

# The ARMY HISTORIAN

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## Using History at the IG: A Case for Historians on Senior Staffs

J.W.A. Whitehome

The need for qualified military historians on the staffs of principal general and special staff officers is one not generally acknowledged in the Army. The Department of the Army Inspector General's Agency, however, is an exception—for a variety of reasons. During the 1970s, the establishment of inspectors general agencies in Federal executive departments focused interest on the Army IG's Agency as the oldest continuous operation of its kind. Old means history. These new agencies had to have some concept of what came before. With the activation of a Department of Defense Inspector General in 1978 the need to define the origin of policy and precedent within the Army inspectorate became even more acute. Issues involving the relationships, prerogatives, and practices of the service inspectorates had to be identified and clarified as adjustments were made to accommodate the new Defense agency. In the course of this activity it became apparent that no comprehensive record of the Army Inspector General existed. Nowhere in the published official histories was more than passing notice given to inspectors. As a result, every time an issue was raised action officers had to conduct a hurried search through primary source documents in an effort to provide some historical background. Unfamiliar with earlier filing systems and untrained in historical methods, the action officers—however willing—often produced partial or misleading information, or spent inordinate amounts of time in attempts to assure accuracy.

Something had to be done, and was. In late 1981, The Inspector General at the time, Lt. Gen. Richard G. Trefry, requested that a military historian be assigned to his agency. The historian's concentration on the research and publication of a history of the inspectorate

would assure that a detailed, authoritative record of the Department of the Army Inspector General's Agency would be available to those who needed it. In addition, the historian could provide support to the agency on continuing activities requiring historical research or retention. The position was established and filled.

The concentration on the research, writing, and publication of a history of the inspectorate has expanded, rather than limited, the historian's usefulness to the agency. The growing knowledge of the past activities and records of the IG that the research has produced has made the position a resource in its own right. Matters of precedent and past policies can now be identified and incorporated into current actions with little delay. A finder's guide supplementing current records management data has been developed on IG files held by the National Archives and Records Administration, allowing ready reference to IG material from 1814 to the present. Research on a history of the inspectorate has also led to the identification of IG-related material outside the



*Inspection of Engineer Troops, Washington Barracks, 1892. By W.T. Trego.*

Army and the Federal government. In addition, historical reference files—including biographies of former senior inspectors, sets of regulations and general orders, photographs, and examples of precedent-setting documents—have been developed, allowing quick overviews by action officers and others.

Part of the research has been in the form of oral interviews with former senior inspectors, creating a valuable supplement to the official records. These interviews are a priceless source of information which would probably otherwise have been lost. That they were conducted at the user agency level lends them considerable practical value, particularly for reviews of such recurrent topics as organizational structure.

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## Editors' Journal

*The Army Historian* has reached that happy point in a publication's life where sufficient copy exists for one or two issues down the road. This situation happens to coincide with a period of intensive activity in the Center of Military History rethinking goals and planning for the future. It also comes after several issues of *TAH* in which "The Commander and Military History" section has afforded little space for important articles we've wanted to run on unique historical operations, military history detachments, and special educational techniques. This issue, then, is a sort of special catch-up edition for these types of articles. While the Center's planning activities help to explain this issue's rather tardy arrival at GPO, our embarrassment of riches in Commander and Military History articles is the reason for its format.

In place of our traditional Chief's Bulletin, Perspective, At the Center, Professional Reading, and other sections, we are giving No. 9 over to the use and teaching of military history in special agencies and in the field. Lieutenant Colonel Whitehorne's cover piece on history in TIG, for example, provides valuable insights on the merits of having historians on senior staffs. Major Kleckley, commander of the Army's only active duty military history detachment, has provided a thoughtful report on his unit's activities during last summer's Exercise BRIGHT STAR 85 and his view of lessons learned for MHDs. Citizen-Soldier/Professor-Captain Woodward gives us the benefit of a National Guard historian's perspective on the "New Military History," and CSI's Major Eiserman offers the

The practical value of having a historian on the IG staff is demonstrated in the frequent support given to nearly every division in the inspectorate to facilitate current actions. A study on the evolution of inspection concepts since World War I provided the Inspections Division with the data necessary for a recently completed inspection. Background on the agency's internal organization has been useful to several divisions. The Analysis Division made use of information the historian provided on the origin of policies and agreements affecting the Soldiers' Home and the Army Air Force Exchange System in its preparation for scheduled inspections. An agency committee developing IG doctrine and emergency strength projections employed extensive histor-

experience gained from conducting a hands-on course on staff rides for military history instructors. These and others make for a good batch. Having caught up, we will return to our more traditional format with No. 10.

### *The ARMY HISTORIAN*

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ical information on the role of inspectors in wartime. When relatives of former soldiers write for information on the dispositions of ancestral graves lost as a result of post cemetery closings, the Assistance Division—with the historian's support—is now able to provide satisfactory answers based on IG files dating as far back as the Civil War. Inspectorate and unit files the historian has located have provided the most complete replies possible to complaints about unusual discharges during the World War I era. Historical research has justified recognition for foreign nationals promised awards in 1944.

All of these cases required research in archival holdings in places and under time limitations that could not have been imposed upon a non-historian with any real expectation of satisfactory results. The same may be said of research in support of IG responses to inquiries from members of Congress and the public. IG elements in the field and from other services have also begun to rely upon the agency's historian for historical information and support. As a side effect, inaccuracies and legends floating around uncorrected for decades are gradually being dispelled.

