. Army, Seoul, South Korea. The Third Army



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served as a tactical field army and also as ARCENT, the U.S. Army component command of CENTCOM during the Persian Gulf war. The five continental United States armies (CONUSAs)-the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth armies-commanded the USAR troop units within their geographical areas. They also directed the training of ARNG units within their geographical areas in accordance with HQDA and FORSCOM guidance. FORSCOM assigned the CONUSAs operational control for mobilization and deployment at all mobilization stations in their areas. In the event of full-scale mobilization, the CONUSAs were scheduled to become Joint Regional Defense Commands.

The corps is the highest tactical echelon of the Army, and the primary command and control headquarters for the land battle in-theater. It has two or more combat divisions and permanently assigned nondivisional combat, combat support, and combat service support units that can be allocated to subordinate divisions or utilized independently to influence the battle. During FY 90 and 91 five corps were in the active component -I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington; III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas;V Corps, Frankfurt, Germany; VII Corps, Stuttgart, Germany; and the XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. On 15 August 1991, the Army announced that it would inactivate the VII Corps by 15 April 1992.

**Divisions and Separate Brigades**

The division is the Army's highest tactical echelon with a fixed organization. Commanded by a major general, a division is a combined arms unit with permanently assigned forces that perform five essential functions- maneuver, air defense, fire support, intelligence and electronic warfare, and combat service support. A division can fight as a self-contained force, but it is usually augmented with corps troops for sustained operations. Each division organizes for combat by assigning missions and allocating divisional resources and troops to its three organic maneuver brigades.

Army divisions are classified as heavy (armored and mechanized), light (light infantry, airborne, air assault, and motorized), or infantry, which describes either a specially organized division, such as the 2d Infantry Division in Korea, or the standard infantry divisions in the ARNG. Heavy divisions are either armored or mechanized infantry units designed to fight against a mechanized enemy in a mid-to-high intensity battlefield. Armored divisions organically consist of six tank and four mechanized infantry battalions and approximately 16,800 men, while a mechanized infantry division has five tank and five mechanized infantry battalions and approximately 17,100 men. In FY 90 the Army had six armored (four active component and two reserve component) and eight mechanized (six active component and two reserve component) divisions



TABLE 1-FY 90 AND 91 ACTIVE COMPONENT DIVISIONS

| Unit | Type | Location | Maneuver Brigade 90/91 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Armored Division | Armored | Germany | 3/3 |
| 1st Cavalry Division | Armored | Fort Hood, Texas | 2/2 |
| 1st Infantry Division | Mechanized | Fort Riley, Kansas | 3/2 * |
| 2d Armored Division | Armored | Fort Hood, Texas | 3/0 ** |
| 2d Infantry Division | Infantry | Korea | 3/3 |
| 3d Armored Division | Armored | Germany | 3/3 |
| 3d Infantry Division | Mechanized | Germany | 3/3 |
| 4th Infantry Division | Mechanized | Fort Carson, Colorado | 3/2 |
| 5th Infantry Division | Mechanized | Fort Polk, Louisiana | 2/2 |
| 6th Infantry Division | Light | Fort Richardson, Arkansas | 2/2 |
| 7th Infantry Division | Light | Fort Ord, California | 3/3 |
| 8th Infantry Division | Mechanized | Germany | 3/3 |
| 9th Infantry Division | Motorized | Fort Lewis, Washington | 2/0 *** |
| 10th Infantry Division | Light | Fort Drum, New York | 2/2 |
| 24th Infantry Division | Mechanized | Fort Stewart, Georgia | 2/3 |
| 25th Infantry Division | Light | Hawaii | 3/3 |
| 82d Airborne Division | Airborne | Fort Bragg, North Carolina | 3/3 |
| 101st Airborne Division | Air Assault | Fort Campbell, Kentucky | 3/3 |

*The 1st Infantry Division Forward (3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division) in Germany is counted as the third brigade in FY

90. The brigade was inactivated in FY 91.
** The 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division, forward deployed in Germany was counted as the 3d brigade. The 2d Armored Division was reduced to zero strength in FY 91.
*** The 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) was inactivated in FY 91. The assets of its last brigade became the separate 199th Infantry Brigade.

(*Table 1*). As FY 90 began, three heavy divisions were rounded out with reserve component combat brigades (*Table 2*). This number had increased to four as FY 91 closed (*Table 3*).

An armored division was removed from the active component in FY 91. On 15 September 1991, the 2d Armored Division stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, was dropped from the active force, although formal inactivation was postponed until a future date. The 2d Brigade, 2d Armored Division, was inactivated in August 1990. The division's 1st Brigade, the famed "Tiger Brigade," attached to U.S. Marine Corps forces during Operation DESERT STORM, was inactivated on 20 May 1991, and the officers and men became the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. The 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division, remained in Germany and had not been officially redesignated and assigned to another unit by the end of FY 91.



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TABLE 2-FY 90 ACTIVE COMPONENT (AC) DIVISIONS
WITH RESERVE COMPONENT (RC) ROUNDOUT BRIGADES

| AC Unit | RC Roundout Unit | Location |
|---|---|---|
| 1st Cavalry Division (Armored) | 155th Armored Brigade<br>3 (Mech)/141 Infantry | Mississippi<br>Texas |
| 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) | 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) | Louisiana |
| 6th Infantry Division (Light) | 205th Infantry Brigade | Minnesota |
| 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) | 81st Infantry Brigade (Motorized) | Washington |
| 10th Infantry Division (Light) | 27th Infantry Brigade | New York |
| 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) | 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) | Georgia |
| 25th Infantry Division (Light) | 29th Infantry Brigade | Hawaii |

Another heavy unit, the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), was inactivated on 15 December 1989 as part of the budget cuts required under the QUICKSILVER program. The 4th Infantry Division was targeted for the cut since it was the only heavy division in CONUS with three brigades. To compensate for the loss, the division was assigned the 116th Cavalry Brigade of the Idaho National Guard as a roundout brigade (*Table 3*). QUICKSILVER also caused a restructuring of the separate 194th Armored Brigade to a 1,068-man, armor-heavy task force that consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, three armor companies, two mechanized infantry companies, a reserve component armor company, a field artillery battery, a supply and transport company, and a support battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment. The restructuring was completed on 30 September 1990.

The Chief of Staff, Army, approved the implementation of the Engineer Restructure Initiative, later called the Heavy Division Engineer Brigade, on 5 March 1991 as part of the Army of Excellence process. This initiative called for an engineer brigade organic to each heavy division, which would provide one engineer battalion for each of the maneuver brigades and an engineer brigade headquarters for overall command and control. USAREUR previously had reorganized its engineer assets in a test of the concept, which was validated in combat during Operation DESERT STORM. Implementation was scheduled to begin in Europe and Korea in FY 92 and within FORSCOM during FY 92-94. Projected plans called for implementation for the five heavy ARNG divisions during FY 95-97.

Light divisions are configured for rapid deployment and immediate insertion into trouble spots worldwide. In FY 90 the

Army had five light



TABLE 3-FY 91 ACTIVE COMPONENT (AC) DIVISIONS
WITH RESERVE COMPONENT (RC) ROUNDOUT BRIGADES

| AC Unit | RC Roundout Unit | Location |
|---|---|---|
| 1st Cavalry Division (Armored) | 155th Armored Brigade<br>3 (Mech)/141 Infantry | Mississippi<br>Texas |
| 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) | 116th Armor Brigade | Idaho/Oregon/<br>Nevada |
| 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) | 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) | Louisiana |
| 6th Infantry Division (Light) | 205th Infantry Brigade<br>6/297th Infantry | Minnesota<br>Alaska |
| 10th Infantry Division (Light) | 27th Infantry Brigade | New York |
| 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) | 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) | Georgia |
| 25th Infantry Division (Light) | 29th Infantry Brigade | Hawaii |

infantry divisions (four active component and one reserve component), and three other active component light divisions-one airborne, one air assault, and one motorized-but it eliminated the motorized division in FY 91 (*see Table 1*). Four active component light divisions were assigned reserve component roundout brigades in FY 90, but during FY 91 this number was reduced to three (*Tables 2 and 3*). On 5 February 1989, QUICKSILVER directed restructuring the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) by 1991 to a separate motorized brigade with a strength of 3,900 men. Inactivation of the 9th, formerly known as the High Technology Light Division (HTLD), began in FY 90, but official inactivation of the division was rescheduled for 15 August 1992. Having inactivated its 2d Brigade in February 1988, the 9th inactivated its 1st Brigade in FY 90 and both its Division Artillery and 3d Brigade on 15 February 1991. The soldiers and equipment of the 3d Brigade were re-formed into the separate 199th Infantry Brigade.

The Army had one active component infantry division, the 2d Infantry Division in Korea, and five reserve component infantry divisions during FY 90 and 91 (*see Tables 1 and 4*). No major structural changes were made to those units during that time. In 1990, however, HQDA announced a planned consolidation of the 42d Infantry Division of New York, the 26th Infantry Division of New England, and the 50th Armored Division of New Jersey, all ARNG units, into one heavy division by 1993.

In April 1990 the Army began studying the feasibility of incorporating cadre divisions into the Total Army. The end of the Cold War permitted more time for the United States to detect and counter a resurgent Soviet or other major threat. Reconstituting units under full mobilization relies on



TABLE 4-RESERVE COMPONENT (NATIONAL GUARD) DIVISIONS

| Unit | Type | Location |
|---|---|---|
| 49th Armored Division | Armored | Texas<br>New Jersey/ |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 50th Armored Division | Armored | Vermont/Texas |
| 26th Infantry Division | Infantry | Massachusetts/ Connecticut/ Rhode Island |
| 28th Infantry Division | Infantry | Pennsylvania |
| 29th Infantry Division | Light Infantry | Virginia/Maryland |
| 35th Infantry Division | Mechanized Infantry | Nebraska/Kansas/ Kentucky |
| 38th Infantry Division | Infantry | Indiana/Michigan |
| 40th Infantry Division | Mechanized Infantry | California |
| 42d Infantry Division | Infantry | New York |
| 47th Infantry Division* | Infantry | Minnesota/ Illinois/Iowa |

*The 47th Infantry Division was redesignated the 34th Infantry Division in FY 91.

stockpiled or produced equipment and on soldiers drafted and trained after mobilization. Estimates in 1991 indicated that it would take two or more years before new units could be formed, equipped, trained, and deployed. Planners decided that the Army needed units that could attain combat readiness more quickly than newly formed units and that would be less expensive to maintain than fully structured active or ARNG divisions.

Cadre divisions are partially manned and equipped units that are filled and trained in the event of war. In peacetime, a cadre division consists of a skeletonized division organization of about 3,000 trained officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Upon mobilization, the division would be filled with an influx of equipment and drafted or recruited soldiers who would be trained by the cadre leadership and then deploy. An armored cadre division could attain combat readiness twelve to fifteen months after mobilization. TRADOC began full development of the cadre division concept in a force development concept analysis during FY 90 and 91. Army leadership expected to make implementation decisions prior to submission of the 1994-99 Defense Plan.

As FY 90 began, the Army active component had four separate brigades (one armor, one mechanized infantry, and two infantry) and three armored cavalry regiments (*Table 5*). Additionally, the third brigades from both the 1st Infantry Division and the 2d Armored Division were based in Germany. The reserve component had twenty separate brigades in the



TABLE 5-SEPARATE BRIGADES AND ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENTS (ACRS)

| **Unit** | **Component** | **Location** |
|---|---|---|
| 2d ACR | Active Component | Nuernberg, Germany |
| 3d ACR | Active Component | Fort Bliss, Texas |
| 11th ACR | Active Component | Fulda, Germany |
| Berlin Brigade | Active Component | Berlin, Germany |
| 177th Armored Brigade | Active Component | Fort Irwin, California |
| 193d Infantry Brigade | Active Component | Fort Clayton, Panama |
| 194th Armored Brigade | Active Component | Fort Knox, Kentucky* |
| 197th Infantry Brigade (Mech) | Active Component | Fort Benning, Georgia** |
| 199th Brigade (Motorized) | Active Component | Fort Lewis, Washington*** |
| 107th ACR | ARNG | Ohio |
| 278th ACR | ARNG | Tennessee |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 27th Infantry Brigade (Light) | ARNG | New York |
| 29th Infantry Brigade | ARNG | Hawaii |
| 30th Infantry Brigade (Mech) | ARNG | North Carolina |
| 32d Infantry Brigade (Mech) | ARNG | Wisconsin |
| 33d Infantry Brigade | ARNG | Illinois |
| 39th Infantry Brigade | ARNG | Arkansas |
| 41st Infantry Brigade | ARNG | Oregon |
| 45th Infantry Brigade | ARNG | Oklahoma |
| 48th Infantry Brigade (Mech) | ARNG | Georgia |
| 53d Infantry Brigade | ARNG | Florida |
| 3d Infantry Brigade | ARNG | Ohio |
| 81st Infantry Brigade (Mech) | ARNG | Washington |
| 92d Infantry Brigade | ARNG | Puerto Rico |
| 218th Infantry (Mech) | ARNG | South Carolina |
| 256th Infantry Brigade (Mech) | ARNG | Louisiana |
| 30th Armored Brigade | ARNG | Tennessee |
| 31st Armored Brigade | ARNG | Alabama |
| 116th Armored Brigade | ARNG | Idaho |
| 155th Armored Brigade | ARNG | Mississippi |
| 163d Armored Brigade | ARNG | Montana |
| 157th Infantry Brigade (Mech) | USAR | Pennsylvania |
| 187th Infantry Brigade | USAR | Massachusetts |
| 205th Infantry Brigade (Light) | USAR | Minnesota |

*Reduced to a heavy task force on 20 September 1990.
** Inactivated as a separate brigade in FY 91. Troops and equipment assigned as 3d Bde, 24th Infantry Division (Mech).
*** Formed from the remains of the inactivated 9th Inf Div (Motorized). The 199th was activated in February 1991.



ARNG (five armor, six mechanized infantry, and nine infantry), three in the USAR (one each of mechanized infantry, infantry, and light infantry), as well as two armored cavalry regiments in the ARNG. As mentioned earlier, the 194th Armored Brigade was reconfigured to an armored heavy task force during FY 90. During FY 91 the 197th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) was inactivated and its resources were assigned to the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) to form its third brigade. At the same time, the soldiers and equipment of the former 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) became the 199th Infantry Brigade (Motorized). Also during FY 91 the 1st Infantry Division (Forward), the third brigade of the 1st Infantry Division in Germany, was inactivated. When FY 91 ended, there were four active component separate brigades: one armor, one mechanized infantry, one infantry, and one motorized infantry. There were no changes to the armored cavalry regiments.

## Special Operations Forces

Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) add to the theater commander's broad range of military options. Comprising nearly 70 percent of the Department of Defense's SOF personnel, Army SOF consists of special forces, rangers, special operations aviation, psychological operations units, and civil affairs units. On 1 December 1989, the Army activated the U. S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) as the sixteenth MACOM and made it the Army component of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). In October 1990 USASOC assumed command of all reserve component SOF, which meant that reserve component SOF training, operations, and budget would be aligned with active component SOF activities. Additionally, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC), an active component command, was to control all special forces units. The U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) (USACAPOC), a reserve component command, was to control all civil affairs and psychological operations units.