For the historian, immersion in the history of a staff function or agency often provides insights that can be gotten in no other way. Unique perspectives—valuable not only to an analysis of the agency but concerning the Army as a whole—can be developed. In the case of the IG, this became apparent during the preparation of an overview of World War I logistics as seen by inspectors. Existing official histories provide little inkling of the frictions experienced in the 1917-1919 logistical efforts. World War I Inspectors General, however, were concerned with developing efficiency in areas where there had been problems, and their reports dealt with flaws in the system. By contrast, the logisticians had a tendency to report only on their programs' achievements. Both views are necessary to a researcher's or staff officer's balanced assessment. Military historians on the staffs of other principal general and special staff officers could also gain this sort of perspective, one they could pass on to support their staffs and agencies in decision making.

The Inspector General's Agency and its predecessors have performed essentially the same functions for the same Army for over two centuries. The agency is a sort of bureaucratic laboratory reflecting the concerns of the Army as a whole. Its history offers countless examples of internal restructurings to perform the same mission. The IG historian's job began with a

single focus on the accomplishment of a specific mission—preparation of books. From this narrow base, the position's wider applications have grown to proportions that reinforce the view that a military historian is a useful addition to any staff element directed at the lieutenant general level or higher. Without historical support, agencies of this type can rarely perform at maximum efficiency. Reference to aspects of their corporate pasts are essential to high-level decision makers if they are to avoid repeating earlier errors. These agencies cannot meet their fullest potentials if they continue to go over the forgotten ground covered by their predecessors. With historical support they can build upon past achievements and make further progress. Existing historical organizations like the Center of Military History and the Military History Institute have neither the mission nor the resources to develop the expertise or perform the services necessary to support specific agencies on a routine basis. Expertise and services of this sort can be developed and provided only through the assignment of a qualified military historian who can capture, preserve, and interpret his agency's past and make it available when it is needed.

What has worked for The Inspector General's Agency will work for similar Army agencies. Until historians at these levels become the general rule rather than the exception, it will be left to future historians to show how much time has been wasted and how many opportunities lost while the past continues to be ignored.

*Lieutenant Colonel Whitehorne is the historian for the Department of the Army Inspector General's Agency.*

### Call for Articles

*The Army Historian* is seeking articles of from 300 to 2,500 words for publication in future issues. Articles on such topics as Army historical activities, current research, the uses of military history and its position in the Army, past commanders' use of history, military historiography, programs promoting historical mindedness, and professional reading are being considered. Accepted submissions are edited for clarity and suitability, but every effort is made to preserve the authors' individual styles. Where possible, photographic prints related to the articles would be very helpful, and will be returned to authors of accepted manuscripts upon request. Manuscripts should be double-spaced, in two copies, accompanied by a daytime telephone number and a brief description of the writer's current position, and sent to Managing Editor, *The Army Historian*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314-0200.



# THE COMMANDER AND MILITARY HISTORY

## BRIGHT STAR 85:

### Lessons Learned for Military History Detachments

Edgar Kleckley

The recent surge of activity in the Army historical community has brought with it a renewed interest in the organization and activities of military history detachments (MHDs). While the interest is welcome, we should remember that any determination of where we should be going with MHDs must necessarily be based upon an understanding of where we are. This essay is an attempt to contribute to this understanding by describing the activities of the 44th Military History Detachment, US Army Forces Command, during the recent Exercise BRIGHT STAR 85. The 44th, the Army's only active duty MHD, was at the time of the exercise manned by a major commanding, an E-7 Journalist (the NCOIC), and an E-5 Administrative Assistant. While our participation in the exercise taught us a number of new lessons, it also revalidated some old ones and verified the wisdom of recent changes to equipment authorizations.

BRIGHT STAR 85 was the fourth in a series of exercises designed to test the United States' ability to project a credible presence into Southwest Asia. Coincidentally, it provided a rare opportunity to sensitize American soldiers to the climatic, cultural, and operational conditions in the area. The exercise took place over a five-week period, and was exceptional in that it embraced four discrete training missions, each at a different site.

#### Splitting the MHD

For the 44th MHD, the most singular aspect of BRIGHT STAR 85 was the requirement to divide the detachment. While the main effort of the exercise was in Egypt, a separate—and highly significant—training mission was undertaken in Somalia, which included a number of combined training exercises and a combined CPX. The Somali segment of the exercise could not be ignored. What was more, the Army Component Commander in Somalia, realizing the significance and sensitivity of the Somali activities, had requested coverage by an historian. The detachment's NCOIC was dispatched to Somalia and remained there throughout the entire exer-

cise period. Meanwhile, the Commander and the Administrative Assistant deployed to Egypt with the main body.

In purely operations terms, the division of the detachment was not entirely unrealistic. It is quite possible that detachments under contingency or combat conditions would have to act similarly. The potential division of detachments, whether for short or long periods, is therefore something that should be considered as the process of developing MHD doctrine proceeds.

While the division of the detachment between Egypt and Somalia allowed broader coverage than otherwise would have been possible, it did create a number of nettlesome problems. The most significant of these were in the following areas:

—Communications. Ideally, the two detachment parts should have coordinated with one another to compare notes, work out logistical problems, and report status. Since the detachment has no organic communication, it was forced to rely on the communication system supporting the Army Component headquarters. Because of climatic conditions and the priority accorded to operational traffic, opportunities for the two to converse were few. Conclusion: When an MHD is divided, we cannot assume the ability to communicate with any frequency. Reliance must be placed instead upon prior planning and individual initiative.

—Resupply. When an MHD is divided, some, but not all, of its resources can be divided. Resupply of items peculiar to a military history detachment (film, camera batteries, tape cassettes, and the like) cannot be assured. This problem was never solved during the exercise, since intratheater resupply resources were few and erratically scheduled.

—Transportation. The detached portion of an MHD without organic transportation must rely upon the support headquarters. In the case of BRIGHT STAR 85, the NCOIC in Somalia was supported magnificently, largely because of prior coordination with the Army Component

headquarters. Such coordination should be standard in any similar situation.

All the problems a divided detachment entailed ultimately proved worth the trouble. Had the detachment not been divided, a significant portion of BRIGHT STAR 85 would not have been given adequate coverage.

### Access

In situations where an MHD commander functions as the theater historian—and BRIGHT STAR 85 was such a situation—it is very important that detachment personnel have adequate access to all activities within the headquarters. As is usually the case, the 44th's effectiveness during this exercise was dependent upon two conditions:

—Adequate clearances. As a result of the Grenada experience, the members of the 44th had had their clearances upgraded to TOP SECRET level prior to BRIGHT STAR 85. The necessity of this clearance level was demonstrated during the exercise. Detachment personnel were privy to the full story from the outset, a perspective that would have been denied them had they had lower-grade clearances. Conclusion: Detachments should—as a matter of urgency—assure that their clearances are adequate for possible contingencies.

—A good working relationship with headquarters personnel. Although it is common to scoff at the importance of this, an open and friendly relationship—not just with the key players but with the “worker bees”—is essential to an MHD's acquisition of full and objective information. The initiative rests with the historian. He should do everything necessary to build such a working relationship. Conclusion: The behavioral scientists have a point after all.



44th MHD photo of USCINCCENT, General Kingston (center left), meeting with Somali Minister of Defense during BRIGHT STAR 85.

### Equipment

In general, the detachment's equipment proved itself. Prior to BRIGHT STAR 85, the 44th had acquired a diesel-powered Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle (CUCV), M1008 (in layman's parlance, a souped-up pickup truck). It also procured, through local purchase procedures, a fiberglass cap for the truck bed, allowing for a securable storage area. The CUCV is far superior to the jeep/trailer combination. With both low- and high-range four-wheel-drive capability, it has better traction (a not inconsequential attribute in places where there is a lot of sand). Its storage capacity is twice that of the jeep; its air and gas filtration systems and its gas mileage are much better. In short, the CUCV is a vast improvement. MHDs should make sure that their authorization documents for these vehicles are valid, and should undertake to acquire them as a matter of priority.

Equipment shortfalls were few, but the needs they pointed to are worth mentioning:

—MHDs need an organic communications system. The ability to follow an operation is enhanced by the ability to follow radio traffic. An AN/VRC-47 set would be ideal for this purpose, and the CUCV electrical system can accommodate it easily.

—MHDs will find themselves occupying part of the supported unit's defensive perimeter, yet they are not authorized a crew-served weapon. While all personnel should carry pistols, the detachment should have—and be trained in the use of—a medium-calibre machinegun.

—MHDs must be able to record and transcribe field interviews. The progress of solid-state technology in both areas has been rapid in recent years. The 44th, through local purchase, acquired lightweight, durable recorders, transcribers, and typewriters, which together weigh less and occupy less space than a single manual field typewriter. The result during the exercise was the ability to move around with greater ease without sacrificing effectiveness.

### Lessons Learned

Although this is not the place for a detailed accounting of the 44th's field operations, several lessons on covering exercises of this sort stand out:

1. MHD personnel must have a reasonable understanding of the political objectives underlying the contingency being exercised. Without such an understanding, the collection of history is akin to placing a seed in a pot without soil.

2. Similarly, MHDs must have an appreciation of the local culture and social norms, particularly in contingency areas where combined training with local forces is to take place. We cannot judge the efficacy of training unless we understand the other fellow's perspective.

3. MHD personnel must understand the relevant Operation Plan(s) thoroughly. Assessment of training in the absence of this knowledge will be both fruitless and pointless.

4. MHD personnel, to be effective analysts, must have a solid grasp of the theory of war. It means the difference between asking pertinent questions and stupid ones.

5. You can see the "Big Picture" on a Command Briefing Map. But get out with the troops anyway.

However obvious these lessons may appear, they bear repetition. The point, of course, is that no amount of directed training will substitute for doing your homework. BRIGHT STAR 85 was a clear validation of this principle.

#### Future MHDs

In the final analysis, the 44th's experience during BRIGHT STAR 85 pointed out both strengths and weaknesses in the way MHDs are organized, equipped, and employed. Relating these to the question of how the Army's military history detachments should develop, I make bold to suggest the following:

1. What are needed are more detachments, not more people in each detachment. A three-man detachment is adequate to cover the activities of a major command, even if it has to

divide itself from time to time. Problems can arise, however, when there are no MHDs to cover the activities of subordinate commands. We should therefore continue to create more MHDs.

2. The recent modifications to detachment TOE equipment have proven themselves under field conditions. There are further modifications, however, especially in recording/transcription devices and weapons authorizations, that need to be initiated.

3. Unit SOPs are dandy items, but be flexible anyway.

4. There has been much discussion of late about creating doctrine, writing field manuals, and so forth, for MHDs. While such activities are worthwhile, we must not lose sight of the truth that doctrine is meant to guide, not to direct. As always, the ultimate guarantor of success is the initiative and drive of the individual.

In summary, two points stand out from the 44th's experiences in the Middle East. First, while there is much room for improvement in MHD structure and functions, there is much that should be retained. As we ponder the detachment of the future, we should be careful not to throw out the baby with the bathwater. Second, all the prior planning, directed training, and doctrine in the world cannot substitute for an MHD whose personnel are enthusiastic, do their homework, and have sufficient flexibility of thought to deal with the unexpected.

*Major Kleckley commands the 44th Military History Detachment, US Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia.*

## Military History Activities of the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency

Clayton Newell

The US Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) is a Field Operating Agency of the Army Staff. Its mission is to provide a responsive in-house study activity to analyze major issues affecting the size and composition of future Army forces. Although the agency focuses on the theater level of war and is heavily computer-oriented, the Director, E. B. Vandiver III, has instituted a variety of historical activities to sup-

plement the quantitative analysis for which CAA is well known. These activities include the CAA Military History Forum, a group which meets informally to study military history and visit local military historical sites; the CAA History Program, a formal series of seminars on theater warfare presented by recognized experts in the field; and the Combat History Analysis Study Effort (CHASE), a search for historically



based quantitative results for use in military operations research, concept formulation, war-gaming, studies, and analyses.