Special forces train and assist foreign military and paramilitary forces in unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and can conduct direct action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance missions. They are capable of conducting integrate d, joint, and combined operations in remote, urban, or rural environments during peace and war. As FY 90 began, there were four special forces groups in the active component, two in the ARNG, and two in the USAR. On 29 June 1990, the Army activated a group headquarters, the 3d Special Forces Group, and a battalion in the active component, bringing the total for FY 91 to five active component and four reserve component groups.



TABLE 6-RANGER REGIMENTS AND SPECIAL FORCES GROUPS (SFG)

| Unit | Component | Location |
|---|---|---|
| 75th Ranger Regiment | Active Component | Fort Benning, Georgia |
| 1st SFG (Airborne) | Active Component | Fort Lewis, Washington |
| 3d SFG (Airborne) | Active Component | Fort Bragg, North Carolina |
| 5th SFG (Airborne) | Active Component | Fort Campbell, Kentucky |
| 7th SFG (Airborne) | Active Component | Fort Bragg, North Carolina |
| 10th SFG (Airborne) | Active Component | Fort Devens, Massachusetts |
| 19th SFG (Airborne) | ARNG | Salt Lake City, Utah |
| 20th SFG (Airborne) | ARNG | Birmingham,Alabama |
| 207th Infantry Group (Scout) | ARNG | Anchorage,Alaska |
| 11th SFG (Airborne) | USAR | Fort Meade, Maryland |
| 12th SFG (Airborne) | USAR | Arlington Heights, Illinois |

Rangers are highly skilled light infantrymen employed primarily for unique missions that have a specific objective, are time sensitive, and require direct action. They may conduct these operations independently or in support of other special operations forces. The Army's only ranger unit in FY 90 and 91 was the active component's 75th Ranger Regiment, which consisted of a regimental headquarters and three ranger battalions (*Table 6*).

The highly trained crews and modified aircraft of Army special operations aviation (SOA) provide the unique capability to support SOF missions at night and during adverse weather. During FY 90 and 91 the Army had one active component SOA regiment that consisted of three active component and one reserve component battalions, two active component separate companies, and one active component forward-deployed detachment.

Civil affairs (CA) forces support the commander's relationship with civil authorities and the local populace, promote mission legitimacy, and enhance military effectiveness. CA operations assist the military effort in all operational environments and support both other SOF and general purpose forces. In FY 90 and 91 there was one active component civil affairs unit, while the USAR had the remainder of the Army's civil affairs assets: three commands, four groups, five brigades, and thirty-six civil affairs units. Psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel support friendly forces at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. PSYOP units plan campaigns consisting of selected themes and use various media to disseminate these messages. These campaigns seek to influence the attitudes, opinions, and behaviors of selected friendly, enemy, and neutral audiences. The Army maintained one PSYOP group and four battalions in the active component, as well as three groups, six battalions, and twenty-two companies in the reserve components during FY 90. In FY 91 the number of reserve component companies increased to twenty-seven.



## Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC)

Closing bases has always been one of the Army's most contentious restructuring actions. As national strategy changes pointed to a smaller Army centered in CONUS, the DOD considered realigning and closing Army bases, as well as those of the other armed services. Reshaping the Army's installations is an ongoing process. By the close of FY 91, two rounds of base realignment and closure actions (BRAC I and BRAC II) were under way with more to follow. No major Army installation had completed closure procedures by September 1991; however, many minor ones-family housing sites, storage facilities, and remote Nike sites- identified for closure under the first round, BRAC I (*see below*), had been closed. In these instances, the active component mission of the installation had been relocated to another installation, or the installation was transferred from Army control as required by law.

On 3 May 1988, the Secretary of Defense chartered an independent commission to recommend military bases within the United States and its possessions for realignment or closure. The BRAC Commission submitted a report to the Secretary of Defense on 29 December 1988 that identified more than 100 Army installations for serious consideration. The commission assumed that the DOD force structure would remain relatively stable, so it focused on realigning and closing those installations that were inefficient or outmoded, or were duplicating the mission of another post. Defense authorization amendments and the Base Realignment and Closure Act (Public Law 100-526) of 24 October 1988 required the Secretary of Defense and Congress to accept all or none of the commission's recommendations. On 18 April 1989, the House voted down a resolution of disapproval of the commission's report. No action was taken by the Senate, so the recommendations became legally binding after mid- May 1989.

The DOD must complete all realignment and closure actions specified in the commission's recommendations by 30 September 1995. Implementation of BRAC I affected 133 Army installations. Fifty-seven would undergo some realignment in their assigned units, while seventy-seven would close, fifty-three of these were housing sites located apart from an Army installation. On 29 January 1990, the Secretary of Defense announced that the Department of Defense was considering realigning twenty additional bases and closing another thirty-five. This was known as BRAC II but was not commission-directed or mandated by public law. The list included eight Army bases and portions of several commands and the USAR for realignment, and thirteen for closure. Seven of the thirteen slated for closure were Army ammunition plants, and they were to be retained in a layaway status (*Table 7*). Whereas BRAC I assumed an Army



TABLE 7-BRAC II REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE RECOMMENDATIONS

| Realignment |
|---|
| Army Materiel Command HQ, Alexandria, Virginia |
| Depot Systems Command, Letterkenny Depot, Pennsylvania |
| Elements of the Army Reserve |
| Eleven Army management engineering activities |
| Fort Gillem, Georgia |
| Fort Hood, Texas |
| Fort Knox, Kentucky |
| Fort Lewis, Washington |
| Fort Meade, Maryland |
| Fort Sam Houston, Texas |
| Fort Sheridan, Illinois |
| Parts of the Army Information Systems Command |
| Red River Army Depot, Texas |
| **Closure** |
| Army Ammunition Plant, Charleston, Indiana * |

| |
|---|
| Army Ammunition Plant, Desoto, Kansas * |
| Army Ammunition Plant, Minden, Louisiana * |
| Army Ammunition Plant, Parsons, Kansas * |
| Army Ammunition Plant, Picayune, Mississippi * |
| Army Ammunition Plant, Karnack, Texas * |
| Army Ammunition Plant, Scranton, Pennsylvania * |
| Detroit Army Tank Plant, Michigan |
| Fort McClellan, Anniston, Alabama |
| Fort Ord, Seaside, California |
| Lima Army Tank Plant, Ohio |
| Sacramento Army Depot, California |
| Troop Support Command, St. Louis, Missouri |

*These to be retained in layaway status.

active component strength of 781,000 in the mid-1990s, BRAC II considered global security changes and fiscal realities and envisioned active component strength reduced to 630,000 by 1995.

BRAC III, also not commission-directed or mandated by public law, announced by the Department of Defense on 19 September 1990 as the third base realignment and closure initiative, called for implementation of proposals to reduce or close operations at 113 Army installations and sites overseas. These proposals were the direct result of programmed overseas force structure reductions during upcoming years. The proposals identified actions on 101 sites in Europe, including disestablishment of two Army military communities in Germany, Bad Tolz and Neu Ulm, and



TABLE 8-BRAC 91 REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE RECOMMENDATIONS

| Realignment |
|---|
| Army Corps of Engineers |
| Aviation Systems Command/Troop Support Command, St. Louis, Missouri |
| Fort Chaffee, Arkansas |
| Fort Dix, New Jersey |
| Fort Polk, Louisiana |
| Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania |
| Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois |
| Ten RDT&E Laboratories |
| Seven Medical Laboratories |
| **Closure** |
| Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana |
| Fort Devens, Massachusetts |
| Fort Ord, California |
| Harry Diamond Lab Woodbridge Research Facility, Virginia |
| Sacramento Army Depot, California |

called for reduction in operations or closure at twelve sites in Korea. The majority of the sites were scheduled to begin scaling back or closing in FY 91, with the remainder to begin in FY 92 or later.

Concerned about the Secretary of Defense's January 1990 recommendations in BRAC II, Congress passed the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), known as BRAC 91, which required equal consideration for all DOD installations concerning possible realignment or closure. This legislation halted any closure actions for bases on the January list that employed more than 300 people. The act established new procedures for realigning or closing CONUS installations. It directed the formation of an independent commission to review base realignment and closure recommendations made by the Department of Defense during the following five years. The act required the commission to convene in 1991, 1993, and 1995 to evaluate base realignment and closure recommendations from all of the armed services and to forward its recommendations to the President and Congress for approval. The Army withdrew its proposals that did not comply with the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990, including many of the proposals made in BRAC II. BRAC III proposals were not affected by the legislation.

In November 1990 the Secretary of the Army established a Total Army Basing Study group and directed it to recommend realignments and closures. The group divided Army installations into seven categories and analyzed each category by using five existing measures of merit, which were

116

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defined in terms of Department of Defense criterion 104 (military value) and criterion 7 (community infrastructure). Each measure of merit was weighted to determine the military value of the installations and make recommendations on realignments and closures. The Army Staff reviewed the study group's proposals and recommended approval; the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff then approved the list, as did the Secretary of Defense. The independent commission reviewed the Secretary of Defense's recommendations and adopted most of the proposals. Six bases and seventeen laboratories were scheduled for realignment and five bases for closure (*Table 8*).

117

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118

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***Go to:***

**Previous Chapter** **Next Chapter**

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**Return to Table of Contents**

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


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*Last updated 30 October 2003*

# 9

## Organization, Management, and Budget

The dramatic changes in world politics that followed the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of communism across Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union had a direct impact upon Army organization, management, and budget policies. As the United States reassessed its national military strategy, it was readily apparent that the Army's primary mission of defending Western Europe against potential aggression by the Soviet bloc had rapidly become unnecessary. Along with these geopolitical changes, domestic pressures impinged upon the Army's plans, as the weak American economy spurred calls for a peace dividend through drastic reductions in defense spending.

### Organization

On 23 June 1991, General Gordon R. Sullivan became the thirty-third Chief of Staff of the Army and succeeded General Carl E. Vuono, who had served in the position since 1987. General Sullivan had previously served as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) and most recently as Vice Chief of Staff (VCSA). General Dennis J. Reimer succeeded General Sullivan as VCSA.

Few major organizational adjustments occurred within HQDA since implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Significant institutional changes were set in motion, however, in the Army's acquisition management structure during FY 90 and 91 as a consequence of the Defense Management Review. Discussed below are several noteworthy changes that did occur. Effective 1 December 1989, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) was established as a MACOM and as the Army component command of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). With headquarters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, USASOC was formed from assets of the 1st Special Operations Command and FORSCOM. The new MACOM is responsible for active and reserve component special forces, rangers, Psychological operations (PSYOP), and civil affairs units.



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The U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) was established on 15 November 1990 as a field operating agency of the Army Staff with headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia. Its mission is to conduct all Army user test and evaluation, except medical. The new command combines several previous organizations: the Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA) in Alexandria;TRADOC's Test and Experimentation Command (TEXCOM) at Fort Hood, Texas; and the Acquisition and Development of Threat Simulators Activity (ADATS-A) at Fort Bliss, Texas. Consequently, four of TEXCOM's eight test boards were eliminated (Aviation at Fort Rucker, Alabama; Communications and Electronics at Fort Gordon, Georgia; Armor/Engineer at Fort Knox, Kentucky; and Infantry at Fort Benning, Georgia), and their functions were transferred to test directorates at Fort Hood. Three other boards (Air Defense Artillery at Fort Bliss, Texas; Field Artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and Intelligence and Security at Fort Huachuca, Arizona) were reduced to test directorates. Only the Airborne/Special Operations board at Fort Bragg remained relatively unaffected. OPTEC has about 2,000 personnel in thirteen locations and an annual budget of approximately $200 million.

On 1 October 1990, the Chief of Staff provisionally established the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) at Fort McPherson, Georgia, as a major subordinate command of FORSCOM. The Chief, Army Reserve, became both its commander and the FORSCOM Deputy Commanding General for Reserve Affairs. The new organization gave the USARC command and control over all CONUS-based reserve units, except those that report to USASOC. The Reserve Command assumed control over Fourth Army units on 1 October 1991 (Fourth Army was inactivated on 30 September 1991), and was scheduled to become fully operational by October 1992. Based on the findings of an independent commission, USARC will either remain under FORSCOM or become a separate MACOM.

## Management: General

Given the pressures to reduce costs, the streamlining of the DOD management practices presented a major area of potential budget savings. To that end, the Army addressed the issues raised by the Defense Management Review, originally ordered by President George Bush in February 1989, to improve the defense procurement process and the management of the department. The objectives of that extensive internal evaluation were to implement fully the recommendations made by the Packard Commission in 1986, to improve the performance of defense acquisition systems, and to manage defense resources more effectively.



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In July 1989 Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney responded to the executive mandate by submitting his Defense Management Report (DMR) to President Bush. It outlined specific measures that would save approximately $39 billion during the 1991-95 period. In general, Cheney's goals were to centralize policies, procedures, standards, and systems and to decentralize their execution. Ultimately, many functions would be carried out by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in order to eliminate duplication among the individual services. Since the Army had already begun implementing the recommendations of the Packard Commission, it found itself well-positioned to comply with the report's proposals. The Army established the Army Management Review Task Force to develop initiatives to achieve the recommendations of the DMR. The task force ex a mined numerous proposals, and in October 1989 the Army submitted its report (AMR I) to Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald J. Atwood, Jr. The Army's recommendations became part of the first round of DOD spending reductions, known as DMR I, which took effect during FY 91.

The Army Management Review became the Army's formal structure for implementing the directives of the DMR. To conduct this ongoing process, the Army Management Report Coordination Office succeeded the task force during the fall of 1989. Located within the Office of the Under Secretary of the Army, its purpose was to act as a clearinghouse for DMR information to HQDA staff and to agencies outside the Army. The coordination office would task new initiatives to the Army Staff, monitor and track the execution of initiatives, ensure that the Army leadership was informed of their implementation status, and maintain records of decisions and related implementation plans. In September 1990 the Army Management Report Coordination Office was placed under the operational control of the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management) was to provide necessary guidance and oversight to achieve the mission.

Before any implementation can begin, the Deputy Secretary of Defense must approve each initiative. Upon receiving his signature, an initiative becomes a DMR Decision, or DMRD, and is assigned a number in the 900 series. The Army Audit Agency reviews each DMRD to ensure that the savings baseline is accurate, the management plan is complete, and the savings goal is reasonable. The actual implementation is left to the affected agency. As a final check, the reported savings are also validated by the Army Audit Agency.