The purpose of the Military History Forum is to stimulate an interest in military history in an informal atmosphere. Recently organized, the Forum's first meeting featured a presentation by Mr. Vandiver on the early phases of operations in the Western Theater in the Civil War. The Forum took its first staff ride to Harpers Ferry and Sharpsburg to study Lee's invasion of Maryland. Future activities will include presentations both by members of the agency and outside experts on various aspects of military history. While initial interest has been on the Civil War, future activities will encompass a wide range of military history. Staff rides to Fort McHenry in Baltimore and the Gettysburg battlefield are under consideration.

The CAA History Program, on the other hand, is a formal approach to the study of military history to supplement the CAA quantitative focus on theater level or operational warfare. CAA conducts analyses of theater level warfare using computer simulations and war games, and although a variety of models are available to simulate theater campaigns there is a dearth of recent experience in conducting warfare at that level. Theater level warfare approximates operational art, the level of warfare between tactics and strategy. The US Army's recently increased interest in the operational level of war has brought with it a need to study historical examples of operations at the theater level. The CAA History Program will explore issues pertaining to theater warfare—the operational level of war—in an academic atmosphere to encourage a free exchange of ideas.

The initial program consists of a series of six seminars, each of which depicts an historical example of theater level war. Each seminar consists of a one-hour lecture supplemented by visual aids, followed by a one-hour or longer discussion period. The lecture portion of each seminar will concentrate on issues relevant to theater level operations and will be presented by recognized experts on the seminar topic. Participants will each receive a recent book on the subject to read prior to the seminar. Whenever possible the distribution of these texts will be accompanied by a film or video tape which highlights the seminar topic.

The historical examples selected for the seminars are World War II: The German Offensive in Europe (May-June 1940); World War II:

The Eastern Front (June 1941-July 1943); World War II: The Western Front (June 1944-May 1945); the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria (August 1945); Korea (June 1950-July 1951); and the Arab-Israeli Wars (June 1967 War, October 1973 War). The Strategic Studies Center of SRI International has arranged for lecturers for each seminar under a contract from CAA. They include William S. Lind, National Security Assistant to Senator Gary Hart; Dr. Harold W. Rood, Professor of Political Science at Claremont Graduate School; Dr. Forrest C. Pogue, official biographer of General George C. Marshall; Harriet Fast Scott, a well-known consultant on Soviet military affairs; Dr. MacKubin T. Owens, Jr., political-military analyst for the Strategic Studies Center; and Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, vice president of Analytical Assessments.

The Combat History Analysis Study Effort, the third new CAA historical activity, is an analysis of historical data on battles and engagements. The Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO) recently developed for CAA an extensive new data base of information on historical battles. While this compilation is highly detailed, it is not directly useable in military operations research, concept formulation, war games, or studies requiring summary quantitative relationships applicable throughout a broad range of engagement situations. The CHASE project applies modern statistical methods to this historical battle data to describe long-term trends and relations that can be extrapolated to future situations with a reasonable degree of confidence. Although this effort is far from complete, findings thus far confirm that quantitative data on historical battles can be used to discover important quantitative trends and relations of potentially major significance to military operations analysis, war-gaming, concept development, studies, and analyses. When completed, the results of this study will be made available to analysts throughout the Army.

Although the Concepts Analysis Agency's primary mission is quantitative analysis using highly sophisticated and complex modeling techniques, the variety of historical programs underway remind analysts that not every aspect of operational warfare can be simulated in a computer model. The agency concentrates on studying the science of war, but must also understand the art of war.

*Lieutenant Colonel Newel was recently an analyst in the Forces Directorate of the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda, Maryland.*

# Westport Staff Ride: One Way to Do It

Rick A. Eiserman

Each year, the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, conducts an instructors' course for about fifty branch historians and military history instructors from US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) branch schools and ROTC detachments. The primary purpose of the course is to present and discuss a variety of approaches to teaching military history. Two weeks of lectures, seminars, and research, plus a bundle of take-home materials, acquaint the participants with course content and teaching techniques that can be put to immediate use in their classrooms.

One of the objectives for the 1985 course was to introduce the students to the methodology of the staff ride. The purpose of this article is to assist others interested in conducting staff rides by describing our efforts and identifying some of the lessons we learned. Keep in mind that while *our* process at the Combat Studies Institute began with a decision to conduct a staff ride, in most cases *your* first step will probably be to determine the feasibility and potential value of using the technique. Nevertheless, there should be enough common ground that others may profit from our experience.

Staff rides are currently conducted at the Army War College, the Command and General Staff College, at several TRADOC service schools, and in some ROTC detachments. They are also becoming popular in Europe, where many World War II battle sites are readily accessible. Interest in this form of instruction has been expressed at the highest Army levels; the Secretary of the Army and the Department of the Army Staff recently visited Antietam battlefield.

The idea of taking students to a battlefield to study tactics and terrain is certainly not new. As early as 1906, staff rides were part of the formal Staff College curriculum. On these early trips such future leaders as George C. Marshall, Billy Mitchell, and John McAuley Palmer were exposed to the lessons of history.

The key element distinguishing the staff ride from a terrain walk or a Tactical Exercise Without Troops is that an actual battle must have been fought on the ground to be walked. This allows the student to research and study all aspects of a battle, then to apply that knowledge to the actual terrain—a "three-dimensional analysis," as one student remarked. The staff ride is also more than a battlefield tour, as the historical study allows students to draw modern lessons that are still critical for success. Benefits of staff rides usually include increased student interest and awareness, a depth of understanding beyond what can be achieved in the classroom, and unit or class cohesion through shared learning experience.

## Objectives, Approach, Constraints

In setting up our course on staff rides, our first task was to identify the objectives, approach, and initial constraints. The objective was simple: to expose the students, through firsthand experience, to the "how-to" methodology and benefits of staff rides. The hope was that they would consider using such a teaching tool at their own institutions. To accomplish this objective, we decided to assign each student the preparation of a fifteen-minute classroom presentation on a unit commander and his role in the battle. This assignment would facilitate maximum involvement as the student tried to gain an understanding of the commander, his military background and leadership traits, and specific decisions made and actions taken during the battle. The class would then travel to the battlefield, where additional discussions would focus on the impact of terrain. The product would be an analysis of what happened and why.

As is often the case in programs of this sort, time would be our primary constraint. We would have only one day, including travel time, to conduct the battlefield trip. During the first week of the course, a two-hour introductory lecture on staff rides and issuance of the necessary adminis-



trative instructions were planned. Portions of several seminar discussions were also scheduled to be set aside for student questions on the subject and for progress reports. During the second week of the course, we planned to use four additional classroom hours prior to the day of the actual staff ride for student presentations.



### Battlefield Selection

The second step was to select a battlefield. Ideally, this decision is heavily influenced by the nature of the target audience and specific objectives of the course the staff ride is to support. Some battlefields and campaigns naturally lend themselves to the study of the operational level of warfare, while others may be better suited for tactical study. The date of the battle is not as important a factor as may be assumed. No matter when the battle was fought, it can offer valuable lessons on leadership, morale, cohesion, and operational principles. Because our objective in the instructors' course was to teach methodology rather than a specific aspect of military history, the more mundane factor of travel time from Fort Leavenworth was a major consideration.

A little preliminary research, including a cursory examination of local maps, identified a Civil War battle in nearby Westport, Missouri. In 1864, almost 25,000 Union and Confederate cavalrymen fought the largest Civil War battle west of the Mississippi there, a battle which ended Confederate Maj. Gen. Sterling Price's last invasion of Missouri. Although much of the battlefield is now in downtown Kansas City, enough terrain was available for our purposes. Some of the problems of urban growth, in fact, actually helped reinforce the teaching point of conducting staff rides under less than ideal conditions. As one planner put it, "If you can do a staff ride to Westport, you can do one anywhere." The point is that you don't have to go to a Gettysburg or an Antietam to learn from a staff ride.

### Research

Our third step was to research the battle. Here, the goal was twofold: first, to identify available source material and local agencies that could provide assistance; second, to outline specific teaching points to be gained from the



Left, Westport battle lines on the morning of 23 October 1864. Right, the area today in downtown Kansas City, MO, with Westport Historical Society tour route. (Courtesy Westport Historical Society.)

battle. We struck a goldmine when contact was made through the Kansas City Civil War Round Table with the Westport Historical Society. These two organizations regularly conduct guided tours of the battlefield and have produced several booklets and pamphlets, including extracts of after-action reports on the battle from the official records in *The War of the Rebellion*. These resources proved so useful that we obtained local purchase funds to buy sufficient copies for our students. A member of the Historical Society helped us identify the route best suited to our teaching points and actually accompanied the class on the day of the staff ride.

### Organization

The fourth step in the planning process was to determine the final format and organization of the instruction. We selected key battlefield commanders for study, broke the student roster down into four groups, and assigned read-ahead materials to the group instructors/facilitators. Reference books were made available in the library and student issue packets of booklets, after-action extracts, and maps were assembled, with temporary hand receipts prepared ahead of time to ensure accountability.

The facilitators studied and discussed primary teaching points. Specific lessons included examples of both good and bad leadership, commanders' "intent," operational objectives, logistics, use of terrain, and unity of command. Each of these lessons would be brought out in the student presentations or in short question-and-answer periods, and then be reinforced on the battlefield. We were to find that instructor/facilitator expertise was critical to the general success of the staff ride.

### Final Coordination

The fifth and last step prior to the students' arrival involved final coordination. This step was important to ensure that logistical problems would not interfere with the learning experience the staff ride was expected to provide. We conducted a "recon" with the facilitators to verify the route, timing, and teaching points. We selected a restaurant and made arrangements for lunch for fifty people. The transportation officer confirmed the bus and driver, and the place and time of departure were selected. With the planning completed, we were ready for the arrival of the students.

### Lessons Learned

As it turned out, the actual execution of the staff ride closely followed our plans. There were the usual last-minute surprises and changes (one student missed the bus, and a gate was closed across one of the approaches to a Union artillery position), but no major problems arose. Student presentations often exceeded our expectations and comment sheets were generally favorable. Most students agreed that the staff ride technique offered strong possibilities as an effective teaching tool.

Based upon our first experience with the staff ride, we plan to make the following modifications in the 1986 course:

- Increase the group facilitators' preparation and provide for a more standardized approach. This will be crucial if all students are to benefit equally from the field-study portion of the staff ride.
- Condense the bus ride and spend more time concentrating on one or two specific areas.
- Add some form of living history, such as a presentation by trained personnel from local reenactment groups in period uniforms, to one of the battlefield stops.
- Add more reference material, especially primary documents, to the library collection. These items will be placed on two-day loan reserve.
- Provide better terrain maps, possibly overprinted with troop positions.
- Obtain a commercial bus with sound system and restroom for the trip. On our first trip we used an Army bus lacking these niceties. Control and student focus was lost during segments of the ride because not everyone could hear the instructor comments.

There are, of course, many different ways to conduct a staff ride. We built on the experience of others in patterning our Westport trip after an elective course taught at the Command and General Staff College. While our first exercise successfully met our course objective of student exposure to the method through practical application, next year's staff ride should be even better. With modifications allowing for the particular circumstances of your unit or school, the staff ride can prove an exciting and effective teaching tool for exploring the lessons of military history.