In accordance with DMR I, the Army will implement thirty-eight initiatives that focus on the restructuring of the AMC and improvements in the logistics system. These include streamlining the AMC and its headquarters by eliminating more than 5,200 jobs, cutting transportation costs, and reducing inventories of outmoded items. The Army also initiated savings in



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the functional categories of administration; base operations and facility management; automated support and information systems; and finance, procurement, and contract management. Several initiatives relating to the consolidation of various functions-supply depots; financial operations; and research, development, test, and evaluation activities-were deferred for further analysis. The Army's execution of DMR reforms is a long term effort. Under DMR II the Army will implement forty-one initiatives that will cut across nearly all functional areas and MACOMs and will begin in FY 92. Together, the DMR I and DMR II initiatives were expected to save the Department of Defense more than $70 billion through FY 97. The Army estimated that it would save about $23 billion during this period, and would start with approximately $650 million in FY 91.

In addition to the actions taken in accordance with the DMR, the Army leadership endorsed the philosophy of Total Quality Management (TQM) as a strategy to increase quality, productivity, and efficiency throughout the Army. This program focused on total employee involvement in achieving a continuous process of improvement. The Office of the Under Secretary of the Army assumed responsibility for the implementation of TQM in 1990.

**Management: Acquisition**

In 1986 the President's Packard Commission recommended major changes in national security planning, budgeting, organization, and defense acquisition procedures. In response to the Packard Commission Report and the Goldwater-Nichols Act, in 1987 the Army established a three-tier administrative structure that consisted of the Army acquisition executive, program executive officers, and project/product managers. More changes were needed, however, and further improvement became a principal objective of the Defense Management Review. Consequently, the Army initiated additional measures to streamline acquisition management and shorten the acquisition cycle. The AMC has been particularly affected by changes in the acquisition process. As a result of the DMR, program executive officers now receive funds directly from HQDA instead of AMC. AMC's role has shifted from total responsibility for all major systems to one of support. It continued, however, to be responsible for those programs not managed by program managers. By 1995 AMC will have lost approximately 4,800 personnel.

By implementing management reforms, the Department of Defense sought to improve its purchasing practices. Secretary Cheney aimed to cut bureaucratic red tape and eliminate the days of $600 toilet seats and $200 hammers. A committee of reviewers determined that the profusion of procurement regulations had contributed greatly to contractor delays and the cost of doing business with the government. Many of them, therefore,



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were revised or rescinded, and the DOD asked Congress to reduce its reporting requirements.

The recruitment and retention of qualified personnel is essential to improving business-related management in the DOD. The DMR addressed this issue by directing the service secretaries to submit plans for the establishment of a corps of full-time, professional acquisition specialists in each service by 1 October 1989. The Army Acquisition Corps was established in January 1990, and on 1 March 1990 Brig. Gen. Malcolm R. O'Neill became its first director. The position is dual, with the incumbent also serving as Assistant Deputy for Systems Management, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition (OASA[RDA]).

Both military and civilian personnel are eligible for positions within the Army Acquisition Corps. When fully implemented, it will consist of approximately 3,000 officers and 1,300 civilians. Officers will gene rally enter at their eighth year of service and civilians at the GS/GM- 13 level from acquisition-related career fields. Under a centralized career management system, the members of the Corps will receive the necessary training and experience to become certified acquisition managers. Only Army Acquisition Corps members will be considered for critical positions with program executive offices, project and product management offices, headquarters staffs, and selected support commands. Military incumbents will have the potential to advance from company grade to flag rank, and a comparable promotion system will prevail for civilian members.

The Army's Strategic Logistics Program involves a comprehensive analysis of logistics requirements for the year 2000 and beyond. The Strategic Logistics Agency was created in July 1990 to manage this program. One of its major objectives is the integration of the Army's retail and wholesale logistics systems. As part of this process, the DMR mandated that depot-reparable items be converted to stock funding. Consequently, MACOMs will pay for new items out of their operating funds instead of receiving them at no cost. Thus, commands were encouraged to repair articles rather than replace them. This procedure is part of the Army's new "users pay for services" philosophy and was scheduled to become effective in January 1992. Ultimately, an objective supply system will use advanced automation to shorten order times and virtually eliminate paperwork.

By 30 June 1990, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force had transferred most of their contract administration services

to the Defense Contract Management Command under the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). This command worked with the approximately 30,000 contractors who supply the military services with more than 3 million different items.



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**Management: Resources**

Because of declining budgets, the Army's management of its manpower and materiel, with a goal of maintaining efficiency with fewer resources, assumed critical importance. The DMR complemented other cost-saving efforts undertaken by the Department of Defense and the Army. The initial BRAC Commission, which released its report in December 1988, and subsequent basing proposals, focused on streamlining the Army's installations to conform to changes in the force (see Chapter 8). Project QUICKSILVER, chartered by the Secretary of the Army in the fall of 1989, recommended reductions in the Army's table of organization and equipment (TOE) structure. An umbrella group of six officers from the Army Staff, known as the Army 2000 Integration/Analysis Team, monitored and coordinated the work of QUICKSILVER's various task forces. The Inspector General's Office also created a team to supervise the Army's reshaping efforts.

The VANGUARD study group, which convened in mid-May 1990, examined ways to trim the Army's table of distribution and allowances (T DA) organizations (HQDA, MACOMs, field operating agencies [FOAs], and installations) that will support the leaner Army of the 1990s. Headed by Maj. Gen. John R. Greenway, VANGUARD conducted the most comprehensive review of the Army's TDA structure since the STEADFAST study of the early 1970s. Composed of approximately 60 civilian and military members, it worked at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for seven months. VANGUARD's goal was to find ways to gain the optimal balance between improved effectiveness and lowest operating and sustainment cost. In the midst of Vanguard's work, however, the outbreak of hostilities in the Persian Gulf found the Army expanding once again.

With input from HQDA and the field, VANGUARD developed a vision for the Army of the future. Considerable effort was devoted to examining the MACOMs, with the purpose of both reducing their numbers and realigning their missions. The team's most controversial proposal was establishment of a Services Command with centralized control over all Army installations. Because of widespread MACOM opposition, General Greenway ultimately dropped this concept. VANGUARD concluded that HQDA should be reduced by 20 percent and that the number of field operating agencies should be significantly decreased. Its Zero Based Enlisted Study sought ways to remove soldiers from the TDA force. While all military slots could not be abolished or converted to civilian positions, VANGUARD identified approximately 9,000 slots for elimination. The task force's final report, published in December 1990, contained about 170 initiatives out of more than 500 that were considered. Twenty-one VANGUARD initiatives also became a part of the second round of the Army Management Review (AMR II).



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Consequently, the DMR II management initiatives contained a number of recommendations developed by VANGUARD.

In July 1990 Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood approved consolidation of the finance and accounting organizations of the individual services and defense agencies into one office. Consequently, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service was established in November 1990 with its headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. The new agency, under the authority of the DOD Comptroller, operated six major finance centers, including the Army Finance and Accounting Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service will eventually consolidate the 250 separate DOD accounting systems and was expected to save approximately $310 million through FY 95. Along with creation of a financial center, Atwood approved several other consolidation studies carried over from DMR I. They included the transfer of all supply depots to the DLA and began with those in the San Francisco Bay area. The DLA also received responsibility from the individual services for the management of more than one million consumable items. A Defense Depot Maintenance Council was also established to review management efficiencies in the maintenance depot system.

In concert with the DMR's emphasis on procurement, the Army, in November 1989, initiated LAB 21, a study that explored improved ways to manage Army laboratories to meet the research and development needs of the next century. In particular, the Army planned to create the Army Research Laboratory to conduct first-rate scientific research. By FY 97 the Army expected to consolidate or convert its forty-two laboratories into twenty-two restructured organizations.

Environmental quality represented an allied concern. The FY 91 Defense Appropriations Act established the Legacy Resource Management Program in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Environment). This program's purpose was to provide integrated stewardship of all DOD natural and cultural resources. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Housing) represented the Army on the Legacy Steering Committee, composed of members from each armed service. Through improvements in the Army Energy Program (see Chapter 10), the Army sought to better its total environmental conservation effort.

**Management: Information Systems**

Computers have provided Army managers with a plethora of new management tools. A significant challenge lay in achieving standardization and compatibility among the many hardware and software systems being used by the Army and throughout the Department of Defense. In



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addition to the management initiatives discussed above, the DMR cited the streamlining of automation as another way to pare costs. To ensure standardization and quality from the DOD's multiple management information systems, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the Corporate Information Management initiative in October 1989. One of the initiative's primary goals was creation of a single departmental automated information system in various business-related areas. A group of specialists from the DOD and private industry was created to propose an information management strategy. Responsibility for implementing the group's recommendations was assigned to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. Corporate Information Management officials approved acquisition of both the Army's Computer-Aided Acquisition and Logistic Support (CALS) program and a triservice program called the Joint Uniform Services Technical Information System (JUSTIS), the most advanced electronic publishing technology available.

With the proliferation of computers, the distinction between communications and automation has become increasingly blurred. Since 1984, the Signal Corps has been the Army's information systems manager, responsible for the five subdisciplines of the Information Mission Area: communications, automation, records management, visual information, and printing/publications. The U.S. Army Information Systems Command (USAISC) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, was the major command responsible for centrally managing these functions. The DMR recommended personnel cuts for the USAISC, and 265 civilian and 106 military positions were eliminated by October 1991.

To streamline its automatic data processing, the Army is replacing redundant systems with single ones in each major management functional area. The development, acquisition, and maintenance of these Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS) is the responsibility of the program executive officer for STAMIS at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Installation support modules (ISM) is a software modernization program designed to enhance readiness and improve installation management throughout the Army. It will replace unique automated systems and time spent on administrative activities, such as in/out processing and clothing issue. ISM will allow installation commanders to manage daily operations more effectively and cheaply and will interface with other standard Army information systems, such as tactical and strategic ones. Fielding is scheduled to begin during FY 92. The Standard Installation/Division Personnel System-3 (SIDPERS-3) is projected to provide an integrated data base management system for all Army personnel activities. SIDPERS-3 uses the ADA programming language, the successor to COBOL, and will replace the Army's current automated systems-SIDPERS-2, 2.5, and 2.75.



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Logistics automation in the Army progressed during FY 90 and 91. For example, the Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS) will automate the requisition process. The ULLS interfaces with the Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS) and the Standard Army Maintenance System (SAMS). The latter two systems run on the Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS). Two thousand of these microcomputers were sent to the Persian Gulf during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, and they performed well. By the end of FY 91, approximately 10,000 TACCS units had been fielded to both the active and reserve components. Fielding to all Army divisions of the Logistics Applications of Automated Marking and Reading Symbols (LOGMARS), which also runs on TACCS, had been completed by 1990. Fielding continued during 1991 to nondivisional units in both the active and reserve components. This barcode reading, storage, and printing system ties into the SARSS and the SAMS. Other logistics-related automation systems include the Standard Army Ammunition System (SAAS) and the Standard Property Book System (SPBS). Future improvements in logistics automation are under development as part of the Strategic Logistics Program.

Information processing for combat service support is being further improved through the acquisition of the Corps/Theater ADP Service Center-Phase II System (CTASC-II). Its air-transportable equipment allowed field commanders to make timely and accurate decisions during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The deployment to the Persian Gulf in August 1990 hastened development of the Prisoner of War Information System-2 (PWIS-2). It is part of the Military Police Management Information System (MPMIS), a group of four automation systems designed to improve the collection, storage, and retrieval of information relating to incident reporting, vehicle registration, military prisoners, and enemy prisoners of war.

The Army Standard Information Management System (ASIMS), formerly known as VIABLE, processes sustaining base information for installations throughout CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama. Since 1982 the Electronic Data Systems Corporation had operated five regional data centers for the Army in Virginia, Georgia, Kentucky, Texas, and California. During 1991 the Army terminated this contract, and the work is now performed at four Army Information Processing Centers at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois; Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania; and St. Louis, Missouri. These centers are operated and maintained by the 7th Signal Command. The shift to government-owned and -operated centers is expected to save approximately $20 million annually.

Congress has shown considerable interest in the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) that uses state-of-the-art automation,



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telecommunications, distributed data bases, and distributed processing capability to provide timely and accurate information for mobilization and administration purposes. The RCAS will link together 9,800 Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve (USAR) units at more than 4,700 locations. It will also be capable of exchanging data with related systems in both the active and reserve components. Fielding of critical elements was scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter of FY 92.

## Budget

FY 85 marked the peak of the Reagan-era increases in defense spending. Since then, defense appropriations have declined in real terms as Congress attempted to reduce the federal deficit. Throughout the years of the Reagan military buildup, however, the Army received a proportionally smaller share of funds than either the Navy or the Air Force. During the late 1980s the Army leadership responded to world events and to existing and projected budget constraints by developing plans to reshape the Army of the 1990s into a smaller and leaner force. The Chief of Staff envisioned that, by 1995, the Army would consist of four corps and twenty divisions twelve active and eight reserve component), the minimum force deemed capable of meeting the Army's share of the nation's global commitments. Careful management of this restructuring was essential to maintain the quality and readiness of the force and prevent a return to the "hollow Army" of the 1970s.

In January 1989 President Ronald Reagan presented the original FY 90 and 91 Department of Defense budget to Congress. His request for FY 90 totaled $305.6 billion and represented a 2 percent real growth increase from the

previous year. Congress, faced with the spiraling federal deficit, opposed even this modest rise. In response to the need to hold the deficit below the $110 billion ceiling for FY 90 set by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act, newly inaugurated President George Bush in February 1989 proposed a 1-year freeze in the defense budget. Negotiations between the White House and Congress resulted in a compromise that established the FY 90 defense budget about $10 billion below the Reagan administration's request. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, then a new appointee, submitted a revised budget request in April 1989 that incorporated this reduction and lowered defense spending by 1.2 percent, in real terms, below FY 89. The Army's modified request of $79 billion placed its budget 2.6 percent below that for FY 89 in real terms.

Despite efforts at bipartisan negotiation and compromise, Congress did not reach a budget agreement before the new fiscal year began on 1 October 1989. Consequently, $16.1 billion in automatic across-the-board cuts (known as sequestration) mandated by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings



TABLE 9-ARMY BUDGET SUMMARY *(In billions of dollars)*

| **Appropriation Category** | **FY 90** | **FY 91** |
|---|---|---|
| Military Personnel | 29.8 | 30.1 |
| Operations and Maintenance | 25.6 | 25.3 |
| Procurement | 14.3 | 9.0 |
| Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation | 5.4 | 5.4 |
| Military Construction | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| Family Housing | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Stock Fund/Industrial Fund | 0.0 | 0.5 |
| TOTAL | 77.7 | 73.0 |

Act went into effect on 16 October. According to the law, half of the cuts must come from the defense budget and the other half from domestic programs. Through a series of continuing resolutions, Congress kept the government running until it finally passed a budget bill. The President signed the Defense Appropriations Act on 21 November and thereby lifted the sequester. For FY 90 Congress authorized $291.4 billion for defense spending. Adjusted to 1991 dollars, this amount equaled $302.9 billion. This total did not include approximately $10 billion allotted to the Energy Department for nuclear weapons and miscellaneous defense-related programs in other agencies. The Army received $77.7 billion, the fifth consecutive annual decline (*Table 9*).