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# Military History and Officer Education: Who Should Teach, and What?

David G. Gruenbaum

In his article, "Military History and Officer Education: Some Personal Reflections" (*TAH*, Winter 85), Dr. Jay Luvaas touched upon the questions of who should teach what military history to officers. Although his comments were somewhat encouraging to those of us in officer training and development, Dr. Luvaas nonetheless undercut many of us by writing that utilizing civilian instructors "is probably the best way" to approach military history since, in his words, "the officer ROTC instructor would probably try to *explain* (his emphasis) history rather than teach it."

This statement dismayed me. I became even more dismayed this past summer when I served as one of the leadership instructors at the Second ROTC Region's Basic Camp at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Military history played an important part in the instruction there. The lesson plan for the two-hour leadership class given to each Basic Camp platoon is based upon FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, and focuses on Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain's command of the 20th Maine in the defense of Little Round Top during the Battle of Gettysburg. The cadets' subsequent comments gave Dr. Luvaas' stated preference for civilian instructors a hollow ring. Many said that the class was their first ever in military history, a fact they attributed either to their schools' not offering such a course, or to their civilian professors' lack of interest in the subject. Other cadets said that it was their first class ever to cast service and command in a favorable light, their civilian professors being antimilitary in belief and hostile to military history.

Given these situations, what should be the program of military history instruction for ROTC candidates? My comments here are offered for the consideration of Army historians both in defense of uniformed instructors and for the development of course materials appropriate to their use.

## Who Should Teach?

There are roles for both civilian professors and uniformed instructors in the teaching of military history. Purdue University is fortunate to have the renowned historian, Gunther E. Rothenberg, on its faculty. His expertise in European military history is complemented at Purdue by Robert May's in American military

affairs. Other universities have on their faculties such military historians as Ronald Spector and Raymond Callahan. At schools not so fortunate, military instructors can and should be able to present stimulating, well-prepared military history survey courses.

On some campuses the need for military instructors to be articulate and knowledgeable in military history is connected with a different problem—answering the challenges of antimilitary history professors. (There is a very real difference between being "antiwar" and being "antimilitary.") I have listened astonished as a professor "interpreted" the lessons of World War II to advance his thesis that this nation could readily dispense with seventy-five percent or so of its active military, disband its reserves, and rely solely upon a "peoples' militia" to conduct a "peoples' war" against any invader. Had not, it was argued, that been the manner in which the Finns had fought the Winter War, or the French Resistance defeated the Nazis, or the Swiss "nation in arms" deterred aggression? Should military instructors not be able and willing to present an alternative interpretation (including perhaps, some mention of such incidental factors as a Mannerheim Line, an Allied invasion, or the Alps)?

The antimilitary military history ROTC cadets are likely to get is not confined to the classroom. Recently, the Public Broadcasting System ran a series entitled "War: A Commentary by Gwynne Dyer." This "commentary" by someone billed as a "Canadian military historian and former officer in three navies" resembled nothing so much as the sort of commentary one would expect from Madalyn Murray O'Hair on Catholicism. Mr. Dyer rightly emphasized the simpleminded slaughter Haig precipitated on the Somme, for example, but made no mention of the brilliant tactical solutions the Germans created in the 1918 "Kaiser Schlacht," which in turn served as the basis for the blitzkrieg doctrine of World War II. Did Dyer lie? No, but he did not present a complete picture and implied that all of World War I was and necessarily had to be as futile a bloodbath as the Somme. Should we not, for example, clearly show our future officers that while Haig had much to do with the tragedy of the Somme, the Germans



had not send their men forward in slow rigid lines to be mowed down?

Dyer also dealt with the subject of officer training and careers in an episode entitled "The Profession of Arms." In this segment of the series he dwelt on the rather obvious, that modern war is neither romantic nor glorious, but a grim, violent struggle in a milieu of machinery of incredible complexity and deadliness. Missing in his analysis, however, was the corollary that mechanized warfare on an expanding, "empty," and lonely battlefield of fewer and fewer combatants demands combat leaders of higher and higher calibre. Other civilian military historians might have caught it, but trained uniformed instructors would certainly not have omitted this central truth.

It seems to me that military instructors must be able to serve as a counterbalance to views of the sort antimilitary teachers purvey, providing instruction and an "antithesis" cadets can use to arrive at their own synthesized concepts of military history and its lessons. This should be the case at campuses where military history is offered. But, as Maurice Matloff noted in "The Present State and Future Directions of Military History" (*TAH*, Winter 84), most colleges and universities do not teach military history. At these the role of the uniformed ROTC instructors is even more important. An additional benefit is to the teaching officers, themselves, who have unparalleled opportunities to gain new insights into the fundamentals of the military art. Despite years of service and study, I never gained as high a level of understanding for the lessons of military history as I did after preparing and teaching "The Profession of Arms" course at Purdue.

### What Should They Teach?

In his *Army Historian* article, Dr. Matloff identified seven very distinct areas military historians need to explore. In the same issue Prof. Ray Callahan offered some observations on officers' interests and needs based upon his term as John F. Morrison Professor of Military History at the Command and General Staff College. Their comments are a good basis for determining the roles of civilian and military instructors in the development of ROTC cadets into observant, ethical, and thinking junior officers.

Of the several fields of military historical study Dr. Matloff outlined, civilian historians seem prone to concentrate upon war and societies, armies and military institutions, military biographies, strategy and politics, and the significance

and courses of wars within particular areas. Civilian academics occasionally delve deeply into his two other major areas—comparative operational and tactical analyses and the interrelationships of weapons systems technologies and tactical change—but not often. Yet these are of the "How exactly?" nature Professor Callahan found to be of such interest and importance to his students.