The Army's smaller budget resulted in force structure reductions and cutbacks in such areas as facilities maintenance and repair. Procurement terminations included the Army Helicopter Improvement Program (AHIP) and the Apache attack helicopter after FY 91. The Army agreed to drop the AHIP in order to save the LHX light reconnaissance helicopter, the centerpiece of the aviation modernization program. The armored systems modernization program also escaped the budget axe. A modest amount of growth was preserved for research, development, testing, and evaluation in order to preserve the nation's technology base.

Saving money was not the only impetus behind budgetary decisions; the epochal events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union significantly influenced the budget process for FY 91. While the collapse of communism occurred too late to be reflected in the Pentagon's initial budgetmaking process for the fiscal year, the budget subsequently underwent substantial revision to reflect changing conditions. The Bush administration submitted its revised FY 91 defense budget to Congress on 29 January 1990, the first in fifteen years that proposed reducing defense spending in terms of real buying power. The $295.1 billion request, while

somewhat larger than the appropriation for FY 90, fell short of the amount needed to keep up with inflation. The Army's budget request had been trimmed by $6 billion, down to $76.1 billion.

While the administration had pruned its defense budget request, some lawmakers thought it should be reduced further because of the thawing of the Cold War. Moreover, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act hung over the yearly budget debate as it had done each year since 1985. The debt ceiling mandated for FY 91 totaled $64 billion. After months of discussion, the beginning of the new fiscal year loomed once again without Congress' having passed a budget bill. During a week-long summit in late September at Andrews Air Force Base, White House and congressional leaders reached a budget compromise, but the House of Representatives rejected it the following week. With negotiations at an impasse, time ran out, and the government shut down over the Columbus Day weekend. A subsequent series of stopgap spending measures kept the government afloat until Congress finally hammered out a settlement at the end of October. On 5 November President Bush signed both the Defense Authorization and the Defense Appropriations Acts, which set the Pentagon's budget at $268.2 billion. The figure rose to $288.3 billion, if all defense-related spending in the federal budget were considered.

The 1991 defense appropriation did not cover the cost of U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf war, then estimated at $15 billion for the fiscal year. Those expenses were considered to fall outside the savings targets. Congress provided money in supplemental legislation, but the brunt of the financial burden for the war was largely borne by the allied nations. In the short term at least, the Middle East crisis saved the Army and the rest of the Defense Department from deeper cuts. The FY 91 budget provided the Army with $73 billion, a reduction of roughly 7 percent from the previous year. Some of the shortfall would be met through savings that resulted from the Defense Management Review. In addition, the Army faced significant force reductions that included the inactivation of two active component divisions-the 2d Armored Division and the 9th Infantry Division. The procurement account declined sharply, as its share of the total budget continued to fall. FY 91 also marked the first time that funds for Special Operations Forces (SOF) were removed from the services' accounts and included with defense agencies' appropriations.

The peace dividend remained elusive during FY 90 and 91. Despite the Department of Defense's efforts to save money, such unanticipated events as the Persian Gulf war and the savings and loan bailout devoured the government's projected savings. With the successful conclusion of offensive operations in the Middle East on 28 February 1991, the Army returned to adjusting to the post-Cold War world. Although democracy seemed to be spreading and the threat of a major war abating, there were



many uncertainties associated with the new geopolitics of Central and Eastern Europe. Old ethnic tensions resurfaced with the downfall of Communist regimes. Nevertheless, real declines in the Army's budget were expected to continue into the foreseeable future as military and civilian leaders wrestled with the persistently mounting federal deficit.





*Go to:*

**Previous Chapter** **Next Chapter**

**Return to Table of Contents**


**Return to CMH Online**

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# 10

## Special Functions

Special functions are those activities conducted by the Army that significantly affect the welfare of the civilian sector in both the United States and foreign nations. During FY 90 and 91 noteworthy activities included civil works by the Corps of Engineers, participation in the war against illegal drugs, increased involvement in improving and preserving the environment, Army litigation, relief for natural and war-related disasters and civil disorders, and preservation of historic structures and sites.

### Civil Works

The Civil Works Program of the Army Corps of Engineers provides for nationwide water resources development and management, including investigations and surveys, preconstruction engineering and design, construction, rehabilitation, and the operation and maintenance of flood control, navigation, and multiple purpose hydroelectric power projects having a replacement value of more than $125 billion. In addition to this direct federal investment program, the Civil Works Program includes an important regulatory mission whereby the Corps of Engineers regulates the deposit of dredged and fill material in waters and wetlands of the United States. Funding of the Civil Works Program totaled $3,196,589,000 in FY 90 and $3,314,262,000 in FY 91 (*Table 10*).

The Water Resources Development Act of 1990 (WRDA '90) was signed into law on 28 November 1990. It was the culmination of much effort during the previous year to continue the objective set forth with WRDA '86 to establish biennial authorizations for water resources projects and programs. WRDA '90 authorized twenty-seven new projects and twenty-three modifications at an estimated cost of $3.3 billion. WRDA '90 authorized the Corps of Engineers to undertake a research and development program, in conjunction with the Department of Transportation and other agencies, to develop a magnetic levitation transportation system.

During this period the Corps of Engineers was concerned with the continuing drought that had forced a reduction in the draft of vessels navigating



TABLE 10-CORPS OF ENGINEERS CIVIL APPROPRIATIONS FISCAL YEARS 90-91

| Appropriation Title | FY 90 | FY 91 |
|---|---|---|
| Total Appropriation* | $3,196,589,000 | $3,314,262,000 |
| General Investigations | 129,251 | 146,433,000 |
| Construction, General | 1,083,811,000 | 1,143,073,000 |
| Operations and Maintenance, General** | 1,398,219,000 | 1,450,656,000 |
| Regulatory Program | 68,455,000 | 71,099,000 |
| Mississippi River and Tributaries | 336,000,000 | 344,602,000 |
| General Expenses | 141,997,000 | 126,598,000 |
| Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies | 20,000,000 | 20,000,000 |
| Permanent appropriations | 14,700,000 | 11,801,000 |
| Revolving fund | 9,860,000 | - |

*Funds contributed by nonfederal sponsors of civil works projects and studies as part of local cooperation agreements amounted to $135,819,000 in FY 90 and $121,179,000 in FY 91.
**Special Recreation Use fees included in Operations and Maintenance appropriation.

major water ways such as the Mississippi Rive r, reduced power generation, and affected water supplies. As a result of these problems, the Corps initiated a Water Management During Drought Study to increase the value of existing projects to the economy through development of a consensus on the management of the nation's waters in time of drought.

## War Against Illegal Drugs

Although the Army was legally prohibited from taking a direct part in law enforcement, as an indirect participant it played a vital role in combating illegal drug activities during FY 90 and 91. The Army contributed significantly to the overall drive to stop illegal drugs from crossing U.S. borders, to destroy the trade at its sources, and to reduce the demand for illegal drugs within the United States. The Bush administration had announced a new attack on the drug traffic within the United States, along its borders, and in Latin America late in FY 89, by targeting both supply and demand. Congress, in turn, had called for the Department of Defense to serve as the lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of the movement of illegal drugs into the United States. The Army expected to receive $306.6 million of the more than $1 billion that Congress voted the Department of Defense for the intensified war against drugs for FY 91. These increased efforts had public support; a poll conducted in October 1990 suggested that 54 percent of Americans believed that drug use was the nation's most important problem.



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As a result of these developments, the role of the Army in assisting U.S. civilian law enforcement agencies and the governments of Latin America in their struggle against drug trafficking expanded. Up to this point, the United States had sent only military equipment and a few advisers to aid these nations. The new effort called for increased activity, especially against cocaine traffickers based in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. In outlining the role of the commanding generals of major U. S. commands and the Army's relationship with federal agencies waging the war against illegal drugs, the new plan emphasized that Army personnel respect the laws, regulations, and sovereignty of host nations and their anti-drug teams.

In April 1990 Secretary of the Army Michael P. W. Stone and Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono signed the Army Counter-Narcotics Plan that was designed to implement the national counternarcotics efforts called for by the Bush administration. The plan described the nature of the assistance the Army would provide to law enforcement agencies and to foreign governments that requested it. Among the Army's responsibilities were broad guidance, defining missions that supported national objectives, establishing procedures, and providing training, facilities, and intelligence support. The Army would lease or loan equipment needed to interdict drug traffic that included communications equipment, night vision devices, forward-looking radar, and aviation assets. By 20 July 1990, it had loaned almost $100 million in military equipment to law enforcement agencies.

Implementation of the anti-drug effort was the responsibility of many Army commands, agencies, and the Army National Guard (ARNG). In the summer of 1990 the DCSOPS formally created the Army Anti-Drug Task Force Division as the primary point of contact on the Army Staff for the Army's support of the war on drugs. Training for international military students at Army training activities and installations was the responsibility of the TRADOC's Security Assistance Training Field Activity. Special Operations Forces (SOF) established both formal schools and MTTs within the United States to work in host nations.

To improve the coordination of the armed services with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, a series of one-week classes began in the fall of 1990 at the National Interagency Counternarcotics Institute established by the National Guard at Camp San Luis Obispo, California. Congress voted $3.2 million to ensure the permanence of the new institution. Attendees came from all the armed services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and federal, state, and local drug law enforcement agencies. One session was attended by students from intelligence agencies and the Department of State, which provided $1.5 million to support counternarcotics training through 30

March 1990. Students benefited from lessons already learned by the participants in the many joint anti-drug operations conducted in California and along the U.S.-Mexican border. Subject areas covered by instructors included land navigation, firearms, communications, surveillance, patrolling, and aviation.

The Army initiated another course for law enforcement personnel at Fort Benning, Georgia, in May 1990. The six-week class, taught by the Ranger Training Brigade, was designed to prepare team leaders to conduct paramilitary operations as part of Operation SNOWCAP. TRADOC created SNOWCAP in response to the Drug Enforcement Administration's request for aid in reducing the flow of illegal drugs from the producing countries. The students were experienced law enforcement agency personnel from the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; and the Border Patrol (a part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service) who had demonstrated leadership ability. Graduates of the course joined MTTs in various Latin American countries, where they worked with SOF units or personnel to train, advise, and support host national police and military anti-drug forces.

FORSCOM was responsible for assisting law enforcement agencies in CONUS in the prosecution of their campaign to stem the flow of drugs across the Mexican border. An estimated 60 percent of the cocaine that entered the United States from Latin America was transported through Mexico. To intensify his command's contribution, in November 1989 the CINCFORSCOM formed Joint Task Force Six, based at Fort Bliss, Texas, to coordinate the support provided for drug law enforcement agency efforts along the Southwest border by Army active and reserve components units. The agencies with which Joint Task Force Six worked included the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, state highway patrols, and local police departments. In the summer of 1990 soldiers from the 52d Engineer Battalion stationed at Fort Carson, Colorado, and part of the task force, assisted the Border Patrol by clearing underbrush along the border in Texas. The U.S. Air Force 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing also supported the Border Patrol by sending U-2s to fly the first counternarcotics imagery missions that produced photographic coverage two miles wide on each side of the border.

LISTENING POST/OBSERVATION POST, another Joint Task Force Six operation, was conducted in FY 91 with units from the 7th Infantry Division. This exercise provided ground surveillance, radar support, remotely monitored battlefield area surveillance system support, air transportation, and aerial visual and photographic reconnaissance for Border Patrol and National Forest Service anti-drug efforts near Roswell, New Mexico, and Fort Bliss, Texas. As a result of such operations, FORSCOM's contribu-



tions to the war against illegal drugs was five times greater in FY 91 than FY 90. The Army's trained dogs took part in efforts to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States from abroad, including those going through Customs into Washington state. As part of the support offered in the Goodwill Games in Seattle in the summer of 1990, two narcotic detector dog teams, one from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the other from Fort Riley, Kansas, assisted Customs agents at the Seattle port of entry for participants. These teams discovered narcotics on several occasions; one find resulted in an important prosecution case.

With an anti-drug budget of $100 million, the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) held DOD responsibility for training and supporting local law enforcement agencies that were fighting the drug traffic in Latin America. By April 1991 SOUTHCOM had sent eleven anti-drug training teams into five Latin American countries. In June the command hosted a meeting of ambassadors to the United States from sixteen Latin American nations as part of a drive to build a regional network for drug intelligence. By that date U.S. arms and equipment valued at $60 million had been sent to assist in reducing cocaine production. Army personnel were included on tactical analysis teams that worked in U.S. embassies to counter the illegal drug traffic. The Army Corps of Engineers helped design Drug Enforcement Administration facilities in northern Mexico, Bolivia, and Peru. The Peruvian government's request to the United States for technical and educational assistance in fighting the Shining Path guerrillas, whose activities were linked to

trafficking in cocaine, was denied. Congress had placed a freeze on aid to Peru based on human rights violations. In August 1991 the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters emphasized that, unless the Shining Path guerrillas were confronted, Peru could not hope for success in dealing with drug traffickers. He also noted that U.S. help was needed if this effort were to succeed. Having heard the president of Peru, Alberto Fujimori, maintain that progress was being made in civil rights, Congress considered removing its freeze on anti-drug aid to Peru by the end of FY 91. The Bush administration prepared to send more than fifty U.S. military personnel, to include Green Berets, to train Peruvian forces.

The principal responsibility for interdicting waterborne drug traffic in the Pacific and Atlantic oceans had been given to two joint task forces supported by the Army-Joint Task Force Five in the Pacific and Joint Task Force Four in the Atlantic-before the start of FY 90. Each task force worked under the command of a U.S. Coast Guard flag officer. In the Pacific region in 1990, Hawaii and Alaska were major transfer points for illegal drugs, and Hawaii was a major producer of marijuana. In January 1990 the belief that drug trafficking in the Pacific region would rival that in the Caribbean led to giving the responsibility for countering all ground



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drug activities throughout the Pacific Command to the U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC). In conducting this program, USARPAC managed assets of the Pacific Fleet and the Pacific Air Forces as well as those of the ARNG and the Army Reserve (USAR).

USARPAC emphasized two areas, the import and manufacturing of crystal methamphetamine and the local marijuana crop. In 1990, when a multiagency task force was established to deal with the threat posed by crystal methamphetamine, USARPAC provided analytical and linguistic support. The success of the task force in bringing about the arrest and indictment of fifteen alleged traffickers in 1990 led to requests by Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) for support similar to that given to U.S. law enforcement agencies. In Hawaii, Operation WIPEOUT proved so successful in dealing with an estimated annual crop of four to five million marijuana plants that by the end of the year the state changed from being the second largest producer of marijuana in the United States to a net importer. The success of this operation led to Operation WIPEOUT-91, which began receiving Army support on 18 April 1991. The use of military dogs at U.S. Customs stations in Hawaii and Alaska increased illegal drug detection capabilities by 50 percent.