We cannot just trot out uniformed soldiers, display weapons and equipment, cite statistics of weapons' characteristics, and call the result "military history." It is not. On the other hand, we uniformed instructors are not on campus to teach an academic history course for its own sake. We are there first and foremost to teach *leadership*, a value-laden subject. With this important distinction in mind, we can more confidently turn to those areas of military history that will help us develop tactically and technically proficient junior officers with confidence in their understanding of doctrine, in their ability to lead soldiers and carry out missions, and in surviving on the battlefield. If we cannot develop these attributes in our cadets, we have failed the Army's future leaders and the soldiers they will lead.

The military history taught to first- and second-year cadets (MS I and II) should emphasize the development of the officer's role within the military and in society. I am indebted to Professor Rothenberg for suggestions and assistance in organizing a course which provides these emphases. For Purdue's "Profession of Arms" course, Gen. Sir John Hackett's book of the same title serves as text, supplemented by class discussions of the key events, campaigns, and battles he touches upon, with emphasis on the development of the officer's role.

The military history taught to third- and fourth-year cadets (MS III and IV) should emphasize the practical aspects and key organizational, structural, logistical, technological, tactical, operational, and doctrinal landmarks tracing the route from the armies of earliest times to those of today. Specific attention should be given to the evolution of modern combined arms warfare from the days of Gustavus Adolphus to AirLand Battle. That, I submit, would serve us as the study of military history served the German General Staff, by providing a coherent and consistent foundation for understanding and overcoming the perils of war. I would structure such a course upon the following readings:

Chandler, David G. *The Campaigns of Napoleon*. New York: Macmillan, 1976.

House, Jonathan M. *Towards Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization in the 20th Century*. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC, 1984.

Lupfer, Timothy T. *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War*. Leavenworth Paper No. 4. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC, 1981.

Marshall, S.L.A. *The River and the Gauntlet*. New York: Morrow, 1953.

Shaara, Michael. *The Killer Angels*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1981.

Van Creveld, Martin. *Command in War*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945*. Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1982.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1975.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

And, of course, FM 100-5, *Operations*.

Instructors can add a bit more life to their programs of instruction by integrating these readings with the Dunn-Kempf or *Panzer Command* (New York: Victory Games, 1984) games.

## Line of Departure

Where do we go from here? Military history is of more than just passing interest to the officer corps; it shows us where we are today, how we got here, and points the way into the future. Though not identical, the roles of the civilian professor and the military instructor can be complementary in the military history education of ROTC cadets. History professors can educate cadets on the broad concepts of historical perspective and critical thinking. Military instructors can convey through history how cadets can focus their attentions on the tactical demands they may soon be facing.

Dr. Luvaas noted Napoleon's complaint: "I have studied much history, and often, for lack of a guide, I have been forced to waste considerable time in useless reading." Between us—civilian professors and military instructors—we can serve as the guides cadets need to lead them through the wilderness of words to the lessons of military history.

*Major Gruenbaum is a member of the Maryland Army National Guard on active-duty assignment to the US Army Senior ROTC Instructor Group, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana.*

## The Citizen-Soldier Historian and the "New Military History"

William H. Woodward

In the Fall 1984 issue of *The Army Historian*, Center of Military History Chief Historian David Trask offered a provocative summary of the implications of the "new military history" for Army historians, suggesting nine elements that should shape their agenda for the future. His express desire to "engage others in the discussion" prompts this response, one from the perspective of a National Guard historian—that is, from a "part-time" Army historian charged with researching the story of a "part-time" army.

Dr. Trask first challenges Army historians to regard their "central theme" in its broadest sense as the "total process of national security affairs." Although the focus of study should remain on the nation's wars, it should encompass their preludes and aftermaths as well as actual armed conflict. In addition to scrutinizing the *conduct* of particular wars, Trask believes, Army historians must study the periods before and after conflicts to learn the wars' *causes* and *consequences*. They should concentrate on *policy*, *strategy*, and *operations*, and include in

their investigations and analyses all "individuals and groups that make up the national security community." This new military history will consider the internal and external contexts of war—activities on the home front as well as the interplay of the American effort with other forces and nations. It will include all the armed services, sea and air as well as land, and will give special emphasis to the technology and geography of warfare. Army historians must recognize in their application of the new military history, Trask continues, the extraordinary shift in historical context between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Far different national security factors operated upon an insular, agrarian America in an "age of free security" than preoccupied the urban, industrialized world power she became in a century of instability and aggression.

Dr. Trask has, in my view, effectively outlined the Army historian's expanded task—with one crucial exception. Despite his acknowledgement of the need to deal with national security affairs in their broader contexts, including the home



front and the non-professional character of America's nineteenth-century armed forces, he underplays an element that seems to me essential to the Army historian's role in the new military history—what can be called the “civilian-military nexus.”

This missing element, aspects of which may be subsumed in Trask's other points, is how the national security process (following his central theme) is embedded in American society and culture. Although Army historians may not be able to deal with this vast topic with the social historian's comprehensive field of vision, they need to recognize that much in America's military experience makes little sense without considering its connections and interpenetrations—at both personal and institutional levels—with the larger society.

A fruitful basis for pursuing this task is to understand the story of the military as a *minority* experience within a pluralist culture. In a very real (if metaphorical) sense, the individual soldier, professional or amateur, belongs to a kind of ethnic group—an inherently valid and strategic subculture. And the institutional fabric of the national security process is interwoven in the full tapestry of American history as a distinct but not exclusive motif. (Indeed, if, as I am inclined to believe, Robert Dallek is correct in his argument that the American style of foreign policy depends upon the “domestic mood or climate,” the threads in this motif are clearly secondary in the collective American mind.) As a minority experience, American military history nests within the larger social context on at least four levels: its relation to the general cultural environment, its responses to political climate and public image, civil actions, and the civilian life of the non-professional and part-time soldier.