Within the United States and its territories, the ARNG played a significant role in the Army's contributions to the war against drugs during FY 90 and 91. In some states the Guard had been participating in this effort for more than thirteen years, and by 1990 every state, plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, employed the ARNG in its drive to eradicate marijuana. The part that the Guard played in the war against illegal drugs grew in the fall of 1989, when Congress included funds in the Defense Appropriations Act for counternarcotics operations outside of regular Guard training exercises. In FY 90 alone, the ARNG, often working with the Air National Guard, took part in twenty-five counter-drug operations. All of these activities were conducted while Guard units were under state control. ARNG drug seizures grew from 57,843 pounds of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and opium in 1989 to 139,760 pounds in 1991. One operation in 1990 involved units of the Florida National Guard under the direction of Customs Service and Drug Enforcement Administration officials. Guardsmen conducted inspections to detect drugs before they entered the country, and in FY 90 they detected almost five tons of cocaine with a street value of $295 million in addition to $26 million more in other forms of contraband.

The California National Guard, working with the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and approximately thirty other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, watched the U.S.-Mexico border and remote deserts, handled port of entry shipping container and vehicle inspections, and conducted aerial observation. In the summer of 1990 units from both



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the California National Guard and the 7th Infantry Division conducted the first mission that involved both Guard and active component units to destroy marijuana crops. Since the 7th Infantry Division was not legally permitted to uproot

the marijuana plants, this activity was left to the Guard. A civil suit filed against Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, Army commanders, and others involved in this operation (*Drug Policy Foundation* v. *William J. Bennett*) was dismissed on the grounds that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek relief. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which was still pending at the end of FY 91.

Another Army approach to combat the traffic in illegal drugs was reducing the demand within the United States. In Washington, D.C., the Reserve Officer's Training Corps initiated a pilot program, Operation CAPITAL, as part of an effort to make the Junior Reserve Officer's Training Corps more responsive to contemporary needs of society. The purpose of the new program, which involved school administrators and community leaders as well as Army personnel, was to prevent drug abuse and increase graduation rates in the inner city schools of the nation's capital through role modeling, peer counseling, and drug education. Its success led to plans for expansion into other school districts in CONUS. In another effort to reduce the demand for narcotics, USARPAC and U.S. Pacific Command units used the Drug Abuse Resistance Education Program to educate fifth and sixth graders about the dangers of drug abuse.

### Environmental Protection and Preservation

The need to protect and preserve the nation's natural and historical resources was widely recognized by FY 90. The Army's twenty-year program to clean up pollution on the approximately twenty-four million acres that composed the Army's more than 2,000 installations had already been in place for several years. In 1988 the Army's intensified efforts to protect and preserve the environment had led to establishment of an Environmental Law Division in the Judge Advocate General's Corps. During the first five years of the program, the scope of contamination received the greatest emphasis. While this work was still in progress, the Army launched a drive, not only to clean up pollution, but also to prevent further damage to the environment.

The drive to increase the Army's contribution to preserving the environment moved into high gear after passage of the FY 90 Defense Authorization Act, which called for the Department of Defense to prepare a comprehensive report on long range environmental goals and challenges and to submit it no later than 29 November 1991. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, in turn, required each of the services to formulate



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an environmental strategic plan for the next ten years. This plan would include the cost of solid waste and effluent disposal through the date of the report, projected funding, a schedule of actions for the Defense Environmental Restoration Account, and an assessment of anticipated federal, state, and local laws and regulations and their effects on DOD operations. Other topics included in the plan were the environmental costs of major missions, training, facilities acquisition and base closures, demilitarization, and systems acquisition and development.

On 17 July 1990, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff issued a memorandum in response to increasing concerns about the environment. The memorandum emphasized the importance of an Army environmental management policy that would require all Army installations to meet or exceed environmental standards. As a result, TRADOC developed an Integrated Training Area Management Program, which called for both education programs that emphasized environmental awareness and efforts to avoid or repair damage to the environment. Among the benefits expected from this program were training areas that continued to resemble terrain that might be encountered during actual combat. It also gave the Army a good image and reduced vulnerability to lawsuits that could result from failure to comply with environmental laws. The program was first implemented in February 1990 at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Knox, Kentucky; Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; and Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

FY 91 marked the beginning of the second phase of the Army's twenty- year program to clean up pollution on Army bases. This phase involved letting contracts for the design of solutions to pollution problems and for management of the cleanup. Army officials estimated that the total cost of the second phase would reach $2.5 billion. In the course of efforts to improve its record in dealing with environmental problems, the Army tripled the funds designated for compliance in 1991 and set aside for this purpose more than $350 million of the $1.2 billion it had allocated for all of its

environmental programs. When the Department of Defense increased Defense Environmental Restoration Program funding for FY 91 by 31 percent, it allotted another $209 million for Army projects.

The Army collaborated with other federal agencies on environmental problems. A program to exchange personnel with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to increase mutual understanding continued; an EPA employee was assigned to USAREUR for two years. The Army joined the EPA and the Justice Department in developing procedures to guide investigations of compliance with environmental laws at Army posts. One successfully tested approach involved notifying a post commander in confidence twenty-four hours in advance of an inspection. Following satisfactory completion of the investigation, the Office of The



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Judge Advocate General began to formalize this approach in a memorandum of understanding to guide future investigations. The Army also worked with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to develop a new pollution prevention directive and took part in the triservice/multiagency Pollution Prevention Model Community Pilot Study in the Tidewater area of Virginia. Army officials anticipated that lessons learned in this study would form the basis for future practices and technologies to improve recycling and solid waste minimization programs.

By the spring of 1991 the Army had made considerable progress in preparing its ten-year environmental strategic plan required by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Quantitative data were being obtained from the Pollution Prevention Control and Abatement Report, which the Army Environmental Office submitted twice a year through the EPA to the Office of Management and Budget. Work groups were preparing cost estimates of major areas not covered in that report. In FY 91 approximately $350 million more than had been allotted to environmental compliance in FY 90 was earmarked for this purpose. The Army estimated that it would spend $2.5 billion in the next five years in efforts to clean up the environment. In addition, an Environmental Compliance Achievement Program had been created to assist commanders and their staffs in complying with federal and state environmental laws with a goal to correct deficiencies in the most cost-effective manner with minimal impact on military missions. Each command was required to appoint an environmental quality control committee to notify major commands of their needs in order to comply with federal and state laws.

In spite of these efforts, 173 Notices of Violation citing Army installations for 418 separate violations of one or more federal, state, or local environmental laws or regulations were received in FY 90. The violations involved hazardous waste, waste water, underground storage tanks, polluted air, or polluted drinking water. Improper administrative and operational practices that often resulted from inadequate environmental staffing at installations caused most of the Army's violations of environmental law s. Since environmental law was growing in both size and complexity, and pressure from organized citizens' groups concerned with the environment was increasing, the FORSCOM staff judge advocate initiated a program to provide legal advice in the environmental audits conducted by that command.

Predictably, actual and alleged violations resulted in litigation. The Army became the defendant in its first toxic tort case when, after lengthy preliminary legal maneuvering that began in 1989, *Werlein* v. *United States* finally came to trial on 22 April 1991. This case involved claims for injunctive relief and damages for the adverse effects on health attributed to groundwater contamination caused by a common degreaser, trichlorethylene, used at most Army installations. Because similar cases



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were anticipated in the future, this one was particularly important for the precedents it would set. Eighty-nine plaintiffs were involved, but the court chose fifteen of them as "test plaintiffs," which left open the possibility of subsequent trials for the others. Many witnesses appeared-at least forty expert witnesses as well as eleven attorneys, of whom seven were trial attorneys for the United States. After seven months of trial, settlement was reached.

A complex series of cases also developed as a result of environmental contamination at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado; several of them continued throughout FY 90 and 91. Settlement of *U.S.* v. *Shell Oil*, a cost recovery and

contribution action against the former facility lessee, resulted in a cost-sharing agreement between the Army and Shell. Other cases involved the extent to which the state of Colorado could undertake independent enforcement actions, pursuant to its hazardous waste laws at the Arsenal, independent of the ongoing cleanup under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Because of the contamination, the Army became a defendant in several personal injury or property cases.

An attempt in 1990 to require the Army to submit an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before inactivating the 2d Armored Division resulted in more litigation. In *Keep Hood Alive and Kicking* v. *Department of the Army*, the Western District Court of Texas concluded on 14 August that the Army was not required to file a complete EIS. The court upheld the Army's right to determine the fate of Army units by ruling that the Army had both the expertise and the official mission to perform that function. The plaintiffs decided not to appeal the decision.

United States obligations that resulted from a treaty with the Soviet Union and a congressional mandate to destroy 80 percent of its chemical weapons by the year 2002 produced further litigation. Incineration in place, where possible, was approved as a disposal method because of the danger of leakage from movement of the munitions. As a precaution, the Army decided to conduct extensive testing of chemical weapons incineration at Johnston Atoll before permitting it at other locations. Greenpeace and four other plaintiffs opposed an attempt to move the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile in Germany to Johnston Atoll for destruction. They filed a complaint and claimed that the Army had not complied with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The Army submitted EISs that covered both the move of the stockpile and the activities associated with burning it. On 9 August 1990, the District Court of Hawaii denied the plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order. On 7 September the District Court judge denied requests by the plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction and an injunction pending review by the appeals court. The appeals court denied the request for an injunction.



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Early in FY 91 the Army became involved in two more environmental cases. Both the Sierra Club and the state of Hawaii reacted adversely to the Army Strategic Defense Command's plan to support SDI by testing nonnuclear missiles and platforms, or Strategic Target Systems (STARS), at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Kauai, Hawaii. The Sierra Club sued to require a complete EIS before firing took place, while Hawaii asked for relief under the State Endangered Species Act and various state land use requirements. Neither plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to stop STARS activities. The cases were consolidated in March 1991, and on 9 May the District Court of Hawaii granted the Army summary judgment on all issues except those involving hydrogen chloride emissions and Hawaii's law concerning freon. In August Hawaii's Senator Daniel Inouye wrote to the director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization to urge that the Strategic Defense Command stop all STARS activities until an EIS had been prepared.

In addition to preserving the environment, the Army considered both the preservation of historical buildings and sites and the impact that training exercises might have on endangered species. The anticipated closing of bases raised concerns about preserving historical structures. Congress established the Legacy Resource Management Program in the FY 91 Defense Appropriations Act which provided funding for the DOD to undertake historical and natural resources projects. The primary goal was creating plans to identify and manage biological, geophysical, cultural, and historical resources existing either on, or in connection with, DOD lands. Appointed to manage the new program, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Environment) named representatives from each armed service to form a Legacy Steering Committee. The Army's representative was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Housing). The Corps of Engineers laboratories became responsible for most of the program planning and the Army Engineering and Housing Support Center for planning to preserve cultural resources. The Army's role in the Legacy Resource Management Program complemented its ongoing efforts to abide by the Endangered Species Act and the National Historic Preservation Act.

### Army Litigation

Environmental suits formed but one of many types of litigation that involved the Army during FY 90 and 91. Others included those that arose from Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the acceptance of

homosexuals as military personnel, and questions concerning the liability of medical officers to malpractice suits. In order to deal more effectively with the complex litigation it faced in FY 90 and 91, the



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Army created the Judge Advocate General's Army Litigation Center in Arlington, Virginia. This organization resulted from consolidation of the Contract Appeals, Procurement Fraud, Litigation, and Environmental Law Divisions and the Regulatory Law Office of The Judge Advocate General's Office, previously located at four different sites.

Following Operation JUST CAUSE, which occurred in Panama during December 1989 and January 1990, some 1,700 claims were filed that asked for more than $255 million in damages allegedly caused by looting in the wake of the American intervention. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed a class action that attempted to force establishment of a claims tribunal to pay compensation in these instances. Ruling that the judiciary could not question executive branch decisions relating to the overseas deployment of military forces, the court also dismissed 17 lawsuits, filed by more than 120 plaintiffs, that asked in excess of $80 million in property damage and personal injuries. An appeal of the dismissal of JUST CAUSE actions in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was still pending at the end of FY 91.

Litigation related to Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM began long before DESERT STORM was launched. One of the most significant cases was *Dellums* v. *Bush*, a suit filed by fifty-three members of Congress. The plaintiffs sought an injunction to stop the President from launching an attack against Iraq without a declaration of war or a similar authorization from Congress. They maintained that the certainty of war was not clear; thus, the President could not act without congressional approval. The District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the suit on 13 December 1990.

One of the earliest cases filed by individuals who sought to avoid being sent to the Persian Gulf was *Wiggins* v. *Secretary of the Army*, heard by the District Court for the Western District of Texas. On 30 November 1990, the court refused to interfere with the deployment of Wiggins, an Army physician and U.S. Military Academy graduate, who had received his professional education at Army expense, but who decided to claim conscientious objector status. Army policy did not permit acceptance of an application for conscientious objector status until the individual had deployed to Saudi Arabia. The plaintiff's conduct after his deployment to Saudi Arabia on 17 December 1990 led to general court-martial charges for willful disobedience, dereliction of duty, and conduct unbecoming an officer. He was dismissed from the Army. In a similar case, *Pruner* v. *Department of the Army*, the District Court for Kansas refused to interfere in the deployment of a 1st Infantry Division soldier to Saudi Arabia. The plaintiff then went absent without leave and later returned to military control. As a result, he was charged with being absent without leave, missing movement, and desertion.



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The volume of litigation concerning Army personnel liable for mobilization for the Persian Gulf war was low in view of the large number of reservists called to active duty. Of 126,930 members of the Selected Reserve, 20,921 members of the IRR, 5,541 reservists on temporary tours of active duty, and 1,293 recalled retirees, only 19 reservists challenged their activation. Seven more suits were brought by active component personnel. In *Ange* v. *Bush*, a reservist disputed the President's authority to send units of the Selected Reserve to the Persian Gulf. The District Court for the District of Columbia heard this case and rejected it on 13 December 1990. A member of a South Dakota National Guard unit that was mobilizing at Fort Carson, Colorado, attempted to avoid deployment to Saudi Arabia on the grounds that he suffered from a post-traumatic stress disorder caused by military service in Vietnam. The District Court of Colorado summarily dismissed his claim.

A challenge to the Army's use of drugs to protect soldiers sent to the Persian Gulf against chemical and biological warfare also failed. It was dismissed by the District of Columbia Circuit Court, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected a subsequent appeal. An anonymous soldier and his wife filed the case; they maintained that soldiers could not be forced to use the drugs without their informed consent. The District of Columbia Circuit Court

ruled that the use of drugs in this situation reflected a strategic military decision with which it would not interfere, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the rule waiving informed consent requirements in combat situations did not violate the Food and Drug Act.

The Army litigated several cases during FY 90 and 91 regarding the right of homosexuals to serve as military personnel. In *Watkins* v. *United States Army*, the U.S. Supreme Court refused on 9 November 1990 to review a ruling made by a lower court. The lower court had ruled that, since the Army recognized that S. Sgt. Perry Watkins, a career noncommissioned officer (NCO), was a homosexual, yet had not discharged him, it could not deny him reenlistment on that ground. As a result, the Army and Watkins reached an agreement that gave him a retroactive promotion, back pay and allowances, credit for continuous service until 31 January 1991, and retirement rather than return to active duty.