At the first level, the historian's concern is to relate the military experience to the general cultural character of its time. “The armed forces,” Trask points out, “often embody the ideas and emotions of the whole people.” Soldiering during the Revolution, for example, cannot be understood apart from the emerging ideology of republicanism. The American response to the Philippine Insurrection makes no sense without taking into consideration the Social Darwinian racial views of the time. And the racial and generational tensions of the 1960s must be part of the Vietnam story.

At the second level, again as Trask has stressed, the political environment—from foreign policy priorities to bureaucratic infighting—shapes the planning and conduct of war. Policy, strategy, and operations all flow from political decisions

and develop according to changing political leadership and often erratic public moods. President Polk, a Democrat, manipulated Mexican War campaigns in part to prevent any one Whig general from earning too much political capital. Woodrow Wilson's political agenda, articulated in compelling rhetoric, created a particular psychological environment for the American doughboy, and ultimately shaped the events that led to the armistice.

Within the third subcategory of the civilian-military connection, that of civil actions and activities, may be placed such diverse concerns as the Corps of Engineers' civil works projects, the community service efforts of military personnel and units, the environmental and social service impacts of military installations, such visitor services as museums and cemeteries, and the mobilization of active and reserve forces to augment civil authorities in responses to domestic violence and natural disasters. This aspect has been especially central to the military history of the Pacific Northwest. Settlers berated the Army for its apparent sympathies with the region's Indians during the red-white conflicts of the 1850s. Labor unrest delayed construction of several of the coastal defense fortifications on Puget Sound in the 1890s. National Guard and active forces—representing both air and land services—responded to the eruption of Mount St. Helens in 1980, earning extraordinary dividends in public good will. Washington citizens have shown mixed emotions about welcoming a new naval base to Puget Sound, yet—with most Americans—seem distinctly unwilling to allow the Department of Defense to close marginal installations.

At the fourth level, and most importantly from my vantage point, the new military history must deal with the fact that the twentieth-century American soldier, more often than not, is a civilian in heart, mind, and experience. Unlike his nineteenth-century forebear, he cannot be expected to come into the Army with a working familiarity with firearms, or to have been socialized to military discipline and pomp by schooling or public celebrations. He (and now she) thus stands as part of a minority group within a minority group, since—as Trask has so rightly argued—the contemporary military establishment is “huge and highly professional.” Russell Weigley's *History of the United States Army* serves as a model in this regard, explicitly recognizing that it is a history of two armies: not just the professionalized career Regulars, but also the “Citizen Army” of National Guardsmen



and Reservists, volunteers looking primarily for a paycheck and a college subsidy, and draftees.

National Guard historians—the other Army historians (citizens-soldier historians, if you will)—are already researching at these levels. It is not merely parochial pride that prompts National Guardsmen endlessly to reiterate such slogans as “We’re the world’s sixth largest army,” or “We’re the nation’s oldest fighting force.” Such statements no doubt reflect a certain siege mentality stemming from generations of perceived neglect. (We still resent Emory Upton, you understand.) On the other hand, they perpetuate a long and honored tradition, dating back to the pique of our most famous militia officer, George Washington, when haughty British generals refused him a regular commission during the French and Indian War. More to the point, the Guard’s slogans demonstrate the apparently eternal obligation to remind the military establishment that the citizen-soldier has a distinctive role, history, and identity. And thus it seems in order to proffer a reminder that there is also a distinctive kind of citizen-soldier historian, one who has a distinct—and essential—contribution to make to the new military history.

It would be a mistake, however, to allow a situation to develop in which National Guard historians do their own kind of “ethnic group” history while “full-time” Army historians concentrate exclusively on the “full-time” Army. Rather, the “Total Force” notion should shape the way we all do our military history, including our attention to the “civilian-military nexus.” When it does, commanders and planners—who need the insights and perspectives that full-bodied historical mindedness can afford—will have access to the total picture for which David Trask so persuasively pleads. The entire community of historians will benefit, as well, from a conscious inclusion of the civilian-military connection in our new, comprehensive military history. For those historians whose truncated vision of American civilization has excluded the

military experience we will be providing a needed corrective. In the long run, better history in the journals, the books, and the classrooms may well be one of the more strategic services we can provide to the collective public consciousness—and to the “total national security process” in particular.

*Dr. Woodward is an associate professor of history at Seattle Pacific University and commander of the 141st Military History Detachment, Washington Army National Guard.*

## Drums & Trumpets Corner

More glorious verbage from the shot-strewn past, this time on the Battle of New Orleans:

Yet steadily on marched Wellington’s veterans, stepping firmly over the dead bodies of their slain comrades until they had reached a point within two hundred yards of the American line, behind which, concealed from the view of the invaders, lay the Tennesseans and Kentuckians four ranks deep. Suddenly the clear voice of General Carroll rang out, *Fire!* His Tennesseans arose from cover, and each man taking sure aim, delivered a most destructive volley on the foe, their bullets cutting down scores of the gallant British soldiery. The storm ceased not for a moment; for when the Tennesseans had fired they fell back, and the Kentuckians took their places, and so the four ranks, one after another participated in the conflict. At the same time round, grape, and chain shot went crashing through the ranks of the British, making awful gaps, and appalling the stoutest hearts. The line began to waver, and would have broken but for the cool courage and untiring energy of the officers, and the inspiring cry, “Here comes the Forty-fourth with the fascines and ladders!”

Benson J. Lossing, *The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812; or, Illustrations, by Pen and Pencil, or the History, Biography, Scenery, Relics, and Traditions of the Last War for American Independence* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1869), II: 1046.

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*Participants in the Military History Detachment Workshop on a staff ride of Gettysburg Battlefield, Pennsylvania, July 1985. (Photo by SP4 Roy Ives, 305th MHD.)*

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