Unlike *Watkins* v. *United States Army*, *Ben Shalom* v. *John O. Marsh, Jr., et al.*, challenged the Army's basic policy that excluded homosexuals from military service. An appellate court had reversed a lower court decision against the Army's customary refusal to admit homosexuals, and on 4 December 1989 the plaintiff appealed for U.S. Supreme Court review. On 26 February 1990, the Supreme Court refused to hear the case. The refusal upheld the appellate court's decision to let the Army's exclusion policy stand and ended fourteen years of ongoing litigation. Nevertheless,



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as FY 91 came to an end, another case that challenged this practice was pending, after a federal appeals court in California ruled that the Army must demonstrate that legitimate government interests were at risk before it could discharge a homosexual.

Another type of litigation that occurred in FY 90 and affected the Army pertained to the authority of governors of states and territories over the service of the Army National Guard (ARNG). In *Perpich* v. *Department of Defense*, the governor of Minnesota maintained that the Montgomery Amendment to the FY 87 Defense Authorization Act infringed on the states' authority to train the state militias under the militia clauses of the Constitution. The Montgomery Amendment prohibited the governors of states and territories from refusing to consent to active duty by the National Guard of the United States on the basis of location, purpose, type, or schedule of the activity. On 11 June 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that the amendment was a valid exercise of Congress' constitutional authority to raise an army.

The issue of the degree to which the Army could be held responsible for physical injuries incurred by military personnel incident to service continued during FY 90 and 91. The Feres Doctrine, based on a ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court, held that neither the armed services nor the responsible individual could be sued for physical injuries to military personnel in the United States. Several bills that pertained to injuries that resulted from medical malpractice were being considered in Congress. On 20 March 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Federal Employee Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 protected Army medical officers from being sued for malpractice for services provided to Army personnel overseas. In this decision, the Supreme Court reversed an appellate court ruling in *United States* v. *Smith* (initially *Smith* v. *Marshall*). This decision left only administrative remedies available to military personnel who felt they had grounds to sue an Army medical officer, whether the incident occurred in the United States or overseas.

### Army Energy Program

Long involved in efforts to conserve energy, the Army decreased energy consumption to 2.6 percent below its goal in FY 90. In an outstanding case, Fort Gordon, Georgia, saved $1.6 million that year by attaining a level 13.4 percent below its assigned goal. In the Department of Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts for FY 91, however, Congress criticized the Army's lack of energy retrofit projects and voted $10 million to stimulate improvements in the Department of Defense energy conservation programs. Guidelines to encourage suggestions for new energy-saving projects were sent to major Army commands (MACOMs), installa-



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tions, and Corps of Engineers divisions and districts. In the past, the Army Energy Program had produced significant savings in energy and money. The Army set energy reduction goals for each installation.

**Disaster Relief**

In FY 90 and 91 the Army continued its long tradition of aiding the victims of both natural and manmade disasters. During FY 90 the Corps of Engineers played a major role in the cleanup of the 1989 Exxon *Valdez* oil spill through the use of remote sensing to locate and track the oil's movement. Using two hopper dredges, the Corps collected nearly 7,000 barrels of oil in Prince William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska. The Corps also explored ways to improve its response to future oil spills. A survey of the oil industry's ability to respond to spills, which the Corps initiated, included an inventory of the industry's hopper dredges as well as an engineering study of ways to modify the Corps' hopper dredges to improve recovery operations.

October 1989 brought a powerful earthquake to the San Francisco area of California. Completion of a revised CINCFORSCOM Catastrophic Earthquake Plan was awaiting publication of a final version of a disaster response plan by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) when the fourth largest earthquake in recorded California history struck the Loma Prieta area on 17 October. The quake, which registered 7.1 on the Richter scale, rendered the Corps of Engineers' San Francisco District and South-Pacific Division offices temporarily inoperable, so the Sacramento District immediately assumed control of the Corps' initial response to the disaster. Later that evening the Corps of Engineers set up operations at the Presidio Army Base. A JCS mobilization exercise, PROUD SCOUT, was being conducted at the Presidio, and participating personnel were released to assist the victims. The Sixth Army promptly activated its Emergency Operations Center. Army firefighters from the Presidio were the first to arrive at the fires that soon erupted in the Marina district a mile away. Military police and other soldiers from the garrison cleared cars and spectators from the area and helped move the heavy hoses that carried water pumped from the bay.

Helicopters brought earthquake victims to Letterman Army Medical Center, the only hospital in the area with a helipad. The earthquake did not damage Letterman's water and sewage systems and caused only slight damage to the telephone system. The hospital lost electrical power, however, and for forty-eight hours relied on an electric generator. Because the telephone system was severely overloaded, no attempt was made to recall off-duty hospital personnel. Nevertheless, except for those who normally used the heavily damaged Oakland-San Francisco Bay Bridge, all hospital



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personnel came in voluntarily. By 1830 hours on the day of the earthquake, Letterman was ready to treat as many as 200 casualties. The hospital also cooperated with other facilities in the area-the Naval Hospital in Oakland, the David Grant Medical Center at Travis Air Force Base, and other hospitals in the San Francisco Bay area. Letterman eventually treated forty-nine civilians and admitted nine of them. It also provided meals and shelter to refugees until they could be relocated to city-operated facilities the next day. On 23 October the Letterman Medical Center returned to normal operations. For some time after the earthquake the Letterman Preventive Medicine Service assisted with health and sanitation matters in displaced persons shelters at the Presidio of San Francisco and increased its monitoring of local water supplies.

From nearby Fort Ord, the 237th Medical Detachment (AA) flew sixty units of blood and plasma for casualties being treated at the Naval Hospital in Oakland in support of its Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) mission. The 237th also evacuated earthquake victims from small hospitals to larger facilities during the hours of darkness on 17 October 1989. To help meet the emergency, the California National Guard mobilized an engineer battalion, an air ambulance company, an evacuation hospital, a combat support hospital, and headquarters elements from a medical brigade and a military police brigade, a total of 1,178 troops. Guard units assisted in setting up emergency housing and in clearing roads.

The day after the quake, Presidio firefighters returned to search damaged buildings for survivors, and military police from the Presidio began patrolling the Marina district on a 24-hour basis. On the weekend, 21-22 October, three hundred volunteers from the various districts and divisions of the Corps of Engineers throughout the United States had arrived in

response to a request by FEMA for assistance in assessing damage to private buildings. Army engineers also conducted damage assessments of public structures, conducted dredging operations, and promoted ferry service in the Bay area. The Corps supported the relief efforts of the General Services Administration, the Small Business Administration, and the Department of Education. Inspectors checked federal dams and principal levees in the area for damage. At one point, the Corps had more than 1,200 personnel in the area.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1990, the Army assisted the victims of natural disasters. Although much aid was rendered by the National Guard of the affected states, Corps of Engineers personnel were called upon when unusually heavy rainstorms struck Alabama in March. The Director of Military Support in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS) solicited assistance from the CINCFORSCOM who, in turn, required the Second U.S. Army to provide a disaster control officer. Aviation, public affairs, and engineer personnel



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from Fort McPherson and Fort Stewart, Georgia, and Fort Rucker, Alabama, supported relief efforts throughout the month.

In May similar storms hit Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, states in which the Corps of Engineers had thirty flood control reservoirs. Nevertheless, some of these areas experienced the worst flooding since 1927. The high water records at five Corps of Engineers reservoirs in the Trinity and Brazos River Basin in Texas were broken, and at one point all five exceeded their flood control capacity. Joining others working around the clock, engineer personnel attempted to reduce the danger by regulating the release of water from reservoirs. When the Cumberland Dikes system that protected an oil field in Oklahoma was severely damaged, corps personnel shored up the dike and closed the breach. The Engineer district at Little Rock, Arkansas, distributed 325,000 sandbags to hold back flood waters in that area, and the ARNG joined Marine Corps units in building sandbag levees. Helicopters from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, flew reconnaissance runs over flooded areas, and planes from Fort Hood carried congressmen on inspection trips of devastated areas in Texas.

Fire also caused disaster in 1990 when a rash of dangerous blazes broke out in the western United States after a long, dry period. Earlier in the year a meeting was held at the Boise, Idaho, Interagency Fire Center to discuss the issues involved in committing military resources to fight such conflagrations. To expedite joint planning, on 7 June the Director of Military Support alerted the CINCFORSCOM regarding the participation of Army personnel in fighting forest fires. A comprehensive plan that outlined the roles of various Army organizations was released on the fifteenth. After FORSCOM issued a warning order on 27 June, Air Force Modular Airborne Firefighting Systems were deployed to drought-stricken southern California to fight wildfires. In August two battalions from Fort Carson, Colorado, and another from Fort Lewis, Washington, approximately 1,775 active component personnel, joined by several ARNG units, worked with federal firefighters struggling to subdue forest fires in eastern Oregon and northern California.

The Army also assisted the victims of man-made and natural disasters in other nations during FY 90 and 91. Immediately after the 1st Infantry Division entered Safwan near the Ku wait-Iraq border during the Persian Gulf war in late February 1991, several U.S. Army medical personnel opened a clinic that treated as many as 150 to 200 Iraqi refugees a day. Two months later, soldiers based in Panama aided victims of an earthquake that killed 79 Panamanians and left 6,000 homeless. Coordinating their efforts with the Panamanian government, 130 soldiers of the 536th Task Force evacuated victims, brought them water and blankets, and set up temporary shelters. Eighty soldiers of the 59th Engineer Company repaired the major road between two of the largest communities in the affected province. A



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cyclone destroyed villages, roads, bridges, and communications in Bangladesh in May 1991. Five UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, a team of Army engineers en route to the United States from the Persian Gulf war, and Army SOF troops from Okinawa were among those who provided assistance. Active participation by U.S. Army personnel in Bangladesh represented a policy change. Heretofore, assistance in such circumstances was limited to food, credits, funds, and advisers.

## Other Forms of Support to U.S. Agencies and Foreign Governments

On a number of occasions in FY 90 and 91, the Army was called upon to assist foreign nations in recovering from damage produced by war or to help third world nations modernize their infrastructure. For example, the U.S. Army assisted the new civilian government of Panama to function independently after Manuel Noriega's removal from power at the end of 1989. The U.S. Military Support Group-Panama was established to serve as liaison between U.S. military forces and the new government. The support included medical readiness training exercises that brought medical, dental, and veterinary assistance to the people of the Panamanian countryside. USARSO's command surgeon and the 142d Medical Battalion worked with the Panamanian Ministry of Health to provide medical treatment and vaccinations. By the end of 1990, Panamanians were ready to manage their own medical needs.

The U.S. Army assisted the new Panamanian government in other ways. The USARSO Staff Judge Advocate's Chief of International Law and Affairs was responsible for helping Panamanian legal authorities to develop a judicial system. He was assisted by his Judicial Liaison Group, composed of active and reserve component lawyers with skills in law enforcement and the management of prisons. During Operation JUST CAUSE, the U.S. Army had operated a twenty-hour law enforcement training course for the Panamanian police. The new Panamanian government forbade military participation in law enforcement training, so the U.S. Justice Department assumed control of the program. Nevertheless, Panamanian National Police continued to accompany U.S. military police on security patrols until November 1990. SOUTHCOM and USARSO engineers were already familiar with many local infrastructure problems. The Corps of Engineers assisted Panama after JUST CAUSE by using training exercises to construct and repair public facilities. During one of these exercises, USARSO's 536th Combat Engineer Battalion joined ARNG units in building and repairing schools, medical and dental clinics, bridges, and roads.

The swift conclusion of offensive operations in DESERT STORM was followed by a remarkably rapid transition to operations that supported the



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restoration of Kuwait. This classic application of civil-military operations was an effort in which the active component, the reserve components, and Army civilians were fully integrated. On 1 December 1990, responsibility for planning civil affairs assistance to Kuwait was given to fifty-seven Army Reservists from the 352d Civil Affairs Command and the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade. Created from this group, the Kuwait Task Force coordinated directly with Kuwaiti officials. In February 1991, this task force became part of the larger Combined Civil Affairs Task Force which, in turn, became part of Task Force Freedom when it was formed on 13 February. Task Force Freedom was responsible for emergency repairs to damage in Kuwait caused by the Iraqis and the collateral effects of the Persian Gulf war. The Combined Civil Affairs Task Force arrived in Kuwait on 1 March to provide assistance with infrastructure, public security and safety, public services, and commerce. It continued as part of Task Force Freedom until its disestablishment on 30 April 1991. Task Force Freedom turned the remaining reconstruction work over to the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office, which kept twenty task force members in Kuwait until 1 June, when all but four of this group returned to the United States.

The work of the Corps of Engineers complemented that of civil affairs units in Kuwait. The Corps of Engineers participated extensively in damage assessment and supervision of repair contracts. It received $46.35 million for emergency recovery assistance from the government of Kuwait as early as 14 January 1991. Corps military and civilian personnel then established the Ku wait Emergency Recovery Office. The Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Division, headquartered at Winchester, Virginia, which had worked in Saudi Arabia for many years, managed the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office. All but 14 of its 130 personnel were civilians. Many of them were engineers, although some were specialists in contracts, computers, litigation, and personnel.

With the cooperation of Kuwaiti engineers, the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office oversaw the work of hired civilian contractors. These efforts concentrated upon restoring the capacity for generating and distributing electric power, treating and distributing water, and collecting and treating waste water. Engineer personnel also helped to restore international airport service, roads, and public buildings. As of 7 July 1991, 694 damage surveys with estimates of

repair costs of $828.2 million had been completed. By May, 1991 electric power had been reestablished, airports had been reopened, and the principal roads were again passable. Plans called for repair work to continue throughout 1991.

The multination PROVIDE COMFORT Task Force, headquartered at Incirlik, Turkey, was formed on 6 April 1991 to provide humanitarian assistance to some 500,000 Kurdish refugees living in tent cities scattered



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over northern Iraq or in villages near the Turkish border. Four of the task force's five subordinate commands were led by U.S. Army officers and contained U.S. units. One of these U.S.-led subordinate commands was the Combined Support Command, responsible for guiding supplies provided by the United Nations and nongovernment organizations to the refugees and for the overall support of the coalition troops. The second U.S.-led subordinate command, Joint Task Force Alpha, dealt with humanitarian aid and included the 10th Special Forces Group. The third, Joint Task Force Bravo, which included the 18th Engineer Brigade, created a security zone to separate the Kurdish villages from the Iraqis and helped resettle the refugees in a large area of northern Iraq after the Iraqi Army had been ousted. The fourth command led by a U.S. Army officer was an Army civil affairs brigade that included two civil affairs companies from Task Force Freedom that were reassigned to Turkey. They operated three refugee villages at Zahku and helped establish a fourth camp at al Amadiya. They assisted with civil administration and sanitation, and also supplied water, electricity, food, and other items urgently needed by the displaced Kurds.

The Corps of Engineers began a partnership with the EPA to improve the environment in Eastern Europe under the authority of the Support for Eastern European Democracies Act passed by Congress in November 1989. One of the first projects carried out under the new law involved helping the EPA to improve the quality of the water in Krakow, Poland. The engineers purchased equipment in the United States to treat both water for human consumption and waste water and then managed the shipment and installation of this equipment in Poland.

Army security assistance is an important instrument that assists allied and friendly countries to strengthen their ground forces and to develop politically democratic societies. During FY 90 and 91 Army security assistance included sales of major Army systems to several Middle East countries in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and substantial transfers to other foreign military sales claimants of equipment which had become excess because of conventional force reductions in Europe and the general Army drawdown. Under Section 506 (drawdown) of the Foreign Assistance Act, $48 million of materiel, training, and services were provided to selected Latin American countries to eradicate drug production and trafficking and to the Philippines to support counterinsurgency and nation building.

Army security assistance sales for FY 90 totaled $6.5 billion and increased sharply to $11 billion in FY 91. The total value of FY 91 sales was higher than the Army-only procurement program. Sales and transfers of Army major systems during FY 90 and 91 included the procurement of Abrams M1A2 tanks by Saudi Arabia, a coproduction agreement for man-



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ufacturing Abrams M1 tanks in Egypt, the purchase of M198 howitzers by Pakistan, and coproduction of the Stinger missile in Switzerland. In FY 90 the Army trained 6,747 foreign students in Army schools and facilities in CONUS and deployed 142 Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) abroad for on-the- job training of foreign personnel.

Enrollment of foreign students at Army schools and deployment of MTTs abroad increased to 7,013 and 152 respectively in FY 91.

Special functions during FY 90 and 91 presented the Army with challenges both familiar and new. Those encountered by the Corps of Engineers changed little, except that restricted funding required the Corps to reemphasize efficient management. The needs produced by war and disaster and by the disorders that they spawned varied with each case, but the Army had extensive experience in these matters and remained prepared to meet them. Major new challenges resulted

from the increasing threat posed by the traffic in illegal drugs, growing environmental concerns, and military operations conducted in Panama and the Persian Gulf. The effort to increase the Army's contribution to the war against the trade in illegal drugs, in view of legal restraints on its participation both at home and abroad, posed a difficult challenge that the Army met rather well. The intensified emphasis upon cleaning up the environment and eliminating serious future threats required creating new programs and raising the consciousness of the people who work for the Army.

153

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154

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***Go to:***

**Previous Chapter** **Next Chapter**

---

**Return to Table of Contents**

---


**Return to CMH Online**

*Last updated 30 October 2003*

# 11

## Conclusion

The fast pace of political and economic change, which unfolded in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, produced remarkable developments during FY 90 and 91. These developments significantly affected the international security environment. Formal renunciation of the communist party by members of the Warsaw Pact during 1989 and 1990 resulted in both changes in government and major arms reductions agreements. The second Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit-attended by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Pact, and all other European nations, except Albania-was held in Paris during 19-21 November 1990. CSCE leaders signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which proclaimed a new era of democracy and peace on the continent. Leaders of NATO and Warsaw Pact nations also signed the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). Although it did not specify troop levels, the CFE Treaty established limits on nonnuclear weapons-tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, and combat aircraft-and also provided for mutual verification inspections.

The Warsaw Pact, conceived by its creators as an alliance against NATO, was signed in Warsaw, Poland, in 1955 by the Soviet Union and its East European satellites: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Rejection of the communist party during 1989 and 1990 by East European member nations culminated in dissolution of the Warsaw Pact on 1 July 1991. One month later, President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in Moscow. START covered long-range nuclear arms that included air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and the bombs and short-range attack missiles carried by heavy bombers. The treaty limited each country to 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 strategic delivery systems. In November 1990 President Bush had heralded the CFE Treaty as the end of the Cold War; Gorbachev characterized START as the end of the arms race.

Favorable change in the Soviet Union was threatened in August 1991 when a group of hard-line communist party leaders briefly seized power



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while Gorbachev was vacationing in the Crimea. The coup attempt was promptly put down, and the Supreme Soviet suspended activities of the Communist Party. Boris Yeltsin, elected president of the Russian Republic by popular vote in June 1991, played a major role in quelling the attempted coup. On 8 December Yeltsin and the leaders of Ukraine and Belorussia formed a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to replace the Soviet Union. On 25 December 1991, eleven of the twelve former Soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had become independent republics in September) officially joined the CIS. The Soviet Union disbanded, and Gorbachev resigned. Members of the CIS pledged to abide by all international agreements signed by the former Soviet Union, to pursue nuclear disarmament, to establish free market economies, and to respect human rights.

The collapse of the Soviet empire formed a watershed in international security considerations and American military strategy. Since the end of World War II, the primary concern of the U.S. defense establishment was a potential major war against the Soviet Union in Europe. The United States had followed a policy of containment against Soviet expansionism with a network of mutual security alliances, pre-positioned forces and combat materiel in Europe, and a strategic nuclear arsenal. In his address to the Aspen Institute Symposium in Colorado on 2 August 1990 President George Bush enunciated the importance of the alteration in the Soviet threat. The change both allowed a reduction of the U.S. armed services and called for substantive revisions in national military strategy. President Bush also declared that the world remained a dangerous place, a condition so vividly illustrated by Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait that very day.

The military strategy of the United States in the post-Cold War era still relied upon mutual security agreements and

strategic deterrence, both nuclear and conventional. A forward presence of Army forces overseas would continue, although at markedly reduced levels. U.S. defense planners foresaw a cut of U.S. forces in Europe to 150,000 by 1995. Army forces stationed in Europe would consist of one armored corps with two divisions, and one division would remain in South Korea. Other elements of the U.S. forward presence included pre-positioned equipment afloat and ashore, joint and combined training exercises, security assistance programs, counternarcotics efforts, and disaster relief. Crisis response, or the rapid projection of armed power from CONUS, represented another major element of national military strategy. This required designing a contingency force from heavy, light, and SOF units supported by adequate strategic lift. Finally, the Army must be able to reconstitute, or expand beyond its existing force structure if faced by a major armed conflict.

The rising federal budget deficit caused Congress to slice President Ronald Reagan's original FY 90 Department of Defense budget request of $305.6 billion to $291.4. This action resulted in an FY 90 Army budget of



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$77.7 billion. The epochal events that were occurring within the Warsaw Pact nations and ongoing budget deficit concerns created a sharply reduced DOD budget of $268.2 billion for FY 91, with the Army's share set at $73 billion. Most of the Army's $4.7 billion cut for FY 91 was taken from procurement. Because of declining congressional appropriations, the Army undertook two primary force structure studies, Project QUICKSILVER in late 1989 and Project VANGUARD in 1990. QUICKSILVER, which concentrated on the table of organization and equipment (TOE) Army, recommended reducing it by 160,000 and also cutting the table of distribution and allowances (T DA) Army (primarily HQDA, MACOMs, field operating agencies [FOAs], and installations) by 40,000 soldiers and 57,000 civilian man-years by FY 97. VANGUARD focused upon TDA organizations but also considered the reserve components. It concluded that HQDA should downsize by 20 percent, and the number of FOAs should decrease significantly. VANGUARD also identified 9,000 TDA enlisted personnel slots for elimination.

Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney advised Congress in June 1990 that the Bush administration was willing to consider a 25 percent cut in the armed services by 1995. This implied a reduction in Army active component strength to 520,000. President Bush publicly supported the 25 percent cut in his 2 August 1990 speech at Aspen, Colorado. The Army implemented programs during FY 90 and 91 that both reduced the numbers and maintained high quality in its military and civilian personnel. Two programs, Voluntary Separation Incentives and Special Separation Benefits (SSB), offered economic incentives to minimize involuntary separations of soldiers. Recruitment goals dropped sharply during the period. The active component enlisted objective of 119,901 in FY 89 fell to 78,241 in FY 91. Active component strength, 765,287 at the outset of FY 90, decreased to 706,160 by the end of FY 91. Reserve components recruitment dipped somewhat in FY 91, but both Ready Reserve and Army National Guard (ARNG)strengths actually increased from FY 90 to FY 91-from 594,319 to 668,755 and from 444,224 to 446,121 respectively. Army civilian personnel dropped from 455,776 in FY 90 to 435,195 in FY 91.

The revised national military strategy and personnel cuts of FY 90 and 91 were accompanied by force structure modifications. *The Defense Department Total Force Policy Report to the Congress* in December 1991 essentially reaffirmed the integrated roles of the active and reserve components formalized in 1973. The report continued the use of ARNG roundout brigades, but also stipulated that active component forces be able to deploy rapidly from CONUS to trouble spots and sustain themselves for the first thirty days. Relieved of the Warsaw Pact threat, the Army had more time to create additional forces for major combat operations. In FY 90 the Army had five corps and twenty-eight combat divisions (eighteen active component and ten ARNG), but it inactivated two active component



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divisions in FY 91-the 2d Armored and the 9th Infantry (Motorized). Planners envisioned a four-corps, twenty-division force by 1995 (twelve active component, six ARNG, and two heavy reserve component cadre divisions). TRADOC force structure specialists anticipated that heavy cadre divisions could attain combat readiness twelve to fifteen months after mobilization, whereas new units would require two years.

A smaller Army required fewer installations, and concern for base realignments and closures (BRAC) was reemphasized during FY 90 and 91. The Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-526) had codified the proposal of the BRAC Commission appointed by the Secretary of Defense in 1988. This commission had recommended more than 100 Army installations for realignment or closure, despite expectations of a sustained active component strength of 781,000. In January 1990 the Secretary of Defense proposed realignment or closure of 26 additional Army installations, and in September he called for reducing or closing operations at 113 Army installations overseas. With passage of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510) Congress tightened the BRAC process to include halting closure of any bases on the January 1990 list that employed more than 300 persons. Army spokesmen, expecting an active component reduced to 535,000 by the mid-1990s, in 1991 recommended base closures that included Fort Devens, Massachusetts; Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana; and Fort Ord, California.

Quality of life programs for soldiers and their dependents-housing, family support, child care, and health care-received priority consideration during FY 90 and 91, despite budget and personnel reductions. Both the Army's leaders and Congress recognized that maintenance of these programs, by contributing to good job performance and retention of high-quality personnel, had a beneficial effect on readiness. Since funding for new housing was minimal, the Army developed the Whole Neighborhood Revitalization Program for outmoded family quarters and encouraged private developers to construct housing on federal land and lease to soldiers. Army families encountered problems with rising health care costs similar to those experienced by the general public. The Army sought to control costs with its CHAMPUS Management Improvement Program and introduced the Gateway to Care program, a comprehensive health care delivery system similar to health maintenance organizations in the private sector. During Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM some family assistance centers operated twenty-four hours a day. Enlisted soldiers could exclude military pay received for service during DESERT STORM from federal income tax liability, while soldiers with ninety or more days active duty during the Persian Gulf war qualified for VA home loan guarantees.



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Army training philosophy underwent substantial change during FY 90 and 91. Begun in FY 88, formulation of the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) continued. CATS anticipated that Army training eventually will be based on devices rather than merely supported by them, which meant that training would decrease at institutions and increase at home stations. This concept accelerated development of training aids, devices, simulators and simulations (TADSS). By the end of FY 90 the Combined Army Tactical Training System (CATT) was networked to eight active component units, and branch trainers for close combat, aviation, air defense, and engineers were in development. In FY 90 the Army implemented the Leadership Assessment and Development Program (LADP) in selected Army schools for senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and officers. LADP utilized self-analysis and input by peers and faculty regarding individual leadership potential. The Reserve Component Training Development Action Plan (RC TDAP), approved in 1989, identified thirty-eight reserve component training problems. It focused initially upon a successful MOS skill level of 85 percent, leader development, and at least a C3 unit readiness rating.

The Big Five, the core of the Army's modernization program during the 1970s and 1980s-the Abrams M1 tank, the AH64 Apache attack helicopter, the UH60 Black Hawk utility helicopter, the Bradley M2/M3 fighting vehicle, and the Patriot air defense missile-performed well as a group during the Persian Gulf war. The drop in procurement money, from $14.8 billion in FY 89 to $9 billion in FY 91, demanded procurement policy adjustments. In FY 90 the Army adopted the "one-third" strategy, which meant fielding equipment to units according to their scheduled deployment times. Army planners decided in FY 91 to focus on modernizing by acquiring technically advanced new weapons systems rather than upgrading existing ones. For example, the revised Armored Systems Modernization plan curtailed production of the M1A1 and M1A2 tank in preference to the Block III and also sought a common heavy chassis for the Block III and three other weapons systems. Utilization of nondevelopmental items, or commercially developed products, was another modernization method emphasized by the Army during the period FY 90 and 91.

Concern by the Army with performing its mobilization, deployment, and sustainment responsibilities in combat operations graduated from peacetime preparations to the real thing during FY 90 and 91. The limited scale of Operation JUST CAUSE required neither activation of reserve component units nor sizable logistical support. Operation DESERT

SHIELD/DESERT STORM, on the other hand, necessitated deployment of more than 300,000 Army personnel and heavy reliance for sustainment upon an 8,700 mile supply line from CONUS. Existing mobilization, deployment, and sustainment plans, and training programs for combat operations, served



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the Army reasonably well, but the Army also benefited from the five month delay between DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Postwar assessments indicated several problem areas, including the following: lack of a standardized Army training validation plan, inadequate provision by the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) for multiple scenarios under a 200,000 Selected Reserve mobilization, an absence of joint deployment training, and shortages in strategic lift capability.

Among the various special functions that the Army conducted for the civilian sector during FY 90 and 91, support for the war against illegal drugs and preservation of the environment ranked high among public concerns. In April 1990 the Army Counter-Narcotics Plan reinforced recent Army assistance for the drug war that included intelligence, loan of equipment, and Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) that instructed law enforcement personnel in combat and jungle operations. Central and South American governments increased their requests for U.S. Army MTTs during 1990 and 1991. Not restricted by the Posse Comitatus Act while under state control, the ARNG participated directly in twenty-five counter-drug operations in FY 90. The Army in the mid-1980s had begun a twenty-year program to eradicate pollution on its properties and prevent contamination. Prompted by the FY 90 Defense Authorization Act, the Army submitted a ten-year environmental strategic plan to the Department of Defense. Despite its efforts to comply with federal, state, and local environmental laws, the Army received 173 violation notices in FY 90. The Army designated more than $350 million for environmental cleanup in FY 91, while the Defense Environmental Restoration Program allotted another $209 million to Army projects.

As FY 91 ended, the Army leadership reflected upon the extensive changes that had occurred during the preceding two years in the world order and their effect upon national military strategy and the state of the Army. The threat of Soviet expansionism was being replaced by potential threats from many small countries. The Commonwealth of Independent States entered an unstable period as member nations renewed long-term religious and cultural rivalries and boundary disputes. A number of third world countries were acquiring the ability to engage in high-intensity land warfare by assembling arsenals of armor, missiles, and chemical weapons.

The Army budget had experienced six years of real decline, and the trend was likely to continue. The Army leadership was prepared to reduce the size, but not the quality, of its trained and combat-ready force. The new Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan, declared that "the mistakes of dismantling battle-proven Armies following major twentieth century wars must not be repeated in the post-Cold War era. It took fifteen years of hard work and dedication to build today's Army. We must avoid tearing it apart as we reshape it for the future."



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***Go to:***

**Previous Chapter** **Glossary**

---

**Return to Table of Contents**

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


**Return to CMH Online**

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# Glossary

| | |
|---|---|
| A-RATIONS | freshly cooked meals |
| AA | Medical Detachment |
| AAFES | Army and Air Force Exchange Service |
| ACAP | Army Career and Alumni Program |
| ACCHRM | Army Center for Civilian Human Resource Management |
| ACE | Armored Combat Earthmover |
| ACES | Army Continuing Education System |
| ACOE | Army Communities of Excellence |
| ACPERS | Army Civilian Personnel System |
| ACS | Army Community Service |
| ACTEDS | Army Civilian Training Education and Development System |
| ADATS | air defense antitank system |
| ADATSA | Aquisition and Development of Threat Simulators Activity |
| ADCATT | Air Defense Combined Arms Tactical Trainer |
| AER | Army Emergency Relief |
| AFAP | Army Family Action Plan |
| AFAS | Advanced Field Artillery System |
| AFFS | Army Field Feeding System |
| AFQT | Armed Forces Qualification Test |
| AGESAD | Air Ground Engagement System Air Defense System |
| AHIP | Army Helicopter Improvement Program |
| ALOC | Air Line of Communication |
| ALRTP | Army Long Range Training Plan |
| AMC | Army Materiel Command |
| AMEDD | Army Medical Department |

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|---|---|
| AMEDDECP | Army Medical Department Enlisted Commissioning Program |
| AMOPS | Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System |
| AMR | Army Management Report |
| AMSC | Army Management Staff College |
| ANC | Army Nurse Corps |
| | 161 |
| ANCOC | Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course |
| AOC | Army Operations Center |
| AOR | area of operational responsibility |
| APC | Armored Personnel Carrier |
| APS | Afloat Prepositioned Stocks |
| ARCENT | U.S. Army Forces Central Command |
| ARNG | Army National Guard |
| ARSPACE | U.S. Army Space Command |
| ARTEP | Army Training and Evaluation Program |
| ASIMS | Army Standard Information Management System |
| ASM | Armored Systems Modernization |
| ATACMS | Army tactical missile system |
| ATBMP | Army Technology Base Master Plan |
| ATTD | Advanced Technology Transition Demonstration |
| ATTU | Atlantic to the Urals |
| AUIB | Aircrew Battle Dress Uniform |
| AVCATT | Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer |
| | |
| BBS | Brigade Battalion Battle Simulation |
| BCTP | Battle Command Training Program |
| BDU | battle dress uniform |
| BFV | Bradley Fighting Vehicle |

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|---|---|
| BNCOC | Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course |
| BOSS | Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers |
| BRAC | base realignment and closure |
| | |
| C2I | command control and intelligence |
| CA | civil affairs |
| CAI | combined arms initiatives |
| CAL | Center for Army Leadership |
| CALS | Computer Aided Acquisition and Logistic Support |
| CAPSTONE | A program aligning reserve component units scheduled for Europe with their wartime chain of command |
| CAS3 | Combined Arms and Services Staff School |
| CATIES | Combined Arms Team Integrated Evaluation System |
| CATS | Combined Arms Training Strategy |
| CATT | Combined Army Tactical Training System |
| CBS | corps battle simulation |
| 162 | |
| CCTT | Close Combat Tactical Trainer |
| CDC | child development center |
| CDS | child development services |
| CENTCOM | U.S. Central Command |
| CFC | Combined Forces Command |
| CFE | Conventional Forces in Europe |
| CFF | Central Funding and Fielding System |
| CFSC | Community and Family Support Center |
| CHAMPUS | Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services |
| CINC | Commander in Chief |
| CINCCENT | Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command |

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|---|---|
| CINCFORSCOM | Commander in Chief U.S. Forces Command |
| CINCPAC | Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command |
| CINCSOUTH | Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command |
| CIPPS | Civilian Personnel Proponent System |
| CIS | Commonwealth of Independent States |
| CLDP | Civilian Leader Development Action Plan |
| CMTC | Combat Maneuver Training Center |
| CMV | Combat Mobility Vehicle |
| COBRA | Cost of Base Realignment and Closure |
| COE | U.S. Army Corps of Engineers |
| COEMISPA | Corps of Engineers Management Information System |
| CONOPS | contingency operations |
| CONPLAN | Concept Plan |
| CONUS | Continental United States |
| CONUSA | continental United States army |
| CPAS | Civilian Personnel Accounting System |
| CPMP | Civilian Personnel Modernization Project |
| CPX | command post exercises |
| CRAF | Civilian Reserve Air Fleet |
| CSCE | Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| CSSTSS | Combat Service Support Training Simulation System |
| CTASC | Corp Theater ADP Service Center |
| CTC | Combat Training Center |
| CVI | Conditional Voluntary Indefinite |
| | |
| DCPC | Direct Combat Position Coding |
| DCSLOG | Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics |
| DCSOPS | Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans |

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|---|---|
| DCSPER | Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel |
| DeCA | Defense Commissary Agency |
| DEPMEDS | Deployable Medical Systems |
| DLA | Defense Logistics Agency |
| DLI | Defense Language Institute |
| DMR | Defense Management Report |
| DMRD | Defense Management Report Decision |
| DMZ | demilitarized zone |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| DPP | Dedicated Procurement Program |
| DPRK | Democratic People's Republic of Korea |
| DPSC | Defense Personnel Support Center |
| DRB | Division Ready Brigade |
| DTS | distributed training strategy |
| DWS | Distributed War Game System |
| | |
| EIDS | Electronic Information Delivery System |
| EIS | Environmental Impact Statement |
| ENCATT | Engineer Combined Arms Tactical Trainer |
| EPA | Environmental Protection Agency |
| ERIS | Exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle Interceptor Subsystem |
| EUSA | Eighth United States Army |
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| FAADS | Forward Area Air Defense System |
| FAC | family assistance center |
| FAMSIM | Family of Simulators |
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|---|---|
| FARV | future armored resupply vehicle |
| FEMA | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| FEPCA | Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act |
| FIFV | future infantry fighting vehicle |
| FOA | Field Operating Agency |
| FOG-M | fiber optic-guided missile |
| FORSCOM | U.S. Forces Command |
| FY | fiscal year |
| | |
| GAO | General Accounting Office |
| GPALS | Global Protection Against Limited Strikes |
| | |
| HEDIKITE | High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor Kinetic Integrated Technology Experiment |
| HEMTT | Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck |
| HIP | howitzer improvement program |
| HMMWV | High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle |
| | 164 |
| HOMES | Housing Operations Management System |
| HQDA | Headquarters, Department of the Army |
| HTLD | High Technology Light Division |
| | |
| ICBM | Intercontinental Ballistic Missile |
| IDP | Imminent Danger Pay |
| IET | initial entry training |
| IFV | Infantry Fighting |
| INF | Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces |
| ING | Inactive National Guard |
| IRR | Individual Ready Reserve |

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|---|---|
| ISM | installation support module |
| ITR | information ticketing and registration |
| | |
| JAC | Job Assistance Centers |
| JCS | Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| JESS | Joint Exercise Simulation System |
| JGSDF | Japanese Ground Self Defense Force |
| JOPES | Joint Operations and Planning Execution System |
| JRTC | Joint Readiness Training Center |
| JSSS | Joint Service Software System |
| JUSTIS | Joint Uniform Services Technical Information System |
| JWARS | Joint Wars |
| | |
| LADP | Leadership Assessment and Development Program |
| LANTCOM | U.S. Atlantic Command |
| LHX | Light Helicopter |
| LOC | Logistics Operations Center |
| LOGMARS | Logistics Applications of Automated Marking and Reading Symbols |
| LOSAT | line-of-sight anti-tank |
| LOS-F-H | line-of-sight-forward-heavy |
| LOS-R | line-of-sight-rear |
| LRIP | low-rate initial production |
| | |
| MACOM | Major Army Command |
| MAST | Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic |
| MAT | mobilization assistance team |
| MCB | Managing Civilians to Budget |
| MCCA | Military Child Care Act |

| | |
|---|---|
| MEET | Minimum Essential Equipment for Training |
| MILES | Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System |
| MITS | Mobile Independent Target System |
| MLRS | Multiple Launch Rocket System |
| MORE | Meals Operational Ready to Eat |
| MOS | Military Occupational Specialty |
| MPMIS | Military Police Management Information System |
| MQS | Military Qualification Standards |
| MRE | Meals Ready-To-Eat |
| MSC | Military Sealift Command |
| MSR | main supply route |
| MTM | millions of ton miles |
| MTMC | Military Traffic Management Command |
| MTT | Mobile Training Team |
| MWR | morale welfare and recreation |
| | |
| NAF | Non-Appropriated Funds |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NBC | nuclear biological chemical |
| NBCRS | Nuclear Biological Chemical Reconnaissance vehicle |
| NCA | National Command Authority |
| NCO | noncommissioned officer |
| NCOES | NCO Educational System |
| NCOLEAD | NCO Leader Education and Development |
| NDI | Nondevelopment Item |
| NEPA | National Environmental Policy Act |
| | |

| | |
|---|---|
| NETT | new equipment training team |
| NPS | no prior service |
| NTC | National Training Center |
| | |
| OCONUS | Outside the Continental United States |
| ODCSLOG | Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics |
| ODCSOPS | Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans |
| ODCSPER | Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel |
| ODT | overseas development training |
| OMA | Operations and Maintenance |
| OPM | Office of Personnel Management |
| OPTEC | U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command |
| 166 | |
| OPTEMPO | operating tempo |
| OTEA | Operational Test and Evaluation Agency |
| | |
| PADS | position azimuth determining system |
| PCS | permanent change of station |
| PDF | Panamanian Defense Force |
| PIP | product improvement program |
| PLDC | Primary Leadership Development Course |
| PLS | palletized loading system |
| PMCIE | Project Manager for Clothing and Individual Equipment |
| POL | Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants |
| POM | Program Objective Memorandum |
| POMCUS | Prepositioning of material configured to unit sets |
| PREPO | Prepositioning |
| PRIMUS | Primary Care of the Uniformed Services |

| | |
|---|---|
| PSYOP | psychological operations |
| PWIS | Prisoner of War Information System |
| PX | Post exchange |
| | |
| RA | Regular Army |
| RAIS | Relocation Assistance Information System |
| RC3 | Reserve Component Course Configuration Program |
| RCAS | Reserve Component Automation System |
| RCOES | Reserve Components Officer Education System |
| RCTDAP | Reserve Components Training Development Action Plan |
| RD&E | Research Development and Engineering |
| REP | REFORGER Enhancement Program |
| RIF | Reduction in Force |
| ROK | Republic of Korea |
| RO/RO | roll on/roll off |
| ROTC | Reserve Officer's Training Corp |
| ROWPU | Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit |
| RRF | Ready Reserve Force |
| | |
| SAAS | Standard Army Ammunition System |
| SAG | Senior Advisory Group |
| SAMS | Standard Army Maintenance System |
| SARSS | Standard Army Retail Supply System |
| SCALP | Suit Contamination Avoidance and Liquid Protective |



| | |
|---|---|
| SCIPMIS | Standard Civilian Management Information System |
| SDI | Strategic Defense Initiative |
| SDT | Self Development Test |

| | |
|---|---|
| SELCOM | Select Committee |
| SEP | Soldier Enhancement Program |
| SES | Senior Executive Service |
| SFG | special forces groups |
| SGLI | Serviceman's Group Life Insurance |
| SIDEPERS | Standard Installation Division Personnel System |
| SIMNET | simulation networking |
| SINCGARS | single channel ground and airborne radio system |
| SIPE | Soldier Integrated Protective Ensemble |
| SOA | special operations aviation |
| SOCCOM | Special Operations Command, Central Command |
| SOF | Special Operations Forces |
| SOP | Standard Operating Procedure |
| SOUTHCOM | U.S. Southern Command |
| SPBS | Standard Property Book System |
| SQT | Skill Qualification Test |
| SSB | Special Separation Benefits |
| STAMIS | Standard Army Management Information System |
| STARS | Strategic Target System |
| START | Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty |
| STRAC | Standards in Training Commission |
| SUPCOM | Support Command |
| | |
| T-RATIONS | tray rations |
| TAACOM | theater army area command |
| TACCIMS | theatre automated command and control information management system |
| TACCS | Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System |
| | |

| | |
|---|---|
| TADSS | training aids, devices, simulators, and simulation |
| TAO | Transition Assistance Office |
| TATS | Total Army Training Study |
| TDA | table of distribution and allowances |
| TDY | temporary duty |
| TEXCOM | Test and Experimentation Command |
| T/O | Table of Organization |
| 168 | |
| TOE | table of organization and equipment |
| TPFDL | Time Phased Force Deployment List |
| TQM | Total Quality Management |
| TRADOC | Training and Doctrine Command |
| TRANSCOM | U.S. Transportation Command |
| TUSA | Third U.S. Army |
| | |
| UIC | Unit Identification Code |
| ULLS | Unit Level Logistics System |
| UNCMAC | United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission |
| USACAPOC | U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command |
| USAISC | U.S. Army Information Systems Command |
| USAR | U.S. Army Reserve |
| USARC | U.S. Army Reserve Command |
| USAREUR | U.S. Army, Europe |
| USARPAC | U.S. Army Pacific |
| USARSO | U.S. Army South |
| USASFC | U.S. Army Special Forces Command |
| USASOC | U.S. Army Special Operations Command |
| USO | United Services Organization |

| | |
|---|---|
| USR | Unit Status Report |
| USSOCOM | U.S. Special Operations Command |
| | |
| VA | Veteran's Affairs |
| VCSA | Vice Chief of Staff |
| VERA | Voluntary Early Retirement Authority |
| VHA | variable housing allowance |
| VSI | Voluntary Separation Incentives |
| | |
| WAC | Women's Army Corps |
| WESTCOM | Western Command |
| WHNS | wartime host nation support |
| WPC | Warrior Preparation Center |
| WRDA | Water Resources Development Act |
| | |
| YDP | Youth Development Program |
| YS | Youth Services |



*Go to:*

**Previous Chapter** **Appendix**

**Return to Table of Contents**




**Return to CMH Online**

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# Appendix

Organization Department of the Army



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***Go to:***

**Glossary**

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**Return to Table of Contents**

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


**Return to CMH Online**

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# Appendix A. ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY




(1) Reports directly to the Secretary of the Army and is responsive to the Chief of Staff.
(2) Commander, USACE reports through the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) to the Secretary of the Army on civil works matters.
(3) Reports directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics and Environment) on operational matters.
(4) Reports directly and concurrently to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff on criminal matters.

As of 30 September 1991